Rajender @ Yusuf @ Sachin vs Government Of India Ministry Of Finance Department Of Revenue Pitndps Unit

Court
Delhi High Court

$~2
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 22.04.2026

+ W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025
RAJENDER @ YUSUF @ SACHIN
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr.Vikram Hegde, Mr.Abhinav
Hansaraman & Mr.Trishan
Dollny, Advs.

versus

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE PITNDPS UNIT & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr.Nishant Gautam, CGSC
with Ms.Kavya Shukla,
Mr.Vineet Negi & Mr.Vibhav
U Nath, Advs.
Mr. Amol Sinha, ASC (Crl.)
with Mr.Kshitiz Garg,
Mr.Ashvini Kumar, Ms.Chavi
Lazarus & Mr.Manan Wadhwa,
Advs. along with SI Sohan
Thakur, Anti Narcotic Cell.


CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA


NAVIN CHAWLA, J. (ORAL)
1. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, challenging the Order dated 29.07.2025, bearing
F.No. U-11012/09/2025-PITNDPS, passed by the Deputy Secretary to
the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 1 of 17


Revenue, PITNDPS Division, under Section 9(f) of the Prevention of
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1988 (PITNDPS Act), confirming the Detention Order bearing No.
F.No. U-11011/20/2025-PITNDPS dated 13.05.2025 passed by the
Joint Secretary to the Government of India (hereinafter referred to as
the „Detaining Authority‟) under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act
and continued detention of the petitioner for a period of one year from
the date of his detention, that is, 15.05.2025.

2. The Grounds of Detention refer to four FIRs registered, inter
alia , against the petitioner herein. The details thereof are as under:-
a) FIR No. 107/1997, dated 20.01.1997, under Sections 21/61/85
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
(in short, „NDPS Act‟), wherein, by an order dated 12.01.1999,
on being found guilty of a charge under Section 21 of the NDPS
Act, the petitioner had been sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for ten years along with a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-;
b) FIR No. 92/2021, dated 01.03.2021, under Section 21(b) of the
NDPS Act, wherein the petitioner was released on bail vide
order dated 08.12.2021 passed by the learned ASJ/Spl. Judge
(NDPS) North, Rohini Courts, Delhi;
c) FIR No. 76/2021, dated 17.03.2021, under Sections 21/29/61/85
of the NDPS Act, wherein the petitioner was discharged vide an
order dated 02.07.2024 passed by the learned ASJ/Spl. Judge,
NDPS/ND;
d) FIR No. 341/2024, dated 02.04.2024, under Sections 21/25/29
of the NDPS Act, wherein, by an order dated 06.03.2025 passed
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 2 of 17


by this Court, the application seeking bail filed by the petitioner
had been rejected.
3. The Grounds of Detention further state that, although the
Detaining Authority is aware that the petitioner is presently in judicial
custody, it is of the opinion that, in view of his conscious and repeated
involvement in the illegal trafficking of drugs and psychotropic
substances to the detriment of society, he has a high propensity to
engage in prejudicial activities in the future. It is, therefore, necessary
to immobilize him and prevent him from engaging in such activities.

SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIONER

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, as far as FIR
No. 107/1997 is concerned, on an appeal filed against the order of
conviction dated 12.01.1999, being Criminal Appeal No. 157/1999
titled Rajender v. State, NCT of Delhi , this Court, considering the
quantity of heroin allegedly recovered from the petitioner, had
reduced the sentence of the petitioner to the period already undergone.
The Court had not given any opinion on the merits of the conviction
of the petitioner. He submits that, in any case, this FIR being more
than 28 years prior to the passing of the Detention Order, had neither a
live nor proximate link with the purpose of detention. He submits that
therefore, the same could not have been considered for passing the
impugned detention order.
5. He submits that, similarly, FIR No. 76/2021 could not have
been considered for passing the detention order inasmuch as the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 3 of 17


petitioner had been discharged from the said case vide an order dated
02.07.2024 passed by the competent Court.
6. He submits that though the Detaining Authority records that the
bail application filed by the petitioner in FIR No. 341/2024 has been
rejected by this Court vide order dated 06.03.2025, it does not give
any reasons as to how, in spite of such rejection, the petitioner can still
indulge in illegal activities and therefore needs to be detained by
invoking the extraordinary power of preventive detention. He
highlights that in order to get bail in FIR No. 341/2024, the petitioner
shall have to pass the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. In
support of his plea, he places reliance on the judgments of the
Supreme Court in Amritlal & Ors. v. Union Govt. Through Secy.,
Ministry of Finance and Ors. , (2001) 1 SCC 341; Ameena Begum v.
State of Telangana & Ors. , (2023) 9 SCC 587; Rameshwar Shaw v.
D.M., Burdwan & Anr. , 1963 SCC OnLine SC 33; and,
Ahmedhussain Shaikhhussain @Ahmed v. Commissioner of Police,
Ahmedabad and Anr. , (1989) 4 SCC 751; and of this Court in
Rizauddin @ Riyajuddin @ Riyajudden @ Pintu v. Union of India &
Ors. , 2024:DHC:6831-DB.

SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE LEARNED ADDITIONAL
STANDING COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS


7. On the other hand, the learned ASC for the State submits that
the involvement of the petitioner in four distinct FIRs over a period of
time, itself shows that the petitioner has a propensity of indulging in
illegal activities of dealing in narcotic drugs and psychotropic
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 4 of 17


substances immediately on being released. He submits that the FIR
No. 107/1997 has been referred to in the grounds of detention, only to
show this propensity, and similar is the case with FIR No. 76/2021.
8. He further submits that the Detaining Authority was well aware
of the bail application filed by the petitioner herein having been
rejected by this Court vide its order dated 06.03.2025, however, it was
also aware that his co-accused has been released on bail. It was,
therefore, only a matter of time that the petitioner would also have
been granted bail, and given the above factors, there was every
likelihood of the petitioner re-starting his illegal activities on being
released. He submits that, therefore, this Court should be slow in
interfering with the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining
authority.
9. The learned ASC further submits that the proposal for passing
of the Detention Order had been moved by the sponsoring authority
while the bail application filed by the petitioner was pending before
this Court and, therefore, there was every likelihood of the petitioner
being released on bail, given that his co-accused had been granted
bail.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
10. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties.

11. In the present case, the impugned grounds of detention, after
recording that the bail application filed by the petitioner in FIR No.
341/2024 has been rejected by this Court vide order dated 06.03.2025,
further proceed to record the satisfaction for passing of the impugned
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 5 of 17


Detention Order in the following words:-
“2. After going through the facts and
circumstances in all above mentioned cases, it
is clearly established that you i.e. Rajender @
Yusuf @ Sachin S/O Late Nishi Bhushan, are
actively involved in trafficking of Narcotics
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and you
are a habitual offender. Your presence in the
society is a threat to innocent person of the
locality/State/Nation and your activities are
prejudicial to society.
3. I am aware that at present you i.e.
Rajender @ Yusuf @ Sachin S/O Late Nishi
Bhushan are in Judicial Custody. However,
considering your conscious involvement in
illegal trafficking of drugs and psychotropic
substances in a repeated manner to the
detriment of the society, you have a high
propensity to be involved in the prejudicial
activities in future.
4. In view of the facts mentioned above, I
have no hesitation in arriving at the
conclusion that you i.e. Rajender @ Yusuf @
Sachin S/O Late Nishi Bhushan through your
above acts engaged yourself in prejudicial
activities of illicit traffic of narcotics and
psychotropic substances, which poses serious,
threat to the health and welfare not only to the
citizens of this country but to every citizen in
the world, besides deleterious effect on the
national economy. The offences committed by
you i.e. Rajender @ Yusuf @ Sachin S/o Late
Nishi Bhushan are so interlinked and
continuous in character and are of such nature
that these affect security and health of the
nation. The grievous nature and gravity of
offences committed by you i.e. Rajender @
Yusuf @ Sachin S/o Late Nishi Bhushan in a
well-planned manner clearly establishes your
continued propensity and inclination to
engage in such acts of prejudicial activities.
Considering the facts of the present case
mentioned in foregoing paras, I have no
hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 6 of 17


there is ample opportunity for Rajender @
Yusuf @ Sachin S/O Late Nishi Bhushan i.e.
you to repeat the above serious prejudicial
acts. Hence, I am satisfied that in the
meantime you i.e. Rajender @ Yusuf @ Sachin
S/O Late Nishi Bhushan should be immobilized
and there is a need to prevent you i.e.
Rajender @ Yusuf @ Sachin S/O Late Nishi
Bhushan from engaging in such illicit traffic of
narcotic drag and psychotropic substances in
future by detention under section 3(1) of
Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances (PITNDPS) Act,
1988.
5. In view of the overwhelming evidences
discussed in foregoing paras, detailing how
you i.e. Rajender @ Yusuf @ Sachin S/O Late
Nishi Bhushan have indulged in organizing the
illicit trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic substances as well as have a
high propensity to engage in this illicit
activity, it is conclusively felt that if you are
not detained under section 3(1) of the
PITNDPS Act, 1988, you i.e. Rajender @
Yusuf @ Schin S/o Late Nishi Bhushan would
continue to so engage yourself in possessing,
purchase, sale, transportation, storage, use of
narcotics and psychotropic substances
illegally and handling the above activities,
organizing directly in the above activities and
conspiring in furtherance of above activities
which amount to illicit trafficking of
psychotropic substances under section 2(e) of
the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drags and Psychotropic Substances
(PITNDPS) Act, 1988 in future also. I am,
therefore, satisfied that there is full
justification to detain you i.e. Rajender @
Yusuf @ Sachin S/O Late Nishi Bhushan under
section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1988 with a view to preventing
you i.e. Rajender @ Yusuf @ Sachin S/O Late
Nishi Bhushan from engaging in above illicit
traffic of narcotics and psychotropic
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 7 of 17


substances specified under schedule to the
NDPS Act, 1985.
6. Considering the magnitude of the
operation, the chronicle sequence of events,
the well-organized manner in which such
prejudicial activities have been carried on, the
nature and gravity of the offence, the
consequential extent of investigation involved
including scanning/ examination of papers,
formation of grounds, I am satisfied that the
nexus between the dates of incident and
passing of the Detention Order as well as
object of your detention has been well
maintained.”

12. The grounds of detention themselves show that, in spite of bail
having been granted to the co-accused much prior, the application
filed by the petitioner for the same was rejected by this Court vide its
order dated 06.03.2025. In such circumstances, at the very least, the
grounds of detention should have further recorded was the satisfaction
that the petitioner is still likely to be released on bail.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly contended that
the petitioner has to meet the standards of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
before being released on bail. This Court did not find him to be
meeting this standard, though his co-accused had been released on
bail, and therefore, had rejected his application seeking bail.
14. In Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar & Ors. ,
(1986) 4 SCC 416, the Supreme Court, while highlighting the
importance of considering the prospect of imminent release in cases
where the detenu was already in jail, opined as under:
“7.It is well settled in our constitutional
framework that the power of directing
preventive detention given to the appropriate
authorities must be exercised in exceptional

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 8 of 17

cases as contemplated by the various
provisions of the different statutes dealing with
preventive detention and should be used with
great deal of circumspection. There must be
awareness of the facts necessitating preventive
custody of a person for social defence. If a
man is in custody and there is no imminent
possibility of his being released, the power of
preventive detention should not be exercised.
In the instant case when the actual order of
detention was served upon the detenu, the
detenu was in jail. There is no indication that
this factor or the question that the said detenu
might be released or that there was such a
possibility of his release, was taken into
consideration by the detaining authority
properly and seriously before the service of
the order. A bald statement is merely an ipse
dixit of the officer. If there were cogent
materials for thinking that the detenu might be
released then these should have been made
apparent. Eternal vigilance on the part of the
authority charged with both law and order and
public order is the price which the democracy
in this country extracts from the public
officials in order to protect the fundamental
freedoms of our citizens. In the affidavits on
behalf of the detaining authority though there
are indications that transfer of the detenu from
one prison to another was considered but the
need to serve the detention order while he was
in custody was not properly considered by the
detaining authority in the light of the relevant
factors. At least the records of the case do not
indicate that. If that is the position, then
however disreputable the antecedents of a
person might have been, without consideration
of all the aforesaid relevant factors, the detenu
could not have been put into preventive
custody. Therefore, though the order of
preventive detention when it was passed was
not invalid and on relevant considerations, the
service of the order was not on proper
consideration.”

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 9 of 17


15. In Rizauddin (supra), on almost similar facts as the case at
hand, this Court had set aside the detention order, observing as under:
“ 12. The Detaining Authority, i.e.,
Respondent no. 1 in the „grounds of detention‟,
although records the fact that the Petitioner is
in judicial custody; however, does not record
that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the Petitioner is likely to be released on
bail enabling him to engage in prejudicial
activities. Relevant portion of the detention
order is as under:
“3. I am aware that at present you i.e.
Rizauddin @ Riyajudden @ Pintu are in
judicial custody. However, considering
your conscious involvement in illegal
trafficking of drugs and psychotropic
substances in a repeated manner to the
detriment of the society, you have high
propensity to be involved in the
prejudicial activities in future on being
released on bail.”
13. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in N. Meera
Rani vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and
Another (1989) 4 SCC 418, in respect to the
aforementioned aspect, held as under:
“11. The contents of the detention order
and its accompanying annexure clearly
show that the detaining authority was
aware and conscious of the fact that the
detenu was already in custody in
connection with the Bank dacoity at the
time of making the detention order. The
fact that the detenu's application for
grant of bail in the dacoity case had
been rejected on 22-8-1988 and he was
remanded to custody for the offence of
bank dacoity punishable under Section
397 IPC is also evident from the record.
The detention order came to be made on
7-9-1988 on the above grounds in these
circumstances. In the detention order
the detaining authority recorded its
satisfaction that the detenu's preventive
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 10 of 17


detention was necessary to prevent him
from indulging in activities prejudicial
to maintenance of public order in which
he would indulge if he was allowed to
remain at large. The above quoted
paras 18 and 19 of the Annexure to the
detention order clearly disclose the
factual position. However, it may be
pointed out that the detention order read
along with its annexure nowhere
indicates that the detaining authority
apprehended the likelihood of the
detenu being released on bail in the
dacoity case and, therefore, considered
the detention order necessary. On the
contrary, its contents, particularly those
of the above quoted para 18 clearly
mention that the detenu had been
remanded to custody for being
proceeded against in due course and
even though his name was not
mentioned in the FIR as one of the
dacoits who participated in the
commission of the armed Bank dacoity
yet the documents clearly revealed that
the detenu was an active participant in
the conspiracy to loot the bank in
furtherance of which the dacoity was
committed; and that considerable booty
of that crime including weapons, bombs
and hand grenades were recovered from
his possession pursuant to the detenu's
confession made after his arrest. These
averments in the detention order
indicate the satisfaction of the detaining
authority that in its view there was
ample material to prove the detenu's
active participation in the crime and
sharing the booty for which offence he
had already been taken into custody.
This view of the detaining authority
negatives the impression of likelihood of
detenu being released on bail.
*
21. A review of the above decisions
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 11 of 17


reaffirms the position which was settled
by the decision of a Constitution Bench
in Rameshwar Shaw case [AIR 1964 SC
334 : (1964) 4 SCR 921 : (1964) 1 Cri
LJ 257] . The conclusion about validity
of the detention order in each case was
reached on the facts of the particular
case and the observations made in each
of them have to be read in the context in
which they were made. None of the
observations made in any subsequent
case can be construed at variance with
the principle indicated in Rameshwar
Shaw case [AIR 1964 SC 334 : (1964) 4
SCR 921 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 257] for the
obvious reason that all subsequent
decisions were by Benches comprising
of lesser number of Judges. We have
dealt with this matter at some length
because an attempt has been made for
some time to construe some of the recent
decisions as modifying the principle
enunciated by the Constitution Bench in
Rameshwar Shaw case [AIR 1964 SC
334 : (1964) 4 SCR 921 : (1964) 1 Cri
LJ 257].
22. We may summarise and reiterate the
settled principle. Subsisting custody of
the detenu by itself does not invalidate
an order of his preventive detention and
the decision must depend on the facts of
the particular case; preventive detention
being necessary to prevent the detenu
from acting in any manner prejudicial to
the security of the State or to the
maintenance of public order etc.
ordinarily it is not needed when the
detenu is already in custody; the
detaining authority must show its
awareness to the fact of subsisting
custody of the detenu and take that
factor into account while making the
order; but, even so, if the detaining
authority is reasonably satisfied on
cogent material that there is likelihood
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 12 of 17


of his release and in view of his
antecedent activities which are
proximate in point of time he must be
detained in order to prevent him from
indulging in such prejudicial activities,
the detention order can be validly made
even in anticipation to operate on his
release. This appears to us, to be the
correct legal position.
23. Applying the above settled principle
to the facts of the present case we have
no doubt that the detention order, in the
present case, must be quashed for this
reason alone. The detention order read
with its annexure indicates the detaining
authority's awareness of the fact of
detenu's jail custody at the time of the
making of the detention order. However,
there is no indication therein that the
detaining authority considered it likely
that the detenu could be released on
bail. In fact, the contents of the order,
particularly, the above quoted para 18
show the satisfaction of the detaining
authority that there was ample material
to prove the detenu's complicity in the
Bank dacoity including sharing of the
booty in spite of absence of his name in
the FIR as one of the dacoits. On these
facts, the order of detention passed in
the present case on 7-9-1988 and its
confirmation by the State Government
on 25-10-1988 is clearly invalid since
the same was made when the detenu was
already in jail custody for the offence of
bank dacoity with no prospect of his
release. It does not satisfy the test
indicated by the Constitution Bench in
Rameshwar Shaw case [AIR 1964 SC
334 : (1964) 4 SCR 921 : (1964) 1 Cri
LJ 257] . We hold the detention order to
be invalid for this reason alone and
express no opinion on merits about the
grounds of detention.”

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 13 of 17


14. Learned Division Bench of this Court in
Gurminder Singh @ Lalli (supra) in a similar
situation held as under:
“6. From the above it is apparent that
the detaining authority was conscious of
the fact that the petitioner was in
custody, but it failed to point out any
material on the basis of which it was led
to believe that there was a likelihood of
the bail being granted to the petitioner.
The inference of the detaining authority
does not seem to be grounded on any
cogent material. It is important to note
that the petitioner is alleged to have
committed offences under Sections 21
and 23 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act. It is also
clear from the reading of the grounds of
detention that the D.R.I. claims to have
seized 4.800 kgs. of heroine from the car
which was driven by the petitioner.
Ordinarily, when such a huge quantity
of heroine is alleged to have been
recovered from the custody of a person,
there is hardly any possibility of his
being released on bail in view of the
provisions of Section 37 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act.
7. In Kamarunnissa v. Union of India
and another, (1991) 1 S.C.C. 128, the
Supreme Court on review of a large
number of decisions laid down that even
in the case of a person in custody a
detention order can be passed provided
the following conditions are satisfied:-
(1) the authority passing the
order is aware of the fact that he
is actually in custody;
(2) the detaining authority has
reason to believe on the basis of
reliable material placed before it
that there is a real possibility of
his being released on bail, and
that on being so released he
would in all probability indulge
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 14 of 17


in prejudicial activity; and
(3) it is essential to detain him to
prevent him from indulging in
prejudicial activities.
To the same effect are the decisions of
the Supreme Court in Suraj Pal Sahu v.
State of Maharashtra and others, (1986)
4 S.C.C. 378; Smt. Shashi Aggarwal v.
State of U.P. and Others, (1988) 1
S.C.C. 436; N. Meera Rani v.
Government of Tamil Nadu and Another,
(1989) 4 S.C.C. 418; and Anand Prakash
v. State of U.P. and Others, (1990) 1
S.C.C. 291. 8. Thus, even in a case
where a person is in custody, if the facts
and circumstances of the case so
demand, detention order can be passed
for his detention under the law of
preventive detention provided there is
relevant and creditable material to
indicate that he is likely to be released
on bail and is likely to repeat his
criminal activities.”

15. In the present case, it is an admitted fact
that the application for regular bail in the
fourth FIR being FIR no. 253/2021, filed by
the Petitioner, already stands dismissed on
29th August, 2023 by the Learned Special
Judge (NDPS Act), Rohini Courts, Delhi and
considering the circumstances in which the
present Petitioner is facing trial under Section
21(c) of the NDPS Act, there is no subjective
satisfaction of the Detaining Authority with
regard to reasonable grounds to believe that
the Petitioner is likely to be released on bail. It
is also pertinent to note that the present
detention order has been passed after the
period of 2 years and 3 months
(approximately) from the date of his arrest,
i.e., 18th June, 2021 in the fourth FIR. There is
again no explanation given with regard to the
Detaining Authority‟s order being passed after
a gap of 2 years and 3 months
(approximately).”
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 15 of 17


16. In Pabbar Giri @Vijay v. Union of India and Ors. ,
2024:DHC:8798-DB, this Court, in a case involving a detention order
passed while the petitioner was in judicial custody, opined that the
mere acknowledgment of such custody and a general apprehension
that the petitioner may participate in prejudicial activities if released
on bail, was not enough. What had to be assessed was also the
likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail in such
circumstances. It was further reiterated that although Courts generally
hesitate in substituting the “subjective satisfaction” of the Detaining
Authority with its own opinion to interfere with detention orders, such
satisfaction should be arrived at after proper application of mind. In
situations where such was not the case, the detention order could be
set aside by this Court while exercising its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
17. We are of the opinion that the above judgments apply in full
force to the facts of the present case.
18. In the present case, leave alone giving any reason as to how the
petitioner, inspite of his recent rejection of bail application, is still
likely to be released on bail and therefore, has a propensity to be
involved in prejudicial activities in future, the impugned Grounds of
Detention do not even record the statement that the petitioner is likely
to be released on bail. In absence of such opinion, the subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority is completely
perverse and cannot meet the muster of constitutional guarantees.
19. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in setting aside the
impugned order, that is the Detention Order dated 13.05.2025 as
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 16 of 17


confirmed by the Confirmation Order dated 29.07.2025. The same is,
therefore, set aside.
20. The petition is allowed in the above terms.
21. It is made clear that any observation made in the present
judgment shall in no manner be considered as an expression of
opinion on any of the matters pending against the petitioner.


NAVIN CHAWLA, J


RAVINDER DUDEJA, J
APRIL 22, 2026/ rv /ik

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:24.04.2026
18:12:20
W.P.(CRL) 3515/2025 Page 17 of 17