Satbir Singh vs Rukman Devi And Ors

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

IN THE HIGH Court OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

RSA No.713 of 2023 (O&M)
Satbir Singh . . . Appellant
vs.
Rukman Devi and others . . . . Respondents

Reserved on: November 19, 2026
Pronounced on: November 20, 2026
Pronounced fully/opera 9ve part : Fully

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
Argued By:- Mr. Sanjay Mi al and Rajesh Goyal, Advocates
for the appellant.
Mr. Sandeep Singh Ghangas, Advocate
for respondent Nos.1 and 2.
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
The present regular second appeal has been preferred by defen-
dant No.2–Satbir Singh, under Sec %on 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (for short, 'CPC'), assailing the judgment & decree dated 13.12.2022
passed by the learned Addi%onal District Judge, Panipat, whereby the appeal
preferred by defendants No.1 and 2 against the judgment & decree dated
07.04.2017 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Panipat, was
dismissed. By the said judgment, the trial Court had decreed the suit ins%-
tuted by respondent Nos.1 and 2–plain%ffs for declara%on and consequen%al
relief of permanent injunc%on.
Facts of the case
2. The dispute pertains to agricultural land measuring 106 Kanal 02
Marla, situated within the revenue estate of village Kurana, Tehsil Israna,
District Panipat. The plain %ffs, namely Rukman Devi and Savitri Devi, who are
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wives of defendant No.1–Mansa, ins %tuted the suit claiming ownership to
the extent of 2/3rd share in the suit property and challenging the release
deed bearing Vasika No.2118/1 dated 12.02.2014, executed by Mansa in
favour of defendant No.2–Satbir Singh.
3. The plain%ffs pleaded that a family se lement had taken place
between them and Mansa in May 1993, whereby 2/3rd share in the suit
property was allo ed to them, while Mansa retained the remaining 1/3rd
share. The said family se lement was subsequently acknowledged through
judgment and consent decree dated 08.03.1994 passed in Civil Suit No.114 of
1994, %tled Rukman Devi and another v. Mansa . It was further pleaded that
despite having divested himself of ownership to the extent of 2/3rd share,
Mansa executed the release deed dated 12.02.2014 in favour of Satbir Singh,
thereby necessita %ng ins%tu%on of the suit.
4. The defendants contested the suit, denying the alleged family
se lement as well as the voluntary execu%on of the consent decree dated
08.03.1994. They alleged that the decree was the result of fraud and
impersona%on. It was further pleaded that the plain%ffs had earlier ins%tuted
Civil Suit No.174 of 2014, challenging the very same release deed, but had
subsequently withdrawn that suit without obtaining permission to ins%tute a
fresh suit. The maintainability of the subsequent suit was, therefore,
ques%oned.
5. The trial Court, aAer apprecia%ng the oral and documentary
evidence, held that the consent decree dated 08.03.1994 had been duly
proved and that the plain%ffs had acquired ownership rights to the extent of
2/3rd share. Consequently, Mansa was held incompetent to transfer that
share in favour of Satbir Singh. The suit was accordingly decreed on
07.04.2017.
6. The first Appellate Court independently re-appraised the
evidence and affirmed the findings of the trial Court. It held that the consent
decree had been duly established through the judicial record and the
tes%mony of the advocates, who had represented the par%es in the earlier
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proceedings. The objec %ons concerning maintainability of the suit were also
rejected. Hence, the present second appeal.
Submissions on behalf of the appellant
7. Learned counsel for the appellant has mainly raised three
conten %ons. Firstly , it is submi ed that the plain%ffs had previously ins%tuted
Civil Suit No.174 of 2014 concerning the same property and challenging the
same release deed dated 12.02.2014. The said suit was withdrawn on
02.08.2014 without obtaining liberty from the Court to ins%tute a fresh suit.
Consequently, the present suit is stated to be barred under Order XXIII Rule
1(4) CPC.
8. Secondly , it is contended that the subsequent suit is also barred
under Order II Rule 2 CPC, since the plain %ffs were required to put forward
their en%re claim and all available grounds in the earlier proceedings. Having
omi ed to rely upon the alleged consent decree in the previous suit, they
could not subsequently ins%tute another suit based upon the same
transac%on.
9. Thirdly , learned counsel submits that the alleged consent decree
dated 08.03.1994 was not even men %oned in the earlier plaint, although it
cons%tuted the very founda%on of the plain%ffs' claim in the subsequent
proceedings. Such omission, according to learned counsel, creates serious
doubt regarding the genuineness of the decree and the alleged family
se lement. It is urged that the Courts below failed to appreciate this material
circumstance and consequently recorded findings which are legally
unsustainable.
Submissions on behalf of the respondents
10. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent
Nos.1 and 2–plain %ffs has supported the concurrent judgments and decrees
passed by both the Courts below. It is submi ed that the plain%ffs have
successfully established their ownership to the extent of 2/3rd share in the
suit property on the basis of the family se lement arrived at in May 1993,
which was subsequently acknowledged by Mansa through the consent
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judgment and decree dated 08.03.1994 passed in Civil Suit No.114 of 1994.
The said decree has never been set aside by any competent Court and
con %nues to bind Mansa as well as the appellant, who claims %tle through
him.
11. Mee%ng the objec%on under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC, learned
counsel submits that the present suit was ins%tuted on 15.05.2014, whereas
the earlier Civil Suit No.174 of 2014 was withdrawn subsequently, on
02.08.2014. Thus, the present suit was already pending when the earlier suit
came to be withdrawn. It is contended that the statutory prohibi%on against
ins%tu%on of a fresh suit aAer withdrawal of the earlier suit without liberty
cannot be extended to proceedings, which had already been ins%tuted
before such withdrawal. Moreover, the earlier suit was never adjudicated on
merits and, therefore, no ques%on of res judicata arises.
12. As regards the objec%on under Order II Rule 2 CPC, learned
counsel contends that the plain%ffs had not omi ed any relief in the earlier
proceedings which they subsequently sought to recover through the present
suit. The release deed dated 12.02.2014 was challenged in both proceedings.
The mere fact that the plain%ffs specifically relied upon the family se lement
and consent decree dated 08.03.1994 in the present suit would not a ract
the prohibi%on contained in Order II Rule 2 CPC. It is submi ed that the
appellant has failed to establish the necessary ingredients for invoking the
said provision.
13. Learned counsel further submits that the omission to men%on
the consent decree dated 08.03.1994 in the earlier plaint cannot, by itself,
render the decree suspicious or non-existent. The plain%ffs have proved the
decree through cer%fied copies of the judgment and decree sheet, the
original judicial record, and the tes%mony of the advocates who represented
the par%es in Civil Suit No.114 of 1994. Par%cular reference is made to the
tes%mony of PW5–R.N. Tyagi, Advocate, who had represented Mansa in the
earlier proceedings and iden%fied his signatures on the wri en statement
and vakalatnama. The report of the handwri%ng and fingerprint expert also
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corroborates the genuineness of the thumb impressions of Mansa appearing
on the relevant judicial documents.
14. It is further argued that the allega %ons of fraud and
impersona%on levelled by the defendants have remained unsubstan%ated.
Mansa himself was a party to the consent decree and, despite the lapse of
several years, did not ins%tute any substan%ve proceedings for seIng it
aside. The mere denial of execu%on of the decree, in the face of the judicial
record and corrobora%ve evidence, cannot displace the concurrent findings
recorded by both the Courts below.
15. Lastly, learned counsel submits that once the ownership of the
plain%ffs to the extent of 2/3rd share stands established, Mansa was legally
incompetent to transfer that share in favour of Satbir Singh through the
release deed dated 12.02.2014. The appellant cannot acquire any be er %tle
than that possessed by his predecessor-in-interest.
16. It is accordingly contended that both the Courts below have
appreciated the evidence in its proper perspec%ve and recorded concurrent
findings which are neither perverse nor contrary to law. No substan%al
ques%on of law arises for considera%on under Sec%on 100 CPC. Dismissal of
the appeal is, therefore, prayed for.
Considera on by the Court
17. I have heard learned counsel for the par %es and carefully
examined the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, along
with the material evidence referred to therein. The rival submissions have
been considered.
18. The primary ques%ons requiring examina%on are whether the
withdrawal of the earlier suit without liberty renders the present suit
incompetent under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC; whether the subsequent suit is
barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC; and whether the omission to disclose the
consent decree dated 08.03.1994 in the earlier proceedings undermines the
concurrent findings regarding its genuineness and binding effect. These
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conten %ons are being examined in the light of the statutory provisions and
the evidence available on record.
Objec on under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC
19. Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC deals with withdrawal and abandonment
of suits. Under sub-rule (3), the Court may permit withdrawal of a suit with
liberty to ins %tute a fresh suit where the prescribed condi%ons are sa%sfied.
Sub-rule (4) provides that where a plain%ff withdraws a suit or abandons a
claim without such permission, he shall be precluded from ins%tu%ng a fresh
suit in respect of the same subject ma er or part of the claim.
20. The object of the provision is to prevent a li%gant from
repeatedly ins%tu%ng proceedings concerning the same subject ma er aAer
withdrawing earlier proceedings without obtaining the requisite permission.
However, the applicability of the provision must be examined with reference
to the chronology of the proceedings and the subject ma er of the
respec%ve suits.
21. In the present case, the relevant dates are significant. The earlier
Civil Suit No.174 of 2014 was ins%tuted on 25.03.2014. The subsequent suit,
out of which the present appeal arises, was ins%tuted on 15.05.2014,
whereas the earlier suit was withdrawn subsequently, on 02.08.2014. Thus,
on the date of ins%tu%on of the present suit, the earlier suit was admi edly
pending and had not been withdrawn.
22. The language of Order XXIII Rule 1(4) CPC contemplates a bar
against the ins%tu%on of a fresh suit consequent upon withdrawal of the
earlier suit without permission. The provision cannot be mechanically applied
to a suit which had already been ins%tuted before the withdrawal of the
earlier proceedings. In Vimlesh Kumari Kulshrestha v. Sambhajirao and
another , (2008) 5 SCC 58, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the effect
of withdrawal of an earlier suit upon a subsequent suit ins %tuted before such
withdrawal. The dis%nc%on between a suit ins%tuted aAer withdrawal and
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one already pending when the earlier suit is withdrawn is material to the
applica %on of Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC.
23. Furthermore, the trial Court no%ced that the earlier suit was
founded upon the plain%ffs' asser%on concerning the ancestral character of
the property and their claimed en%tlement therein, whereas the present suit
was founded upon the family se lement of May 1993 and the consent
decree dated 08.03.1994. Although the release deed dated 12.02.2014 was
challenged in both proceedings, the %tle asserted by the plain%ffs in the two
suits was not founded upon iden%cal juridical grounds.
24. Merely because the property and the impugned release deed
were common to both proceedings, it would not necessarily follow that the
two suits were iden%cal in every material respect. More importantly, the
subsequent suit had already been ins%tuted before the earlier suit was
withdrawn. The withdrawal of the earlier suit, therefore, did not
retrospec%vely render the pending suit incompetent. The finding of the trial
Court rejec%ng the objec%on under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC consequently calls
for no interference.
Objec on under Order II Rule 2 CPC
25. Coming to the second conten %on, Order II Rule 2 CPC requires
that every suit shall include the whole claim, which the plain%ff is en%tled to
make in respect of the cause of ac%on. Where a plain%ff omits or
inten%onally relinquishes any por%on of his claim, he cannot subsequently
sue in respect of the por%on so omi ed or relinquished. Likewise, where a
plain%ff is en%tled to more than one relief arising from the same cause of
ac%on, but omits to sue for any such relief without leave of the Court, he
cannot subsequently ins%tute a suit for the omi ed relief.
26. In Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal , AIR 1964 SC 1810 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court explained that, for a rac%ng the bar under Order II Rule 2
CPC, it must be established that the second suit is founded upon the same
cause of ac%on as the earlier suit and that the plain%ff had omi ed to claim a
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relief available to him in the previous proceedings. The burden of establishing
these ingredients rests upon the defendant who invokes the statutory bar.
27. Similarly, in M/s Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private Limited v. M/s
Venturetech Solu ons Private Limited , (2013) 1 SCC 625 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court reiterated the principle that a plain %ff cannot split claims or
reliefs arising from the same cause of ac%on and pursue them through
successive suits. The provision is intended to prevent mul%plicity of li%ga%on
and harassment of defendants.
28. However, the dis%nc%on between omission of a relief and
omission of a ground or piece of evidence in support of a relief cannot be
overlooked. Order II Rule 2 CPC is concerned primarily with the spliIng of
claims and reliefs arising from the same cause of ac%on. Every omission to
plead a par%cular fact or document in an earlier suit does not, by itself,
a ract the statutory prohibi%on.
29. In the present case, the plain%ffs had challenged the release
deed dated 12.02.2014 in the earlier suit and sought substan%ally similar
declaratory and injunc%ve relief. In the subsequent suit also, the release deed
was challenged, though the plain%ffs specifically founded their %tle upon the
family se lement and the consent decree dated 08.03.1994. Thus, it is not a
case where the plain%ffs omi ed a par%cular relief in the earlier suit and
subsequently ins%tuted another suit exclusively to claim that omi ed relief.
30. The first Appellate Court has rightly no%ced that the relief
claimed in the subsequent suit was substan%ally the same as that claimed
earlier. Though the similarity of reliefs would not, by itself, conclusively
exclude Order II Rule 2 CPC, the appellant was required to establish the
statutory ingredients of the bar, including the spliIng or omission of an
enforceable claim or relief arising from the same cause of ac%on. Such
ingredients have not been established merely by demonstra%ng that the
plain%ffs relied upon an addi%onal founda%on of %tle in the subsequent
proceedings.
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31. It is also material that the subsequent suit was ins %tuted during
the pendency of the earlier suit. The earlier suit was subsequently withdrawn
and was never adjudicated on merits. In these circumstances, neither the
principle of res judicata nor the prohibi%on against spliIng of claims under
Order II Rule 2 CPC can be invoked merely on the basis that both suits
concerned the same release deed. The objec%on raised on behalf of the
appellant is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Effect of non-disclosure of the consent decree in the earlier suit
32. The next conten %on concerns the omission of the plain%ffs to
men%on the consent decree dated 08.03.1994 in their earlier suit.
Undoubtedly, when a party claims ownership on the basis of a pre-exis%ng
decree, omission to disclose such a material document in earlier proceedings
concerning the same property is a circumstance which requires examina%on.
However, the legal effect of such omission must be assessed in the light of
the evidence establishing the existence and authen%city of the decree.
33. In the present case, the plain%ffs produced the cer%fied copy of
the judgment dated 08.03.1994 as Ex.P3 and the decree sheet as Ex.P4. The
plaint and wri en statement filed in Civil Suit No.114 of 1994 were proved as
Ex.P5 and Ex.P6, respec%vely. The statement of Mansa recorded in those
proceedings was also brought on record.
34. Pointedly, the plain%ffs did not rest their case merely upon
cer%fied copies of the decree. They examined the concerned officials from
the judicial record room, who produced and iden%fied the record of the
earlier proceedings. PW4–Om Parkash, Advocate, who had represented the
plain%ffs in Civil Suit No.114 of 1994, proved the ins%tu%on of the said suit.
PW5–R.N. Tyagi, Advocate, who had represented Mansa in those
proceedings, iden%fied his signatures on the wri en statement and the
vakalatnama and supported the factum of his representa%on of Mansa.
35. The trial Court also considered the evidence of PW7–Shamsher
Singh Malik, Handwri%ng and Fingerprint Expert. His report Ex.PW7/B
disclosed that the disputed thumb impressions appearing on the wri en
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statement, vakalatnama and statement recorded in Civil Suit No.114 of 1994
tallied with the admi ed thumb impressions of Mansa appearing on the
contemporaneous banking documents. The expert evidence thus furnished
corrobora%on to the judicial record and the tes%mony of the advocates
concerned.
36. In the face of such evidence, the allega%on that the consent
decree was obtained by impersona%on remained unsubstan%ated. The
Courts below concurrently found that Mansa had par%cipated in the earlier
proceedings and had acknowledged the family se lement upon which the
decree dated 08.03.1994 was founded. These findings are based upon
apprecia%on of substan%ve documentary and oral evidence.
37. The omission to men%on the decree in the earlier plaint may
cons%tute an inconsistency in the plain%ffs' pleadings, but it does not
establish that the decree itself was fabricated or obtained fraudulently. The
existence of the decree stands independently established through the judicial
record, and its execu%on has been corroborated by witnesses having direct
knowledge of the earlier proceedings. An omission in a subsequent pleading
cannot, without further evidence, nullify a judicial decree passed
approximately twenty years earlier.
38. It is equally significant that Mansa, who was a party to the
consent decree dated 08.03.1994, did not ins%tute any substan%ve
proceedings seeking to have the decree set aside on the ground of fraud,
impersona%on or misrepresenta%on. A consent decree, unless lawfully
avoided, binds the par%es thereto. A mere denial of its execu%on, par%cularly
when contradicted by the judicial record and the evidence of the advocates
who represented the par%es, is insufficient to deprive it of legal effect.
39. As regards the objec%on concerning non-registra%on of the
consent decree, both the Courts below have found that the decree merely
acknowledged the family se lement which had already taken place in May
1993. The dis%nc%on between a decree which itself creates rights in
immovable property for the first %me and a decree which merely recognises
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or declares pre-exis %ng rights is well recognised. Reference in this regard
may be made to Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major and others , (1995) 5 SCC
709, and Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolida on and others ,
(1976) 3 SCC 119.
40. In the present case, the finding that the decree acknowledged a
prior family se lement is supported by the pleadings and admissions forming
part of the judicial record of Civil Suit No.114 of 1994. The Courts below have,
therefore, treated the decree as declaratory of the rights already se led
between the par%es, rather than as an instrument independently crea%ng
%tle for the first %me. No perversity in this concurrent finding has been
demonstrated.
Validity of the release deed
41. Once the consent decree dated 08.03.1994 is accepted as valid
and binding, the consequence concerning the release deed dated 12.02.2014
necessarily follows. By virtue of the family se lement, duly acknowledged in
the decree, the plain%ffs acquired ownership to the extent of 2/3rd share in
the suit property, while Mansa retained only the remaining 1/3rd share.
42. Mansa could not, therefore, convey or release any right, %tle or
interest exceeding the share which legally vested in him. The execu%on and
registra%on of the release deed in favour of Satbir Singh could not confer
upon the la er a %tle superior to that possessed by its executant. The Courts
below have accordingly held the release deed ineffec%ve and not binding
upon the plain%ffs to the extent of their 2/3rd share. The said conclusion is
consistent with the se led principle that a transferor cannot ordinarily
convey a be er %tle than he himself possesses.
Scope of interference under Sec on 100 CPC
43. It is well se led that the jurisdic%on of the High Court under
Sec%on 100 CPC is confined to substan%al ques%ons of law. Concurrent
findings of fact recorded by the Courts below cannot be disturbed merely
because another view of the evidence may also be possible. Interference is
warranted where such findings are perverse, based upon no evidence,
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arrived at by ignoring material evidence, or suffer from a substan %al error of
law.
44. In Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal , (2006) 5 SCC 545, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the dis %nc%on between a ques%on of law
and a substan%al ques%on of law, and the limited circumstances in which
concurrent factual findings may be interfered with in second appeal.
45. In the present case, the Courts below have concurrently held
that the consent decree dated 08.03.1994 was duly proved, that the plain%ffs
acquired ownership to the extent of 2/3rd share in the suit property, and that
the release deed dated 12.02.2014 could not affect their pre-exis%ng rights.
The objec%ons concerning the maintainability of the suit have also been
considered and rejected for reasons which are legally sustainable.
46. The appellant has not been able to demonstrate that the
concurrent findings are based upon misreading of material evidence or suffer
from any perversity. The conten%ons raised essen%ally seek reapprecia%on of
the evidence already examined by both the Courts below, which is
impermissible within the limited jurisdic%on under Sec%on 100 CPC.
47. Consequently, no substan%al ques%on of law arises for
considera%on in the present appeal.
48. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present regular second
appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. The judgments and de-
crees passed by both the Courts below are affirmed. Pending miscellaneous
applica%on(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.


(DEEPAK GUPTA)
JUDGE
November 20, 2026
Sarita
Whether speaking/reasoned? : Yes/No
Whether reportable? : Yes/No
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