Khuram Parvez vs National Investigation Agency
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 08.05.2026
Pronounced on: 10.06.2026
+ CRL.A. 1234/2024
KHURAM PARVEZ .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Tanveer Ahmed Mir, Sr.
Adv. with Ms. Swati Khanna,
Ms. Raminder Kaur, Mr. Md.
Imran Ahmad and Mr. Shahzad
Khan, Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rahul Tyagi, SPP,
Ms. Priya Rai, Mr. Shubham
Goyal, Mr. Jatin, Mr. Amit
Rohila, Advs. with DSP Sonu
Verma, CIO
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
J U D G M E N T
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section
21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter
referred to as the „NIA Act‟), assailing the Order dated 13.12.2024
passed by the learned Additional Session Judge-03, N.D.D. Patiala
House Courts, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the „Trial Court‟)
in NIA/4/2022, titled National Investigation Agency v. Khuram
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Parvez@Khurram and Ors., emanating from RC No.
30/2021/NIA/DLI, whereby the learned Trial Court rejected the bail
application filed by the appellant herein.
CASE OF THE PROSECUTION:
2. The appellant before this Court is the Accused No.1 before the
learned Trial Court.
3. The case of the prosecution is that reliable information was
received by the Central Government on the Lashkar-e-Taiba („LeT‟), a
Pakistan-based proscribed terrorist organization, establishing a
widespread network of operatives/over-ground workers („OGWs‟) in
India for providing support in the planning and execution of its
terrorist activities in various parts of the country.
4. Basis the said inputs, the Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India, issued Order No. 11011/68/2021 dated
05.11.2021, directing the National Investigation Agency („NIA‟) to
investigate into the same.
5. Pursuant thereto, FIR bearing No. RC-30/2021/NIA/DLI came
to be registered at Police Station NIA, New Delhi on 06.11.2021,
under Sections 120B, 121 and 121A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(„IPC‟) and Sections 17, 18, 18B, 38 and 40 of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 („UAPA‟).
6. The said FIR, apart from naming various individual accused
persons, also narrates a broad conspiracy involving the recruitment
and running of an OGWs network of the LeT in India by a Pakistan
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based handler identified as one Hyder@Ali@Yusuf. The name of the
appellant was not mentioned in the FIR.
7. Upon registration of the FIR, an investigation team was
constituted by the NIA, which commenced an inquiry into digital and
ground-level networks allegedly connected with the said conspiracy.
This investigation led to the arrest of multiple suspects, including the
appellant-Khuram Parvez (A-1), Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2),
Arshid Ahmad Tonch (A-3), and Zafar Abbas (A-4), who were
arrested on 22.11.2021, 16.11.2021, 18.11.2021, and 07.12.2021,
respectively. Thereafter, Rambhawan Prasad (A-5) and Chandan
Mahato (A-6) were arrested on 16.12.2021. On analysis of the digital
devices of the accused persons, the role of Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-
7), Superintendent of Police, surfaced and he was arrested on
18.02.2022.
8. Upon completion of substantial investigation, the NIA filed its
first charge-sheet on 13.05.2022 against the aforementioned seven
accused persons.
9. In the charge-sheet, it is alleged that the LeT, which is engaged
in waging war against the Government of India, has established a
widespread network of OGWs for providing support in the planning
and execution of its terrorist activities in various parts of India,
including in Jammu and Kashmir. The accused persons along with
their associates, are stated to have hatched a conspiracy to recruit
persons across various States of India for the said cause. It is alleged
that they were in contact with foreign based handlers and upon their
directions, gathered intelligence on vital installations, Security
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Forces/Security Agencies of India. They also identified target
locations for launching terror attacks. This information was then stated
to be passed on to the LeT leadership based in foreign countries via
internet-based communication platforms. It is alleged that they also
received terror funds from handlers abroad, including from
Hyder@Ali@Yusuf, and were operating multiple pseudonymous bank
accounts to channelize and distribute these funds to OGWs for
furtherance of terrorist activities.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE APPELLANT
(ACCUSED NO.1):
10. It is alleged that the appellant is the Program Coordinator of the
Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) and the
Chairperson of the Asian Federation Against Involuntary
Disappearances (AFAD). It is alleged, that he, in guise of human
right‟s activism, was part of the larger conspiracy.
11. It is alleged that the appellant recruited Muneer Ahmad Kataria
(A-2) as an OGW for LeT, and personally facilitated his contact with
Hyder@Ali@Yusuf, a Pakistan-based LeT handler. Muneer Ahmad
Kataria (A-2), in turn, is alleged to have recruited Arshid Ahmad
Tonch (A-3) as an OGW.
12. It is alleged that in guise of human rights activism, the appellant
was actively involved in collecting information regarding movement
of Army vehicles near the Line of Control, road conditions and details
of army camps, structures of army, paramilitary and police etc..
Information regarding officers and security personnel who were
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involved in militancy operations, was also collected and a dossier of
officers named „High-Ranking Perpetrators‟ was maintained. The
mail data of the appellant is also alleged to reveal that the appellant
was in contact with many Pakistani journalists who wanted to portray
India in a bad light and wanted from the appellant, footage of the
presence of the Indian Army in Kashmir.
13. It is alleged that visiting cards, including that of spokespersons
of Pakistan based proscribed terrorist organisation Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen (HM) were found at office of JKCCS. It is alleged that the
appellant had visited Pakistan twice in the year 2007 and 2015, during
which he had met Syed Salauddin (Amir of HM), a designated
terrorist. It is alleged that the appellant had contact with Hurriyat
leaders from both sides of the border. It is alleged that these findings
establish that the appellant had nefarious links with Pakistan based
proscribed terrorist organisations.
14. The appellant is also alleged to have been actively involved in
instigating and providing material support to the protestors in the
Kashmir valley during the post Burhan Wani encounter agitation in
the year 2016. It is alleged that the appellant provoked protestors by
giving hate speeches “Burhan teray janissar, beyshumaar
beyshumaar”, “Go Back Go Back India” and “India go away from
Kashmir”, which incited the protestors and caused disaffections
against the government. He is also alleged to have been involved in
distributing Azad Kashmir Flags to the protestors and other
successionist activities.
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15. It is alleged that the appellant negotiated the payment of illegal
gratification to Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-7), Superintendent of Police,
via Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2), for compromising the investigation
of NIA Case No. RC-37/2020/NIA/DLI by releasing of digital devices
and other material seized by NIA during search conducted in the
house of the appellant and the office of JKCCS in the said case.
16. He has accordingly been charge-sheeted under sections 120B
and 121A of the IPC, Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption
(Amendment) Act, 2018 („PC Act‟) and Sections 13, 18, 18B, 38 and
39 of the UAPA.
THE IMPUGNED ORDER AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
BEFORE THE LEARNED TRIAL COURT:
17. The application filed by the appellant seeking regular bail has
been rejected by the learned Trial Court by the Impugned Order,
observing that the allegations against him appeared to be prima facie
true. In reaching the said conclusion, the learned Trial Court has relied
upon the chats allegedly between the appellant and Muneer Ahmad
Kataria (A-2), observing that the same showed that the appellant tried
to bribe Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-7) to compromise the investigation
of NIA Case No. RC-37/2020/NIA/DLI and for releasing the seized
digital devices in the said case. The learned Trial Court also observed
that there is evidence against the appellant of having introduced
Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2) to Hyder@Ali@Yusuf. The learned
Trial Court further found that there is evidence that the appellant used
to promote the cause of separate Kashmir by making speeches as well
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as by distributing flags to protestors, which protests resulted in
injuries to the security personnel.
18. Aggrieved of the said order, the appellant has preferred the
present appeal .
19. During the pendency of the present appeal, a supplementary
charge sheet was filed on 15.07.2025, wherein certain additional
material has been placed on record.
20. Pertinently, it has been highlighted that Muneer Ahmad Kataria
(A-2) has been granted the status of approver by the learned Trial
Court on 02.07.2025. In his statement under Section 164 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 („Cr.P.C.‟), he has stated that he
was working as an NIA informer with Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-7)
since 2019. He has stated that he knows the appellant since 2015, and
in 2020 the appellant introduced him to Hyder@Ali@Yusuf who had
links with the LeT. He has stated that the appellant had told him that
Hyder@Ali@Yusuf was the Chief Operating Commander of the LeT
(J&K module). He has stated that on request of the appellant, he
approached Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-7) requesting for the release of
digital gadgets of the appellant which had been seized by the
respondent. He has stated that the appellant paid Rs. 1,50,000/- to him
to pay Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-7).
SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL
FOR THE APPELLANT:
21. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that the
appellant has been in custody for more than four years. The trial is at
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the stage of framing of charge and that there are more than 190
witnesses to be examined. He submits that in such a scenario, the
delay in the trial itself constitutes a ground for grant of bail. He
highlights that in cases of prolonged incarceration, bail can be granted
without complying with the requirements of Section 43D(5) of the
UAPA. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment dated
12.03.2026 of the Supreme Court in SLP (CRL.) No. 13399 of 2025,
titled, Shabir Ahmed Shah v. National Investigation Agency;
judgment dated 12.01.2026 in SLP (CRL.) No.11095/2025, titled
Alemla Jamir v. National Investigation Agency ; Athar Parwez v.
Union of India , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762; Shoma Kanti Sen v.
State of Maharashtra & Anr. , (2024) 6 SCC 591; Ashim v. National
Investigation Agency , (2022) 1 SCC 695; Union of India v. K.A.
Najeeb , (2021) 3 SCC 713; Sagar Tatyaram Gorkhe & Anr. v. State
of Maharashtra , (2021) 3 SCC 725; and, Angela Harish Sontakke v.
State of Maharashtra , (2021) 3 SCC 723. He also refers to the
judgment of this Court in Haris Nisar Langoo v. National
Investigation Agency and Zamin Adil Bhat v. National Investigation
Agency, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1183; of the High Court of Jammu
and Kashmir and Ladakh in Baseerat-ul-Ain v. National
Investigation Agency & Anr. , 2024 SCC OnLine J&K 36; of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Chandeep Singh v.
National Investigation Agency , 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 6332; of the
Gauhati High Court in Indra Mohan Bora v. National Investigation
Agency , GAHC010153542023 and of the Allahabad High Court in
Sharjeel Imam v. State of U.P. , 2021:AHC:147247.
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22. He submits that bail is the rule and jail is the exception even in
cases involving the provisions of the UAPA. In this regard, reliance is
placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Jalaluddin Khan v.
Union of India , (2024) 10 SCC 574 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v.
State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2024) 9 SCC 813. Placing reliance on
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rup Bahadur Magar v. State
of West Bengal , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5575, he further submits that
bail cannot be denied even on account of the expedited measure of
trial.
23. He submits that in fact, some of the co-accused, namely,
Rambhawan Prasad (A-5), Chandan Mahato (A-6) and Arvind
Digvijay Negi (A-7) have already been granted bail on 02.06.2022.
24. He submits that it is a matter of record that on 20.04.2004, the
appellant lost his leg in a tragic incident during an election monitoring
exercise in Kupwara, North Kashmir, when his vehicle was struck by
a landmine blast. The appellant has worn a prosthetic leg since then
and is infirm. He states that hence, the appellant is entitled to be
enlarged on bail on account of his infirmity. He submits that the
proviso of Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C. provides for infirm accused to
be released on bail even if such accused is otherwise covered by the
restrictions imposed under Section 437(1)(i) and (ii) of the Cr.P.C..
Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satender
Kumar Antil v. CBI & Anr. , (2022) 10 SCC 51; and in Alemla Jamir
(supra); and of the High Court of Gauhati in National Investigating
Agency v. Redaul Hussain Khan , 2010 SCC OnLine Gau 606, he
submits that the said proviso is applicable even in cases of UAPA.
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Placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Kewal Krishan
Kumar v. Enforcement Directorate , 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1547, he
submits that infirmity has been defined to include „ some permanent
disease, accident, or something of that kind ‟. He submits that the
appellant is therefore, entitled to be released on bail, being infirm.
25. Turning to the alleged activities attributed to the appellant, the
learned senior counsel for the appellant, at the outset, places reliance
on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Dablu Kujur v. State of
Jharkhand , (2024) 6 SCC 758; and Rajesh Yadav and Anr. v. State
of Uttar Pradesh , (2022) 12 SCC 200; and of this Court in Ashok
Chawla v. Ram Chander Garvan, Inspector CBI , ILR (2011) 3 Delhi
638, to submit that a charge sheet is merely the opinion of the
investigating officer. Reliance is placed on the judgement of the
Supreme Court in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali , (2019) 5 SCC
1, to further submit that as per Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the
complete material must be analyzed for the purpose of bail.
26. He highlights that the appellant is an internationally renowned
and decorated Kashmiri human rights activist who works on
documenting and publishing human rights reports on topics such as
people who have disappeared in Kashmir, fake encounters, the
militarisation of Kashmir, and its impact on human rights. The
appellant has deep roots in society and conducts various seminars and
dialogues with the Kashmiri people. He interacts with the Kashmiri
community across religious and ideological spectrums through means
of non-violence. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Ravinder Singh Alias Kaku v. State of Punjab , (2022) 7
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SCC 581, he submits that mere statements and incoherent facts of the
appellant‟s years of activism, without conclusive evidence to form a
chain of circumstances, does not make a prima facie case against the
appellant.
27. He submits that the information gathered by the appellant
regarding army structures, paramilitary formations, army‟s chain of
command, and the roles of individual officers, was collated in a
structured form and published in 2015 in the name of „ Structures of
Violence Report ‟‟. The said report was released on 11.09.2015 in
Srinagar and is, till date, available publicly on the official website of
JKCCS. He submits that the said document constitutes legitimate
human rights documentation carried out in the public interest.
28. As far as the „ Alleged Perpetrators‟ report is concerned, he
submits that the same was also published on 06.12.2012 and is
available on the JKCCS website till date. He states that the report is
not a secret document as most of the information was collected
through RTI. Moreover, the said report was also shared with the army
which gave a public response, as reported by the Kashmir Tribune on
12.12.2012. The report advocates legal responsibility and institutional
reform, not armed retaliation.
29. He submits that as far as the flow chart of the structure of the
army is concerned, the same is accessible across various online
sources, including websites like Wikipedia. He further submits that
the purpose of the research into militants killed and arrested, was to
document the subsequent promotions or awards distributed amongst
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security forces, to study whether the encounters were fake and
incentivised by awards or promotions.
30. In so far as the visits of the appellant to Pakistan in 2007 and
2015 are concerned, the learned senior counsel points out that both
visits are in public domain and had no criminal intent behind them.
The appellant visited Pakistan with a valid visa.
31. He submits that in as far as allegations of subscribing to a
separatist ideology and inciting protests post-Burhan Wani‟s killing in
2016 is concerned, the appellant already has four FIRs against him on
similar grounds which are all bailable offences. Moreover, the
appellant was taken into illegal detention by passing of a Detention
Order 21.09.2016 under the Public Safety Act, 1978 on this ground
alone. The same was however quashed by the High Court of Jammu
and Kashmir in H.C.P No. 297/16, titled Khuram Parvez Sheikh v.
State of Jammu and Kashmir & Ors., vide its order dated 25.11.2016.
32. He submits that the mere expression or belief of political
dissent, advocacy of self-determination, or criticism of State policy,
cannot attract provisions of the UAPA, unless it crosses the threshold
of incitement or active involvement in violence. In this regard, he
places reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath
Singh v. State of Bihar , 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6, and Balwant Singh
& Anr. v. State of Punjab , (1995) 3 SCC 214; of the High Court of
Bombay in Jyoti Babasaheb Chorge v. State of Maharashtra &
Sushma Hemant Ramtekke v. State of Maharashtra , 2012 SCC
OnLine Bom 1460 and of this Court in Kanchan Mishra @Anu v.
State of NCT of Delhi , 2012 (130) DRJ 646.
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33. He submits that, at best, raising objectionable slogans without
incitement of violence, may fall under the definition of „unlawful
activity‟ under Section 2(1)(o) of the UAPA, and may attract Section
13 of the UAPA, which has a maximum sentence of 7 years and does
not attract the twin conditions of bail as prescribed in Section 43D(5)
of the UAPA. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment of the
High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh in Union Territory of
J&K v. Ameer Hamza Shah and Anr. , 2025 SCC OnLine J&K 745.
34. In as far as the allegation pertaining to recruitment of OGWs for
the LeT is concerned, he submits that the mere statement of Muneer
Ahmad Kataria (A-2) is not enough to deny bail to the appellant. He
submits that while the WhatsApp Chats between the appellant and
Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2) may prima facie show that Muneer
Ahmad Kataria (A-2) was seeking bribe from the appellant on behalf
of Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-7) in return for the seized devices
belonging to the appellant, there is no material on record against
appellant of recruiting him as an OGW, especially given the fact that
Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2) himself disclosed in the WhatsApp Chat
that he is an NIA official‟s, namely, Arvind Digvijay Negi‟s (A-7)
appointed person. He submits that the learned Trial Court has erred in
interpreting the WhatsApp conversation between the appellant and
Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2), and the alleged sharing of Official
Secret Documents by Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2) with
Hyder@Ali@Yusuf as being part of the same transaction. He submits
that the appellant has no role to play in Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-7)
sharing Official Secret Documents to Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2)
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who is further alleged to have shared the same with
Hyder@Ali@Yusuf. He submits that Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2)
has, in fact, now been granted the status of an approver by the learned
Trial Court.
35. He submits that uncorroborated oral evidence of recruitment is
not conclusive evidence, and a surface level analysis of its probative
value is required. He submits that the mere association of the appellant
with a co-accused does not amount to a prima facie case under the
UAPA. To buttress his submission, reliance is placed on the
judgments of the Supreme Court in Ravi v. State , (2008) 15 SCC 115,
Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) , (2023) 4 SCC 731,
Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India & Union of India v. Allan Shuaib ,
2021 SCC OnLine SC 1000 and Vernon v. State of Maharashtra &
Anr. , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 885; and of the High Court of Kerala in
Abusalih & Anr. v. M.K. Jubairiya , 2013 SCC OnLine Ker 18835 .
Placing reliance on the judgment dated 16.07.2024 passed by the
Supreme Court in Review Petition (Crl.) No. 299 of 2024 in Crl. A.
No. 704 of 2024, titled Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. ,
the learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment
of the Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. ,
2024 INSC 92, rejecting the bail of the appellant therein, has been
clarified as having been passed in the facts and circumstances of the
said case.
36. He highlights that it is the own case of the prosecution that the
appellant was not in direct contact with Arshid Ahmad Tonch (A-3),
Zafar Abbas (A-4), Rambhawan Prasad (A-5) and Chandan Mahato
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(A-6). Hence, the dismissal of the bail appeal of Zafar Abbas (A-4) by
this Court is of no consequence.
37. He submits that hence, the Impugned Order is liable to be set
aside, and the appellant should be granted bail.
SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE LEARNED SPECIAL PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR FOR THE RESPONDENT
38. On the other hand, Mr. Rahul Tyagi, the learned Special Public
Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the respondent, places reliance of
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt.
of NCT of Delhi) , 2026 SCC OnLine SC 10, to submit that even in
cases of prolonged incarceration, the statutory context of the UAPA
and the nature of allegations has to be taken into consideration prior to
the grant of bail. He submits, that even otherwise, in the present case,
the delay in trial has been caused by the accused persons.
39. He further submits that the appellant has failed to make out a
case for grant of bail by satisfying the conditions stipulated under
Section 43D(5) of the UAPA. He submits that the said provision
imposes a statutory bar on the release of a person accused of offences
under Chapter IV and/or VI of the UAPA if, upon a perusal of the case
diary and the charge-sheet, there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the allegations against such person are prima facie true. Reliance
in this regard is placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court passed
in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), Gurwinder Singh (supra) and
Union of India rep. by the Inspector of Police, National
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Investigation Agency, Chennai Branch v. Barakathullah Etc. , 2024
INSC 452.
40. He submits that the appellant has a lot of sympathizers across
the globe and is a major flight risk. He also possesses a record of
attempting to tamper with evidence and influence investigations. He
has past antecedents, which include five other cases involving similar
successionist and terrorist activities. He submits that the judgments
relied upon by the appellant are not applicable to the facts of the
present case.
41. The learned SPP further takes us through the material relied
upon by the prosecution in support of the allegations against the
appellant.
42. In so far as direct evidence is concerned, he draws our attention
to the statement of Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2), who turned
approver, highlighting that the same carries the weight of a sworn
judicial deposition. He also takes us through Section 161 Cr.P.C.
statements of Protected Witnesses D, E, F, G, H, J, as also of LW-24,
LW-25 and LW-26, to show that the statement of Muneer Ahmad
Kataria (A-2) stands corroborated by independent witnesses. He
submits that the appellant‟s visits to Pakistan evidences his sustained
engagement with the leadership of organisations that have always
been engaging in waging war against the Government of India,
irrespective of whether such organisations stood formally proscribed
under the UAPA on the specific date of engagement. He submits that
the same can be used to corroborate the statement of Protected
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Witness-H, who mentions that the appellant met top leadership of the
LeT and HM during these visits.
43. In so far as digital and forensic evidence is concerned, he takes
us through the WhatsApp Chats between the appellant and Muneer
Ahmad Kataria (A-2). He also draws our attention to various social
media posts, photographs and email threads of the appellant. He
submits that the same shows the appellant‟s active involvement in
orchestrating the violent protests following the encounter of Burhan-
Wani and the propagation of successionist ideology.
44. In so far as documentary evidence is concerned, he highlights
the various material recovered from the office of JKCCS, including
visiting cards and documents listing out army officials as „ High
Ranking Perpetrators ‟ and the „ Structure of Army, Rashtria Rifles ‟.
He submits that the nomenclature of the documents is itself revealing.
He submits that the said information was neither publicly available
nor can there be any justification for collecting and publishing the
names of Indian Army officers as perpetrators of crimes against
Kashmiris. He submits that the appellant was involved in an
intelligence gathering operation directed against the Security Forces of
India.
45. He submits that hence, the materials against the appellant show
that the present case is not one of „mere association‟, but rather is
founded on overt acts including recruitment of OGWs for LeT,
transmission of intelligence to a Pakistan based handler, active
orchestration of public violence, possession of targeting lists of Indian
Army personnel and corrupt engagement with a former NIA officer.
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46. He submits that the appellant cannot claim parity with co-
accused persons who were not charge-sheeted for offences under the
UAPA. He highlights that in fact, the bail appeal filed by Zafar Abbas
(A-4), who was charge-sheeted under the UAPA, has been dismissed
by this Court in Zafar Abbas@ Jaffar v. National Investigation
Agency , 2025:DHC:286-DB. The same has been upheld by the
Supreme Court vide order dated 17.04.2025 passed in Special Leave
to Appeal (Crl.) No (s). 5489/2025 titled Zafar Abbas @Jaffar v.
National Investigation Agency .
47. He submits that the quashing of the detention order passed
against the appellant on procedural infirmities, cannot operate as an
adjudication on the substantive merits of the appellant‟s conduct
during the Burhan-Wani protests.
48. The learned SPP further submits that the appellant does not
qualify as an “infirm person” entitled to the discretionary benefit
under Section 437(1) of the Cr.P.C.. Even though the appellant lost his
leg in 2004, he has worked without any hinderance ever since,
participating in so-called field work and human rights activism. He
has also gone on multiple foreign trips. He submits that the Tihar Jail
is well equipped to deal with all necessary medical requirements of the
appellant, and it is not his case that he is sick or not receiving
treatment for ailments, if any.
49. He submits that therefore there is no infirmity in the Impugned
Order passed by the learned Trial Court.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
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50. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties.
51. At the outset, we would note the special provision governing
the grant of bail to a person accused of offence punishable under
Chapters IV and VI of the UAPA. Section 43D(5) of the UAPA reads
as under:
“ 43D. Modified application of certain
provisions of the Code.—
xxx
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code, no person accused of an offence
punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this
Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or
on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor
has been given an opportunity of being heard
on the application for such release:
Provided that such accused person shall not
be released on bail or on his own bond if the
Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the
report made under section 173 of the Code is
of the opinion that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusation
against such person is prima facie true.”
52. In K.A. Najeeb (supra), the Supreme Court considering the
balance to be achieved between the Fundamental Right of an accused
for a speedy trial vis-à-vis the restrictions imposed under Section
43D(5) of the UAPA on release of the accused on bail, held that these
restrictions do not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant
bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. It held that
whereas at the commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected
to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail, however,
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these restrictions will melt down where there is no likelihood of the
trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. It was further held that Section 43D(5) of UAPA
is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, where the court needs to be
satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is
unlikely to commit another offence while on bail. Instead, Section
43D(5) of the UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the
court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like
gravity of offence, etc.. We quote from the judgment as under:
“ 17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of
statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of
the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of
the constitutional courts to grant bail on
grounds of violation of Part III of the
Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions
under a statute as well as the powers
exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction
can be well harmonised. Whereas at
commencement of proceedings, the courts are
expected to appreciate the legislative policy
against grant of bail but the rigours of such
provisions will melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has exceeded
a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.
Such an approach would safeguard against the
possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5)
of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for
denial of bail or for wholesale breach of
constitutional right to speedy trial.
18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are
conscious of the fact that the charges levelled
against the respondent are grave and a serious
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threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case
at the threshold, we would have outrightly
turned down the respondent's prayer.
However, keeping in mind the length of the
period spent by him in custody and the
unlikelihood of the trial being completed
anytime soon, the High Court appears to have
been left with no other option except to grant
bail. An attempt has been made to strike a
balance between the appellant's right to lead
evidence of its choice and establish the
charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously
the respondent's rights guaranteed under Part
III of our Constitution have been well
protected.
19. Yet another reason which persuades us to
enlarge the respondent on bail is that Section
43-D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less
stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Unlike the NDPS Act where the competent
court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the
accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to
commit another offence while on bail; there is
no such precondition under UAPA. Instead,
Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA merely provides
another possible ground for the competent
court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-
settled considerations like gravity of the
offence, possibility of tampering with evidence,
influencing the witnesses or chance of the
accused evading the trial by absconsion, etc.”
53. The above judgment and various others of the Supreme Court
were considered by the Supreme Court in Gulfisha (supra), and the
Supreme Court framed the question to be considered as “ in
prosecution under the UAPA, when delay and prolonged
incarceration are invoked as grounds for bail, what is the principled
approach by which a constitutional court is to examine such a plea.”
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54. In answer to the above question, the Supreme Court held as
under:
“ 30. Article 21 occupies a central place in the
constitutional scheme. The right to life and
personal liberty, and the insistence that any
deprivation must conform to procedure
established by law, are foundational
guarantees. The right to a speedy trial has
been recognised as an important facet of this
guarantee. It follows that pre-trial
incarceration cannot, by the mere passage of
time, be permitted to assume the character of
punishment.
31 . At the same time, Article 21 has never been
understood as operating in isolation from law.
The constitutional promise is not that liberty
will be unregulated, but that deprivations of
liberty will not be arbitrary, unconscionable,
or unfair. The expression “procedure
established by law” reflects that balance. The
UAPA, as a special statute enacted to address
offences alleged to affect the security of the
State and the stability of civic life, represents a
legislative judgment as to the conditions under
which bail may be granted at the pre-trial
stage. Section 43D(5) of UAPA embodies the
exercise of that judgment.
32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb , this
Court recognised a constitutional safeguard
that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions
cannot be applied so as to render the
guarantee of personal liberty illusory. It was
held that where the trial is not likely to
commence or conclude within a reasonable
period, constitutional courts retain the
jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding
statutory restraints. The decision thus operates
as a protection against unconscionable
detention and there can be no second opinion
on the said principle.
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33. The same decision, however, does not
indicate as laying down a mechanical rule
under which the mere passage of time becomes
determinative in every case arising under a
special statute. The jurisprudence of this Court
does not support a construction whereby delay
simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted
by Parliament to address offences of a special
category.
34. The constitutional inquiry into delay is not
an inquiry into guilt. It is an inquiry into
whether continued detention remains
constitutionally permissible in the
circumstances of the case. That inquiry is
necessarily contextual. Context includes the
nature of the allegation, the statutory field, the
stage of the proceedings, the realistic
trajectory of the trial, the causes contributing
to delay, and the risks attendant upon release.
Delay cannot be detached from these
considerations and treated as a solitary
determinant.
35. The proper constitutional question,
therefore, is not whether Article 21 is superior
to Section 43D (5). The proper question is how
Article 21 is to be applied where Parliament
has expressly conditioned the grant of bail in
relation to offences alleged to implicate
national security. The law does not
contemplate an either-or approach. Nor does
it contemplate an unstructured blending of
statutory and constitutional considerations.
What is required is disciplined judicial
scrutiny that gives due regard to both.
xxx
101 . It is well recognised that Article 21
rights, though not absolute, require the State
and the Court to justify continued custody with
reference to the specific individual before it.
Treating all accused identically irrespective of
their roles would risk transforming pre-trial
detention into a punitive mechanism divorced
from individual circumstances. The
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constitutional mandate demands a
differentiated inquiry: where prolonged
custody disproportionately burdens those
whose roles are limited, the balance between
individual liberty and collective security may
call for conditional release, while the same
balance may tilt differently for those alleged to
have orchestrated the offence.”
55. The Supreme Court also examined the principles governing the
scope of judicial inquiry under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA at the
bail stage, and held as under:
“ 80. From the foregoing discussion, certain
propositions governing the application of
Section 43D(5) emerge with clarity. First , the
provision embodies a deliberate legislative
departure from ordinary bail jurisprudence,
premised upon the distinctive nature of
offences under Chapters IV and VI of the
Act. Second , the expression “prima facie true”
mandates a threshold judicial inquiry which is
neither perfunctory nor adjudicatory,
requiring the Court to examine whether the
prosecution material, taken at face value,
discloses the essential statutory ingredients of
the alleged offence. Third , the inquiry is
necessarily accused-specific, directed to the
role and attribution qua the individual, and
does not admit of collective or undifferentiated
treatment merely because allegations arise
from a common transaction or
conspiracy. Fourth , the bail stage under
Section 43D(5) is not a forum for evaluating
defences, weighing evidence, or conducting a
mini-trial; judicial restraint at this stage is not
an abdication of duty but a fulfilment of the
statutory mandate. These propositions, read
together, define the contours of judicial power
and responsibility under the provision.
81. The correct application of Section 43D(5),
therefore, requires the Court to undertake a
structured inquiry confined to the following:
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i. whether the prosecution material,
accepted as it stands, discloses a prima
facie case satisfying the statutory
ingredients of the offence alleged;
ii. whether the role attributed to the
accused reflects a real and meaningful
nexus to the unlawful activity or
terrorist activity proscribed under the
Act, as distinguished from mere
association or peripheral presence; and
iii. whether the statutory threshold is
crossed qua the individual accused,
without embarking upon an assessment
reserved after full-fledged trial.
82. Where these requirements are met, the
statutory restraint on the grant of bail must
operate with full force; where they are not, the
embargo stands lifted. This approach
preserves the legislative purpose of the Act,
and ensures that the exceptional nature of the
bail regime under Section 43D(5) is neither
diluted by overreach nor distorted by
mechanical application.”
56. The correctness of the above judgment, insofar as interplay
between Article 21 of the Constitution of India and Section 43D(5) of
the UAPA is concerned, has been doubted by the Supreme Court in
Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu,
2026 INSC 503. It explained K.A. Najeeb (supra), as under:
“31. In K.A. Najeeb, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court was clear and unequivocal in
holding that once it is obvious that a timely
trial would not be possible and the accused
has suffered incarceration for a significant
period of time, the courts would ordinarily be
obligated to enlarge the accused on bail. We
have already extracted supra paragraph 17 of
the said judgment where it has been clearly
stated that the presence of statutory
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restrictions like Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act
per se does not oust the ability of the
constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds
of violation of Part III of the Constitution.
Whereas at the commencement of the
proceedings, the courts are expected to
appreciate the legislative policy against grant
of bail but the rigors of such provisions will
„melt down‟ where there is no likelihood of the
trial being completed within a reasonable time
and the period of incarceration already
undergone has exceeded a substantial part of
the prescribed sentence. In the facts of that
case, this Court observed that it was conscious
of the fact that the charges levelled against the
accused were grave and a serious threat to
societal harmony and had it been the case at
the threshold, perhaps the Court would have
outrightly rejected such a prayer. However,
keeping in mind the duration of incarceration
and the unlikelihood of the trial being
completed in the near future, the accused had
to be enlarged on bail.
xxx
35. The often invoked phrase „bail is the rule
and jail is the exception‟ is not merely an
empty statutory slogan flowing from the CrPC
as Gurwinder has stated. It is a constitutional
principle flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of
the Constitution and the presumption of
innocence which is the cornerstone of any
civilised society governed by the rule of law.
Statutes may undoubtedly calibrate the
manner in which that principle is applied,
particularly in cases involving national
security or terrorist offences for which the
UAP Act is meant, but those cannot altogether
invert the constitutional relationship between
liberty and detention. The statutory embargo
of Section 43-D(5) must remain a
circumscribed restriction that operates subject
to the guarantee of Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution. Therefore, we have no manner of
doubt in stating that even under the UAP Act,
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„bail is the rule and jail is the exception‟; of
course, in an appropriate case, bail can be
denied having regard to the facts of that
particular case.”
57. Further, while highlighting the low conviction rate in UAPA,
the Supreme Court opined that:-
“42.3. Thus, from the aforesaid figures, it is
evident that the country-wide percentage of
conviction under the UAP Act for the five
years comprising the period 2019-23 hovers
between 2% to 6%. In other words, there is
94% to 98% possibility of acquittal in such
cases in the country. When it comes to the
Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the
percentage of conviction is abysmal, to say the
least. For the aforesaid period, the annual rate
of conviction is always less than 1%. It means
that at the end of the trial, there is 99%
possibility of acquittal in such cases. With
these kind of statistics staring at our face, the
question is, should we continue the detention
of the appellant or defer the consideration to a
later stage, simply because the charges are
serious?”
58. We must also note that this issue concerning the interplay
between Article 21 of the Constitution and Section 43D(5) of the
UAPA Act, has now been referred to a larger Bench in Tasleem
Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi (order dated 22.05.2026
passed by the Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) 2867/2026). In the said
order, the Supreme Court has observed that delay cannot be the sole
ground for releasing the accused on bail and that the inquiry into delay
is contextual and must take into account the nature of the allegations,
the statutory field, the stage of the proceedings, the realistic trajectory
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of the trial, the causes contributing to the delay, the role attributed to
the accused, the prima facie material, the availability of intermediate
safeguards, and the risks attendant upon release. It has further
observed as under: -
“ 20. We are also conscious that an unqualified
reading of the proposition that lapse of time by
itself must compel bail in every case under the
UAPA may have serious consequences. Such
an approach may leave little room for courts
to examine the nature of allegations, centrality
of role, protected witnesses, risk of
intimidation, possibility of reactivation of
networks, nature of delay and whether such
delay is attributable to the accused
himself/herself, public order concerns and
national security implications. On the other
hand, an equally unqualified insistence on
Section 43D(5) without regard to prolonged
incarceration would imperil Article 21. The
Constitution does not command either
extreme. It is this precise issue that may
warrant attention of the appropriate bench
dealing with the issues.
21. The question, therefore, is not whether
Article 21 survives Section 43D(5). It
undoubtedly does. The true question is how
Article 21 is to be applied in a statutory field
where Parliament has consciously imposed
restrictions on bail in respect of offences
alleged to affect the security of the State and
the stability of civic life.
22. We clarify that nothing in this order is
intended to whittle down, dilute, read
narrowly, or detract from the authority of K.A.
Najeeb. ...”
59. In the said order, after having referred the issue to the larger
Bench, the Supreme Court still went on to consider the case of the
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appellant therein for bail and, taking into account the substantial
period of incarceration already undergone by the appellant therein,
released the appellant on interim bail for a period of 6 months.
60. In Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors. v. Jammu and
Kashmir National Conference and Anr., (2024) 18 SCC 643, the
Supreme Court has also held that merely because a question of law is
referred to a larger Bench, the High Court must not refrain from
considering the matter before it in accordance with the law binding on
it. It has opined as under:
“ 35. We are seeing before us judgments and
orders by High Courts not deciding cases on
the ground that the leading judgment of this
Court on this subject is either referred to a
larger Bench or a review petition relating
thereto is pending. We have also come across
examples of High Courts refusing deference to
judgments of this Court on the score that a
later coordinate Bench has doubted its
correctness. In this regard, we lay down the
position in law. We make it absolutely clear
that the High Courts will proceed to decide
matters on the basis of the law as it stands. It
is not open, unless specifically directed by this
Court, to await an outcome of a reference or a
review petition, as the case may be. It is also
not open to a High Court to refuse to follow a
judgment by stating that it has been doubted
by a later coordinate Bench. In any case, when
faced with conflicting judgments by Benches of
equal strength of this Court, it is the earlier
one which is to be followed by the High
Courts, as held by a 5-Judge Bench
in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay
Sethi. The High Courts, of course, will do so
with careful regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case before it.”
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61. Keeping in view the above, we have proceeded to consider the
case of the appellant for releasing him on bail.
62. For the same, we would note that the appellant was taken into
custody in the present case on 22.11.2021, and has, therefore,
undergone prolonged incarceration of almost 4½ years. The stage of
the trial is at the arguments for framing of charge. We are further
informed that the prosecution intends to examine 197 witnesses in
case the charge is framed against the appellant.
63. We shall also conduct a surface evaluation of the case alleged
by the prosecution against the appellant.
64. The prosecution alleges that Hyder@Ali@Yusuf, an LeT
operative based in Pakistan, hatched a conspiracy with his Indian
counterparts, including the appellant herein, to run a network of
OGWs of LeT for furthering the activities of LeT and to commit
terrorist acts in India. The prosecution further alleges that, in
furtherance of this conspiracy, the appellant recruited Muneer Ahmad
Kataria (A-2), who has since turned approver, and who in turn
recruited one Arshid Ahmad Tonch (A-3). It is alleged that the
appellant, along with Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2) and Arshid
Ahmad Tonch (A-3), was involved in collection of sensitive
information regarding vital installations of Indian Security Forces and
passed on the same to Hyder@Ali@Yusuf with an intention to further
the activities of LeT in India.
65. The case against the appellant is primarily based on the
statement of Muneer Ahmad Kataria (A-2). He, in fact, states that he
was working as an NIA informer since 2019 and was working with
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Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-7). He states that he knows the appellant
since 2015, and in 2020 he had met him at Delhi. He states that as he
was suffering financially at that time due to Covid-19 Pandemic, the
appellant told him that there are some people based out of India, that
is, in European countries and Pakistan, who are working towards
secessionist activities pertaining to Kashmir in India, and if he helps
them, then they will also help him financially. He states that he then
got a video call from a person, who the appellant later told was
Hyder@Ali@Yusuf. He states that the appellant also told him that he
can share his bank account details with Hyder@Ali@Yusuf to receive
gifts from him. He states that the appellant called Hyder@Ali@Yusuf
in his presence, and it is then that he came to know that
Hyder@Ali@Yusuf was the chief operating commander of LeT (J&K
module), who was operating from Azad Kashmir in Pakistan. He
states that appellant was the one who introduced him to
Hyder@Ali@Yusuf. He also states that the appellant asked for his
help in getting his digital devices, including a mobile phone and a pen
drive seized from him, released and, for the said purpose, he contacted
Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-7), who then asked for a bribe of Rs. 3
lakhs. He states that the appellant gave a bribe of Rs. 1,50,000/-,
which he then forwarded to Arvind Digvijay Negi (A-7).
66. While the above statement raises serious allegations against the
appellant, these allegations are based on the statement of a co-accused
who has since turned approver and who himself claims to be an NIA
informer. His evidence is yet to be tested in trial.
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67. It is then alleged that the documents seized from the office of
JKCCS showed that the appellant was actively involved in collecting
information regarding the movement of Army vehicles near the LOC,
road conditions, and details of Army camps, structures of the Army,
paramilitary forces, and police, etc.. Information regarding officers
who were involved in militancy operations was also collected by him,
and the same were named as perpetrators, and posters containing the
names of security personnel were also printed.
68. The appellant, on the other hand, alleges that the materials
referred to by the prosecution in this regard are all public documents
and have been published in the form of articles and reports. These
include an article published in 2015 under the name „ Structure of
Violence Report ‟, which is, till date, publicly available on the official
website of JKCCS. Also included is a report published on the website
of JKCCS under the name „ Alleged Perpetrators 2012 ‟, which is still
publicly available. The said report was also shared with the Indian
Army, which gave a public response to the same in the newspaper,
Kashmir Tribune on 12.12.2012. The said submission was not
disputed by the learned SPP.
69. There is then an allegation regarding the seizure of visiting
cards, including those of the spokesperson of Pakistan-based
proscribed terrorist organisation HM, e-mails, one photograph of the
appellant with Syed Salauddin (Amir of HM), a designated terrorist,
during his visits to Pakistan. The appellant has alleged that these visits
were way back in the years 2007 and 2015 and were open visits.
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70. There are also allegations of the appellant taking part in, and in
fact, instigating protests post the encounter of Burhan Wani. The
appellant alleges that the same cannot be said to, in any manner; incite
the commission of any terrorist act.
71. We have taken note of the above allegations and the defence of
the appellant, only to highlight that they must be tested against the
long period of incarceration of the appellant and the fact that there is
no likelihood of the trial ending soon as also against the yardstick of
bail being the rule, while denial thereof being an exception. The
appellant‟s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India need to
be balanced and may even trump the restriction imposed under
Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.
72. We are also mindful of the fact that one of the co-accused,
namely, Zafar Abbas (A-4), has been denied bail by this Court and the
said order has been upheld by the Supreme Court, however, we find
that the allegations against the said co-accused were very different
from the one against the appellant herein.
73. We are also to keep in mind that the appellant is infirm. Though
the learned SPP has emphasised that his infirmity has not deterred the
appellant from still indulging in activities, which he describes as being
anti-national, the fact remains that the appellant is infirm and deserves
that special consideration.
74. Guided by the above-referred judgments as also the judgments
of the Supreme Court in Kareem @ Sadam v. State by National
Investigation Agency (Order dated 07.10.2025 in SLP (Crl.) No.
11626/2025); Alemla Jamir (supra) and Tapas Kumar Palit v. State
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of Chhattisgarh , 2025 INSC 222, and without expressing any opinion
on the merits of the allegations and the defence, we are inclined to
grant bail to the appellant, on the conditions as we shall set out below.
Some of the conditions are being set as the learned SPP has submitted
that the appellant may be a flight risk.
75. We direct that the appellant be released on bail in RC No.
30/2021/NIA/DLI, P.S. NIA, in NIA/4/2022 titled NIA v. Khuram
Parvez @ Khurram & Ors ., on the following conditions:
a. The appellant shall execute a personal bond in the sum of
Rs. 2,00,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the learned Trial Court;
b. The appellant shall surrender his passport, if any, before
the learned Trial Court. If he does not hold a passport, an
affidavit to that effect shall be filed before the learned
Trial Court;
c. The appellant shall not leave the National Capital Territory
of Delhi without prior permission of the learned Trial
Court. Any application seeking permission to travel shall
disclose the destination, duration, purpose of travel and
complete contact details during such travel;
d. The appellant shall only use one mobile phone and/or
landline number during the course of the trial, which shall
always be kept in the switch-on mode. He shall furnish his
current residential address, the mobile/landline number and
his e-mail address to the Investigating Officer and to the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:10.06.2026
15:43:55
CRL.A. 1234/2024 Page 34 of 36
learned Trial Court. He shall not change his residence or
contact particulars without giving at least seven days‟ prior
intimation to the Investigating Officer and the learned
Trial Court;
e. The appellant shall appear before the learned Trial Court
on each date of hearing, unless exempted by the learned
Trial Court from such appearance;
f. He shall not exhibit any conduct that has the effect of
delaying the proceedings;
g. The appellant shall not directly or indirectly contact,
influence, threaten or communicate with any prosecution
witness, protected witness, complainant or person
acquainted with the facts of the case;
h. The appellant shall not tamper with evidence, electronic
material, records, devices or documents relating to the
case;
i. The appellant shall not make any public statement,
including through print, electronic media or social media,
touching upon the merits of the case, the evidence, the
witnesses or the pending trial;
j. The appellant shall not participate in any activity which
may prejudice public order or the integrity of the trial;
k. The appellant shall not upload/share/disseminate or
circulate any anti-national material on any social media
platform or otherwise;
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:10.06.2026
15:43:55
CRL.A. 1234/2024 Page 35 of 36
l. The appellant shall report to the Investigating Officer once
every fortnight, or at such interval as may be directed by
the learned Trial Court. The Investigating Officer shall
maintain a separate register of attendance with respect to
the appellant;
m. In the event of breach of any condition, it shall be open to
the prosecution to seek cancellation of bail before the
appropriate court.
76. The Impugned Order is, accordingly, set aside and the appeal is
disposed of in the above terms. However, it is clarified that the release
of the appellant pursuant to the present order shall remain subject to
any order(s) passed in another case wherein the appellant may be
detained or otherwise be in custody in accordance with law.
77. It is made clear that the observations made herein shall not be
construed as an observation of the merits of the case.
78. A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court as
also to the concerned Jail Superintendent for information and
necessary compliance.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J
JUNE 10, 2026/ rv /ik
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:10.06.2026
15:43:55
CRL.A. 1234/2024 Page 36 of 36