RAMESH MANDAVI vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 2656 of 2025
Ramesh Mandavi S/o Rajman Mandavi Aged About 35 Years R/o
Village- Kokvaar, Panchayat Arra, Block- Antagarh, District- Northern
Bastar Kanker (C.G.)
... Appellant
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Officer-In-Charge, Police Station-
Amabeda, District- Northern Bastar Kanker (C.G.)
... Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant : Ms. Priyanka Shukla, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Soumya Rai, Deputy Government
Advocate

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice
02.03.2026
1. Heard Ms. Priyanka Shukla, learned counsel for the appellant as
well as Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Deputy Government Advocate,
appearing for the State/respondent.

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2. The present appeal has been preferred under Section 21 of the
National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as
“the NIA Act”), calling in question the legality, propriety and
correctness of the orders dated 07.10.2025 and 17.10.2025
passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA Act), North Bastar,
Kanker (hereinafter referred to as “the Special Judge”) in
connection with FIR No. 16/2022 registered at Police Station
Amabeda, District Kanker, for alleged offences punishable under
Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(for short ‘IPC’) Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 for
short, ‘Arms Act’) as well as Sections 17, 18-A, 19, 23, 38(2) and
40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short,
‘UAPA’).
3. By order dated 07.10.2025, the learned Special Judge allowed the
application preferred by the Investigating Officer seeking
extension of time for completion of investigation from 90 days to
180 days in terms of Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA. Thereafter,
by order dated 17.10.2025, the learned Special Judge rejected
the application filed by the appellant seeking statutory/default bail
under Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (hereinafter referred to as “the BNSS”).
4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has approached this Court
contending that the impugned orders suffer from patent illegality
and material irregularity. It is urged that the extension of time

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granted under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA was mechanical
and contrary to the mandatory requirements of law, and
consequently, the rejection of the appellant’s application for
default bail under Section 187 of the BNSS has resulted in a
serious infraction of the appellant’s indefeasible right to personal
liberty as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
5. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the present appellant,
Ramesh Mandavi, is named as an accused in FIR No. 16/2022
registered at Police Station Amabeda, District Kanker, alleging
commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149,
307 and 506 of the IPC; Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act; and
Sections 17, 18-A, 19, 23, 38(2), 39(2) and 40 of the UAPA.
5.1. As per the prosecution, the appellant is alleged to have
been associated with certain unlawful and extremist activities
connected with banned Naxalite organisations and to have
facilitated or supported activities prejudicial to the sovereignty
and integrity of the country. The investigation in the aforesaid
FIR was stated to be continuing at the time of his arrest.
5.2. The appellant, however, is stated to be a resident of
Village Kokvar (Arra). It is not in dispute that he has earlier
served as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Arra for a period of
approximately ten years and as Ward Panch of Kokvar for
about five years. It is further borne out from the record that he
had contested the 2023 Vidhan Sabha elections. He is stated

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to be a permanent resident of the village and claims to have
no criminal antecedents.
5.3. According to the prosecution, on 16.07.2025 at about 3:00
AM, a team comprising personnel of the District Reserve
Guard (DRG) along with local police apprehended the
appellant from his residence at Village Kokvar in connection
with the aforesaid FIR. He was produced before the
jurisdictional Court on the same day at about 4:00 PM and
was thereafter remanded to judicial custody.
5.4. It is an admitted position on record that the statutory
period of 90 days for completion of investigation, as
contemplated under Section 187 of the BNSS, read with
Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA, was to expire on 14.10.2025.
5.5. Prior thereto, on 07.10.2025, an application was moved
before the learned Special Judge by the Public Prosecutor,
based on a report submitted by the Investigating Officer,
seeking extension of time for completion of investigation by a
further period of 90 days under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the
UAPA. In the said application, the Investigating Officer, in
substance, stated that arrest of certain absconding co-
accused was pending, sanction under Section 45 of the UAPA
had not yet been obtained from the State Government, search
and patrolling operations were continuing in the area, and that
further time was required to complete the investigation.

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5.6. By order dated 07.10.2025, the learned Special Judge
allowed the said application and extended the period of
investigation from 90 days to 180 days, authorising
continuation of the appellant’s judicial custody up to
06.01.2026. The order substantially records the grounds
mentioned in the Investigating Officer’s report.
5.7. Thereafter, upon expiry of the initial period of 90 days and
in the absence of filing of charge-sheet within that period, the
appellant moved an application under Section 187(2) of the
BNSS, read with Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA, claiming
statutory/default bail, contending that the extension order
dated 07.10.2025 was invalid in law and that his indefeasible
right to be released on default bail had accrued.
5.8. By order dated 17.10.2025, the learned Special Judge
rejected the appellant’s prayer for default bail, upholding the
earlier order granting extension of time for investigation.3.9.
Being aggrieved by the order dated 07.10.2025 extending the
period of investigation and by the subsequent order dated
17.10.2025 rejecting his application for default bail, the
present appeal has been filed.
6. Ms. Priyanka Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
assailed the impugned orders dated 07.10.2025 and 17.10.2025
as being wholly unsustainable in law and in direct contravention of
the mandatory statutory safeguards embodied in Section 43-D(2)

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(b) of the UAPA and Section 187 of the BNSS. She further
submits that the order dated 07.10.2025 extending the period of
investigation from 90 days to 180 days is void ab initio inasmuch
as it was passed without production of the appellant before the
learned Special Judge, either physically or through video-
conferencing. Inviting attention to the very recital in the impugned
order, she submits that it records the presence of the Public
Prosecutor but acknowledges that the accused was not produced
and only a jail warrant was placed before the Court. It is
contended that production of the accused at the time of
considering continuation of judicial custody is not a mere formality
but a mandatory jurisdictional requirement.
7. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jigar alias Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of
Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484, wherein it has been categorically
held that extension of remand without production of the accused,
either in person or through electronic linkage, violates the
mandate of Section 167 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for
short, “CrPC”) (pari materia with Section 187 BNSS) and infringes
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and that prejudice is
inherent in such violation. She submits that in view of the said
authoritative pronouncement, the extension order suffers from a
foundational defect and cannot defeat the appellant’s right to
default bail.

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8. It is further submitted by Ms. Shukla that the extension granted
under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA was based on no valid
“report of the Public Prosecutor” as contemplated by the statute.
Learned counsel argues that the Public Prosecutor merely
forwarded the application of the Investigating Officer without any
independent analysis, evaluation of progress of investigation, or
specific reasons necessitating continued detention of the
appellant. Placing reliance upon State of Maharashtra v.
Surendra Pundlik Gadling and others, (2019) 5 SCC 178, it is
urged that the Supreme Court has laid down that four cumulative
conditions must be satisfied before extension of time is granted,
including a reasoned report of the Public Prosecutor indicating
progress of investigation and specific reasons for further
detention. It is contended that absence of such an independent
report strikes at the root of jurisdiction and renders the extension
completely illegal.
9. Further reliance is placed upon Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and
others v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1994) 4 SCC 602,
wherein the Apex Court held that the Public Prosecutor is an
independent statutory authority and not a mere post office of the
investigating agency, and that mechanical forwarding of the IO’s
request cannot substitute the statutory report mandated by special
enactments. She submits that the impugned order fails to
demonstrate any prosecutorial satisfaction or judicial scrutiny as

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required by law. She next submits that the learned Special Judge
acted mechanically and without application of mind. The order
merely reproduces general grounds such as pending arrest of
absconding accused, sanction under Section 45 of the UAPA, and
continuation of search operations, grounds which, according to
her, bear no nexus with the necessity of continued detention of
the appellant. It is argued that sanction under Section 45 is an
administrative act independent of custodial interrogation, and that
arrest of other accused cannot justify prolonged incarceration of
the present appellant. In this regard, reliance is placed upon
Sanjay Kumar Kedia v. Narcotics Control Bureau, (2008) 2
SCC 294, wherein the Supreme Court emphasised that extension
of custody beyond statutory limits must rest upon compelling and
specific reasons, and not on vague or routine investigative
assertions. She further submits that settled law mandates that
where a statute prescribes a particular manner for exercise of
power, it must be exercised strictly in that manner, failing which
the action becomes void.
10. It is contended by Ms. Shukla that the appellant’s indefeasible
right to default bail crystallised on 14.10.2025 upon expiry of the
statutory 90-day period without a valid extension order in the eye
of law. Learned counsel places strong reliance upon M.
Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence, (2021) 3 SCC 485, to submit that the right to default

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bail arises the moment the stipulated period expires without a
valid charge-sheet or lawful extension, and once such right
accrues, it cannot be extinguished by subsequent or curative
steps taken by the prosecution. She submits that the rejection of
the appellant’s application for default bail on 17.10.2025 amounts
to negation of a vested statutory right and is therefore
unconstitutional and contrary to the mandate of Article 21.
11. Lastly, Ms. Shukla submits that the appellant is a permanent
resident of Village Kokvar, has served as an elected Sarpanch
and Ward Panch, and has no criminal antecedents. She submits
that the appellant undertakes to abide by any stringent conditions
that may be imposed by this Court. In sum, learned counsel urges
that the impugned orders being jurisdictionally flawed and
violative of statutory safeguards deserve to be set aside, and the
appellant be released on default bail in accordance with law.
12. Reliance is also placed upon the judgments rendered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi
and others, 1953 SCR 652, Judgebir Singh v. NIA, (2023) 17
SCC 48, Chaganti Satyanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
(1986) 3 SCC 141, CBI v. Anupam Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141
and State of Maharashtra v. Bharati Chandmal Varma, (2002)
2 SCC 121 to buttress her submissions.
13. On the other hand, Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Deputy Government
Advocate appearing for the State/respondent, vehemently

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opposed the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the
appellant and supported the impugned orders dated 07.10.2025
and 17.10.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA Act),
Kanker. He further submits that the FIR bearing Crime
No.16/2022 was registered on 05.08.2022 for serious offences
punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307 and 506 IPC;
Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act; and Sections 17, 18-A, 19,
23, 38(2), 39(2) and 40 of the UAPA. It is contended that the
nature of the allegations pertains to organised unlawful activities
connected with extremist elements, and the investigation is of a
complex and sensitive character involving multiple accused
persons, several of whom were absconding at the relevant time.
14. It is further submitted by Mr. Rai that prior to expiry of the initial
statutory period of ninety days from the date of arrest of the
appellant on 16.07.2025, the prosecution, through the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, DRG, Kanker, moved an application
under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA seeking extension of time
for completion of investigation up to 180 days. Learned counsel
submits that the said application was supported by a progress
report detailing pendency of arrest of several absconding accused
persons, ongoing search and combing operations, pendency of
sanction under Section 45 of the UAPA, and requirement of
further investigation. According to Mr. Rai, the learned Special
Judge, after perusing the case diary and being satisfied that

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investigation involved offences under the UAPA and that the
statutory conditions stood fulfilled, exercised judicial discretion
and extended the remand period till 06.01.2026. It is emphasised
that on 07.10.2025, when the application for extension was
considered, the Deputy Director of Prosecution was present
before the Court and the counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant was also present, as recorded in the order sheet. No
objection was raised on behalf of the appellant to the extension
sought by the prosecution at the relevant stage. Thus, according
to him, the order was passed after due consideration and cannot
now be challenged on hyper-technical grounds.
15. Mr. Rai contends that Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA provides a
special statutory regime for extension of the investigation period
up to 180 days in cases where offences under the UAPA are
involved, subject to satisfaction of the Court on the report of the
Public Prosecutor indicating progress of investigation and specific
reasons for continued detention. He submits that in the present
case, the progress report was placed before the Court through the
Deputy Director of Prosecution and the learned Special Judge,
upon satisfaction, extended the period in exercise of judicial
discretion.
16. It is argued that the requirement under Section 43-D(2)(b) stood
substantially complied with, and the order cannot be termed as
without jurisdiction. With respect to the appellant’s claim of default

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bail under Section 167(2) CrPC/Section 187(2) BNSS, Mr. Rai
submits that once the remand period had been validly extended to
180 days by order dated 07.10.2025, the statutory period had not
expired when the application for default bail was filed on
17.10.2025. Therefore, no indefeasible right had accrued to the
appellant. The learned Special Judge, after examining the case
diary and statutory provisions, rightly rejected the application for
default bail. It is contended that the offences alleged are grave in
nature, involving threats to public order and security. The
investigation required coordination at multiple levels, including
sanction under Section 45 of the UAPA and arrest of co-accused.
In such circumstances, the legislature itself has provided for
extended time up to 180 days. The prosecution having invoked
the said provision before expiry of the initial 90-day period, and
the Court having granted extension upon satisfaction, the
subsequent bail application under Section 167(2)/187(2) was
rightly held to be not maintainable.
17. Lastly, Mr. Rai submits that the learned Special Judge exercised
statutory powers as a judicial authority in accordance with law,
after due application of mind. The impugned orders do not suffer
from illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting
interference by this Court under Section 21 of the NIA Act. The
present appeal, therefore, being devoid of merit, deserves to be
dismissed.

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18. We have heard the learned appearing for the parties, considered
their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through
the records with utmost circumspection.
19. At this stage, it would be relevant to quote Section 43-D(2)(b) of
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, which is reproduced
below for easy reference:-
“ Section 43-D(2)(b) Modified application of
certain provisions of the Code- (1) *
“(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in
relation to a case involving an offence
punishalbe under this Act subject to the
modification that in sub-section (2),—
(a) the references to ‘fifteen days’, ‘ninety
days’ and ‘sixty days’, wherever they occur,
shall be construed as references to ‘thirty
days’, ‘ninety days’ and ‘ninety days’,
respectively; and
(b) after the proviso, the following proviso
shall be inserted, namely:—
“Provided further that if it is not possible to
complete the investigation within the said
period of ninety days, the Court may, if it is
satisfied with the report of the Public
Prosecutor indicating the progress of the
investigation and the specific reasons for the
detention of the accused beyond the said
period of ninety days, extend the said period up
to one hundred and eighty days:”

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20. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it abundantly
clear that the power of the Court to extend the period of
investigation beyond ninety days is conditional and can be
exercised only upon: (i) a report of the Public Prosecutor; (ii) such
report indicating the progress of investigation; and (iii) specific
reasons for continued detention of the accused beyond ninety
days. The satisfaction of the Court is, thus, statutorily tethered to
and contingent upon the existence of a valid and independent
report of the Public Prosecutor.
21. From perusal of the order dated 07.10.2025, it transpires that the
State was represented through the office of the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, DRG, North Bastar, Kanker, District
North Bastar Kanker (C.G.). Accused Ramesh Kumar Mandavi
was not produced from District Jail, Kanker; however, the jail
warrant was submitted, and he was represented through counsel.
It further transpires that a remand application along with the case
diary was presented by the office of the Deputy Superintendent of
Police, DRG, North Bastar, Kanker, in connection with Crime
No.16/2022 registered at Police Station Amabeda, stating that
prosecution sanction was yet to be obtained, investigation was
incomplete, and additional time was required. On consideration of
the case diary, the Court granted judicial remand up to 17.10.2025
and directed that the case diary be returned along with a copy of
the remand application. It is further reflected from the said order

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that an application was moved seeking extension of judicial
remand of the arrested accused, Ramesh Kumar Mandavi, under
Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA, praying for extension of the
remand period from 90 days to 180 days, i.e., up to 06.01.2026.
22. Upon perusal of the case diary, the Court noted that the accused
had been booked under the provisions of the aforesaid Act; that
several co-accused persons were still absconding and efforts
including continuous search and operations were being
undertaken for their arrest; that permission from the Inspector
General of Police, Bastar Range, under Section 173(8) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure for further investigation was yet to be
obtained; and that sanction from the State Government under
Section 45(1)(2) of the UAPA for filing of the prosecution
complaint was still pending. Considering these aspects, the Court
found it appropriate to allow the application and accordingly
extended the remand period of the accused from 90 days to 180
days, i.e., up to 06.01.2026.
23. Further, from the order dated 17.10.2025, it reflects that the
applicant/accused Ramesh Mandavi was represented through
counsel and an application for default bail under Section 167(2)
CrPC / Section 187(2) BNSS was filed on his behalf, which was
taken up for consideration and disposal by the Court. It is
reflected that the case diary in Crime No. 16/2022 registered at
Police Station Amabeda for the offences punishable under

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Sections 147, 148, 149, 307 and 506 IPC, Sections 25 and 27 of
the Arms Act, and Sections 17, 18-A, 19, 23, 38(2), 39(2) and 40
of the UAPA was produced before the Court. An affidavit in
support of the default bail application was also filed, stating that it
was the first bail application and that no previous application had
been filed or rejected either before the said Court or before the
High Court. The principal contention raised on behalf of the
accused was that he had been in judicial custody since
16.07.2025 and that the period of 90 days of judicial custody
stood completed on 14.10.2025. It was urged that the application
seeking extension of time for investigation was filed on
07.10.2025, i.e., eight days prior to the expiry of 90 days, and
therefore the same was premature and the order extending time
from 90 to 180 days was illegal and non est. It was further
contended that on 07.10.2025 the accused was neither produced
physically nor through video conferencing and that a copy of the
report sent through the prosecuting agency was not supplied. It
was also urged that no independent report of the Public
Prosecutor was annexed and, thus, the order extending time to
180 days was not binding upon the accused.
24. Various documents regarding the antecedents and social standing
of the accused were filed along with the application, and reliance
was placed upon judicial precedents including Surendra Pundlik
Gadling (supra), Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra), and Chaganti

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Satyanarayana (supra) and the said application was orally
opposed on behalf of the State.
25. On consideration of the rival submissions and perusal of the case
diary, the Court recorded that prior to completion of 90 days of
judicial custody, an application under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the
UAPA had been moved by the Investigating Officer seeking
extension of time for investigation, and the said application had
been allowed on 07.10.2025, extending the period of judicial
custody from 90 days to 180 days. The order further records that
on the date of consideration of the extension application, both
sides were represented through counsel and no objection was
raised on behalf of the accused. The Court also noted that the
progress report specified the pending steps in investigation and
that the prosecuting agency had supported the application, upon
which the Court, being satisfied, exercised judicial discretion to
extend the period. The Court further observed that under Section
43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA, the presence of the accused is not
mandatory at the time of hearing an application for extension of
time for investigation.
26. In light of the fact that the judicial custody of the accused had
already been validly extended up to 180 days, the Court held that
the application for default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC /
Section 187(2) BNSS was not maintainable and accordingly
rejected the same.

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27. The legislative framework under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA
engrafts a special procedure for investigation of offences under
the Act and permits extension of the period for completion of
investigation beyond ninety days up to one hundred and eighty
days, subject to satisfaction of the Court on a report of the Public
Prosecutor indicating (i) the progress of investigation and (ii)
specific reasons for continued detention of the accused. The said
provision is an exception to the general rule embodied in Section
167(2) CrPC / Section 187(2) BNSS, and is designed to address
the complexity and sensitivity of offences affecting national
security and public order.
28. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the appellant was
arrested on 16.07.2025 and that the application seeking extension
of time under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA was filed on
07.10.2025, i.e., prior to expiry of the initial period of ninety days.
The impugned order dated 07.10.2025 records that the Court
perused the case diary and the progress report placed before it;
noted that arrest of several absconding co-accused was pending;
that search and combing operations were ongoing; that sanction
under Section 45 of the UAPA was yet to be obtained; and that
further investigative steps remained to be completed. Upon being
satisfied with the grounds set out, the learned Special Judge
extended the period of investigation to 180 days, i.e., up to
06.01.2026.

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29. The argument that the order of extension is mechanical or without
jurisdiction does not commend acceptance. The order reflects
application of mind to the material placed before the Court and
records satisfaction regarding the necessity for extension. The
statute does not require a detailed adjudicatory order akin to a
judgment after trial; what is mandated is satisfaction of the Court
on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating progress of
investigation and reasons for continued detention. On a
cumulative reading of the order dated 07.10.2025 along with the
progress report forming part of the record, we find that the
essential statutory requirements stood complied with.
30. The contention that the appellant was not physically produced on
07.10.2025 and, therefore, the extension order is void, is also
liable to be rejected in the facts of the present case. The order
sheet indicates that the accused was represented through
counsel on the relevant date. Furthermore, the subsequent order
dated 17.10.2025, passed while considering the application for
default bail, records that on 07.10.2025 both sides were
represented and that no objection was raised on behalf of the
accused at the time when extension was sought and granted.
Thus, the appellant was not left unrepresented nor was any
protest recorded contemporaneously. In these circumstances, it
cannot be held that prejudice stood automatically occasioned so
as to render the order non est.

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31. Equally untenable is the submission that there was no
independent application of mind by the prosecuting agency. The
record discloses that the application for extension was
accompanied by a progress report detailing the pending steps in
investigation, including arrest of absconding accused,
continuation of search operations, and pendency of statutory
sanction. The application was presented through the prosecuting
agency before the Court, which upon perusal of the material,
recorded its satisfaction. The mere fact that the grounds relate to
pending investigative steps does not ipso facto render the
extension illegal; rather, such factors are germane to assessing
the progress of investigation and necessity of continued custody
in offences under the UAPA.
32. Much reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the
appellant upon decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court including
Surendra Pundlik Gadling (supra), Hitendra Vishnu Thakur
(supra), Jigar alias Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (supra), M.
Ravindran (supra) and others. There can be no quarrel with the
propositions of law enunciated therein, namely, that (i) extension
of time must be based upon a report of the Public Prosecutor
indicating progress of investigation and specific reasons; (ii) the
Public Prosecutor must act as an independent statutory authority;
and (iii) the right to default bail is an indefeasible right which
accrues upon expiry of the statutory period in the absence of a

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valid extension. However, the aforesaid decisions are clearly
distinguishable on facts. In several of the cases relied upon, the
extension orders were passed either in the absence of the
accused and without representation through counsel, or without
there being any material to indicate consideration of a report of
the Public Prosecutor, or without recording satisfaction in terms of
the statutory mandate.
33. In contradistinction, in the case at hand, the record demonstrates
that the appellant was represented through counsel at the time
when the extension application was considered; no objection was
raised at that stage; a progress report detailing the status of
investigation was placed before the Court; and the learned
Special Judge recorded satisfaction before granting extension.
Moreover, from the order dated 17.10.2025, it clearly transpires
that while considering the application for default bail, the learned
Special Judge specifically noted that on 07.10.2025 both sides
were represented and no opposition had been voiced by counsel
for the appellant at the time of extension. Thus, the factual
substratum in the present matter materially differs from the cases
cited.
34. Once it is held that the order dated 07.10.2025 extending the
period of investigation up to 180 days was not vitiated by illegality,
procedural impropriety or want of jurisdiction, the very substratum
of the appellant’s claim for statutory/default bail necessarily

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ceases to exist. The right contemplated under Section 167(2)
CrPC, now embodied in Section 187(2) BNSS, though described
in judicial pronouncements as an “indefeasible right”, is
nonetheless a conditional right. It does not arise in vacuo, nor
does it operate mechanically upon mere expiry of ninety days.
The said right accrues only when two foundational requirements
are cumulatively satisfied: first, that the prescribed statutory
period for completion of investigation has expired; and second,
that there exists neither a charge-sheet filed within such period
nor a valid order of extension passed under a special enactment
where applicable. In cases governed by Section 43-D(2)(b) of the
UAPA, the statutory scheme itself carves out an exception and
expressly empowers the Court to extend the period of
investigation up to one hundred and eighty days upon being
satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating
progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued
detention.
35. In the present case, the application seeking extension of time was
moved and allowed on 07.10.2025, that is, prior to expiry of the
initial ninety-day period which was to lapse on 14.10.2025. The
competent Court, upon considering the progress report and the
material placed on record, exercised jurisdiction vested under
Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA and extended the period for
completion of investigation up to 06.01.2026. Once such

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extension stood granted in accordance with law and within the
permissible time frame, the statutory period for purposes of
default bail automatically stood enlarged from ninety days to one
hundred and eighty days. The legal consequence thereof is that
the computation for accrual of the right under Section 167(2)
CrPC / Section 187(2) BNSS shifts to the extended period. Thus,
on 14.10.2025, when the initial period of ninety days expired,
there was already a subsisting and operative judicial order
extending the time for investigation. In such a situation, no
indefeasible right in favour of the appellant could be said to have
crystallised. The concept of “indefeasibility” attaches only after the
statutory conditions are fulfilled; it cannot override a lawful
extension granted under a special statute. Since the extended
period of one hundred and eighty days had not expired when the
appellant moved the application for default bail, the very premise
of the application was untenable.
36. Accordingly, the learned Special Judge, by order dated
17.10.2025, rightly held that the application under Section 167(2)
CrPC / Section 187(2) BNSS was not maintainable in view of the
valid extension already granted. The rejection of the application,
therefore, cannot be characterised as either illegal or as an
infraction of the appellant’s constitutional right to personal liberty,
but rather as a faithful application of the statutory scheme
governing investigation of offences under the UAPA.

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37. We are also mindful of the nature of allegations, which pertain to
offences under the UAPA involving activities alleged to be
prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of the nation, in addition to
serious penal offences under the IPC and Arms Act. The
legislative intent behind incorporating Section 43-D(2)(b) is to
enable a fair and effective investigation in complex cases of this
nature, while at the same time subjecting extension of custody to
judicial scrutiny. In the present matter, such scrutiny was indeed
exercised.
38. In appellate jurisdiction under Section 21 of the NIA Act,
interference is warranted only when the impugned order suffers
from patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error. We do not
find that the learned Special Judge has transgressed statutory
limits, ignored mandatory requirements, or acted in a manner so
arbitrary as to warrant interference.
39. Consequently, we hold that the order dated 07.10.2025 extending
the period of investigation from 90 days to 180 days under
Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA is legally sustainable, and the
subsequent order dated 17.10.2025 rejecting the appellant’s
application for default bail under Section 187(2) of the BNSS does
not suffer from any infirmity.
40. The appeal, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed .
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

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41. Office is directed to send a certified copy of this order to the trial
Court concerned for necessary information and compliance
forthwith.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Anu

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Head Note
Extension of time for investigation under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, if granted prior to expiry of
the initial 90-day period upon consideration of the progress report and
with the accused represented through counsel, constitutes a valid
enlargement of statutory time. In such circumstances, no indefeasible
right to default bail accrues under Section 167(2) CrPC / Section 187(2)
BNSS on completion of ninety days, and rejection of the default bail
application is legally sustainable.