The Principal Secretary Technical vs Dr S Prashanth, S/o Shivanna Y S

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

TH
DATED THIS THE 29 DAY OF OCTOBER 2026



PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

AND

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI


WRIT APPEAL NO.100356 OF 2024 (S-RES)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO.100342 OF 2024 (S-R)

IN WA NO.100356/2024:
BETWEEN:

1. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
(TECHNICAL),
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
M.S BUILDING, BENGALURU-560 001.

2. THE DIRECTOR
(COMMISSIONERATE)
TECHNICAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
(HIGHER EDUCATION),
PALACE ROAD, BENGALURU-560 001.










Digitally signed
by PRATIBHA M
PATIL
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
DHARWAD
BENCH
Date: 2026.11.13
14:51:03 +0530

3. THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
(EXPENDITURE), FINANCE DEPARTMENT,
VIDHANA SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560 001.

…APPELLANTS
(BY SMT.GIRIJA S.HIREMATH, HCGP)

AND:

DR. RANGASWAMY S/O. THIMMEGOWDA,
AGE: 59 YEARS, OCC: PROFESSOR,
R/O. C/O. SHARAVAN KUMAR B.KERUR,
H.NO.1925, KERUR BUILDING,
JADAR ONI BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT-587116.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.M.K.RAVISHANKAR, ADVOCATE)

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THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 24.11.2022 PASSED BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON’BLE HIGH COURT IN W.P.
NO.103122/2022 (S-RES) AND DISMISS THE PETITION WITH COSTS
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY; AND ETC.

IN WA NO.100342/2024:
BETWEEN:

1. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY (TECHNICAL)
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
M.S.BUILDING, BANGALORE-560001.

2. THE DIRECTOR (COMMISSIONERATE)
TECHNICAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
(HIGHER EDUCATION), PALACE ROAD,
BENGALURU-560001.

3. THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
(EXPENDITURE), FINANCE DEPARTMENT,
BANGALORE-01.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SMT.GIRIJA S.HIREMATH, HCGP)
AND:

DR. S.PRASHANTH S/O. SHIVANNA Y.S
AGE: 59 YEARS, OCC: PROFESSOR,
R/O. SATHISH D, PLOT NO.32,
SHREE RAM KRUPA, FLAT NO.4,
IIND CROSS, SAMBHAJI NAGAR,
VADAGAV, BELAGAVI-590005.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.M.K.RAVISHANKAR, ADVOCATE)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 24.11.2022 PASSED BY THE
LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON’BLE COURT IN W.P. NO.
102785/2022 (S-R) AND DISMISS THE PETITIONER WITH COSTS
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY; AND ETC.

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THESE WRIT APPEALS COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS
UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

ORAL JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )

In W.A.No.100356/2024 the State stands before us calling
in question the order of the learned Single Judge dated
24.11.2022 passed in W.P.No.103122/2022.

2. In W.A.No.100342/2024 the State stands before us
calling in question the order of the learned Single Judge dated
24.11.2022 passed in W.P.No.102785/2022.

3. The learned Single Judge in W.P.No.103122/2022
holds as follows:
“The petitioner was appointed as a Lecturer in
a Government Aided Malanad Engineering College,
Hasan on 5/10/1993, and his probationary period
was declared as satisfactory in the year 1995. After
completing 17 years of service, the petitioner
submitted an application with the 1st respondent to
appoint him as an Professor. On considering his
application, the petitioner was appointed as an
Professor in Mechanical Department on 23/9/2010.
Thereafter, the petitioner submitted an application
dated 9/12/2011 with the first respondent to
consider the prior service rendered by him in the

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Government Aided College for the purpose of
pension.
2. The first respondent rejected the
application submitted by the petitioner stating that
the prior services rendered by him in an aided
institution cannot be considered for fixing the
pension against which he petitioner filed a writ
petition in W.P. No.101831/2021. This Court, by
order dated 16/7/2021 quashed the endorsement
rejecting the application submitted by the
petitioner, and directed the first respondent to
reconsider the claim of the petitioner for counting
of his qualifying service for the purpose of fixing
pension by taking into consideration the prior
services rendered by him in the aided institution,
strictly in accordance with the Rules.
3. Thereafter, the first respondent has issued
the impugned endorsement dated 14/02/2022
rejecting the claim of the petitioner stating that the
petitioner was appointed in the Government
Engineering College after 01.04.2006 and in view of
the amended rule i.e., Rule 2-C. of the Karnataka
Civil Services Rules (for short, ‘the Rules’), the
petitioner is not entitled for counting of his services
rendered in Government Aided College, against
which the present petition is filed.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the petitioner was appointed as a
Lecturer in the Government Aided Malanad
Engineering College on 5/10/1993, and Rule 2-C of
the Rules is not applicable to the petitioner. Hence,
he submits that the petitioner is entitled for
counting of prior services rendered by him in the
Government Aided College for the purpose of fixing
pension.
5. On the other hand, the learned High Court
Government Pleader appearing for the State
submits that the petitioner having been appointed
in the Government Engineering College after 2006,
the petitioner is not entitled for counting of the

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services rendered by him in the Government Aided
Institution as specified in Rule 2-C of the Rules and
as such the impugned order passed by the first
respondent is in accordance with law and does not
warrant any interference.
6. I have examined the submissions made by
the learned counsel for the parties.
7. A reading of Rule 224-B of the Rules
indicates that every employee desirous of having
the benefit of counting their previous service of
additional years as qualifying service for pension,
as the case may be under the Rules shall make a
request in writing to the Appointing Authority within
three months from the date of joining the
Government service.
8. Rule 2-C of the Rules specifies that
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1)
of Rule 2, Part IV of these Rules, shall not be
applicable to new recruits to State Government
service joining on or after 1st April, 2006. In the
instant case, the petitioner was appointed as a
Lecturer in the Government Aided Institution in the
year 1993. The petitioner is entitled to the benefit
under Rule 224-B of the Rules since he was
appointed in the Government Aided institution prior
to 2006 and after completing 17 years of service
was appointed as an Associate Professor in the
Government Engineering College. Accordingly, I
pass the following:
ORDER
i) The writ petition is allowed.

ii) The impugned endorsement dated
14/2/2022 issued by respondent NO.1, at
Annexure-H, is hereby quashed.

iii) Respondent No.3 shall count the prior
service rendered by the petitioner in the
Government Aided Institution for the
purpose of fixing pension in terms of Rule
224 of the Rules and pass appropriate

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orders expeditiously within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of
certified copy of this order.
In view of disposal of the writ petition,
I.A. No.1/2021 does not survive for
consideration and the same is disposed
of accordingly.”


4. The learned Single Judge in W.P.No.102785/2022
holds as follows:
“The petitioner was appointed as a Lecturer in
a Government Aided Malanad Engineering College,
Hasan on 20/02/1991, and his probationary period
was declared as satisfactory in the year 1995. After
completing 17 years of service, the petitioner
submitted an application with the 1st respondent to
appoint him as an Professor. On considering his
application, the petitioner was appointed as an
Professor in Department of Civil Engineering on
23/9/2010. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted an
application dated 9/2/2011 with the first
respondent to consider the prior service rendered
by him in the Government Aided College for the
purpose of pension.
2. The first respondent rejected the
application submitted by the petitioner stating that
the prior services rendered by him in an aided
institution cannot be considered for fixing the
pension against which he petitioner filed a writ
petition in W.P. No.101832/2021. This Court, by
order dated 16/7/2021 quashed the endorsement
rejecting the application submitted by the
petitioner, and directed the first respondent to
reconsider the claim of the petitioner for counting
of his qualifying service for the purpose of fixing
pension by taking into consideration the prior

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services rendered by him in the aided institution,
strictly in accordance with the Rules.
3. Thereafter, the first respondent has issued
the impugned endorsement dated 15/02/2022 at
Annexure-H rejecting the claim of the petitioner
stating that the petitioner was appointed in the
Government Engineering College, Hasan after
01.04.2006 and in view of the amended rule i.e.,
Rule 2-C. of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules (for
short, ‘the Rules’), the petitioner is not entitled for
counting of his services rendered in Government
Aided College, against which the present petition is
filed.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the petitioner was appointed as a
Lecturer in the Government Aided Malanad
Engineering College on 20/2/1991, and Rule 2-C of
the Rules is not applicable to the petitioner. Hence,
he submits that the petitioner is entitled for
counting of prior services rendered by him in the
Government Aided College for the purpose of fixing
pension.
5. On the other hand, the learned High Court
Government Pleader appearing for the State
submits that the petitioner having been appointed
in the Government Engineering College after 2006,
the petitioner is not entitled for counting of the
services rendered by him in the Government Aided
Institution as specified in Rule 2-C of the Rules and
as such the impugned order passed by the first
respondent is in accordance with law and does not
warrant any interference.
6. I have examined the submissions made by
the learned counsel for the parties.
7. A reading of Rule 224-B of the Rules
indicates that every employee desirous of having
the benefit of counting their previous service of
additional years as qualifying service for pension,
as the case may be under the Rules shall make a

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request in writing to the Appointing Authority within
three months from the date of joining the
Government service.
8. Rule 2-C of the Rules specifies that
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1)
of Rule 2, Part IV of these Rules, shall not be
applicable to new recruits to State Government
service joining on or after 1st April, 2006. In the
instant case, the petitioner was appointed as a
Lecturer in the Government Aided Institution in the
year 1991. The petitioner is entitled to the benefit
under Rule 224-B of the Rules since he was
appointed in the Government Aided institution prior
to 2006 and after completing 17 years of service
was appointed as an Professor in the Government
Engineering College. Accordingly, I pass the
following:
ORDER

i) The writ petition is allowed.

ii) The impugned endorsement dated
15/2/2022 issued by respondent NO.1, at
Annexure-H, is hereby quashed.

iii) Respondent No.3 shall count the prior
service rendered by the petitioner in the
Government Aided Institution for the
purpose of fixing pension in terms of Rule
224 of the Rules and pass appropriate
orders expeditiously within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of
certified copy of this order.
In view of disposal of the writ petition,
I.A. No.1/2021 does not survive for
consideration and the same is disposed
of accordingly.”


5. The direction is to count the prior service rendered by
the petitioners in the Government Aided Institution for the

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purpose of fixing of pension in terms of Rule 224 of the
Karnataka Civil Services Rules and pass necessary orders.
Therefore, the orders are restricted to fixing of pension of the
writ petitioners. Though the orders are passed on 24.11.2022,
the appeals are preferred only on 11.07.2024, after about 565
days of delay.

6. The explanation for delay in the affidavit seeking its
condonation in W.A.No.100356/2024 is as follows:
“The above named Appellants most
respectfully submit as under:
1. It is submitted that the above Appeal is
filed by the Appellants / State challenging the
Order dated 24.11.2022 passed by the learned
Single Judge of this Hon'ble High Court in W.P
No.103122/2022 (S-RES).
2. It is respectfully submitted that, the
averments made in the Memorandum of Writ
Appeal be treated as part and parcel of this
Application in order to avoid repetition.
3. It is respectfully submitted that the above
Writ Petition came to be disposed on 24.11.2022
and the certified copy was applied and sent to the
Head of the Legal Cell, Higher Education
department vide letter dated: with an opinion that
it is not a fit case to prefer an appeal against the
order. After receiving the said opinion, the
Commissioner department of collegiate and
technical education department sent a proposal to
the Ist Appellant, i.e., the Principal Secretary
(Technical), Higher Education Department with the

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opinion it is suitable to prefer appeal against the
order vide letter dated: 10.03.2023.
4. It is respectfully submitted that, after
verifying the proposal, the I Appellant approved the
proposal to prefer Writ Appeal against the order.
Thereafter, the file was sent to the Head of the
legal cell. The Head of Legal Cell on 27.04.2023,
issued a Government Order authorizing the
Government Advocate to prefer Writ Appeal before
the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court against the
Order of the Learned Single Judge.
5. It is respectfully submitted that, in the said
order, the address of the Government advocate
was wrongly mentioned as High Court building
Bengaluru. Hence, corrigendum order was issued
on
6. It is respectfully submitted that after
receipt of the above said Government Order, the
concerned section in the office of the
Commissioner, had examined the service
particulars of the Respondent No.1 and prepared
grounds for filing writ appeal and the same was
approved on 06.11.2023. It is further submitted
that the grounds for filing have been sent to the
Office of the Advocate General, High Court
Dharwad vide letter dated: 09.11.2023.
7. It is respectfully submitted that, the delay
was caused in preferring the Appeal and the delay
was mainly due to the above said reasons. The
same is purely administrative in nature and is not
due to any deliberate or intentional one.
8. It is respectfully submitted that, it is just
and necessary to condone the delay in preferring
the Writ Appeal. If the Application for condonation
of delay is not allowed, the Appellants will be put to
irreparable loss and hardship whereas no hardship
or injury will be caused to the Respondents, if the
Application for condonation of delay is allowed.

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WHEREFORE, it is prayed that, this Hon'ble
Court be pleased to allow the application for
condonation of delay and condone the delay of 565
days in filing the above Appeal in the interest of
justice and equity.”

7. The explanation for delay in the affidavit seeking its
condonation in W.A.No.100342/2024 is as follows:
“The above named Appellant most respectfully
submit as follows:
1. The above Appeal is filed by the
Appellants/state against the Order dated
24.11.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of
this Hon'ble High Court in W.P.No.102785/2022.
2. It is submitted that, in the above cited
case, pursuant to the Order passed by the learned
Single Judge, the Government Advocate had opined
that the present case is a fit case wherein the
Order of the learned Single Judge has to be
questioned before the Division Bench of this
Hon'ble Court in an Appeal.
3. It is respectfully submitted that, the above
Writ Petition was allowed on 24-11-2022 by this
Hon'ble Court. The learned Single Judge had
directed the Appellant No.3 to count the prior
service rendered by the Respondent in the
Government Aided Institution for the purpose of
fixing pension in terms of Rule 224-B of the Rules
and pass appropriate orders expeditiously within a
period of three months from the date of receipt of
certified copy of this order. It is submitted that,
vide letter dated: 11.01.2023. the learned
Government Advocate sent the certified copy of the
order dated 24-11-2022 to the Head of Legal Cell
along with the opinion that it is not fit case to
prefer an appeal against the order received in this
office on 04-02-2023. The said opinion was

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4. It is respectfully submitted that vide letter
dated: 06-03-2023, the Commissioner Department
of collegiate and Technical Education Department
sent a proposal to the Ist Appellant, i.e Principal
Secretary (Technical) Higher Education department
with the opinion it is suitable to prefer an appeal
against the judgement.
5. It is respectfully submitted that the Head of
Legal Cell, vide order dated 20-04-2023, issued a
Government Order authorising the Government
Advocate to prefer a Writ Appeal before the
Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court against the
Order of the learned Single Judge.
6. It is respectfully submitted that, the
concerned section in the office of the
Commissioner, had examined the service
particulars of the Respondent and prepared
grounds for filing appeal and the same was
approved on 06-11-2023. It is further submitted
that the grounds for filing have been sent to the
Office of the Advocate General, High Court
Dharwad vide letter dated: 09-11-2023.
7. It is submitted that, the delay in filing the
present appeal is not intentional but due to the
reasons stated above.
8. It is submitted that, if the accompanying
application is not allowed, the Appellants will be put
to untold hardship and on the contrary, if the
accompanying application is allowed, the same will
not cause any prejudice to the Respondents.
WHEREFORE , it is prayed that this Hon'ble
Court be pleased to allow the application for
condonation of delay and 565 condone the delay of
days in filing the above appeal in the interest of
justice and equity.”

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8. The reasons so stated in the affidavits filed in support
of the applications seeking condonation of delay are hardly
satisfactory. In this regard, it would be apposite to refer to the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in SHIVAMMA (DEAD)
1
By LRS v. Karnataka HOUSING BOARD AND OTHERS ,
wherein it was held as follows:
“ …. …. ….
116. As already discussed in the foregoing parts, for
the purpose of seeking condonation of delay under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the party has to
demonstrate the existence of a “ sufficient cause ” “within
the prescribed period” to the satisfaction of the court.
Thus, establishment of “sufficient cause” is the
first ingredient for the purpose of condonation of
delay. Insofar, as what is meant by the phrase
“ sufficient cause ”, neither Section 5 nor the
Limitation Act itself provide any guidance on what
its constituent elements ought to be. Instead,
Section 5 leaves the task of determining
appropriate reasons for seeking condonation of
delay to judicial interpretation and exercise of
discretion upon the facts and individual
circumstances of each case.

117. While there is no arithmetical formula,
through decades of judicial application, certain
yardsticks for judging the sufficiency of cause for
condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good
cause is not sufficient enough to turn back the
clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise
barred by delay. The court ought to be cautious
while undertaking such an exercise, being
circumspect against condoning delay which is

1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969

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attributable to the applicant. Although the actual
period of delay might be instructive, it is the
explanation for the delay which would be the
decisive factor.

118. The court must also desist from throwing the
baby out with the bathwater. A justice-oriented
approach must be prioritised over technicalities, as one
motivation underlying such rules is to prevent parties
from using dilatory tactics or abusing the judicial
process. Pragmatism over pedanticism is therefore
sometimes necessary, despite it appearing liberal or
magnanimous. The expression “ sufficient cause ” should
be given liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice.

119. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by
the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts
to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-
purpose for the existence of the institution of courts.
Despite the liberal approach being adopted in such
matters, which was termed justifiable, this Court
lamented that the message had not percolated down to
all the other courts in the hierarchy and, accordingly,
emphasis was laid on the courts adopting a liberal and
justice-oriented approach. [ See: Sheo Raj Singh v.
Union of India , (2023) 10 SCC 531]

120. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause
being shown or an acceptable explanation being
proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be
condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of
long periods can be condoned if the explanation is
satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts
must distinguish between an “explanation” and an
“excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give
someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for
something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a
particular event and allows the person to point out
that something that has happened is not his fault,
if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be
taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an
“excuse”. Although people tend to see

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“explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and
struggle to find out the difference between the
two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is
real. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India ,
(2023) 10 SCC 531]

121. This Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v.
Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy , (2013) 12 SCC 649, after examining a
plethora of decisions on what is meant by
“ sufficient cause ”, summarized its principles as
under:—

“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that
can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing
with an application for condonation of delay, for the
courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are
obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should
be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy
and purpose regard being had to the fact that
these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining
fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be given
undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on
the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5 . (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a
party seeking condonation of delay is a
significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice and cause
public mischief because the courts are required to be
vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no
real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to
the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to

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the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first
one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls
for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant
factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the
fundamental principle is that the courts are required to
weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both
parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go
by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or
the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the
courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one
gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or
interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of
law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based
on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded
on objective reasoning and not on individual
perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.

22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some
more guidelines taking note of the present day
scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern and not in a
haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of
the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is
seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay
should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the
base of individual philosophy which is basically
subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid
down regard being had to the concept of judicial
discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system
should be made as that is the ultimate institutional
motto.

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22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive
delay as a non-serious matter and, hence,
lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters.

122. The exceptional provision of condonation
of delay on grounds of “ sufficient cause ” is
couched as a manifestation of substantive justice.
This Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. v.
Special Deputy Collector (LA) , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513,
summarized the principles governing the exceptions
imagined under “ sufficient cause ” vis-à-vis substantive
justice as under:—
“26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions
of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that
there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the
right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or
cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to
be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause
of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the
same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation
Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is established
for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled
to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with
the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for
condoning the delay and condoning the delay
for the reason that the conditions have been
imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision.”
(Emphasis supplied)

123. From above, it is manifest that that the phrase
“ sufficient cause ” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is an
expression of elastic import, incapable of precise
definition, yet not without boundaries. Its purpose is to
empower courts to advance the cause of justice by
preventing genuine litigants from being shut out on
account of unavoidable delays . At the same time, it is
equally clear that the phrase is not a charter for
indolence or a device to revive stale claims that
the law of limitation otherwise extinguishes.

124. The burden to establish sufficient cause
lies upon the party seeking condonation, and the
court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bona
fide, and free of negligence. Sufficiency of cause is
to be determined contextually, on the totality of
circumstances, with due regard to the conduct of
the applicant and the prejudice caused to the
opposite party. The inquiry is not mechanical but
principled, resting on the dual pillars of bona fides
and diligence.

125. The expression “ sufficient cause ” is not
itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing
negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be
construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not
to punish innocent litigants for circumstances
beyond their control.

126. Courts must not condone gross negligence,
deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to
do so would undermine the maxim interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the
certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.

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127. The expression “ sufficient cause ” must be
construed in a manner that advances substantial
justice while preserving the discipline of
limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by
sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a
judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted
with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy.
Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and
consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts
have leaned towards condonation. Where
negligence, want of good faith, or a casual
approach is discernible, condonation has been
refused. ”


9. In the light of the reasons for seeking condonation of
delay, being hardly satisfactory, there is no warrant of
interference in the cases at hand. Accordingly, the writ appeals
stand rejected .

10. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand
disposed as not calling for adjudication.

Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE

PMP/CT:VH/List No.: 1 Sl No.: 33