Union Of India And Others vs Prem Chand And Others
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
CWP No. 36905 of 2026 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
(126) CWP No. 36905 of 2026 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 05.11.2026
Union of India and others ......Petitioners
Versus
Prem Chand and others .....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH
Present: Mr. Ashutosh Dhankar, Senior Panel Counsel with
Mr. Shikhar Kataria, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Avinit Avasthi, Addl. Standing Counsel
for respondents No. 2 to 4-UT., Chandigarh. .
KIRTI SINGH , J. (ORAL)
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the order dated 03.03.2025
(Annexure P-1) passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972-cum-Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central),
Chandigarh (respondent No. 2), as well as the order dated 10.03.2026
(Annexure P-7) passed by the Appellate Authority-cum-Deputy Chief Labour
Commissioner (Central), Chandigarh.
2. As per the pleaded facts, respondent No. 1-Prem Chand was
initially engaged as a Beldar on muster-roll basis with the Central Public
Works Department (CPWD) on 10.09.1984. He continued to work on muster
roll till 15.04.1993, whereafter his services were regularized with effect from
16.04.1993. Upon regularization, he became a regular Government employee
governed by the Central Civil Services Pension Rules. He continued in
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regular service and eventually superannuated on 31.05.2023 from the post of
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Multi-Tasking Staff. At the time of his retirement, respondent No. 1 was
drawing wages of Rs.56,516/- per month, including basic pay of Rs.39,800/-
with Dearness Allowance. His retirement gratuity for the regular service
rendered from 16.04.1993 to 31.05.2023 was paid under the Central Civil
Services Pension Rules, 2021, amounting to Rs.8,47,740/-. Thereafter,
respondent No. 1 raised a claim for payment of gratuity in respect of his
earlier muster-roll service from 10.09.1984 to 15.04.1993 under the Payment
of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1972'). The
Controlling Authority, vide order dated 03.03.2025, directed the petitioners
to pay a sum of Rs.2,93,448/- along with simple interest at the rate of 10%
per annum, by taking into consideration the wages drawn by respondent No.
1 at the time of his retirement in the year 2023. Aggrieved by the said order,
the petitioners preferred a statutory appeal under Section 7(7) of the Act of
1972, along with an application seeking condonation of delay and an
application for stay. However, vide order dated 10.03.2026, the Appellate
Authority returned the appeal without adjudication on merits, on the grounds
of limitation and non-compliance with the statutory requirement of pre
deposit.
3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that the
grievance of the petitioners is primarily with regard to the manner in which
the gratuity payable for the period of muster-roll service has been computed
by the Controlling Authority. It is contended that the Controlling Authority
erroneously took into consideration the wages drawn by respondent No. 1 at
the time of his retirement in the year 2023, whereas the gratuity payable for
the muster-roll period ought to have been calculated on the basis of the last
wages drawn by him before his regularization in April, 1993. Learned
counsel further submits that the Directorate General, CPWD, vide Office
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Memorandum dated 20.11.2023 (Annexure P-3), has clarified the basis for
computation of gratuity for the period of service rendered on
muster-roll/daily-rated basis. The last wages drawn by respondent No. 1 in
April, 1993 were Rs.1,440/- per month and, accordingly, the gratuity payable
to him works out to Rs.7,477/-, along with applicable interest at the GPF
rate. It is argued that the Controlling Authority has failed to deal with the
aforesaid Office Memorandum and the relevant statutory provisions while
determining the amount payable.
4. With regard to the delay in filing the statutory appeal, learned
senior counsel submits that the order dated 03.03.2025 was received by the
petitioners on 17.04.2025 and thereafter the matter was processed through
various administrative channels for obtaining approval and legal vetting. The
delay, according to learned counsel, was neither intentional nor deliberate but
occurred on account of the administrative procedures and the time taken in
collecting the relevant records and obtaining the requisite approval. The
petitioners, accordingly, filed the appeal on 17.02.2026 along with an
application seeking condonation of delay. It is contended that the Appellate
Authority ought to have considered the explanation furnished for the delay
instead of returning the appeal without examining the grounds raised therein.
It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned orders be set aside.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 to 4 has
opposed the prayer made in the present petition.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused
the material available on record.
7. The principal question which arises for consideration is whether
the Appellate Authority was justified in declining to entertain the statutory
appeal on the ground that the same had been filed beyond the period
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CWP No. 36905 of 2026 (O&M) -4-
prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972.
8. A perusal of Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 reveals that an
appeal against an order passed by the Controlling Authority may be preferred
within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order. The first proviso
empowers the appropriate Government or the Appellate Authority, as the
case may be, to extend the said period by a further period of sixty days, if
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring
the appeal within the initial period. Thus, the statutory provision prescribes
an outer limit of 120 days for preferring an appeal against an order passed by
the Controlling Authority.
9. The aforesaid provision is a special provision governing the
limitation for filing appeals under the Act of 1972. The Appellate Authority,
therefore, cannot extend the period of limitation beyond the maximum period
expressly permitted by the statute.
10. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the
Division Bench of this Court in The Punjab State Cooperative Supply &
Marketing Federation Ltd. v. Appellate Authority under the Payment of
Gratuity Act and others, LPA-1000-2021 (O&M), decided on 07.12.2022,
wherein, after considering the provisions of Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972
and the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, it was held that the
Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal beyond the
outer limit of 120 days. It was further held that the provisions of the
Limitation Act cannot be invoked to enlarge the period specifically
prescribed under the Act of 1972. The contention raised by learned senior
counsel that Section 5 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963
would confer an additional power upon the Appellate Authority to condone
the delay beyond the period of 120 days, therefore, cannot be accepted. The
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CWP No. 36905 of 2026 (O&M) -5-
statutory scheme under Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 specifically provides
not only the initial period of limitation but also the maximum extent to which
the delay can be condoned. Once the legislature has prescribed an outer limit,
the same cannot be enlarged by invoking the general provisions of the
Limitation Act.
11. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the order passed by
the Controlling Authority is dated 03.03.2025. The statutory appeal filed by
the petitioners on 17.02.2026 itself records that the order was dispatched on
15.04.2025 and received by the petitioners on 17.04.2025. Though the
application seeking condonation of delay contains a different recital with
regard to the date of receipt of the order, even if the date of 17.04.2025, as
mentioned in the appeal, is taken into consideration, the appeal was filed
after a period of 306 days from the date of receipt of the order. Thus, the
appeal was clearly beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed under
Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972.
12. The fact that the application seeking condonation of delay
refers to the time taken in obtaining administrative approval, processing the
matter through various offices and collecting the relevant documents does
not alter the aforesaid position. Once the statutory outer limit had expired,
the Appellate Authority lacked the jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond
the period prescribed by the legislature. The administrative process involved
in obtaining approval for filing an appeal cannot enlarge the period of
limitation or confer a jurisdiction upon the Appellate Authority which is
otherwise not vested in it.
13. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The second proviso to
Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 specifically provides that no appeal by an
employer shall be admitted unless, at the time of preferring the appeal, the
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appellant either produces a certificate of the Controlling Authority to the
effect that the requisite amount of gratuity has been deposited with it or
deposits such amount with the Appellate Authority. The order dated
10.03.2026 records that the petitioners had neither produced the requisite
certificate nor deposited the amount of gratuity awarded by the Controlling
Authority along with the appeal. Thus, the appeal was also not accompanied
by compliance with the mandatory statutory pre-condition for its admission.
14. No doubt, the petitioners have raised grounds assailing the
manner in which the Controlling Authority computed the amount of gratuity,
particularly with regard to the wages taken into consideration for the muster-
roll period and the Office Memorandum dated 20.11.2023 issued by the
Directorate General, CPWD. However, the statutory appeal itself having
been filed beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 7(7) of the
Act of 1972, the Appellate Authority could not have examined those grounds
on merits. The said grounds, therefore, cannot confer jurisdiction upon the
Appellate Authority to entertain an appeal which is otherwise barred by the
statutory limitation.
15. The jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked to confer upon a statutory
authority a power which the legislature has expressly withheld. The
petitioners have failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error or procedural
illegality in the impugned order dated 10.03.2026 warranting interference by
this Court.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no ground
to interfere with the order dated 10.03.2026 (Annexure P-7) passed by the
Appellate Authority cum Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central),
Chandigarh.
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CWP No. 36905 of 2026 (O&M) -7-
17. Consequently, the present writ petition is dismissed.
18. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand
disposed of.
(KIRTI SINGH)
JUDGE
th
November 05 , 2026
Gurpreet Singh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
GURPREET SINGH
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integrity of this document
Chandigarh