National Highway Authority Of India vs Rajendra Singh

Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:91150
1 AA-103-2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK AGARWAL
th
ON THE 16 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
ARBITRATION APPEAL No. 103 of 2018
CNR No.: MPHC010593762018
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
Versus
RAJENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Mohan Sausarkar, learned counsel for the appellant.
Shri Anand Nayak, learned counsel for the respondent No.1.
Shri Manas Mani Verma, learned Govt. Advocate and Shri Amit
Mishra, learned Panel Lawyer for respondent No.2.
WITH
ARBITRATION APPEAL No. 102 of 2018
CNR No.: MPHC010593752018
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
Versus
SMT. SOBHNA SINGH RAJPUT AND ANR
Appearance:
Shri Mohan Sausarkar, learned counsel for the appellant.
Shri Anand Nayak, learned counsel for the respondent No.1.
Shri Manas Mani Verma, learned Govt. Advocate and Shri Amit
Mishra, learned Panel Lawyer for respondent No.2.
ORDER
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: TULSA SINGH
Signing time: 20-11-2026
19:07:10

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:91150
2 AA-103-2018
These two arbitration appeals have been filed by the appellant-

National Highway Authority of India being aggrieved of the order dated
11/08/2018 passed by learned 1st Additional District Judge to 1st Additional
Judge, Narsinghpur in M.J.C.(Arbitration) No.10/2017 and order dated 11th
August, 2018 passed by learned 1st Additional District Judge to 1st
Additional Judge, Narsinghpur in M.J.C.(Arbitration) No.09/2017 whereby
learned Court below under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 has exercised its power and has modified the award.
2. It is submitted that modification of award is not permissible. Shri
Mohan Sausarkar, learned counsel for the appellant, places reliance on the
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gayatri Balasamy Vs.
ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, (2025) 7 SCC 1 and submits that since
modification is not permissible, impugned orders need to be set aside.
3. Shri Anand Nayak, learned counsel for respondent No.1, in his turn,
submits that provisions as contained in Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, which will be applicable in terms of the
provisions contained in Section 3G (6) of the National Highways Act, 1956,
provides that a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the
award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of two per cent higher than
the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of award, from the date of
award to the date of payment.
4. Thus, it is submitted that there is a limited modification and that too
within the ambit of the provisions contained in Section 31(7)(b) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which is permissible in terms of the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: TULSA SINGH
Signing time: 20-11-2026
19:07:10

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:91150
3 AA-103-2018
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gayatri Balasamy

(supra) itself wherein, in para-39 to 45 Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under :

"39. We agree with this argument, but only to a limited extent. It
is true that modification and setting aside have different
consequences: the former alters the award, while the latter annuls
it. [ The words used in the statute must be interpreted contextually,
taking into account the purpose, scope, and background of the
provision. Many words and expressions have both narrow and
broad meanings and thereby open to multiple interpretations.
Legal interpretation should align with the object and purpose of
the legislation. Therefore, we may not strictly apply a semantic
differentiation while interpreting the words “modification” or
“setting aside”. Instead, a holistic and purposive interpretation of
these words will be consistent with the intent behind the provision
and the 1996 Act. Linguistically and even jurisprudentially, a
distinction can be drawn between the expressions —
“modification”, “partial setting aside”, and “setting aside” of an
arbitral award in its entirety. However, we must note that the
practical effect of partially setting aside an award is the
modification of the award.] However, we do not concur with the
view that recognising any modification power will inevitably lead
to an examination of the merits of the dispute. It will completely
depend on the extent of the modification powers recognised by us.
In the following part of our Analysis, we outline the contours of
this limited power and explain why, in our view, recognising it
will ultimately yield more just outcomes.
IV. A limited power of modification can be located in Section 34
40. A core principium of arbitration, an alternative dispute
resolution (hereinafter referred to as “ADR”) mechanism, is to
provide a quicker and cost-effective alternative to courtroom
litigation. While this suggests minimal judicial interference, the
role of domestic courts remains crucial, as they function in a
supportive capacity to facilitate and expedite the resolution of
disputes. Therefore, it follows that judicial intervention is
legitimate and necessary when it furthers the ends of justice,
including the resolution of disputes.
41. To deny courts the authority to modify an award—particularly
when such a denial would impose significant hardships, escalate
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: TULSA SINGH
Signing time: 20-11-2026
19:07:10

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:91150
4 AA-103-2018
costs, and lead to unnecessary delays—would defeat the raison
d'être of arbitration. This concern is particularly pronounced in
India, where applications under Section 34 and appeals under
Section 37 often take years to resolve.
42. Given this background, if we were to decide that courts can
only set aside and not modify awards, then the parties would be
compelled to undergo an extra round of arbitration, adding to the
previous four stages: the initial arbitration, Section 34 (setting
aside proceedings), Section 37 (appeal proceedings), and Article
136 (SLP proceedings). In effect, this interpretation would force
the parties into a new arbitration process merely to affirm a
decision that could easily be arrived at by the Court. This would
render the arbitration process more cumbersome than even
traditional litigation.
43. Equally, Section 34 limits recourse to courts to an application
for setting aside the award. However, Section 34 does not restrict
the range of reliefs that the Court can grant, while remaining
within the contours of the statute. A different relief can be
fashioned as long as it does not violate the guardrails of the power
provided under Section 34. In other words, the power cannot
contradict the essence or language of Section 34. The Court would
not exercise appellate power, as envisaged by Order 41 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Code”).
44. We are of the opinion that modification represents a more
limited, nuanced power in comparison to the annulment of an
award, as the latter entails a more severe consequence of the
award being voided in toto. Read in this manner, the limited and
restricted power of severing an award implies a power of the
Court to vary or modify the award. It will be wrong to argue that
silence in the 1996 Act, as projected, should be read as a complete
prohibition.
45. We are thus of the opinion that the Section 34 Court can apply
the doctrine of severability and modify a portion of the award
while retaining the rest. This is subject to parts of the award being
separable, legally and practically, as stipulated in Part II of our
Analysis."


4. Thus, when tested, then it is evident that Court under Section 34 of the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: TULSA SINGH
Signing time: 20-11-2026
19:07:10

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:91150
5 AA-103-2018
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 exercising authority vested by a

statute in an arbitration under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 which was required to be exercised by the arbitrator,
but, arbitrarily not exercised qua granting interest for a delaying period of
about two years between the date of award and the date of actual payment,
cannot be faulted with in the light of the judgment of Hon'be Supreme Court
in the case of Gayatri Balasamy (supra) when the aspect of payment of
interest is distinctly severable from the remaining award.
5. Accordingly, these appeals fail and the same are hereby dismissed.
(VIVEK AGARWAL)
JUDGE
ts

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: TULSA SINGH
Signing time: 20-11-2026
19:07:10