Nayabuddin vs Parveen Singh

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 16.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 20.11.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010346322019
+ RC.REV. 499/2019, CM APPL. 38031/2019 (Stay), CM APPL.
7006/2022 (Subsequent events) & CM APPL. 9241/2026
(Subsequent events)

NAYABUDDIN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Aly Mirza, Advocate

versus

PARVEEN SINGH .....Respondent
Through: Appearance not given

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Revision Petition has been preferred by the
Petitioner-Tenant under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control
1 2
Act, 1958 , assailing the Judgment and Order dated 18.04.2019
passed by the learned SCJ-Cum-Rent Controller (West), Tis
3
Hazari Courts, Delhi , in Eviction Petition No. E-25596/2016, titled
“ Smt. Parveen Singh v. Sh. Nayabuddin” , whereby the Eviction
Petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the
DRC Act was allowed in respect of the tenanted premises bearing No.
4
WZ-30C, Virender Nagar, Delhi - 110058 .

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Judgment
3
learned Rent Controller
4
Tenanted Premises
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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2. Along with the Revision Petition, this Court is also called upon
to consider the Applications, being CM APPL. 7006/2022 and CM
APPL. 9241/2026, seeking to bring subsequent events on record,
particularly the demise of the original Respondent, Smt. Parveen
Singh, and her husband, during the pendency of the present
proceedings.
3. The principal controversy requiring consideration is whether the
subsequent demise of the original Respondent and her husband, after
an order of eviction had already been passed in their favour, has the
effect of extinguishing the bona fide requirement on the basis of
which the Eviction Order was granted, thereby warranting interference
by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

BRIEF FACTS:
4. The original Respondent, Smt. Parveen Singh, instituted an
Eviction Petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the
DRC Act against the Petitioner herein, seeking his eviction from one
shop measuring approximately 11 feet × 12 feet, situated at property
bearing No. WZ-30C, Virender Nagar, Delhi - 110058. It was pleaded
that the Petitioner had been inducted as a tenant in the said premises
by the father of the original Respondent, and that pursuant to a
registered Sale Deed dated 08.08.2003 and a subsequent Gift Deed
dated 01.10.2011, the original Respondent had acquired ownership
rights in the property and had become the landlady of the Petitioner.
5. The original Respondent asserted that she was residing in rented
accommodation at WZ-79C, Top Floor, Gali No. 8, Virender Nagar,
Delhi, whereas her husband was operating a computer coaching
institute under the name and style of Compworld Information
Technology . It was further pleaded that the institute required
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BHATIA
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additional space for accommodating its students and conducting
classes. The original Respondent also asserted that she was working as
an LIC agent and required suitable space for establishing an office in
the tenanted premises to attend to her clients. In addition, the
requirement of the premises for residential purposes for herself and
her family was also pleaded.
6. The Petitioner-Tenant contested the Eviction Petition and
sought leave to defend, which was granted by the learned Rent
Controller vide Order dated 21.08.2013. Thereafter, the Petitioner
filed his Written Statement, inter alia , disputing the bona fide
requirement pleaded by the original Respondent and alleging that the
computer coaching institute was a sham arrangement created to secure
eviction. The Petitioner also raised objections concerning the
ownership of the property, previous litigation between the parties and
the availability of alternative accommodation. The original
Respondent filed her Replication, reiterating the averments made in
the Eviction Petition and denying the contentions raised by the
Petitioner.
7. During the pendency of the eviction proceedings, the Petitioner
filed an Application seeking to bring subsequent facts on record,
contending that the original Respondent had shifted along with her
family to the first floor of the property in question and that the
computer institute allegedly being operated by her husband had ceased
to exist. The learned Rent Controller allowed the said Application,
noting that the original Respondent had not specifically denied the
assertion regarding her shifting to the upper floor. Thereafter, the
original Respondent examined herself as PW-1 and closed her
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BHATIA
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evidence on 30.10.2014, whereas the Petitioner examined himself as
RW-1 and closed his evidence on 01.02.2017.
8. Upon completion of the evidence, the learned Rent Controller
heard the final arguments and granted the parties an opportunity to file
written submissions vide Order dated 10.10.2018. After considering
the pleadings, evidence and written submissions of the parties, the
learned Rent Controller, vide Judgment dated 18.04.2019, allowed the
Eviction Petition and held the original Respondent entitled to recover
possession of the tenanted premises.
9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment, the Petitioner preferred
the present Revision Petition. During its pendency, the husband of the
original Respondent passed away on 22.04.2021, followed by the
demise of the original Respondent on 27.04.2021. They were survived
by their daughter, Ms. Kashvi Singh, who was subsequently brought
on record as the legal representative of the deceased Respondent vide
Order dated 30.09.2024. The Petitioner thereafter filed Applications
seeking to bring the aforesaid subsequent events on record,
contending that the demise of the original Respondent and her
husband had extinguished the bona fide requirement forming the basis
of the eviction order. The aforesaid Applications have been opposed
by the surviving legal representative, who maintains that the
subsequent demise of the original Respondent and her husband, after
the Impugned Judgment had already been passed, does not extinguish
the rights accrued thereunder.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submitted
that the very foundation of the Impugned Judgment has ceased to exist
in view of the subsequent demise of the original Respondent and her
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BHATIA
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husband. It was contended that the bona fide requirement pleaded in
the Eviction Petition was for expansion of the computer coaching
institute being operated by the husband of the original Respondent as
well as for the opening up of an office for the Respondent. It was
pointed out that, even during the pendency of the eviction
proceedings, an Application bringing to the notice of the learned Rent
Controller the closure of the said institute had been allowed. Despite
the same, the learned Rent Controller proceeded to pass the Eviction
Order dated 18.04.2019.
11. It was further submitted that the husband of the original
Respondent passed away on 22.04.2021, followed by the demise of
the original Respondent on 27.04.2021. Consequently, neither the
requirement for expansion of the computer institute nor the personal
requirement of the original Respondent for establishing an office for
her LIC agency or for residential purposes survives.

12. Learned counsel contended that although Ms. Kashvi Singh,
being the daughter and sole legal heir of the deceased Respondent,
may succeed to the estate and ownership rights, such succession
would not automatically result in the continuation of the specific
personal requirements pleaded by her deceased parents. Any
independent bona fide requirement that may presently exist in favour
of the daughter would constitute a fresh cause of action and cannot
retrospectively sustain the Eviction Order passed on the basis of the
requirements of the deceased persons.
13. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel placed
reliance upon V. Ramanathan v. Kalawati (Deceased) through LRs
5 6
& Anr. ; Gurinder Singh v. Jasjit Kaur ; Kedar Nath Agrawal

5
1987 SCC OnLine Del 353
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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7
(Dead) & Anr. v. Dhanraji Devi (Dead) by LRs & Anr. ; and Gaya
8
Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava . On the strength of the aforesaid
decisions, it was urged that subsequent events materially affecting the
existence of the bona fide requirement are required to be taken into
consideration by the Court, and that the demise of the original
Respondent and her husband has completely eclipsed the requirement
forming the basis of the eviction order. Accordingly, it was prayed
that the subsequent-event Applications be allowed and the Impugned
Judgment be set aside.
14. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent, through her legal representative, opposed the
submissions advanced by the Petitioner and contended that the
subsequent demise of the original Respondent and her husband,
having occurred after the Impugned Judgment had already been
passed in their favour, does not extinguish the rights accrued under the
said Judgment. It was submitted that the bona fide requirement had
been duly adjudicated by the learned Rent Controller after a full-
fledged trial and that the subsequent death of the original Respondent
during the pendency of the Revision Petition cannot, by itself, render
the Impugned Judgment unsustainable. It was further contended that
the surviving daughter, Ms. Kashvi Singh, has succeeded to the estate
of the deceased Respondent and is entitled to defend the Impugned
Judgment passed in favour of her predecessor-in-interest.
15. Learned counsel further submitted that the Judgments relied
upon by the Petitioner are distinguishable on facts and cannot be
construed to lay down an absolute proposition that the death of a

6
2019 SCC OnLine Del 11393
7
(2004) 8 SCC 76
8
(2001) 2 SCC 604
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BHATIA
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landlord during the pendency of a revision petition would necessarily
result in the extinguishment of an eviction order already passed in his
or her favour. It was emphasised that the bona fide requirement
pleaded in the Eviction Petition was not confined merely to the
computer coaching institute operated by the husband of the original
Respondent, but also included the requirement for an LIC office and
residential purposes. The survival of the daughter, therefore, assumes
significance while examining the effect of the subsequent events upon
the Impugned Judgment.
16. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel placed
9
reliance upon Shakuntala Bai & Ors. v. Narayan Das & Ors. ;
Keshav Bhaurao Yeole (Dead) through LRs v. Murlidhar (Dead) &
10 11
Ors. ; Gopal Krishan v. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal & Anr. ; and
12
Raghuabir Saran v. Jai Bhagwan . On the basis of the aforesaid
decisions, it was urged that the subsequent demise of the original
Respondent and her husband does not warrant setting aside the
Impugned Judgment, and the Revision Petition is liable to be
dismissed.


ANALYSIS:
17. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the material placed on record, including the Impugned Judgment, the
Applications seeking to bring subsequent events on record, as well as
the replies thereto.

9
(2004) 5 SCC 772
10
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1362
11
2024 SCC OnLine Del 1757
12
2026 SCC OnLine Del 3372
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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18. Before examining the contentions advanced on behalf of the
Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope and ambit of the
revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to
Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. The jurisdiction exercised by this
Court is supervisory and revisional in nature and is distinct from the
jurisdiction exercised by an Appellate Court. The High Court is not
expected to substitute its own findings for those recorded by the
learned Rent Controller merely because another view may be possible
on the material available on record.
13
19. In Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, while examining the scope of the revisional jurisdiction under
the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, held that the
legislative intent behind the provision is to exclude an appellate
remedy and confer upon the High Court a limited power of
superintendence over the decision-making process of the learned Rent
Controller. It was observed that the High Court is required to satisfy
itself that the order passed by the learned Rent Controller is in
accordance with law and cannot undertake a reappreciation of the
evidence or substitute its own conclusions as though exercising
appellate jurisdiction. Interference is warranted only where the
decision suffers from an illegality, material irregularity or an error
apparent on the face of the record. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court
observed as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent
Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior
court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural
compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and
supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the
appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process

13
(2022) 6 SCC 30
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on
the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence
of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to
disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving
inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to
converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first
appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”


20. The aforesaid principles have to be borne in mind while
examining the challenge raised in the present Revision Petition. The
Impugned Judgment has been passed after the parties were afforded an
opportunity to lead evidence and the learned Rent Controller
considered the respective pleadings, evidence and submissions before
arriving at its conclusions. This Court, therefore, would not be
justified in reopening the entire factual adjudication merely because
the Petitioner seeks to place subsequent developments before this
Court. The question is whether the subsequent events relied upon are,
in law, of such a nature as to warrant interference with the order
passed by the learned Rent Controller.
21. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce
herein below the relevant findings rendered by the learned ARC in the
Impugned Order on the issue of bona fide requirement, which read as
under:

(b). Bonafide need of the petitioner(s)/ family member(s)/
“
dependent(s).
8.(b)(i) It is the case of the petitioner that she is residing in a
tenanted premises. The application of the respondent for bringing
on record subsequent facts has been allowed. In the application, it
is stated that due to the shifting of the petitioner to the first floor of
the aforementioned property the computer institute allegedly run
by the husband of the petitioner has now been closed. As such,
there is no need for the said computer institute. I have seen the site
plan Ex. PW1/3. The first floor is shown to have three rooms, one
store and one portion covered with asbestos sheet. In the petition, it
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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is written that two rooms in the back portion of the said property
are being used for the computer institute. One room is used as
office and other room is used as conference room. On the first
floor, there are three rooms. Out of three rooms, two rooms are
being used as Lab where the computers are installed for practical
training of the students. If the petitioner has shifted to the first floor
of the said property, it is still not clear how much portion on the
first floor she has occupied. As already clarified, two rooms on the
first floor were used for computer lab. If the said rooms have been
occupied by the petitioner, it would show that now there is even
less space available for the computer institute as compared to
earlier. The computer institute is on the ground floor as well as on
the first floor. There is nothing on record to show that the said
institute has been completely closed down.It is further the case of
the petitioner that she is an LIC agent. She needs office for her
profession. In the photographs Ex. PW1/5 to Ex. PW1/10, the
running of computer institute can be seen.
8.(b)(ii) On the other hand, the respondent in his written statement
has merely denied the case of the petitioner. It is baldly stated that
a sham computer institute is being run. It is also claimed that Sh.
Nand Lal, father of the petitioner wants to construct a big
residential cum commercial complex in the said property. In this
regard, Sh. Nand Lal entered into a collaboration agreement with
one builder and constructed one basement, ground floor and 4
floors above the ground floor (Sic).
8.(b)(iii) I have perused the examination in chief of
respondent/RW1. He has primarily relied on raising objection of
the previous litigation between the parties. It is nowhere mentioned
how the previous litigation is relevant for the purpose of the
present case. No material regarding the said construction by the
father of the plaintiff is filed on record. The respondent has not
taken any specific ground regarding the need for computer institute
being a need for additional accommodation. It is for the respondent
to take up this ground and prove the same.
8.(b)(iv) The petitioner has claimed that she is residing in the
tenanted premises, at WZ-79C, Top Floor, Gali no.8, Virender
Nagar, Delhi. At the time of her examination on 30.10.2014, she
mentioned her address as WZ-166A, Virender Nagar, New Delhi.
The respondent has not alleged anything to show that during the
pendency of the petition, the petitioner has acquired new property
WZ-166A, Virender Nagar, New Delhi. On the contrary, now it is
the case of the respondent that the petitioner has shifted along with
her family to the said property.
8.(b)(v) The petitioner claims that she is an LIC agent and she
needs space to run an office. There is nothing on record to show
that the petitioner is working as an LIC agency. The respondent
has also not produced any evidence to show that the petitioner is
otherwise gainfully employed. There is no specific denial
regarding the petitioner being LIC agent. Further the
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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petitioner/dependent need not be an expert in the proposed
business/profession (subject to legal/statutory requirement).
During the cross examination dated 30.10.2014, the petitioner
admitted that she was residing in the suit property till 2009.
Thereafter she shifted to rented accommodation. The present
petition was filed in March, 2013. It was not filed immediately
after the petitioner shifted to a rented accommodation.
8.(b)(vi) The petitioner has claimed bonafide need on three counts-
firstly, extra space for running the computer institute of her
husband; secondly, space for establishing her office as LIC agent
and thirdly for use of the tenanted premises and/or said property as
residence. As per the case of the respondent now, the petitioner has
shifted to the first floor of the said property. The petitioner is free
to use the space available in the said property as per her own
convenience. As such, the need of the petitioner is bonafide.”

22. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioner is
that the subsequent demise of the original Respondent and her
husband has completely extinguished the bona fide requirement on the
basis of which the Eviction Order was passed. In order to appreciate
the said contention, it would be necessary to first examine the settled
position of law governing the consideration of subsequent events in
eviction proceedings.
23. It is well settled that the bona fide requirement of a landlord is
ordinarily required to be examined with reference to the date of
institution of the eviction petition. The subsequent developments
occurring during the pendency of the proceedings cannot, merely by
their occurrence, defeat a claim which was otherwise validly instituted
and established. The Court, however, is not precluded from taking
cognizance of subsequent events where such developments have a
material bearing upon the entitlement of the parties to relief or
necessitate moulding of the relief.
24. In Gaya Prasad (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated
that the crucial date for determining the bona fide requirement of the
landlord is ordinarily the date of institution of the eviction petition.
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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While recognising the power of the Court to take cognizance of
subsequent events, it was held that such events must be of such a
nature and dimension that the requirement originally pleaded by the
landlord is completely eclipsed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
cautioned that subsequent developments ought not to be permitted to
defeat a genuine requirement merely on account of the time consumed
in the adjudication of eviction proceedings. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 10. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the
bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his
application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have
utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If
every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to
be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement
pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as
the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow-process system
subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on
the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord
nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest,
joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at
the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a
stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more
would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long
interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new
enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a
tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get
faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional
lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina
might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain
intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It
is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an
applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing
through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the
ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because
the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such
unduly long period.
11. We cannot forget that while considering the bona fides of the
need of the landlord the crucial date is the date of petition. In
Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram [1992 Supp (2) SCC 623] a two-
Judge Bench of this Court (M.N. Venkatachaliah, J., as he then
was, and N.M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the normal rule is that
rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they
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BHATIA
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were when the lis commenced and the only exception is that the
court is not precluded from moulding the reliefs appropriately in
consideration of subsequent events provided such events had an
impact on those rights and obligations. What the learned Chief
Justice observed therein is this: (SCC pp. 626-27, para 6)
“ 6 . The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and
obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they
obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject
to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or
law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of
the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the
moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded
from taking a „cautious cognizance‟ of the subsequent
changes of fact and law to mould the relief.”
12. This Court reiterated the same principle in Kamleshwar Prasad
v. Pradumanju Agarwal [(1997) 4 SCC 413] that the crucial date
normally is the date of filing the petition. In that case, a two-Judge
Bench (K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.) has held that even
the subsequent event of death of the landlord who wanted to start a
business in the tenanted premises is not sufficient to dislodge the
bona fide need established by him earlier. This is what Pattanaik J.
has observed for the Bench: (SCC p. 415, para 3)
“That apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises
in question for starting a business which fact has been
found by the appellate authority, in the eye of the law, it
must be that on the day of application for eviction which is
the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being
evicted from the premises. Even if the landlord died
during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court
the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the
business in question can be carried on by his widow or any
other son.”
13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the
genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a
dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party
should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events.
A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v.
Motor and General Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770] which pointed to
the need for remoulding the reliefs on the strength of subsequent
events affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control
litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such subsequent events
should be taken very cautiously. This is what learned Judges of the
Bench said then: (SCC pp. 772-73, para 4)
“We affirm the proposition that for making the right or
remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also
legally and factually in accord with the current realities,
the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious
cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the
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BHATIA
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institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness
to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.”
14. The next three-Judge Bench of this Court, which approved and
followed the above decision, in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad
[(1981) 3 SCC 103] has taken care to emphasise that the
subsequent events should have “wholly satisfied” the requirement
of the party who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal
requirement. The relevant passage is extracted below: (SCC pp.
113-14, para 14)
“Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where
possession is sought for personal requirement it would be
correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord
must not only exist on the date of the action but must
subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is
made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which
would show that the landlord's requirement is wholly
satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such
a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for
eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the
court to take into consideration subsequent events .”
(emphasis supplied)
15. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has
acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long
long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady
afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events
are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the
parties as well as the subject-matter of the lis. If the cause of action
is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the
malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant,
despite the impairment already caused.”

25. The aforesaid principle was also reiterated in Kamleshwar
14
Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that even the subsequent demise of a landlord, who had
sought eviction for commencing his own business, did not necessarily
result in the extinguishment of the bona fide requirement, particularly
when the business could be carried on by his widow or other family
members. Thus, the subsequent demise of the person who originally
instituted the eviction proceedings cannot, in every circumstance, be
treated as an event which automatically defeats the claim for eviction.

14
(1997) 4 SCC 413
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“ 3. Mr Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
in this Court urged that the person, for whose bona fide
requirement the order of eviction has been passed by the appellate
authority, having died during the pendency of the writ petition, the
said bona fide requirement no longer subsists and consequently the
High Court should have taken that fact into consideration and
should have interfered with the order passed by the appellate
authority for the eviction of the tenant. The learned counsel further
urged that no doubt the proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not a continuation of the eviction proceedings under
the Act, but all the same the High Court while exercising its power
of supervision under Article 226 of the Constitution is not denuded
of its power to take into consideration the subsequent event that
had happened which is necessary to be taken into consideration in
the interest of justice. Accordingly, the High Court committed
serious error in not taking into account the facts of the death of the
landlord for whose bona fide requirement the order of eviction had
been passed by the appellate authority, and therefore, this Court
should interfere with the said order of the High Court. Having
given an anxious consideration to the contention raised by the
learned counsel for the appellant and under the facts and
circumstances of this case we are of the considered opinion that
this case does not warrant interference by this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution. Under the Act the order of the appellate
authority is final and the said order is a decree of the civil court
and a decree of a competent court having become final cannot be
interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its power of
superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by
taking into account any subsequent event which might have
happened. That apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises
in question for starting a business which fact has been found by the
appellate authority, in the eye of law, it must be that on the day of
application for eviction which is the crucial date, the tenant
incurred the liability of being evicted from the premises. Even if
the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the
High Court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the
business in question can be carried on by his widow or any elder
( sic other) son. In this view of the matter, we find no force in the
contention of Mr Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and we do not find any error in the impugned judgment
of the High Court warranting interference by this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution. The appeal, accordingly, fails and
is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to
costs.”

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26. More importantly, the question concerning the effect of the
demise of a landlord after an order of eviction has already been passed
in his favour came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Shakuntala Bai & Ors. (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
where an order of eviction has been passed in favour of the landlord
and the tenant thereafter challenges the same, the subsequent demise
of the landlord during the pendency of such challenge would not, by
itself, render the eviction proceedings liable to dismissal. The legal
representatives are entitled to defend the estate and the benefit
accruing under the order of eviction. The Court further observed that
taking subsequent events, such as the death of the landlord, into
consideration at every stage of the proceedings would result in
interminable litigation and defeat the very object of expeditious
adjudication of eviction disputes. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 10. The effect of death of a landlord during the pendency of the
proceedings has been considered in several decisions of this Court.
In Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia [(1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR
1973 SC 2110] the landlord filed an ejectment application under
Section 14(1)( e ) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and eviction of the
tenant was sought on the ground that the premises were required by
the plaintiff “for occupation as a residence for himself and
members of his family”. The Additional Rent Controller dismissed
the application on a preliminary ground that the notices to quit
were not valid, without examining the case on merits. The plaintiff
died during the pendency of the appeal preferred by him and his
heirs were substituted. The case was remanded and the Rent
Controller passed an order of eviction. In appeal a contention was
raised that the right to sue did not survive to the heirs of the
plaintiff, which was rejected by the Rent Control Tribunal but was
accepted in appeal by the High Court. This Court held that
different results may follow according to the stage at which the
death occurs. One of the situations considered in para 13 of the
Report is as under: [SCC p. 694, para 13( i )]
“ 13 . ( i ) cases in which the death of the plaintiff occurred after
a decree for possession was passed in his favour; say, during
the pendency of an appeal filed by the unsuccessful tenant;”
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10.1. With regard to this category of cases, it was held that the
estate is entitled to the benefit which, under a decree, has accrued
in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, the legal representatives
are entitled to defend further proceedings, like an appeal, which
constitutes a challenge to that benefit. Even otherwise, this appears
to be quite logical. In normal circumstances after passing of the
decree by the trial court, the original landlord would have got
possession of the premises. But if he does not and the tenant
continues to remain in occupation of the premises it can only be on
account of the stay order passed by the appellate court. In such a
situation, the well-known maxim “ actus curiae neminem gravabit ”
that “an act of the court shall prejudice no man” shall come into
operation. Therefore, the heirs of the landlord will be fully entitled
to defend the appeal preferred by the tenant and claim possession
of the premises on the cause of action which had been originally
pleaded and on the basis whereof the lower court had decided the
matter and had passed the decree for eviction. However, in regard
to the case before the court it was held that the requirement pleaded
in the ejectment application on which the plaintiff founded his
right to relief was his personal requirement and such a personal
cause of action must perish with the plaintiff. On this ground it was
held that the plaintiff's right to sue will not survive to his heirs and
they cannot take the benefit of the original right to sue.
11. In Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala
[(1976) 4 SCC 417] a larger Bench overruled the decision rendered
in Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia [(1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR
1973 SC 2110] insofar as it held that the requirement of the
occupation of the members of the family of the original landlord
was his personal requirement and ceased to be the requirement of
the members of his family on his death. The Court took the view
that after the death of the original landlord the senior member of
his family takes his place and is well competent to continue the suit
for eviction for his occupation and occupation of the other
members of the family. Thus, this decision held that the substituted
heirs of the deceased landlord were entitled to maintain the suit for
eviction of the tenant. The ratio of this decision by a larger Bench
does not in any manner affect the view expressed in Phool Rani
[(1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110] that where the death of
the landlord occurs after a decree for possession has been passed in
his favour, his legal representatives are entitled to defend further
proceedings like an appeal and the benefit accrued to them under
the decree. In fact, the ratio of Shantilal Thakordas [(1976) 4 SCC
417] would reinforce the aforesaid view. There are several
decisions of this Court on the same line. In Kamleshwar Prasad v.
Pradumanju Agarwal [(1997) 4 SCC 413] it was held that the
need of the landlord for the premises in question must exist on the
date of application for eviction, which is the crucial date and it is
on the said date the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted
therefrom. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the
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writ petition in the High Court, the bona fide need cannot be said
to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his
widow or any other son. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava
[(2001) 2 SCC 604] it was held that the crucial date for deciding as
to the bona fides of requirement of the landlord is the date of his
application for eviction. Here the landlord had instituted eviction
proceedings for the bona fide requirement of his son who wanted
to start a clinic. The litigation continued for a long period and
during this period the son joined the Provincial Medical Service
and was posted at different places. The subsequent event i.e. the
joining of the service by the son was not taken into consideration
on the ground that the crucial date was the date of filing of the
eviction petition. Similar view has been taken in G.C. Kapoor v.
Nand Kumar Bhasin [(2002) 1 SCC 610] . Therefore, the legal
position is well settled that the bona fide need of the landlord has
to be examined as on the date of institution of proceedings and if a
decree for eviction is passed, the death of the landlord during the
pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant will make no
difference as his heirs are fully entitled to defend the estate.
12. The High Court in the present case no doubt noticed the
decisions rendered in Phool Rani [(1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973
SC 2110] and Shantilal Thakordas [(1976) 4 SCC 417] but chose
to rely upon a decision by a two-Judge Bench rendered in P.V.
Papanna v. K. Padmanabhaiah [(1994) 2 SCC 316] . In this case
the trial court had passed a decree for eviction which was
challenged by the tenant by filing a revision in the High Court
which was dismissed but four years' time was granted to vacate the
premises. The special leave petition preferred by the tenant was
also dismissed. During the pendency of this period of four years,
the landlord died leaving a will in favour of his brothers. When the
tenant did not vacate the premises after the expiry of four years, the
appellants applied for execution of the decree. The execution
petition was allowed by the trial court and order for eviction was
passed but the order was reversed by the High Court in a revision
filed by the tenant on the ground that the cause of action did not
survive on the death of the landlord and the appellants (legatees
claiming as legal representatives of the deceased landlord) could
not execute the decree for eviction which was purely personal.
After examining several earlier decisions, the Court held as under:
(SCC p. 322, para 18)
“ 18 . For the foregoing discussion, we must hold that
events which take place subsequent to the filing of an
eviction petition under any Rent Act can be taken into
consideration for the purpose of adjudication until a
decree is made by the final court determining the rights of
the parties but any event that takes place after the decree
becomes final cannot be made a ground for reopening the
decree. The finality to the dispute culminating in the
decree cannot be reopened by the executing court for
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readjudication on the ground that some event or the other
has altered the situation. As a corollary thereto it must also
be held that once the decree became final it became a part
of the estate of the landlord and therefore the appellants as
legal representatives of the deceased landlord are entitled
to execute the same.”
13. The limited question for consideration in this case was whether
a decree which had attained finality would become unexecutable
on account of death of the landlord and this question was answered
in favour of the landlord and against the tenant basically on the
principle that the executing court cannot go behind the decree. For
the decision of the appeal it was wholly unnecessary to examine
the question as to the effect of death of the landlord during the
pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant after a decree for
eviction has been passed. The decisions rendered in Phool Rani
[(1973) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2110] and Shantilal Thakordas
[(1976) 4 SCC 417] were not brought to the notice of the Bench.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the observations made in the
aforesaid case that (SCC p. 322, para 18)
“events which take place subsequent to the filing of an
eviction petition under any Rent Act can be taken into
consideration for the purpose of adjudication until a
decree is made by the final court determining the rights of
the parties”,
which are more in the nature of obiter do not represent the correct
legal position.
14. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act says “no suit shall be
filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction …”. The
language employed does not say “no decree shall be passed …”.
So the bar created is against filing of the suit except on one of the
grounds enumerated in clauses ( a ) to ( p ) of the sub-section.
Therefore what is to be seen is whether the suit was validly filed
i.e. whether on the date of filing of the suit one of the grounds was
made out. A suit validly filed cannot be scuttled or held no longer
maintainable in absence of any specific provision to that effect.
Therefore the principle that “the need of the landlord must exist till
the decree for eviction is passed by the last court and attains
finality” can even otherwise have no application here in view of
the express language used in the section.
15. As the preamble shows, the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation
Control Act, 1961 has been enacted for expeditious trial of eviction
cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlords and
generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants. If the
subsequent event like the death of the landlord is to be taken note
of at every stage till the decree attains finality, there will be no end
to litigation. By the time a second appeal gets decided by the High
Court, generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if
during this period the landlord who instituted the proceedings dies,
the suit will have to be dismissed without going into merits. The
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same thing may happen in a fresh suit filed by the heirs and it may
become an unending process. Taking into consideration the
subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole
proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of public time.
There is no warrant for interpreting a rent control legislation in
such a manner, the basic object of which is to save harassment of
tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive
the owners of their properties for all times to come.
16. There is another aspect of the matter which needs
consideration. After the case had been remanded, the plaint had
been amended and the need of the sons had been set up who had all
attained majority by that time. The courts thereafter proceeded to
decide the controversy on the basis of the need of the sons and the
lower appellate court, after finding their need to be bona fide,
passed a decree for eviction in their favour. In the second appeal
preferred by the tenant, the High Court, instead of examining the
issues on the basis of which the case had been decided, went on to
hold that on account of death of Girdhari Lal, the need set up by
him came to an end and on that finding dismissed the suit. The
parties having amended their respective pleadings and the two
courts below having decided the matter on such amended pleadings
and the evidence adduced thereon, it was wholly impermissible on
the part of the High Court to examine the question as to the effect
of death of the original plaintiff and thereafter to dismiss the suit
on the finding that his need having come to an end, the suit ought
to have been dismissed. It is well settled that when amendment is
allowed, the proceedings have to be decided on the basis of such
amended pleadings. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view
taken by the High Court is wholly illegal.”

27. The aforesaid position has also been considered by this Court in
Mohd. Burhan & Ors. v. Shri Triloki Nath (Since Deceased)
15
Through LRs & Ors. , wherein the Court was confronted with a
similar objection arising out of the subsequent demise of the original
landlord and his wife after an eviction order had been passed
following a full-fledged trial. The Court, relying upon Shakuntala Bai
(supra) and Kamleshwar Prasad (supra), held that the subsequent
demise of the landlord did not, by itself, extinguish the bona fide
requirement already adjudicated in his favour. It was further observed
that the expression 'own use' occurring in Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC

15
2026 SCC OnLine Del 25
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Act is not to be construed narrowly so as to exclude the legitimate
requirements of the members of the landlord's family. The relevant
portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 30. In the present case, since the landlord was very much alive at
the time of and also till the passing of the first impugned order,
whereby it was established that the order of eviction was passed in
his favour as his requirement was found to be genuine, truthful and
benign when he filed the eviction petition and that too after
withstanding the prolonged trial and test of time, there could be no
extinguishment of his legal and valid right for seeking execution
qua the subject premises. On the date of filing and passing of the
first impugned order by the learned ARC, as the landlord was
alive, the cause of action for initiating the eviction petition by the
landlord was validly surviving, existing and subsisting. For ease of
reference, reliance is placed upon Shakuntala Bai case
[ Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das , (2004) 5 SCC 772] wherein the
Supreme Court has clearly held as under: (SCC pp. 780-82, paras
11 & 15)
“ 11. … Therefore, the legal position is well settled that the
bona fide need of the landlord has to be examined as on
the date of institution of proceedings and if a decree for
eviction is passed, the death of the landlord during the
pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant will make
no difference as his heirs are fully entitled to defend the
estate.
∗∗∗
15. As the preamble shows, the M.P. Accommodation
Control Act, 1961 has been enacted for expeditious trial of
eviction cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of
landlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of
tenants. If the subsequent event like the death of the
landlord is to be taken note of at every stage till the decree
attains finality, there will be no end to litigation. By the
time a second appeal gets decided by the High Court,
generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if
during this period the landlord who instituted the
proceedings dies, the suit will have to be dismissed
without going into merits. The same thing may happen in a
fresh suit filed by the heirs and it may become an
unending process. Taking into consideration the
subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the
whole proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of
public time. There is no warrant for interpreting a rent
control legislation in such a manner, the basic object of
which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous
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landlords. The object is not to deprive the owners of their
properties for all times to come.”
(emphasis supplied)
31. Same is the view expressed by the Supreme Court in
Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal [ Kamleshwar
Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal , (1997) 4 SCC 413] .
32. A perusal of Prem Chand case [ Prem Chand v. Subhash
Chand Saini , 2012 SCC OnLine Del 4607] , Inderchand Jain case
[ Inderchand Jain v. Motilal , (2009) 14 SCC 663 : (2009) 5 SCC
(Civ) 461] , Education Directorate case [ Education Directorate v.
Mohd. Shamim , 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11490] , Jungli case
[ Jungli v. Syed Waris Ali , 1974 SCC OnLine Del 59 : (1975) 11
DLT 132] and Sheshambal case [ Sheshambal v. Chelur Corpn.
Chelur Building , (2010) 3 SCC 470 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 737]
reveal that none of them are/can be applicable to the facts and
circumstances involved herein as they were all cases wherein the
landlord expired during the pendency of the litigation i.e. before
passing of the final judgment or there were concealment. Those
were cases wherein the right of the landlord(s) therein stood
extinguished by default. Here is a case where, admittedly , the
landlord was very much alive when the first impugned order was
passed by the learned ARC.
33. Similarly, perusal of Hasmat Rai case [ Hasmat Rai v.
Raghunath Prasad , (1981) 3 SCC 103] and Ramesh Kumar case
[ Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram , 1992 Supp (2) SCC 623 : AIR
1992 SC 700] also reveal that they cannot come to the aid of the
tenants as they all are not pertaining to the DRC Act, where there
is no scope of an appeal against an order of eviction passed by the
learned ARC while disposing of an eviction petition under Section
14(1)( e ) of the DRC Act and the only remedy available is one
under the revisional jurisdiction. This Court cannot be expected to
import provisions of another/parallel statute and that too of an
appeal into the DRC Act, when it is in itself silent about the same,
just to somehow expand the already available scope there. Doing
so, would be against the very purport, intent and principles of the
DRC Act. This Court cannot ignore that Section 14(1)( e ) and the
intent of introducing Section 25-B in the DRC Act thereafter
was/is as a summary procedure as per the prevailing circumstances
within Delhi.
34. Lastly, in the context of the DRC Act, where there is no
provision of an appeal and the only remedy available is that of a
review, as held by the Supreme Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval
Kishore Behal [ Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal , (2002) 5
SCC 397] and followed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in
Labhu Lal v. Sandhya Gupta [ Labhu Lal v. Sandhya Gupta , 2010
SCC OnLine Del 3423 : (2010) 173 DLT 318] , in a pari-materia
provision, the bona fide need cannot be interpreted narrowly or
restrictively as being confined only to the personal use of the
landlord. The expression “ own use ” in DRC Act is of wide import
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and encompasses the legitimate needs of the members of the
landlord's family as also it is a moral obligation of a parent to settle
their children and help them to attain economic independence and
such a need by a landlord is undoubtedly bona fide . Merely
because the landlord in a proceedings under the DRC Act has
expired does not mean that his need for the subject premises has
extinguished, particularly, whence there is no dispute that both the
son and daughter are his legal heirs and both of them are alive.
35. Although, principles of natural justice, equity, conscience and
balance of convenience are not factors on merits, however, before
parting, this Court wishes to express that under the given facts and
circumstances involved, agreeing with the interpretation sought to
be given by the learned counsel for the tenants would amount to
relegating the parties to another long drawn litigation only because
the landlord has expired after having an order of eviction from a
court of law in his favour and that too after a full-fledged trial.
36. Therefore, there is no scope of interference by this Court in the
second impugned order dated 19-7-2023 passed by the learned
review court as well. Consequently, based on the foregoing, there
is no interference warranted by this Court in either of the two
impugned order(s).”

28. The aforesaid decisions, therefore, make it clear that while
subsequent events may be taken into consideration where they
completely eclipse the requirement originally pleaded, the mere
demise of the landlord after an order of eviction has already been
passed cannot, by itself, be treated as sufficient to nullify the
adjudicated claim. The Court must examine the nature of the original
requirement, the stage at which the subsequent event occurred and
whether any part of the requirement continues to subsist in favour of
the surviving legal representatives.
29. This Court has also considered the judgments relied upon by the
Petitioner. However, the same do not advance the case sought to be set
up by him. In V . Ramanathan (supra), the subsequent demise of the
landlady was considered along with other intervening developments,
including the marriage of her daughters and the availability of
sufficient alternative accommodation with the surviving family. It was
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in the backdrop of those cumulative circumstances, which
demonstrated that the requirement had substantially diminished, that
the eviction order was set aside. The said decision, therefore, cannot
be construed as laying down an absolute proposition that the
subsequent demise of a landlord, by itself, extinguishes an eviction
order already passed in his or her favour.
30. Similarly, in Gurinder Singh (supra), the eviction petition had
been instituted exclusively to meet the requirement of the landlady's
son for opening an office. Upon his subsequent demise, this Court
held that the very requirement forming the foundation of the eviction
proceedings no longer survived. The factual position in the present
case is materially distinguishable, inasmuch as the original
Respondent had pleaded not merely the requirement of her husband
for the computer institute, but also her own requirement for an LIC
office and, importantly, the requirement of the premises for residential
purposes. The present case, therefore, cannot be equated with one
where the entire eviction claim was founded exclusively upon the
personal requirement of the deceased person.
31. The reliance placed upon Kedar Nath Agrawal (Dead) & Anr.
(supra) and Gaya Prasad (supra), also does not assist the Petitioner
beyond the settled proposition that subsequent events may be taken
into consideration where they materially affect the relief claimed.
Neither of the aforesaid decisions lays down that every subsequent
development, including the death of the landlord, must invariably
result in the dismissal of an eviction petition. On the contrary, as
noticed hereinabove, the subsequent event must be of such a nature as
to completely eclipse the requirement originally pleaded. The said
principle has to be read harmoniously with the subsequent
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pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shakuntala Bai
(supra) and Kamleshwar Prasad (supra), which specifically recognise
the survival of an eviction order despite the subsequent demise of the
original landlord.
32. Reliance placed by the Respondent upon Keshav Bhaurao
Yeole (supra), Gopal Krishan (supra) and Raghubir Saran (supra)
further support the settled position that the legal representatives of a
deceased landlord step into his shoes and are entitled to pursue and
defend the rights accruing under an eviction order. The aforesaid
decisions lend further support to the position that the subsequent
demise of the original Respondent and her husband does not, by itself,
extinguish the rights accrued under the Impugned Judgment.
33. In the present case, the Impugned Judgment was passed on
18.04.2019, whereas the husband of the original Respondent passed
away on 22.04.2021 and the original Respondent herself passed away
on 27.04.2021. Thus, both deaths occurred more than two (02) years
after the learned Rent Controller had adjudicated the bona fide
requirement and passed the eviction order in favour of the original
Respondent. The Petitioner is, therefore, seeking to rely upon events
which occurred subsequent to the adjudication of the Eviction
Petition, to unsettle an order which had already conferred upon the
original Respondent the right to recover possession of the tenanted
premises.
34. This Court is unable to accept the contention that the aforesaid
subsequent events, by themselves, completely eclipse the bona fide
requirement which had been adjudicated by the learned Rent
Controller. As noticed hereinabove, the Eviction Petition was founded
upon three requirements, of which the requirement for residential
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purposes was not confined exclusively to either the original
Respondent or her husband. The original Respondent and her husband
were survived by their daughter, Ms. Kashvi Singh, who has since
been brought on record as the legal representative of the deceased
Respondent. Consequently, the demise of the original Respondent and
her husband cannot be construed as automatically extinguishing the
residential requirement pleaded for the family, particularly when the
surviving daughter continues to be a member of the family and has
succeeded to the estate of the deceased Respondent.
35. It is further pertinent to observe that upon the demise of the
original Respondent, her daughter, Ms. Kashvi Singh, having been
brought on record as her legal representative, steps into the shoes of
the deceased Respondent and succeeds to the rights and interests
accruing to her under the Impugned Judgment. In this regard, reliance
may be placed upon the decision of this Court in Mohd. Burhan &
Ors. (supra), wherein, while considering the effect of the demise of the
original landlord, this Court observed that the expression 'own use'
occurring in Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act is of wide import and
encompasses the legitimate requirements of the members of the
landlord's family. It was further observed that the moral obligation of
a parent to settle their children and facilitate their economic
independence constitutes a legitimate bona fide requirement. The
relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“34. Lastly, in the context of the DRC Act, where there is no
provision of an appeal and the only remedy available is that of a
review, as held by the Supreme Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval
Kishore Behal [ Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal , (2002) 5
SCC 397] and followed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in
Labhu Lal v. Sandhya Gupta [ Labhu Lal v. Sandhya Gupta , 2010
SCC OnLine Del 3423 : (2010) 173 DLT 318] , in a pari-materia
provision, the bona fide need cannot be interpreted narrowly or
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restrictively as being confined only to the personal use of the
landlord. The expression “ own use ” in DRC Act is of wide import
and encompasses the legitimate needs of the members of the
landlord's family as also it is a moral obligation of a parent to settle
their children and help them to attain economic independence and
such a need by a landlord is undoubtedly bona fide . Merely
because the landlord in a proceedings under the DRC Act has
expired does not mean that his need for the subject premises has
extinguished, particularly, whence there is no dispute that both the
son and daughter are his legal heirs and both of them are alive.”

36. The aforesaid principle assumes significance in the present
case, particularly when the original Eviction Petition had also been
instituted on the ground of residential requirement of the family, and
the daughter of the original Respondent continues to survive as her
legal heir. Thus, the subsequent demise of the original Respondent
and her husband cannot, in the facts of the present case, be construed
as having completely extinguished the requirement which had already
been adjudicated in their favour.
37. It is also significant that the Petitioner has sought to treat the
three requirements pleaded in the Eviction Petition as though the
entire claim was founded exclusively upon the computer coaching
institute operated by the deceased husband or upon the requirement of
the original Respondent to open an office. Such an interpretation does
not accord with the findings recorded in the Impugned Judgment
itself, wherein the learned Rent Controller, after examining the three
requirements pleaded by the original Respondent and the evidence led
by the parties, ultimately returned a finding that the bona fide
requirement stood established. The fact that one of the requirements
was attributable to the husband and another to the original Respondent
cannot, in the absence of any other circumstance completely eclipsing
the entire claim, lead to the conclusion that the Impugned Judgment
itself stands extinguished.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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38. It is trite that the legal representatives of a deceased landlord
step into the estate of the deceased and are entitled to pursue and
defend the rights accruing thereunder. The subsequent demise of the
original Respondent and her husband, having occurred after the
Impugned Judgment was passed, cannot be employed as a standalone
ground to deprive the surviving legal representative of the benefit of
an order already passed in favour of her predecessor-in-interest. The
Petitioner has, therefore, failed to demonstrate that the subsequent
events relied upon by him are of such a nature and dimension as
would warrant setting aside the Impugned Judgment.
39. This Court has also considered the subsequent-event
Applications, being CM APPL. 7006/2022 and CM APPL.
9241/2026, along with the replies filed thereto. In CM APPL.
7006/2022, the Petitioner brought on record the demise of the original
Respondent and her husband, stating that they were survived by their
minor daughter, Ms. Kashvi Singh. It was further alleged that,
following their demise, a portion of the property had been let out to
Anmol and Dipanshu for running a tuition centre. Subsequently, by
way of CM APPL. 9241/2026, the Petitioner reiterated the aforesaid
allegations and further contended that Ms. Kashvi Singh had attained
majority and entered into a Rent Agreement for continuation of the
tuition centre, besides alleging that another shop, earlier under the
tenancy of Tara Singh, continued to remain locked and unused.
40. The Respondent, through her legal representative, has disputed
the aforesaid allegations, contending that no Rent Agreement has been
placed on record and that the photograph relied upon by the Petitioner
does not establish the alleged tenancy, its duration or terms. It has also
been contended that the alleged availability of the shop previously
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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occupied by Tara Singh does not establish its suitability or availability
for the requirement in question. The Respondent has further disputed
the maintainability of the aforesaid Applications and raised objections
regarding the Petitioner's compliance with the interim directions
passed by this Court.
41. Having considered the rival contentions, this Court finds that
the aforesaid allegations, particularly in the absence of cogent material
establishing the alleged subsequent tenancy or the suitability of the
other shop, do not demonstrate that the bona fide requirement
adjudicated by the learned Rent Controller stood completely eclipsed.
Accordingly, the subsequent events pleaded in the aforesaid
Applications do not furnish any ground for interference with the
Impugned Judgment.
42. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in
the contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioner that the bona fide
requirement stood completely extinguished upon the demise of the
original Respondent and her husband. The Judgments relied upon by
the Petitioner are distinguishable on their respective facts and do not
warrant a different conclusion in the present case. The Impugned
Judgment does not call for interference on the grounds urged in the
present Revision Petition.

CONCLUSION:
43. Consequently, the Applications seeking to bring subsequent
events on record, being CM APPL. 7006/2022 and CM APPL.
9241/2026, are allowed to the extent of taking the subsequent events
pleaded therein on record. However, the said subsequent events do not
warrant interference with the Impugned Judgment.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:02:20

44. This Court finds no illegality, material irregularity or
jurisdictional error in the impugned judgment warranting interference
in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. In view thereof,
the present Revision Petition being devoid of merits, is dismissed. The
Impugned Judgment and Eviction Order dated 18.04.2019 passed by
the learned Rent Controller are upheld.
45. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
Application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 20, 2026/ma


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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:02:20