The State By Lokayuktha Police vs K. Rangayya
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 574
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). OF 2026
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.5245 of 2025)
THE STATE BY LOKAYUKTHA POLICE …... APPELLANT (S)
Versus
SRI K. RANGAYYA & ANR. ... RESPONDENT (S)
J U D G M E N T
NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal, filed by the State through the
Lokayuktha Police, Karnataka, challenges the impugned
final Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2024 passed by the
High Court of Karnataka at Dharwad in Writ Petition No.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHA SUNDRIYAL
Date: 2026.05.27
16:57:49 IST
Reason:
104236 of 2023, whereby the High Court allowed the writ
Page 1 of 37
petition filed by the Respondent No. 1 – Sri K. Rangayya and
quashed the FIR bearing Crime No. 04/2023 dated
03.06.2023, registered against the Respondent No. 1 under
Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as “PC Act”), at the Karnataka
Lokayukta Police Station, Bellary, along with all proceedings
emanating therefrom qua the said Respondent No. 1, on the
ground that, there was neither any demand made by the
Respondent No. 1 nor any acceptance of any money by him.
3. The facts material to the adjudication of this matter, as
regards the prosecution case and as emerging from the
record before us are that the Respondent No. 1 was serving
as a Police Sub-Inspector (hereinafter “PSI”) posted at
Siruguppa Police Station, Bellary District, Karnataka. On
15.03.2023, in the afternoon hours, when the Respondent
No. 2/Complainant was near Gadyala Maremmana Temple,
the Respondent No. 1 accompanied by other police officials
approached him, threatened him with accusations of illegally
selling ration rice, and seized his Suzuki Access 125 two-
wheeler bearing registration No. KA-01 HF 1343 and his
Page 2 of 37
Redmi mobile phone. The Complainant was instructed to
report to the police station. When he did so, he was informed
that a case had been registered against him on the ground
that the Complainant had been transporting rice meant for
sale through the Fair Price Depots.
4. From 15.03.2023 until 01.06.2023, the Complainant
repeatedly visited the police station on several occasions
seeking the return of his seized two-wheeler and mobile
phone. On each occasion, he was avoided by the police
officials and no resolution was forthcoming.
5. On 28.05.2023, when the Complainant again visited
the police station and met the Respondent No. 1, the latter
informed him that he had spoken to one Mohammed Ali
(Accused No. 3), a private person also known to the
Complainant, regarding the matter. The Complainant
thereupon telephoned Mohammed Ali (Accused No. 3), who
demanded a sum of Rs. 50,000 (Fifty Thousand) on behalf
of and on the instructions of the Respondent No. 1.
6. On 01.06.2023, the Complainant met the Respondent
No. 1, who called the Police Constable Kashinath (Accused
Page 3 of 37
No. 2) and directed him to release the two-wheeler. The
Respondent No. 1 simultaneously stated that “ you have not
done anything to me, please do something to these boys and
go ” to the Complainant, which meant that as nothing had
been done for the Respondent No.1, the Complainant should
at least do something for the other police officials.
7. It has been further alleged that subsequently, acting
upon the instructions and on behalf of the Respondent No.
1, Constable Kashinath (Accused No. 2) demanded a bribe
of Rs. 5,000 from the Complainant, which amount was
thereafter on negotiation reduced to Rs. 3,000, along with
an additional penalty of Rs. 500.
8. Being aggrieved and unwilling to pay the demanded
bribe, the Complainant filed a complaint dated 03.06.2023
before the Appellant i.e., the Karnataka Lokayukta Police,
Bellary. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, an FIR
bearing Crime No. 04/2023 dated 03.06.2023 was
registered under Section 7(a) of the PC Act against the
Respondent No. 1 (Accused No. 1), Constable Kashinath
(Accused No. 2), and Mohammed Ali (Accused No. 3).
Page 4 of 37
9. The Appellant, thereafter, laid a trap on 04.06.2023.
The Complainant contacted Accused No. 2 to arrange a
meeting. However, as the presence of the Respondent No. 1
could not be confirmed, the trap on that day could not be set
up.
10. A second trap was then arranged on 09.06.2023 at the
office of the Respondent No. 1. On this occasion, the
Respondent No. 1 was found to be absent from his office. The
Complainant then met one Venkatesh (Accused No. 4), not
originally named in the FIR, and acting upon the
instructions of the Venkatesh (Accused No. 4), the bribe
amount was placed in a cloth bag which was recovered from
Venkatesh (Accused No.4).
11. The Respondent No. 1, aggrieved by the registration of
the aforesaid FIR, filed a writ petition, being Writ Petition
No. 104236/2023 before the High Court of Karnataka
seeking quashing of the aforesaid FIR under Crime No.
04/2023 and all proceedings arising therefrom qua him.
12. Vide the impugned final Judgment and Order dated
23.01.2024, the High Court allowed the writ petition and
Page 5 of 37
quashed the FIR and all the proceedings against the
Respondent No. 1, essentially by holding that the basic
ingredients of Section 7 of the PC Act, namely, demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification, were not made out on the
face of the allegations.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
By the Appellant:
13. Learned counsel for the Appellant advanced the
following submissions:
i. That the High Court gravely erred in quashing
the FIR at the nascent stage of investigation, thereby
usurping the statutory powers of the investigating
agency by undertaking a detailed examination of the
facts, credibility of the allegations, and the outcome
of the trap proceeding. Thus, the High Court
essentially conducted a mini-trial while exercising
its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, which is wholly impermissible.
Page 6 of 37
ii. That the facts and circumstances of the present
case disclose a strong prima facie case against the
Respondent no.1.
iii. That Section 7 of the PC Act punishes not
merely the act of obtaining or accepting an undue
advantage but expressly includes the ‘attempt to
obtain’ an undue advantage. Furthermore,
Explanation 2 to Section 7 of the PC Act
categorically provides that it is immaterial whether
the undue advantage is obtained directly or through
a third party.
iv. That the High Court erroneously concluded
that since the Respondent No. 1 did not demand
money for himself, the ingredient of demand was
absent. This interpretation is contrary to law. The
breadth of Section 7(a) read with Explanation 2
thereto is wide enough to encompass demand made
through subordinates or third parties. If such an
interpretation were to be upheld, it would create a
dangerous loophole enabling senior officials to
Page 7 of 37
orchestrate the collection of illegal gratification
through their subordinates while maintaining
personal deniability, thereby defeating the very
object and purpose of the PC Act.
v. That the reliance placed by Respondent No. 1
1
upon K. Shanthamma v. State of Telangana , is
wholly misplaced as this judgment was rendered
after the trial was concluded, upon appreciation of
evidence led in the course of the trial. The standards
and principles applicable to the evaluation of
evidence at the stage of trial are entirely distinct
from and cannot be applicable at the threshold stage
of considering whether a prima facie case has been
made out of the offence for the purpose of quashing
of the FIR.
vi. That the departmental enquiry report relied
upon by the Respondent No. 1 is completely
irrelevant and misplaced, inasmuch as: (i) the
standards of proof in a departmental enquiry are
1
(2022) 4 SCC 574
Page 8 of 37
entirely different from those applicable in a criminal
trial; and (ii) the said report was not before the High
Court. The findings of such an enquiry concerning
subordinate officers cannot absolve the principal
accused Respondent No. 1 from criminal liabilities.
vii. That the fact that a witness or the
Complainant may turn hostile in one forum is a
matter to be evaluated at trial, and a case can still
be established through other evidence, including
recorded conversations and the testimony of
independent witnesses.
By the Respondent No.1:
14. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1 advanced the
following submissions:
i. That the genesis of the complaint lies in the
previous hostility existing between the Complainant
and Respondent No. 1. The Respondent No. 1 had in
an earlier complaint filed by the Complainant on
20.01.2022 against one Janardhan which was
Page 9 of 37
registered as Crime No.25/2022, refused to invoke
Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code against the
aforesaid accused in the charge-sheet. Thereafter, a
complaint came to be filed on 15.03.2023 alleging
illegal transportation of rice meant for ration card
holders in connection with which the Respondent
No.1 registered an FIR case in Crime No. 48/2023
under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 against
unknown persons. During the investigation, it was
found that the Respondent No.2 was a driver of the
transporting vehicle and, thus, involved in the illegal
transportation of rice. According to the Respondent
No.1, the present FIR is a retaliatory act motivated
by malice.
ii. The two trap proceedings were conducted on
04.06.2023 and 09.06.2023. On both the occasions,
the Respondent No. 1 was not present, no recovery
whatsoever was effected from him, and the
phenolphthalein test as well as sodium carbonate
Page 10 of 37
test were negative insofar as the Respondent No. 1
was concerned.
iii. That the High Court exercised its jurisdiction
consistent with the principles laid down by this
2
Hon'ble Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ,
which recognizes that quashing is appropriate
where the allegations, taken at face value, do not
disclose the commission of any offence, or where the
complaint is manifestly attended with mala fides.
iv. That Section 7(a) of the PC Act requires proof of
both demand and acceptance. Neither exists in the
present case. Mere vague or casual words cannot
constitute a demand under law, as held by this
3
Hon'ble Court in Soundarajan v. State , and
4
Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab .
v. That the involvement of Accused No. 3
(Mohammed Ali) in a telephonic conversation does
not implicate the Respondent No. 1 directly, as the
2
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
3
(2023) 16 SCC 141
4
(2023) 19 SCC 498
Page 11 of 37
said conversation lacks the necessary details to
establish a demand or agreement for illegal
gratification. The investigation has failed to
establish any direct link between the Respondent
No. 1 and the alleged illegal demand.
vi. That the departmental enquiry conducted in
respect of the trap proceedings exonerated
Venkatesh (Accused No.4) and G. Ramesh (Accused
No.5) from all allegations, which is a significant
finding militating against the prosecution's case.
vii. That this Court, in K. Shanthamma v. State
5
of Telangana , has clearly held that both demand
and acceptance are sine qua non for establishing an
offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The High
Court rightly applied this principle while quashing
the FIR.
5
(2022) 4 SCC 574
Page 12 of 37
ANALYSIS
15. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective
parties and have perused the material on record.
(A) Scope of power to quash an FIR
16. The power to quash an FIR vested in the High Court
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”) is an extraordinary and
discretionary power, which must be exercised sparingly and
with great circumspection. This Court has consistently held
that at the stage of considering a petition for quashing an
FIR, the Court is not required to examine the merits of the
allegations or to evaluate the evidence that may ultimately
be led at trial. The sole and limited inquiry at this threshold
stage is whether the allegations set out in the FIR, taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety as true, prima
facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence against
the accused. It is not permissible for the Court to conduct
what amounts to a mini-trial by sifting through the evidence,
assessing probabilities, or weighing the credibility of
Page 13 of 37
witnesses, for these are functions exclusively reserved for the
court of trial.
17. In the present case, the High Court, in our considered
opinion, has traversed beyond the permissible limits of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 in exercising the power under
Section 482 CrPC. Rather than confining itself ascertaining
as to whether any prima facie case has been made out of
commission of offence on the basis of the contents of the FIR,
the High Court proceeded to examine the outcome of the trap
proceedings, the absence of personal recovery from
Respondent No. 1, the result of the phenolphthalein test, and
the findings of a departmental enquiry against some of the
accused, all of which are matters of evidence to be evaluated
at the stage of trial. By undertaking such a detailed
examination, the High Court has in effect conducted a mini-
trial, which is fundamentally contrary to the settled
principles governing the exercise of the quashing
jurisdiction.
Page 14 of 37
(B) Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988: Scope and Ambit
18. In order to appreciate the contention of the Appellant,
it is necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of the PC
Act. Section 7(a) of the PC Act reads as follows:
‘‘ 7. Offence relating to public servant being
bribed .—Any public servant who,—
(a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from
any person, an undue advantage, with the
intention to perform or cause performance of public
duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or
cause forbearance to perform such duty either by
himself or by another public servant’’
Section 7 is further clarified by Explanation 2, which
provides that,
“ Explanation 2 .—For the purpose of this section,—
(i) the expressions “obtains” or “accepts” or
“attempts to obtain” shall cover cases where a
person being a public servant, obtains or “accepts”
or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for
himself or for another person, by abusing his
position as a public servant or by using his
personal influence over another public servant; or
by any other corrupt or illegal means;
(ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person
being a public servant obtains or accepts, or
attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or
through a third party.”
Page 15 of 37
19. As we proceed to examine the issue at hand, it would
be necessary ascertain the ingredients of Section 7(a) of the
PC Act under which the Respondent No.1 has been charged.
When we split Section 7(a) of the PC Act, it consists of
the following parts:
(i) The charged person must be a public servant;
(ii) Such a public servant should be charged of
obtaining or accepting or attempting to obtain an
undue advantage;
(iii) from any person;
(iv) with the intention to
(a) perform or cause performance of public duty;
(b) improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or
cause forbearance to perform such duty;
(v) such act of performance or forbearance is to be
done either
(a) by himself; or
(b) by another public servant.
If the aforesaid parts or ingredients are disclosed, such
a public servant can be charged of committing offence
contemplated under Section 7(a) of the PC Act.
Page 16 of 37
20. Reading of Section 7(a) of the PC Act, however, would
indicate that it will apply when the public servant himself
obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain the undue
advantage, by doing such acts with the intention as
mentioned in the aforesaid Clause (a).
However, it appears that the Explanation 2(i) to Section
7 has enlarged the scope of the offence by not restricting the
beneficiaries to the public servant himself only but to
“another person” also. Explanation 2 (i) to Section 7 expands
the scope of the beneficiaries by not confining only to the
public servant who obtains, accepts or attempts to obtain
an undue advantage, but also in favour of “another person”
who may or may not be a “public servant” as there is no
qualification to the words “another person”. Thus,
Explanation 2(i) clearly mentions that for the purpose of
Section 7, the expressions “obtains” or “accepts” or
“attempts to obtain” shall cover cases where a person being
a public servant, obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain,
any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by
abusing his position as a public servant or by using his
Page 17 of 37
personal influence over another public servant; or by any
other corrupt or illegal means.
Further, Explanation 2(ii) provides that it shall be
immaterial whether such person being a public servant
obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue
advantage directly or through a third party.
21. Therefore, it is clear from Section 7(a) read with
Explanation 2(i) that it is not necessary that the public
servant himself has to obtain or accept or attempt to obtain
undue advantage for himself only, but such undue
advantage can be obtained or accepted or attempted to be
obtained for “another person” also.
Further, as per Explanation 2(i) such
obtaining/accepting/attempting to obtain undue
advantages can be by way of abusing the position of public
servant himself but also by using the personal influence over
“ another public servant ”. Therefore, Explanation 2 clearly
provides that the aforesaid act of performing the public duty
improperly/dishonestly or refraining to perform the public
Page 18 of 37
duty can be by himself or by another public servant by using
influence by the concerned public servant.
22. Thus, such an offending act can be done by “another
public servant” also under the personal influence of the
concerned public servant. What we, therefore, understand
from the reading of Section 7 (a) of the PC Act read with
Explanation 2, is that, it is not necessary that the public
servant who has been charged of the offence under Section
7 of the PC Act has to obtain the undue benefit for himself,
but it also covers cases where he does the offensive act for
obtaining undue advantages for “another person”, and this
act may be done by himself by abusing his position, or may
be executed through another public servant by using his
personal influence over the other public servant.
Therefore, in the light of the above provision, a public
servant may not be directly a recipient or the executor of the
offensive act and thus, may not be in the limelight and
remain in the background. Nevertheless, he can be
instrumental in ensuring obtaining, accepting or attempting
to obtain from another person the undue advantage for
Page 19 of 37
“another person” by taking the help of “another public
servant”. Such public servant who has been charged of
offence under Section 7(a) may be the main instrumentality,
through whom undue advantage is obtained and/or
arranged through other public servant.
Keeping the aforesaid broad scope of Section 7(a) read
with Explanation 2, we must consider the issue on hand.
23. Applying this understanding to the facts of the present
case, it is manifest that the allegations in the complaint,
taken at their face value, disclose at the very minimum, an
attempt by the Respondent No. 1, a public servant to obtain
an undue advantage from the Complainant if not for himself
but definitely for his subordinates i.e. for another person as
contemplated under Explanation 2(i) to Section 7 of the PC
Act. The specific allegation attributed to the Respondent No.
1 is him directing the Complainant that he should ‘ do
something for the other police officials’ or ‘ make those boys
happy ’ which constitutes a veiled demand for illegal
gratification or undue advantage for these persons who were
closely associated with him officially. This direction, as
Page 20 of 37
alleged, was immediately followed by a demand from the
Accused No. 2 for Rs. 5,000, which further corroborates the
causal nexus between the instruction of Respondent No. 1
and the subsequent demand made by his subordinate.
24. The High Court fell into a grave error in characterizing
the aforesaid conduct of the Respondent No. 1 as
insufficiently proximate to constitute a ‘demand’ within the
meaning of Section 7 of the PC Act. The High Court appears
to have imported a requirement of a direct, personal, and
express demand by the public servant himself by not taking
into consideration Explanation 2, a standard not warranted
by the broad statutory language. The PC Act does not
countenance any such straitjacketed formulation limiting to
acts of demand and acceptance of bribe by the official himself
as explained by expansive provision of Explanation 2. It can
be for obtaining the undue advantage “for another person”
also. Further, an attempt to obtain a bribe through
subordinates who are also public servants, is precisely the
kind of indirect corruption that the legislature, by enacting
Page 21 of 37
Explanation 2 to Section 7, has sought to bring within the
fold of the statute.
25. The interpretation adopted by the High Court, if
permitted to stand, would limit the broad scope of Section 7
read with Explanation 2, and would create a pernicious
loophole in the anti-corruption law by permitting senior
public officials to orchestrate and direct the collection of
illegal gratification through their public servant
subordinates and park the benefits in the account of the
“another person” for whose benefit the public servant
intends, while maintaining personal deniability. Such a
construction would subvert the manifest purpose and policy
of the PC Act and render the Explanation 2 redundant, and
thus, cannot be countenanced.
26. In this regard, it is apposite to note the legal proposition
as set out in the observations of this Court in Devinder
6
Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab :
“ 12. Further it is seen that, Section 7 speaks of the
“attempt” to obtain a bribe as being in itself an
offence. Mere demand or solicitation, therefore, by a
6
(2025) 4 SCC 493
Page 22 of 37
public servant amounts to commission of an offence
under Section 7 of the PC Act. The word “attempt” is
to imply no more than a mere solicitation, which,
again may be made as effectually in implicit or in
explicit terms.
13. Actual exchange of a bribe is not an essential
requirement to be prosecuted under this law.
Further, those public servants, who do not take a
bribe directly, but, through middlemen or touts, and
those who take valuable things from a person with
whom they have or are likely to have official
dealings, are also punishable as per Sections 10
and 11 of the 1988 Act, respectively.
14. *
15. We may also refer to a Division Bench decision
of the Bombay High Court in Damodar Krishna
Kamli v. State [Damodar Krishna Kamli v. State,
1954 SCC OnLine Bom 72 : 1955 Cri LJ 181] . P.B.
Gajendragadkar, J. (as his Lordship then was),
speaking for the Bench, observed as under : (SCC
OnLine Bom para 9)
“9. … If we turn to Section 161, it would be
clear that a public servant would be guilty of
the offence of taking gratification under the
said section even if he agrees to accept the
prohibited gratification. It is thus not
necessary in order to bring home to the public
servant the charge under Section 161 to prove
that he has actually accepted or obtained
illegal gratification. It would be enough if it be
shown that he had agreed to accept the said
illegal gratification. In other words, if a
proposal is made to the public servant in
respect of payment of illegal gratification and
the proposal is accepted by the public servant,
Page 23 of 37
he would be guilty under Section 161 of the
Penal Code.”
16. Section 161 of the Penal Code, 1860 came to
be omitted at the time when the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 came to be repealed and the
Prevention of Corruption of Act, 1988 came into
force. Section 161 IPC is pari materia to Section 7
of the 1988 Act . ”
27. Mere demand or solicitation, therefore, by a public
servant may amount to commission of an offence under
Section 7 of the PC Act. The word ‘attempt’ is to imply no
more than a mere solicitation, which, again, may be made as
effectually in implicit or in explicit terms. This Court further
observed therein that “actual exchange of a bribe is not an
essential requirement to be prosecuted under this law” and
that those public servants who do not take a bribe directly
but through middlemen are equally made liable under the
provisions of the PC Act, 1988. These observations, though
rendered in the context of grant of anticipatory bail in a case
involving offence under Section 7 of the PC act, firmly reflect
the legislative policy pervading the PC Act that an attempt to
obtain undue advantage whether for oneself or for another,
and whether directly or through intermediaries is equally
Page 24 of 37
culpable under Section 7 read with Explanation 2 of the Act.
The Respondent No. 1’s implicit yet unmistakable direction
to the Complainant to provide illegal gratification to his
subordinate police officials as disclosed in the records thus
falls squarely within the scope of “attempt to obtain” an
“undue advantage” “for another person,” as contemplated by
Explanation 2(i) to Section 7 of the PC Act. The fact that the
Respondent No. 1 may not personally have received or even
intended to receive any part of the illegal gratification is
entirely immaterial to the establishment of the offence at the
stage of prima facie inquiry, by reason of the express
statutory language of Explanation 2 to Section 7 of the PC
Act.
(C) Distinction of Judgments Relied Upon by Respondent
No. 1
28. We now advert to the three judgments relied upon by
Respondent No. 1 in support of the impugned order, in each
of which this Court considered the applicability of Section 7
of the PC Act.
Page 25 of 37
7
(i) K. Shanthamma v. State of Telangana , In
this case, this Court was called upon to examine the
correctness of the conviction of the appellant who
had been convicted by the Special Court under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
PC Act, and whose conviction had been confirmed in
appeal by the High Court of Telangana. The
appellant was a Commercial Tax Officer and the
allegation against her was of demanding a bribe of
Rs. 3,000 for issuing an assessment order. The
prosecution's case rested primarily on the sole
testimony of PW 1, the complainant, whose evidence
on the question of demand was found to be
unreliable because of improvement over his prior
statements and being replete with inconsistencies.
Upon a full and complete appreciation of the
evidence adduced at trial, this Court set aside the
conviction.
7
(2022) 4 SCC 574
Page 26 of 37
The said judgment arose after a full trial. The
principles enunciated therein regarding the
reliability of evidence of demand and acceptance are
applicable only at the stage of trial when the court
is called upon to evaluate the evidence adduced by
the prosecution and to determine whether the
charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
They have no application at the stage of quashing an
FIR, when the court is only required to determine
whether the allegations, taken at face value, prima
facie disclose a cognizable offence.
(ii) Soundarajan v. State Represented by the
8
Inspector of Police , In this case, this Court was
called upon to examine the conviction of the
appellant, a Sub-Registrar, who had been convicted
under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section
13(1)(d) of the PC Act for demanding Rs. 500 from
the complainant for handing over a registered sale
deed. The conviction had been confirmed by the
8
(2023) 16 SCC 141
Page 27 of 37
High Court of Madras. This Court, upon examining
the evidence on record, found that the complainant
had not stated anything in his examination-in-chief
about the demand made by the appellant, nor had
the shadow witness stated in his examination-in-
chief that the appellant had made a specific demand
for gratification in the presence of the complainant.
Applying the principles laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT
9
of Delhi) , this Court set aside the conviction on the
ground that demand for gratification had not been
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
This judgment too was rendered in the context
of a completed trial, on the basis of a full
appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution.
The standard of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’
which is the yardstick for sustaining a conviction at
9
(2023) 4 SCC 731
Page 28 of 37
the end of trial has no applicability at the threshold
stage of quashing an FIR.
10
(iii) Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab , In this
case too, the Court was concerned with a criminal
appeal against a conviction by the trial court that
had been upheld by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana. The appellant had been convicted for
demanding Rs. 500 as illegal gratification for
supplying a death certificate. At trial, the
complainant as well as the shadow witness had
turned hostile. The only witness who had deposed
about recovery was PW 8 (the District Social
Security Officer), who stated that he recovered the
currency notes from the appellant. This Court,
applying the principles enunciated in the
Constitution Bench judgment in Neeraj Dutta
( supra ), found that there was no evidence on record
to prove the demand of illegal gratification and that
10
(2023) 19 SCC 498
Page 29 of 37
the High Court had incorrectly drawn an inference
of demand solely from the fact of recovery. The
conviction was accordingly set aside.
The ratio of this judgment is applicable in the
context of an appeal against conviction upon a
concluded trial. As this Court itself observed in
Jagtar Singh ( supra ), in the absence of evidence of
the complainant, it is permissible to draw an
inferential deduction of culpability under Sections 7
and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act based on other evidence
adduced by the prosecution. The entire discussion
in this case pertains to the evidentiary threshold for
sustaining a conviction again a matter entirely
distinct from the prima facie threshold for permitting
an investigation to proceed. All questions of evidence
and proof are to be resolved at the trial stage.
29. It is manifest from the foregoing analysis that all three
judgments relied upon by Respondent No. 1 and by the High
Court are distinguishable from the present case on a
fundamental and decisive ground i.e., each of those
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judgments arose in the context of a completed criminal trial,
wherein the court was required to evaluate whether the
evidence adduced by the prosecution met the standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt necessary to sustain a
conviction. The present case, on the other hand, is at the
pre-trial stage, when no evidence has been led, no witnesses
have been examined, and charge sheet has not been
evaluated. The principles and standards articulated in post-
trial judgments cannot be transplanted to the pre-trial stage
of considering the quashing of an FIR.
30. Significantly, as rightly argued by the Appellant, in
Jagtar Singh ( supra ), this Court itself observed that in the
absence of evidence of the complainant, the inference of
culpability under Section 7 may be drawn from
circumstantial evidence. In the present case, the
circumstantial evidence including the recorded telephonic
conversations and the recovery of bribe amount from a
person closely connected with the Respondent No. 1
constitutes material that is required to be examined and
evaluated during the course of the trial. Whether such
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evidence ultimately supports the inference of demand and
attempt to obtain an undue advantage is a question to be
resolved by the trial court upon a full consideration of all the
evidence. It is not a matter to be pre-empted and foreclosed
at the stage of quashing.
(D) The Role of the Departmental Enquiry Report
31. The Respondent No. 1 has placed considerable reliance
upon the fact that a departmental enquiry was conducted
against Venkatesh (Accused No. 4) and G. Ramesh (Accused
No. 5) and that both were exonerated. In our view, this
reliance is wholly misplaced and liable to be ignored on the
following grounds:
(i) The departmental enquiry and its findings
pertain to Venkatesh and G. Ramesh, not to the
Respondent No. 1 directly. The exoneration of
subordinates in a departmental proceeding cannot
operate as an exoneration of the principal accused
in a criminal investigation.
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(ii) The said report was not placed before the
High Court during the hearing of the writ petition as
the departmental enquiry order was passed later, on
12.08.2025 and cannot, therefore, be relied upon to
sustain the impugned order.
(E) The Question of Mala Fide
32. The Respondent No. 1 has contended that the present
FIR is a retaliatory and mala fide complaint, motivated by
prior hostility arising out of the Respondent no. 1's refusal
to invoke Section 307 IPC in Crime No.25/2022 and his
filing of a charge sheet against the Complainant in Crime
No. 48/2023 under the Essential Commodities Act. We do
not find merit in this contention. The question as to whether
a complaint is motivated by mala fides is itself a matter of
evidence and trial. The mere allegation of pre-existing
hostility does not render the allegations in the FIR so
inherently improbable or manifestly absurd as to justify
quashing, especially in light of the presence of recordings of
conversation between the Complainant and Respondent
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No.1. The Complainant's motive, if any, is a matter that can
be tested by the defence in the course of the trial by way of
cross-examination or otherwise. The existence of prior
disputes between the parties does not, in and of itself,
constitute a ground for quashing the FIR, particularly when
the allegations, taken at face value, disclose a prima facie
cognizable offence.
CONCLUSION
33. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
considered opinion that the impugned order dated
23.01.2024 passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Circuit
Bench at Dharwad in Writ Petition No. 104236 of 2023 is
liable to be set aside as it is contrary to the settled principles
governing Section 7 of the PC Act and also the exercise of the
power of quashing an FIR and the High Court had practically
conducted a mini-trial which is impermissible at the
threshold.
34. As even an attempt to obtain an undue advantage,
made through the specific demand attributed to Respondent
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No. 1 to the effect that the Complainant should ‘Do
something for those boys’ falls prima facie within the ambit
of Section 7(a) of the PC Act read with Explanation 2 thereto,
inasmuch as Section 7, expressly includes the ‘attempt to
obtain’ an undue advantage and is not confined to actual
obtainment, and Explanation 2 makes it clear that it is
immaterial whether the advantage is sought for another
person or directly or through a third party.
35. The allegations set out in the complaint and the FIR
bearing Crime No. 04/2023 dated 03.06.2023, taken at their
face value, prima facie disclose the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 against Respondent No. 1.
36. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2024 passed by the High
Court of Karnataka at Dharwad in Writ Petition No. 104236
of 2023 is hereby set aside. FIR bearing Crime No. 04/2023
dated 03.06.2023 registered against Respondent No. 1 under
Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and all
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proceedings arising therefrom, stand revived and restored
and the trial court to proceed in accordance with law.
37. It is, however, clarified that the observations made
hereinabove are only with reference to the consideration as
to whether any prima facie case is made out to constitute the
offence as alleged in the FIR for the purpose of consideration
in exercise of the power under Section 482 CrPC and it
cannot influence in any manner the final or conclusive
determination of the guilt or innocence of Respondent No. 1
which has to be determined at the conclusion of the trial
based on the evidence that may be adduced during the trial.
Whether, at trial, the prosecution is able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the offence under
Section 7(a) of the PC Act including whether the conduct of
Respondent No. 1 amounted to a demand or an attempt to
obtain an undue advantage within the meaning of Section
7(a) is a matter entirely within the domain of the trial court,
to be determined upon evidence duly led and examined in
accordance with law and the observations made herein
would have no bearing merit of the case.
qua
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38. The Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed
of accordingly.
……………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
….…………….…………………………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 26, 2026.
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