The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs M/S Pawan Industries Through Its Partners Babulal

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WA No.263 of 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
A T I N D OR E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUBODH ABHYANKAR
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ALOK AWASTHI
WRIT APPEAL No. 263 of 2025
DEVI AHILYA VISHWAVIDYALAYA
Versus
MAHESH JOSHI AND OTHERS

Appearance:
Shri Mukesh Kumawat – Advocate for the appellant/DAVV.
Shri Rohit Sharma – Advocate for the respondent No.1/writ petitioner.
Shri Amit Bhatia – G.A. for respondent No.2/State

Reserved on : 31.08.2026
Pronounced on : 22.10.2026
…........................................................................................................
This appeal having been heard and reserved for judgement, coming
on for pronouncement this day, the Court passed the following:
JUDEMENT


Per : Justice Subodh Abhyankar:-

1] Heard.
2] The present writ appeal has been preferred by the appellant
under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya
(Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 , against the order
dated 18.01.2024 passed by the writ Court in W.P. No.13856 of
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 10/22/2026
5:38:16 PM

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2020 whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent No.1 has
been allowed.
3] The writ petition was filed by the respondent No.1 seeking
quashment of the order dated 24.07.2020 whereby he was denied the
benefits accrued to him during the suspension period upon his
acquittal from all criminal charges.
4] In brief, the facts of the case are that the respondent
No.1/writ petitioner was posted as Assistant Grade-III in Devi Ahilya
Vishwavidyalaya (hereinafter referred to as „DAVV‟), against him
an FIR was lodged on 30.06.2009 at Crime No.184 of 2009
registered at Police Station Chhoti Gwaltoli , Indore, in which it was
alleged that answer-sheets of examination were stolen from the
strong room of University in conspiracy with the respondent No.1
and the other accused persons, and consequently, he was also tried in
S.T. No.534 of 2010 under Sections 380/120, 420/120, 467 & 468 of
IPC, however, he was acquitted on 16.11.2016. Subsequent to which
he submitted his representation on 18.11.2016 for grant of full salary
and other consequential benefits during the suspension period, and
reminder of the same was also sent by him on 14.05.2018. His
claims were partly allowed vide the order dated 24.07.2020, which
was challenged by him in the writ petition, which was allowed vide
impugned order dated 18.01.2024, in light of the order passed by this
Court in the case of Babulal Jhad Vs. The State of Madhya
Pradesh passed in W.P. No.8658 of 2018 dated 02.07.2018 , and it is
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 10/22/2026
5:38:16 PM

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directed that the respondent No.1/writ petitioner shall be entitled to
get all the benefits accrued to him from 14.02.2010, till the date of
revocation of the order of suspension, against which, the present
appeal has been preferred by the DAVV.
5] Shri Mukesh Kumawat, learned counsel for the
appellant/DAVV has submitted that the case was not covered by the
said order passed in the case of Babulal Jhad (supra) and wrong
parity has been drawn by the writ Court. Counsel has also submitted
that the respondent No.1 was involved in a serious criminal case,
wherein it was alleged that the answer-sheets were stolen from the
office of DAVV in conspiracy with the respondent No.1 by the other
accused persons, and while acquitting the respondent No.1, the
Court has given him the benefit of the doubt. It is further submitted
that it is also apparent from the record that in spite of releasing on
bail, the respondent No.1 avoided to join the duty and his conduct
established a clear motive for only getting arrears of salary. It is also
submitted that the respondent No.1 has already been given the salary
for the period for which he had actually rendered service and cannot
claim the period for which he did not work. It is further submitted
that respondent No.1 also did not file any representation for
revocation of his suspension and, in fact, waited for the trial to
conclude, and only after that he preferred his representation for back
wages, etc. Thus, it is submitted that the respondent No.1 was not
entitled to get any emoluments on the basis of no work, no pay.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 10/22/2026
5:38:16 PM

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6] Shri Kumawat has also submitted that the suspension of the
respondent No.1 was automatic on account of the lodging of the FIR
and his subsequent incarceration. Counsel has also relied upon a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India Vs. Jaipal Singh reported as (2004) 1 SCC 121 .
7] Shri Rohit Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent
No.1, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer, and it is submitted
that the writ Court has rightly relied upon the decision rendered by
this Court in the case of Babulal Jhad (supra) . Thus, it is submitted
that no case for interference is made out.
8] Heard. Having considered rival submissions and on perusal
of the documents filed on record, it is found that so far as the
impugned order is concerned, since its major part relates to the
order passed by this Court in the case of Babulal Jhad (supra) , it
would be apt to reproduce the order itself:-
“ 3. Admittedly, after registration of the FIR, no charge-sheet was
issued to the petitioner and no disciplinary enquiry was initiated against him.
The aforesaid benefits has been denied to the petitioner only on the ground
that he was acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt which is not honourable
acquittal. Vide judgment dated 18.11.2016, the petitioner was acquitted from
the Session Trial No.534/2010, thereafter vide order dated 24.07.2020, the
suspension was revoked. Vide letter dated 13.08.2020, the petitioner was
directed to give joining otherwise order of revocation of suspension dated
24.07.2020 shall be treated cancel suo moto.
4. After notice the respondent No.1 filed reply by submitting that
initially three months from the date of suspension, the petitioner was paid
50% of salary as subsistence allowance, thereafter subsistence allowance was
increased upto 75% of the salary, since the petitioner did not work therefore
under the principle of '' no work no pay'' he is not entitled for entire salary.
5. The similar issue came up for consideration before this Court in
Writ Petition No.8658/2018 dated 02.07.2018 (Babulal Jhad Vs. The State of
Madhya Pradesh. Relevant content of the order is reproduced below:-
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PANDEY
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“Having heard the learned counsel for parties and on
perusal of the record, it is noticed that undisputedly the
trial of the petitioner in the criminal case resulted into
acquittal. Thereafter there is only an order of minor
punishment of imposition of fine of Rs.10,000/-. The
division bench of this court in the matter of Umashankar
Choubey Vs. Union of India and others 2006(2) MPHT
471 taking note of para (d) of Administrative Instructions
contained in OM dated 28/3/1959 and F.R.54-B(3) has
held that where a government servant is deemed to be
under suspension on account of his detention exceeding
48 hours for a criminal charge and he is acquitted of the
charges and is reinstated without taking disciplinary
proceedings against him, he has to be paid full pay and
allowances for the period of suspension. In the other
judgments in the matter of Dattatraya Vasudeo Kulkarni
Vs. Director of Agriculture, Maharashtra & others 1984
Mh.LJ 406, Brahma Chandra Gupta Vs. Union of India
(1984) 2 SCC 433, Lehna Singh Vs. State of Haryana
and another 1999 SCC OnLine P & H 1487, Ramsinhji
Viraji Rathod, Parmanand Society Vs. The State of
Gujarat and another 1970 SCC OnLine Guj 43 and
Mohan Lal Vs. Union of India & Others ILR (1981) II
Delhi 1037 also it has been held that if after revocation of
suspension if only minor penalty is imposed then on
revocation of suspension the employee concerned is
entitled to the salary for the suspension period. Counsel
for petitioner has also placed reliance upon the
subsequent circular of the GAD No.F-6-3-77-3-1 dated
15/9/1977 and has submitted that even in cases of
termination on account of conviction by the trial court
and acquittal in appeal the direction is to treat the period
on duty and pay the full salary and allowance. In this
regard, he has also placed reliance upon the judgment of
Jharkhand High Court in the matter of Prasenjit Ghosh
Vs. State of Jharkhand and others 2004 AIR Jhar 2134 .
Having regard to the aforesaid factual and legal position,
I am of the opinion that the respondents are not justified
in denying full salary to the petitioner for the suspension
period. Hence, the impugned orders to that extent are set
aside and the respondents are directed to pay difference
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 10/22/2026
5:38:16 PM

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of salary and allowances to the petitioner for the period
he had remained under suspension.
The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.”
6. In view of above, Writ Petition is allowed. Order dated 24.07.2020 is
quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to get all the benefits accrued
to him from 14.02.2010 to till the date of revocation of the suspension.
The benefits be given to the petitioner within three months from today. ”
9] Although, in the light of the aforesaid judgment in the case
of Babulal Jhad (supra), and having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the present case, we had no hesitation to hold that
where a Government servant is deemed to have been placed under
suspension by reason of his detention for a period exceeding forty-
eight hours in connection with a criminal charge, and is subsequently
acquitted of the said charge and reinstated in service without
initiation or conclusion of any disciplinary proceedings against him,
he cannot be deprived off the pay and allowances for the period
during which he remained under such deemed suspension, however,
M.P. Civil Services
what is bothering us is Rule 9(5) of the

(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to
as “the CCA Rules‟), which has not been considered either in the
case of Babulal Jhad (supra) or in the relied upon case of Jaipal
Singh (supra). Under Rule 9(5) there exists a provision for
revocation of the order of suspension, which reads as under:-
“(5) (a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made
under this rule, shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or
revoked by the authority competent to do so :
[Provided that the order of suspension shall stand revoked on expiry of the
period of forty-five days from tire date of order of suspension in case a copy
of charges and other documents referred to in sub-rule (2-a) are not issued to
such Government servant by the disciplinary authority (if it is not the State
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PANDEY
Signing time: 10/22/2026
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Government) without obtaining the orders of the State Government for
extension of the period for issue of the said documents, as required under
sub-rule (2-b) :
Provided further that the order of suspension shall stand revoked on expiry of
the period of 90 days from the date of order of suspension, in case the copy of
charges and other documents referred to in sub-rule (2-a) are not issued to
such Government servant.] [Inserted by Notification No. F-6-5-81-3-I, dated
26-2-1982.]
(b) In respect of a Government servant, whose orders of suspension stand
revoked in accordance with the first or second proviso of clause (a) the
authority competent may, if it considers expedient so to do, place him under
suspension after a copy of charges and other documents, as required by sub-
rule (4) of Rule 14, have been issued to him. [Inserted by Notification No. F-
6-5-81-3-I, dated 26-2-1982.]
(c) Where a Government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been
suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or
otherwise) and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him
during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place
him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing,
direct that the Government servant shall continue to be under suspension until
the termination of all or any of such proceedings. [Re-lettered by Notification
No. F-6-5-81-3-I, dated 26-2-1982.]
(d) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this
Rule may at any time be modified or revoked by the authority which made or
is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority
is subordinate :]
[Provided that an order of suspension made under the first proviso to sub-rule
(1) of Rule 9 shall not be revoked except by an order of the Government
made for reasons to be recorded.] [Inserted by Notification No. C-6-2-96-3-
(1), dated 3rd August, 1996.] ”
10] We also find that the writ petitioner/respondent No.1 remained
suspended for an extended period of 6 years and 9 months i.e., from
14.02.2010 till 18.11.2016 i.e., when he first submitted his
representation/he was acquitted, but during this entire period of six long
years, he never tried to get his suspension revoked, and was content with
being suspended, which only demonstrate the writ petitioner‟s
unwillingness to work. It is also found that as per Annexure P/3, which is
the order dated 28.04.2010 of the grant of subsistence allowance, it is also
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PANDEY
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5:38:16 PM

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mentioned that the writ petitioner is also required to give a certificate
every month to the effect that he is not engaged in any business,
employment or calling, however, there is nothing on record to suggest
that the writ petitioner has submitted such a certificate to the
respondent/appellant. On the other hand, the appellant was also at fault in
not initiating any departmental proceedings against the writ petitioner
even after serious allegations of fraud were made against him.
11] In such circumstances, to strike a balance between the two
erring parties, we cannot be extended the full back wages to the writ
petitioner till the order of suspension was revoked after his acquittal, but
in our considered opinion, the interest of justice would suffice if the writ
petitioner is granted half of the benefits which he is likely to get on
account of the impugned order.
12] Thus, we hold that the writ petitioner, in place of 100% of the
benefits granted to him by the writ Court, shall be entitled to receive 50%
of the same, the calculation regarding which can be made by the appellant
positively within further four weeks‟ time, the amount shall be paid to the
respondent/writ petitioner.
13] With the aforesaid, present writ appeal stands partly
allowed to the aforesaid extent .

(SUBODH ABHYANKAR) (ALOK AWASTHI)
JUDGE JUDGE



Pankaj

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 10/22/2026
5:38:16 PM