Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board vs Nageshwar Sharma Sole Prop. Of M/S Sarthak Construction Co.

Court
Delhi High Court

$~131
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
# CNR No. DLHC010403002026
+ RFA(COMM) 573/2026, CM APPL. 57947/2026, CM APPL.
57948/2026 & CM APPL. 57949/2026

DELHI URBAN SHELTER
IMPROVEMENT BOARD .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Rishikant Singh, Mr.
Manoj Jadly, Mr. Vinay Rathi and Ms. Hetu,
Advs.

versus

NAGESHWAR SHARMA SOLE PROP. OF
M/S SARTHAK CONSTRUCTION CO. .....Respondent
Through:

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
% 25.08.2026

C.HARI SHANKAR, J.


1. This is a statutory appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act read with Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1
1908 , filed with a delay of 439 days, of which condonation has been
sought in CM APPL. 57947/2026.

2. We have heard Mr. Rishikant Singh, learned counsel for the
appellant on the aspect of condonation of delay.

1
“CPC” hereinafter
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KUMAR
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RFA(COMM) 573/2026 Page 1 of 6

3. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and having
perused the application for condonation of delay, we are of the
opinion that keeping in mind the fact that this is a commercial appeal,
no case for condonation of delay is made out.

4. Even as per the application filed by the appellant, there is
admittedly a delay of 439 days in filing the appeal. Paras 2 to 4 of the
application read thus:

“2. That the appellant was supposed to file the accompanying
appeal within limitation (period of 60 days as per Commercial
Courts Act). Whereas, the appellant preferred review petition
against the impugned decree before the Ld. Trial court on
06.02.2025 and the same was dismissed vide order dated
21.04.2025. Therefore, the period in availing remedy for review of
the decree may kindly be exempted in preferring the present
appeal. Also, the appellant applied the Certified copies of
Impugned Judgment and decree dated 07.01.2025 04.02.2025 and
received on 17.02.2025. In pursuance of the same, the period of
around 14 days ought to be excluded while calculating the
limitation period. Therefore, the limitation was extended upto
22.03.2025 for filing the accompanying appeal. However, the same
was filed in original RFA (Comm) 378/2025 on 11.07.2025 with a
delay of 77 days. Thereafter, in terms of liberty granted by the
Hon'ble court vide order dated 12.08.2025 in said original appeal,
the appellant filed Application U/o 9 Rule 13 CPC before the Ld.
Trial court. Hence, the period spent in the proceedings of RFA
(Comm.) 378/2025 of around 32 days may kindly be exempted
Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act being proceedings pending
before the Hon'ble court.

3. The appellant submits that the application U/o 9 Rule 13
CPC was filed by the appellant before the Ld. Trial court on
12.09.2025 and the same was dismissed vide order dated
24.11.2025, therefore, the period spent in proceedings U/o 9 Rule
13 CPC may kindly be exempted as per Section 14 Limitation Act
which comes out to be of 70 days accordingly.

4. Thereafter, the concerned division file was send for
approval and codal formalities to the concerned was retained by the
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KUMAR
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RFA(COMM) 573/2026 Page 2 of 6

concerned department however, In the meantime when the case file
was with the concerned division, the concerned division official of
the said department was suspended from services and seat remain
vacant till the new charge be given to some other official.
Thereafter the file was processed by the newly joined officer and
necessary approval from the competent authority was obtained.”


5. A reading of paras 2 and 3 make it clear that the appellant seeks
exclusion, from the periods spent in filing the appeal, of (i) the time
spent in prosecuting the review petition before the learned
Commercial Court, (ii) the time spent in obtaining certified copies of
the impugned judgment and decree, (iii) the period during which RFA
(COMM) 378/2025 remained pending before this Court, and (iv) the
period during which the application filed by the appellant before the
learned Commercial Court under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC
remained pending.

6. Even if this entire period is excluded from the period of 439
days, the appeal is nonetheless hit by a delay of 258 days.

7. For this period, there is practically no explanation in the
application for condonation of delay except stating that time was spent
in “approval and codal formalities”. The period during which the file
moved from desk to desk is not stated. The period during which the
file was retained by the concerned department is also not forthcoming.
Reference is made to suspension of a concerned official of the
Division without disclosing his identity or stating the period during
which his seat remained vacant. There is also no explanation as to
why, during the period the said official was not available, the file
could not be processed.
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KUMAR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
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RFA(COMM) 573/2026 Page 3 of 6

8. Clearly, para 4 of the application indicates that the appellant has
proceeded as though condonation of delay is a matter of course and
that no reasonable explanation for the delay need be furnished.

9. That, however, is not the position, least of all in the case of
commercial appeals. We may reproduce, in this context, to following
paragraphs from Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers
2
Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd . and Jharkhand Urja Utpadan
3
Nigam Ltd. v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd . :

From Borse Brothers
“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the
Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a
delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be
condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case
in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a
negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the
discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that
the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have
acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the
first party's inaction, negligence or laches.”
From Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam
“27. We shall next consider whether the delay of 301 days in
filing this Commercial Appeal can be condone in exercise of power
conferred on this Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963.
28. The extent of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 to cases falling under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Government of
Maharashtra .

2
(2021) 6 SCC 460
3
2025 SCC OnLine SC 910
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KUMAR
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RFA(COMM) 573/2026 Page 4 of 6

29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it's judgment in
Government of Maharashtra discussed the statement of objects
and reasons behind enacting of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
and held that period of limitation must always to some extent be
arbitrary and may result in some hardship, but this is no reason as
to why they should not be strictly followed.
In para 32, it held that the condonation of delay under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be seen in the context of the object
of speedy resolution of the dispute.
In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given the object sought to
be achieved under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 i.e., the
speedy resolution of the disputes, expression “sufficient cause” in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not elastic enough to cover
long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision
itself; and that the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose
panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims.
In other words, the Supreme Court indicated that in exercise of
power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a delay beyond
the period of 60 days from the date on which the appeal could have
been filed can be condoned (i.e., below 120 days from the date of
pronouncement of the judgment) by invoking Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, but where there is negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fides, such power ought not to be exercised.
It went further in para 59 by observing that merely because the
Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of
delay cannot be laid down. (This rule would thus apply equally to
instrumentalities of Government like the applicants herein).
It held in para 62 that merely because sufficient cause has been
made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the
applicants or the appellants to have the delay condoned.
It concluded in para 63 as under:
“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration
An and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals pled under
section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by
Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(l-
A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days,
30 days or 60 days. respectively, is to be condoned by way
of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a
party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent
manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the
discretion of the court, he condoned, always bearing in
mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite
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KUMAR
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RFA(COMM) 573/2026 Page 5 of 6

party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what
may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or
laches.”
30. Thus, the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra
permitted condonation of delay beyond 60 days in a case falling
under the Commercial Courts Act only by way of exception and
not by way of rule. If the applicants for condonation of delay had
not acted bona fide and had acted in a negligent manner as in the
instant case, the delay is not liable to be condoned.”

10. Tested on the anvil of these decisions, it is clear that there is no
explanation whatsoever for condoning the delay in filing the present
appeal, even if appellant is given amnesty for all the periods stated in
paras 2 and 3 of the application.

11. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is
dismissed. Resultantly, the appeal is also dismissed on the ground of
delay and without going into merits.

12. Needless to say, we have not pronounced on the question of law
raised in the appeal which shall, therefore, remain open.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J

VINOD KUMAR, J
AUGUST 25, 2026/ AR/yg
Signature Not Verified
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KUMAR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
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