Basamma vs Goparappa
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 712
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. ………………. OF 2026
(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10183 of 2024)
BASAMMA & ANR. … APPELLANT (S)
Versus
GOPARAPPA AND ORS. … RESPONDENT (S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. Leave Granted.
2. The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment and order dated
22.02.2023 passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench in Writ
Petition No.102875 of 2021 (GM-CPC), whereby the High Court allowed the writ
1
petition preferred by respondent no.1 herein and set aside the findings returned
2 3
by the First Appellate Court in Paragraph 24. Aggrieved thereof, the appellants
are before us.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2026.07.16
15:57:48 IST
Reason:
1
Defendant No.5 (Goparappa) in OS No.165 of 1999.
2
Court of Senior Civil Judge at Kushtagi in R.A.98/2015.
3
Defendant No.1 (Basamma) and Defendant No.6 (Shivayya) in OS No.165 of 1999.
C.A.No../2026 @ SLP(C)No.10183 of 2024 Page 1 of 15
3. The genesis of the present case lies in a suit for partition and separate
possession being O.S. No.165 of 1999 instituted before the Court of Civil Judge
4
& JMFC at Kushtagi by the plaintiffs, Veerabasamma (predecessor-in-interest
of respondent no.2 herein) and Malakajamma (predecessor-in-interest of
Respondent Nos.11 to 14 herein). The plaintiffs sought relief of partition and
rd
separate possession of 2/3 share in the suit schedule properties. According to the
5
plaintiffs, the suit properties originally belonged to one Basayya . He had a son,
namely Basalingaiah, and the plaintiffs were Basayya’s daughters, and sisters of
Basalingaiah. Upon the demise of Basayya, the khata in respect of the suit
properties was mutated in the name of Basalingaiah, being the male descendant
in the family. However, despite the mutation, the plaintiffs claim that they
continued to remain in joint possession thereof. It is further the case of the
plaintiffs that Basalingaiah died in the year 1983, leaving behind defendant no.1
(appellant no.1 herein), Basamma (daughter) as his sole heir. Thereafter, the
defendant no.1 allegedly got khata of the suit properties mutated in her name
without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs and subsequently began
asserting exclusive ownership over the suit schedule properties by creating third-
party interests. Aggrieved thereby, the suit for partition and separate possession
came to be instituted. For ready reference, below is the family genealogy:
4
Hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’.
5
Also referred to as ‘Basaiah’.
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4. The suit was contested by Basamma (defendant no.1) and the subsequent
purchasers, who disputed the plaintiffs’ claim over the suit schedule properties.
Defendant No.1, in her written statement, though admitted the relationship
between the plaintiffs and her father Basalingaiah, however, contended that the
plaintiffs had no kind of interest in the suit properties, as they were self-acquired.
The subsequent purchasers, specifically defendant nos.2, 5, and 6, consistently
supported the stand taken by defendant no.1 and contended that they were the
bona fide purchasers of the suit schedule properties.
5. The Trial Court, vide judgment dated 20.04.2015, dismissed the suit for
partition and separate possession. The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove their right over the suit schedule properties and further observed that
defendant no.1, being the owner, had every right to alienate the suit properties. It
was also observed that the possession of the purchasers over the suit schedule
properties cannot be disbelieved. Relevant part thereof is extracted hereunder for
ready reference:
“25. For the reasons stated above come to conclusion that, plaintiffs
have failed to prove that the suit properties were acquired by Basaiah.
Though defendant No. 1 & 6 failed to prove the alleged partition, have
succeeded in establishing that suit item 1, 4 & 5 was self-acquisition of
defendant No.1. Accordingly, I answer issue No.l & 2 in the negative
and Issue No.3 in the affirmative.
… … …
29. Additional issue No.1 to 4 :- Defendant No.l sold suit item No.2
under Ex..D-4 sale deed dated 23-01-2001 in favour of defendant No.2.
She sold suit item No.1 under Ex.D-10 sale deed dated 10-11-1999 in
favour of defendant No.3. She sold suit item No.3 under Ex.D-9 sale
deed dt: 16-7-1999 to an extent of 10 guntas in favour defendant No.4
and an extent of 8 guntas in favour of defendant No.5 under Ex.D-7 sale
deed dt: 16-07-1999. Suit was filed on 17-12-1999. Hence, sale
transaction under Ex.D-4 is subsequent to suit and the other two
transaction are prior to suit. The evidence on record does not disclose
that, defendant No.2 to 5 have purchased the properties though having
knowledge of the suit. I already held that plaintiffs have failed to
establish their right over suit properties. The defendant no. 1 being the
owner had right to alienate the properties. The possession of the
purchasers cannot be disbelieved. Hence, I answer Additional issue
No.l to 4 are in the negative.
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30. Additional issue No.5 & 6 :- Defendant No.1 sold suit item No.2 in
favour of defendant No.2 under Ex.D-4, who in turn sold in favour of
defendant No.6 under Ex.D-15 sale deed dt:19-10-2010. As already
held that plaintiffs have failed to prove their right over the property. The
defendant No.l had right to alienate the property. Therefore, the sale
transaction in favour of defendant No.2 & 6 cannot be treated as invalid
or void. Hence, I answer Additional-issue No.5 & 6 are in the negative.
… … …
ORDER
Suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed.
Parties to bear their costs own.
Draw preliminary decree accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. In appeal, the First Appellate Court, vide judgment dated 02.08.2021,
dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiffs. The First Appellate Court concurred
with the Trial Court that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the suit schedule
properties were ancestral/family properties. However, the Court found that the
sale deeds executed by defendant no.1 in favour of the other contesting
defendants (purchasers) were not valid and recorded that defendant no.1
(Basamma) was the owner in possession of such suit schedule properties. The
same was observed in Paragraph 24, which reads as under:
“24. Suit schedule properties.
1) Sy.No.18 Hiss-C measuring 6 acre 25 guntas
This property is sold by Basammaa to Defendant No.3
Sharanappa, said property is in the name and occupation of Defendant
No.3.
2) Sy.No.9 Hissa 6-A measuring 1 Acre 22 guntas
This property was sold by Basamma to Defendant No.2 Syed
Zilani, thereafter the son of Basamma has sold it to Defendant No.6
Shivayya, said property is in the name and occupation of Defendant
No.6.
3) Sy.No.8 Hissa-6 measuring 28 guntas.
On 16.07.1999 by committing fraud without the knowledge of
Basamma sale deed qua said property is executed. In O.S.No.165/1999
Hon'ble Civil Court has observed that sale deeds were executed during
the pendency of the suit. Whereas, the sale deeds were executed 6
months prior to filing of Suit. It is marked as Ex.D7, Ex.D8 and Ex.D9.
In Ex.D7 sale deed name is shown as Goparappa S/o.
Sanganabasappa Kudtini whereas name of Defendant No.5 in the suit
C.A.No../2026 @ SLP(C)No.10183 of 2024 Page 4 of 15
is Goparappa S / o. Mudukappa Kudtini. In the sale deed only 8 guntas
was given.
In Ex.D8 sale deed dated 16.07.1999 out of 25 guntas 10 guntas
is transferred in the name of Smt. Apsara W/o. Syed Tajudding but in
the suit the name of Defendant No.4 is shown as Zainab W/o. Tajuddin.
In Ex.D9 sale deed dated 16.07.1999 out of 28 guntas 10 guntas
is transferred in the name of Smt. Zainabiban W/o. Md. Zakirhussain,
but she is not made party to the suit.
4) On 16.07.1999 3 sale deeds are executed. But O.S.No.165/1999 is
filed on 17.12.1999. But said people have not got mutation entries done
till date. They say there is stay in O.S.No.165/1999. But there is no such
stay in this proceedings. To get mutation entries done only 41 days is
there. During the pendency of the suit or even after disposal of suit in
2015 only the mutation entries is not done and they are not in
occupation. As 12 years has elapsed the time period of said sale deed is
over. All three sale deeds dated 16.07.1999 measuirng 28 guntas are in
valid. There duration is also over. Till date defendant Basamma is
owner and in possession of proeprty. The name is said three sale deeds
and the names in suit don't match with each other.
5) Suit property 4,5 and 6 Basamma is the owner in possession.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. It is this limited finding returned by the First Appellate Court in Paragraph
24 that came to be challenged before the High Court by Goparappa, defendant
no.5 (respondent no.1 herein), being one of the purchasers claiming under the sale
deed dated 16.07.1999, by way of a writ petition. Defendant No.5 prayed that a
writ of certiorari be issued and the observations made in Paragraph 24 be quashed
on the ground that the said findings were returned without appreciating the
material on record and did not arise either from pleadings, issues or evidence led
by the parties.
8. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment and order dated 22.02.2023,
allowed the writ petition and set aside the findings and observation recorded by
the First Appellate Court in Paragraph 24. The relevant part of the order is
extracted hereunder:
“THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR A WRIT OF ANY OTHER NATURE,
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QUASHING THE IMPUGNED FINDINGS/ OBSERVATIONS
MADE BY THE LEARNED SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, KUSHTAGI IN
THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.08.2021 IN R.A.NO.98/2015 AT
PARAGRAPHS NO.24(3)(4) AND (5) VIDE ANNEXURE-A.
… … …
3. Respondent No.1 having been served with notice of the petition, but
has chosen to remain unrepresented and has not contested the petition.
… … …
st
5. As stated supra, the 1 respondent/plaintiff having been served with
notice of this petition, but has remained unrepresented and has not
contested this petition.
6. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for petitioner, a perusal
of the findings and observations recorded in paragraph. No.24 of the
st
judgment and decree passed by the 1 appellate Court in
R.A.no.98/2015 will clearly indicate that the said findings and
st
observations have been recorded and rendered by the 1 Court without
there being any pleadings, issues or evidence and consequently, I am of
the considered opinion that while the impugned judgment and decree
deserves to be upheld in all other aspects, the findings and observations
recorded in paragraph No.24. of the impugned Judgment deserve to be
set aside. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The petition is hereby allowed.
st
(ii) The findings and observations recorded by the 1
appellate Court in RA.No.98/2015 at paragraph No.24 of
the impugned judgment are hereby set aside.
(iii) It is however made clear that the remaining portion of
the impugned judgment including dismissal of the appeal
preferred by respondent No.1/plaintiff is hereby confirmed.
(iv) Liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to
produce a copy of this order before the revenue authorities
for appropriate action.”
( emphasis supplied )
9. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants, the defendant no.1 (Basamma/owner)
and defendant no.6 (subsequent purchaser/son of Basamma), are before this
Court. The appellants contend that the High Court erred in allowing the writ
petition without affording them an opportunity to be heard. It is further alleged
that the High Court wrongly and without recording any reason dispensed with
service of notice upon the appellants, despite the fact that the findings under
challenge directly affected their rights and interests in the suit schedule property.
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10. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned senior
counsel for the respondents and perused the material-on-record.
11. The issues that arise for our consideration are – (i) whether a writ petition,
seeking a writ of certiorari , under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India, was
maintainable in the facts of the present case, particularly when the subject matter
of the dispute had already been tried and adjudicated by way of a civil suit; and
(ii) whether the High Court erred in setting aside the findings more so of facts
recorded by the First Appellate Court in Paragraph 24 without hearing the present
appellants.
12. At the outset, it would be apposite to briefly recapitulate the settled
principles of law governing the exercise of extraordinary and certiorari
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is trite law that while
exercising such jurisdiction, the High Court does not act as a Court of appeal over
findings, more so, of facts recorded by the subordinate Courts or Tribunals. The
High Court does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the
determination of the subordinate Courts is purported to be based. Such a writ
jurisdiction may be invoked in cases where there is an error of law, jurisdictional
error, or patent illegality.
12.1. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed
6
Ahmad Ishaque , while relying on an earlier Constitution Bench decision
7
in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa , laid down the following propositions with
regard to the writ of certiorari:
“ 24. … There was considerable argument before us as to the
character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions
under which it could be issued. … On these authorities, the
following propositions may be taken as established:
6
(1954) 2 SCC 881.
7
(1954) 1 SCC 905.
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24.1. Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction,
as when an inferior court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in
excess of it, or fails to exercise it.
24.2. Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts
illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it
decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or
violates the principles of natural justice.
24.3. The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a
supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this
is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the
inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the
principle that a court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter
has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the
legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that
decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior
court were to rehear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own
findings in certiorari. These propositions are well settled and are
not in dispute.”
(emphasis supplied)
8
12.2. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan , P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J.,
speaking for the Constitution Bench, held that the writ of certiorari can be
issued only to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by Courts or
Tribunals, but not for the purpose of reappreciation of evidence or acting
as a Court of appeal.
“ 7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts
in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently
considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is
no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals :
these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or
tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of
failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where
in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts
illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without
giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order,
or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is
opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no
doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a
supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled
to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that
findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result
8
1963 SCC OnLine SC 24.
C.A.No../2026 @ SLP(C)No.10183 of 2024 Page 8 of 15
of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned
in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face
of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact,
however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is
shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had
erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or
had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has
influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is
based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law
which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this
category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in
proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant
and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient
or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to
be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ
Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be
legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad
Ishaque [(1955) 1 SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath
Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals
Assam [(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar
Singh [AIR 1960 SC 1168]”
(emphasis supplied)
12.3. This Court, succinctly, in Central Council for Research in
9
Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das , expounded on the scope of
certiorari jurisdiction and held as under:
“ 49. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution,
more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari
is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the
powers of the Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the
evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal
purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to
be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not
substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ
of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face
of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ,
should not be issued on mere asking.
… … …
61. In the aforesaid context, it will be profitable for us to refer to
the decision of this Court in Indian Overseas Bank v. Staff Canteen
9
(2023) 16 SCC 462.
C.A.No../2026 @ SLP(C)No.10183 of 2024 Page 9 of 15
Workers' Union [ Indian Overseas Bank v. Staff Canteen Workers'
Union , (2000) 4 SCC 245 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 471] . This Court
observed as under : (SCC pp. 259-60, para 17)
“ 17 . … The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding
authority duly constituted for the purpose and which
ordinarily should be considered to have become final,
cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been
based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible
in the opinion of the writ court to warrant those findings,
at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material
which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground
that there is yet another view which can reasonably and
possibly be taken.”
62. However, we may clarify that findings of fact based on “no
evidence” or purely on surmises and conjectures or which are
perverse points could be challenged by way of a certiorari as such
findings could be regarded as an error of law.
63. …To put it pithily, certiorari shall issue to correct errors of
jurisdiction, that is to say, absence, excess or failure to exercise and
also when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there has been
illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the decision or
determination itself, if it is an error manifest on the face of the
proceedings. By its exercise, only a patent error can be corrected
but not also a wrong decision. It should be well remembered at the
cost of repetition that certiorari is not appellate but only
supervisory.
64. … We may only say that while adjudicating a writ application
for a writ of certiorari, the court is not sitting as a court of appeal
against the order of the tribunals to test the legality thereof with a
view to reach a different conclusion. If there is any evidence, the
court will not examine whether the right conclusion is drawn from
it or not. It is a well-established principle of law that a writ of
certiorari will not lie where the order or decision of a tribunal or
authority is wrong in matter of facts or on merits. (See : R. v. Nat
Bell Liquors Ltd. [ R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. , (1922) 2 AC 128
(PC)] )”
(emphasis supplied)
13. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court clearly transgressed the limited contours of the certiorari
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution while setting aside the findings
recorded by the First Appellate Court in Paragraph 24. The High Court, in the
impugned order, took the view that the findings returned by the First Appellate
Court were unsupported by pleadings or evidence on record. However, a careful
perusal of the judgment of the First Appellate Court reveals the evidence
C.A.No../2026 @ SLP(C)No.10183 of 2024 Page 10 of 15
produced during the trial was independently examined and appreciated by them.
It is only after perusing the pleadings, mutation entries, sale deeds and the conduct
of the parties regarding possession and ownership of the suit schedule properties
that the findings impugned before the High Court came to be returned.
14. Pertinently, it has to be borne in mind that the dispute in the present case
arose out of a civil suit for partition and separate possession wherein issues
relating to title, nature of suit schedule properties, possession and validity of
alienations effected by defendant no.1 were decided by the competent civil Courts
upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. The observations made in
Paragraph 24 were not returned dehors the evidence placed on record or in the
absence thereof but were arrived at upon consideration of evidence adduced by
the parties during the course of trial. Therefore, once the First Appellate Court,
being fully competent to adjudicate the appeal, had returned findings after due
consideration of the evidence on record, it cannot be said that such findings were
tendered without jurisdiction or in excess of it. Thus, in our considered opinion,
the High Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, could not have set aside the findings returned in Paragraph 24.
15. The said conclusion is fortified by yet another reason. The findings
recorded in Paragraph 24 directly affected the ownership, possession and rights
of the appellants over the suit schedule properties. Despite this, the High Court
proceeded to decide the writ petition, ex parte, after dispensing with service of
notice to the present appellants, which, in our considered opinion, was definitely
not a correct or proper course to adopt. Any finding on ownership and possession
by the Court would, obviously, directly impact the parties against whom these
findings have been returned. In such a circumstance, the least expectation that a
litigant is entitled to have from a Court, much less a constitutional Court, is that
they would be heard before being condemned. For whatever reason, the High
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Court in the present case thought it not to be so. As such, despite it being a general
principle of law, we may underscore the importance of a party being heard.
15.1. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar
10
Singh , expounded on the scope of principles of natural justice in the
following words:
“42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals:
42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary
to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi
alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the
conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law
embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does
not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice
must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory
provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest,
but also in public interest.
42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the
breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the
case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel,
acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial
or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that
no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the
person complaining of the breach of natural justice.
42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or
indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does
not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in
fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the
Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority
who denies natural justice to a person.
42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere
apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should
exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of
likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural
justice.”
15.2 In Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC
11
SMO MCML (JV) , a five-Judge Bench of this Court described the object
of observing the principles of natural justice as under:
“80. … The object of observing the principles of natural justice is
to ensure that “every person whose rights are going to be affected
10
(2021) 19 SCC 706.
11
(2025) 4 SCC 641.
C.A.No../2026 @ SLP(C)No.10183 of 2024 Page 12 of 15
by the proposed action gets a fair hearing” [ State Bank of
Patiala v. S.K. Sharma , (1996) 3 SCC 364, para 29 : 1996 SCC
(L&S) 717] . The non-observance of natural justice is itself a
prejudice to any person who has been denied justice depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. [ S.L.
Kapoor v. Jagmohan , (1980) 4 SCC 379, para 24] The principle of
procedural fairness is rooted in the principles of the rule of law and
good governance. [ Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE , (2015) 8
SCC 519, para 26 : (2015) 33 GSTR 1] In Madhyamam
Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India [ Madhyamam Broadcasting
Ltd. v. Union of India , (2023) 13 SCC 401, para 55.1.] , this Court
held that the requirement of procedural fairness “holds an inherent
value in itself”. It was further observed : (SCC p. 447, para 45)
“ 45 . Inherent value in fair procedure : Fair procedure is
not only a means to the end of achieving a fair outcome
but is an end in itself. Fair procedure induces equality in
the proceedings. The proceedings “seem” to be and are
seen to be fair.””
(emphasis supplied)
12
15.3 Recently, this Court in Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. , held
as under:
“ 38. This brings us to the second limb of the principle of natural justice
i.e. audi alteram partem and whether the demonstration of prejudice is
mandatory for raising a claim of violation of right of hearing. The
principle of audi alteram partem lies at the very heart of procedural
fairness, ensuring that no one is condemned or adversely affected,
without being given an opportunity to present their case. The decision
in Ridge v. Baldwin [ Ridge v. Baldwin , 1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 WLR
935 (HL)] is regarded as a significant landmark decision in British
administrative law and is often referred to as a magna carta of natural
justice. This decision has resonated deeply in the Indian legal context
where natural justice principles are firmly entrenched with
constitutional guarantees.
… … …
43. The opportunity of hearing is considered so fundamental to any
civilised legal system that the courts have read the principles of natural
justice into an enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional
on procedural grounds [ Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. ,
(1985) 3 SCC 545] .
44. It has been argued before us that if the failure to provide hearing
does not cause prejudice, observing the principle of natural justice may
not be necessary. In this context, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [ S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan , (1980) 4 SCC
379] speaking through Chinappa Reddy, J. considered such arguments
to be “pernicious” and held that “[t]he non-observance of natural justice
12
(2025) 7 SCC 545.
C.A.No../2026 @ SLP(C)No.10183 of 2024 Page 13 of 15
is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of
proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary”. The Supreme Court,
however, has drawn out an exception where “on the admitted or
indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible, and under the law
only one penalty is permissible, then the Court may not compel the
observance of natural justice” [ Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of
India , (1981) 1 SCC 664 : (1981) 51 Comp Cas 210; Aligarh Muslim
University v. Mansoor Ali Khan , (2000) 7 SCC 529 : 2000 SCC (L&S)
965] .”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In view of the above exposition of law, we are of the considered opinion
that the course adopted by the High Court resulted in a clear violation of the
doctrine of audi alteram partem , which constitutes one of the foundational
principles of natural justice. In the facts of the instant case, we find that, prima
facie, prejudice has been caused to the present appellants. The findings which
were challenged in the impugned judgment pertained to the ownership,
possession and rights of the present appellants, and any interference with the said
finding would necessarily entail adverse civil consequences and would in effect
cause prejudice to them. That being the case, the present appellants were not
merely proper parties but necessary ones to effectively adjudicate the writ
petition.
17. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated 22.02.2023 passed
by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench is set aside. The judgment and
order dated 02.08.2021, passed by the First Appellate Court, is restored in its
entirety. It must be noted that nothing contained in the present judgment shall be
construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. Parties are at
liberty to espouse remedies, as may be available, in accordance with law, if so
advised. Should the respondents choose to pursue such alternative remedies, they
may do so within three months from today. Limitation should not come in the
way of adjudication on merits.
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18. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. Pending application(s), if any,
shall stand disposed of.
……………………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
…………………………………….J.
(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)
NEW DELHI;
16 JULY 2026
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