THE UNION OF INDIA vs SHRI V BHASKAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 28 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA
WRIT PETITION NO. 23868 OF 2026 (S-CAT)
BETWEEN:
1.
THE UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
SOUTH BLOCK,
NEW DELHI-110 001.
2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
AERONAUTICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE,
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
DEFENCE OFFICE COMPLEX, KG MARG,
NEW DELHI-110 001.
Digitally signed
by AASEEFA
PARVEEN
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
2.
THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
ALISDA AND ADG (SZ),
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
JALAHALLI CAMP ROAD,
YESHWANTHPUR P.O.,
BENGALURU-560 022.
…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. JAYAKARA SHETTY H., CGC)

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AND:
SHRI V. BHASKAR,
S/O.LATE VENKATARAMANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS,
RTD. JUNIOR SCIENTIFIC ENGINEER,
ALISDA AND ADG (SZ),
JALAHALLI CAMP ROAD,
YESHWANTHPUR P.O.,
BENGALURU-560 022.
R/AT. NO.E-3, S NO.152/2,
2ND FLOOR, DODDANEKKUNDI,
BANGALORE-560037.
…RESPONDENTS
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO CALL FOR
RECORDS FROM THE HONBLE CAT, BANGALORE, WHICH
ULTIMATELY RESULTED IN PASSING THE IMPUGNED ORDER
ANNEXURE-A DATED 23.11.2023 MADE IN OA No.
170/00368/2022 BY THE HONBLE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE AND ISSUE AN ORDER, DIRECTION,
WRIT IN THE NATURE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER
APPROPRIATE ORDER, DIRECTION, WRIT QUASHING THE
ORDER DATED 23.11.2023 ANNEXURE A MADE IN OA No.
170/00368/2022 BY THE HONBLE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE AND DISMISS THE O.A. No.
170/00368/2022 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
and
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA

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ORAL ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT)
The petitioners, Union of India and other authorities,
aggrieved by the order dated 23.11.2023 in OA
No.170/00368/2022 passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench, Bengaluru are before this
Court in this writ petition, whereunder the respondent's
prayer for grant of non-functional financial upgradation
benefit of the grade pay of Rs.5,400/- in Pay Band-2 to
the applicant with effect from 05.10.2014 with all
consequential benefits is directed to be considered in an
expeditious manner.
2. Heard learned CGC Sri.Jayakara Shetty for
petitioners and perused the entire writ petition papers.
3. At the outset, it is seen that the order
impugned passed by the Tribunal is dated 23.11.2023,
whereas the present writ petition is filed before this Court
on 30.07.2026 after nearly 3 years from the date of order

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passed by the Tribunal. At paragraph 8 of the Writ
Petition, it is stated that considerable time has been
consumed in taking appropriate administrative decision in
the matter of filing the writ petition. Thereafter, learned
counsel for the petitioner filed additional affidavit of the
Principal Scientific Officer of third petitioner dated
08.10.2026 to explain the delay.
4. We have gone through the affidavit dated
08.10.2026 filed by one of the officers of third petitioner.
The affidavit would only state the file movement from the
date of receipt of the certified copy of the order by the
third petitioner. The affidavit would give dates of
movement of file from one table to another table from
Bangalore Office to New Delhi Office. Except indicating the
date of file movement from one table to another table,
there is no bonafide explanation or reasons in the entire
affidavit. The movement of files from one table to another
table for nearly 3 years cannot be considered as bonafide
reason to condone the delay.

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5. Learned CGC for the petitioners Sri.Jayakara
Shetty places reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the matter of condonation of delay on the
following decisions:
1. (1998) 7 SCC 123 N.Balakrishnan vs.
M.Krishnamurthy.
2. (1988) 2 SCC 142 G.Ramegowda Major etc vs.
Spl. Land Acquisition Officer.
3. (1996) 3 SCC 132 State of Haryana vs.
Chandramani and Others.
4. (1987) 2 SCC 107 Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag and Another vs. Mst.Katiji and Others.
6. We have gone through the above decisions. The
above decisions are rendered on different factual
situations. However, those decisions would say that delay
shall have to be Liberally construed. We are respectfully in
agreement with the principles laid down in the above
decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. However, this Court
would take note of the recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in SHIVAMMA (DEAD) BY LRs VS KARNATAKA
HOUSING BOARD reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC

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1969 , whereunder, the Hon'ble Apex Court at relevant
paragraphs of the said judgment reads as under:
“ 212. The law as it presently stands, post the
decision of Postmaster General (supra), is unambiguous
and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an
exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less
than private parties, must demonstrate bona fide,
sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such
justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the
ground of the identity of the applicant.
213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan
Mathur (supra) and Sheo Raj Singh (supra) it is equally
manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is,
in essence, twofold. First , that State or any of its
instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential
treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be
judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To
do otherwise would not only compromise the sanctity of
limitation. The earlier view, insofar as it favoured a
liberal approach towards the State or any of its
instrumentality is no more the correct position of law.
Secondly , that the habitual reliance of Government
departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural
bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds
for seeking condonation of delay cannot always,
invariably accepted as a “sufficient cause” for the
purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such
reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the
very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of
limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless
uncertainty in litigation.
XXXXXX
216. In this regard, the vital test that has to be
employed, wherever “sufficient cause” is sought to be
demonstrated on the ground of bureaucratic
inefficiencies is to distinguish between whether the same
is an “explanation” or an “excuse”. Although the two

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may appear to be one and the same, yet there exists a
fine but pertinent distinction between an “excuse” and
an “explanation”.
XXXXXX
261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the
impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set
aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we
deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a
sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want
to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts
that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and
superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient
cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able
to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained
vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to
justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more
particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to
obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who
also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing
litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a
legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State
authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain
extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay
is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates
for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts
ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a
private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations
of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their
decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later
stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting
trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to
reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient
cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to
the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section
100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited
to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain
a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More

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than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is
the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate
and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations
deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold,
because, say if a party litigating against the State, for
whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of
delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the
lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such
litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is
our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent
from pillar to post to seek justice.
264.
No litigant should be permitted to be so
lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the
courts to misuse the process of law.”
7. The delay of nearly 3 years in the instant case
cannot be considered as reasonable delay. The petitioners
have failed to explain the delay and the affidavit dated
08.10.2026 would not indicate any bonafide reasons.
Unless cogent or bonafide reasons are assigned, this Court
would not be in a position to condone the delay. The delay
appears to be for the reason that the officers were not
serious or were sleeping over the matter.
8. Though there is no limitation to invoke Article
226 of the Constitution of India, one shall invoke the

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jurisdiction under Article 226 within a reasonable time.
Nearly 3 years delay in invoking Article 226 of Constitution
of India cannot be considered as reasonable period. This
Court shall also take note of the prejudice that would be
caused to the respondent.
MRINMOY MAITY
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
vs. CHHANDA KOLEY AND OTHERS 2024
, reported in
SCC OnLine SC 551
has held that the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of Constitution of India shall be invoked within
a reasonable time. Relevant paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12
read as follows:
9.
“ Having heard rival contentions raised and on
perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are
of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have
been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to
have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches
itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly
or in other words sleeps over his rights for a
considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep
slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief
by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held
that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the
factors which should be born in mind by the High Court
while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High
Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if
laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has

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allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts
are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of
action.
10.
The discretion to be exercised would be
with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned
in approaching the writ court is explained which would
appeal to the conscience of the court, in such
circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting
party that for all times to come the delay is not to be
condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which
gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary
jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and
circumstances of each case, same cannot be described
in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision.
The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court
depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the
terrain in which the facts have travelled.
11.
For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt
that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However,
when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is
invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a
reasonable time same has been invoked and even
submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause
of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a
natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of
delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be
dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is
found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and
latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on
that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are
not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take
advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot
be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High
Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the
delay and latches on the part of the applicant in
approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip
Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has
held to the following effect:
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is
no doubt true that there can be no waiver of
fundamental right. But while exercising

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discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226,
227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes
into account certain factors and one of such
considerations is delay and laches on the part of
the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is
well settled that power to issue a writ is
discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing
reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution
is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction
of a writ court, he should come to the Court at
the earliest reasonably possible opportunity.
Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ
will indeed be a good ground for refusing to
exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The
underlying object of this principle is not to
encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume
matters which have already been disposed of or
settled or where the rights of third parties have
accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v.
Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR
261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR
1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of
India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 :
(1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even
in case of an infringement of fundamental right
(vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi,
[(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC
185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
[(1970) 1 SCC 84]).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower
limit as to when a person can approach a court.
The question is one of discretion and has to be
decided on the basis of facts before the court
depending on and varying from case to case. It
will depend upon what the breach of
fundamental right and the remedy claimed are
and when and how the delay arose.”
12.
It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid
down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v.

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K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been
held that the High Court may refuse to exercise
extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or
omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It
has been further held thereunder:
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is
to be borne in mind by the High Court when they
exercise their discretionary powers under Article
226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case
the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such negligence
or omission on the part of the applicant to assert
his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse
of time and other circumstances, causes
prejudice to the opposite party. Even where
fundamental right is involved the matter is still
within the discretion of the Court as pointed out
in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports
and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC
769]. Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR
492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court
in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC
1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant
Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR
1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust
to give a remedy either because the party
has, by his conduct done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of
it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has
though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay
are most material. But in every case, if an

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argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of
that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances
always important in such cases are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as it relates to the remedy.”
8. It would be appropriate to note certain
decisions of this Court in which this aspect has
been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the
Constitution. It is apparent that what has been
stated as regards that article would apply, a
fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in
Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1
SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be
given to the petitioner who without any
reasonable explanation approaches this Court
under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was
stated that though Article 32 is itself a
guaranteed right, it does not follow from this
that it was the intention of the Constitution-
makers that this Court should disregard all
principles and grant relief in petitions filed after
inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal
Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251]
that the High Court in exercise of its discretion
does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If
there is inordinate delay on the part of the
petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily
explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is
premised on a number of factors. The High Court
does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause

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confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in
its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have
the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties.
It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is
invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of third-party rights in the meantime is
an important factor which also weighs with the
High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise
such jurisdiction.”
10. In the instant case, as we don't find any
sufficient reason to condone the delay, we reject the writ
petition on the ground of delay.
Sd/-
(S.G.PANDIT)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(DR.CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA)
JUDGE
NS
CT:TSM
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