Smt. Sushma Tyagi vs M/S Hdfc Ergo General Insurance Company Limited, Thrugh Its Director & Ors.

Court
Delhi High Court

$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment reserved on: 27.07.2026
Judgment pronounced on:18.11.2026

+ W.P. (C) 168/2024 & CM APPL. 37041/2026
SMT. SUSHMA TYAGI
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shantnu Aggarwal, Adv.

versus

M/S HDFC ERGO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED,
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Ms. Suman Bagga, Adv. For R-1
Mr. Abhishek Nanda, Ms. Hrishika
Rawat, and Ms. Yashika Singh, Advs.
for R-2
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH

J U D G M E N T
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution seeking the following prayers:
“a) In the nature of Certiorari thereby seeking quashing of
Repudiation letter dated 03.07.2021 passed by the
respondent no. I being onerous, arbitrary, illegal, malafide,
unfair, unreasonable, harsh and void;
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b) Certiorari thereby seeking quashing of the Award dated
26.09.2023 passed by the Respondent no.3 being onerous,
arbitrary, illegal, malafide, unfair, unreasonable, harsh and
void;
c)Mandamus inter-alia directing the Respondent nos. 1 to
allow the claim of the petitioner in respect of Insurance
Policy No. 2999202171789000000 as submitted by the
petitioner on 29.06.2021 and release the total sum insured
alongwith interest @12% p.a. to the Petitioner;
d) Mandamus inter-alia directing the Respondent no. 1 to
also release the Interest Component of Rs.10,16,352/-
(Rupees Ten Lacs Sixteen Thousand Three Hundred Fifty
Two Only) paid by the Petitioner on monthly EMI paid by
her w.e.f. April, 2021 till date and also till the date of actual
payment in respect of Loan Account No. 633622461, to the
Petitioner;…”
FACTUAL MATRIX AS PER THE PETITION
2. The petitioner herein is the widow of Late Sh. Anand Kumar Tyagi. The
late husband of the petitioner and his brother, Sh. Naresh Kumar Tyagi,
th
had purchased the residential property bearing No. B-803, 8 Floor,
Casa Woodstock, Tower B, Plot No. GC-03E, Sector 16-C, Greater
Noida, Uttar Pradesh-201310 (“subject property”) .
3. The respondent No. 1, i.e. M/s HDFC Ergo General Insurance Company
Limited, is a general insurance company which provides a variety of
health insurances, home loan insurance etc. to the public at large. The
respondent No. 2 is Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority
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of India, a statutory body under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Finance,
Government of India. The respondent No. 3 is the office of the
Insurance Ombudsman, an alternate grievance redressal platform for
aggrieved policyholders against insurance companies who are within the
regulatory control of the respondent No. 2.
4. For the purpose of purchasing the subject property, the late husband of
the petitioner and his brother had availed a home loan from the
respondent No. 1 vide a Home Loan Agreement dated 12.07.2018. A
loan facility of Rs. 50,00,000/- was extended under home loan account
bearing No. 633622461, which was repayable in 240 monthly
instalments of Rs. 45,309/-.
5. The late husband of the petitioner and his brother took out an insurance
policy under the name “Home Credit Assure” from the respondent No.
1 to secure the home loan in case of any mishap to either the property
itself or the persons insured, i.e. the husband of the petitioner and his
brother. The policy term was for five years from 18.07.2018 to
18.07.2023.
6. Though the policy was availed in the name of both the late husband of
the petitioner and his brother due to the fact that the residential property
was purchased by them jointly, only the husband of the petitioner was
making all EMI payments of the said Home Loan from his
proprietorship concern’s current account namely M/s Deep Glass
Emporium. He had also paid a premium of Rs. 5,94,890/- in respect of
policy bearing No. 2999202171789000000.
7. Unfortunately, on 20.04.2021, the petitioner’s husband suffered cardiac
arrest and passed away. In the time following her husband’s death and
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till date, the petitioner has continued to pay the Home Loan EMIs to
ensure that she retains possession of her home.
8. Following the death of her husband, the petitioner filed an insurance
claim with respondent No. 1 on 29.06.2021 along with supporting
documentation, on the grounds that cardiac arrest falls under the ambit
of “Major Medical Illness” under Section III of the terms of policy No.
2999202171789000000, which includes “Myocardial Infarction” as per
the policy certificate.

9. The petitioner’s claim was repudiated by the respondent No. 1 vide the
impugned Repudiation Letter dated 03.07.2021, wherein it was stated
that death caused by cardiac arrest, respiratory failure, bilateral
pneumonitis was not covered under the critical illnesses mentioned in
the terms and conditions of the policy.
10. The petitioner had approached this Court in W.P.(C) 8320 of 2023 ,
which was disposed vide order dated 14.07.2023, directing the petitioner
to approach the respondent No. 3 for disposal of the petitioner’s
grievance.
11. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the respondent No. 3 and filed a
complaint against the respondent No. 1 on 26.07.2023. The respondent
No. 3 called upon the petitioner to attend a hearing on 25.09.2023. The
respondent No. 3 dismissed the petitioner’s complaint vide Award dated
26.09.2023 (“the Award”) .
12. The respondent No. 3 observed in the Award that the petitioner was
given a form for mediation which the petitioner allegedly refused to
sign, and hence no settlement was arrived at. However, it is the
contention of the petitioner that she was provided with a blank
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settlement form and was being pressured by the officials of the
respondent No. 3 to sign it in blank or have her complaint dismissed.
13. In this view of the matter, the present petition has been filed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
14. On the question of maintainability, Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel for
the petitioner, contends that the present petition is maintainable as the
respondent No. 1 is a General Insurance Company performing a public
duty by providing general insurance to the public at large, and is thereby
working as a state instrumentality that is subject to the power of judicial
review under the writ jurisdiction of this court. Reliance is placed on
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Goel, (2001) 2 SCC 160 ,
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264 ,
and S udhakar Tiwari v. New India Assurance Company Limited, 2020
SCC OnLine Del 2520 in this regard.
Cardiac Arrest is Covered by the Policy
15. He further submits that Section III of the terms and conditions of the
policy provide that the coverage shall extend to all “Major Medical
Illnesses” as enumerated in the policy certificate issued by the
respondent No. 1 in favour of the petitioner. He contends that cardiac
arrest falls under the category of “Myocardial Infarction” under clause
9 and is covered by the policy. However, the respondent No. 1 has
malafidely rejected this claim through a “jugglery of words”.
16. Further, the petitioner submits that “Myocardial Infarction” has been
defined in Section III of the policy as “the first occurrence of heart
attack or myocardial infarction, which means death of a portion of the
heart muscle as a result of inadequate blood supply to the relevant
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area.”
17. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No. 1
has stated in its own counter affidavit that Myocardial Infarction results
in impaired blood supply to the heart while cardiac arrest is caused by
the immediate cessation of normal blood supply to the heart. Both
conditions are related to a disruption in blood supply to the heart and
both conditions, in general parlance, are termed as a “heart attack”.
Thus, cardiac arrest must fall under the ambit of “Myocardial
Infarction” .
18. The petitioner submits that a case involving the respondent No. 1 on
similar facts was decided by a single judge bench of the Madras High
court in Jasmine Ebenezer Arthur v. HDFC Ergo General Insurance
Company Limited, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 2246 and then confirmed by
the Division Bench of the Court in W.A. No. 4035 of 2019 titled HDFC
ERGO General Insurance Company Limited v. Jasmine Ebenezer
Arthur & Ors. , decided on 28.11.2019. The Madras High Court therein
had rejected the respondent No. 1’s claim that cardiac arrest does not
fall under “Myocardial Infarction” . Reliance is further placed on the
decision of the Madras High Court dated 29.04.2024 in W.P. No.
26233/2022 titled N. Lakshmi v. The Insurance Regulatory &
Development Authority of India .

19. The petitioner further contends that there is a general exclusion clause in
the definition of “Myocardial Infarction” as per Section III of the
policy, but there is no exclusion clause which excludes cardiac arrest
from the definition. Further, reliance has been placed on National
Insurance Company Limited v. Vedic Resorts & Hotels (P) Ltd., ( 2023)
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12 SCC 823 to contend that wherever there is an exclusionary clause,
the burden of showing that the case falls within the exclusionary clause
falls upon the insurer.
20. It is further contended that in case there is any ambiguity or a term can
be given two possible interpretations, the ambiguity must be decided in
favour of the insured insofar as it is not inconsistent with the purpose for
which the policy was put forth. Reliance is placed, in this regard, on the
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in United India Insurance
Company Limited v. Pushpalaya Printers, (2004) 3 SCC 694 , Sangrur
Sales Corporation v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 16 SCC
292 , and Canara Bank v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 3 SCC
455 .
21. The petitioner submits that she had approached the respondent No. 1
officials and was assured that her claim would be allowed. Based on
these assurances and despite the petitioner being a widow and a
housewife, the petitioner had continued to pay the monthly EMI of Rs.
45,309/- and Rs. 7,792/- per month towards the insurance premium even
after the death of her husband, out of the savings left behind by her late
husband. However, the petitioner claims that the respondent No. 1
rejected her claim without any justification, and that the Repudiation
Letter issued by the respondent No. 1 is arbitrary, illegal, unjustifiable,
and contrary to the terms and conditions of the policy.
Ombudsman’s Award is Invalid
22. After being directed to approach the respondent No. 3 by an order of
this Court dated 14.07.2023, the petitioner filed a complaint with the
respondent No. 3 against the respondent No. 1 and sought that the
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insured sum be released.
23. It is stated that the petitioner was called for a hearing on 25.09.2023, but
upon her arrival at the respondent No. 3’s office, the respondent No. 3
was present virtually and did not consider the petitioner’s claim or
documentation.
24. Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel, states that the petitioner was given a
blank Mediation/Conciliation Agreement Refund form and pressurised
to sign it, particularly by one Mr. R.K. Sirova, an official of the
respondent No. 3. The petitioner was told to sign the agreement in blank
or else the complaint would be dismissed by the respondent No. 3. The
petitioner did not sign the agreement and left the office, and on
26.09.2023 the complaint of the petitioner was dismissed by the
respondent No. 3’s impugned award.
25. The petitioner submits that the Award states that the respondent No. 1
agreed to reconsider the claim if the petitioner provides medical
certificates from a doctor stating that the cardiac arrest was due to
Myocardial Infarction, even though the petitioner has already provided
all medical documentation along with the initial claim.
26. It is further submitted that the Award states that she refused to sign the
Mediation form. However, Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel, asserts that
the petitioner was never provided with a mediation form, and only
refused to sign a blank settlement agreement without undertaking any
mediation or conciliation process.
27. Accordingly, the petitioner has asserted that the Award has been passed
by the respondent No. 3 in an illegal, arbitrary, unlawful, and
unreasonable manner without considering the facts of the case or taking
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the documents on record into consideration.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
28. At the outset, Ms. Bagga, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1,
submits that the respondent No. 1 is a private insurance company and its
not State as per Article 12 of the Constitution of India. As such, she
argues that the present writ petition under Article 226 is not
maintainable against the respondent No. 1.
Cardiac Arrest is not Covered by the Policy

29. She submits on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that the petitioner’s
husband had died of cardiac arrest with respiratory failure and bilateral
pneumonitis, which is beyond the scope of coverage of any category of
illnesses/procedures outlined by the policy. It is submitted that the
respondent No. 2 herein has listed categories of critical/medical illnesses
under the Guidelines on Standardization in Health Insurance, based on
which the same illnesses have been incorporated by the respondent No.
1 within the scope of the policy, and the claim of the petitioner exceeds
the scope of these illnesses.
30. She states that the petitioner cannot claim for coverage of a matter that
is beyond the scope of the terms and conditions of the policy. In this
regard, reliance is placed on Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sony
Cherian, (1999) 6 SCC 451, Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of
India Ltd. v. Garg Sons International, (2014) 1 SCC 686 , and United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harchand Rai Chandan Lal, (2004) 8 SCC
644 .
31. It is further contended that myocardial infarction and cardiac arrest are
different medical conditions entirely, and the opinion of Dr. Basant
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Kumar has been obtained in this regard. She further states that Jasmine
Ebenezer Arthur (supra) is not applicable in the present instance as,
unlike in Jasmine Ebenezer Arthur (supra) , no expert opinion was
called by the Court in the present case. In Jasmine Ebenezer Arthur
(supra) , the Court-appointed expert had opined that the cause of death
could be considered myocardial infarction. Additionally, the petitioner
has not provided a certificate from a doctor stating that the cause of
death is myocardial infarction.

32. Thus, it is the case of the respondent No. 1 that cardiac arrest is outside
the purview of coverage by the insurance policy and the petition
deserves to be dismissed and the petitioner’s insurance claim is not
entitled to succeed.
33. The respondent No. 2 has only made submissions to the extent that the
petition at hand is a dispute between the petitioner and the respondent
Nos. 1 and 3. The respondent No. 2 has taken the position that it is
merely a statutory authority that formulates insurance policies and
regulations, and is not in any way involved in adjudicating disputes
between insurance companies and policyholders. The respondent No. 2
contends that it has been unnecessarily impleaded in the petition, which
pertains to a contractual dispute between the petitioner and respondent
No. 1 in which the respondent No. 2 has no role.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
34. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the
documents placed on record.
Preliminary objection of maintainability
35. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent No. 1 to the present
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petition is that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not
maintainable against the respondent No. 1 as it is not within the
meaning of “State” as under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The
petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the respondent No. 1 is
amenable to this Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution given the fact that the respondent No. 1 carries out a public
function.
36. The question of whether the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution can be exercised to enforce a claim under an
insurance policy was discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asha
Goel (supra) . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgement read as
under:
“10. Article 226 of the Constitution confers extraordinary
jurisdiction on the High Court to issue high prerogative
writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights or for any
other purpose. It is wide and expansive. The Constitution
does not place any fetter on exercise of the extraordinary
jurisdiction. It is left to the discretion of the High Court.
Therefore, it cannot be laid down as a general proposition
of law that in no case the High Court can entertain a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce a
claim under a life insurance policy. It is neither possible nor
proper to enumerate exhaustively the circumstances in
which such a claim can or cannot be enforced by filing a
writ petition. The determination of the question depends on
consideration of several factors like, whether a writ
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petitioner is merely attempting to enforce his/her
contractual rights or the case raises important questions of
law and constitutional issues, the nature of the dispute
raised; the nature of inquiry necessary for determination of
the dispute etc. The matter is to be considered in the facts
and circumstances of each case. …
The courts have consistently taken the view that in a case
where for determination of the dispute raised, it is necessary
to inquire into facts for determination of which it may
become necessary to record oral evidence a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not the appropriate
forum. The position is also well settled that if the contract
entered between the parties provide an alternate forum for
resolution of disputes arising from the contract, then the
parties should approach the forum agreed by them and the
High Court in writ jurisdiction should not permit them to
bypass the agreed forum of dispute resolution …
11. The position that emerges from the discussions in the
decided cases is that ordinarily the High Court should not
entertain a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution for mere enforcement of a claim under a
contract of insurance. Where an insurer has repudiated the
claim, in case such a writ petition is filed, the High Court
has to consider the facts and circumstances of the case, the
nature of the dispute raised and the nature of the inquiry
necessary to be made for determination of the questions
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raised and other relevant factors before taking a decision
whether it should entertain the writ petition or reject it as
not maintainable. It has also to be kept in mind that in case
an insured or nominee of the deceased insured is refused
relief merely on the ground that the claim relates to
contractual rights and obligations and he/she is driven to a
long-drawn litigation in the civil court it will cause serious
prejudice to the claimant/other beneficiaries of the policy.
The pros and cons of the matter in the context of the fact-
situation of the case should be carefully weighed and
appropriate decision should be taken. …”
(emphasis supplied)
37. Applying the aforesaid principle, in my mind, the present case cannot be
said to be merely a case for enforcement of a contractual right. The
dispute turns on a pure question of construction of “Myocardial
Infarction” in the policy on admitted facts, and the petition also
challenges the Ombudsman’s Award dated 26.09.2023 of the respondent
No. 3 as vitiated by breach of principles of natural justice, which is a
public-law grievance. The present writ petition raises no disputed
questions of fact but merely an interpretation of terms of the insurance
policy. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner has already
exhausted the alternate forum, to which she was relegated by this
Court’s order dated 14.07.2023.
38. Furthermore, in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami
Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2
SCC 691 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised the wide powers
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conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The
relevant paragraphs read as under:-
“20. The term “authority” used in Article 226, in the context,
must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12.
Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of
fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers
power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the
fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The
words “any person or authority” used in Article 226 are,
therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and
instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other
person or body performing public duty. The form of the body
concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the
nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be
judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or
authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the
duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus
cannot be denied.
…
22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be
denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not
imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of
this law, Professor de Smith states: “To be enforceable by
mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one
imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have
been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even
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contract.” [ Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th
Edn., p. 540] We share this view. The judicial control over the
fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the
people should not be put into watertight compartment. It
should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable
circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must
be easily available “to reach injustice wherever it is found”.
Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that
relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention
urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the wrti
petition.”
(emphasis supplied)
39. Upon a conspectus of the foregoing, Article 226 of the Constitution
confers wide powers on this Court to review the actions of private
entities that perform functions of a public character.
40. I am of the view that even though the respondent No. 1 is a private
entity and is not financially, functionally and administratively
dominated by or under the control of the Government, the respondent
No. 1 is still amenable to this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226.
41. In the modern welfare state, welfare functions are not undertaken by the
State alone. In some cases, private bodies have also been entrusted with
certain obligations towards the public. This is no different in the case of
insurance companies, which act as a social safety net for the general
public. These insurance companies exercise monopoly over their
activities, and though the insurance company and the insured individual
are technically equal in the eyes of law, the insurance companies
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function in a unique position of higher status over the persons whom
they insure. Insurance companies deal with matters of a public nature
and perform functions akin to those of the State. Recently, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Assn., 2026 SCC OnLine
SC 1295 held as under:-
“12. Once upon a time, the maintainability of a petition
under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution depended
primarily upon who the respondent was. The focus has
gradually shifted from the formal character of the body
against whom relief is sought to the nature of the function
performed, the source of power exercised, and the effect of
the impugned action on legally protected rights. Article 226
is not confined merely to statutory authorities or
instrumentalities of the State falling within Article 12. The
expression “any person or authority” occurring in Article
226 has consistently received a wider and more liberal
interpretation.
…
14. Similar principles were reiterated in Zee Telefilms Ltd.
v. Union of India [(2005) 4 SCC 649], wherein this Court
recognised that even private bodies exercising functions of
public significance remain amenable to judicial review
under Article 226.”
(emphasis supplied)
42. This Court has likewise entertained a writ petition against a private
insurer in Mohit Kumar v. Insurance Ombudsman, 2023 SCC OnLine
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Del 7437 , wherein it observed as under:-
“11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.
2-Insurance Company opposes the submissions made by
learned counsel for the petitioners. She submits that in the
instant case, the petitioners try to call upon the
Constitutional Court to adjudicate on disputed questions of
facts. According to her, the writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India is not maintainable against
private Insurance Company. She also submits that the court
in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India cannot adjudicate the terms of the policies and also
the petitioners have efficacious alternative remedy available
under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. She, therefore,
submits that in any case the rejection of the claim of the
petitioners by respondent no. 2-Insurance Company is
strictly in terms of the conditions of the policy and
therefore, respondent no. 1-Insurance Ombudsman has
rightly rejected the petitioners' claim.
…
25. It is clearly seen that in the instant case, there is no
disputed question of facts. What is to be considered is the
import and extent of the relevant clauses of the insurance
policy. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, time and again, has
unequivocally held that the Constitution does not place any
fetter on exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. Rather,
it is left to the discretion of the High Courts. Therefore, it
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cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that in
no case the High Court can entertain a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce a claim under a
life insurance policy. The determination of the question
depends on consideration of several factors i.e., whether a
writ petitioner is merely attempting to enforce his/her
contractual rights or the case raises important questions of
law and constitutional issues, the nature of the dispute
raised, the nature of inquiry necessary for determination of
the dispute etc. The matters are required to be considered in
view of the facts involved in each case.
26. If the court finds that the insurer has illegally
repudiated the claim de hors the specific terms of the policy,
the import of the decision in the case of Asha Goel (supra)
would mean that in such cases, the writ petition would still
be maintainable as it has been rightly relied upon by this
court in the case of Pavan Sachdeva (supra).”
(emphasis supplied)
43. In light of the above, I find it appropriate to exercise jurisdiction in the
present matter. Article 226 of the Constitution may be invoked not only
for the enforcement of fundamental rights but also “for any other
purpose” or in respect of “any person or authority”. Accordingly, a
private body that owes a duty to the public cannot place its actions
beyond the reach of judicial review.
44. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 1 is
untenable and is accordingly rejected. Accordingly, the present writ
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petition is maintainable.
Coverage of Cardiac Arrest by the Policy
45. The central question for consideration in this petition is whether the
death of the petitioner’s husband due to cardiac arrest falls within the
scope of the “Myocardial Infarction” as per the insurance policy. The
illnesses which are covered under the category of Major Medical
Illnesses are enumerated in the policy certificate issued by the
respondent No. 1 in favour of the petitioner’s husband. The relevant
portion of the policy certificate reads as under:-
“Under Major Medical Illnesses & Procedures Section
following illnesses are covered: (1) Cancer (2) End Stage
Renal Failure (3) Multiple Sclerosis (4) Major Organ
Transplant (5) Heart Valve Replacement (6) Coronary
Artery Bypass Graft (7) Stroke (8) Paralysis (9) Myocardial
Infarction. In the Certificate wordings the list of Major
Medical Illnesses and Procedures enlisted under Section III
has 18 illnesses/procedures. However, please note that the
coverage provided to You under this Certificate of
Insurance is restricted only to the above mentioned 9 Major
Medical Illnesses and Procedures.”
46. The term “Myocardial Infarction” is elaborately explained in Section III
of the standard terms and conditions and policy wording of the Home
Credit Assure policy. The relevant portion is extracted as hereunder:
“Myocardial Infarction (First Heart Attack of Specified
Severity):
I. The first occurrence of heart attack or myocardial
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infarction, which means the death of a portion of the heart
muscle as a result of inadequate blood supply to the
relevant area. The diagnosis for Myocardial Infarction
should be evidenced by all of the following criteria:
a. A history of typical clinical symptoms consistent with the
diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction (For e.g. typical
chest pain)
b. New characteristic electrocardiogram changes

c. Elevation of Infarction specific enzymes, Troponins or
other specific biochemical markers.
II. The following are excluded:
a. Other acute Coronary Syndromes
b. Any type of angina pectoris
c. A rise in cardiac biomarkers or troponin T or I In
absence of overt Ischemic heart disease OR following an
intra-arterial cardiac procedure.”
47. It is not in dispute that death caused by Myocardial Infarction falls
squarely within the coverage of the policy. The controversy in the
present instance is confined to whether cardiac arrest can be brought
within the definition of Myocardial Infarction as extracted above.
48. Ms. Bagga, learned counsel, has drawn a distinction between cardiac
arrest and myocardial infarction, submitting a table outlining the
differences between the two as a basis for stating that cardiac arrest
cannot fall under the coverage given for Myocardial Infarction. Reliance
has been placed on the opinion of Dr. Basant Kumar in this regard.
49. The table is relevant and reproduced hereinbelow:-
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Myocardial Infarction Cardiac Arrest
Severe atherosclerotic narrowing of
It is a medical emergency.
one or more coronary arteries
Cessation of the normal
resulted in impaired blood supply to
circulation due to the inability of
the heart muscle causing it to suffer
the heart to pump effectively
from ischemia and infarction.
results in cardiac arrest, and if it
Infarction may be transmural where
is unexpected, it is referred as
the full thickness of the myocardium
sudden cardiac death. Oxygen
is involved or subendocardial where
supply to the tissues and the
partial thickness is involved.
organs is impaired due to the
cessation of normal blood
circulation. Lack of oxygen to the
brain causes loss of
consciousness. The patient is
presented with abnormal or
absent breathing. If cardiac arrest
is not treated within 5 minutes,
brain injury is likely. Hence,
immediate and decisive treatment
is imperative for the best chance
of survival and neurological
recovery.
The risk factors of myocardial
Causes of cardiac arrest are either
infarction are broadly categorized
cardiac or non-cardiac in origin.
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as modifiable and non-modifiable.
Cardiac causes include coronary
Modifiable risk factors include
heart disease, cardiomyopathy,
hyperlipidemia, hypertension,
valvular heart diseases and
diabetes mellitus, smoking, lack of
congenital heart diseases where
exercise, obesity, heavy alcohol
the non-cardiac causes include
consumption, and sedentary life
trauma, hemorrhage, drug over
style. Non-modifiable risk factors
dose, drowning and pulmonary
are age, male gender and positive
embolism.
family history.
Clinically the patient presents with
Symptoms of cardiac arrest are
sudden onset of central chest pain
sudden and drastic. Sudden
for more than 20-30 min duration,
collapse, no breathing, no pulses,
which may or may not be radiating
and loss of consciousness make
to the left arm and the angle of the
the clinical diagnosis.
jaw. It can be accompanied by
excessive sweating, nausea,
vomiting as well as shortness of
breath.
ECG shows ST segment and T wave
The principles of management are
changes. The diagnosis is confirmed
basic life support, advanced life
by the elevation of the cardiac
support and post resuscitative
markers.
care.
Prompt intervention is necessary for
Potential complications of the
better prognosis. Management
cardiac arrest include
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includes high flow oxygen, aspirin,
arrhythmias, stroke, and rupture
clopidogrel and morphine. In ST
of the heart, cardiogenic shock,
elevated MI streptokinase should be
and rib fractures during attempts
considered unless there are any
at resuscitation and death.
contra indications. Statin therapy
should be started irrespective of the
lipid level. Once the patient is
stabilized, have to consider
percutaneous coronary
interventions, stenting, or if
necessary, bypass grafting.
Complications of myocardial

infarction include arrhythmias,
pericarditis, and hypertension,
systemic embolism from mural
thrombi, re-infarction and
myocardial rupture.
Prognosis depends on the person's

health, extent of the damage and the
treatment given.


50. This submission cannot be accepted in the terms in which it has been
advanced, for more than one reason. It is the respondent No. 1’s own
case that Myocardial Infarction arises from impaired blood supply to the
heart, while cardiac arrest results from the immediate cessation of
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normal blood supply to the heart. Thus, admittedly, both conditions
arise from a disruption in blood supply to the heart.
51. Both conditions are also described as a “heart attack” in the common
parlance, a term which has also been utilized in the definition of
“Myocardial Infarction” within the policy wordings of the Home Credit
Assure policy. Thus, on a plain reading of the respondent No. 1’s own
submissions and the policy wordings, any medical event constituting
“the first occurrence of a heart attack” appears to be covered under the
category of Myocardial Infarction.
52. It is well settled that where an insurer seeks to deny a claim on the
ground that the event falls outside the scope of coverage or within the
exclusionary clause, the onus lies upon the insurer, and not upon the
insured. This was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vedic Resorts
(supra) , the relevant portions of which read as follows:
“17. It is tried to say that wherever such an exclusionary clause
is contained in a policy, it would be for the insurer to show that
the case falls within the purview of such clause. In case of
ambiguity, the contract of insurance has to be construed in
favour of the insured.
18. Beneficial reference of the decision in National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Ishar Das Madan Lal, (2007) 4 SCC 105, be made
in this regard, in which it has been held that : (SCC p. 109,
para 8)
“8. However, there may be an express clause excluding the
applicability of insurance cover. Wherever such exclusionary
clause is contained in a policy, it would be for the insurer to
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show that the case falls within the purview thereof. In a case
of ambiguity, it is trite, the contract of insurance shall be
construed in favour of the insured.”
19. The Constitution Bench in General Assurance society Ltd.
v. Chandumull Jain, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 208, had also
observed as back as in 1966 that : (SCC OnLine SC para 11)
“11. … there is no difference between a contract of
insurance and any other contract except that in a contract of
insurance there is a requirement of uberrima fides i.e. good
faith on the part of the assured and the contract is likely to be
construed contra proferentem that is against the company in
case of ambiguity or doubt.”
(emphasis supplied)
53. The respondent No. 1 has done no more than assert that cardiac arrest is
not Myocardial Infarction. However, it has not done so in a manner
which is sufficient to discharge the burden that rests upon it. The
assertions made, though supported by the opinion of Dr. Basant Kumar,
do not make out enough of a difference between the two for it to be said
that cardiac arrest cannot be considered to fall under Myocardial
Infarction for the purposes of the insurance claim.
54. It is at this juncture that the rule of contra proferentem becomes
decisive, whereby ambiguity in the terms of a contract, even in the case
of a contract of insurance, will be interpreted as against the party who
wrote the contract. This has been held by the Supreme Court in General
Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandmull Jain , (1966) 36 Comp Cas 468 ,
as well as in Pushpalaya Printers (supra) , Sangrur Sales Corporation
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(supra) , and Sushilaben Indravadan Gandhi v. New India Assurance
Co. Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 151 .
55. I remain conscious that the rule of contra proferentem is not a license to
manufacture an ambiguity where none exists, and that a clearly worded
clause must be given effect according to its terms even where the result
is unfavourable to the insured, as cautioned in Harchand Rai (supra) ,
and as urged upon this Court by the respondent No. 1 through its
reliance on Sony Cherian (supra) and Garg Sons International
(supra) . However, to my mind, the present case is not one where the
Court is called upon to add words to the policy or to expand its coverage
beyond what was bargained for. The policy already covers Myocardial
Infarction. The only question is what that term is properly understood to
mean.
56. The purposive character of the policy reinforces this construction. The
policy was availed together with a home loan, precisely to protect the
family from the risk of losing the property in the event of death or
incapacity of the insured during the loan tenure. To read the definition
of Myocardial Infarction so narrowly as to exclude cardiac arrest, which
is one of the most frequent modes in which a fatal coronary event
presents, would substantially defeat the very purpose for which the
cover was taken and the premium was paid. This is more so where death
occurs suddenly and no opportunity for antemortem investigation exists.
57. Reliance has been placed by the petitioner on the decision of the Madras
High Court in Jasmine Ebenezer Arthur (Supra) , a case involving the
same respondent No. 1 herein bearing close factual similarity, where the
respondent No. 1 had resisted a claim on the grounds that cardiac arrest
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was not Myocardial Infarction within the meaning of an identically
structured home loan protection policy. The Madras High Court, upon
obtaining an opinion from an independent expert cardiologist, recorded
that Acute Coronary Syndrome is understood in cardiological practice to
encompass Myocardial Infarction, and held that the cardiac arrest
suffered by the insured fell within the scope of that medical event, and
directed the insurer to honour the claim. This decision was carried in
appeal and confirmed by the Division Bench of that Court in W.A. No.
4035 of 2019 titled HDFC Ergo General Insurance Company Limited
v. Jasmine Ebenezer Arthur .
58. Ms. Bagga, learned counsel, has sought to distinguish Jasmine
Ebenezer Arthur (supra) from the present instance on the ground that,
in that case, an independent expert opinion was obtained whereas no
such exercise has been undertaken here, nor has the petitioner furnished
a doctor's certificate specifically attributing the death to Myocardial
Infarction.
59. This distinction, in my view, is untenable. The obtaining of an
independent medical opinion in that case was a step taken by the Court
itself in the exercise of its discretion to resolve a disputed medical
question. It was not laid down as a precondition that must invariably be
satisfied by a claimant before a claim of this nature can succeed. It is not
for this Court to hold the claim against the petitioner merely because she
did not, on her own initiative, procure an expert opinion that the
respondent No. 1 itself never called for at the time of processing the
claim.
60. In the circumstances of the present case, I am not persuaded that a fresh
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reference for expert opinion is necessary. The record before this Court,
including the respondent No. 1’s own pleaded understanding of the
relationship between the two conditions, suffices for the determination
of this question. This Court, in any event, is not bound by Jasmine
Ebenezer Arthur (supra) , being a decision of the Coordinate High
Court. However, I find the reasoning of Jasmine Ebenezer Arthur
(supra) persuasive and consistent with the principles laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the authorities discussed above.

61. In this view of the matter, “Myocardial Infarction” as defined by the
respondents’ own documentation must necessarily include cardiac arrest
within its ambit. Thus, the petitioner herein is entitled to succeed in her
claim. The Repudiation Letter dated 03.07.2021 issued by the
respondent No. 1, being founded entirely on the contrary premise,
cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed.
Validity of the Ombudsman’s Award
62. It is well settled that an authority discharging quasi-judicial functions,
whose decision visits civil consequences upon a party, is obliged to
observe the principles of natural justice, foremost among them the rule
of audi alteram partem . This requirement is not confined to bodies
formally styled as courts or tribunals but extends to every administrative
and quasi-judicial authority whose decisions affect the civil rights of the
persons before it. This has been repeatedly affirmed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, including in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, (2005) 6
SCC 321 , the relevant extracts of which are as follows:
“10. The adherence to principles of natural justice as
recognised by all civilized States is of supreme importance
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when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining
disputes between the parties, or any administrative action
involving civil consequences is in issue . These principles
are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is
commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that
no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first
limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous.
It should apprise the party determinatively of the case he
has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate
so as to enable him to make his representation. In the
absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable
opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated.
Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice
of the case before any adverse order is passed against him.
This is one of the most important principles of natural
justice. …
14. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of
change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules
embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed
thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty
to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of
natural justice should be implied and what its context
should be given in a case must depend to a great extent on
the fact and circumstances of that case, the framework of
the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old
distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act
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has withered away. Even an administrative order which
involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules
of natural justice. The expression “civil consequences”
encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal
rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-
pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything
that affects a citizen in his civil life.”
(emphasis supplied)

63. The respondent No. 3 herein, in adjudicating a complaint against the
repudiation of an insurance claim, passes orders which involve civil
consequences and therefore is bound to adhere to the principles of
natural justice.
64. The role of the respondent No. 3 has been described in the Standard
Terms and Conditions of Home Credit Assure Insurance Policy issued
by the respondent No. 1 as under :-
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65. The duties and functions of the respondent No. 3 are accordingly
elaborated in the Insurance Ombudsman Rules, 2017:-
“13. Duties and functions of Insurance Ombudsman.—(1)
The Ombudsman shall receive and consider complaints
[alleging deficiency in performance required of an insurer
(including its agents and intermediaries) or an insurance
broker, on any of the following grounds:—]
(a) delay in settlement of claims, beyond the time specified
in the regulations, framed under the Insurance Regulatory
and Development Authority of India Act, 1999;
(b) any partial or total repudiation of claims by the life
insurer, general insurer or the health insurer;
(c) disputes over premium paid or payable in terms of
Insurance Policy;
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(d) misrepresentation of policy terms and conditions at any
time in the policy document or policy contract;
(e) legal construction of insurance policies insofar as the
dispute relates to claim;
(f) policy servicing related grievances against insurers and
their agents and intermediaries;
(g) issuance of Life Insurance Policy, General Insurance
Policy including Health Insurance Policy which is not in
conformity with the proposal form submitted by the
proposer;
(h) non-issuance of Insurance Policy after receipt of
premium in Life Insurance and General Insurance including

Health Insurance; and
[(i) any other matter arising from non-observance of or
non-adherence to the provisions of any regulations made by
the Authority with regard to protection of policyholders'
interests or otherwise, or of any circular, guideline or
instruction issued by the Authority, or of the terms and
conditions of the policy contract, insofar as such matter
relates to issues referred to in clauses (a) to (h).]
[Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-rule, the term
“deficiency” shall have the meaning as assigned to it in
clause (11) of Section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act,
2019 (35 of 2019).]
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(2) The Ombudsman shall act as counsellor and mediator
relating to matters specified in sub-rule (1) provided there
is written consent of the parties to the dispute.
(3) The Ombudsman shall be precluded from handling any
matter if he is an interested party or having conflict of
interest.
(4) The Central Government or as the case may be, the
[Authority] may, at any time refer any complaint or dispute
relating to insurance matters specified in sub-rule (1), to the
Insurance Ombudsman and such complaint or dispute shall
be entertained by the Insurance Ombudsman and be dealt
with as if it is a complaint made under Rule 14.
….
17. Award.—(1) Where the complaint is not settled by way
of mediation under Rule 16, the Ombudsman shall pass an
award, based on the pleadings and evidence brought on
record.
[(2) The award passed under sub-rule (1) shall be in
writing, duly signed in person or digitally by the Insurance
Ombudsman with reasons for passing such award.]
(3) Where the award is in favour of the complainant, it shall
state the amount of compensation granted to the
complainant after deducting the amount already paid, if
any, from the award:
Provided that the Ombudsman shall,—(i) not award any
compensation in excess of the loss suffered by the
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complainant as a direct consequence of the cause of action;
or
(ii) not award compensation exceeding Rupees [fifty] lakhs
(including relevant expenses, if any).
(4) The Ombudsman shall finalise its findings and pass an
award within a period of three months of the receipt of all
requirements from the complainant.
(5) A copy of the award shall be sent to the complainant and
the insurer[or insurance broker, as the case may be,]
named in the complaint.
(6) The insurer [or insurance broker, as the case may be,]
shall comply with the award within thirty days of the receipt
of the award and intimate compliance of the same to the
Ombudsman [and upload the details in the complaints
management system].
(7) The complainant shall be entitled to such interest at a
rate per annum as specified in the regulations, framed
under the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority
of India Act, 1999, from the date the claim ought to have
been settled under the regulatios, till the date of payment of
the amount awarded by the Ombudsman.
(8) The award of Insurance Ombudsman shall be binding on
the insurers [or insurance broker, as the case may be,]”
66. Once the petitioner was aggrieved by the repudiation of a claim and had
approached the respondent No. 3, it was incumbent upon the respondent
No. 3 to take the complaint of the petitioner to its logical conclusion. If
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the mediation form was not signed by the petitioner, it was required for
the respondent No. 3 to adjudicate the complaint. Since the same has not
been done and for the reasons stated above, the Award is liable to be set
aside.
Relief and Quantum
67. It has been found, firstly, that the death of the petitioner’s husband falls
within the scope of the policy on a proper construction of the term
“Myocardial Infarction”, secondly, that the Repudiation Letter dated
03.07.2021 is accordingly unsustainable, and thirdly, that the Award
dated 26.09.2023 is vitiated due to breaches of the principles of natural
justice. Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in her claim
against the respondent No. 1.
68. The petitioner’s late husband and his brother, Sh. Naresh Kumar Tyagi,
were both named as insured persons as per the above-mentioned Policy
Certificate. It is only that the husband of the petitioner, i.e. Sh. Anand
Kumar Tyagi, has passed away.
69. In these circumstances, the petitioner, as the nominee of her husband
listed on the Policy Certificate, is entitled to release of the sum
representing her husband’s insured interest under section III of the
policy, namely 50% of the entire insured sum of Rs. 55,94,890/-, which
amounts to a sum of Rs. 27,97,445/-. Additionally, interest of 9% is to
be paid on this sum from the date of repudiation to the date of actual
payment.
70. The petitioner has further sought the interest component of Rs.
10,16,352/- paid by her on the home loan instalments from April, 2021.
Had the respondent No. 1 honoured the claim on 03.07.2021, the
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insured amount would have been available to be applied towards the
loan to the extent of the petitioner’s late husband’s insured interest.
Owing to the unsustainable repudiation, the petitioner was compelled to
continue servicing the loan, including the interest component, on the
very amount that the respondent No. 1 was bound to pay.
71. Hence, the aforesaid interest amount paid is a direct consequence of the
wrongful repudiation, and the respondent No. 1 cannot retain the benefit
of its own wrong. The petitioner is accordingly entitled to the interest
component paid on the portion of the loan corresponding to her
husband’s 50% insured interest, being Rs. 5,08,176/- out of Rs.
10,16,352/-, together with the interest component paid on that portion
thereafter until actual payment, as reflected in the loan account
statement.
CONCLUSION
72. For the reasons as discussed above and having found no ground within
which to reject the insurance claim of the petitioner, the objections
raised by the respondents stand rejected.
73. Consequently, the petition is allowed and both the Repudiation Letter
dated 03.07.2021 issued by the respondent No. 1 and the Award dated
26.09.2023 passed by the respondent No. 3 are quashed and set aside.
74. The respondent No. 1 is directed to pay to the petitioner 50% of the
insured sum under Policy No. 2999202171789000000, amounting to Rs.
27,97,445/-, along with interest at a rate of 9% per annum computed
from date of repudiation, i.e. 03.07.2021 till date of actual payment and
further to pay to the petitioner Rs. 5,08,176/- towards the interest
component, together with the interest component paid on that portion
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thereafter until actual payment.
75. The present petition, along with any pending applications, is disposed of
in the aforesaid terms.
76. The documents handed over in the Court are taken on record.




JASMEET SINGH, J.
th
NOVEMBER 18 , 2026/(SR)

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