Mintellectuals Llp vs Lava International Limited

Court
Delhi High Court
Case type
Original Misc Petition Interlocutory Commercial
Decided on
24-02-2026

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Date of decision: 24 FEBRUARY, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026, I.A. 867/2026, I.A. 868/2026,
I.A.3030/2026
MINTELLECTUALS LLP .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Samrat Nigam, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Pranav Jain, Ms. Arpita Rawat,
Mr. TanishManuja, Advs.

versus

LAVA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Abhay Raj Varma and Mr.
Arjun Rekhi, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1. The present Petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 ( hereinafter referred to as “ the Arbitration Act ”) has
been filed by the Petitioner, seeking urgent interim measures for securing
the amounts awarded to it under the Arbitral Award dated 26.01.2025,
passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal in arbitration proceedings titled as
“Mintellectuals LLP v. Lava International Ltd.” ( hereinafter referred to as
“ the Arbitral Award ”)
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts necessary for adjudication of
the present Petition are that a Research and Collaboration Agreement dated
01.07.2017 ( hereinafter referred to as “ the Agreement ” ) was executed
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 1 of 38

between the Petitioner and the Respondent with Nokia Technologies OY
( hereinafter referred to as “ the Nokia ” ) as Acknowledging Party. It is
stated that two Arbitration proceedings were initiated, the first one was
initiated between July-September, 2018 ( hereinafter referred to as “ the
First Arbitration ” ) wherein the Respondent had invoked arbitration for
disputes and differences on interpretation of rights& obligations under the
Agreement. In November, 2019 the Petitioner herein invoked arbitration
( hereinafter referred to as “ the Second Arbitration ” ) in respect of Claims
for sales commencing 01.10.2018 onwards.

3. The First Arbitration culminated in the Award dated 15.07.2020
wherein the claims for sales between 01.07.2017 to 30.09.2018 were
adjudicated in favour of the Petitioner. The said Award was a subject matter
of challenge in OMP (COMM.)473/2020 before this Court. A Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court vide Order dated 15.01.2021, directed the Respondent
herein to furnish a bank guarantee for 100% of the awarded amount, while
rejecting the Respondent‟s argument that a 50% payment of the awarded
sum would be sufficient.
4. In the Second Arbitration proceedings, the Petitioner herein filed an
Application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act before the Arbitral
Tribunal for securing the amounts in favour of the Petitioner. While
disposing of this Application, the Arbitral Tribunal vide Order dated
26.05.2024 directed the Respondents to secure a sum of Rs. 62.145 crores. It
is pertinent to mention here that the offer of the Respondent to furnish an
unencumbered asset as security was rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal and the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 2 of 38

Respondent was instead directed to furnish a bank guarantee for Rs.62.145
crores.
5. Thereafter, vide Order dated 03.08.2024, the Arbitral Tribunal
rejected the offer of the Respondent to give a cheque and an undertaking as
a security and instead directed the Respondent to produce the bank
guarantee for Rs.62.145 crores. The said Order dated 03.08.2024 was
challenged by the Respondent before this Court by filing ARB. A. (COMM)
48/2024 under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, which was dismissed by
this Court vide Order dated 04.10.2024, upholding the decision of the
Arbitral Tribunal and rejecting the contention of the Respondent that the
conditions under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the CPC for attachment before
judgment are not satisfied. The said Order was also challenged by the
Respondent by filing Special Leave Petition (C) No. 30168/2024 before the
Apex Court, wherein notably, one of the ground of challenge raised by the
Respondent was financial hardship. The said SLP was dismissed by the
Apex Court vide Order dated 19.12.2024.
6. It is pertinent to mention that the Respondent filed another application
before the Arbitral Tribunal for modification of the requirement of the Bank
Guarantee, which was again rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal.
7. Since the Orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal while disposing of
the Applications under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act were not complied
with, the Petitioner approached this Court by filing OMP (ENF.) (COMM)
147/2024. In the said Execution Petition, Applications were filed by the
Petitioner for issuance of warrants of attachments in respect of the bank
accounts of the Respondent as well as for attachment of the trade-marks of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 3 of 38

the Respondent, in favour of the Petitioner. These Applications were
disposed of by this Court vide Order dated 02.12.2024, directing the
attachment of the bank accounts and trade-marks of the Respondent in
favour of the Petitioner. Relevant portions of the said Order reads as under:
“ 16. Material on record indicates that pursuant to the
order passed by this Court on 26.09.2019 in a petition
under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act
wherein the Judgment Debtor undertook to furnish a
cheque of Rs. 11,31,09,035.38/- which was upheld.
Applications were filed under Section 17 of the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act seeking directions to
the Judgment Debtor to furnish security for subsequent
quarters, i.e., Quarter 12 to Quarter 20.

17. The Tribunal after hearing both sides came to the
conclusion that security in the form of banker‟s cheque
would not serve the purpose of securing the arbitral
award. The Tribunal held that there is a substantial
drop in the liquidity available with the Judgment
Debtor and that the Judgment Debtor has already
suffered a consent award which is going to be huge
liability.

18. Despite that, the Tribunal did not direct the
Judgment Debtor to furnish a bank guarantee and
directed the Judgment Debtor to first offer suitable
security of the amounts which were directed in the
Order dated 26.05.2024. However, the security was not
offered within 15 days from the date of the order and
the Judgment Debtor has to furnish a bank guarantee
within four weeks.

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 4 of 38

19. Material on record reveals that the Judgment
Debtor has neither furnished security nor has it
furnished the bank guarantee as directed vide Order
dated 26.05.2024.

20. Material on record also indicates that apart from
suffering a consent award of a substantial amount, the
bank accounts of the Judgment Debtor have also been
attached, meaning thereby, there is a severe liquidity
crunch and even the amounts in the bank accounts can
be frittered away by the Judgment Debtor. In view of
this scenario, this Court is of the opinion that the
prayer sought for by the Decree Holder for attaching
the bank accounts and the trademarks of the Judgment
Debtor in favour of the Decree Holder cannot be said
to be unreasonable.

21. Resultantly, the bank accounts as revealed by the
Judgment Debtor in Document No.22 attached to its
reply to the execution petition and the trademarks of
the Judgment Debtor as reflected in Document No.23
of the reply filed by the Respondent stands attached. ”
8. An Application being EX.APPL.(OS) 2096/2024 was filed by the
Respondent herein in OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 147/2024, seeking
modification and clarification of Paragraph 21 of the abovementioned Order
dated 02.12.2024. The said Application was disposed of by this Court vide
Order dated 24.12.2024 by which the Court modified its earlier Order dated
02.12.2024, recalling the attachment order in respect of the Bank Accounts
of the Respondent and permitting them to operate all its bank accounts,
except the Union Bank of India account. The Respondent was allowed to
operate the Union Bank account only to the extent of the balance exceeding
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 5 of 38

Rs. 62.154 crores, and was directed that the attachment shall continue to that
extent of Rs. 62.154 crores. The request of the Respondent herein for release
of attachment on its trademarks was rejected. Relevant portions of the Order
dated 24.12.2024 reads as under:
“ 20. Accordingly, the order dated 02.12.2024 is hereby
modified to direct that the Judgment Debtor will be
free to operate all its remaining bank accounts held
with Banks except the account held with Union Bank of
India i.e., current account no. 412101010000580. The
order of attachment issued vide order dated
02.12.2024 qua the remaining accounts of Judgment
Debtor stand recalled.
21. The order dated 02.12.2024 is modified to direct
that Judgment Debtor‟s Union Bank of India account
no. 412101010000580 will be permitted to be operated
by the Judgment Debtor to the extent of balance, which
is in excess of INR 62.154 crores. Union Bank of India
will not permit any transaction if the balance fall to
INR 62.154 crores. The attachment order issued vide
order dated 02.12.2024 qua this account shall operate
to the extent of INR 62.154 crores.
22. All other direction in the order dated 02.12.2024
shall apply to the operation of this account.
23. The plea of the Judgment Debtor for release of
attachment on its trademarks is declined and to this
extent the submission at paragraph 3 of the application
is not acceded to.”
9. It is pertinent to mention that a subsequent Order was also passed by
the Arbitral Tribunal on 04.01.2025, directing the Respondent to file
additional bank guarantee of Rs.22,62,18,070/-. The said Order was
challenged by the Respondent by filing ARB.A. (COMM) 6/2025. Pending
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 6 of 38

the said Appeal, the Respondent filed another Application before the
Arbitral Tribunal seeking modification of the Order dated 04.01.2025, which
was rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal vide Order dated 30.05.2025. The said
Order was challenged by the Respondent by filing ARB.A.(COMM)
35/2025.
10. Vide Order dated 11.08.2025, both the above appeals preferred by the
Respondent herein, being ARB.A. (COMM) 6/2025 & ARB.A.(COMM)
35/2025 were dismissed by this Court directing the Respondent to secure
Rs.22,62,18,070/- through lien, which was directed to be kept in the safe
custody of the Registrar General of this Court so that the amount was readily
available, if need be.
11. Vide the Arbitral Award dated 26.12.2025, the Arbitral Tribunal
awarded the following amounts in favour of the Petitioner:

12. Now, the present Petition has been filed by the Petitioner under
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, for securing the above amount awarded to
it by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Arbitration.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 7 of 38

13. It is the case of the Petitioner, that looking at the dwindling financial
condition of the Respondent, there is a likelihood that the Arbitral Award
will be rendered illusory. To buttress this contention, it is brought to light
that the Respondent is facing prosecution for offences under the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 2002 ( hereinafter referred to as “ the
PMLA ” )and the assets of the Respondent are at risk of being attached under
the PMLA. It is further contended that the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has
adjudicated that the financial statements of the Respondent suppressed
liability of over USD 23 Millions, thereby exaggerating the net assets of the
Respondent.
14. It is argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, that the
accounts of the Respondent from 01.04.2024 have not been audited and
more importantly, the Auditor of the Respondent resigned on
10.12.2025citing lack of records for verification of unaudited books and
data. It is further submitted that from 31.03.2022 to 31.03.2024, the
Retained Earnings of the Respondent has dropped by over 96% from Rs.
1,347 crores to Rs. 46.58 crores.
15. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the
dwindling financial condition of the Respondent is not opaque at all, since
the Respondent has not been able to satisfy even the first Arbitral Award
dated 08.09.2021. Attention of this Court is drawn to the previous
proceedings between the parties, wherein the Arbitral Tribunal had
discussed the financial position of the Respondent. He points out that the
Arbitral Tribunal had rejected the contention of the Respondent that it has
sufficient funds and a robust framework and on these observations only, the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 8 of 38

Arbitral Tribunal has passed the Orders securing various amounts – which
orders were upheld not only by this Court but also the Apex Court.
16. Attention of this Court is also drawn to reasons given by the
Respondent, while seeking modification of various Orders citing financial
distress and hardship. He, therefore, contends that it is possible that the
Arbitral Award becomes a mere „paper award‟ and therefore, this Court,
while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act,
should pass orders securing the awarded amount under the Arbitral Award.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner has drawn the attention
of this Court to balance sheets and various financial statements of the
Respondent to buttress his arguments.
17. Per contra , learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent
states that the Petitioner has not been able to establish the prima facie case
in its favour. He states that for passing an Order under Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act, the Petitioner has to first make out a case under Order
XXXVIII Rule 5 of the CPC. He contends that the provisional unaudited
balance-sheet dated 31.03.2025 shows that the Respondent‟s total assets on
31.03.2025 are to the tune of Rs.1,522 crores. He states that the Respondent
has already generated Rs.1627 crores of revenue for the period 01.04.2025
to 31.12.2025 and the expected revenue for the year 2025-2026 is expected
to go up to Rs.2169 crores. He states that this shows that the financial health
of the Respondent is robust and the allegations regarding precarious
financial condition of the Respondent are totally misconceived. He places
reliance on the Judgment dated 18.10.2024, passed by a Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court in OMP(I)(COMM) 172/2024 titled as National Highways
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 9 of 38

Authority of India vs. M/s IRB Ahmedabad Vadodara Super Express Toll
Ways Pvt. Ltd., wherein it has been held that before passing an Order under
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act at the post-award stage, the Courts must be
very circumspect. He states that the said Order was upheld by the Apex
Court in SLP(C) No.25334/2024, wherein the Apex Court vide Order dated
24.02.2025, has held that in order to establish a case under Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act, the conditions mentioned in Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the
CPC must be established.

18. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent also places reliance on
the Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad in First Appeal No.2861/2014 , titled as Essar Oil Ltd. Vs.
United India Insurance Company Ltd., wherein it was held that when the
Court exercises powers under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act either at the
pre-award or post-award stage, the Court has to be guided by the provisions
of the CPC such as Order XXXVIII Rule 5, Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 of the
CPC and other provisions of the CPC; and the powers under Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act cannot be said to un-fettered or unguided. He states that the
same principle was accorded by the Apex Court in Sanghi Industries Ltd. v.
Ravin Cables Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1329 .
19. After the Orders were reserved in the present Petition on 30.01.2026,
the Respondent filed an Application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act
before the Arbitral Tribunal on that day itself, i.e. 30.01.2026, pointing out
the arithmetic errors in the Arbitral Award. Having come to know the same,
an application being I.A. 3030/2026 was filed by the Respondent before this
Court on 02.02.2026, for placing on record the subsequent developments in
the case.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 10 of 38

20. When I.A. 3030/2026 was taken up for hearing, the learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondent argued that since notice has been issued by the
Arbitral Tribunal in the Section 33 Application filed by the Respondent, it
would be in the fitness of things that the decision of the present Petition is
deferred till that application is not decided by the Arbitral Tribunal.
21. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent states that the amounts of
Rs.62.145 crores and Rs. 22.62 crores already stand secured and if the
calculation of the Respondent is accepted then this amount which has
already been secured will be much more than what has been awarded by the
Arbitral Tribunal. He, therefore, states that since the Section 33 Application
is under consideration and the amount has yet not been crystallized, the
present Petition cannot be held to be maintainable at this juncture.
22. While opposing the relief prayed by the Respondent under I.A. No.
3030/2026, it is stated by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that
the Arbitral Award was passed on 26.12.2025 and Section 33 of the
Arbitration Act postulates only 30 days to file an Application under the said
provision, unless otherwise agreed upon by mutual consent of both the
parties. He places reliance on the Judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in S.P.S. Rana v. MTNL, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 136, to contend that
there is no provision to condone the delay in filing an Application under
Section 33 of the Arbitration Act after the stipulated 30 days and, therefore,
the Application filed by the Respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal is not
maintainable.
23. Per contra , in rejoinder, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent
places reliance on the Judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court
in Institute of Human Behaviour and Allied Sciences (IHBAS) v. MI2C
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 11 of 38

Securities and Facilities Pvt. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 10638 , wherein
the Division Bench of this Court has taken a contrary view.
24. Heard the learned Senior Counsels for the parties and perused the
material on record.
25. O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026, I.A. 867/2026& I.A. 868/2026 were
heard and reserved on 30.01.2026, while I.A. 3030/2026 was heard and
reserved on 12.02.2026. By this Judgment, all the Applications as well as
the Petition are being disposed of.

26. Material on record discloses that during the pendency of the arbitral
proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal has passed several orders securing certain
amounts. In its Order dated 26.05.2024, the Arbitral Tribunal has observed
as under:
“ 25) From the materials placed on record, the
Tribunal finds that security in the form of Banker‟s
cheque may not serve the purpose. There is a drop in
the liquidity available with the Respondent even if it is
not to the extent of 94% as contended by the
Claimant. Moreover, the Respondent has suffered the
Consent Award in the matter of Telefonaktiebolaget
L.M. Ericsson v. Lava International Ltd (supra.)
which is going to be a huge liability on the
Respondent. At the same time, the Tribunal is not
straightaway directing the Respondent to furnish the
security by means of Bank Guarantee as the
Respondent claims that it has sufficient assets and
robust financial framework, the Tribunal gives a
chance to the Respondent to offer suitable security of
the amount directed in this order which should
adequately protect the interest of the Claimant. This
security should be offered within 15 (fifteen) days from
the date of this Order and in that event, the Tribunal
would take a call as to whether the security so offered
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 12 of 38

is suitable and sufficient. In case the Respondent fails
to offer any security within 15 (fifteen) days, in the
event, the aforesaid direction of the Tribunal be
substituted with the direction of furnishing a Bank
Guarantee that shall have to be furnished by the
Respondent within four weeks from today i.e., within
two weeks after the expiry of two weeks granted to the
Respondent to furnish some suitable and solvent
security.”
(emphasis supplied)

27. The above finding has not been upset by this Court in
ARB.A.(COMM.) 48/2024.
28. Furthermore, vide Order dated 03.08.2024, the Arbitral Tribunal,
while rejecting the Application of the Respondent for giving security in lieu
of Bank Guarantee and commenting on the contention of the Respondent
that it has robust financial framework, the Arbitral Tribunal held as under:
“ 11 . The Respondent has again offered security in the
form of a cheque along with „Positive Pay
Confirmation‟ even when kind of security has already
been rejected by the Tribunal in its Order dated
26.05.2024. No doubt, it is accompanied with an
Undertaking Affidavit whereby the Respondent ensures
that sufficient funds would be available to pay the
amount that is found payable under the Award. It is
also stated that the Respondent is ready to offer
security in the form of a Corporate Guarantee.
However, for the reasons stated in the Order dated
26.05.2024, the Tribunal is of the opinion that security
furnished in the aforesaid form would not serve the
purpose, more so keeping in view the financial position
of the Respondent. It is stated at the cost of repetition
that in the Order dated 26.05.2024, the Tribunal
directed the Respondent to furnish security in the form
of some asset as the Respondent has claimed it has
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 13 of 38

sufficient assets to meet the eventual liability, if any.
The Tribunal, therefore, rejects the security offered by
the Claimant.

12 . In the circumstances, the Tribunal gives one final
chance to the Respondent to furnish security in the
form of some robust Movable/ Immovable asset(s) of
the value of INR 62.154 crore within 15 (fifteen) days
from today.

13 . In case security of the kind ordered herein is not
furnished within fifteen days, the Respondent shall
have to give the security in the form of a Bank
Guarantee as already directed in the Order dated
26.05.2024.”

29. Thereafter, on 04.01.2025, while considering another Application of
the Petitioner under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, for a direction to the
Respondent to secure Rs.22.62 crores and while dealing with the issue as to
whether the Petitioner has satisfied the condition of Order XXXVIII Rule 5
of the CPC, the Arbitral Tribunal has held as under:
“ 24. At the outset, the Tribunal would like to point out
that orders for furnishing the security for Quarters 6 to
11 have already been passed and at this juncture, the
Respondent cannot re-argue the matter invoking the
provisions of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC. The
questions to be considered are only about the
enhancement of the security for the period and the
form of security.

25. Reverting to the issue of enhancement of security,
Order dated 02.03.2020 would reveal that it was
passed on the basis of the parties agreeing to continue
the Interim Order dated 26.09.2019 of the Hon‟ble
High Court passed in Application under Section 9 of
the Act. This is clear from the following part of the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 14 of 38

order:

“During the arguments, ld. Counsel for both the
parties, on instruction from their respective
clients, agreed for continuation of the interim
order dated 26.09.2019 till the passing of the final
award by the Tribunal. It was, however, submitted
by the learned counsel for the Claimant that the
cheque be now issued in favour of the Claimant
and not the Registrar General of the High Court,
since the matter is now before the Arbitral
Tribunal and there are no proceedings in respect
of subject matter which are pending before the
Hon‟ble High Court at present. This request of the
Claimant appears to be reasonable.”

26. It is a matter of record that against this Order, the
Claimant had filed appeal before the Hon‟ble High
Court. Records shows that in the said Appeal, the plea
of the Claimant was confined to the issue whether
amount of security ordered i.e., INR 11,31,09,035.38
covered one quarter or three quarters. The Tribunal is
of the view that simply because Order dated
26.05.2024 passed for enhancement of the security for
later period is no reason to re-visit the earlier Orders
dated 02.03.2020 and 10.01.2021, particularly going
by the circumstances in which those orders were made
at that time. After all, these are only interim orders and
not a final determination of the amount payable for
these quarters by the Respondent to the Claimant.

27. With this, the Tribunal adverts to the issue of form
of security. Here, the Tribunal finds that the position
has substantially changed which is recorded in the
Order dated 26.05.2024. No doubt, in the said Order,
the Tribunal straightaway passed the orders for
furnishing security by means of Bank Guarantee and
had given a chance to the Respondent to offer suitable
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 15 of 38

security of the amount as the security in the form of a
Banker‟s cheque was not found suitable in view of the
financial position of the Respondent as reflected in
their Annual Financial Statements as well as liability
under the Consent Award against the Respondent. This
Order has been upheld by the Hon‟ble High Court. Not
only that, on the failure of the Respondent to furnish
suitable security, the alternate direction of the Tribunal
in the Order dated 26.05.2024 for furnishing Bank
Guarantee has kicked in. On that basis, the High Court
has itself, in the execution proceedings, attached the
Bank accounts of the Respondent for failure to furnish
the Bank Guarantees.

28. The Tribunal also finds that in so far as form of
security is concerned, subsequent developments
which are noted in the Tribunal‟s Order dated
26.05.2024 have persuaded the High Court to permit
the Claimant to approach the Tribunal „for such
further direction as it considers necessary‟. This can
be found in para 13 of the Order dated 12.07.2024
passed by the High Court in ARB.A.(COMM)
76/2021, which is extracted hereinbelow:

“13. On the form of security applicable to the
previous quarters also, it is Mr. Nigam‟s
contention that the subsequent developments,
which have been alluded to in the order dated
26.05.2024, make that security, ineffective. As
this plea is based on subsequent developments
and appears, prima facie, to have found favour
with the Tribunal in respect of subsequent
quarters, I am of the view that the proper course
would be for the appellant to approach the
Tribunal for such further directions as it
considers necessary. Mr. Varma states that the
respondent has, by a communication dated
12.06.2024, offered security in some form,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 16 of 38

without prejudice to the order dated 26.05.2024.
This is a matter for the Tribunal to consider.”

29. After consideration of the entire matter, the
Tribunal is of the view that it would be reasonable
and justifiable to direct the Respondents to furnish
Bank Guarantees in the sum of INR 11,31,09,035.38
for Quarters 6 to 8 and in the sum of INR
11,31,09,035.38 for the Quarters 9 to 11 instead of
Banker‟s cheques already given as Banker‟s cheques
would not serve any purpose. The Respondent shall,
accordingly, furnish Bank Guarantees of the
aforesaid amounts within three weeks.

30. Application is disposed of on these terms.”
(emphasis supplied)


30. All these Orders have been upheld by this Court and therefore, this
Court is not in a position to accept the unaudited statement produced by the
Respondent, showing its financial health, more so when there is no rebuttal
to the specific contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner,
that the Charter Accountant of the Respondent has resigned due to complete
non-cooperation on part of the Respondent.
31. Moreover, on the argument advanced by the Respondent that the
conditions under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the CPC must be satisfied,
reference is made to the judgment of the Apex Court in Essar House (P) Ltd.
v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd., (2022) 20 SCC 178 , wherein
the Apex Court has observed as under:
“ 47 . Section 9 of the Arbitration Act confers wide
power on the Court to pass orders securing the amount
in dispute in arbitration, whether before the
commencement of the arbitral proceedings, during the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 17 of 38

arbitral proceedings or at any time after making of the
arbitral award, but before its enforcement in
accordance with Section 36 of the Arbitration Act. All
that the Court is required to see is, whether the
applicant for interim measure has a good prima facie
case, whether the balance of convenience is in favour
of interim relief as prayed for being granted and
whether the applicant has approached the court with
reasonable expedition.

48 . If a strong prima facie case is made out and the
balance of convenience is in favour of interim relief
being granted, the Court exercising power under
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act should not withhold
relief on the mere technicality of absence of averments,
incorporating the grounds for attachment before
judgment under Order 38 Rule 5CPC.

49 . Proof of actual attempts to deal with, remove or
dispose of the property with a view to defeat or delay
the realisation of an impending arbitral award is not
imperative for grant of relief under Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act. A strong possibility of diminution of
assets would suffice. To assess the balance of
convenience, the Court is required to examine and
weigh the consequences of refusal of interim relief to
the applicant for interim relief in case of success in the
proceedings, against the consequence of grant of the
interim relief to the opponent in case the proceedings
should ultimately fail.”

32. The judgment of the Apex Court in Essar House (P) Ltd. v. Arcellor
Mittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd. (supra) is very clear in observing that the
Court while exercising power under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act should
not withhold relief on the mere technicality of absence of averments
incorporating the grounds for attachment before judgment under Order
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 18 of 38

XXXVIII Rule 5 of the CPC. In any event, it is pertinent to mention that
identical arguments were raised by the Respondent in the appeal challenging
the Orders under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal. The reliefs prayed in the Section 17 Applications were akin to
those under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. In the said appeal before this
Court, arguments that the requirements under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the
CPC have not been established were raised by the Respondent herein. These
arguments were rejected by this Court. The Apex Court also did not deem it
fit to interfere with the findings while exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This Court on perusal of the various
orders of the learned Arbitral Tribunal, which had commented adversely on
the financial position of the Respondent and thereby directed securing of the
money. At the time when the Orders under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act
were passed, the amount due to the Petitioner was not finalized and despite
that, the Respondent was directed to secure certain amounts. The Petitioner
is now in a better position. The Arbitral Award stands finalized. However,
only empty averments stating that there is no deterioration in the
Respondent‟s financial health have been advanced, and to substantiate the
same, merely an unaudited balance sheet has been filed by the Respondent.
There is no answer to the question as to why the Chartered Accountant
resigned, which the record, shows was because of the non-cooperation of the
Respondent in giving information. Since the arguments regarding Order
XXXVIII Rule 5 raised by the Respondent were rejected once and there is
nothing concrete to show the financial position has anyway improved or not,
this Court is not inclined to accept the same arguments raised by the
Respondent at this stage.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 19 of 38

33. This Court also takes note of the fact that the Respondent did not
comply with the Orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal in the first instance
but has repeatedly approached this Court challenging those Orders while
simultaneously applying for modification of the Orders before the Arbitral
Tribunal. What is further noteworthy is that in the SLP(C) 30168/2024 filed
by the Respondent against the Order dated 04.10.2024 in ARB. A. (COMM)
48/2024, the Respondent itself had taken the ground of financial distress and
hardship. After pleading financial distress and hardship in the Apex Court, it
does not lie in mouth of the Respondent to state that it is now in the pink of
the health, without showing an unaudited balance sheet.
34. Now, adverting to the second issue regarding filing of an Application
under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act by the Respondent before the
Arbitral Tribunal. Before proceeding ahead, it is pertinent to reproduce
Section 33 of the Arbitration Act and the same reads as under:
“ Section 33. Correction and interpretation of award;
additional award.

(1) Within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral
award, unless another period of time has been agreed
upon by the parties—

(a) a party, with notice to the other party, may
request the arbitral tribunal to correct any
computation errors, any clerical or
typographical errors or any other errors of a
similar nature occurring in the award;

(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with
notice to the other party, may request the arbitral
tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific
point or part of the award.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 20 of 38


(2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made
under sub-section (1) to be justified, it shall make the
correction or give the interpretation within thirty days
from the receipt of the request and the interpretation
shall form part of the arbitral award.

(3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error of the
type referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), on its
own initiative, within thirty days from the date of the
arbitral award.

(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party
with notice to the other party, may request, within
thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, the
arbitral tribunal to make an additional arbitral award
as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but
omitted from the arbitral award.

(5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made
under sub-section (4) to be justified, it shall make the
additional arbitral award within sixty days from the
receipt of such request.

(6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the
period of time within which it shall make a correction,
give an interpretation or make an additional arbitral
award under sub-section (2) or sub-section (5).

(7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or
interpretation of the arbitral award or to an additional
arbitral award made under this section.”
(emphasis supplied)

35. The Division Bench of this Court in S.P.S. Rana (supra) has observed
as under:
“ 9. Section 33 of the Act does not use the words “but
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 21 of 38

not thereafter” However, the period of 30 days is
subject to “unless another period of time has been
agreed upon by the parties” In our view the said
expression has to be read in the same manner as the
expression “but not thereafter” was interpreted in M/s
Popular Construction Co. (supra). Also, Section 32
inter alia provides for termination of the arbitral
proceedings by the final award. Section 32(3) lays
down that the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal shall
terminate with the termination of the arbitral
proceedings, subject inter alia to Section 33. It will
thus be seen that unless a case is covered by Section
33, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal is terminated.
Thus, unless an application/petition under Section
33(1) of the Act is preferred within 30 days of the
making of the award, the mandate of the Arbitral
Tribunal terminates. Once the mandate of the Arbitral
Tribunal terminates, it is not possible to file the
application/petition under Section 33 of the Act.

10. The Supreme Court recently in Commissioner of
Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd.,
(2009) 5 SCC 791 has held that it is well settled that it
is the duty of the Court to respect the legislative intent
and further that by giving liberal interpretation,
limitation cannot be extended by invoking the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was
further held that the applicability of the provisions of
the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from
the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of
the Central Excise Act (with which the court was
concerned in that case) relating to filing of reference
application in the High Court. Similarly in Katari
Suryanarayana v. KoppisettiSubba Rao, (2009) 11
SCC 183, it was held that the extent or degree of
leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature
of the application and the facts and circumstances of
the case. One of the main purposes for the re-
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 22 of 38

enactment of the arbitration law was to allow
adjudication of disputes by arbitration expeditiously.
Seen in this light, it will be found that the period of 30
days provided for preferring the application under
Section 33 of the Act is not extendable inasmuch as
unless the application is so preferred, there is no
Arbitrator thereafter. We find that the same conclusion
has been reached in UOI v. Saboo Minerals Pvt. Ltd.,
(2003) 106 DLT 92 and in Ircon International Ltd. v.
Budhraja Mining & Constructions Ltd., 2007 SCC
OnLine Del 1311 by Single Judges of this Court.

11. That being the position, the petition purportedly
preferred by the petitioner under Section 33 of the Act
was in fact no petition. Thus the order dated 18th
December, 2007 of the Arbitrator holding the petition
under Section 33 preferred after 30 days to be not
maintainable and the Arbitrator having become functus
officio cannot be said to have disposed of the said
application. The said order has to be read as an order
only intimating that the application did not lie, the
Arbitrator having become functus officio. The
petitioner is thus not entitled to the benefit of the part
of Section 34(3) providing for commencement of the
period of three months for applying for setting aside of
the order from the date of disposal of the application
under Section 33; as such disposal has to be on an
application preferred within 30 days provided under
Section 33(1) of the Act. If the application under
Section 33 is preferred after 30 days, the order of the
Arbitral Tribunal to the effect that it cannot entertain
the application, being functus officio, is not a
“disposal” from which a fresh period of limitation
would accrue. If such an interpretation were to be
given, it will easily permit the unscrupulous litigants
to, notwithstanding the expiry of the period of three
months prescribed under Section 34(3) apply for
setting aside of the award at any stage by merely prior
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 23 of 38

thereto filing a application under Section 33 of the
Act.”

36. A similar view has been taken by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
Ircon International Ltd. v. Budhraja Mining and Construction, 2007 SCC
OnLine Del 1311 , wherein it has been observed as under:
6. xxx xxx xxx
xxx
A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions indicates
that, unless another period of time has been agreed
upon by the parties, an application for correction of
any computational errors or typographical errors has
to be made to the arbitral tribunal within 30 days from
the receipt of the arbitral award. It is also necessary to
observe that the application has to be made with notice
to the other party. Sub-section (3) of Section 33 also
empowers the arbitral tribunal to make such
corrections on its own initiative within 30 days from
the date of the arbitral award. Sub-section (2) of
Section 33 stipulates that the arbitral tribunal, if it
considers the request for corrections to be justified,
shall make the corrections within 30 days from the
receipt of the request and the same shall form part of
the arbitral award. It is, therefore, clear that there are
three different sets of periods of limitation prescribed
under the said provisions. The first is the period of 30
days of receipt of the award by a party during which
the said party can request the arbitral tribunal to
correct any computational or typographical errors in
the award. The second period is a period of 30 days for
the arbitral tribunal to make the correction. The third
period prescribed is in the case where the arbitral
tribunal seeks to make a correction on its own
initiative. The period prescribed is 30 days from the
date of the arbitral award. Since the arbitral tribunal
makes a correction under this provision, on its own
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 24 of 38

initiative, the date of the receipt of the arbitral award
is not relevant and the clock starts running from the
date of the arbitral award itself. In the present case
this provision is not in issue but it brings out the nature
of the limitation periods prescribed for making
corrections of computational errors/typographical
errors. The nature being that it is strictly time bound
and cannot be extendable unless provided in the statute
itself. The provision for extension of time has been
made in sub-section (6) of Section 33 and it only
pertains to the time during which the tribunal may
make a correction under sub-section (2) or sub-section
(5) of the said Section 33. In other words, there is a
specific provision for extending the time within which
the tribunal makes the correction after a request is
received by it. There is, however, no provision
enabling the tribunal to extend the time for receiving
the request from a party to make corrections of
computational and/or typographical errors. This is
sufficient indication of the fact that the legislature
permitted extension of time to the arbitral tribunal to
decide on the question of corrections but did not permit
extension of time by the arbitral tribunal for receiving
an application whereby a party makes a request for
carrying out corrections. It is in this context that sub-
section (3) of Section 33 also gains importance. As
pointed out above that provision enables the arbitral
tribunal to make a correction on its own initiative and
only 30 days time was granted for doing so and that
too from the date of the arbitral award. There is no
provision like Section 33(6) which enables the arbitral
tribunal to correct an error on its own initiative
beyond 30 days from the date of the arbitral award.
The position, therefore, is very clear that where the
legislature permitted extension of time it did so
expressly. In these circumstances, the inescapable
conclusion would be that the legislative intent was that
the delay, if any, in filing of an application under
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 25 of 38

Section 33(1)(a) of the said Act could not be condoned
by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. This is so because of the provisions of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act read in the light of
the Supreme Court decisions in the case of Hukumdev
and Popular Construction.

7. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as
under:

“29. Savings—

(1) xxx xxx xxx

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for
any suit, appeal or application a period of
limitation different from the period prescribed by
the schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall
apply as if such period were the period prescribed
by the schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed
for any suit, appeal or application by any special
or local law, the provisions contained in Sections
4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and
to the extent to which, they are not expressly
excluded by such special or local law.”

A plain reading of the said provision indicates that
where a special or local law prescribes a period of
limitation different from that provided under the
Limitation Act, 1963, then the provisions contained in
Sections 4 to 24 would apply only insofar as and to the
extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law. The question that arises is
whether the provisions of Section 33(1), (2) and (6) of
the said Act indicate that the provisions of Section 5
are expressly excluded from operation. While
construing the expression “expressly excluded”, the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 26 of 38

Supreme Court in Hukumdev observed that what has to
be seen is whether the scheme of the special law and
the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that
the legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several matters
provided by it. It was further observed that if on an
examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that
the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are
necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred
therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the special Act. The Supreme Court
further held:

“In our view, even in a case where the special law
does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24
of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the court to examine
whether and to what extent the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their
operation.”
8. In Union of India v. Popular Construction Company
(supra) the Supreme Court noted that the said Act was
a special law and that Section 34 thereof provided for
a period of limitation different from that prescribed
under the Limitation Act. The question before the court
was whether the exclusion in Section 34 of the said Act
was expressed or not. The provisions of Section 34 are
slightly different inasmuch as the proviso thereto
specifically indicates that if the court is satisfied that
the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from
making the application within the stipulated period of
three months, it may entertain the application within a
further period of 30 days, “but not thereafter”. This
was construed by the Supreme Court as amounting to
an expressed exclusion in the following words:

“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 27 of 38

1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are „but
not thereafter‟ used in the proviso to sub-section
(3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to
an express exclusion within the meaning of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would,
therefore, bar the application of Section 5 of that
Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To
hold that the court could entertain an application
to set aside the award beyond the extended period
under the proviso, would render the phrase „but
not there-after‟ wholly otiose. No principle of
interpretation would justify such a result.”

After so concluding, the Supreme Court, following the
decision in the case of Hukumdev observed as under:

“13. Apart from the language, „express exclusion‟
may follow from the scheme and object of the
special or local law. Even in a case, where the
special law does not exclude the provisions of
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an
express reference, it would nonetheless be open to
the court to examine whether and to what extent
the nature of those provisions or the nature of the
subject matter and scheme of the special law
exclude their operation.”

Thereafter, the Supreme Court went into the history
and scheme of the said Act to support the conclusion
that the time limit prescribed under Section 34 to
challenge an award was absolute and unextendable by
court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After
referring to various sections including Section 5 of the
Limitation Act the Supreme Court observed (para 16 of
Arb. LR):

“If there were any residual doubt on the
interpretation of the language used in Section 34,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 28 of 38

the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the
issue in favour of curtailment of the court's
powers by the exclusion of the operation of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”

Thus, the decision arrived at by the Supreme Court in
the case of Popular Construction Company was not
merely on the language used in Section 34 but based
on the entire scheme of the said Act. The latter portion
is equally applicable in the present case. As regards
the language employed in Section 33, I have already
indicated above that the legislative intent appears to be
that the delay, if any, in filing of an application under
Section 33(1)(a) of the said Act could not be condoned
by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. This is so because the intention appears
to be clear that the stipulated time period was
absolute.

9. This leaves only the discussion of the decision of the
Supreme Court cited on behalf of the respondent. In
Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers
&Contractors (supra), the short question that arose for
decision was what is the effective date on which a party
could have said to be delivered with and received the
arbitral award as that would be the date from which
limitation within the meaning of sub-section (3) of
Section 34 was to be calculated. The question before
the Supreme Court was different from the one that
arises in the present case. The issue was with regard to
the date of delivery of the arbitral award. In this
context the Supreme Court observed that the delivery
of an arbitral award under sub-section (5) of Section
31 was not a matter of mere formality and it was a
matter of substance. It was further observed that
delivery of an arbitral award to a party, to be effective,
has to be “received” by the party. The court observed
that unless and until the award was actually received,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 29 of 38

it could not be construed that the award had been
delivered and, therefore, the time period for making an
application for setting aside the said award under
Section 34 of the said Act would not start running until
and unless the award is so delivered and/or received
by the party who seeks to challenge the award. These
observations, though on a different context, do not in
anyway advance the case of the respondent. On the
contrary, they tend to support the arguments advanced
by the learned counsel for the petitioner. This is so
because the learned arbitrator had clearly noted in the
award that the applications dated 18.06.2002 were not
received by him or by his office. In other words, there
was no delivery of the application as contemplated in
the said Supreme Court decision. Therefore, the
finding of the learned arbitrator that the respondent
had posted the applications on 18.06.2002 is of no
consequence. What is relevant is that no request for
making any corrections was received by the learned
arbitrator within the period of 30 days prescribed
under the said Act.
10. As a result of the discussion above, the answers to
the questions posed in paragraph 3 are that the
applications under Section 33 of the said Act were not
filed within the period of 30 days stipulated therein.
Secondly, the delay in filing the same could not be
condoned by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. As such the impugned orders
dated 11.08.2003 in both the petitions are liable to be
set aside. The same are set aside. It would be open to
the parties to challenge the awards dated 23.05.2002 if
the law otherwise permits them to do so. These
petitions stand allowed to this extent.”

37. Reference is also made to the judgment of this Court in National
Technical Research Organization (NTRO), 2018 SCC OnLine Del 12417 ,
wherein a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held as under:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 30 of 38

“ 8. Applying the ratio of the above judgment to the
facts of the present case, it has to be held that the
application filed by the petitioner under Section 33 of
the Act, being filed beyond the period of thirty days
from the receipt of the copy of the Award, was no
application in the eyes of law and therefore, the
petitioner was not entitled to seek the benefit of
extension of period of limitation under Section 34(3)
of the Act on the basis of pendency of such
application before the Arbitrator. Once this period is
excluded, the delay in filing of the present petition
would be beyond the period of thirty days from the
expiry of three months from the day of receipt of the
Arbitral Award by the petitioner and such delay
cannot be condoned by this Court.”

38. This Court also recalls the judgment in Tantia Construction Limited v.
International Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2640 , wherein a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court has held as under:
“ 13. Section 33(1) prescribes a specific period of 30
days, from the receipt of the arbitral award, within
which an application for correction or rectification
thereof can be moved. Unlike Section 34, Section 33(1)
does not contain any provision permitting condonation
of the period of limitation stipulated therein.

14. It is not possible for this Court to read, into Section
33(1), a power of condonation of delay, where none
exists. The fact that delay cannot be automatically
condoned by the Arbitral Tribunal, in the case of
application under Section 33(1), also stands
underscored by the stipulation contained by the words
“unless another period of time has been agreed upon
by the parties” in Section 33(1). Clearly, the intent of
the legislature is that, the period of 30 days, stipulation
in Section 33(1), is relaxable only if, ad idem, the
parties agree to another period for filing the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 31 of 38

application thereunder. De hors any such mutual
agreement between the parties, therefore, the period of
30 days in Section 33(1) is sacrosanct and is not
relaxable. Per corollary, delay in preferring the
application under Section 33(1) would not be
condonable, either. The learned arbitrator, therefore,
materially erred in condoning the delay on the part of
the respondent, in filing the application under Section
33.

15. Besides, even otherwise, the period of limitation for
filing the aforesaid period expired somewhere in mid-
February, 2020. The Covid-2019 pandemic hit the
nation only in March, 2020, which is why amnesty, in
respect of periods of limitation under various statues,
was extended even by the Supreme Court only from 15
March, 2020. There is no reasonable explanation for
the respondent not having moved the arbitral tribunal
within time.

16. There is yet a third reason why the decision, of the
learned Arbitrator, to condone the delay in filing the
Section 33(1) application cannot be sustained. The
impugned supplementary award mechanically
condones the delay, by the respondent, in moving the
Section 33 application, without a word by way of
reasoning. The expiry of statutorily prescribed period
of limitation, results in crystallising of valuable rights
in favour of the opposite party. Courts, tribunals and
arbitrators cannot, therefore, mechanically condone
statutorily sanctified periods of limitation, especially
where the delay is inordinate, as in the present case.
Cogent reasons, for doing so, must be apparent on the
face of the order. There is clear non-application of
mind, by the learned arbitrator, in his decision to
condone the delay. Even on this ground, therefore, the
decision of the learned arbitrator to condone the delay
cannot sustain the scrutiny of law. This, of course, is
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 32 of 38

without prejudice to the initial finding, hereinabove,
that, on the expiry of 30 days from the receipt of
arbitral award by the respondent, the arbitral tribunal
was rendered coram non judice and could not,
therefore, have entertained the Section 33 application
filed by the respondent at all.”

39. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent has placed reliance on the
Judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in IHBAS (supra), wherein it
has been observed as under:
“ 9. From a perusal of the pleadings on record, it
cannot be disputed that the respondent had indeed filed
its application on 02.04.2024 under Section 33(1)(a) of
the Act, which is beyond a period of 30 days from the
date of the award dated 26.02.2024. The arbitral
tribunal, relying upon the provisions of Section
33(1)(a) of the Act, dismissed the said application on
13.05.2024. Though the application was indeed filed
beyond a period of 30 days as prescribed in the said
section, what we have to consider is whether such an
application would be completely barred in respect of
the relief sought by the respondent. In that context, it
would be apposite to extract Section 33(1)(a) of the Act
hereunder:

“33. Correction and interpretation of award;
additional award-(1) Within thirty days from the
receipt of the arbitral award, unless another
period of time has been agreed upon by the
parties-

(a) A party, with notice to the other party, may
request the arbitral tribunal to correct any
computation errors, any clerical or typographical
errors, or any other errors of a similar nature
occurring in the award;”(emphasis supplied)

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 33 of 38

10. Having regard to the submissions made by learned
counsel for the appellant, and the narration of facts
encapsulated by the learned Single Judge in para 11 of
the impugned order, we need to appreciate this
conundrum by considering whether the passing of the
award in the wrong name/title of the respondent would
amount to a typographical error in the award at all. In
our considered opinion, the said error occurred at the
end of the arbitral tribunal, and as such could not be
deemed to be an error in the award in the sense
requiring correction by any of the parties. In fact,
according to us, correction of the said error would fall
within the Latin maxim “actus curiae
neminemgravabit” which means an act of a Court can
prejudice no one. Undoubtedly, right from the time of
appointment of an arbitrator by this Court, as well as
filing of the statement of the claim, and other pleadings
up till the culmination of the arbitral proceedings,
were in the name of MI2C Security and Facilities Pvt.
Ltd. Additionally, learned counsel for the appellant
fairly admitted that the contract, too, was awarded in
the name of MI2C Security and Facilities Pvt. Ltd. It is
very likely that all the payments before such disputes
arose also must have been tendered into the account of
MI2C Security and Facilities Pvt. Ltd.

11. In that view of the matter, in case while passing the
final award, the arbitral tribunal committed a mistake
or a typographical error in entering the correct name
of the respondent, the said error would clearly fall
within the aforesaid maxim. Applied on all fours, it is
manifest that the respondent cannot be held
responsible for the error committed by the arbitral
tribunal. Thus, the argument of learned counsel for the
appellant, to our mind, is hypertechnical and is
unmerited. Only to buttress and substantiate as to how
Courts have interpreted and applied the aforesaid
maxim, we refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 34 of 38

Supreme Court in Neeraj Kumar Sainy v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (2017) 14 SCC 136 and in particular to para
26, which is extracted hereunder:

“26. The seminal question that is required to be
posed is whether the maxim actus curiae
neminemgravabit would apply to such a case. In
Jang Singh v. Brij Lal [Jang Singh v. Brij Lal,
AIR 1966 SC 1631], a three-Judge Bench noted
that there was error on the part of the court and
the officers of the court had contributed to the
said error. Appreciating the fact situation, the
Court held: (AIR p. 1633, para 6)

“6. … It is no doubt true that a litigant must be
vigilant and take care but where a litigant goes
to Court and asks for the assistance of the
Court so that his obligations under a decree
might be fulfilled by him strictly, it is incumbent
on the Court, if it does not leave the litigant to
his own devices, to ensure that the correct
information is furnished. If the Court in
supplying the information makes a mistake the
responsibility of the litigant, though it does not
altogether cease, is at least shared by the
Court. If the litigant acts on the faith of that
information the courts cannot hold him
responsible for a mistake which it itself caused.
There is no higher principle for the guidance of
the Court than the one that no act of courts
should harm a litigant and it is the bounden
duty of courts to see that if a person is harmed
by a mistake of the court he should be restored
to the position he would have occupied but for
that mistake. This is aptly summed up in the
maxim: Actus curiae
neminemgravabit.”[emphasis supplied]

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 35 of 38

12. Predicated on the analysis, and the observations
made above, we are of the considered opinion that the
emphasis of the learned counsel for the appellant on
the 30-day time period prescribed in Section 33(1)(a)
of the Act would not strictu senso bar the respondent
from filing and maintaining an application for
correction in the factual scenario noted by us. This is
for the reason that the error appears to be clearly on
the part of the arbitral tribunal and not attributable to
any of the parties. It would be onerous and absurd to
deprive a party of a lawful decree, and an entitlement
to the benefits contained therein merely for the reason
that the court or the arbitral tribunal itself has
committed an error of such a nature. Even otherwise,
the corrections sought have no nexus or correlation to
the merits of the case. We are not laying down a
proposition that in all cases the bar or limitation
prescribed in Section 33(1) of the Act is to be relaxed
or diluted, but that it may be only in exceptional
circumstances like the one in the present case, that the
rigors may be relaxed. Clearly, it would depend on a
case to case basis.”

40. The Application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act is pending
before the Tribunal. This Court does not want to decide the issue at this
juncture as to which of the Judgment would be applicable to the present case
as it will make the Application infructuous. However, it is well settled that
when there are two contrary and conflicting judgments, it is not necessary
that the judgment which came at a later point of time will prevail. A Full
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Indo Swiss Time Limited v.
Umrao, 1981 SCC OnLine P&H 45 , while dealing with a situation as to
how a High Court must reconcile two conflicting Judgments passed co-equal
benches, has held that the decision made in the later point of time will not
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 36 of 38

necessarily prevail over the later decision. Relevant extract of the said
judgment are given below:
“ 32 . Even though it is perhaps unconventional to quote
a living authority, it deserves recalling that Mr.
Seervai in his latest edition of his authoritative work on
the Constitutional law of India has opined as
follows:—

“ But judgments of the Supreme Court, which *
cannot stand together, present a serious problem to the
High Courts and to subordinate Courts. It is submitted
that in such circumstances the correct thing is to follow
that judgment which appears to the Court to state the
law accurately or more accurately then the other
conflicting judgment.””

41. This Court has taken note of the subsequent events and does not find
any impediment in proceeding further and disposing of the Application
under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and preserving the principal amount
passed under the Award which is 127.856 crores. The amount of Rs.62.145
crores and Rs.22.62 crores already stands secured. The Respondent is
directed to furnish bank guarantee for the balance amount, i.e., Rs. 43.091
crores to be deposited with the Registrar General of this Court.
42. This Court is aware that a Bench of three Judges in Hyder Consulting
(UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189 , has held that interest is a
part of the Award, however, considering the facts of this case, this Court is
inclined to only preserve the principal amount under the award at this
juncture.
43. Needless to state, this Order is only limited to the adjudication on the
Petitioner‟s Application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. If and when
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 37 of 38

the Arbitral Award is put to challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act, it is always open for the Petitioner to contend that the entire amount
under the Arbitral Award, including the interest, be protected.
44. With these observations, the Petition is disposed of, along with
pending applications, if any.
45. It is made clear that this Court has not observed anything on the
merits of the case and the same will be examined while considering an
application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.



SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
FEBRUARY 24, 2026
Rahul/ AP
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
Signing Date:28.02.2026
20.00.17
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 15/2026 Page 38 of 38