NIROSH ABBASI vs UNION OF INDIA

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CGHC010041302022 2026:CGHC:39113

NAFR
AVINASH
SHARMA
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally signed
by AVINASH
SHARMA
Date:
2026.09.07
18:14:49 +0530
WPC No. 795 of 2022
Judgment Reserved On :12.08.2026 .
Judgment Delivered On : 07.09.2026.
Nirosh Abbasi W/o Abid Khan Aged About 38 Years D/o Late K.I. Abbasi (Adhar No.
3561-4130-5842), R/o Near Umang Colony, Opposite Government Gnm And a MM
School Of Nursing Near Nootan Higher Secondary School, RDA Colony, Near
Tikrapara, Dist - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Union Of India Through The Secretary To The Central Home Minister, Ministry
Of Home Affairs, North Block, Central Secretariat, New Delhi 110001
2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Chief Secretary, Department Of Law,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.,
3 - The Collector, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
4 - Superintendent Of Police, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
5 - Station House Officer (S.H.O.), P.S. - D.D. Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
6 - Station House Officer (S.H.O.), P.S. - Tikrapara, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
7 - Station House Officer (S.H.O.), P.S. - City Kotwali District Raipur Chhattisgarh
8 - Station House Officer (S.H.O.), P.S. - Mahila Thana, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh.,
9 - Idara-E Shariya Islami Court, Through Janaab Kaazi (Judge) Sahaab, Idara-E
Shariya Islami Court, Vidhya Nagar Police Line, Near Petrol Pump, Tikrapara,
District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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10 - Mohd. Abid Khan, S/o Mohd. Ashiqullah Khan, Near Shabri Kanya Ashram,
Daganiya, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s) : Shri Devershi Thakur, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1 : Shri Abhishek Banjare, Central Government Counsel.
For State/Respondent
Nos.2 to 8
: Shri RK Gupta, Addl AG.
For Respondent No.10: Ms. Fouzia Mirza, Senior Advocate with Shri Ali Afzaal
Mirza, Advocates.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
C A V Order
1. Challenge by the petitioner in this Writ Petition is two fold. First, she seeks
quashment of impugned order dated 18.01.2022 passed by the Respondent
No.9/Idara- E-Shariya Islami Court by which it has been informed that the
said Court has passed the decision of giving Triple Talaq/Divorce to the
petitioner. Next, the petitioner is also challenging the very existence of the so
called Idara-E Shariya Islami Court which is in violation of the Constitution,
Fundamental Rights to Life & Liberty, & The Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 {specifically Section 2 (c ) }, where absolutely
no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the Petitioner/Muslim Women
following the 'Shariyat Law' which is not applicable in India as provided by the
Constitution of India.
2. Necessary facts of the case are that Petitioner, being a Muslim woman, had
lodged a complaint against her husband and in-laws. Pursuant thereto, the
One Stop Sakhi Centre initiated proceedings and undertook counselling.
However, the counselling process failed, whereafter an FIR was registered.
The first husband of the Petitioner had passed away in the year 2015.
Thereafter, with the involvement of her family members and relatives,

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including the in-laws, the Petitioner was engaged to marry Respondent No.
10, namely, Mohd. Abid Khan, on 18.07.2020. The Petitioner and
Respondent No. 10 were duly acknowledged as having entered into a
subsequent marriage, and it was also acknowledged that the Petitioner had
children from her first marriage. It was alleged by Respondent No. 10 that the
children were unable to adjust with the new family and, on that purported
ground, the Petitioner was subjected to Talaq-e-Biddat/Triple Talaq.
Notwithstanding the aforesaid purported pronouncements of Talaq, the
Petitioner categorically replied to the notices, specifically asserting that no
such purported Shariyat Law could override the law applicable in India.
However, the said reply and the objections raised by the Petitioner were not
duly considered. The Petitioner also brought to the notice of the concerned
authorities that Respondent No. 10 was allegedly suffering from medical
conditions/incapacities affecting his ability to discharge marital obligations.
The Petitioner further reported the harassment, cruelty and ill-treatment
allegedly meted out to her and her children by Respondent No. 10 and his
family members. In this regard, a complaint was submitted before the
Superintendent of Police on 07.10.2021. Acting upon the aforesaid
complaint, FIR No. 118/2021 was registered on 01.11.2021 at Police Station
Mahila Thana, Raipur (C.G.), for offences punishable under Sections 498-A
and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It is pertinent to state that both in the
complaint as well as in the FIR, it was specifically recorded that notices
purporting to effect Triple Talaq under Shariyat Law had been served upon
the Petitioner. Despite the registration of the aforesaid FIR and the pendency
of proceedings before the competent authorities, Respondent No. 9, namely,

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Idara-E-Shariya Islami Court, proceeded to pass the impugned order dated
18.01.2022. The said order was received by the Petitioner on 21.01.2022,
whereby Respondent No. 9 purported to declare that the Petitioner had been
divorced by way of Triple Talaq. Being aggrieved by the said purported order,
the Petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court by way of the present writ
petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Petitioner, being an
educated Muslim woman, was shocked and astonished to learn that
Respondent No. 9, styling itself as an Idara-E-Shariya Islami Court, had
purported to exercise such authority and pass an order affecting her marital
status, despite the Petitioner having already approached the competent
authorities and set the machinery of law into motion. The Petitioner
respectfully submits that no private body or self-styled Shariya Court can
assume the jurisdiction vested in the courts established under the
Constitution and laws of India or pass orders having the effect of determining
or altering the legal rights and status of a citizen. It is further submitted that
the rights and interests of Muslim women are protected under the
Constitution of India and the applicable statutory framework, including the
legislation enacted to safeguard Muslim women against practices such as
Talaq-e-Biddat. The impugned action of Respondent No. 9 is therefore liable
to be examined by this Hon’ble Court in accordance with law.
4. Learned counsel for Respondent No.1 submits that “Police” and “Public
Order” are subjects falling within the State List under the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the primary responsibility for
maintaining law and order, protection of the life and property of citizens,

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prevention and detection of offences, and investigation of criminal cases
rests with the respective State Government and its law-enforcement
agencies. Insofar as the prayer in the present petition is concerned, the
petitioner seeks, inter alia, a direction for staying the order purportedly
passed by the Idara-E-Shariyah Islami Court. The grievances raised by the
petitioner, including any alleged action or inaction complained of, essentially
concern matters falling within the domain of the concerned State Government
and its competent authorities. Such grievances may, therefore, be
appropriately considered and redressed by the concerned State Government
in accordance with law. It is also submitted that that no specific relief has
been sought by the petitioner against the Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India, New Delhi, nor has any specific act or omission on the
part of the answering respondent been alleged which would warrant the grant
of any relief against it. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the role of the
answering respondent is purely formal in nature.
5. Learned counsel for the State submits that the Indian constitutional and legal
framework does not recognize any parallel judicial system based on religion.
Informal bodies, alternatively styling themselves as "Sharia Courts," "Darul
Qaza," or "Courts of Kazi, have absolutely zero statutory recognition, judicial
authority, or power to adjudicate civil and matrimonial disputes. Any "Faisla,"
settlement, or decree issued by such extra-judicial forums carries no legal
weight, possesses no binding authority, and cannot be executed through any
state machinery. Legally, these private entities function at best as informal
mediation or conciliation cells, whose recommendations are entirely non-
binding. It is further submitted that an informal body cannot lawfully assume

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the powers of a statutory court, issue coercive orders, or enforce its decisions
against an unwilling person. Where such a body falsely assumes the
authority of a public servant and acts in that capacity, Section 204 of the
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 may attract if the ingredients of the offence
are prima facie found. In cases involving Talaq-e-Sunnat (comprising Talaq-
e-Ahsan and Talaq-e-Hasan), an informal Sharia forum or Kazi lacks the
legal jurisdiction to pass a judgment confirming a divorce. Under Muslim
Personal Law, Talaq-e-Sunnat is an extra-judicial act performed personally
by the husband under strict procedural guidelines. The role of a Kazi is
strictly restricted to that of a private witness or an administrative record-
keeper. If the wife disputes the procedural validity of the talaq, the
reconciliation attempts, or the fulfillment of statutory conditions, the Sharia
forum cannot adjudicate the matter. The exclusive authority to examine
evidence and pass legally binding declaration regarding the marital status of
the parties rests solely with a formally established Statutory Family Court. It
is a well-settled position of law that a statutory Family Court cannot rely upon
any settlement, compromise, or decree drafted by a Kazi or Sharia forum to
reject or diminish a Muslim woman's legal entitlements. The statutory
remedies provided by the legislature cannot be extinguished by private
religious arrangements. Respondent number 9 has projected itself as Court
and acted in that fashion only so that the people of the particular community
are influenced by such projection and accept the authority of respondent
number 9 Court, and feel themselves obliged to obey their illegally passed
judgement". Following facts show that the respondent number 9 has
attempted to create and establish itself as a parallel system of dispensation

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of justice by its self-proclaimed authority under the religious code: (a) Using
the word Court with its name; (b) in emblem showing a balance (Taraju) as
shown in the emblem of almost all the courts; (c) in proceeding recording the
statement; (d) taking evidence and then terming the final outcome as
"judgement". If such illegal acts are not curbed and criminal action against
responsible person is not initiated then this will embolden such elements and
would lead to a situation of lawlessness and anarchy in the society.
6. Learned Senior counsel for Respondent No.10 submits that the present writ
petition has been instituted, inter alia, alleging that Respondent No. 9 is
functioning as a parallel judicial authority and is passing decisions affecting
the legal rights of individuals, particularly in relation to the pronouncement of
Talaq by Respondent No. 10. It is respectfully submitted that Respondent No.
10 has no role in the alleged functioning of Respondent No. 9 and has been
unnecessarily impleaded in the broader challenge raised in the writ petition.
Learned counsel submits that owing to domestic discord and irreconcilable
differences between the answering Respondent No. 10 and the petitioner,
Respondent No. 10 pronounced Talaq-E-Hasan in three phases by way of
communications dated 31.08.2021, 30.09.2021 and 30.10.2021. The said
pronouncement was made in exercise of what he claims to be his personal
rights under Muslim Personal Law. Respondent No. 9, namely Idara-E-
Shariya, has no statutory or judicial status and does not possess any
authority to adjudicate upon or determine the civil or legal rights of the
parties. The document dated 18.01.2022 issued by Respondent No. 9 merely
conveyed/communicated the alleged execution of Talaq to the petitioner and
cannot, by itself, be treated as a judicial determination of the rights and

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obligations of the parties. The petitioner is, in any event, pursuing such
statutory and other remedies as may be available to her, in which
proceedings, Respondent No. 10 is appearing and contesting the claims in
accordance with law. Respondent No. 10 respectfully submits that the issues
sought to be raised in the present writ petition appear to travel beyond the
individual conduct of the Respondent No.10 and seek, inter alia,
constitutional adjudication concerning the validity of religious practices and
the status and functioning of religious institutions. Such wider constitutional
questions are distinct from the individual acts or conduct attributable to
Respondent No. 10. Respondent No. 10 therefore submits that he ought not
to be unnecessarily burdened with issues concerning the alleged exercise of
judicial or quasi-judicial authority by Respondent No. 9, over which he has
neither control nor authority. It is further submitted that the constitutional
validity of Talaq-E-Hasan is already the subject matter of proceedings before
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Benazeer Heena v. Union of India”, which, as
presently understood, is likely to be listed on 07.10.2026. Thus, it is
submitted that the larger constitutional questions concerning the validity of
Talaq-E-Hasan are presently pending consideration before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court and may appropriately be left to be adjudicated in the said
proceedings.
7. According to return of Respondent No.9, it is evident that the institution of
Idara-E Shariya Islami Court is religious and advisory institution and does not
exercise any judicial or statutory powers nor running any parallel judicial
system and does not possess or claim any legal status as a court of law nor
does it act as a Magistrate or Judicial Authority under any statute be it the

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Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act, 1986. It functions solely
in a religious and conciliatory capacity, offering opinions or documentation
based on religious understanding when sought voluntarily by members of the
community. The document dated 18.01.2022 impugned in the present
petition is only a religious declaration recording the pronouncement of
Divorce by way of Talaq-E-Hasan by respondent no. 10 and is not a legal
instrument. Respondent No.9 is not conducting any judicial proceeding, but
have given a religious finding on the basis of Quran and Shariya with regard
to pronouncement of Talaqe-E-Hasan by respondent no. 10. It has not
invalidated any marriage from the legal stand point and has not violated any
constitutional provision. The petitioner has already set the law in motion by
approaching the court of law and this shows that her access to justice is fully
intact and unhindered by any action of respondent No.9. Reliance has also
been placed in the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matter "Vishwa Lochan Madan Vs. Union of India" (2014) 7 SCC 707, in
which, Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken into consideration the
establishment of Darul Qaza and Idara-E-Shariya under the All India Muslim
Personal Law Board and the legal status of the Institutions and have
observed that despite the laudable object of the establishment of such court,
it has no legal status and is not binding upon any individual, but the existence
of Darul Qaza or for that matter practice of issuing fatwas does not means it
to be illegal, it is informal justice delivery systems and further the decision or
fatwa issued by whatever body being not emanating from any judicial system
recognized by law, it is not binding on anyone including the person, who had
asked for it. Further, such an adjudication or fatwa does not have a force of

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law and, therefore, cannot be enforced by any process using coercive
method. Any person trying to enforce that by any method shall be illegal and
has to be illegal and has to be dealt with in accordance with law. In view of
the aforementioned observation, the relief sought for issuance of writ
restraining the respondent no. 9 Idara-E-Shariya to exercise power of the
Court or Magistrate U/s 2(c) of the Act 1986 cannot be granted as it does not
have any legal status or is not functioning as a Magistrate, but is only giving
decision under Islami Shariya and Teachings of Quran, which is advisory in
nature and it is within the discretion of person either to accept or reject it.
Further the order dated 18.01.2022 is not an order having any legal status
and is not liable to be enforced, but is a decision on the basis of Muslim
Personal Law with respect to the exercise of execution of Talaque-E-Hasan,
which is the personal right as has been granted to the respondent no. 10.
Idara-E-Shariya i.e. respondent no. 9 is not a parallel judicial system, but is
only advisory religious establishment functioning under the right granted
under Article 25 of the Constitution of India, hence cannot be restrained or
any action be taken for performing the religious activities.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents
annexed with the petition carefully.
9. The first and foremost question which arises for consideration is whether
Respondent No.9, styling itself as an “Idara-E-Shariya Islami Court”,
possesses any legal authority to adjudicate upon and determine the marital
status or legal rights and obligations of the petitioner.
10. The answer to the aforesaid question is no. In this regard, It would be
appropriate to visit the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

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matter of Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India and Others, reported in
(2014) 7 SCC 707 , wherein following has been observed in paragraphs 10 to
17:-
10. The plea of the State of Madhya Pradesh is that fatwa
issued by Dar-ul-Qaza has no legal value.
11. The stand of the State of U.P. is that fatwas are advisory
in nature. They are not mandatory and do not prohibit any
Muslim to approach courts established by law for
adjudication of their disputes. Hence, Dar-ul-Qaza does not
act as a parallel court for adjudication of disputes.
12. From the pleadings of the parties there does not seem
to be any dispute that several Dar-ul-Qazas presided over
by the Qazis exist and they do issue fatwas. In the present
case, what we have been called upon to examine is as to
whether Dar-ul-Qaza is a parallel court and “fatwa” has any
legal status.
13. As it is well settled, the adjudication by a legal authority
sanctioned by law is enforceable and binding and meant to
be obeyed unless upset by an authority provided by law
itself. The power to adjudicate must flow from a validly made
law. A person deriving benefit from the adjudication must
have the right to enforce it and the person required to make
provision in terms of adjudication has to comply that and on
its failure consequences as provided in law are to ensue.
These are the fundamentals of any legal judicial system. In
our opinion, the decisions of Dar-ul-Qaza or the fatwa do not
satisfy any of these requirements. Dar-ul-Qaza is neither
created nor sanctioned by any law made by the competent
legislature. Therefore, the opinion or the fatwa issued by
Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter anybody is not adjudication of
dispute by an authority under a judicial system sanctioned
by law. A Qazi or Mufti has no authority or powers to impose

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his opinion and enforce his fatwa on anyone by any coercive
method. In fact, whatever may be the status of fatwa during
Mogul or British Rule, it has no place in independent India
under our constitutional scheme. It has no legal sanction
and cannot be enforced by any legal process either by the
Dar-ul-Qaza issuing that or the person concerned or for that
matter anybody. The person or the body concerned may
ignore it and it will not be necessary for anybody to
challenge it before any court of law. It can simply be
ignored. In case any person or body tries to impose it, their
act would be illegal. Therefore, the grievance of the
petitioner that Dar-ul-Qazas and Nizam-e-Qaza are running
a parallel judicial system is misconceived.
14. As observed earlier, the fatwa has no legal status in our
constitutional scheme. Notwithstanding that it is an admitted
position that fatwas have been issued and are being issued.
The All India Muslim Personal Law Board feels the
“necessity of establishment of a network of judicial system
throughout the country and Muslims should be made aware
that they should get their disputes decided by the Qazis”.
According to the All India Muslim Personal Law Board “this
establishment may not have the police powers but shall
have the book of Allah in hand and sunnat of the Rasool
and all decisions should be according to the book and the
sunnat. This will bring the Muslims to the Muslim courts.
They will get justice”.
15. The object of establishment of such a court may be
laudable but we have no doubt in our mind that it has no
legal status. It is bereft of any legal pedigree and has no
sanction in laws of the land. They are not part of the corpus
juris of the State. A fatwa is an opinion, only an expert is
expected to give. It is not a decree, nor binding on the court
or the State or the individual. It is not sanctioned under our

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constitutional scheme. But this does not mean that
existence of Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter practice of
issuing fatwas are themselves illegal. It is informal justice
delivery system with an objective of bringing about amicable
settlement between the parties. It is within the discretion of
the persons concerned either to accept, ignore or reject it.
However, as the fatwa gets strength from the religion; it
causes serious psychological impact on the person
intending not to abide by that. As projected by Respondent
10 “Godfearing Muslims obey the fatwas”. In the words of
Respondent 10 “it is for the persons/parties who obtain
fatwa to abide by it or not”. He, however, emphasises that
“the persons who are Godfearing and believe that they are
answerable to the Almighty and have to face the
consequences of their doings/deeds, such are the persons,
who submit to the fatwa”. Imrana's case is an eye-opener in
this context. Though she became the victim of lust of her
father-in-law, her marriage was declared unlawful and the
innocent husband was restrained from keeping physical
relationship with her. In this way a declaratory decree for
dissolution of marriage and decree for perpetual injunction
were passed. Though neither the wife nor the husband had
approached for any opinion, an opinion was sought for and
given at the instance of a journalist, a total stranger. In this
way, the victim has been punished. A country governed by
rule of law cannot fathom it.
16. In our opinion, one may not object to issuance of fatwa
on a religious issue or any other issue so long it does not
infringe upon the rights of individuals guaranteed under the
law. Fatwa may be issued in respect of issues concerning
the community at large at the instance of a stranger but if a
fatwa is sought by a complete stranger on an issue not
concerning the community at large but individual, then the

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Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter anybody may consider the
desirability of giving any response and while considering it
should not be completely unmindful of the motivation behind
the fatwa. Having regard to the fact that a fatwa has the
potential of causing immense devastation, we feel impelled
to add a word of caution. We would like to advise the Dar-ul-
Qaza or for that matter anybody not to give any response or
issue fatwa concerning an individual, unless asked for by
the person involved or the person having direct interest in
the matter. However, in a case the person involved or the
person directly interested or likely to be affected being
incapacitated, by any person having some interest in the
matter. Issuance of fatwa on rights, status and obligation of
individual Muslims, in our opinion, would not be permissible,
unless asked for by the person concerned or in case of
incapacity, by the person interested. Fatwas touching upon
the rights of an individual at the instance of rank strangers
may cause irreparable damage and therefore, would be
absolutely uncalled for. It shall be in violation of basic
human rights. It cannot be used to punish the innocent. No
religion including Islam punishes the innocent. Religion
cannot be allowed to be merciless to the victim. Faith cannot
be used as the dehumanising force.
17. In the light of what we have observed above, the prayer
made by the petitioner in the terms sought for cannot be
granted. However, we observe that no Dar-ul-Qazas or for
that matter, anybody or institution by any name, shall give
verdict or issue fatwa touching upon the rights, status and
obligation, of an individual unless such an individual has
asked for it. In the case of incapacity of such an individual,
any person interested in the welfare of such person may be
permitted to represent the cause of individual concerned. In
any event, the decision or the fatwa issued by whatever

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body being not emanating from any judicial system
recognised by law, it is not binding on anyone including the
person, who had asked for it. Further, such an adjudication
or fatwa does not have a force of law and, therefore, cannot
be enforced by any process using coercive method. Any
person trying to enforce that by any method shall be illegal
and has to be dealt with in accordance with law.
11. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the status of
Dar-ul-Qaza and fatwas under the constitutional scheme of India. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that adjudicatory power must flow from a validly
enacted law and that a Dar-ul-Qaza is neither created nor sanctioned by law.
Consequently, the opinion or fatwa issued by such a body does not constitute
adjudication by an authority forming part of the judicial system recognised by
law.
12.The Hon'ble Supreme Court further made it clear that a fatwa is merely an
opinion and is not a decree; it is not binding upon the Court, the State or an
individual and cannot be enforced through any coercive legal process. The
existence of Dar-ul-Qaza or the practice of issuing fatwas, by itself, was not
declared illegal; however, such bodies cannot assume the status or authority
of Courts established under law.
13.More importantly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned that no Dar-ul-Qaza
or other institution, by whatever name called, should issue a verdict or fatwa
touching upon the rights, status or obligations of an individual unless such
individual has sought it, and further held that such a decision, not emanating
from a judicial system recognised by law, is not binding and cannot be
enforced by coercive process.

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14.Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,
Respondent No.9 cannot be recognised as a Court constituted under the
Constitution or any statute. It has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
marital status of the petitioner or to pass an order which, in law, determines
whether the petitioner stands divorced from Respondent No.10.
15.Consequently, the document/order dated 18.01.2022 issued by Respondent
No.9 cannot have the legal effect attributed to it by the petitioner or
Respondent No.10. It is, at best, a communication or religious opinion
emanating from a private body and does not constitute a decree or judicial
determination of dissolution of marriage. It neither creates, extinguishes nor
alters any legally enforceable right or status of the petitioner.
16.It is necessary to clarify that the aforesaid conclusion is confined to the
competence and legal effect of the order/communication dated 18.01.2022
issued by Respondent No.9. This Court is not called upon, in the present
proceedings, to adjudicate upon the larger constitutional validity of Talaq-e-
Hasan.
17. The said distinction assumes significance because Respondent No.10 has
relied upon alleged pronouncements of Talaq-e-Hasan made by
communications dated 31.08.2021, 30.09.2021 and 30.10.2021. The
constitutional and legal questions concerning unilateral Talaq-e-Hasan have
been the subject matter of proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
The subsequent proceedings in Benazeer Heena v. Union of India also
demonstrate that the issue has remained under consideration before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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18.In view of the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, this Court considers it inappropriate to enter into or
pronounce upon the larger constitutional question concerning the validity of
Talaq-e-Hasan. All questions in that regard are accordingly left open to be
considered by the competent Court in accordance with law.
19.At the same time, pendency of such proceedings cannot confer jurisdiction
upon Respondent No.9 which it otherwise does not possess. Nor can a
purported decision of a private religious body be treated as a substitute for an
adjudication by a Court established under law.
20.It is also clarified that nothing contained in this order shall prejudice the
criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No.118/2021 or any other statutory
remedy available to the petitioner. The competent authorities shall deal with
such proceedings independently and strictly in accordance with law.
21.The contention of Respondent No.10 that the dispute between the parties
arises out of domestic discord and that he has separately asserted Talaq-e-
Hasan does not alter the legal position concerning Respondent No.9.
Whatever rights or defences Respondent No.10 may have in law are required
to be examined by the competent forum and cannot derive legal validity
merely from the order dated 18.01.2022 issued by Respondent No.9.
22. This Court is also conscious of the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Vishwa Lochan Madan that religious faith cannot be permitted to
operate as a dehumanising force or to be used to determine the rights, status
or obligations of an individual in a manner contrary to the rule of law.
23.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part. The purported
order/communication dated 18.01.2022 issued by Respondent No.9, insofar

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as it purports to determine or declare the marital status of the petitioner or to
dissolve the marriage between the petitioner and Respondent No.10, is
declared to be without legal authority and incapable of conferring or altering
any legal right, status or obligation of the parties.
24.Respondent No.9 is further held to have no jurisdiction to function as a Court
constituted under the Constitution or any law enacted by a competent
legislature, and any opinion, verdict or decision issued by it cannot be
enforced by coercive process or treated as a binding adjudication of the civil
or matrimonial rights of the parties.
25.However, this Court consciously refrains from adjudicating upon the
constitutional validity or otherwise of Talaq-e-Hasan, leaving the said
question open as some matters are pending for determination before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
26.It is made clear that this order shall not preclude either party from pursuing
any remedy available under the Constitution, statutory law or applicable
personal law before the competent forum, and all such proceedings shall be
decided independently on their own merits and in accordance with law.
27.The writ petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
28. Before parting, this Court observes that religion may guide an individual's
conscience and personal faith, but no religious institution or private body can
be permitted to assume the authority of a Court established by law or to use
religious belief as a means of determining or enforcing the legal status and
rights of an individual. The rule of law and the constitutional framework
remain paramount. Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Avinash
Judge

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The date when the
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judgment is reserved
judgment is
uploaded on the website
pronounced
Operative Full
12.08.2026 07.09.2026 ------ 07.09.2026