PREMLATA DEVI vs MADHUR KUMAR SINGH
- Court
- Jharkhand High Court
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No.235 of 2026
Premlata Devi, aged about 38 years, Daughter of Late
Dhirendra Kumar, Wife of Madhur Kumar Singh, Resident
of village-Bhatdiha, P.O. Godda, P.S. Godda Town,
District-Godda, Jharkhand.
… Appellant/Respondent
Versus
Madhur Kumar Singh, Son of Late Prayag Singh,
Resident of Mohalla-Karharbil, P.O. Shivpahar, P.S.
Dumka (T), Subdivision and District-Dumka, Jharkhand
… … Respondent/petitioner
-------
CORAM: HON’BLEMR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AKHIL KUMAR
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Manoj Kumar Sah, Advocate
For the Respondent : None
----------------------------
CAV/Reserved on 09.10.2026 Pronounced on 05/11/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer:
1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Court
Act, 1984 is directed against order/judgment dated
05.12.2023 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family
Court, Dumka in Original Suit No. 90 of 2023, whereby and
whereunder the learned Principal Judge has allowed the suit
ex-parte filed by the petitioner, respondent herein under
Section 13(1)(ia)(i-B) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for
grant of decree of divorce.
Brief facts of the case :
1
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the
original suit, needs to be referred herein reads, which reads
as under:
3. The parties are legally wedded husband and wife and their
marriage was solemnized on 09.05.2006 at village-
Bhatdiha, P.O. Godda, P.S. Godda (T), Subdivision and
District- Godda (Jharkhand) according to Hindu rites and
customs. Out of their wedlock one female child aged about
14 years another male child aged about 08 years named
Virat Kumar Singh were born at the time of filing of the suit.
4. Case was made out before the learned family court since
after marriage, the appellant-wife several times went to her
parent's place situated at village- Bhatdiha, sometimes with
her father and sometimes with her brother and sometimes
with the respondent and stayed there most of the time, as
per her own will and desire.
5. It is contended that the plaintiff-husband, the respondent
herein, was an educated unemployed at the time of his
marriage having no earning of his own and was dependent
on his parents, who had little area of agricultural land, while
on other hand parents of the defendant-wife, the appellant
herein, were men of means, having a big area of agricultural
land in their possession. It is stated that since the
defendant-wife spent most of the times in her parent's place
2
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
as such, the plaintiff-husband used to visit his sasural place
time to time, where the defendant became pregnant and
deliver her first female child in the year 2007. After birth of
the first daughter, the parents of the plaintiff-husband asked
the parents of the defendant-wife for "bidagiry" of the
defendant but parents of the defendant contrary to it began
to put pressure upon the plaintiff-husband to reside as
"Gharjamai" in their house and to look after their properties
and business. But the plaintiff-husband refused the
proposal of the parents of the defendant-wife and as such
they became angry and as a result the defendant was not
agree to come back with the plaintiff to her matrimonial
home. However, later on, due to intervention of his parents
and society persons the plaintiff-husband brought the
defendant-wife to her matrimonial home. Subsequently, the
parents of the defendant began to disturb the plaintiff as at
short intervals they used to put pressure before the plaintiff,
his parents and upon the other family members of his family
for "Bidagiry" of their daughter. However, several times,
father of the defendant took her away from her matrimonial
home without his consent and his parents and the same
character of the defendant's brother in the same matter. He
suffered a lot in such situation in which at one hand the
defendant was living most of the time at her parents place
and plaintiff was passing his life as a Bachelor life and there
3
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
was several occasions with him to remain depend on local
hotels for his daily food/meal and breakfast. The defendant
without his consent or his parents started frequently visiting
her parent's house and whenever she visited her parents‟
house, she used to reside there or a considerable period in
each visit and that too without any rhyme and reason. The
plaintiff had tried his best to make her understand to lead
conjugal happy life with him but the entire efforts of the
plaintiff gone in vain. The plaintiff faced such a situation for
further several years and under such circumstances he was
compelled to visit his sasural but defendant had no interest
to live and reside with the plaintiff and in due course of time
the defendant delivered an another male child in the year
2015. After birth of the second male child, he brought his
wife to his house along with female child but the defendant
has no interest to live in her matrimonial home with him
along with her children. The plaintiff after a long struggle
and hard work and labour of his own has got a L.L.B. Degree
in the year 2019, and he has applied in the Bar Council of
Jharkhand for certificate of Advocacy. On 14.08. 2019, when
the plaintiff was in examination hall for last paper
examination of L.L.B., the uncle and brother of the
defendant came to the house of the petitioner's sister which
house is situated near Polytechnic Gate where the defendant
was living with her children in the house of the plaintiff's
4
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
sister. They told the sister of the plaintiff that the mother of
the defendant is lying serious ill and on this ground showing
urgency took away, the defendant and their children with
them. The sister of the plaintiff refused to the request of the
uncle and brother of the defendant and requested to wait the
plaintiff but they do not wait the plaintiff and she left the
plaintiff's sister's house and she along with children went
with them in her father's house at Bhatdiha, Godda. When
the plaintiff arrived his house after examination of L.L.B.,
the sister of the plaintiff disclosed about the incident to him.
6. After about a week the plaintiff visited his sasural place, but
when he knocked door of his house, the defended opened
the door and expressed before the plaintiff that she will not
reside in his house of "khapra Pose house" and she further
added that she has plenty of every things at her parents
hose and nothing any type of income which the plaintiff
earns from his private tuition itself not sufficient to maintain
the status expense and finally told the plaintiff to forgo the
private tuition work and come to her parents house with his
all belongings, otherwise there was no shelter for the plaintiff
in his said sasural place and thereafter closed the door of
the house. The plaintiff became very shocked from such type
of behaviour of the defendant having no alternative available
with him returned back to his house and disclosed about the
facts to his sister and brother-in-law including some
5
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
relatives and friends. The defendant, her mother and brother
has given threatening to implicate in a false Criminal case
like 498 'A' I.P.C. and D.P. Act and they said that it is not
possible to lead he conjugal life with the plaintiff. The
plaintiff filed original suit no. 8/2020 u/s 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, but after receiving the notice the
defendant had not appeared in Court and after publication
of the Gazette, this learned Court passed ex-parte order But
the defendant after receiving notice U/S 9 of Hindu Marriage
Act, lastly filed a false P.C.R. Case against the plaintiff which
was converted to G.R. Case No. 602/2020 which is still
pending in the Court of C.J.M. Godda and also filed a
maintenance case against the plaintiff before the Principal
Judge, Family Court, Godda which is still pending. The
plaintiff sent a legal notice upon the defendant on
30.09.2022, regarding judgment and decree u/s 9 of the
Hind Marriage Act, for restitution of conjugal rights but the
defendant has not taken any step for restitution of conjugal
rights till now. Since 2016, over a period of more than seven
years has elapsed already and since then there is no
conjugal relationship in between the plaintiff and the
defendant and that the defendant without any reasonable
excuse, has withdrawn herself from the society.
7. The cause of action for the petition arose on 09.05.2006
when the marriage of the plaintiff with the defendant was
6
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
performed. It also arose on several occasion, when the
defendant behaved and committed cruelty through several
ways towards the plaintiff and without any just and
reasonable excuse, withdrawn herself from the society and
after birth of the second male child there is no conjugal,
relationship in between the plaintiff and defendant and in
the meantime the defendant left the matrimonial home on
14.08.2019 without consent of the plaintiff.
8. In the aforesaid background, the petitioner-husband, the
respondent herein, had filed the suit wherein prayer was
made to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage in favour
of the petitioner/ respondent herein.
9. Before the family court, despite being noticed, the
respondent-wife, appellant herein, did not appear, as such
the case proceeded ex-parte vide order dated 11.10.2023, as
against the appellant-wife.
10. The petitioner-husband adduced evidence in support of his
case before the Family Court.
11. The learned family court, allowed the suit filed by the
petitioner-husband filed under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for grant of decree of divorce.
12. The respondent-wife (appellant herein) being aggrieved with
the order passed by the learned family court has approached
this Court by filing the instant appeal.
7
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
13. On being noticed by this Court, the respondent-husband has
appeared and contested the appeal.
Submission of learned counsel for the appellant-wife
14. Submission has been made that the learned family court did
not consider the fact that prior to filing of divorce case, the
appellant-wife had filed PCR Case No. 602/2020 against the
respondent under Sections 498(A) IPC and ¾ D.P. Act and
the respondent in order to save his skin had filed the suit for
divorce.
15. Submission has been made that the learned family court has
proceeded in such a fashion that the Suit has to be
dismissed which will appear from the entire record of the
case itself.
16. Learned family court has failed to take into consideration the
fact while passing the impugned Judgment that the learned
court has never discussed in the impugned order, whether
the substituted service of notice was ever executed or the
process of summon or notice was executed properly.
17. It has been submitted that the learned family court has
failed to take into consideration while passing the impugned
judgment that the respondent-husband has suppressed
several material fact with regard to the cruelty done to the
appellant by the respondent i.e., i.e., the appellant had not
8
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
left her matrimonial house voluntarily rather the appellant
was forced to live in her parental house.
18. Submission has been made that the impugned order has
been passed treating the statement made by the husband to
be a gospel truth, and on that basis order of divorce has
been passed.
19. Therefore, submission has been made that the impugned
order may be quashed and set aside.
Analysis:
20. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and gone
through the pleading available on record as also the finding
recorded by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, and
other materials available on record.
21. This Court before proceeding further needs to refer herein
that this Court vide order dated 05.05.2026 issued notice
upon the respondent, both by speed post as well as by
ordinary process. The service report of the process server
reflects that the notice has been personally received by the
respondent but the respondent did not appear.
22. However, this Court while admitting the appeal vide order
dated 17.07.2026, again issued notice upon the respondent.
Pursuant thereto, the respondent appeared by filing
Vakalatnama but when the case was taken up, on repeated
9
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
call none appeared on behalf of respondent, as such this
Court proceeded on the basis of pleading available on record.
23. This Court before appreciating the legality and propriety of
the impugned order needs to refer herein the factual aspect
of the matter.
24. The marriage of the parties was solemnized on 09.05.2006
and out of their wedlock one female child aged about 14
years and another male child aged about 08 years was born
at the time of filing of the suit.
25. Case has been made out before the learned family court that
since after marriage, the appellant-wife stayed most of the
times in her parental house and pressure was upon him
[husband] to become Gharjamai which he refused.
26. It is further case of the plaintiff-husband, the respondent
herein, that the plaintiff filed original suit no. 8/2020 u/s 9
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, after receiving the notice
the defendant had not appeared in Court, after publication
of the Gazette, this learned Court passed ex-parte order, but
the defendant after receiving notice U/S 9 of Hindu Marriage
Act, lastly filed a false P.C.R. Case against the plaintiff which
was converted to G.R. Case No. 602/2020 which is still
pending in the Court of C.J.M. Godda and also filed a
maintenance case against the plaintiff before the Principal
Judge, Family Court, Godda which is still pending. The
10
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
plaintiff sent a legal notice upon the defendant on
30.09.2022, regarding judgment and decree u/s 9 of the
Hind Marriage Act, for restitution of conjugal rights but the
defendant has not taken any step for restitution of conjugal
rights till now. Since 2016, over a period of more than seven
years has elapsed already and since then there is no
conjugal relationship in between the plaintiff and the
defendant and that the defendant without any reasonable
excuse, has withdrawn herself from the society.
27. The cause of action for the petition arose on 09.05.2006
when the marriage of the plaintiff with the defendant was
performed. It also arose on several occasion, when the
defendant behaved and committed cruelty through several
ways towards the plaintiff and without any just and
reasonable excuse, withdrawn herself from the society and
after birth of the second male child there is no conjugal,
relationship in between the plaintiff and defendant and in
the meantime the defendant left the matrimonial home on
14.08.2019 without consent of the plaintiff.
28. In the aforesaid background, the plaintiff-husband, the
respondent herein, had filed the suit seeking decree for
dissolution of marriage.
29. Before the learned family court the suit proceeded ex parte
against the appellant-wife, as despite being notice upon the
11
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
appellant-wife, she did not appear. However, it has
vehemently been opposed by learned counsel for the
appellant stating that the process of summoning the
appellant has not been complied with nor the notices have
been served to the appellant properly nor sufficient
opportunity was given to the appellant to appear, further no
mode of substituted service was executed.
30. In absence of appellant-wife, the defendant in the suit, in
course of the proceeding, three witnesses have been
examined by the plaintiff which includes the plaintiff himself
as P.W.1 Madhur Kumar Singh, P.W. 2 Bikash Kumar and
P.W. 3 Bishnu Kumar Singh. Besides this some documents
were also marked as exhibit.
31. P.W.1 is Madhur Kumar Singh, the plaintiff himself has fully
supported his own case as mentioned in the plaint above
mentioned. Further deposed that he was married with the
defendant according to Hindu rites on 09.05.2006 as per
Hindu rites and rituals at village-Bhatdiha, P.S. Godda,
District -Godda. After marriage his wife came to the house of
the defendant situated at Mohalla- Karharbil and they
started to lived together happily. Further deposed that since
after marriage his wife several times went to her parent's
place situated at village- Bhatdiha, sometimes with her
father and sometimes with her brother and sometimes with
12
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
him, stayed there most of the time, as per her own will and
desire. He was an educated unemployed at the time of his
marriage having no earning of his own and was dependent
on his parents, who had a little area of agricultural land of
his own in village Danre within Poraiyahat Police station,
District- Godda, while on other hand parents of the
defendant were men of means, having a big area of
agricultural land in their possession, so she stated to him
that she is unable to stay with him because there is no
accommodation in his house and she spent most of the
times in her parent's place in a circumstances, he used to
visit his sasural time to time, where his wife became
pregnant and deliver her first female child in the year 2007.
After birth of the first daughter he and his parents asked the
parents of the defendant for "bidagiry" of the defendant but
parents of the defendant contrary to it began to put pressure
upon him to reside as "Gharjamai" in their house and to look
after their properties and Business of the vehicles and shop,
his wife also has a Tailor shop and she carrying a business
of sewing cloths/dresses of the students of the local private
school, they have suggested to him to live as a Gharjamai in
his house but he refused the proposal of his parent's-in-law
and as such they became angry and as a result his wife was
not agree to come back with him to her matrimonial home,
situated at Mohalla Karharbil, P.S Dumka Town,
13
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
Subdivision and District-Dumka. Later on, due to
intervention of his parents and society persons he brought
his wife to her matrimonial home.. Subsequently, the
parents of his wife began to disturb him as at short intervals
they used to put pressure before him, his parents and upon
the other family members of his family for "Bidagiry" of their
daughter. Further deposed that father of his wife took her
away from her matrimonial home without his consent and
will and his parents and the same character of brother of his
wife in the same matter. He suffered a lot in such situation
in which at one hand the defendant was living most of the
time at her parents place and he was passing his life as a
Bachelor life and there was several occasions with him to
remain depend on local hotels for his daily food/meal and
breakfast due to his parents has died as there was no any
member in his house he is alone in his family. His wife
Premlata Devi without his consent started frequently visiting
her parent's house and whenever she visited her parents‟
house, she used to reside there or a considerable period in
each visit and that too without any rhyme and reason. He
had tried his best to make her understand to lead conjugal
happy life with him but the entire efforts of the plaintiff gone
in vain and he faced such a situation for further several
years and under such circumstances he was compelled to
visit his sasural place and in due course of time the
14
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
defendant delivered an another male child in the year 2015.
After birth of the second male child, he brought his wife to
his house. Thereafter a long struggle and hard work and
labour of his own he has got a L.L.B. Degree in the year
2019, and he has applied in the Bar Council of Jharkhand
for certificate of Advocacy. On 14.08. 2019, when he was in
examination hall for last paper examination of L.L.B., the
uncle and brother of his wife came to his sister's house and
she left the plaintiff's sister's house with her uncle and
brother and went to her father's house Bhatdiha, Godda.
After about a week he visited his sasural place, but his wife
told that she will not reside in his house at Mohalla
Karharbil in "khapra Pose house". He had filed a original suit
no. 8/2020 u/s 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, after
receiving the notice the defendant had not appeared in
Court, after publication of the Gazette in "Prabhat Khabar",
learned court passed ex-parte order, but she after receiving
notice U/S 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, lastly filed a false P.C.R.
Case against the plaintiff which is converted in G.R. Case
No. 602/2020 which is still pending in the Court of C.J.M.
Godda and also filed a maintenance case against the plaintiff
before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Godda which is
still pending. Since 2016, over a period of more than seven
years has elapsed already and since then there is no
conjugal relationship in between them and the defendant
15
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
without any reasonable excuse, has withdrawn her self from
the society of her husband. No body appeared to cross-
examine this witness so this witness has been discharged
without cross-examination.
32. P.W. 2 Bikash Kumar and P.W. 3 Bishnu Kumar Singh have
fully supported the case of the plaintiff including his
marriage with the defendant which was solemnised
according to Hindu rites on 09.05.2006 as per Hindu rites
and rituals at village-Bhatdiha, P.S. Godda, District-Godda.
After marriage the defendant came to the house of the
plaintiff situated at Mohalla- Karharbil and they started to
lived together happily. Further deposed that since after
marriage the defendant several times went to her parent's
place situated at village- Bhatdiha, sometimes with her
father and sometimes with her brother and sometimes with
the plaintiff, stayed there most of the time, as per her own
will and desire. The plaintiff was an educated unemployed at
the time of his marriage having no earning of his own and
was dependent on his parents, who had a little area of
agricultural land of his own in village- Danre within
Poraiyahat Police station, District- Godda, while on other
hand, parents of the defendant were men of means, having a
big area of agricultural land in their possession, so she
stated to him that she is unable to stay with him because
there is no accommodation in his house and she spent most
16
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
of the times in her parent's place in a circumstances, the
plaintiff used to visit his sasural time to time, where his wife
became pregnant and deliver her first female child in the
year 2007. After birth of the first daughter he and his
parents asked the parents of the defendant for "bidagiry" of
the defendant but parents of the defendant contrary to it
began to put pressure upon the plaintiff to reside as
"Gharjamai" in their house and to look after their properties
and business of the vehicles and shop, the defendant also
has a Tailor shop and she carrying a business of sewing
cloths/dresses of the students of the local private school,
they have suggested to him to live as a Gharjamai in his
house but the plaintiff refused the proposal of his parent's-
in-law and as such they became angry and as a result the
defendant was not agree to come back with the plaintiff to
her matrimonial home, situated at Mohalla Karharbil, P.S
Dumka Town, Subdivision and District-Dumka. Later on,
due to intervention of parents and society persons of the
plaintiff, he brought his wife to her matrimonial home.
Subsequently, the parents of the defendant began to disturb
him as at short intervals they used to put pressure before
him, his parents and upon the other family members of his
family for "Bidagiry" of their daughter. Further deposed that
father of the defendant took her away from her matrimonial
home without consent and will of the plaintiff and his
17
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
parents and the same character of brother of the defendant
in the same matter. The plaintiff suffered a lot in such
situation in which at one hand the defendant was living
most of the time at her parents place and the plaintiff was
passing his life as a Bachelor life and there was several
occasions with him to remain depend on local hotels for his
daily food/meal and breakfast due to which his parents has
died as there was no any member in his house, he is alone
in his family. The defendant without his consent started
frequently visiting her parent's house and whenever she
visited her parents house, she used to reside there for a
considerable period in each visit and that too without any
rhyme and reason. He had tried his best to make her
understand to lead conjugal happy life with him but the
entire efforts of the plaintiff gone in vain and he faced such a
situation for further several years and under such
circumstances he was compelled to visit his sasural place
and in due course of time the defendant delivered an
another male child in the year 2015. After birth of the
second male child. the plaintiff brought his wife to his
house. Thereafter a long struggle and hard work and labour
of his own the plaintiff has got a L.L.B. Degree in the year
2019, and he has applied in the Bar Council of Jharkhand
for certificate of Advocacy. On 14.08. 2019, when the
plaintiff was in examination hall for last paper examination
18
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
of L.L.B., the uncle and brother of the defendant came to his
sister's house and she left the plaintiff's sister's house with
her uncle and brother and went to her father's house
Bhatdiha, Godda. After about a week the plaintiff visited his
sasural place, but when he knocked door of his house, his
wife opened the door and expressed that she will not reside
in his house at Mohalla Karharbil in "khapra Pose house".
The plaintiff had filed a original suit no. 8/2020 u/s 9 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, after receiving the notice the
defendant had not appeared in Court, after publication of
the Gazette in "Prabhat Khabar", this learned court passed
ex-parte order, but the defendant after receiving notice U/S
9 of Hindu Marriage Act, lastly filed a false P.C.R. Case
against the plaintiff which is converted in G.R. Case No.
602/2020 which is still pending in the Court of C.J.M.
Godda and the plaintiff was on bail in that case and the
defendant also filed a maintenance case against the plaintiff
before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Godda which is
still pending. Since 2016, over a period of more than seven
years has elapsed already and since then there is no
conjugal relationship in between them and the defendant
without any reasonable excuse, has withdrawn her self from
the society of her husband. No body appeared to cross-
examine these witnesses so these witnesses have been
discharged without cross- examination.
19
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
33. Some documents have also been filed on behalf of plaintiff-
husband, the respondent herein. Ext. 1 is Notice delivered to
Premlata Devi with registered receipt by the Advocate of
Madhur Kumar Singh with judgment and decree sheet
passed in O.S. 81/2020. Ext 2 is certified copy of order sheet
of O.S. no. 08/2020 from dated 14.01.2020 to 28/.05.2022,
Ext. 3 is Certified Copy of judgment passed in O.S. 08/2020
and Ext. 4 is Certified copy of decree sheet of O.S. 08/2020.
34. It requires to refer herein that since appellate jurisdiction
has been invoked herein, therefore, before entering into
merit of the case, at this juncture it would be purposeful to
discuss the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court.
35. It needs to refer herein that under section 7 of the Family
Courts Act, the Family Court shall have and exercise all the
jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Sub-
ordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force
in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature which are
described in the explanation to section 7(1).
36. Sub-section (1) to section 19 of the Family Courts Act
provides that an appeal shall lie from every judgment or
order not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to
the High Court "both on facts and on law". Therefore, section
19 of the Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of which has been dealt
with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in series of judgments.
20
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
37. The law is well settled that the High Court in a First Appeal
can examine every question of law and fact which arises in
the facts of the case and has powers to affirm, reverse or
modify the judgment under question . In "Jagdish Singh v.
Madhuri Devi" (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court acting as
the First Appellate Court to enter into not only questions of
law but questions of fact as well and the appellate Court
therefore can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire
evidence and can come to its own conclusion. For ready
reference the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is
being quoted as under :
“It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising
power as the first appellate court and hence it was open
to the Court to enter into not only questions of law but
questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal
is a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a rehearing of
the main matter and the appellate court can reappraise,
reappreciate and review the entire evidence--oral as well
as documentary--and can come to its own conclusion.”
38. Herein, the learned counsel for the appellant has argued
that the evidence of cruelty and desertion as also the
demand of dowry has not properly been considered and as
such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not
sustainable in the eyes of law.
39. This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on
behalf of learned counsel on the issue of perversity, needs to
21
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has
been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means
that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the
evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs.
State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr.,
(2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word
perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of
fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material
or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice
of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then,
the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs,
i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as
under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a
number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman
Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the
expression “perverse” means that the findings of the
subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence
brought on record or they are against the law or suffer
from the vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry &
Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that
“perverse finding” means a finding which is not only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether against
the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC
1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it
can be said that the findings of the authorities are based
on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no
reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.
22
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977
Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in
conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse
order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the
Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be
defined as one that is not only against the weight of
evidence but is altogether against the evidence.
In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined
“perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted
from the right; turned away or deviating from what is
right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by
various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current
English, 6th Edn.
“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to
behave in a way that most people think is wrong,
unacceptable or unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English,
International Edn.
Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal
and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of
evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the
English Language (Deluxe EncyclopedicEdn.)
Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or
expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward;
stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases,
4th Edn.
“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined
as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but
is altogether against the evidence.”
40. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that any order
said to be perverse if a finding of fact is arrived at by
ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into
23
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so
outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality.
41. Thus, "perversity" refers to a finding or decision so
unreasonable or irrational that no reasonable person acting
judicially could have reached it. It signifies a gross and
unreasonable assessment of evidence or law by a court.
42. Further Perversity is a high threshold for
intervention, distinguishing it from a mere error of fact or
law. The "safest approach on perversity is the classic
approach on the reasonable man's inference on the facts
but inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of
evidence is not perversity, reference in this regard be made
to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 14 SCC 197.
43. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual and legal
circumstances, this Court has carefully examined the
impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned
Family Court in order to ascertain whether the findings
recorded therein suffer from perversity, arbitrariness, or
any patent illegality warranting interference in the exercise
of appellate jurisdiction.
44. Allegation has been made on behalf of the
respondent-husband before the learned family court that
24
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
the appellant/respondent-wife committed mental and
physical cruelty against him as also deserted him.
45. So far the allegation of cruelty is concerned, it
requires to refer herein the definition of „ cruelty’ as has been
defined by Hon‟ble Apex in the judgment rendered in Dr.
N.G. Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane [(1975) 2 SCC 326],
wherein it has been held that the Court is to enquire as to
whether the charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to
cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable
apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to
live with the respondent.
46. The cruelty has also been defined in the case of
Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi [(1988) 1 SCC 105],
wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents
demanded dowry. The Hon‟ble Apex Court emphasized that
“cruelty” can have no fixed definition.
47. According to the Hon ’ ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the
“conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct
in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations”. It is the
conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty
can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or
unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your
spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty;
intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be
25
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a
question of fact and degree.”
48. The Hon ’ ble Apex Court has further observed
therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty
that it is important for the Court to not search for a
standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty
in another case. What must be considered include the kind
of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social
conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which
they attach importance.”
49. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal
conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations
against the spouse in the written statement filed before the
court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute
cruelty.
50. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC
337 , the wife alleged in her written statement that her
husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid
disorder”. The wife ’ s lawyer also levelled allegations of
“lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family
while he was conducting cross-examination. The Hon ‟ ble
Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to
constitute “cruelty”.
51. In Vijay kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela
Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon ’ ble Apex
26
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
Court has observed by taking into consideration the
allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement
that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity
with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having
an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context
of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute
“cruelty” itself.
52. The Hon ‟ ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v.
Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742 , has been
pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct
is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct,
which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of
the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to
make one live with the other. The conduct may take the
form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental
pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct
complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial
irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not
constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
53. Cruelty” has an inseparable nexus with human
conduct and is always dependent on social strata or milieu
to which parties belong, their ways of life, relationship,
temperaments and emotions that are conditioned by their
social status, reference be made to the judgment rendered
by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case Vishwanath
27
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal , (2012) 7 SCC
288 .
54. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of K. Srinivas
Rao v. D.A. Deepa , (2013) 5 SCC 226 has observed that
cruelty is evident where one spouse so treats other and
manifests such feelings in other, as to cause reasonable
apprehension in mind of other that it would be harmful or
injurious to reside with other spouse and cruelty may be
physical or mental. It has further been observed that
staying together under the same roof is not a precondition
for mental cruelty. Spouse can cause mental cruelty by his
or her conduct even while he or she is not staying under the
same roof.
55. In matrimonial relationship cruelty mean absence of
mutual respect and understanding between spouses which
embitters relationship. Sometimes it may take form of
violence, or at times may just be an attitude or approach.
Silence in some situations may also amount to cruelty
reference be made to the case of Ravi
Kumar v. Julmidevi, (2010) 4 SCC 476.
56. For considering dissolution of marriage at instance
of a spouse who alleges mental cruelty, result of such
mental cruelty must be such that it is not possible to
continue with matrimonial relationship reference may be
taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex
28
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
Court in the case of Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal
Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742.
57. Further the word „cruelty‟ is used relation to human
conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to
or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a
course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the
other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or
unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct
complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or
illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other
spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such
cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is
proved or admitted, reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of
Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit , (2006) 3 SCC 778.
58. Further, in the case of Manish Tyagi v. Deepak
Kumar , (2010) 4 SCC 339 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has
categorically observed that to constitute „cruelty‟, it is
enough that conduct of one of parties is so abnormal and
below accepted norm that other spouse could not
reasonable be expected to put up with it. Conduct is no
longer required to be so atrociously abominable which
would cause reasonable apprehension that it would be
harmful of injurious to continue cohabitation with another
spouse. Hence, it is not necessary to establish physical
29
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
violence. Continued ill-treatment, cessation of marital
intercourse, studied neglect, indifference may lead to
inference of cruelty.
59. The word “cruelty” under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the
Act has got no static connotation, and therefore, gives a very
wide discretion to the Court to apply it liberally and
contextually. What is cruelty in one case may not be the
same for another and has to be applied from person to
person while taking note of the attending circumstances.
Harm or injury to health, reputation, the working-career or
the like, would be important considerations in determining
whether the conduct of the defending spouse amounts to
cruelty. It has to be shown that the defending spouse has
treated him with cruelty to cause reasonable apprehension
in his/her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live
with the contesting spouse.
60. Since issue of desertion has also been raised before
the learned Family Court it would be apt to discuss herein
the element of constituting desertion.
61. It needs to refer herein that the word „desertion‟ has
been given in Explanation to Section 13 (1) wherein it has
been stated that “the expression desertion means the
desertion of the one spouse by the other party to the
marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent
or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful
30
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
neglect of the one spouse by the other party to the marriage,
and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions
shall be construed accordingly.
62. It is pertinent to note that the word „desertion‟, as
has been defined in Explanation part of Section 13 of the
Act, 1955, means the desertion of the petitioner by the other
party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without
the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes
the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the
marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate
expressions shall be construed accordingly.
63. Rayden on Divorce ,which is a standard work on the
subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised the case-law
on the subject in these terms:
“Desertion is the separation of one spouse
from the other, with an intention on the part
of the deserting spouse of bringing
cohabitation permanently to an end without
reasonable cause and without the consent of
the other spouse; but the physical act of
departure by one spouse does not
necessarily make that spouse the deserting
party.”
64. The legal position has been admirably summarised
in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws
of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:
“In its essence desertion means the intentional
permanent forsaking and abandonment of one
31
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
spouse by the other without that other's consent,
and without reasonable cause. It is a total
repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view
of the large variety of circumstances and of modes
of life involved, the Court has discouraged
attempts at defining desertion, there being no
general principle applicable to all cases.
65. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but
from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is
the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of
the married state; the state of things may usually be
termed, for short, „the home‟. There can be desertion
without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the
marriage having been consummated. The person who
actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the
deserting party.
66. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct
which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground
for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or,
where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer.
67. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the
statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence
founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete,
but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a
continuing offence.
32
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
68. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of
meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one
of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from
wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in
a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust,
without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will
not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far
as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of
separation, and ( 2 ) the intention to bring cohabitation
permanently to an end.
69. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the
deserted spouse is concerned: ( 1 ) the absence of consent,
and ( 2 ) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the
spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary
intention aforesaid.
70. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs.
Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the
definition of „desertion‟ on the basis of the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman
Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena , AIR 1964 SC 40 which
has been consistently followed in several decisions of this
Court.
71. The law consistently has been laid down by this
Court that desertion means the intentional abandonment of
33
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
one spouse by the other without the consent of the other
and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must
prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an
intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the
cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there
should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting
spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of
the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse
should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse
to leave the matrimonial home.
72. This Court, on the backdrop of aforesaid facts,
provisions of law and law laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme
Court, has gone into the grounds on which decree of divorce
has been granted by the learned family court and found
therefrom that allegation against the appellant-wife is that
she used to left her matrimonial house on the one pretext or
the other and further pressure was put upon the
respondent-husband to live as „Gharjamai‟, as he was
unemployed at that time and has less agricultural property.
73. Whereas the case of appellant-wife is that it is the
respondent-husband who used to assault her and inflicted
mental and physical torture, which forced her to leave her
matrimonial house. It is admitted case of the parties that for
demand of additional dowry and torture a case was lodged
by the appellant-wife being GR Case No. 602/2020 by the
34
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
appellant-wife against the respondent under Sections 498(A)
IPC and ¾ D.P. Act. The appellant-wife has made out a case
that the respondent-husband in order to save his skin from
the said case had filed the suit for divorce.
74. It is necessary to notice that the matrimonial relationship
between the parties is not in dispute. Their marriage was
solemnized on 09.05.2006 and two children were born out of
the wedlock. The dispute essentially relates to the
circumstances under which the parties started living
separately and whether the respondent had established the
statutory grounds for dissolution of marriage.
75. From the materials available on record, it appears that the
respondent's main allegation was that the appellant had left
the matrimonial home on 14.08.2019 and had not returned
thereafter. The respondent also alleged that the appellant
had been residing at her parental home for considerable
periods even prior to the aforesaid date. However, the
aforesaid allegations were seriously disputed by the
appellant in the present appeal. Her specific case is that she
was subjected to cruelty and harassment on account of
demand of dowry and was ultimately compelled to leave the
matrimonial home. She has also asserted that the
respondent suppressed the aforesaid material facts while
instituting the matrimonial proceeding.
35
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
76. The foundational question which falls for consideration
before this Court is as to whether the respondent-husband
was able to establish the grounds of cruelty under Section
13(1)(ia) and desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, so as to entitle him to a decree of
dissolution of marriage.
77. From the pleadings as well as the evidence of P.W.-
1, it transpires that the principal allegation levelled against
the appellant-wife is that she used to stay for substantial
periods at her parental house and that her family members
wanted the respondent-husband to reside as a
"Gharjamai". It has also been alleged that she left the
matrimonial house on 14.08.2019 and thereafter did not
return.
78. However, upon careful consideration of the evidence
available on record, this Court finds that no specific
incident constituting cruelty, either physical or mental, has
been narrated by the respondent-husband. The allegations
are general, omnibus and devoid of particulars regarding
date, time, place or manner of commission of any act
amounting to cruelty.
79. Mere assertion that the wife preferred staying at her
parental home or that her parents desired the husband to
reside with them cannot, in itself, be construed as
matrimonial cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia)
36
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
of the Act, unless it is shown that such conduct caused
such mental pain and suffering to the spouse that it
became impossible for the parties to live together.
80. Significantly, the evidence of P.W.-2 and P.W.-3
does not advance the case of the respondent-husband any
further. Both witnesses have merely reiterated the same
facts narrated by P.W.-1. Their depositions are
substantially repetitive and appear to be reproduction of
the assertions made by the plaintiff himself. No
independent act of cruelty has been disclosed by these
witnesses.
81. The factum of issue of filing of case under Section
498A IPC for demand of dowry has been accepted by the
respondent-husband in his testimony. So there is no denial
of the fact that the allegation against the respondent-
husband is of demand of dowry and in order to save his
skin he has filed the suit for grant of decree of divorce.
82. Furthermore, the appellant-wife had also taken the
ground that it is the appellant-wife who is subjected to
cruelty and ousted by the respondent-husband and in-laws,
as such she left with no support for herself she was having
no source of income, she filed Original Maintenance Case,
which is pending. As the ground of desertion, as has been
taken by the respondent-husband before the learned Family
Court cannot be said to be tenable as it is the wife who has
37
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
been forced to leave her matrimonial house due to mental
and physical torture meted out to her.
83. So far as the ground of cruelty under Section
13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is concerned, the
Court is required to consider the nature, gravity and
cumulative effect of the alleged conduct in the background
of the matrimonial relationship.
84. The allegations made by the respondent regarding
the appellant's frequent visits to her parental home and her
alleged unwillingness to reside in the matrimonial home
required an objective assessment. Such conduct cannot be
mechanically characterized as cruelty without examining
the surrounding circumstances.
85. We further find that the respondent examined
himself and two other witnesses in support of his case.
However, the fact that the evidence remained unchallenged
because the trial was proceeded ex parte that does not
absolve the Court of its duty to examine the inherent
probability, consistency and legal sufficiency of such
evidence.
86. The learned Family Court appears to have accepted
the testimony of the plaintiff-husband at its face value
without undertaking the judicial exercise of determining
whether the facts deposed by him legally constituted
38
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
cruelty as contemplated under Section 13(1)(ia) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
87. So far as the ground of desertion is concerned, the
law is well settled that desertion consists not merely of
physical separation but also of animus deserendi , namely
the intention to permanently bring cohabitation to an end.
88. In order to establish desertion, the petitioner is
required to prove that the respondent deserted him without
reasonable cause and against his wish and that such
desertion continued for the statutory period immediately
preceding presentation of the petition.
89. In the case at hand, the respondent-husband has
failed to establish that the appellant-wife left the
matrimonial house without reasonable cause.
90. On the contrary, the appellant-wife has specifically
contended before this Court that she was subjected to
cruelty on account of demand of dowry, was assaulted, and
was ultimately compelled to leave the matrimonial home
whereafter GR Case No. 602 of 2020 was instituted under
Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act.
91. Although such allegations were not tested before the
Family Court because the proceeding went ex parte, the
existence of the criminal proceeding itself assumes
39
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
significance inasmuch as it demonstrates that the
appellant-wife had set up a case that she was compelled to
leave the matrimonial home on account of the conduct of
the husband and his family members.
92. The respondent-husband has merely described the
criminal case as false. However, no material has been
brought on record to show that the said criminal
proceeding culminated in acquittal or that the allegations
levelled therein were found to be false by a competent
court.
93. Therefore, mere filing of a criminal case by the wife
cannot automatically be treated as cruelty or as proof of
desertion, particularly when the said proceeding is stated to
be pending.
94. This Court further finds that the learned Family
Court has proceeded substantially on the basis of an earlier
decree passed in Original Suit No. 08 of 2020 filed under
Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
95. However, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights
by itself does not automatically entitle a party to a decree of
divorce.
96. The Court is still required to examine whether the
statutory ingredients under Section 13(1)(ia) or Section
40
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
13(1)(ib) stand independently established through cogent
and reliable evidence.
97. From the evidence available on record, this Court is
of the considered view that there is no legal evidence
establishing any specific act of cruelty on the part of the
appellant-wife.
98. Likewise, there is no convincing evidence to
establish that the appellant-wife had withdrawn from the
society of the respondent-husband without reasonable
cause and with the intention of permanently terminating
the matrimonial relationship.
99. This Court also finds substance in the submission
advanced on behalf of the appellant that before proceeding
ex parte , the learned Family Court ought to have satisfied
itself regarding effective service of notice upon the
appellant-wife.
100. In a proceeding concerning dissolution of marriage,
which affects the civil status of the parties permanently,
strict adherence to the principles of natural justice
assumes greater significance.
101. The learned Family Court has failed to undertake
such exercise and appears to have proceeded mechanically
merely because the appellant-wife did not enter
appearance.
41
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
102. It is a cardinal principle that a decree of divorce
cannot be granted solely on the basis of unchallenged
testimony unless such testimony independently establishes
the statutory grounds contemplated under the Act. The
evidence must be considered in the light of the pleadings,
the documentary materials and the statutory requirements
governing the grant of divorce.
103. Upon overall consideration of the facts, evidence
and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the respondent-husband failed to
discharge the burden cast upon him to establish cruelty
and desertion in accordance with law.
104. The findings recorded by the learned Principal
Judge, Family Court, Dumka are therefore not sustainable
in the eyes of law and suffer from non-appreciation of
material facts and improper application of the provisions of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
105. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the respondent-
husband failed to establish the grounds of cruelty under
Section 13(1)(ia) and desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
42
2026:JHHC:32565-DB
106. Therefore, this Court does not find any element of
cruelty and/or desertion to sustain the decree of divorce in
favour of respondent-husband.
107. This Court, in view of the discussions made
hereinabove, is of the view that the order passed by the
learned family court requires interference.
108. Accordingly, the impugned order/judgment dated
05.12.2023 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family
Court, Dumka in Original Suit No. 90 of 2023, is hereby
quashed and set aside.
109. Resultantly, the instant appeal stands allowed.
110. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands
disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Akhil Kumar, J.) (Akhil Kumar, J.)
05/_11/2026
Alankar /A.F.R.
Uploaded on 06.11.2026
43