TARUN CHATURVEDI & ORS vs M/S WIDE RANGE SALES PVT LTD
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta
C.R.R. No. 2828 of 2017
Shaleen Khemani & Ors.
Versus
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
WITH
CRR 142 of 2016
Tarun Chaturvedi & Anr.
Vs.
M/s. Wide Range Sales Pvt. Ltd.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Ayan Bhattacharjee, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Aditya Ratan Tiwary, Adv.
For the
Opposite Party No. 2 : Mr. Soumya Nag, Adv.
Mr. Rajdeep Sengupta, Adv.
Heard on : 15.09.2026
Judgment on : 19.11.2026
Uploaded on : 19.11.2026
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Ajay Kumar Gupta, J.: -
1. CRR 2828 of 2017 has been filed by seven Petitioners, being the
accused Nos. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12 under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, ‘Cr.P.C.’), seeking quashing of
the proceeding being complaint case no. C.S. 23882 of 2015
instituted under Sections 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 (in short, ‘N.I. Act’) pending before the Learned Metropolitan
th
Magistrate, 14 Court, Calcutta.
2. CRR 142 of 2016 has been filed by two Petitioners, being accused
nos. 9 and 10, also seeking similar prayer for quashing the aforesaid
proceeding and all orders passed therein, including the order dated
20.07.2015 whereby the learned Magistrate was pleased to issue
process under Sections 138/141 of the N.I. Act against the
petitioners. Both the revisional applications are being taken up
together for analogous hearing and disposal by passing a common
judgment since the facts and circumstances, prayer and parties are
identical.
3. The brief facts of the case, relevant for the purpose of disposal of the
instant applications, are that the opposite party no. 2, M/S Wide
Range Sales Pvt. Ltd., represented by its authorised representative,
Sri Raj Narain Singh, filed an application under section 138 read with
section 141 of the N.I. Act, 1881 (as amended up to date) before the
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learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, alleging, inter alia,
therein that the accused persons approached and requested the
opposite party no. 2/company for a loan and/or an inter-corporate
deposit for the promotion of their business. Finally, on 14.06.2012,
upon such request and further discussions between the parties, the
opposite party no. 2 agreed and paid a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/-
(Rupees one crore) only as an inter-corporate deposit. The same was
renewed from time to time.
4. The latest renewal was done on 01.04.2014 for the period of 91 days
with an interest @ Rs.17% per annum and the same was due on
30.06.2014. The accused company, M/S Tantia Constructions
Limited, acknowledged the same through its letter dated 23.06.2014
to the complainant’s company.
5. The accused company issued an account-payee cheque bearing no.
008233 dated 01.07.2014, for Rupees one crore towards repayment
of the inter-corporate deposit drawn on Allahabad Bank, Beliaghata
Branch, P-214, CIT Road, Scheme No. IV, Kolkata -700010, West
Bengal, along with the aforesaid letter dated 23.06.2014 towards
discharge of their lawful debt/liabilities in part.
6. The said cheque was presented by the complainant company to its
bankers, namely, Bank of India, Lindsey Street Branch, Kolkata for
encashment within the validity period of the said cheque on
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10.09.2014. However, the said cheque was dishonoured with remarks
“Exceeds Arrangement” vide return memo dated 11.09.2014.
7. Thereafter, a demand notice was issued to all the accused persons, as
they were the persons in charge, responsible for running the day-to-
day business affairs of the accused company at the relevant point of
time. However, they did not heed to pay the amount although the
cheque was issued to discharge debt/liabilities; as such, the accused
persons committed an offence punishable under Section 138 read
with Section 141 of the N.I. Act.
8. The application was subsequently transferred to the learned
th
Metropolitan Magistrate, 14 Court at Calcutta for its inquiry and
disposal. Accordingly, the learned Magistrate, vide impugned order
th
dated 20 July, 2015, issued summons against the petitioners.
9. In view of the above facts and circumstances, the petitioners have
filed these applications seeking quashing of the proceeding as they
are claiming themselves innocent and in no way connected with any
offence, far less the offence alleged.
10. Learned Sr. counsel, Mr. Bhattacharya, appearing on behalf of the
Petitioners, vehemently argued and submitted that the petitioners are
innocent and they were not at all involved in the alleged offence.
Neither did they issue any cheque in favour of the complainant
company, nor were the petitioners involved in the transaction as
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alleged. They were in no way connected with the day-to-day affairs of
the accused company. Section 141 of the N.I. Act conceptualizes
‘vicarious liability’ of the company’s officers, who are engaged in the
day-to-day affairs of the company, when the company becomes an
accused.
11. It was further submitted that the accused persons herein are not the
whole-time directors and are not involved in the affairs of the accused
company. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently laid down
that while considering the question of ‘vicarious liability’ of the
director in a company that may mere averment being a director would
not make a person liable for an offence that may have been
committed by the company.
12. For launching prosecution against the directors of a company under
section 138 read with section 141 of the NI Act, there has to be a
specific averment in the complaint with regard to the actual role
played by them in the business transaction. The allegation had to be
clear and unambiguous, showing that the directors were in charge of
and responsible for the business of the company and issued a cheque
for discharge of their debt/ liability.
13. In the present case, the complainant did not specify the role of the
accused persons. Simply indicating the designation as whole-time
directors/directors/additional directors in an application would not
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be sufficient to initiate proceedings against them. Every director need
not be and is not in charge of the business of the company. It is
mandatory to state their duties and responsibilities in the conduct of
the business of a company and how and in what manner the accused
persons are responsible or liable for commission of the offence
punishable under section 138 read with section 141 of the NI Act,
1881.
14. Finally, it was submitted that no where in body of complaint,
mentioned that how and in what manner the petitioners were
responsible for the affairs of company and what capacity they were in
charge of the company. The petitioner no. 1/accused no. 9 in CRR
142 of 2016 had joined the company on 25.09.2013. Similarly, the
petitioner No.2/ accused no.10 in CRR 142 of 2016 had joined the
company on 13.02.2014 as a non-executive Independent Director.
Petitioner nos. 1 and 2, namely, Tarun Chaturvedi and
Madhuchhanda Chatterjee in CRR No 142 of 2016 appointed as non-
executive independent directors as evident from Form 32. The
petitioner no.7/accused no.12 in CRR 2828 of 2017, namely, Md.
Jamshed Alam was secretary and same is also confirmed by the
complainant in his complaint, therefore, their role is totally different
and not at all involved either in transaction or issuance of cheque but
they were also implicated in the present. In the present case, 12
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individuals were arraigned as accused persons, including the
company.
15. It was further submitted that the Learned Trial Court had issued
summons against all the petitioners in a casual and mechanical
manner, without applying judicious mind. Accordingly, the entire
proceeding is liable to be quashed as none of the ingredients required
for initiation of the proceeding is fulfilled.
16. Particularly on behalf of petitioner no.7/accused no.12 in CRR 2828
of 2017, it is submitted that he was the Secretary of the company and
had only statutory duty under the Companies Act, 1956. He has key
responsibility in several management areas of the company as
required under the law, and the Company Secretary never dealt with
and had no control over the day-to-day business affairs of the
company.
17. To bolster his aforesaid submissions and argument, the learned
counsel has placed reliance upon the following judgments as under: -
a. Kamal Kishor Shrigopal Taparia Vs. India Ener-gen private
Limited & Anr reported on (2025) 7 SCC 393 particularly
paragraphs 17 to 22 thereof;
b. K.S Mehta Vs. Morgan Securities and Credits Private
Limited reported in (2025) 7 SCC 615 particularly paragraphs
17 to 23 thereof;
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c. Rahul Sood Vs. Government NCT of Delhi and Anr reported
2025 SCC Online Del 2155 particularly paragraphs 24 to 33
thereof;
d. Manish Goyal vs. S.P. Realtors reported in 2026 SCC Online
Del 3985 particularly paragraphs 9 to 14 thereof;
e. K.K Ahuja vs. V.K. Vora and anr reported in (2009) 10 SCC 48
particularly paragraphs no. 18,25,28 and 29;
f. S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Neeta Bhalla and Anr
reported in (2005) 8 SCC 89 particularly paragraphs Nos.
4,8,12,18 and 19;
g. National Small Industries Corporation Limited Vs. Harmeet
Singh Paintal & Anr reported in (2010) 3 SCC 330 particularly
paragraphs 12 to 15;
h. Anita Malhotra vs. Apparel Export Promotion Council &
Anr reported in (2012) 1 SCC 520, particularly paragraph no. 22;
i. Shaleen Khemani & Ors Vs. The State of West Bengal &
Anr. reported in (2018) 1 C CrLR 515, particularly paragraph
nos. 4,6,7 and 11-14 thereof;
j. Hitesh Verma Vs. Health Care at Home India Private
Limited & Ors. reported in (2025) 7 SCC 623, particularly
paragraph nos. 3 to 5 thereof;
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k. Paresk Alumines Ltd Vs. Venus Ordhads Private Limited
reported in 2025 ACD 1011 (Cal), particularly paragraphs 8 to
13.
18. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2, on
the other hand, controverted the aforesaid submissions and
arguments and further submitted that the complainant has
categorically specified their designation in the complaint. All the
accused persons, particularly accused Nos. 2 to 12, were full-time
directors/managing directors/additional directors/secretaries and
were directly involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company and
responsible for the company's debts and liabilities. They have
controlled and managed the Company.
19. To discharge the company’s existing legal debts/liabilities arising out
of the aforesaid inter-corporate deposit on 14.06.2012, accused No. 1
Company has issued an A/C Payee Cheque bearing No.008233 dated
01.07.2014 for Rupees one crore towards part-repayment of the inter-
corporate deposit drawn on Allahabad Bank, Beliaghata Branch, P-
214, CIT Road, Scheme No. IV, Kolkata -700010 in favour of the
Opposite Party No. 2. The said cheque was presented to its banker for
encashment within the valid period but the same was returned with
endorsement “Exceeds Arrangement” vide return memo dated
11.09.2014. Despite issuing demand notice, accused persons failed to
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discharge their liability. Having no alternative, Opposite Party No. 2
was compelled to initiate proceedings against the accused persons.
They are indeed liable for commission of offences punishable under
Sections 138/141 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, the instant Criminal
Revisional application is liable to be dismissed.
20. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has placed reliance on a
judgment passed in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd v.
Neeta Bhalla and Another (Supra) to bolster his contention that
liability arises from being in charge of and responsible for the
conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, when
the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a
designation or office in a Company. Conversely, a person, not holding
any office or designation in a company, may also be liable if he
satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible
for the conduct of business of a company at the relevant time.
21. It has further placed reliance of a judgment passed in the case of
Rallis India Limited v. Poduru Vidya Bhushan and others
reported in (2011) 13 Supreme Court Cases 88 to support his
contention that being Director of the Company and having taken part
in the affairs of the Company, its management and policy making
cannot simply shrug off his liability in commission of the
contravention of law and further for fastening the criminal liability,
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there is no legal requirement for the complainant to show that the
accused partner of the firm was aware of each and every transaction.
On the other hand, section 141 of the Act clearly lays down that if the
accused is able to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the
offence was committed without his knowledge or had exercised due
diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, he will not be
liable to punishment. Needless to say, the final judgment and order
would depend on the evidence adduced. Criminal liability is attracted
only on those who, at the time of commission of the offence, were in
charge of and were responsible for the conduct of business of the firm
as alleged.
22. Further reliance was placed in the case of Gunmala Sales Private
Ltd v. Anu Mehta reported in 2015 (1) SCC 103 to support his
contention that once a complaint is filed under Section 138 read with
Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the basic
averment is made that the Director was in charge or and responsible
for the conduct of business of the Company at the relevant time when
the offence was committed, the Magistrate can issue process against
such Director and if the specific averment made against the
Petitioners stating that they were very much involved in the day to
day activity of the Company and was involved in issuing the cheque,
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question of quashing of proceeding on the ground that they were not
responsible for day-to-day affairs of the company does not arise.
23. Similarly, the learned counsel further placed reliance on two other
decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of S. P. Mani & Mohan
Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan reported in 2023 (10) SCC
685 and HDFC Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.
reported in 2025 (9) SCC 653 to support his contention that the
proceeding should be allowed to continue to reveal the actual people
liable for commission of offence punishable under section 138/141 of
the N. I. Act, 1881. Therefore, the revisional application filed with
mala fide intention to frustrate the claim of the Opposite Party No. 2
is required to be dismissed.
24. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsels
appearing on behalf of the respective parties, judgments relied upon
by the Parties and on perusal of the materials made available on
record, only questions fall for consideration as under: -
i. Whether the full-time director can be prosecuted under sections
138/141 of the N.I. Act, 1881 in the absence of any specific
averment or particular role attributed to them?
ii. Whether a director or independent directors can be prosecuted
under sections 138/141 of the N.I. Act, 1881 in the absence of any
specific averment or particular role attributed to them?
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iii. Whether a company secretary can be prosecuted under sections
138/141 of the N.I. Act, 1881 in the absence of any specific
averment or particular role attributed to them?
25. It appears before this Court that the Opposite Party No. 2 has
initiated a proceeding for commission of the offence punishable under
Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act against the Company and others, who
were associated with the company. The complainant has specifically
indicated in the cause title, as regards the designation of the accused
persons at the time of commission of the offence, i.e., dealing with the
transaction and issuing of the cheque in favour of the complainant
company. The said cheque was presented before its bankers within
the valid period, but it was returned with the remark “Exceeds
Arrangement” vide return memo dated 11.09.2014. Thereafter, the
opposite party no. 2 issued notice asking for payment of the cheque
amount as it was issued to discharge the company’s debt/liabilities.
The whole case is based on documentary evidence and time-bound
compliance of provisions as stipulated under Section 138/141 of the
N. I. Act, 1881.
26. It is an undisputed fact that the complainant has not averred about
the individual role played during the transaction or issuing of cheque
by the company. It is not specifically mentioned in the complaint as
to who was the signatory of the cheque and when it was issued.
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27. Upon perusal of the judgments relied upon by the parties, it is
revealed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that
non-Executive and independent director(s) cannot be held liable
under section 138 read with section 141 of the N. I. Act,1881 unless
specific allegations demonstrate their direct involvement in affairs of
the company at the relevant point of time.
28. Petitioner no. 7 in CRR 2828 of 2017, Md. Jamshed Alam, was
designated as Secretary of the Company. Similarly, petitioner nos. 1
and 2 in CRR No. 142 of 2016, namely Tarun Chaturvedi and
Madhuchhanda Chatterjee, were appointed as non-executive
independent directors. In support of their contention, they have
placed on record Form 32 (issued pursuant to Sections 303(2),
264(2), 266(1)(a) and 266(1)(b)(iii) of the Companies Act, 1956),
appended to the application. Upon perusal of Form 32, it is revealed
that the said two petitioners were independent directors and that
petitioner no. 7, Md. Jamshed Alam, was the Company Secretary of
the Company/petitioner no. 1. This is an undisputed fact.
29. According to them, they were innocent and not involved in the offence
as alleged by the complainant. In addition, the complainant has not
disclosed any ingredients or specific role played or particular act
attributed against them in the offence punishable under Sections
138/141 of the N. I. Act. No specific averment is made either in the
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complaint or affidavit with regard to his role in the transaction
between the complainant and the company. These Petitioners were
unaware of the transaction and issuance of the cheque on behalf of
the Company. They prayed for quashing the proceedings on the
grounds of their position in the company and the fact that they had
no role in the company’s day-to-day business affairs or financial
transactions.
30. Nothing transpires from the documents to suggest that these
petitioners were active director(s) or a shareholder of the company;
they had no role to play in any transaction or day-to- day business
affair of the company. They cannot be said to be an active Director or
who can be termed responsible for running the day-to-day
management of the company. The liability of the Company Secretary
(non-executive) is very limited, and it does not extend to managing
the day-to-day affairs of the company. They were not a signatory of
the cheque which was dishonoured. In this regard, this Court finds
the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel on behalf of the
opposite party no. 2 in the cases of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v.
Neeta Bhalla and Anr. (Supra), Sunita Palita and Ors. v.
Panchami Stone Quarry (Supra), and Susela Padmavathy Amma
v. Bharti Airtel Limited (Supra) are squarely applicable in the
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present case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again,
reiterated as under: -
“A Director of a company who was not in charge or responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time,
will not be liable for offence punishable under Section 138/141 of
the N.I.Act. The liability under Section 138/141 of the N.I.Act
arises from being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of
the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence
was committed, and not on the basis of merely holding a
designation or office in a company. It would be a travesty of justice
to drag directors, who may not even be connected with the
issuance of a cheque or dishonour thereof, such as Director
(Personnel), Director (Human Resources Development), etc into
Criminal Proceedings under the N.I. Act, only because of their
designation”
(Emphasis supplied)
31. In the case at hand, the petitioners, namely, Md. Jamshed Alam,
Tarun Chaturvedi and Madhuchhanda Chatterjee were mere
Company Secretary and independent director(s), who were neither in
charge nor responsible for the conduct of the business of the
company at the relevant point of time. They were not the signatory of
the cheque, which was dishonored. Furthermore, there is no
averment or specific role attributed to them in the petition of
complaint.
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32. The concept of “independent director’ was introduced in the
Companies Act, 2013. Sections 149(6) to (13) of the Companies Act,
2013 deal with ‘independent director’.
33. According to section 149(12) of the Companies Act, 2013, an
independent director is not liable for any action of the company
unless he has attributed to the same knowingly. In this regard,
section 149(12) of the Companies Act, 2013 is quoted hereinbelow: -
“(12) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, —
(i) an independent director;
(ii) a non-executive director not being promoter or key
managerial personnel, shall be held liable, only in respect of
such acts of omission or commission by a company which
had occurred with his knowledge, attributable through Board
processes, and with his consent or connivance or where he
had not acted diligently.”
34. Upon perusal of the aforesaid provision, it indicates that an
independent director can only be held responsible under section
141(2) of the N. I. Act, which requires the specific, direct and distinct
role to be attributed in commission of an offence punishable under
section 138 read with section 141 of the N. I. Act, as an independent
director is not supposed to be in charge of the conduct of business of
the company. Merely a bald allegation, without specific role or details,
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an officer falling under sub-section (2) of section 141 of N. I. Act
cannot be held responsible.
35. Consequently, initiation of proceedings under Section 138 read with
Section 141 of the N. I. Act, 1881 against the petitioners, namely, Md.
Jamshed Alam, Tarun Chaturvedi and Madhuchhanda Chatterjee are
termed as sheer abuse of process of law and, to secure the ends of
justice, their case is liable to be quashed.
36. Insofar as the other petitioners in CRR No. 2828 of 2017 are
concerned, this court finds they are full-time directors/Additional
directors/directors as per the complainant. To controvert the same,
the petitioners have filed one annual report of the accused
no.1/company for the year 2014-15 without any valid authentication
and/or certification of the company by way of supplementary
affidavit. The Petitioners have also failed to prove the same by filing
Form 32 and/or other sterling documents to substantiate their
contention that some of the accused persons, namely, Sri Bajrang Lal
Tulsian, Sri Shaleen Khemani and Sri Sandeep Kumar Saraogi are
Independent, Non-executive Directors. Therefore, in such a situation,
the complaint against the remaining petitioners cannot be quashed
merely on the ground that, apart from the basic averment, no
particulars are given in the complaint about their role, because
ordinarily the basic averment would be sufficient to send them to trial
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and it could be argued that further role could be brought out in the
trial. Quashing of a complaint based on documentary evidence,
especially in a cheque dishonour case, is a serious matter. In order to
seek quashing of such a proceeding, the petitioners must establish
that no offence is made out at all against them as full-time directors,
additional directors or directors. The petitioners have been unable to
satisfy this Court that no offence whatsoever is made out against
them.
37. In view of the above circumstances, this Court is of the view that the
petitioners, namely, Md. Jamshed Alam, Tarun Chaturvedi and
Madhuchhanda Chatterjee have satisfied this court that proceeding
against them, if allowed to continue, would be a sheer abuse of
process of law. Accordingly, the proceedings against the accused
persons, namely, Md. Jamshed Alam, Tarun Chaturvedi and
Madhuchhanda Chatterjee are hereby quashed in exercise of the
inherent power of this Court, under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to
prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and secure the ends of
justice. However, the case of the remaining accused persons shall
continue strictly in accordance with law.
38. Consequently, CRR No. 2828 of 2017 is partly allowed, and CRR
No. 142 of 2016 is, thus, allowed. Pending applications, if any, are
also, thus, disposed of.
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39. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
40. Let a copy of this Judgment be sent to the Learned Trial Court for
information and taking necessary steps in accordance with law.
41. All parties will act on the server copies of this Judgment uploaded
from the official website of this Court.
42. Urgent photostat certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for, is to
be given as expeditiously to the parties on compliance of all legal
formalities.
(Ajay Kumar Gupta, J.)
(P.A.)