State Of U.P. vs Jai Bir Singh

Court
Supreme Court

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 897

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



CIVIL APPEAL NO. 897 / 2002



State of Uttar Pradesh …Appellant(s)


Versus


Jai Bir Singh …Respondent(s)

with
Civil Appeal No. 4646 / 2007
Civil Appeal No. 3647 / 2007
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1112 / 2009

Civil Appeal No. 3920 / 2010
Signature Not Verified
Civil Appeal No. 3119 / 2011
Digitally signed by
ARJUN BISHT
Date: 2026.08.21
15:09:36 IST
Reason:
Civil Appeal No. 6114 / 2001
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Civil Appeal No. 6108 / 2002
Civil Appeal No. 1276 / 2001
Civil Appeal No. 1279 / 2001
Civil Appeal No. 1278 / 2001
Civil Appeal No. 6471 / 2002
Civil Appeal No. 2506 / 2002
Civil Appeal No. 8597 / 2001
Civil Appeal No. 4569 / 2002
Civil Appeal No. 5101 / 2002
Civil Appeal No. 2409 / 2002
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20982 / 2002

Civil Appeal Nos. 355-358 / 2003
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14085 / 2004

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 11291 / 2004

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14127 / 2004

Civil Appeal No. 7994 / 2004
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4139 / 2005

Civil Appeal No. 1274 / 2007
Civil Appeal No. 1273 / 2007
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Civil Appeal Nos. 1311-1312 / 2008
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 16301 / 2007
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3107 / 2008
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4327 / 2008
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4329 / 2008
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4328 / 2008
Civil Appeal No. 296 / 2008
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 16276 / 2008

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 17224 / 2008

Civil Appeal No. 5519 / 2012
Civil Appeal No. 5681 / 2010
Special Leave Petition (Civil)………CC No. 7990 / 2009
Civil Appeal No. 7757 / 2011
Civil Appeal No. 1131 / 2012
Civil Appeal Nos. 8149-8151 / 2012
Civil Appeal Nos. 4505-4506 / 2013
Civil Appeal Nos. 4507-4508 / 2013
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 12679-12682 / 2014
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1857 / 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14156 / 2021
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ABLE OF ONTENTS
T C
A. Overture ..................................................................................... 7
B. Interpretational History of the ‘industry’ definition ..................... 10
B.1. Bangalore Water Supply (supra): A truly watershed moment .. 11
B.1.1. Reasons prompting reference to a larger Bench................ 14
B.1.2. Laying down the Triple Test ............................................. 15
B.1.3 Reading down ‘Undertaking’ ............................................. 17
B.1.4. The creation of the Dominant Nature Test ....................... 21
B.1.5. The Sovereign Functions Exception ................................. 21
B.2. The Pre-Bangalore Water Supply (supra) Jurisprudence ........ 23
B.2.1. Casting the Net Wide: The Early Expansion of the term
‘Industry’ .................................................................................. 23
B.2.2. The Turning of the Tide: The retrenchment of the expansive
approach .................................................................................. 27
B.3. The Post-Bangalore Water Supply (supra) jurisprudence ........ 31
B.3.1. The Initial Legislative Response ....................................... 32
B.3.2. The discord regarding the Sovereign Function Exception .. 33
B.3.3. The treatment and status of Research Institutions ........... 36
B.3.4 The calls for reconsideration of the decision in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) .............................................................. 37
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C. The Prefatory Question of Maintainability .................................. 42
C.1. Correctness of the manner in which Reference was made ...... 44
C.1.1. The framework governing Larger Bench References .......... 44
C.1.2. Testing the Reference on the anvil of Dawoodi Bohra (supra)
................................................................................................. 48
C.1.3. The Res Judicata conundrum? ........................................ 57
C.1.4. Stare Decisis and the doctrine of overruling ..................... 63
C.2. Treading the razor’s edge between technicality and quietus ... 66
D. Contentions of the Parties ......................................................... 67
D.1. Contentions on behalf of the Appellants ................................ 67
D.2. Contentions on behalf of the Respondents ............................. 71
D.3. Contentions on behalf of the Amicus Curiae .......................... 75
E. Issues for consideration ............................................................ 78
F. At the Heart of the Matter: What Constitutes an ‘Industry’? ....... 79
F.1. The meaning of ‘Industry’ as encapsulated in the ID Act ........ 82
F.2. The judicial interpretation accorded to ‘Industry’ ................... 90
F.3. The Ripple Effects of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) .......... 108
F.4. Manner in which the term ‘industry’ under Section 2(j) ought to
be interpreted ............................................................................ 111
F.4.1. The Noscitur a Sociis Principle ........................................ 112
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F.4.2. A fresh look at the interpretative approach ..................... 117
F.4.3. Calibrating the Triple Test ............................................. 128
F.4.4. Reconsidering Institutional Categorisation ..................... 134
G. Legal impact of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982
and the IR Code, 2020 .................................................................. 146
H. Conclusion .............................................................................. 148
















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JUDGEMENT

SURYA KANT, CJI. (on behalf of himself, Satish Chandra Sharma J.,
Alok Aradhe J. and Vipul M. Pancholi J.)
A. O VERTURE

1. The issue concerning the instant batch of appeals can be
consolidated into a singular judicial inquiry, namely, whether the
Social Forestry Department of the Appellant State, having been
created as a welfare-oriented initiative aimed at environmental
amelioration, falls within the ambit of the term ‘industry’ as defined
under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ( ID Act,
1947 ).
2. More pointedly, the legal issue, particularly the interpretive scope
of the abovementioned term ‘industry’, constitutes a question that
has persistently engaged the attention of this Court over an
extended temporal period. Indeed, it would not be inapt to
characterise this conundrum as a proverbial albatross fastened to
the Court’s metaphorical neck, continuing to demand judicial
clarification.
3. The question may appear at first blush disarmingly
straightforward; yet, upon closer scrutiny, it discloses a far more
intricate and layered inquiry. For decades, the manner of its
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definition has, in tangible and determinative terms, governed which
entities fall within the statutory fold and, correspondingly, who may
legitimately invoke the rights and protections it confers.
4. It becomes necessary at this juncture to acknowledge that
subsequent legislative developments have altered the statutory
landscape. The provision whose interpretation has, for years on
end, engaged sustained judicial attention is no longer in force, and
this, in itself, presents an additional question warranting
adjudication. However, the present batch of petitions, having been
instituted prior to these legislative changes, does not fall within the
ambit of the regime now governing the field, namely the Industrial
Relations Code, 2020 ( IR Code ).
5. These developments, it must be noted, transpired after the
reference of the present matters to a Bench of Nine Judges, at a
time when the interpretive contours of Section 2(j) of the ID Act
continued to carry determinative significance. Yet, the considerable
passage of time, coupled with the intervening statutory
transformation, has resulted in a state of doctrinal and procedural
liminality. These appeals stand in a precarious interstice, being
neither governed by the new legislative framework nor conclusively
resolved under the erstwhile definition of ‘industry’ contained in
Section 2(j).
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6. As the Court of last resort, we remain acutely conscious that the
interpretive exercise now being undertaken may not, in the
contemporary statutory context, yield consequences of far-reaching
practical application. Nonetheless, the discharge of this function is
neither optional nor contingent upon its immediate utility. It is a
responsibility that inheres in the judicial office, particularly where
a reference has been authoritatively made. The principle, long
embedded in our jurisprudential tradition, that justice must not
only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, acquires
particular salience in such circumstances.
7. When a reference has been entrusted to this Court by learned
Judges, acting in view of the exigencies and uncertainties prevailing
at the relevant time, it would be neither institutionally appropriate
nor jurisprudentially sound to permit the matter to remain in
abeyance. To do so would, metaphorically speaking, be akin to
burying the body before conducting the post-mortem, leaving the
very cause of the controversy forever unexplored. To defer or deny
its resolution any further would be to countenance a state of
avoidable indeterminacy. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to
finally adjudicate the issue and bring the matter to a reasoned and
authoritative quietus .
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8. We have, therefore, endeavoured to discharge our constitutional
obligation by addressing the question referred to the Nine-Judge
Bench. The exercise of this jurisdiction is not discretionary in
character; it is anchored in the imperatives of the Constitution and
the foundational precepts of the Rule of Law. The Court cannot
resile from the performance of its duty merely because, in the
subjective estimation of the adjudicator, the issue may appear to
admit of gradations of importance.
9. The constitutional function entrusted to this Court admits of no
such artificial hierarchies. Once a question is validly referred, it
commands authoritative determination, and it would be contrary
to settled principle for the Court to decline adjudication on the
basis of perceived relative significance.
B. I NTERPRETATIONAL H ISTORY OF THE ‘ INDUSTRY ’ DEFINITION
10. In that view of the matter, before embarking upon an analysis of
the issues that presently fall for our consideration, it is imperative
to trace the trajectory traversed by this Court over time, and to
examine the manner in which the definition in question has evolved
through successive judicial pronouncements. A careful
engagement with this evolutionary process will furnish the
necessary analytical foundation and illuminate the interpretive
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choices that now confront us, thereby enabling a more coherent
and methodical resolution of the questions at hand.
11. It is apposite at the outset to advert to the language employed in
Section 2(j) of the ID Act, according to which, “ ‘industry’ means any
business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers
and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or
industrial occupation or avocation of workmen .”
12. Section 2(j) defines ‘industry’ in a bifurcated manner, employing
two distinct yet complementary limbs. The first proceeds from the
standpoint of the employer and extends to “ any business, trade,
undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers. ” The second is
cast from the perspective of the workman and encompasses “
any
calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or
avocation of workmen. ” The phraseology employed is of the widest
amplitude, having been drawn in substantial measure from Section
4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act of
Australia, and has, in consequence, invited sustained judicial
engagement in the course of its interpretation.
B.1. Bangalore Water Supply (supra): A truly watershed moment
13. There can, of course, be no gainsaying that any meaningful
consideration of the definition of the term ‘industry’ must
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necessarily entail an examination of the formulation articulated by
a Seven Judge Bench in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage
1
Board v. A. Rajappa .
14. The controversy therein originally arose when certain employees of
the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board ( Board ) were
subjected to penalties in the form of fines for alleged misconduct.
Aggrieved thereby, they instituted proceedings before the Labour
Court under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act. In response, the Board
therein raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the
proceedings, contending that it was engaged in the discharge of
essentially ‘regal’ or governmental functions by providing basic civic
amenities to the public and, consequently, could not be regarded
as an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section 2(j). It was argued
that, if the Board itself fell outside the ambit of the Act, the
employees could not claim the status of ‘workmen’ thereunder and,
correspondingly, the Labour Court would lack jurisdiction to
entertain or adjudicate their claims.
15. The dispute thereafter traversed first before the Karnataka High
Court and subsequently before this Court. By that stage, the
question concerning the meaning and scope of ‘industry’ under
Section 2(j) had already become the subject of substantial judicial

1
(1978) 2 SCC 213.
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debate, with divergent strands of authority emerging from different
decisions of this Court. In light of this interpretative discordance
and the significance of the issues involved, the matter ultimately
came to be placed before a larger Bench for an authoritative
determination of the law.
16. It was in these circumstances that the judgment now universally
recognised as Bangalore Water Supply (supra) came to be
rendered, a decision that would sagaciously influence the course of
industrial jurisprudence in India and remain the focal point of
reference in debates concerning the meaning of the term ‘industry’
for decades thereafter.
17. To state briefly, in that decision, a majority of Five Judges, speaking
through the seminal exposition authored by Krishna Iyer, J. and
comprising himself, P.N. Bhagwati, J. and D.A. Desai, J., adopted
an expansive construction of the term by propounding what has
since come to be recognised as the ‘ Triple Test ’.
18. The leading judgment was accompanied by a concurring opinion
authored by M. H. Beg, C.J., together with a brief order delivered
by Y. V. Chandrachud, J. ( as he then was ), on behalf of himself,
Jaswant Singh, J. and V. D. Tulzapurkar, J., which was delivered
on 21.02.1978, clarifying that their detailed reasoning would
follow. Vide the main judgment, the learned concurring Judges
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recorded their respectful agreement with the principal opinion
authored by Krishna Iyer, J., agreeing with the ultimate conclusion
that the matter ought to be dismissed, while observing that reasons
would be furnished subsequently to delineate the areas of
concurrence and divergence, if any, on the questions in controversy
addressed in the leading judgment.
19. Thereafter, on 07.04.1978, Y. V. Chandrachud J. ( as he then was ),
delivered his detailed reasons, while Jaswant Singh J., speaking for
himself and V. D. Tulzapurkar J., rendered a partly dissenting
opinion, thereby crystallising the effective majority of the judgment
at 5:2.
B.1.1. Reasons prompting reference to a larger Bench
20. The reference to a Bench of Seven Judges was itself occasioned, as
explained by Krishna Iyer, J., by “ the urgent need for an
authoritative resolution of this confused position which has survived
indeed, has been accentuated by-the judgment of this six-member
bench in Safdarjung, if we may say so with deep respect, has led to
a reference to a larger bench of this diehard dispute as to what an
‘industry’ under Section 2(j) means. ”
21. The respected Judge, speaking with his characteristic candour,
noted that the prevailing uncertainty had necessitated what had
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become a persistent and intractable dispute as to the meaning of
industry under Section 2(j) of the ID Act.
22. There thus appears to have been no divergence of opinion among
the learned Judges on this aspect, namely, that the persistent
deviation in judicial interpretation ought to be clarified
immediately. It was also broadly acknowledged that, in an ideal
course, legislative intervention by Parliament, through an
appropriate amendment, would have been desirable to bring clarity
and resolution to the prevailing state of ambiguity.
B.1.2. Laying down the Triple Test
23. The majority, in the leading judgment, having undertaken an
exhaustive survey of the preceding authorities that had shaped the
interpretation of the expression ‘industry’, proceeded to articulate
the Triple Test as the governing standard for determining whether
a particular body or entity would fall within its ambit.

24. The Triple Test postulates the existence of: ( i ) a systematic and
organised activity; ( ii ) cooperation between employer and employee
in the conduct of such activity; and ( iii ) the production or
distribution of goods and services directed towards the satisfaction
of human wants and wishes. The formulation was consciously
designed to avoid an unduly restrictive construction and to capture
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within its ambit a wide spectrum of organised economic and quasi-
economic undertakings.
25. It is of particular significance that, in explicating the element of
cooperation between employer and employee, the Court rejected the
necessity of establishing any direct or proximate nexus of a rigid
character, regarding such a requirement as illusory and
normatively untenable. Further, the phrase “ goods and services
calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes ” was construed in a
manner that excluded activities of a purely spiritual or religious
character, while encompassing material goods and services
intended to confer tangible, temporal benefit. Illustratively,
activities such as the large-scale preparation and distribution of
food, including prasad, were held to fall within the inclusive sweep
of the definition of industry.
26. The absence of a profit motive or any gainful objective was held to
be immaterial, and it was clarified that an enterprise could fall
within the ambit of ‘industry’ irrespective of whether it operated in
the public, joint, private, or any other sector. The emphasis,
therefore, was placed squarely on the functional character of the
activity, with the decisive inquiry centring on its nature,
particularly as manifested through the relationship of cooperation
between employer and employee.
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27. The Triple Test appears to have secured broad acceptance among
all seven learned Judges, with the divergence being confined not to
its formulation, but to the manner and extent of its application.
Thus, while the foundational elements of the test were not in
serious dispute, differences arose as to the manner in which
particular factual settings ought to be treated. For instance,
Chandrachud J. ( as he then was ), agreed with the activity test but
highlighted that the determinative inquiry ought to instead be
based on “ whether the activity, considered objectively, is organised
or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is normally
organised or arranged.”
28. Even in the dissenting opinion of Jaswant Singh J., for himself and
Tulzapurkar J., substantially accepted the three constituent
elements of the Triple Test, but proceeded to superimpose an
additional requirement. According to the learned Judges, the
activity in question must further be carried on “ on commercial lines
by private entrepreneurs .”
B.1.3 Reading down ‘Undertaking’
29. An important facet of the decision in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) lies in the illumination it provides on the scope and ambit
of the term ‘undertaking’. The leading opinion made it clear that
the construction of Section 2(j) of the ID Act could not be extended
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to the point that it ‘skids into a domain too rarified to be realistic’.
Put in more lucid terms, while the provision was to be accorded a
broad and purposive interpretation, it was not to be so unbounded
as to assume an all-encompassing character that would
indiscriminately draw every conceivable activity within its sweep.
30. This ultimately resulted in the recognition of the second guideline
that:
“Undertaking must suffer a contextual and
associational shrinkage as explained in Banerji and in
this judgment; so also, service, calling and the like. This
yields the inference that all organized activity
possessing the triple elements in I, although not trade
or business, may still be ‘industry’ provided the nature
of the activity, viz. the employer-employee basis, bears
resemblance to what we find in trade or business. …
All features, other than the methodology of carrying on
the activity viz. in organizing the co-operation between
employer and employee, may be dissimilar. It does not
matter, if on the employment terms there is analogy.”
31. The logical corollary of this guideline was thus that any organised
activity satisfying the constituent elements of the Triple Test,
though not strictly amounting to trade or business, may
nevertheless qualify as an ‘industry’, provided that the essential
character of the activity, particularly the employer–employee
relationship, bears a discernible resemblance to that which
ordinarily obtains in trade or business. The consideration thus lies
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in the manner in which the activity is organised, specifically the
structured cooperation between employer and employee.
32. The majority decision further emphasized that the application of
these guiding principles must not be curtailed by subjective
considerations, whether arising from ideological predilections,
institutional character, or perceived incongruity between the
nature of the activity and its economic consequences. The
interpretive exercise must remain faithful to the statutory purpose,
namely, the promotion of industrial peace and the orderly
regulation and resolution of disputes between employers and
workmen.
33. On this basis, it was made clear that a wide range of organised
activities, including professions, clubs, educational institutions,
cooperatives, research bodies, charitable undertakings, and other
analogous ventures, cannot be excluded from the ambit of Section
2(j) merely by reason of their form or avowed purpose, so long as
they satisfy the requirements of the Triple Test.
34. At the same time, a limited category of such institutions may stand
outside the definition where, applying the dominant nature test,
the activity is essentially carried on without the employment of a
substantive workforce, and only minimal or marginal engagement
of labour is involved. In such cases, the absence of a structured
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employer–employee relationship of any real significance would
preclude their characterisation as an ‘industry’.
35. Thus, as a manner of illustration, the decision put forth that
institutions founded upon a fundamentally altruistic or
eleemosynary basis may fall outside the ambit of ‘industry’ in
narrowly circumscribed circumstances. Where the activity is
carried on predominantly by individuals who associate themselves
with the endeavour out of a sense of service, commitment to a
cause, or spiritual or ideological motivation, and who render their
services either gratuitously or for nominal honoraria, the essential
metric of an employer–employee relationship may be absent.
36. This would also encompass situations such as voluntary legal aid
initiatives, free medical services rendered by professionals in their
spare time, or institutions sustained by individuals working in
furtherance of a shared spiritual or charitable purpose. In such
cases, where services are provided free of charge or at nominal cost,
and those engaged are not employed on terms indicative of a
master–servant relationship, the organisation would not qualify as
an ‘industry’, notwithstanding the engagement of a limited number
of ancillary or technical staff.
37. This exemption, however, was confined to such genuinely
charitable or eleemosynary undertakings. It does not extend to
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activities merely because they are animated by generosity,
compassion, or developmental objectives, where the organisational
structure otherwise satisfies the criteria of the statutory definition
or the Triple Test.
B.1.4. The creation of the Dominant Nature Test
38. Krishna Iyer J., in his lead judgment, further articulated what has
come to be recognised as the ‘dominant nature test’ in order to
address situations involving a composite or multifaceted
undertaking.
39. Where an organisation comprises a complex of activities, some of
which may, if viewed in isolation, fall outside the definition, while
others clearly fall within it, the determinative inquiry must centre
on the predominant character of the enterprise as a whole. If the
dominant nature of the activity, viewed in its integrated form,
satisfies the criteria of an ‘industry’, the entire undertaking would
ordinarily be so characterised, notwithstanding that certain
components or personnel may not independently meet the
statutory definition.
B.1.5. The Sovereign Functions Exception

40. The Court also clarified that the exemption carved out for sovereign
functions must be narrowly construed and confined to functions
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strictly understood as sovereign in character. Welfare activities or
economic ventures undertaken by the State or its instrumentalities
do not, merely by reason of their governmental provenance, attract
such immunity.
41. Further, even within departments discharging sovereign functions,
distinct and severable units which independently satisfy the indicia
of an ‘industry’ may fall within the ambit of Section 2(j) of the ID
Act. Lastly, it was recognised that the Legislature, acting within its
constitutional competence, retains the authority to expressly
exclude categories of activities from the operation of the Act, even
if they would otherwise fall within its definitional scope. While this
is only a brief synopsis of the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) , the reasoning buttressing its findings has been dealt with
in greater detail in the later part of this judgment.
42. That being so, the decision in Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
was by no means the first occasion on which this Court undertook
an authoritative exposition of the term ‘industry’. The interpretive
enterprise predates that pronouncement and is marked by a series
of decisions that sought to delineate the contours of the definition
in varying factual settings. In order to bring analytical coherence to
this body of precedent, it is both convenient and conceptually
sound to classify the trajectory of the case law into two distinct
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phases: first , the jurisprudence preceding Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) ; and second , the jurisprudence that has developed
in its aftermath.
B.2. The Pre-Bangalore Water Supply (supra) Jurisprudence
43. Prior to the authoritative pronouncement of Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) , the construction of the provision ‘industry’
exhibited a marked oscillation between two competing interpretive
approaches. On the one hand, a liberal construction sought to
bring within its sweep a broad spectrum of organised activity; on
the other, a more restrictive approach endeavoured to confine its
application to undertakings of a predominantly commercial
character.
B.2.1. Casting the Net Wide: The Early Expansion of the term
‘Industry’
44. One of the earliest decisions in this line of authority is that of D.N.
2
Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee , wherein a Five-Judge Bench held that
a municipal body could fall within the ambit of ‘industry’, and in
doing so articulated what has come to be described as the
‘analogous to trade or business’ test. The Court observed that it is
sufficient if the activity in question bears a functional resemblance

2
AIR 1953 SC 58.
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to the carrying on of trade or business and is carried on through
cooperation between employers and employees.
45. This approach marked a deliberate departure from a narrow, profit-
centric understanding. It was held that an activity need not be
undertaken by a private enterprise, nor must it be strictly
commercial in character or profit-generating, in order to attract the
statutory definition. In a significant interpretive move, the Court
also rejected the contention that the expression ‘undertaking’ must
take its colour ejusdem generis from the preceding words ‘business,
trade, manufacture or calling’. Such a construction, it was
reasoned, would unduly constrict the scope of the provision and
render both the term ‘undertaking’ and the second limb of the
definition otiose.
46. The expression ‘undertaking’, within the meaning of Section 2(j),
was accordingly construed in expansive terms to denote any
business, work, or project that is undertaken as an enterprise, so
long as it is analogous in its organisation and operation to trade or
business.
47. Thereafter, the decision in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor
3
Sabha marked a significant stage in the evolution of the

3
AIR 1960 SC 610.
Page 24 of 154

jurisprudence. In that case, a Three Judge Bench held that a
government-run hospital would fall within the ambit of an
‘industry’, while simultaneously refining the principles earlier
enunciated in D.N. Banerji (supra) . It articulated a more
structured formulation of what would constitute an ‘undertaking’
within the meaning of Section 2(j). Accordingly, an activity would
so qualify where: ( a ) it is systematically or habitually undertaken;
( b ) directed towards the production or distribution of goods, or the
rendering of material services to the community, whether in whole
or in part; ( c ) carried on with the assistance of employees; ( d )
organised in a manner analogous to trade or business; and ( e ) not
of a casual character, nor undertaken for personal consumption or
pleasure. Significantly, the presence of a profit motive or the
investment of capital was held to be non-essential to the
characterisation.

48. This Court was, however, careful in emphasising that the
amplitude of the definition was not without limits. A principled line
of demarcation was recognised, excluding from its ambit activities
that are purely domestic, personal, or casual in nature.

49. Following closely on the heels of Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra)
was the judgment rendered in Corporation of the City of Nagpur
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4
v. Its Employees , wherein a municipal corporation was construed
to be an ‘industry’ with two qualifications justifying such
categorisation. The first was a narrow sovereign function
exception, confined to the ‘primary and inalienable functions of a
constitutional government’, namely, the legislative power, the
administration of law, and the exercise of the judicial power; these
were held to remain excluded even when statutorily delegated to a
corporation. The second was the predominant function test for
composite departments, under which a department discharging
both industrial and non-industrial activities takes its character
from its predominant nature of function. On the anvil of that test,
the Octroi Department was held not to be an industry, whereas the
Fire Brigade service of a municipal committee was. Once again, it
was observed that neither investment of capital nor a profit motive
is a necessary element in the modern conception of industry, and
that monetary consideration for service is not an essential
characteristic of industry in a modern State.
50. Soon after, the decision in Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s
5
Research Association v. State of Bombay , following the ratio
laid down in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) , classified a
Research Association set up by the textile mills of Ahmedabad to

4
AIR 1960 SC 675
5
AIR 1961 SC 484.
Page 26 of 154

be an ‘industry’. It founded its decision on the basis that: ( i ) the
activity of the research association had been systematically taken;
( ii ) it rendered material services to a part of the community by
discovering manufacturing processes to improve efficiency and
reduce costs; and ( iii ) it was carried out with the help of technical
personnel. The Court further imbued that the association’s
activities did not have much in common with the activities of what
may be construed to be a purely educational institution, thereby
leaving the legal status of ordinary educational institutions open.
B.2.2. The Turning of the Tide: The retrenchment of the expansive
approach
6
51. In National Union of Commercial Employees v. M.R. Meher ,
this Court held a firm of solicitors not to be an ‘industry’, and
thereby inaugurated the restrictive turn, marking a turn in the tide.
The third prong of the working principle in Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha (supra) was qualified by the further requirement that the
cooperation between employer and employee must have a ‘direct’
nexus with the goods or services produced. To that end, the court
reasoned that a solicitor’s output depends on his personal
professional equipment, knowledge and efficiency; the clerical work
of his staff is incidental and has no direct or essential nexus with

6
AIR 1962 SC 1080.
Page 27 of 154

the advice rendered to the client. On that reasoning, the learned
professions more generally were excluded from the definition.
7
52. In a similar vein, this Court in University of Delhi v. Ram Nath ,
held a university to not be an ‘industry’ within the bounds of
Section 2(j) of the ID Act. The work of imparting education was, the
Court observed, more of a ‘mission’ and a vocation than a
profession or trade or business. Moreover, it was held that the
majority of a university’s employees (the teachers) do not qualify as
‘workmen’ under the Act. The Court stated that its decision was not
to be understood as laying down a general proposition, but the
effect of the ruling was to take educational institutions as a class
out of Section 2(j).
53. Thereafter, in Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union v.
8
Madras Gymkhana Club , a Three Judge Bench of this Court held
that a self-serving members’ club, albeit organised on a substantial
scale and comprising approximately 1,200 members with a fully
equipped catering department, would not fall within the ambit of
an “industry.” The Court proceeded on the basis that,
notwithstanding the provision of material services to a defined

7
AIR 1963 SC 1873.
8
AIR 1968 SC 554.
Page 28 of 154

section of the community, such activities were not undertaken in
the course of trade or business, nor were they analogous thereto.
54. In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the Court declined to adopt
the formulation articulated in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) ,
particularly insofar as it introduced the criterion of whether the
activity in question could, in principle, be carried on by a private
individual. This qualification was regarded as conceptually
unsound, on the footing that there exist few, if any, activities
incapable of being undertaken by private enterprise. The
interpretive consequence of this approach was to accord primacy
to the first limb of the definition contained in Section 2(j), thereby
substantially attenuating the independent significance of the
second limb and narrowing the scope of the provision.
55. A similar view was then taken in Cricket Club of India v. Bombay
9
Labour Union , wherein the Cricket Club of India was held not to
be an industry.
56. Thereafter came the decision in Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldip
10
Singh Sethi , which can be safely regarded as inscribing the high-
water mark of the restrictive approach. In that case, a Six-Judge
Bench of this Court expressly overruled the earlier decision in

9
AIR 1969 SC 276.
10
(1970) 1 SCC 735.
Page 29 of 154

Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) and significantly narrowed the
scope of the definition of ‘industry’. The Court was concerned with
three institutions: the Safdarjung Hospital, which operated as a
governmental department; the Tuberculosis Hospital, functioning
as a wholly charitable and research-oriented institution; and the
Kurji Holy Family Hospital, a charitable establishment expressly
precluded from generating profit. All three were held not to fall
within the ambit of an ‘industry’.
57. The central proposition articulated was that, although the presence
of a profit motive is not determinative, an activity must nonetheless
bear a close analogy to trade or business in a commercial sense in
order to qualify as an ‘industry’. It must be directed towards the
production of material goods or the provision of material services
possessing commercial value. In this context, ‘material services’
were understood to denote organised activities carried on through
the cooperation of employers and employees to provide the
community with the use of essential utilities, such as electricity,
water, transportation, postal services, and telecommunication.
This formulation imposed a distinctly higher threshold,
reintroducing, albeit in a nuanced form, a commercial character as
a limiting principle, and thereby consolidating the restrictive
trajectory in the interpretation of Section 2(j) of the ID Act.
Page 30 of 154


58. The judicial path thus reveals that different Benches of this Court
adopted a multiplicity of distinct and, at times, divergent
approaches in determining whether particular institutions, such as
Hospitals, Clubs, Universities, and Governmental Departments,
would satisfy the substantive import of the definition of ‘industry’
under Section 2(j) of the ID Act.
B.3. The Post-Bangalore Water Supply (supra) jurisprudence
59. In the aftermath of the decision in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) , the jurisprudence appeared, for a time, to attain a measure
of doctrinal stability, if not complete finality. This interlude of
relative calm was, however, short-lived. Subsequent developments
once again unsettled the field and rekindled debate regarding the
correctness, scope, and continuing viability of the interpretation
accorded to the term ‘industry’.
60. These developments may, for analytical clarity, be organised into
four broad categories: ( i ), the initial legislative response; ( ii ), the
contestation surrounding the ambit of the sovereign functions
exception; ( iii ), the treatment and status of research institutions;
and ( iv ), the recurring judicial calls for a reconsideration of the
principles laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) itself.

Page 31 of 154

B.3.1. The Initial Legislative Response
61. The Parliament, by way of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act
46 of 1982, amended Section 2(j). The amendment retained the core
of the Triple Test enunciated in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) ,
clarified that the employer-and-employee relationship includes
workmen employed through a contractor, though it carved out
exceptions, such as: (1) agricultural operations (save where
integrated with industrial activity); (2) hospitals and dispensaries;
(3) educational, scientific, research or training institutions; (4)
institutions engaged in charitable, social or philanthropic service;
(5) khadi or village industries; (6) activities of the Government
relatable to its sovereign functions, including the departments
dealing with defence research, atomic energy and space; (7)
domestic service; (8) professions practised by an individual or body
of individuals employing fewer than ten persons; and (9)
cooperative societies, clubs or like bodies employing fewer than ten
persons.
62. Although the above-quoted amendment was passed on 21.08.1984,
the amended definition of ‘industry’ was never notified and thus the
amended provision did not see the light of day.

Page 32 of 154

B.3.2. The discord regarding the Sovereign Function Exception
63. Subsequently, a phase of friction emerged in relation to the
exceptions carved out for sovereign functions as articulated in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) . This divergence was occasioned
by the coexistence of two distinct judicial approaches: one line of
authority adhered to the narrow construction adopted in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , while another sought to expand
the contours of the exception, thereby enlarging the category of
activities insulated from the definition of ‘industry’.
64. To explicate, the narrow construction of the sovereign functions
exception found early articulation in Chief Conservator of Forests
11
v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare , wherein a Three Judge Bench
held that the State’s Social Forestry Department would fall within
the ambit of an ‘industry’.
65. However, such divergence became manifest when a Two Judge
Bench, in Sub Divisional Inspector of Post, Vaikam v. Theyyam
12
Joseph , adopted a broader construction of the exemptions
provided to sovereign functions and held the Postal Department
would fall within the domain of welfare functions envisaged under
Part IV of the Constitution. Such functions, being sovereign in

11
(1996) 8 SCC 489.
12
(1996) 2 SCC 293.
Page 33 of 154

character, were held to lie outside the ambit of an ‘industry’. This
line of reasoning was subsequently followed by another Two Judge
Bench in Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees’ Association
13
v. Union of India , wherein the departmental canteen attached to
the Prabhadevi Telephone Exchange was likewise held not to
constitute an ‘industry’.
66. Indeed, in the latter decision, the Court went on to observe that a
strict and unqualified application of the ratio laid down in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) could potentially give rise to
consequences of a far-reaching and, perhaps, catastrophic nature.
67. However, this dissonance came to be resolved by a Three Judge
14
Bench in General Manager, Telecom v. A. Srinivasa Rao ,
which held that the Telecommunication Department of the Union
would fall within the ambit of an ‘industry’, having regard to the
fact that it was engaged in activities of a commercial character and
was not discharging functions of a sovereign nature.
68. In the course of its analysis, the Court unequivocally declined to
endorse the broader construction of the sovereign functions
exception. It observed that such an approach stood in direct
conflict with the binding authority of the Seven-Judge Bench

13
AIR 1997 SC 2817.
14
(1997) 8 SCC 767.
Page 34 of 154

decision in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , which continued to
hold the field. The Court emphasised that it would be impermissible
for a Bench of lesser strength to either depart from or circumvent
a binding precedent of a larger Bench. The decisions in Theyyam
Joseph (supra) and Bombay Telephone Canteen (supra) were
accordingly held not to lay down the correct position in law.
69. The decision in Srinivasa Rao (supra) was subsequently followed
and reaffirmed firstly by a Two Judge Bench in All India Radio v.
15
Santosh Kumar , which held that All India Radio and
Doordarshan would qualify as ‘industries’. The reasoning assigned
was that the broadcasting of commercial advertisements for profit
could not be characterised as a purely sovereign function.
Similarly, in Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Ashok
16
Harikuni , another Two Judge Bench held that a Market
Committee constituted under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce
Marketing (Regulation and Development) Act, 1966 would fall
within the ambit of an ‘industry’, noting that none of its functions
could be regarded as sovereign or inalienable, and that the
presence or absence of profit-making was not determinative.

15
(1998) 3 SCC 237.
16
(2000) 8 SCC 61.
Page 35 of 154


70. What emerges from this line of authority is a consistent recognition
that merely because an activity is undertaken by the State, whether
in furtherance of welfare objectives or through departmental
organisation, does not, by itself, attract the sovereign functions
exception, particularly where such activity bears the indicia of
organised service or commercial engagement.
B.3.3. The treatment and status of Research Institutions
71. The expansive construction accorded to the term ‘industry’ in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , particularly in its application
to research institutions, proved to be a significant point of inflection
in jurisprudence. The proposition that such bodies could, in
principle, fall within the statutory definition if they satisfied the
governing criteria introduced a degree of latitude that subsequently
invited reconsideration.
72. This came to the fore in the Two Judge Bench decision in Physical
17
Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma , where the Court held
that the Physical Research Laboratory would not constitute an
‘industry’. The determination rested on the footing that the
institution was engaged in pure research, discharging functions of

17
(1997) 4 SCC 257.
Page 36 of 154

a governmental character, notwithstanding the fact that it
employed personnel in furtherance of its objectives.
73. The reasoning in Physical Research Laboratory (supra) thus
stood in discernible tension with the ratio of Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) , and sought to be an early indication of the judicial
unease that began to surface with respect to the prevailing dictum.
B.3.4 The calls for reconsideration of the decision in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra)
74. A Two Judge Bench in Coir Board, Ernakulam v. Indira Devi
18
P.S , while adjudicating the question as to whether or not the Coir
Board constituted an industry, referred the decision in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) for reconsideration by a larger bench,
pointing to the ‘ damaging effect ’ of the extended meaning given to
‘industry’ and dissenting from the view laid down in that case.
75. The Bench observed that the experience of the two decades since
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) had done more damage than
good, not merely to the organisations but also to the employees by
the curtailment of employment opportunities. It noted that the
elimination of the profit motive had caused a large number of
philanthropic and charitable activities to be unable to cope with

18
(1998) 3 SCC 259.
Page 37 of 154

their requirements, with the consequence that welfare activities
were discontinued, the community was deprived of their benefit
and the employees of their livelihood. As to the Coir Board itself,
the Bench observed that its function was to promote the coir
industry, not to run one, and that it would not be an “industry” on
a predominant-purpose test, though it would have to be so
characterised on the sweeping test in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) .
76. Thereupon, a Three-Judge Bench of this Court, presided over by
the then Chief Justice, declined the reference on the basis that
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) did not require reconsideration
merely because of a reference made by a Two-Judge Bench, which
19
was bound by the larger bench.
77. Nonetheless, Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was subsequently
referred for reconsideration to a larger Bench initially by a Three-
Judge Bench on 31.01.2001 in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir
20
Singh . This reference was founded upon an apparent conflict in
precedent. On one hand, the Three-Judge Bench in Jagannath
Maruti Kondhare (supra) had taken an expansive view, holding
that a Social Forestry Department would fall within the ambit of an

19
Coir Board Ernakulum State of Kerala v. Indira Devi P.S. (II), (2000) 1 SCC 224.
20
(2005) 5 SCC 1.
Page 38 of 154

‘industry’. On the other hand, the Two-Judge Bench in State of
21
Gujarat v. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar adopted a more
restrictive interpretation. The divergence between these decisions
necessitated authoritative clarification by a larger Bench.
78. The Five Judge Bench in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir
22
Singh , while considering the issue, held that there were various
competing interests which would make it prudent to reconsider the
correctness of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) and refer it to a
larger bench. First , the decision in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) was not unanimous; within the majority of five, three joined
in the opinion of Krishna Iyer J., while Beg C.J. and Chandrachud
J. ( ) wrote separately, with views partly different
as he then was
from the other three. Second , the majority itself had recorded that
the definition clause was ‘so wide and vague that it is not
susceptible to a very definite and precise meaning’, and had
described its interpretation as tentative and temporary, till the
legislature stepped in. Third , the Act being social legislation, the
interests of employers, employees and the public, as the ultimate
beneficiaries of industrial activity, must be kept in view; a worker-
oriented approach unmindful of employer and public interest is
one-sided. Fourth , experience had shown that the majority view

21
(2001) 9 SCC 713.
22
(2005) 5 SCC 1.
Page 39 of 154

had produced large awards of reinstatement and back-wages,
which compelled employers of moderate means to close down their
industries, harming employers, workers and the public alike. Fifth ,
though the Act was amended in 1982, the amendment had
remained unenforced. Sixth , an over-expansive interpretation was
a deterrent to private enterprise in a country of scarce public
employment, and the engulfing of liberal professions (lawyers,
architects, doctors, chartered accountants) within the definition
was experienced as a hurdle; such professions require regulation,
but by separate legislation. Seventh , the concept of a sovereign
function ought not, in a constitutional democracy, be confined to
its traditional compass; rather it should comprehend the public
welfare activities which Government undertakes in discharge of its
constitutional obligations under Part IV, and such activities should
fall outside ‘industry’.

79. The cases were thus directed to be placed before the Chief Justice
of India for the constitution of a suitable larger bench. Thereupon,
on 02.01.2017, a Seven-Judge Bench led by the then Chief Justice
of India directed that a Nine-Judge Bench would hear the matter.

80. The matter was thereafter listed on 12.10.2023 for final hearing. In
that regard, this Court issued directions for the preparation of a
common compilation of pleadings, written submissions, documents
Page 40 of 154

and precedents, to be filed on or before 20.11.2023. However, no
further progress ensued in the matter thereafter.
81. In the interregnum , the IR Code, 2020, was brought into force on
21.11.2025, and on 02.02.2026, the ID Act was formally repealed.
82. Subsequently, this Court, by order dated 16.02.2026, with a view
to bringing quietus to the instant controversy, framed the following
questions for consideration:
i. Whether the Triple Test, as laid down in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) , is correct law;
ii. Whether the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 and
the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 ( IR Code, 2020 ) have any
legal impact upon the interpretation of “industry” as
contained in the Principal Act;
iii. Whether the social welfare activities and schemes of
Government Departments or their instrumentalities can be
construed to be “industrial activities” for the purpose of
Section 2(j); and
iv. What are the “sovereign functions” of the State that fall
outside the purview of Section 2(j).
Page 41 of 154


83. The matter was thereupon heard continuously on 17.03.2026,
18.03.2026 and 19.03.2026, and consequently reserved for
judgment.
C. T HE P REFATORY Q UESTION OF M AINTAINABILITY
84. The issue concerning the correctness of the reference itself was
neither considered germane nor framed as a question for
determination, as is evident from paragraph 82 above.
85. However, during the course of the hearing, learned senior
counsel(s) and counsel(s) appearing for the Respondent-workmen
raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present
reference to a Nine-Judge Bench. It was submitted that the appeals
instituted by the State, its instrumentalities, and other employers
were liable to be rejected at the threshold on the ground of
maintainability. Consequently, according to the Respondents, this
Court was not required to venture into the merits of the controversy
or answer the questions formulated by the order dated 16.02.2026.
86. The Respondents further contended that, having held the field for
nearly five decades, the decision in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) has attained a degree of jurisprudential stability that
squarely attracts the principle of stare decisis . It was submitted
that there exists no compelling necessity to reopen or reconsider
Page 42 of 154

the interpretation adopted therein, and that the mere existence of
divergent judicial opinions or subsequent expressions of doubt
does not, by itself, constitute sufficient justification for a
comprehensive reappraisal of the correctness of the decision.
87. The Appellants, in response, supported the reference made to a
Nine Judge Bench vide judgments dated 05.05.2005 and
02.01.2017, contending that it was done as per procedure,
especially given that the Chief Justice of India had appropriately
constituted larger benches to deal with the issues raised.
88. Having regard to these rival asseverations, we deem it appropriate
to address this aspect, notwithstanding that no issue was framed
to this effect on 16.02.2026 nor intended to be considered as a
distinct issue. In view of the fact that several of the learned
counsels have engaged with it and have relied upon it as a basis to
decline the reference, it becomes necessary for us to examine the
matter and record our reasons as well.
89. We have thus given our thoughtful consideration to the preliminary
objection regarding the maintainability of the reference. We are,
however, unable to accept the same and are inclined to reject it at
the outset, inter alia, on two principal grounds, namely: ( i ) the
procedure adopted and the correctness of the reference; and ( ii ) the
Page 43 of 154

broader considerations of institutional propriety that must
rationally govern the adjudication of such matters.
C.1. Correctness of the manner in which Reference was made
90. Before proceeding to examine the correctness of the instant
reference, it is necessary to advert to the general principles that
govern the manner in which a Bench of lesser strength may refer
questions for consideration by a larger Bench. The contours of this
procedural mechanism are neither uncertain nor obscure. There
exists a consistent line of authority that illuminates the governing
norms and provides a principled framework within which such
references are to be made and adjudicated.
C.1.1. The framework governing Larger Bench References
91. One need not set out on an odyssey to appreciate the governing
principle. It would suffice to advert to the seminal Constitution
Bench decision in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community
23
v. State of Maharashtra , wherein the Court authoritatively and
conclusively settled the legal position governing references to a
larger Bench in the following explicit terms:
“12. (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision
delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on
any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.

23
(2005) 2 SCC 673.
Page 44 of 154

(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent
from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger
quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser
quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief
Justice and request for the matter being placed for
hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the
Bench whose decision has come up for consideration.
It will be open only for a Bench of co-equal strength to
express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view
taken by the earlier Bench of co-equal strength,
whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before
a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one
which pronounced the decision laying down the law the
correctness of which is doubted.
(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions:
(i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the
Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the
roster and who can direct any particular matter to be
placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any
strength; and
(ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the
matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench
of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the
view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum,
which view is in doubt, needs correction or
reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a
rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear
the case and examine the correctness of the previous
decision in question dispensing with the need of a
specific reference or the order of the Chief Justice
constituting the Bench and such listing.”
[Emphasis supplied]
92. What has been so cogently articulated in Dawoodi Bohra (supra) ,
and which continues to hold the field on the manner in which
references to a larger Bench are to be made, is sufficiently clear and
Page 45 of 154

admits of no further elaboration. There is no gainsaying that
Dawoodi Bohra (supra) was occasioned by a series of instances
that struck at the very foundation of judicial propriety and
institutional discipline. The Five-Judge Bench therein sought to
clarify that any challenge to the decision rendered in Sardar
24
Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb vs The State of Bombay ,
which pertained to a case on excommunication, would have to be
heard by a Five-Judge or larger bench.
93. It was in that backdrop that the Constitution Bench therein
considered it necessary to formulate comprehensive principles
governing references to larger Benches, which in turn were firmly
anchored in the doctrines of precedent, judicial decorum, and
institutional discipline. In essence, the judgment reaffirmed that a
Bench of lesser strength cannot disregard or depart from the law
declared by a Bench of greater strength. If a smaller Bench
entertains doubts as to the correctness of a larger Bench decision,
the proper judicial course is not to overlook or sidestep the binding
precedent, but to refer the matter to the Chief Justice for
constitution of an appropriate larger Bench to authoritatively
consider the issue.

24
1962 AIR 853.
Page 46 of 154


94. Indeed, one of us (Surya Kant, J. ( as he then was )) relied upon
Dawoodi Bohra (supra) in his dissenting opinion in Aligarh
25
Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal to reject the
maintainability of the reference therein. To elucidate, in Aligarh
Muslim University (supra) , the issue concerned a Two-Judge
Bench, having expressed reservations regarding the correctness of
an earlier decision rendered by a Three-Judge Bench, directly
referred the matter for reconsideration by a Seven-Judge Bench.
This course of action was viewed, with the utmost respect, as
constituting a clear departure from the settled discipline governing
judicial precedents and the procedure for references.
95. In the dissenting opinion in Aligarh Muslim University (supra) , it
was held that such a reference by a Two-Judge Bench directly to a
Seven-Judge Bench was not maintainable. It was observed that a
Bench of lesser strength could not, of its own accord, bypass the
established institutional procedure for constituting larger Benches.
96. There can thus be no doubt with respect to the robust foundations
upon which the principles illustrated in Dawoodi Bohra (supra)
are built.

25
(2025) 6 SCC 1.
Page 47 of 154

C.1.2. Testing the Reference on the anvil of Dawoodi Bohra
(supra)
97. When one turns to the path traversed in the present matter before
it ultimately came to be placed before a Bench of Nine Judges, it
becomes evident that the reference has travelled through a long and
somewhat layered judicial course, engaging different Benches of
varying strength at multiple stages before culminating in the
present proceedings. The question that consequently arises is
whether this journey was undertaken in a manner consistent with
and known to established judicial discipline, or whether, at any
stage, procedural deviations or perhaps, to put it colloquially,
‘shortcuts’ were resorted to, that may be said to have contravened
the principles authoritatively enunciated in Dawoodi Bohra
(supra) . In this regard, we propose to examine the course of referral
adopted at each stage of the proceedings and to assess whether the
procedure so employed by the respective Benches conforms to the
said underlying principles.
98. To begin with, the seeming tranquillity and clarity ushered in by
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) gradually began to exhibit
fissures owing to the divergence that emerged between the
decisions rendered by a Three-Judge Bench in Chief Conservator
of Forests (supra) and a Two-Judge Bench in Pratamsinh
Page 48 of 154

Narsinh Parmar (supra) , in the context of whether the Forest
Department of the State could be construed as an ‘industry’. While
the former held that the Social Forestry Department would fall
within the ambit of the definition notwithstanding its welfare-
oriented functions, the latter adopted a contrary position.
99. In view of this apparent discordance, a Bench of Three Judges while
dealing with a similar question of law in State of U.P. v. Jai Bir
26
Singh (I) , considered it appropriate to observe that the issue as
to whether a governmental welfare scheme, such as the Social
Forestry Department, could be regarded as an ‘industry’ was a
question of considerable public importance warranting
consideration by a larger Bench. The matter was accordingly,
vide
order dated 31.01.2002, directed to be placed before the then Chief
Justice of India for appropriate orders.
100. If one were then to examine the procedure adopted by the Three-
Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh (I) (supra) , it becomes apparent, at
the very threshold, that the Bench merely took cognisance of the
conflicting views expressed by Benches of Two and Three Judges,
as referred to in paragraph 98. In light of the fact that a
substantially similar issue had arisen for consideration before it,
coupled with the evident jurisprudential discordance, the Bench,

26
SLP (C) No. 10411/2001, Order dated 31.01.2002.
Page 49 of 154

being of co-equal strength, was fully justified in expressing doubt
as to the correctness of the view taken by the Bench in Chief
Conservator of Forests (supra) .
101. We may hasten to add that at that juncture, the correctness of
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , partially or in entirety, was not
the subject matter of consideration in Jai Bir Singh (I) .
102. In all fairness, it was argued on behalf of the workmen that the
Three-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh (I) (supra) should have
adhered to the binding precedent established in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) , to determine that the Social Forestry Department
would fall within the scope of Section 2(j) of the ID Act. They
contended that, given the larger bench size in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) compared to Jai Bir Singh (I) (supra) , the former
constituted a binding precedent for the latter. However, we find no
merit in this submission.

103. We say so for the reason that Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
has not issued any comprehensive declaration that the Social
Forestry Department of any State or Union shall automatically be
regarded as an ‘industry’. Difficulties subsequently arose in
applying the test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) ,
particularly where a Three-Judge Bench interpreted the law in
support of its conclusion that the Social Forestry Department
Page 50 of 154

qualifies as an ‘industry’, whereas a Two-Judge Bench arrived at a
different conclusion. Faced with this dilemma of diverging views,
particularly in re: the treatment of the Social Forestry Department,
the Three-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh (I) (supra) appropriately
referred the matter to a Five-Judge Bench.
104. It was only when Jai Bir Singh (I) (supra) came to be placed
before a bench of Five Judges that the said Bench observed that
the central issue concerned whether a governmental welfare
scheme fell within the scope. It may thus be observed that the
singular issue regarding whether the Social Forestry Department
was an industry or not was expanded by the Five-Judge Bench,
thereby broadening the scope of the issue, namely, as to whether
all such governmental welfare schemes would be classified as
industry or not within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the ID Act.
105. Additionally, Jai Bir Singh (I) (supra) did not itself purport to
depart from or overrule the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) , but merely directed that the matter be placed before the
Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. Consequently,
notwithstanding that the decision in Dawoodi Bohra (supra) came
to be rendered subsequent to the order dated 31.01.2002 passed
in Jai Bir Singh (I) (supra) , the procedure adopted cannot be said
Page 51 of 154

to have departed from the generally prevailing norms of judicial
discipline and propriety.
106. This is what prompted the Five-Judge Bench in State of Uttar
27
Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh (II) to observe that the judgment in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) did not exhibit complete
unanimity in its reasoning. It further observed that certain portions
of the majority opinion appeared to suggest that the formulation
adopted therein was intended to operate as an interim judicial
arrangement until such time as Parliament enacted an appropriate
legislative amendment clarifying the scope and meaning of the term
‘industry’. Proceeding on that basis, the Bench expressed
reservations as to whether the majority opinion could, in all
respects, be treated as laying down a fully conclusive and binding
precedent.
107. Further, the Five-Judge Bench supplemented this line of
reasoning by expressing concern over the fact that the separate
opinions in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) had been delivered
by different learned Judges at different points in time, with the
majority opinion having preceded the dissenting opinions and,

27
(2005) 5 SCC 1.
Page 52 of 154

therefore, having been rendered without the benefit of considering
the reasoning subsequently advanced therein.
108. In addition to these reservations, the Five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir
Singh (II) also articulated broader concerns regarding the
substantive approach adopted in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) . It observed that the decision appeared to proceed from an
unduly worker-centric perspective, without according sufficient
consideration to the competing public interest in safeguarding the
viability of industry and the legitimate concerns of employers. The
Bench further opined that, within the framework of a constitutional
democracy, the conception of ‘sovereign functions’ ought not to be
narrowly confined, particularly when the State undertakes a wide
range of welfare-oriented and value-generating activities in
furtherance of its constitutional obligations under Parts III and IV
of the Constitution.

109. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Five-Judge Bench
observed that there existed “ compelling reasons more than
one….for making a reference on the interpretation of the
definition of ‘industry’ in Section 2(j) of the Act, to a larger
bench and for reconsideration by it, if necessary, of the
decision rendered in the case of Bangalore Water Supply
(supra). ” Accordingly, it directed that the matters be placed before
Page 53 of 154

the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate
larger Bench to reconsider the judgment in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) .
110. Once again, irrespective of the ultimate correctness or persuasive
force of the reasons assigned by the Five-Judge Bench, the
significant point is that it unquestionably possessed the authority
to direct that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice of India
for the constitution of an appropriate larger Bench to reconsider
the decision in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) . Indeed, not only
did the Five-Judge Bench faithfully follow it, but it has also made
express reference to the principles crystallised in Dawoodi Bohra
(supra) .
111. There is, therefore, no occasion for us to doubt the procedural
propriety adopted by the Five-Judge Bench, particularly having
regard to the following circumstances: First , the Bench had
originally been constituted to resolve the divergence that had arisen
between Chief Conservator of Forests (supra) and Pratamsingh
Narsinh Parmar (supra) on the question concerning the status of
governmental welfare schemes under Section 2(j). Second , in the
course of undertaking that exercise, it traced the source of the
divergence to the interpretation of ‘industry’ adopted in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) and furnished reasons for entertaining
Page 54 of 154

doubts as to its correctness. Third , recognising that it was a Bench
of lesser numerical strength than the Seven Judge Bench in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , it adhered to the discipline
mandated by Dawoodi Bohra (supra) and merely directed that the
matter be placed before the Chief Justice of India for the
constitution of a larger Bench.
112. Thereupon, pursuant to the reference made by the Five-Judge
Bench in Jai Bir Singh (II) , the then Chief Justice of India
constituted a Bench of Seven Judges to consider the matter. Upon
an anxious consideration of the submissions advanced by the
parties, the Seven-Judge Bench vide its order dated 02.01.2017
observed that, having regard to the “ serious and wide ranging
implications of the issues that fall for determination as also
the fact that serious doubts have been expressed in the
reference order about the correctness of the view taken in
Bangalore Water Supply’s case (supra), we are of the opinion
that these appeals need to be placed before a Bench
comprising Nine Judges to be constituted by the Chief
Justice. ”

113. Accordingly, the papers were placed before the then Chief Justice
of India for the constitution of an appropriate Bench of Nine Judges
Page 55 of 154

to answer the questions raised in the reference order rendered by
the Five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh (II) (supra) .
114. In this specific scenario, the Bench of Seven Judges observed that,
in view of the serious reservations expressed regarding the
correctness of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , the matter
warranted reconsideration by a larger Bench. The Bench
consequently directed that the papers be placed before the Chief
Justice of India for the constitution of a larger Bench. It is pertinent
to note that the Seven-Judge Bench, as well as the subsequently
constituted Nine-Judge Bench, were both presided over by the then
Chief Justice of India.
115. It needs no emphasis that under Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme
Court Rules, 2013, the then Chief Justice of India was vested with
absolute power to constitute a larger bench for the hearing of the
matter upon reference. Even in the absence of a formal reference to
the larger bench by a smaller bench, the matter could thus be
placed before a bench of Five to Seven Judges or Seven to Nine
Judges by the Chief Justice of India in exercise of his plenary
power.

116. Viewed thus, the order of reference squarely satisfies the
principles governing judicial discipline and institutional propriety
as elucidated in Dawoodi Bohra (supra) . There can, therefore, be
Page 56 of 154

no legitimate doubt that the reference in hand has been made fully
in accordance with law and incorruptible adherence to the settled
norms regulating references to larger Benches.
C.1.3. The Res Judicata conundrum?
117. We may now deal with the objection raised by some of the learned
counsel(s) that the initial reference from Three Judge to Five Judge
Bench was barred by the principle of Res Judicata . The submission
is premised on the fact that earlier a Two-Judge Bench in Coir
Board, Ernakulam (I) (supra) , sought reconsideration of
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) by a larger Bench. However,
such an opinion was turned down by a Bench of Three Judges,
according to whom the issue already stood concluded by a Seven-
Judge Bench in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) . This opinion by
the Three-Judge Bench, according to the representatives of
workmen, constitutes res judicata .

118. Res judicata refers to the doctrine that issues and claims decided
between competing parties ought not to be re-adjudicated. While
this postulate finds legislative recognition in the context of civil
suits through Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this
Court has consistently recognised res judicata as a general
principle of jurisprudence, applicable to all kinds of disputes
Page 57 of 154

28
adjudicated by different fora in India. It is also a settled position
that the principle would apply only when the ‘matter in issue’ in
the subject case is necessarily and substantially decided on a prior
occasion by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Here, the ‘matter in
issue’ comprises the rights and claims of the parties to the dispute,
originating from the specific cause(s) of action involved. In other
words, to successfully raise a plea of res judicata , the litigant must
demonstrate that the parties involved are the same, the rights and
entitlements claimed are the same and they arise from the same
cause of action, and that the previous Adjudicating Authority had
jurisdictional competence to decide the same.
119. These requirements inevitably lead to the conclusion that
res
judicata would only apply to decisions made in personam , i.e., to
the rights and claims inter se the parties involved in the litigation.
The claim of right inherently depends upon the identification of
material facts and the application of relevant law thereto. This
would include questions of fact, while also involving determination
of questions of law. However, the determination made on the
question of law does not, in itself, constitute the decision on the
‘matter in issue’, which necessarily flows from the factual context

28
Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, (1952) 2 SCC 219.
Page 58 of 154

29
of a cause of action and the specific claims in a case. Rather, such
30
determination of law would amount only to a precedent in law.
120. In the present scenario and as already elucidated in the segment
titled “ The Calls for Reconsideration of the Decision in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) ,” the Two-Judge Bench in Coir Board,
Ernakulam (I) (supra) sought reconsideration of the interpretation
of ‘industry’ propounded in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) .
While adjudicating upon the question whether the Coir Board
would fall within the ambit of Section 2(j), the Bench expressly
recorded its disagreement with the broad and expansive
construction accorded to the definition in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) .
121. The Bench went so far as to observe that the experience of the two
decades following Bangalore Water Supply (supra) had, in its
perception, produced consequences more detrimental than
beneficial, not only for institutions and organisations but also for
employees themselves, owing to the contraction of employment
opportunities. This conclusion was founded upon the view that the
elimination of the profit motive as a relevant consideration had

29
State (NCT of Delhi) v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370 (including 3 of us – Surya
Kant, J. (as he then was), Dipankar Datta, J. and Ujjal Bhuyan, J.) .
30
Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613; Malook
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 17 SCC 765 (including one of us – B.V. Nagarathna, J.) ;
State of Rajasthan v. Nemi Chand Mahela, (2019) 14 SCC 179.
Page 59 of 154

rendered numerous philanthropic and charitable bodies incapable
of complying with the obligations arising under industrial law.
According to the Bench, this had led, in several instances, to the
discontinuation of welfare-oriented activities, thereby depriving
communities of their benefits and employees of their means of
livelihood.
122. In regard to categorising the Coir Board itself, the Two-Judge
Bench, having considered that the purpose of the Coir Board was
to improve the marketing of coir products and promote its exports
by maintaining show rooms and sales depots, held that it was not
an industry on a predominant purpose test, although it would have
been so characterised on the expansive test laid down in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) . Accordingly, a reference was
made to a larger bench by directing that the matter be placed before
the Chief Justice of India for consideration.

123. However, a subsequent Three-Judge Bench, presided over by the
then Chief Justice of India in Coir Board, Ernakulam (II) (supra) ,
declined the reference vide its order dated 10.11.1998, stating that
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) does not require reconsideration
on a reference made by a Two-Judge Bench, which is itself bound
by the larger Bench.
Page 60 of 154


124. The course adopted in Coir Board, Ernakulam (I) and (II) (supra)
did not pass unnoticed and was expressly adverted to by the Five-
Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh (II) . However, there existed nothing
in law that precluded the Constitution Bench in Jai Bir Singh (II) ,
which had itself been independently constituted to resolve a
distinct divergence arising from the interpretation of ‘industry’ in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , from examining the matter on
its own footing. The proceedings in Jai Bir Singh (II) (supra)
cannot, by any stretch, be regarded as a mere continuation of what
had earlier commenced in Coir Board.
125. Although both lines of authority ultimately converged upon
concerns relating to the consequences and practical implications of
the expansive definition adopted in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) , the foundations upon which such concerns were raised
remained materially distinct.

126. Consequently, the refusal by the Three-Judge Bench in Coir
Board (II) (supra) to reconsider Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
cannot be construed as exerting any binding or preclusive effect
upon the Five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh (II) , which had been
constituted in the context of an altogether different jurisprudential
conflict.
Page 61 of 154


127. There can be no occasion to invoke the doctrine of res judicata in
the present context. To hold otherwise would run counter to the
well-settled principles governing judicial precedents, references,
and the exercise of constitutional adjudicatory power, as
consistently recognised in a catena of decisions of this Court. The
doctrine, conceived to lend finality to inter partes adjudication,
cannot be transposed indiscriminately into a setting involving the
determination of pure questions of law by Benches of varying
strength.
128. Indeed, any such approach would also militate against the
principle of ‘ fundamental determination ’, which has been aptly
elucidated by this Court in Yadaiah and another v. State of
31
Telangana and others , wherein this principle was explained in
the following terms:
45. The effective test to distinguish between a
fundamental or collateral determination is hinged on
the inquiry of whether the concerned
determination was so vital to the decision that
without which the decision itself cannot stand
independently. Any determination, despite being
deliberate or formal, cannot give rise to applicat
ion of the doctrine of res judicata if they are not
fundamental in nature .
[Emphasis supplied]

31
2023 INSC 664.
Page 62 of 154

C.1.4. Stare Decisis and the Doctrine of Overruling
129. A passing reference, as already iterated above, was also made to
the applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis , to buttress the
contention that the instant reference is not maintainable. To briefly
address this assertion, the doctrine of stare decisis is a
jurisprudential tenet that underpins consistency in judicial
decisions. While many foreign jurisdictions may apply it as an
unwritten norm, the Constitution of India embodies it within Article
141, postulating that the law laid down by this Court must be
binding in nature. It, thus, follows that when this Court passes
judgments, there is some finality in the declaration of law made
therein.
130. Be that as it may, this Court has unequivocally held that the
doctrine of stare decisis does not imply that a judicial decision, once
rendered by this Court, is binding for eternity and cannot be
32
subjected to reconsideration by this Court. No historic precedent,
however widely used, can be said to have supplied an unalterable
decision on the interpretation of law.
131. A judicial pronouncement, although made with the binding force
of this Court, may be required to be recalled, overturned, or

32
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 25; S. Nagaraj v. State of
Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595.
Page 63 of 154

modified due to extraordinary, compelling circumstances. In some
cases, such modification has been occasioned due to temporal
changes in the social structure and realities of this Country,
33
whereby existing law is framed into the newer contexts. In other
cases, erroneous interpretation of statute has been rectified by
larger benches of this Court, invoking the inherent power of this
34
Court to review its own decisions. However, the reiteration of this
exception to the traditions of precedent is consistent with the
doctrine of stare decisis . As long as the reconsideration is reasoned
and within the norms of judicial procedure, the doctrine of stare
decisis and the precedential value of the previous decision does not
prevent this Court from assessing the correctness of its prior
decisions.
132. In this light and on an application of this principle to the present
context, there can be no question of any impermissible overlap, nor
can it be contended that the issue concerning the reconsideration
of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was conclusively addressed
by Coir Board (II) (supra) so as to operate as a bar to the reference
made in Jai Bir Singh (II) (supra) .

33
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441.
34
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1955) 1 SCC 763.
Page 64 of 154


133. The two proceedings represented distinct and independent lines
of inquiry, each arising from separate jurisprudential concerns,
albeit converging upon the common legal question concerning the
scope of the term ‘industry’ under Section 2(j) of the ID Act. The
mere existence of such convergence cannot justify the conclusion
that the outcome of one proceeding necessarily foreclosed or
exhausted the jurisdictional basis for the other. To hold otherwise
would be to conflate distinct references founded upon different
causes of judicial doubt and directed towards the resolution of
different controversies.
134. In any case, the Five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh (II) , being of
superior numerical strength, was not bound by any finding or
opinion expressed by the Three-Judge Bench in Coir Board (II) .
135. Accordingly, the decision in Coir Board (II) (supra) cannot be
construed as constituting a definitive impediment to the reference
subsequently made in Jai Bir Singh (II) (supra) , nor as depriving
the latter Bench of the authority to entertain and examine the
questions that arose before it. Therefore, we find no infirmity in the
manner in which the present matter came to be referred to a Nine-
Judge Bench.

Page 65 of 154

C.2. Treading the razor’s edge between technicality and quietus
136. While this conclusion on maintainability necessarily places us at
variance with the views that the reference is fundamentally
misconceived and not in conformity with the procedure
contemplated by law, we are unable, for the reasons already
recorded, to subscribe to that view.
137. Having held that the present reference is neither barred by res
judicata or stare decisis nor does it lack maintainability, we also
find that there exists a broader institutional consideration that
merits articulation. Not every question that reaches a Bench of
such exceptional strength is best left unanswered, particularly
where it concerns an issue that has occupied judicial attention for
decades and has generated substantial uncertainty.
138. In that light, it would be somewhat incongruous if a reference that
has traversed multiple Benches over a considerable period of time,
and which now stands before a Bench of Nine Judges, were to be
terminated solely on the basis of procedural objections of a
technical character. Such considerations undoubtedly have their
place and must be respected; however, they ought not to become a
convenient fig leaf cover behind which the Court declines to engage
with a question whose resolution has long awaited authoritative
determination. Where the occasion presents itself to settle an issue
Page 66 of 154

of recurring importance and bring certainty to the law, institutional
prudence may sometimes favour a decision on the merits rather
than a retreat into procedural abstention.
139. It is therefore our solemn duty, especially keeping the
extraordinary passage of time in view and the considerable
expenditure of judicial effort across successive Benches, not to
retract from our institutional responsibility that accompanies the
exercise of our constitutional jurisdiction.
140. We now proceed to examine the substantive questions that arise
for consideration and to set out, in a structured and systematic
manner, our views and conclusions thereon.
D. C ONTENTIONS OF THE P ARTIES
141. Prior to entering into the substantive merits of the controversy, it
would be apposite to first delineate the principal submissions
advanced by the parties.
D.1. Contentions on behalf of the Appellants
142. We have heard Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned Advocate General
for India, Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General of
India, Mr. Shadan Farasat and Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, learned
Additional Advocates General, and Mr. Shekhar Naphade and Mr.
Sanjay Hegde, learned Senior Counsel appeared on behalf of the
Page 67 of 154

Union of India, and the various States and other entities. Mr.
Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, and Mr. Saket Sikri, Mr.
Anand Verma, and Mr. Krishna Kumar, learned Counsel,
represented the other Appellants and Intervenors supporting the
Appellants. Mr. Alok Sangwan, learned Senior Additional Advocate
General appeared for the State of Haryana. The principal
submissions canvassed by them before this Court are as follows:
a. There is a pressing need to reinterpret Section 2(j), since it
must draw its meaning from modern Constitutional realities
and India’s position as a welfare state. In this sense, the ID Act
must be interpreted by balancing the interests of the employee
and the employer, without permitting either side to dominate
the other;
b. This Court in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) has kept in
sight the objectives of worker protection to interpret Section
2(j). It would not be proper to base the interpretation on such
considerations de hors the textual contents of the provision.
Furthermore, Bangalore Water Supply (supra) went beyond
filling the legislative gaps, amounting to judicial rewriting of
the provisions. Hence, the interpretation in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) warrants reconsideration;
Page 68 of 154


c. The key factor that ought to govern what is included in
‘industry’ is whether the activity, at its core, involves
commercial objectives, in line with trade and business.
Reliance in this regard has been placed on Safdarjung
Hospital (supra) to submit that the entity must have a
commercial or an analogous objective, notwithstanding the
existence of a profit motive. Applying the principle of noscitur
a sociis , it was urged that the intention of the Legislature was
not to include all activities, but only those collectively falling
within the import of “business, trade, undertaking,
manufacture or calling of employers”;
d. The scope of the Triple Test established in Krishna Iyer, J.’s
erudite opinion in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) is very
expansive, having the potential to include various essentially
non-industrial activities like charity, public research, and
government welfare activities. The breadth of the Triple Test is
required to be restricted, keeping in mind the over-inclusion.
Alternatively, exceptions must be introduced to address the
issues raised in the application of Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) in the facts of particular cases;
e. The understanding of ‘sovereign functions’ as made out in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) is based on foreign
Page 69 of 154

jurisprudence and does not properly reflect the duty-bound
role played by the State under the Constitution of India.
Activities like forestry, irrigation, education, etc., which are
undertaken in light of Part IV of the Constitution or as a
statutory duty, do not involve any commercial or commerce-
like objectives and ought not to be included within the
definition of ‘industry’. This is especially so because of the
growing welfare legislation and regulatory activities, which are
not intended to be included within the scope of ‘industry’;
f. In the context of Universities, the functions performed by such
institutions are to confer degrees and diplomas. It is,
essentially, a function emanating from the State’s role,
involving a regulatory scheme through the University Grants
Commission. The undertaking of teaching is also an
intellectual and enlightening exercise, not comparable to
material services. Thus, the engagement of a University in
enabling education and conferring degrees inherently indicates
the functions performed by a State, not a commercial activity
commensurate to be included within ‘industry’; and

g. With reference to temples and private charitable institutions,
the law laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) would
also include temples and charitable organisations within
Page 70 of 154

‘industry’ only because of ‘systematic activity involving an
employer and employee cooperation’, without taking into
account the inherent dissonance between the spiritual and
philanthropic nature of the establishment and the commercial
underpinnings of the ID Act. The test gives no impetus to the
predominant nature of the activities undertaken and only
pertains to the relationship between the workmen and the
employer
.
D.2. Contentions on behalf of the Respondents
143. Per contra , Ms. Indira Jaising, Mr. Bharat Sangal, Mr. C.U. Singh,
Mr. Vijay Hansaria, Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Mr. PV
Surendranath, Ms. Jayana Kothari, Mr. K.S. Chauhan, learned
Senior Counsel, and Mr. Ashok Kumar, Mr. Shivam Singh, Ms.
Sangeeta Bharti, and Ms. Nidhi, learned Counsel, represented the
Respondent-workmen and the Intervenors supporting the
Respondents. In a nutshell, they opposed the reference and argued
that the majority opinion in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) is
good law:
a. The decision in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was
rendered by a bench of seven Judges. It is irrelevant whether
the bench was unanimous or split in its views. The view of the
Page 71 of 154

majority shall carry the weight of the entire bench and has to
be treated as a decision of Seven Judges.
b. It must be kept in mind that the Five Judge bench, vide Jai
Bir Singh (II) (supra) , has only questioned the formulation of
the interpretative test for ‘industry’, not the principles
underlying Bangalore Water Supply (supra) .
c. The ID Act is inherently a beneficial legislation. This Court in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) rightly applied the usual
principles of statutory interpretation which would be used for
a beneficial legislation.
d. By adopting an expansive and inclusive approach to
interpreting the expression of ‘industry’, the Seven-Judge
Bench has ensured that benefits available to workmen under
the ID Act, such as job security and remedy of reinstatement,
are available to all workmen. If the definition of ‘industry’ is
narrowed or the exceptions to it are expanded, many workmen
therein would be deprived of a welfare legislation, the
protection of which the Civil Court would not be able to extend
to them.

e. The core determinative factor to identify an ‘industry’ is the
character of the activity. The nature of the entity carrying out
Page 72 of 154

such activity or the motive behind the same is irrelevant. This
is well discernible from Chandrachud, J.’s ( as he then was )
separate concurring opinion in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) .
f. The words in Section 2(j) cannot be understood through their
‘common sense’ meaning. It is a settled principle of statutory
interpretation that words must be treated as deliberate and
technical so as to derive character from the preceding and
succeeding expressions. The definition of ‘industry’ will thus
draw its colour from the other provisions of the ID Act.
g. As long as the functions carried out by the workmen are
similar and are performed in a similarly structured
environment, there is no rhyme or reason to discriminate
among workmen on the basis that the enterprise is charitable,
governmental, or religious rather than commercial. Similarly,
if the decision in Safdarjung Hospital (supra) is to be
accepted, the statutory protection envisaged under the ID Act
for not only the workers but also the employers and the
common public, would only be available in private hospitals,
not government or charitable healthcare institutions. While
welfare activities, especially those which draw inspiration from
Part IV of our Constitution, are aimed at protecting and
Page 73 of 154

uplifting weaker sections of society, they cannot be allowed to
lead to the deprivation of employment rights of another section
of society.
h. There cannot be an absolute bar on governmental activities
from being included within ‘industry’. The ID Act expressly
recognises ‘public utility services’ under Section 2(n).
i. Since the policy of liberalisation, privatisation, and
globalisation has been effected in 1991, many spheres which
were earlier restricted to government entities have now been
opened to the private sector. In such circumstances, the
government cannot claim that these activities, irrespective of
whether performed by a private entity or the government, fall
beyond the realm of ‘industry’.
j. While certain activities performed by the government bear the
hallmarks of a sovereign function, such other activities which
do not pertain to the sovereign function must be severed from
such function and still ensure the benefit of the ID Act to the
workmen. In the context of the Sovereign Mint, for example, a
workman not concerned with minting of coins need not be
excluded from the protections under the ID Act and the test of
dominant nature ought to be applied in such cases.
Page 74 of 154

D.3. Contentions on behalf of the Amicus Curiae
144. Mr. Jamshed P. Cama and Mr. Parthasarathi Sengupta, Senior
Advocates, were requested to assist this Court as Amici Curiae .
They graciously agreed and enlightened us exponentially, although
their positions on the issues at hand differed substantially.
145. Mr. Cama’s submissions focussed on the textual framework of
Section 2(j) and submitted that the identification of an ‘industry’
can only be from the nature and motive behind the activities
undertaken. He urged that:
a. The Triple Test, as laid down in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) , is expansive because of its focus on the employer-
employee relationship, without any attention towards the
nature of activity being undertaken. It does not take into
account the actual text of the provision and is guided by the
purported intention of the ID Act.

b. The import of the word ‘undertaking’ has to be derived from
the context of “ business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or
calling of employers .” Anything can be an undertaking, but
only the undertakings having some commercial underpinnings
would amount to ‘industry’.
Page 75 of 154


c. An industry would, as such, necessarily involve some
semblance of commercial activity. Mere charitable distribution
of goods and services or operation of a club for its members
would not amount to an industry. The majority opinion in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , would permit such
undertakings to be included within ‘industry’, solely based on
the employment of workmen to facilitate a non-industrial
activity. The existence of an employee-employer relationship
has no bearing on whether the activity amounts to an industry
or not.
d. In this context, the interpretation of Section 2(j) must involve
an appraisal of the character and intention behind the activity
involved, especially in the context of fully altruistic charities
and government welfare activities. An intention of revenue
and/or profit must belie an industrial activity.

e. Once the nature of activity is considered, the character of the
employer becomes irrelevant. The government can also be
running an industry, but not all government undertakings will
have industrial features.

146. Mr. Sengupta, on the other hand, called attention towards the
perspective of the worker to make out a case that the motive behind
Page 76 of 154

the activity should not be the determinative factor and vehemently
submitted that:
a. The ID Act as a whole consistently recognises that the
government can and does operate industries.
b. The coverage under the ID Act is not replaceable by granting
remedies before other fora. The Industrial Tribunals and
Labour Courts are sui generis Authorities and their powers in
respect of employers as well as workmen cannot be available
to any coordinate authority.
c. The intention of the ID Act being to promote industrial
harmony and workman upliftment, the interpretation of
Section 2(j) thereof must be guided by these principles.
d. The core identification factor for an industry is the economic
relationship between the employee and the employer. So long
as such relationship exists, there is no change in the labour
expended by the employee, irrespective of whether the
employer was motivated by generosity/philanthropy or by
commercial gain. There would, thus, be no reason for
distinguishing the coverage by the ID Act on the basis of
underlying intention behind the activity.
Page 77 of 154


e. The decision in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was
rendered by a Bench of Seven Judges. It is irrelevant whether
the bench was unanimous or split in its views. The view of the
majority shall carry the weight of the entire bench and has to
be treated as a decision of Seven Judges.
E. I SSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
147. This Court, by its order dated 16.02.2026, crystallised the
controversy by formulating four questions for consideration, with a
view to securing a final and authoritative resolution of the issues
arising in the present reference ( see paragraph 82 where these
questions have been reproduced ).
148. Upon a perusal of the questions so framed, it appears to us that
the principal analysis on the merits may proceed by addressing
Issue Nos. 1, 3, and 4 conjointly. These questions, though
differently worded, substantially converge upon the broader inquiry
concerning the meaning and scope of the term ‘industry’ under
Section 2(j) of the ID Act, and the nature of the activities and
entities that may legitimately fall within its ambit.
149. Issue No. 2, on the other hand, stands on a somewhat distinct
footing and may appropriately be dealt with separately at a later
stage. This is because both the Industrial Disputes (Amendment)
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Act, 1982 and the IR Code, 2020, represent subsequent legislative
developments, the relevance and effect of which necessarily depend
upon the conclusions reached on the antecedent questions relating
to the interpretation of Section 2(j). Their consideration would,
therefore, be more appropriately undertaken after the foundational
questions arising under Issue Nos. 1, 3, and 4 have been
addressed.
F. A T THE H EART OF THE M ATTER : W HAT C ONSTITUTES AN ‘I NDUSTRY ’?
150. As we embark on an analysis of the merits, it would be apposite
to set out the statutory provision that lies at the nucleus of the
present controversy and has, over the decades, generated such
sustained judicial debate. Section 2(j) defines ‘industry’ to mean
‘ any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling or
employers and includes any calling, service, employment,
handicraft, or industrial occupation of avocation of
workmen ’.
151. What becomes perceptibly obvious from the above definition is
that the ID Act does not leave the term ‘industry’ rigid or undefined.
On the contrary, it is an inclusive clause enshrined within Section
2(j) that furnishes an express catalogue of activities, each of which
constitutes an ‘industry’. The difficulty, therefore, has never lain in
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the absence of a definition; rather it is in determining the true scope
and reach of the one that the Legislature intended to enact.
152. The controversy arises when one is confronted with the task of
discerning which activities or nature thereof fall within the embrace
of the definition and which stand beyond its limits. The language
employed in Section 2(j) is cast in terms of considerable breadth,
lending itself to competing interpretive possibilities. The central
inquiry, therefore, is not whether ‘industry’ has been defined, but
how that definition is to be understood and applied. Is it to receive
a broad and expansive construction, or a more confined and
restrictive one? Is the statutory scheme to be understood as
implicitly requiring identifiable categories of inclusion and
exclusion? Is the focus to be upon the organisation as an integrated
whole, or upon its constituent units viewed in isolation? These are
the questions that have persistently engaged judicial attention and
have shaped the evolution of the jurisprudence on Section 2(j).
153. All the questions subsumed within Issue Nos. 1, 3, and 4 are, in
essence, ancillary to the central task of ascertaining the true
meaning, scope, and import of the definition of ‘industry’ under
Section 2(j). They represent different facets of the same overarching
inquiry and ultimately converge upon the interpretive exercise that
lies at the heart of the present reference. This necessarily entails
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an examination of the construction adopted in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) , the question whether social welfare and public-
oriented organisations fall within the ambit of the definition, and
the extent to which the ‘sovereign functions’ exception operates to
exclude certain entities or activities from its reach. Each of these
issues is not an end in itself, but rather a constituent element in
the broader endeavour of determining what the term ‘industry’ was
intended to encompass.
154. Our analysis shall, therefore, proceed along four broad and
interconnected lines of inquiry. First , we shall examine the true
meaning and import of the language employed in Section 2(j),
viewed in the context of the ID Act as an integrated statutory
scheme. Second , we shall undertake a close examination of the
ratio laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , with
particular emphasis on the formulation and underlying rationale of
the Triple Test. Third , we shall consider the practical and
jurisprudential consequences that have flowed from the application
of the Triple Test over the years. Fourth , on the basis of the
foregoing analysis, we shall determine whether there ought to be a
change in the manner in which Section 2(j) is construed and
applied.

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F.1. The meaning of ‘Industry’ as encapsulated in the ID Act
155. It may be seen from the definition of ‘industry’ in Section 2(j) that
the term means:
a. Any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of
employers;
b. And it includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft or
industrial occupation;
c. Or avocation of workmen.
156. The inclusion of the term ‘includes’ further characterises the
definition as exhaustive; therefore, an activity, regardless of its not
being explicitly listed within the definition, but it otherwise satisfies
the criteria of an industrial activity, shall also be considered as
industry.
157. Further, the provision appears to define a seemingly
straightforward concept. However, upon closer examination, it
becomes apparent that the definition is itself constructed through
a constellation of broad and inherently elastic expressions, many
of which are capable of admitting multiple shades of meaning and
consequently invite further interpretive inquiry.
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158. Expressions such as “business,” “trade,” “undertaking,” “calling,”
“service,” “employment,” and “industrial occupation” are not terms
of narrow or technical import. Read literally, and in isolation, they
are capable of encompassing an extraordinarily wide spectrum of
human activity. Be that as it may, a proper understanding of the
definition necessarily requires a closer examination of the content
and connotation of these constituent expressions.
159. Indeed, the terms are not mere surplusage. Each appears to have
been deliberately chosen to capture a distinct facet of organised
human endeavour, and it is through their collective interplay,
rather than through any one expression in isolation, that the true
legislative conception of ‘industry’ emerges. An inquiry into their
meaning is, therefore, not an exercise in semantics alone, but an
indispensable step in understanding the expanse, limits, and
underlying purpose of Section 2(j). Accordingly, we have taken the
opportunity to individually delineate the meaning of each of these
terms as follows:
a. The expression ‘business’, though not defined in the ID Act, is
one of considerable breadth. Its expansive character is evident
from the definition contained in Section 2(13) of the Income-
tax Act, 1961, which defines it to mean “ any trade, commerce
or manufacture, or any adventure or concern in the nature of
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trade, commerce or manufacture. ” This broad character is
further evidenced by the manner in which its meaning has
been expounded in the Oxford English Dictionary, wherein the
term business means: ( i ) a person’s regular occupation; ( ii )
commercial activity; ( iii ) a commercial organization; ( iv ) work
to be done or matters to be attended to; and ( v ) a person’s
concern.
b. The term trade, similarly, is a fairly wide term with a capacious
connotation and has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as
“ the act or business of exchanging commodities by barter; or the
business of buying and selling for money; traffic; barter. ” Trade,
too, has been broadly interpreted to refer to any organised,
continuous activity of either buying, selling or exchanging
goods and services with a profit motive in mind and
encompasses a spectrum of commercial endeavours.

c. Next, the word ‘undertaking’ has been mentioned in multiple
Statutes including Section 2(35) of the Income Tax Act, 2025,
where it has been defined as “ any part of an undertaking, or a
unit or division of an undertaking or a business activity taken
as a whole, but does not include individual assets or liabilities
or any combination thereof not constituting a business activity”.
It has further been clarified by this Court to mean “ a going
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concern with all its rights, liabilities and assets as distinct from
the various rights and assets which compose it… is an amalgam
of all ingredients of property and are not capable of being
dismembered. That would destroy the essence and innate
character of the undertaking. In reality, the undertaking is a
complete and complex weft and the various types of business
and assets are threads which cannot be taken apart from the
35
weft.”
d. The expressions ‘manufacture’, ‘calling of employers’, and
‘calling’ are likewise couched in broad and open-textured
language. While ‘manufacture’ is generally understood to refer
to the process of producing, making, or transforming goods
into a commercially recognisable form, the remaining
expressions are far less precise and are capable of embracing
a diverse range of activities. The term ‘calling’ ordinarily
denotes an occupation, vocation, pursuit, or line of endeavour
to which a person devotes their labour, skill, or attention.
Similarly, the expression ‘calling of employers’ is not confined
to any particular category of enterprise and may extend to a
wide spectrum of undertakings, professions, occupations, and
organised activities pursued by employers.

35
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564.
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e. The phrases ‘service’, ‘employment’, ‘handicraft’, and
‘industrial occupation’ are, likewise, terms of broad import,
each capable of encompassing a wide range of human activity.
None of these formulations is inherently self-limiting, nor do
they possess a singular or narrowly confined meaning. ‘Service’
is perhaps among the most expansive of these terms,
potentially extending to any organised activity undertaken for
the benefit of another. ‘Employment’ is equally broad, denoting
the engagement of labour or skill in the performance of a task,
occupation, or vocation. ‘Handicraft’ traditionally refers to
activities involving manual skill or craftsmanship, while
‘industrial occupation’ is capable of embracing a diverse
spectrum of occupations connected with productive or
organised economic activity. Viewed either individually or
collectively, these expressions are sufficiently capacious to
encompass an extensive variety of undertakings.
f. The diction ‘industrial occupation’, as its very wording
suggests, appears at first glance to be largely self-explanatory.
It ordinarily connotes an occupation, vocation, or line of work
connected with an industrial activity or undertaking. Yet the
term does little to dispel the ambiguity that surrounds the
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definition as a whole. Rather, it risks reintroducing the very
question that it seeks to answer.
g. Finally, one arrives at the expression ‘avocation of workmen’.
The term ‘avocation’, in its ordinary and colloquial sense, is
capable of referring to an occupation, pursuit, or activity to
which an individual devotes time and effort. Since the term
‘workman’ has been defined in Section 2(s) of the ID Act itself,
there is little need to resort to external aids of interpretation.
The said term provides that a workman “ means any person
(including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any
manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or
supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of
employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any
proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute,
includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged
or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that
dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led
to that dispute, but does not include any such person—
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the
Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957);
or
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(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other
employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative
capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws
wages exceeding 3 [ten thousand rupees] per mensem or
exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office
or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a
managerial nature. ”
160. The foregoing examination of the constituent expressions
employed in Section 2(j) read with Section 2(s) does little to resolve
the interpretive dilemma before us. If anything, it serves to reinforce
the conclusion that the statutory definition is cast in language of
exceptional width and that the individual terms comprising it are
themselves marked by a considerable degree of elasticity. Their
dissection aids in understanding the textual components of the
provision, but offers limited guidance in identifying the principled
boundaries of what the Legislature intended the term ‘industry’ to
encompass.

161. The exercise further reveals that the definition, viewed in isolation,
is incapable of administering a complete answer to the question(s)
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before us. The dimensions of the language employed are such that
the provision does not, by itself, provide a clear mechanism for
distinguishing activities that fall within its ambit from those that
lie beyond it.
162. Viewed in this manner, the definition seemingly possesses an
almost boundless amplitude, which is capable of bringing within
its fold nearly every organised human activity. If one were to adopt
a purely literal construction and focus solely on the words
employed in Section 2(j), it may plausibly be argued that entities
ranging from a solitary street vendor selling fruits and vegetables
to sprawling multinational corporations would all fall within the
compass of an ‘industry’.
163. Yet, such a construction would carry the provision far beyond the
realm of plausibility. Statutory interpretation does not proceed on
the assumption that Parliament legislates in terms so sweeping as
to obliterate all meaningful distinctions between vastly different
forms of economic and social activities. If a definition is construed
with such extraordinary elasticity, on its literal interpretation, it
would risk rendering the concept of ‘industry’ virtually limitless
and, in the process, depriving the provision of any coherent
boundaries. It is difficult to conceive that the legislative intent was
to cast the net so wide as to encompass every conceivable organised
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activity without regard to its nature, purpose, or context. The
definition undoubtedly does not intend to create unmanageable
situations.
164. It is in this context that it becomes necessary to turn to the
construction adopted by this Court in various decisions, including
in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) . An examination of those
formulations and the rationale supplanting them is therefore the
logical next step in our analysis.
F.2. The judicial interpretation accorded to ‘Industry’
165. Of course, this exercise of closely examining the expressions
employed in Section 2(j) and culling out their contextual meaning
was undertaken with considerable depth and rigour in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) . The interpretation accorded to the term
‘industry’ under Section 2(j) by the Seven-Judge Bench in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) has already been examined in
considerable detail in the segment titled “ Bangalore Water Supply
(supra): A Truly Watershed Moment .” That being so, it is equally
important to appreciate the considerations that informed the
Court’s reasoning, which ultimately led to the formulation of the
ratio and the Triple Test.
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166. To properly understand the decision in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) , one must begin with the factual controversy that
confronted the Bench. The principal question was not an abstract
inquiry into the meaning of the term ‘industry’, but whether a
statutory body engaged in providing essential public amenities and
discharging functions traditionally associated with governmental
responsibility could nevertheless fall within the ambit of Section
2(j). More specifically, the Court was required to determine whether
such activities, notwithstanding their public character and their
connection with the discharge of civic obligations, were to be
regarded as lying outside the definition on the footing that they
partook of a governmental or regal character.
167. Indeed, the judgment opens with the concurring opinion of Beg,
C.J., who embarked upon much the same exercise that presently
confronts us, namely, an examination of the language employed in
Section 2(j) and an inquiry into whether the assortment of
expressions comprising the definition could, by themselves, furnish
a satisfactory understanding of what Parliament intended by the
term ‘industry’. Despite this industrious exercise, Beg, C.J.
ultimately arrived at a conclusion not dissimilar to the one that
emerges from our own examination.
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168. However, Krishna Iyer, J. dealt with it in far greater detail in his
majority opinion, wherein he has taken a ‘ panoramic view of the
statute and its jurisprudential bearings ’. In that endeavour, he
sought to examine the contextual import of expressions such as
‘trade’, ‘business’, and ‘undertaking’, not as isolated terms, but as
constituent elements of a composite statutory scheme intended to
regulate industrial relations in a welfare State.
169. In ensuring that he went beyond the mere semantics, considerable
reliance was placed upon earlier authorities, particularly the
36
decision in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee , which had, decades
earlier, laid the foundations for a broader understanding of the
term ‘industry’. Drawing upon this jurisprudential lineage, the
learned Judge proceeded on the premise that the Industrial
Disputes Act is fundamentally a piece of social welfare legislation
enacted with the object of securing industrial peace and protecting
labour. Consequently, according to this line of reasoning, any
interpretive exercise under the Act ought to remain informed by,
and aligned with, its welfare-oriented and worker-protective
character.

170. This nuanced and purposive analysis ultimately culminated in
several landmark interpretive conclusions. Among the most

36
1953 AIR 58.
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significant was the treatment of the word ‘undertaking’, which was
held not to be a term of unbounded amplitude. It was observed
that, even upon applying the principle of noscitur a sociis as a
commonsense guide to construction, the meaning of ‘undertaking’
could not be divorced from the company it keeps, namely,
expressions such as ‘business’, ‘trade’, ‘manufacture’, and ‘calling’.
171. Accordingly, ‘undertaking’ was understood as being subject to a
contextual limitation, such that it would conform to the restrictive
characteristics shared by the associated terms appearing both
before and after it in the definition of ‘industry’ under Section 2(j).
The Seven Judge Bench thus rejected an interpretation that would
permit the aforesaid term to assume an unrestricted or all-
encompassing meaning divorced from its statutory setting.
172. Equally, the Court emphasised that the ID Act, being a social
welfare legislation, ought to be construed in harmony with the
constitutional vision embodied in Part IV of the Constitution.
173. Drawing sustenance from the ratio in Banerji (supra) , the
approach adopted in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) ,
particularly in the lead decision authored by Krishna Iyer, J.,
gradually crystallised around the centrality of the employer-
employee relationship. The emphasis shifted from the intrinsic
nature of the activity undertaken by an enterprise to the
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organisational structure through which such activity was carried
on and, more particularly, to the existence of systematic
cooperation between employer and employee.
174. Proceeding on this footing, the judgment took the view that the
concept of ‘industry’ was not to be confined within the conventional
boundaries of trade or commerce as ordinarily understood. Rather,
it was conceived as a term of considerably wider import, one whose
reach extended beyond the narrow confines of commercial
enterprise. The expressions ‘trade’ and ‘business’, though forming
part of the statutory definition, were not regarded as limiting the
amplitude of the term ‘industry’, but merely as illustrative of the
broad range of activities that could fall within its ambit.
175. The consequence of this approach was that factors such as the
absence of capital investment, profit motive, or commercial gain
were held not to be determinative of the inquiry. It was reasoned
that an activity may still constitute an ‘industry’ notwithstanding
that it is undertaken on charitable or philanthropic lines, provided
that the essential indicia of organised activity and employer-
employee cooperation are present. In similar terms, educational,
vocational, and cultural institutions were held not only to bear an
intimate nexus with industrial activity but also to fall squarely
within the ambit of ‘industry’. Indeed, the majority opinion went so
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far as to proclaim that ‘ education is the nidus of industrialization
and itself is industry ’.
176. A considerable degree of reliance also appears to have been placed
upon the interpretation of the term ‘industry’ undertaken by this
Court in Nagpur Corporation (supra) and Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha (supra) , with these decisions serving to fill the interstitial
gaps left by Banerji (supra) . Both these decisions followed Banerji
(supra) in reiterating that the principle of noscitur a sociis ought
not to be applied so rigidly as to restrict or circumscribe the
magnitude of the term ‘industry’.
177. These decisions assume added significance, particularly since the
same Bench that decided Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra)
subsequently also resolved Nagpur Corporation (supra) , wherein
it grappled with the question whether ‘sovereign functions’ fall
within the ambit of Section 2(j) and sought to delineate the litmus
test for determining which governmental activities may stand
excluded from the bounds of ‘industry’.
178. In Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) , this Court was called upon
to determine whether a government-run hospital, established to
provide medical relief to the public and also discharging substantial
educational and training functions, could be brought within the
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ambit of ‘industry’. The Court then broadly defined ‘industry’
saying:
“ Thus the manner in which the activity in
question is organised or arranged, the condition
of the co-operation between employer and the
employee necessary for its success and its object
to render material service to the community can
be regarded as some of the features which are
distinctive of activities to which s. 2(j) applies. ”
[Emphasis supplied]
179. This Court thus declined to extend the exemption accorded to
‘sovereign’ or ‘regal functions’ under Section 2(j) to the myriad
welfare activities undertaken by the State in discharge of its
obligations as a welfare State. It clarified that only those functions
which are primary, inalienable, and inherently governmental in
character may properly be described as ‘sovereign’ or ‘regal
functions’ for excluding from the definition of ‘industry’. In light of
this understanding, the Court finally held that the subject hospital,
notwithstanding its welfare-oriented objective, would nonetheless
constitute an ‘industry’.
180. The contours of what constitutes an ‘industry’, as well as the
limits of the sovereign or regal functions exception, were further
refined in Nagpur Corporation (supra) , wherein a Three-Judge
Bench formulated the following broad guidelines:
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“31. The result of the discussion may be summarized
thus : (1) The definition of "industry" in the Act is very
comprehensive. It is in two parts : One part defines it
from the standpoint of the employer and the other from
the standpoint of the employee. If an activity falls under
either part of the definition, it will be an industry within
the meaning of the Act. (2) The history of Industrial
disputes and the legislation recognizes the basic
concept that the activity shall be an organized one and
not that which pertains to private or personal
employment. (3) The regal functions described as
primary and inalienable functions of State though
statutorily delegated to a corporation are necessarily
excluded from the purview of the definition. Such regal
functions shall be confined to legislative power,
administration of law and judicial power. (4) If a service
rendered by an individual or a private person would be
an industry, it would equally be an industry in the
hands of a corporation. (5) If a service rendered by a
corporation is an industry, the employees in the
departments connected with that service, whether
financial, administrative or executive, would be entitled
to the benefits of the Act. (6) If a department of a
municipality discharges many functions, some
pertaining to industry as defined in the Act and other
non-industrial activities, the predominant functions of
the department shall be the criterion for the purposes
of the Act.”
181. However, it appears that the Bench in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) , while substantially endorsing the reasoning in both these
decisions, departed from the caution sounded in Hospital
Mazdoor Sabha (supra) that some line must be drawn with
respect to the inclusion of ‘service’ within the wide sweep of
‘industry’, and that limiting principles were necessary to prevent
the definition from assuming boundless amplitude.
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182. This concern appears to have found some resolution in the
Solicitors Case (supra) , wherein this Court postulated that ‘ the
distinguishing feature of an industry is that for the
production of goods or for the rendering of service,
cooperation between capital and labour or between the
employer and his employees must be direct and must be
essential ’. Applying this test, the Court held that a liberal
profession such as that of an attorney could not have been intended
by the Legislature to be encapsulated within the definition of
‘industry’ under Section 2(j).
183. The exclusion of liberal professions from the ambit of ‘industry’
was similarly echoed in Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club
37
Employees’ Union v. Management of the Gymkhana Club ,
though the reasoning adopted therein was somewhat different. The
Court examined the definition through the prism of the employer’s
occupation, proceeding on the footing that if the employer’s activity
constituted an ‘industry’, those employed in aid thereof would
ordinarily be workmen for the purposes of the Act. This
interpretative exercise was found to be broadly consonant with the
analysis undertaken by the majority in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) , which proceeded on the premise that ‘ efficient collectivity

37
(1968) 1 SCR 742.
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is the essence of professional success’ to hold that liberal
professions cannot seek exclusion from the operation of the ID Act.
184. Having sealed the fate of liberal professions, the majority in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) turned its attention to the
status of Education and Educational Institutions under the ID Act.
As already noted, the majority opinion unequivocally went on to
hold that education could constitute an ‘industry’. This conclusion
was founded, first , on the premise that the predominant nature of
the activity is determinative and that imparting education
constitutes a service rendered to the community. Second , it was
observed that educational institutions, particularly universities,
engage in several other activities which are demonstrably industrial
in character and, though ancillary to the principal educational
enterprise, are capable of severance and independent
consideration. Consequently, the decision in University of Delhi
(supra) was held to be wrongly decided.
185. The majority thereafter examined whether Charitable Institutions
are capable of constituting an ‘industry’. In addressing this issue,
the majority adopted a tripartite classification of charitable
undertakings, delineating the circumstances in which such
institutions would, or would not, fall within the ambit of Section
2(j):
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“The first is one where the enterprise, like any other,
yields profits but they are siphoned off for altruistic
objects. The second is one where the institution makes
no profit but hires the services of employees as in other
like businesses but the goods and services, which are
the output, are made available, at low or no cost, to the
indigent needy who are priced out of the market. The
third is where the establishment is oriented on a
humane mission fulfilled by man who work, not
because they are paid wages, but because they share
the passion for the cause and derive job satisfaction
from their contribution.”
186. Having laid out this trichotomy of Charitable Institutions, the
majority opined that the determination of whether such an
institution constitutes an ‘industry’ depends broadly on two
considerations: first , whether there exists cooperation between
employers and employees in the production or supply of goods or
services; and second , the extent to which charity permeates the
quasi-business character of the activity.
187. In this regard, the first category of charitable institutions was held
to constitute an ‘industry’, since such institutions engage in the
production or supply of goods or services with an eye on profit. The
second category was likewise held to be within the scope of
‘industry’, the Court observing that the charitable object of the
enterprise makes little difference to a workman who contributes
labour in return for wages in much the same manner as in a
commercial undertaking. It was only the third category that was
held to stand exempt from the aegis of ‘industry’, there being no
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real economic relationship or employer-employee nexus, thereby
placing such institutions outside the ambit of Section 2(j).
188. A similar exercise was undertaken to ascertain the status of
‘Research Institutions’ and whether research activity involves the
requisite cooperation between employer and employee. The
majority answered the question in the affirmative, proceeding on
the footing that the institution itself constitutes the employer, while
scientists, para-scientists, and other personnel function as
employees. Their discoveries and research, it was observed, are
capable of being translated into intangible goods and valuable
services for which there exists a market, particularly in the case of
technological inventions and innovations that may be patented and
commercially exploited. Accordingly, it was concluded that
research institutions, notwithstanding the absence of a profit
motive, are capable of constituting an ‘industry’.

189. Next was the question of whether ‘Clubs’ are industries. At this
juncture, the majority once again reiterated its principle that any
area where a dichotomy between employer and workmen could
exist would be an industry and thus, clubs also would be no
exception to this rule. The only exception that could however be
carved out would be in the case of dominantly self serving clubs,
wherein the central thrust of the club itself has a dominant self
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service mechanism, with only a modicum of employees at the
periphery. Resultantly, the decisions in Madras Gymkhana Club
(supra) and Cricket Club of India (supra) were held to be wrongly
decided.
190. The same reasoning was extended to ‘Cooperative Societies’. The
Court observed that where the activity partakes of the nature of
trade and is carried on through employer-employee cooperation,
such societies would constitute an ‘industry’. Since member-
workers are generally paid wages and may raise disputes
concerning service conditions against the society, the latter
assumes the position of employer and the workers occupy the
position of employees, thereby attracting Section 2(j).
191. Having examined each of these categories in turn, the Court
ultimately distilled its reasoning into the formulation of the Triple
Test:
“I. ’Industry’, as defined in Sec, 2 (j) and explained by
Banerji, has a wide import.
(a) Where (i) systematic activity, (ii) organized by
cooperation between employer and employee, (the
direct and substantial element is chimerical) (iii) for the
production and/or distribution of goods and services
calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not
spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or
services geared to, celestial bliss e.g. making, on a
large scale, prasad or food), prima facie, there is an
’industry’ in that enterprise.
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(b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is
irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint private or
other sector.
(c) The true focus is functional and the decisive test is
the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the
employer-employee relations.
(d) If the Organisation is a trade or business, it does not
cease to, be one because of philanthropy animating the
undertaking.
II. Although sec. 2(j) uses, words of the widest
amplitude in its two limbs, their meaning cannot be
magnified to overreach itself.
(a) ’Undertaking’ must suffer a contextual and
associational shrinkage as explained in Banerji and in
this judgment, so also, service, calling and the like. This
yields the inference that all organized activity
possessing the triple elements in I (supra), although not
trade or business, may still be ’industry’ (provided the
nature of the activity, viz. the employer-employee basis,
bears resemblance to what we find in trade or
business. This takes into the- fold of ’industry’
undertakings, callings and services adventure
’analogous to the carrying on of trade or business’. All
features, other than the methodology of carrying on the
activity viz. in organizing the co-operation between
employer and employee may be dissimilar. It does not
matter, if off the employment terms there is analogy.
III. Application of these guidelines should not stop short
of their logical reach by invocation of creeds, cults or
inner sense of incongruity or other sense of motivation
for or resultant of the economic operations. The ideology
of the Act being industrial peace, regulation and
resolution of industrial disputes between employer and
workmen, the range of this statutory ideology must
inform the reach of the statutory definition. Nothing
less, nothing more.
(a) The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) Clubs (iii)
educational institutions (iiia) co-operatives, (iv) research
institutes (v) charitable projects and (vi) other kindred
adventures, if they fulfil the triple tests listed in I
(supra), cannot be exempted from the scope of sec. 2 (j).
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(b) A restricted category of professions, clubs,
cooperatives and even Gurukuls and little research
labs, may qualify for exemption if 283 in simple
ventures substantially and going by the dominant
nature criterion substantively, in single simple
ventures, no employees are entertained but in minimal
matters, marginal employees are hired without
destroying the nonemployee character of the unit.
(c) If in a pious or altruistic mission many employ
themselves, free or for small honoraria, or likely return
mainly by sharing in the purpose or cause, such as
lawyers volunteering to run a free legal services clinic
or doctors serving in their spare hours in a free medical
centre or ashramites working at the bidding of the
holiness, divinity or like central personality and the
services are supplied free or at nominal cost and those
who serve are not engaged for remuneration or on the
basis of master and servant, relationship, then, the
institution is not an industry even if stray servants,
manual or technical, are hired. Such eleemosynary or
like undertakings alone are exempt-not other
generosity, compassion, developmental passion or
project.

IV The dominant nature test :
(a) where a complex of activities, some of which qualify
for exemption others not, involves employees on the
total undertaking, some of whom are not ’workmen’ as
in the University of Delhi Case or some departments are
not productive of goods and services if isolated, even
then, the predominant nature of the services and the
integrated nature of the departments as explained in
the Corporation of Nagpur, will be true test. The whole,
undertaking will be ’industry’ although those who are
not ’workmen’ by definition may not benefit by the
status.
(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign
functions, strictly understood, alone qualify for
exemption, not the welfare activities or economic
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adventures undertaken by government or statutory
bodies.
(c) Even in departments discharging sovereign
functions, if there are units which are industries and
they are Substantially severable, then they can be
considered to come within sec. 2(j).
(d) Constitutional and competently enacted legislative
provisions may well remove from the scope of the Act
categories which otherwise may be covered thereby.”
192. Consequently, the decisions in Safdarjung Hospital (supra) ,
Solicitors’ Case (supra) , Madras Gymkhana Club (supra) , Delhi
University (supra) , and other cognate rulings came to be
overruled, while the principles enunciated in Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha (supra) were substantially restored and reaffirmed.
193. As already noticed, while Beg, C.J. concurred with the majority
opinion, Chandrachud, J. ( as he then was ) penned a separate
concurring opinion that largely echoed the reasoning of the
majority. The learned Judge was, however, emphatic in observing
that considerations of motive have no bearing on the determination
of whether an undertaking constitutes an ‘industry’, a proposition
that applies with equal force to factors such as profit motive, capital
investment, or pecuniary gain.
194. However, Jaswant Singh, J., writing on behalf of himself and
Tulzapurkar, J., parted ways with the majority on both its
reasoning and its treatment of the principle of noscitur a sociis . In
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their view, discarding that principle had led to an interpretation of
‘industry’ of excessive range, bringing within its fold charitable
institutions, schools, universities, and research laboratories. The
learned Judges instead advocated a more restrictive construction,
observing that the definition ought to be confined to activities
“ systematically or habitually undertaken on commercial lines
by private entrepreneurs with the cooperation of employees
for the production or distribution of goods or for the rendering
of material services to the community at large or a section
thereof . ”
195. Be that as it may, there can be no gainsaying that Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) , has held the field for more than four
decades, despite its correctness having come under the clouds
hardly within twenty years of its pronouncement. No doubt, the
judgment is the product of a painstaking and deeply deliberative
exercise, where every word and provision was dissected and
interpreted in an attempt to ascertain the true meaning of ‘industry’
under Section 2(j). The result was a seminal decision which has
come to occupy a distinguished place in our industrial
jurisprudence, authored by some of the most eminent jurists to
have adorned this Court, whose scholarship and mastery of the law
are reflected throughout its pages.
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196. We may, however, with utmost respect and considerable
reluctance, hasten to add that Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
has survived in its entirety not merely because it represents a
visionary judicial approach, but also because of institutional
realities. Its status as a decision rendered by a Bench of Seven
learned Judges undoubtedly accorded it formidable precedential
force. Equally, although the correctness of the decision stood
referred to a Nine-Judge Bench, that reference remained unheard
for decades. Whether by reason of institutional priorities,
administrative exigencies, or other circumstances, the
consequence was that the opportunity for authoritative
reconsideration never materialised until the present proceedings.
197. Over time, however, as circumstances evolved and the currents of
industrial jurisprudence continued to shift, a degree of excoriation
began to emerge in relation to the construction of the Triple Test,
the ratio laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , and, more
generally, the expansive sweep accorded to the definition of
‘industry’ coupled with the narrow channel of exceptions carved out
therefrom. What had once proclaimed itself to be a settled course
increasingly came to be questioned as the river of the law flowed
into newer terrains and even newer landscapes.

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F.3. The Ripple Effects of Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
198. The decades following Bangalore Water Supply (supra) have
witnessed profound changes in India’s economic and regulatory
landscape. The era of liberalisation, privatisation, and globalisation
has fundamentally altered the manner in which enterprises are
structured, managed, and operated. The distinction between public
and private economic activity has become increasingly nuanced,
while the organisational forms through which services are delivered
have grown considerably more complex.
199. The role of the State in the economy, too, has undergone a marked
transformation. Activities once predominantly undertaken by the
State and its instrumentalities have, in several sectors, been
transferred to private participation through disinvestment and
privatisation. At the same time, the State has increasingly confined
itself to functions that are constitutional, regulatory, and
governance-oriented in character. In this changed economic milieu,
often dictated by the operation of market forces and private
enterprise, the assumptions that informed industrial relations
jurisprudence in the decades immediately following Independence
and during the period in which Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
was decided can in no circumstances align seamlessly with
synchronic realities.
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200. In contemporary India, virtually every organised activity,
irrespective of its scale or objective, possesses some degree of
institutional structure. Whether it be a small family-run enterprise,
a large commercial undertaking, a charitable organisation, a
shelter for the destitute, or a community-based welfare institution,
the realities of modern governance, regulation, and compliance
require varying levels of organisation, record-keeping, and
administrative management. If the Triple Test is applied in its
broadest possible form, the consequence may well be that an
extraordinarily wide range of activities become susceptible to
classification as an ‘industry’.
201. It is difficult to accept that Parliament intended such an all-
encompassing result. The breadth of the interpretation risks
drawing within the fold of Section 2(j) not just large commercial
enterprises, but also modest undertakings, social initiatives,
charitable institutions, and small-scale economic activities that
operate with limited resources and personnel. While such an
approach undoubtedly advances the protective objectives of labour
welfare legislation, the inquiry cannot be one-sided. The law must
remain cognisant of the realities of a modern and enterprising
economy, in which countless individuals seek to establish small
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businesses, social enterprises, charitable ventures, and community
institutions.
202. The concern, therefore, is not whether workers ought to be
protected, for they must always be protected, but whether the
existing formulation of the Triple Test has expanded to a point
where it risks encompassing activities that Parliament never
intended to characterise as ‘industry’. If every organised endeavour
involving a modicum of employer-employee cooperation is brought
within Section 2(j), difficult questions inevitably arise as to where
the line is to be drawn. For example, we could scarcely describe the
proprietor of a neighbourhood kiosk as an industrialist, just as we
could not characterise the heads of large manufacturing
enterprises and commercial conglomerates as mere shopkeepers.
To do so would ignore the obvious distinction in both scale and
character of the activities undertaken.

203. It is therefore imperative to reconsider whether the Triple Test, in
its present form, requires a more carefully calibrated application so
as to preserve the balance between labour welfare and the
legitimate functioning of small enterprises, charitable institutions,
and community-oriented activities.

Page 110 of 154

F.4. Manner in which the term ‘industry’ under Section 2(j) ought
to be interpreted
204. We are conscious of the fact that the above illustrated
considerations by themselves can hardly furnish a sufficient basis
to doubt the correctness of a decision rendered by a Seven-Judge
Bench of this Court. The stature of the precedent demands a far
more exacting inquiry. However, having been constituted as a
Bench of larger strength to examine its continued correctness, it is
our earnest duty to scrutinise the legal foundations upon which the
decision rests and to ascertain whether its reasoning continues to
withstand scrutiny.
205. The majority opinion in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) itself
opens with the observation that “ the rather zigzag course of the
landmark cases and the tangled web of judicial thought have
perplexed one branch of Industrial Law, resulting from the
obfuscation of the basic concept of ‘industry’ under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. ” On this much, there can be little
disagreement. The question of what constitutes an ‘industry’,
despite its apparent simplicity, has engaged and divided judicial
opinion for decades.
206. It may well have been expected that Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) , rendered after an exhaustive consideration of the law,
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would bring a measure of finality and be the silver bullet to this
long-standing controversy. Yet the very fact that a series of doubts
have repeatedly resurfaced for the last thirty years as to the
amplitude and application of the principles laid down therein,
sufficiently demonstrates that the debate was not laid entirely to
rest and any such proclamation is a mere overestimation.
F.4.1. The Noscitur a Sociis Principle
207. A substantial part of the majority opinion rested upon its
interpretation of the definition contained in Section 2(j). In the
process, it formulated the Triple Test, a framework that is arguably
more elaborate and comprehensive than the statutory definition
itself, while consciously declining to apply the principle of
noscitur
a sociis as an aid to interpretation.
208. Before we advert to the correctness of that view, it is necessary to
briefly examine the principle of Noscitur a Sociis . To begin with,
every word has two meanings: ( i ) Denotation - the literal or actual
meaning of the word, and ( ii ) Connotation - the contextual meaning
derived from the word's association with surrounding words. The
principle of Noscitur a Sociis uses both these meanings to interpret
statutory language. It is a secondary rule of statutory
interpretation. The Latin expression derives from ‘ noscitur ’ (to
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know), ‘ a ’ (with), and ‘ sociis ’ (associates), meaning ‘it is known by
its associates!’
209. The rule of construction Noscitur a Sociis means “ the meaning of a
word is to be judged by the company it keeps. ” It is a legitimate rule
of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with
reference to words found in immediate connection with them.
210. It must be borne in mind that Noscitur a Sociis is merely a rule of
construction and cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that wider
words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of
the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only when the
intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words
of narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear, that the
present rule of construction can be usefully applied.
211. In Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) , the principle of Noscitur a
Sociis was explained in the following terms: “ when two or more
words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are
coupled together, they are understood to be used in their
cognate sense. They take their colour from each other, that
is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a
less general. ( sic ) ”
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212. A further reference was made to Words and Phrases (Vol. XIV,
P.207), which defined the expression in the following terms:
“Associated words take their meaning from one
another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the
philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful
word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning
of words associated with it; such doctrine is broader
than the maxim Ejusdem Generis.”
213. This Court in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) placed reliance
on the English case of Glasgow v. Glasgow Tramway and
38
Omnibus Co. Ltd. , to emphasise that Noscitur a Sociis is merely
a rule of construction and cannot prevail where it is evident that
the Legislature has deliberately employed words of wide import in
order to correspondingly broaden the scope of the expression being
defined. The rule, as explained in Glasgow (supra) , is attracted
only where the legislative intention behind the use of wider words
alongside words of narrower significance becomes doubtful or is
otherwise unclear. Similarly, it may be invoked where the meaning
of the broader expression itself admits of uncertainty. Where,
however, the legislative purpose underlying the use of words of wide
amplitude is clear and unambiguous, the rule has no application
and cannot be pressed into service to cut down the natural meaning
of the statutory text.

38
Glasgow v. Glasgow Tramway and Omnibus Co. Ltd., 1898 A. C. 631.
Page 114 of 154


214. In essence, both Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) and
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) proceeded on the footing that
the principle of noscitur a sociis had little application in the
interpretation of Section 2(j). The underlying rationale was that the
ID Act is a piece of beneficial social welfare legislation, enacted to
protect the interests of workers and to further the constitutional
vision of a welfare State, particularly as reflected in Part IV of the
Constitution. In such a context, it was considered inappropriate to
employ a rule of construction that would unduly curtail the
expansiveness of the statutory definition.
215. Consequently, after undertaking an exhaustive examination of the
language of Section 2(j), the Court concluded that while
expressions such as ‘undertaking’ must be understood in their
proper statutory context and not in their widest conceivable sense,
the term ‘industry’ itself was intended to receive a broad and
expansive construction. It was this interpretive approach that
ultimately culminated in the formulation of the Triple Test and the
wide amplitude accorded to the definition under Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) .

216. In our considered view, and we say so with due circumspection,
the reasoning underpinning this conclusion is not entirely free from
difficulty. By doing away with the Noscitur a Sociis rule, the
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legislative intent appears to have been construed by Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) in a manner that accords an exceptionally
broad meaning to the term ‘industry’, while at the same time
substantially severing it from its traditional commercial and
economic connotations. Whether the text and scheme of the Act
genuinely support such a departure is an issue that requires
careful examination.
217. A perusal of the Preamble, the Short Title, and the scheme of the
ID Act indicates that the enactment was designed to provide a
framework for the investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes. The statute thereafter proceeds to regulate matters
concerning industrial relations, including retrenchment, lay-offs,
compensation, and other protections afforded to workmen engaged
in such enterprises.
218. Perhaps the principal difficulty with the interpretation adopted in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) lies in the extraordinary
broadness of its reach. We say so because the expulsion of the
Noscitur a Sociis rule of construction appears to have had the
cascading effect of substantially diminishing the relevance of the
nature and character of the activity undertaken. In its place, the
inquiry came to be centred almost exclusively upon the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, which emerged as the focal,
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if not decisive factor in determining whether a particular entity or
undertaking constitutes an ‘industry’.
219. The consequence of this shift is that the focus moves away from
what the enterprise does and towards how it is organised. As a
result, activities that are fundamentally distinct in purpose,
character, and function may nevertheless be brought within the
same statutory fold merely because they involve a structured
relationship between employers and employees. It is this
displacement of the nature of activity from the centre of inquiry
that, in our considered view, gives rise to much of the difficulty that
has subsequently shrouded the application of the Triple Test.
F.4.2. A fresh look at the interpretative approach
220. With great respect, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept
either the reasoning behind this approach or the consequences that
flow from it. In our considered opinion, the test, as formulated in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , introduces an undue degree of
subjectivity and open-endedness into the inquiry, owing both to its
structure and to the foundational assumptions upon which it rests.
221. Nor is this conclusion founded solely upon our own analysis of the
law. The practical consequences of the expansive construction
adopted in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) are equally apparent.
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Courts across the country have continued to grapple with litigation
concerning the scope of the definition of ‘industry’, and the
controversy has remained far from settled despite the authoritative
pronouncement of a Seven-Judge Bench.
222. As already noticed, the persistence of this debate is reflected in
the fact that, on more than one occasion, this Court has considered
it necessary to revisit the correctness of Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) through references to larger Benches. Such repeated calls
for reconsideration do not arise in the ordinary course. They are
often indicative of a deeper jurisprudential unease, where
subsequent experience reveals difficulties in application, competing
strands of reasoning emerge, or substantial doubts are expressed
regarding the continued soundness of the principles laid down. The
history of the present reference is itself demonstrative of that
reality.

223. In our respectful view, the interpretation adopted in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) has carried the definition of ‘industry’ far
beyond its natural statutory boundaries. The cumulative effect of
the reasoning employed therein has been the emergence of a
concept considerably wider than the one the language of the statute
intended. Indeed, it may be said that the decision has fashioned an
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interpretive construct that operates in a manner not readily
discernible from the text itself.
224. At this juncture, it is therefore apposite to recall the observation
of Lord Denning, extracted by Beg, C.J. at the commencement of
his concurring opinion.:
"When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his
hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work
on the constructive task of finding the intention of
Parliament and then he must supplement the written
words so as to give ’force and life’ to the intention of
legislature.
A judge should ask himself the question how, if the
makers of the Act had themselves come across this
ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened
it out? He must then do as they would have done. A
judge must not alter the material of which the Act is
woven, but he can and should iron out the creases".
225. We wholeheartedly subscribe to the concern reflected in the
foregoing observation. There can be no quarrel that Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) is a work of immense scholarship, marked
by a painstaking examination of the text, history, and purpose of
the ID Act. Yet, with equal respect to the learned Judges who
authored the majority opinion, we are more than certain that the
decision, in its anxiety to expand the protective reach of the
legislation, ventured beyond the confines of interpretation and
entered territory more appropriately reserved for legislative policy.
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226. The difficulty does not lie in the formulation of the Triple Test
itself, which remains a useful and largely workable indicator for
determining whether a particular undertaking bears the
characteristics of an ‘industry’. Rather, it is the cumulative effect of
the reasoning to draw within the fold of Section 2(j) an ever-
expanding range of activities, institutions, and undertakings, many
of which bear only a tenuous connection to what would ordinarily
be understood as ‘industrial activity’.
227. In our considered view, it is difficult to attribute to the Legislature
an intention that every organised venture, enterprise, institution,
or activity involving some degree of employer-employee cooperation
should lock, stock and barrel stand encompassed within a single
statutory definition. Such an interpretation risks extending the
reach of the Act beyond the purpose for which it was enacted,
namely, to provide a framework for the regulation and resolution of
industrial disputes and allied matters arising in the context of
industrial employment.
228. Be that as it may, Bangalore Water Supply (supra) has managed
to hold the field for nearly five decades and has become deeply
embedded in the fabric of our industrial jurisprudence, regardless
of the persistent doubts questioning its correctness.
Considerations of certainty, stability, and institutional continuity
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therefore counsel against any wholesale departure from the
framework that it has established. Our endeavour is not to unsettle
settled positions, nor to fundamentally reconstruct the
jurisprudence that has developed around Section 2(j), for that
would be akin to throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
229. Rather, our objective is a more modest one: to address the
difficulties that have emerged in the application of the decision and
to ensure that future adjudication under the ID Act proceeds in a
manner consistent with established principles of statutory
interpretation and legal coherence. We are not called upon to
reinvent the wheel; nor is there any occasion to discard the Triple
Test in its entirety. The task before us is one of calibration rather
than reconstruction. Against that backdrop, our endeavour is
confined to examining whether certain components of the
framework laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) could
have benefitted from some refinement.
230. To our mind, the aspect that calls for the greatest degree of
calibration is whether commercial character should be restored as
a relevant consideration in the application of the Triple Test. Such
a consideration may operate as a principled sieve, separating those
undertakings that truly partake of the nature of an ‘industry’ from
those which, despite exhibiting some degree of organisational
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structure and employer-employee cooperation, were never intended
to be brought within the ambit of Section 2(j).
231. In this regard, we turn to the operative portion of Safdarjung
Hospital (supra) , which emphasised the meaning of ‘material
services’, and observed as follows:
What is meant by 'material services' needs some
explanation too. Material services are not services
which depend wholly or largely upon the contribution
of professional knowledge, skill or dexterity for the
production of a result. Such services being given
individually and by individuals are services no doubt
but not material services. Even an establishment where
many such operate cannot be said to convert their
professional services into material services. Material
services involve an activity carried on through co-
operation between employers and employees to
provide the community with the use of something such
as electric power, water, transportation, mail delivery,
telephones and the like. In providing these services
there may be employment of trained men and even
professional men, but the emphasis is not on what
these men do but upon the productivity of a service
organised as an industry and commercially valuable.
Thus the services of professional men involving
benefit to individuals according to their needs,
such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, solicitors etc.
are easily distinguishable from an activity such
as transport service. The latter is of a commercial
character in which something is brought into
existence quite apart from the benefit to
particular individuals. It is the production of this
something which is described as the production
of material services .
……..
It, therefore, follows that before an industrial dispute
can be raised between employers and their employees
or between employers and employers or between
employees and employees in relation to the
employment or non-employment or the terms of
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employment or with the conditions of labour of any
person, there must be first established a relationship of
employers and employees associating together, the
former following a trade, business, manufacture,
undertaking or calling of employers in the production of
material goods and material services and the latter
following any calling, service, employment, handicraft,
or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen in aid
of the employers' enterprise. It is not necessary that
there must be a profit motive but the enterprise must be
analogous to trade or business in a commercial sense.
[Emphasis supplied]
232. The rationale set out above, in our humble opinion, accords more
closely with both the text and structure of the statute. Industrial
activity cannot be wholly divorced from its commercial character.
We say so because we are unable to agree with the majority in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra ) insofar as it declined to apply
the principle of on the basis of what was perceived
Noscitur a Sociis
to be the broader legislative objective underlying the enactment.
233. When these expressions are read together, they appear to convey
a common thread: that an ‘industry’ is an undertaking carried on
in an organised and systematic manner, involving cooperation
between employers and employees, and rooted in an activity
possessing some degree of commercial or economic character. It is
difficult for us to subscribe to the proposition that the commercial
nature of the activity is wholly irrelevant to the inquiry and may be
disregarded altogether.
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234. At the same time, we consider it necessary to clarify that we are
in agreement with the majority opinion in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) to the extent that the presence or absence of a
profit motive ought not to be determinative. An activity may possess
a commercial character without necessarily being animated by the
pursuit of profit. The inquiry, therefore, is not whether the
undertaking seeks to maximise gain, but whether the nature of the
activity undertaken bears the indicia of an organised economic or
commercial enterprise.
235. If commercial character is to be recognised as a relevant
consideration in determining what constitutes an ‘industry’, the
converse must necessarily follow. Activities that lack any
discernible commercial or economic character, and which are
neither undertaken in pursuit of commercial objectives nor bear
any meaningful analogy to trade, business, or economic enterprise,
would ordinarily fall outside the ambit of the definition contained
in Section 2(j).
236. This is not to suggest that every undertaking must be profit-driven
or commercially successful in order to qualify as an ‘industry’.
Rather, the inquiry is directed towards the nature and character of
the activity itself. Where an activity is wholly divorced from
commercial or economic enterprise and cannot reasonably be
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analogised to trade, business, or kindred undertakings, we would
be hard pressed to justify its inclusion within the statutory
conception of ‘industry’.
237. Equally, we find no basis to conclude that according a limited role
to commercial character within the framework of the Triple Test
would in any manner undermine the beneficial object of the
legislation. The introduction of such a consideration does not
denude workmen of statutory protection, nor does it dilute the
welfare orientation of the ID Act. Rather, it serves to ensure that
the definition of ‘industry’ remains tethered to the nature of the
activity undertaken, thereby preventing the concept from
expanding beyond its intended statutory bounds.
238. While the welfare character of the ID Act is beyond dispute, that
consideration alone cannot justify disregarding a settled principle
of statutory construction where the language of the provision
reasonably admits of its application.
239. It is our considered opinion that some distinction based upon the
commercial character of the activity is both necessary and
unavoidable. The boundaries of the concept of ‘industry’ are already
sufficiently diffuse; it would be neither prudent nor doctrinally
sound to render them altogether indistinguishable. The modern
landscape presents a host of entities that may outwardly share
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organisational structures and employer-employee relationships,
yet differ fundamentally in their purpose, character, and mode of
operation.
240. Healthcare, for instance, provides a useful illustration. Today,
healthcare services are delivered through a wide spectrum of
institutions, ranging from large corporate hospital chains and
specialised diagnostic centres operating on commercial lines, to
charitable hospitals and welfare-oriented medical establishments
that primarily serve those unable to afford treatment. There are
even Government Hospitals, some of which were established pre-
Independence, with no discernible profit motive. To treat all such
institutions identically merely because they satisfy the formal
requirements of employer-employee cooperation would be to
overlook the significant differences in the nature and objectives of
their activities.

241. Such an approach, in our considered view, is liable to occasion
serious disservice to society at large. To take but one illustration, if
a charitable or government hospital is constrained, in matters of
engagement, retrenchment, or workforce management, to apply
rigid industrial principles without due regard to the specialised
nature of healthcare delivery, the consequences may well be
detrimental to the very public interest the institution exists to
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serve. The engagement of an X-ray technician, a laboratory
technician, or a nursing officer cannot always be reduced to a
purely mechanical application of principles such as ‘last come, first
go’, where considerations of merit, expertise, and continuity of
patient care may assume overriding significance.
242. The same may be said of Research Institutions. While some
undertake research with a view towards commercial exploitation,
patent generation, and market participation, others engage in
research principally for educational, academic, charitable,
scientific or public welfare purposes.
243. The point is not that charitable or welfare-oriented activities
should automatically stand excluded from the ambit of the Act.
Rather, it is that the nature and character of the activity
undertaken is extremely relevant to the inquiry. A framework that
fails to distinguish between activities carried on predominantly
along commercial lines and those pursued primarily for public
welfare, educational, charitable, or humanitarian purposes risks
collapsing fundamentally different undertakings into a single
category. We are of the clear view that the consideration of
commercial character assumes significance, serving as an
important indicator in determining whether an undertaking truly
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partakes of the nature of an ‘industry’ within the meaning of
Section 2(j).
244. The same holds true in the context of governmental entities
discharging sovereign or regal functions. Without delving too deeply
into that aspect, we believe that no straitjacket formula can be
devised which either excludes all such entities from the ambit of
‘industry’ or, conversely, brings every governmental activity within
its fold. The functions performed by the State today are far too
varied and nuanced to permit such a simplistic categorisation.
245. In the same breath, we do not propose to repeat the very error
that, in our respectful view, has contributed to the present difficulty
by prescribing exhaustive categories, rigid exemptions, or inflexible
criteria. The inquiry necessarily involves an evaluation of the
nature, purpose, and character of the activity in question and is
therefore incapable of being reduced to a mechanical formula.
Ultimately, the determination ought to be undertaken on a case-to-
case basis, having regard to the totality of the circumstances and
the principles set out.
F.4.3. Calibrating the Triple Test

246. In light of the foregoing discussion, we have undertaken a careful
examination of each constituent element of the Triple Test and
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identified certain limited aspects which, in our considered view,
might have served the law better had they formed part of the
framework from the outset. These observations are no more than a
reflection of our own reading of Section 2(j), informed by its text,
scheme, and underlying semantics. Our endeavour is not to
reconstruct the jurisprudence, but merely to refine it in those
limited respects where we perceive a divergence in our
understanding of the scope and contours of the definition of
‘industry’, while preserving the essential framework that has
governed the field for decades.
247. The Triple Test, per our careful consideration, should have been
reformulated in the following terms:
“(a) Where there exists: (i) a systematic activity; (ii)
organised through cooperation between employer and
employee; and (iii) the production, distribution, or
provision of goods or services possessing a
discernible commercial character that is
analogous to trade or business and calculated to
satisfy material human wants and wishes (as
distinguished from activities that are purely spiritual or
religious in nature, though not excluding the provision
of material goods or services merely because they are
associated with a religious objective), a prima facie
presumption shall arise that the undertaking
constitutes an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section
2(j).”

248. The next component of the Triple Test, pertaining to the
irrelevance of profit motive, is retained in its existing form.
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Accordingly, it would continue to read as follows: “ (b) Absence of
profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture
in the public, joint, private, or any other sector . ” We see no
reason to depart from this aspect of the formulation, for the
presence or absence of profit motive does not, by itself, furnish a
reliable indicator of whether an undertaking constitutes an
‘industry’. In our view, the focus must remain on the nature and
character of the activity undertaken, rather than any surplus that
may or may not be generated.
249. Insofar as the third component of the test is concerned, we are of
the view that the special emphasis hitherto placed upon the
existence of an employer-employee relationship requires
moderation. While such a relationship undoubtedly remains an
important indicator, it cannot be elevated to the status of the sole
or predominant determinant. The inquiry must instead proceed on
a conjunctive basis, taking into account both the nature and
character of the activity undertaken as well as the existence of
organised employer-employee cooperation. It is only through a
consideration of both these elements in tandem that a principled
determination may be made as to whether an undertaking
constitutes an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section 2(j).
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Accordingly, this portion of the test could have been considered in
the following terms:
“ (c) The true focus is functional and the decisive
test is the nature of the activity and the existence
of employer-employee relations. ”
[Emphasis supplied]
250. While the following aspect may have diminished significance in
view of the role now accorded to commercial character within the
inquiry, it nevertheless serves as a useful clarification. The mere
prescription of charitable, philanthropic, or benevolent motives
cannot alter the essential character of an undertaking that is
otherwise commercial in nature. It would thus be in line with our
sensibilities to suitably modify this proposition in the following
terms: “ (d) If the organisation is a trade or business, it does
not cease to be one merely because philanthropy animates the
undertaking in its official documentation but on enquiry it is
found otherwise . ”
251. We now turn to another important facet of the decision, namely
the reading down of the expression ‘undertaking’, as enshrined in
the second guideline. At first blush, we do not perceive any
fundamental difficulty in retaining this aspect of the reasoning
assigned in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) . However, we find
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that, once again, it could have certainly been enriched with some
clarification and recalibration.
252. In our respectful view, the travail lies in the manner in which the
majority opinion appears, at certain points, to conflate the nature
of the activity undertaken with the existence of employer-employee
relations, or at the very least to accord the latter such
predominance that the former recedes into the background. This,
in our opinion, is the principal source of much of the confusion in
the application of the Triple Test.
253. The nature and character of the activity on the one hand, and the
existence of organised employer-employee cooperation on the other,
are distinct considerations serving different purposes within the
inquiry. While both are relevant, neither can be collapsed into the
other. Rather, they operate as independent yet complementary
pillars supporting the determinative scaffolding of whether a
particular undertaking constitutes an ‘industry’. To treat them as
interchangeable is akin to saying that apples and oranges are the
same fruit. It overlooks the separate function that each performs in
the analysis and risks reducing a multi-faceted inquiry into a
single-factor test. Accordingly, it is our view that this portion
perhaps could have been recorded in the following manner:
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II. Although section 2(j) uses words of the widest
amplitude in its two limbs, their meaning cannot be
magnified to overreach itself.
(a) ‘Undertaking’ must suffer a contextual and
associational shrinkage as explained in Banerji and in
this judgment; so also, service, calling and the like. This
yields the inference that all organized activity
possessing the triple elements in I (supra), although not
trade or business, may still be ’industry’ provided the
nature of the activity taken together with the
employer-employee basis bears resemblance to what
we find in trade or business. This takes into the fold of
’industry’ undertakings, callings and services,
adventures’ analogous to the carrying on of trade or
business’. All features, other than the methodology of
carrying on the activity viz. in organizing the
cooperation between employer and employee, may be
dissimilar. It does not, matter, if on the employment
terms there is analogy.
254. The effect of this clarification is that the expression ‘undertaking’
continues to retain a broad sweep and is capable of encompassing
a wide variety of activities. The mere fact that an activity may
qualify as an undertaking, however, does not inexorably lead to the
conclusion that it constitutes an ‘industry’. Such an activity must
still satisfy the requirements of the reformulated Triple Test. Once
these principles are recognised, we do not consider it necessary to
delve any further into the meaning of the term ‘undertaking’. The
safeguards against over-inclusion are already embedded within the
reformulated test itself, which provides the necessary framework
for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular
‘undertaking’ falls within the ambit of Section 2(j).
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F.4.4. Reconsidering Institutional Categorisation
255. We now approach a somewhat more contentious aspect of the
decision, namely the treatment accorded to specific categories of
institutions and the application of the guidelines to them. Once
again, we are of the view that while certain portions of this segment
may be retained, others nonetheless warrant reconsideration.
256. We say so because a substantial period of time has elapsed since
the pronouncement of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , and the
institutional and economic landscape has undergone profound
transformation in the intervening decades. The difficulty with
highly specific illustrations and categorical classifications is that
they have been products of the circumstances prevailing at a
particular point in time. What may once have served as a useful
guide risks becoming an inflexible rule when applied to
contemporary realities.

257. Entities today are increasingly multifaceted and frequently
undertake a diverse range of functions that cannot readily be
reduced to a single label or category. A university may engage in
research, consultancy, technology transfer, and commercial
collaboration; a hospital may combine charitable healthcare with
highly specialised commercial services; and a research institution
may simultaneously pursue academic, public welfare, and market-
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oriented objectives. In such circumstances, an approach that
proceeds primarily by reference to predetermined categories risks
pigeonholing institutions without adequately examining the true
nature and dominant character of the activity undertaken.
258. It may have thus been sufficient to have only postulated Guideline
III(a), while omitting Guidelines III(b) and III(c). In our considered
view, the illustrations and narrowly tailored exceptions contained
therein have, over time, contributed to the very difficulties that
have beset the application of the definition. By carving out specific
categories and prescribing highly particularised exemptions, they
risk transforming what ought to be a principled inquiry into an
exercise in classification.
259. We believe that the strength of a legal test lies in its ability to
withstand application across a range of factual scenarios without
the need for exhaustive elaboration or an ever-expanding catalogue
of inclusions and exclusions. A test that requires a growing list of
illustrations, qualifications, and exceptions to sustain itself is, in
our view, a test that risks obscuring rather than clarifying the
inquiry. The law ought not to descend into an exercise of
prescribing, in advance, what must or must not constitute an
‘industry’. Such determinations are best left to the application of
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the governing principles to the facts and circumstances of each
case.
260. It is in this spirit that we deemed fit that the limited purpose of
the third guideline could have been put forth in the following terms:
“ III. Application of these guidelines should not
stop short of their logical reach by invocation of
creeds, cults or inner sense of incongruity or
outer sense of motivation for or resultant of the
economic operations. The ideology of the Act
being industrial peace, regulation and resolution
of industrial disputes between employer and
workmen, the range of this statutory ideology
must inform the reach of the statutory definition.
Nothing less, nothing more.
(a) The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) clubs
(iii) educational institutions (iv) cooperatives, (v)
research institutes (vi) charitable projects and
(vii) other kindred adventures, if they fulfil the
triple tests listed in I (supra), cannot be exempted
from the scope of section 2(j). ”
261. Finally, insofar as the final guideline pertaining to the dominant
nature test is concerned, we consider it necessary to clarify the
scope and contours of the sovereign functions exception. In
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) , the exemption accorded to
sovereign functions was construed in a markedly narrow manner.
The principal rationale advanced was that the State, in the modern
welfare era, had entered a multitude of fields traditionally
associated with industry and commerce, and that it would therefore
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be inappropriate to exclude governmental undertakings merely
because they were carried on by the State or its instrumentalities.
262. The majority accordingly reasoned that only those functions
which are governed by distinct constitutional or statutory regimes,
such as the service conditions of civil servants protected under
Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution, ought, strictly speaking,
to stand outside the ambit of the definition of ‘industry’. It was
further observed that several public utility services performed by
governmental agencies and statutory corporations are themselves
treated by the ID Act as falling within the industrial sphere.
Consequently, where the relationship between the State and its
employees is not regulated by a separate constitutional or statutory
framework, no compelling reason was perceived to artificially
exclude such activities from the operation of the ID Act merely
because they are undertaken by the State.

263. It was on this reasoning that the sovereign functions exception
came to be confined to a narrow category of activities, with the
overwhelming majority of governmental functions remaining
subject to examination under the broader framework of the Act.

264. In our assessment, this aspect too warrants a measure of
recalibration, or perhaps more accurately, simplification.
Experience has shown that excessive elaboration often carries with
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it the unintended consequence of constraining rather than
clarifying. In the quest to define every conceivable category and
exception, one risks making the camel pass through the eye of the
needle.
265. We are, however, entirely ad idem on two aspects of the reasoning
in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) . First , governmental
functions governed by distinct constitutional or statutory
frameworks, including those falling within the ambit of Articles 310
and 311 of the Constitution, stand on a separate footing and are
ordinarily outside the operation of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Second , public utility services, which the Act itself expressly
contemplates and regulates, are, by virtue of the legislative scheme,
amenable to its operation. On both counts, we find no reason to
depart from the position adopted therein.
266. Where we part ways with the reasoning in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) is in the suggestion that, save for these narrowly
circumscribed exceptions, virtually every governmental entity,
enterprise, or undertaking must necessarily fall within the ambit of
the definition of ‘industry’. In our respectful view, such an approach
once again risks extending the concept beyond its natural limits
and drawing within its sweep a host of activities that may bear little
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resemblance to what Parliament intended to regulate under the ID
Act.
267. The mere fact that an activity is undertaken by the State and does
not fall squarely within the traditional understanding of a sovereign
function cannot, by itself, compel the conclusion that it constitutes
an ‘industry’. To adopt such a position would be to presume
inclusion as the rule and exclusion as the rarest of exceptions,
thereby enlarging the definition in a manner that is neither
mandated by the statutory text nor required by principle.
268. The State today undertakes a vast array of functions in
furtherance of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III
of the Constitution and the Directive Principles embodied in Part
IV. It would be difficult to accept the proposition that every such
undertaking, merely by virtue of being organised and involving
employer-employee cooperation, must necessarily be characterised
as an ‘industry’. Many governmental activities are undertaken
primarily to discharge constitutional obligations, advance public
welfare, or fulfil social objectives, and may not possess the
commercial or economic character contemplated by the
reformulated Triple Test.
269. Equally, the realities of the contemporary economic landscape
cannot be ignored. With the increasing participation of private
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actors in sectors once dominated by the State, the range of
governmental activities carried on predominantly along commercial
lines has diminished considerably. The activities undertaken by the
State that are truly analogous to trade, business, or economic
enterprise would undoubtedly fall for consideration under the
reformulated test and, where its requirements are satisfied, would
be amenable to the operation of the ID Act. However, it does not
follow that every activity undertaken in the discharge of
constitutional, welfare, or public obligations must necessarily be
drawn within the same net.
270. The distinction, in our view, lies not in the identity of the actor,
but in the nature and character of the activity itself. It is that
inquiry, rather than any presumption of universal inclusion, that
must govern the application of Section 2(j).
271. In our view, governmental undertakings, no less than private
entities or those that were delineated in Guideline III, must thus be
assessed on the touchstone of the reformulated test. The inquiry
remains one of substance rather than form. It is the nature and
character of the activity undertaken, viewed in conjunction with the
other indicia set out herein, that must guide the determination,
rather than any presumption that all governmental activity is
destined to fall within the broad sweep of ‘industry’.
Page 140 of 154


272. Insofar as the remaining facets of the dominant nature test
formulated in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) are concerned, we
find no reason to depart from such interpretation. It is entirely
conceivable that a single undertaking may engage in a complex
array of activities, some of which may point towards inclusion
within the ambit of ‘industry’, while others may suggest the
contrary. In such circumstances, it remains necessary to look
beyond form and examine the true character of the enterprise as a
whole.
273. The dominant nature test continues to provide a useful analytical
tool for this purpose, enabling the Court to ascertain the principal
character of the undertaking and determine whether any
exemption is warranted or whether, notwithstanding the presence
of ancillary or incidental activities of a different character, the entity
as a whole would continue to constitute an ‘industry’ for the
purposes of the ID Act. We therefore see no occasion to disturb this
specific aspect of the framework laid down in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) . This particular guideline therefore warranted no
particular change and would continue to read thus:
“IV. The dominant nature test:
(a) Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify
for exemption, others not, involves employees on the
total undertaking, some of whom Are not ’workmen’ as
in the University of Delhi case or some departments are
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not ’productive of goods and services if isolated, even
then, the predominant nature of the services and the
integrated nature of the departments as explained in
the Corporation of Nagpur, will be the true test. The
whole undertaking will be ‘industry’ although those
who are not ’workmen’ by definition may not benefit by
the status.
(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign
functions may qualify for exemption, not the welfare
activities of economic adventures undertaken by
Government or statutory bodies.
(c) Even in departments discharging sovereign
functions if there are units which are industries and
they are substantially severable, then they can be
considered to come within sec. 2(j).
(d) Constitutionally and competently enacted legislative
provisions may well remove from the scope of the Act
categories which otherwise may be covered thereby.”
274. Accordingly, when our interpretative permutations and
combinations are read in conjunction with the modifications and
clarifications set out hereinabove, the Triple Test and the
accompanying guidelines would hypothetically stand reformulated
and read as follows:
“I. Industry under Section 2(j) will be defined as:
(a) Where there exists: (i) a systematic activity; (ii)
organised through cooperation between employer and
employee; and (iii) the production, distribution, or
provision of goods or services possessing a
discernible commercial character that is
analogous to trade or business and calculated to
satisfy material human wants and wishes (as
distinguished from activities that are purely spiritual or
religious in nature, though not excluding the provision
of material goods or services merely because they are
Page 142 of 154

associated with a religious objective), a prima facie
presumption shall arise that the undertaking
constitutes an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section
2(j).
(b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is
irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private, or
any other sector.
(c) The true focus is functional and the decisive test is
the nature of the activity and the existence of employer-
employee relations.
(d) If the organisation is a trade or business, it does not
cease to be one merely because philanthropy animates
the undertaking in its official documentation but
on enquiry it is found otherwise
.

II. Although section 2(j) uses words of the widest
amplitude in its two limbs, their meaning cannot be
magnified to overreach itself.
(a) ‘Undertaking’ must suffer a contextual and
associational shrinkage as explained in Banerji and in
this judgment; so also, service, calling and the like. This
yields the inference that all organized activity
possessing the triple elements in I (supra), although not
trade or business, may still be ’industry’ provided the
nature of the activity taken together with the
employer-employee basis bears resemblance to what
we find in trade or business. This takes into the fold of
’industry’ undertakings, callings and services,
adventures’ analogous to the carrying on of trade or
business’. All features, other than the methodology of
carrying on the activity viz. in organizing the
cooperation between employer and employee, may be
dissimilar. It does not, matter, if on the employment
terms there is analogy.

III. Application of these guidelines should not stop short
of their logical reach by invocation of creeds, cults or
inner sense of incongruity or outer sense of motivation
for or resultant of the economic operations. The ideology
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of the Act being industrial peace, regulation and
resolution of industrial disputes between employer and
workmen, the range of this statutory ideology must
inform the reach of the statutory definition. Nothing
less, nothing more.
(a) The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) clubs (iii)
educational institutions (iv) cooperatives, (v) research
institutes (vi) charitable projects and (vii) other kindred
adventures, if they fulfil the triple tests listed in I
(supra), cannot be exempted from the scope of section
2(j).

IV. The dominant nature test:
(a) Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify
for exemption, others not, involves employees on the
total undertaking, some of whom Are not ’workmen’ as
in the University of Delhi case or some departments are
not ’productive of goods and services if isolated, even
then, the predominant nature of the services and the
integrated nature of the departments as explained in
the Corporation of Nagpur, will be the true test. The
whole undertaking will be ‘industry’ although those
who are not ’workmen’ by definition may not benefit by
the status.
(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign
functions may qualify for exemption, not the welfare
activities of economic adventures undertaken by
Government or statutory bodies.
(c) Even in departments discharging sovereign
functions if there are units which are industries and
they are substantially severable, then they can be
considered to come within sec. 2(j).
(d) Constitutionally and competently enacted legislative
provisions may well remove from the scope of the Act
categories which otherwise may be covered thereby.
275. It is pertinent to clarify at this juncture that the foregoing is only
a hypothesis, and we do not propose, at this stage, to disturb the
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application of the Triple Test to proceedings that remain pending.
To do so would risk creating new and unnecessary distinctions
between similarly situated parties, and consequently generate
entirely new classes of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. Our decision is
informed not only by the possibility of creating such an artificial
and narrowly defined class by retrospectively altering the manner
in which the Triple Test is to be applied, but also by the fact that
Section 2(j) of the ID Act is no longer in operation and has since
been succeeded by the legislative framework contained in the
Industrial Relations Code.
276. It goes without saying that we are not in complete agreement with
the ratio laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) . Had we
been in complete agreement, there would have been little reason for
us to undertake the detailed examination of its reasoning,
formulations, and constituent elements that has occupied the
preceding pages. Our endeavour has instead been to identify, with
the benefit of hindsight and experience, those aspects which may
merit refinement, without unsettling the legal position governing
matters that have already entered the judicial stream.

277. In similar vein, we do not consider it either necessary or desirable
to revisit the factual conclusions reached in each of the numerous
decisions that have applied Bangalore Water Supply (supra) over
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the last several decades. To embark upon a case-by-case
reassessment of whether a particular institution was correctly
classified as an ‘industry’ would be an exercise of little practical
utility and would serve only to unsettle a substantial body of
jurisprudence that has long since attained finality. Judicial
correction must be tempered by judicial restraint, particularly
where settled rights and obligations have crystallised over time.
278. The present interpretation and modifications shall thus operate
only prospectively in that sense and shall not reopen, disturb, or
otherwise affect proceedings that have attained finality, or that
presently remain pending. Judgments, awards, settlements, and
determinations that are no longer subject to challenge shall remain
undisturbed, notwithstanding the reformulation of the test set out
in this judgment. The same also applies to proceedings, appeals
and other hearings that are presently in the process of being
adjudicated by various fora.
EGAL IMPACT OF THE NDUSTRIAL ISPUTES MENDMENT CT
G. L I D (A ) A , 1982
AND THE IR C ODE , 2020
279. We also do not propose to enter into an examination of the
definition of ‘industry’ as it presently exists under the IR Code.
Submissions were advanced before us to the effect that the
definition contained therein draws inspiration from, or
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substantially reflects, the principles embodied in the Triple Test. Be
that as it may, we consider it neither necessary nor appropriate to
express any opinion on that aspect.
280. The IR Code is an independent legislative enactment and must be
interpreted on its own terms, having regard to its text, scheme, and
object. Nothing stated in this judgment should therefore be
construed as an expression of opinion on the validity,
interpretation, scope, or constitutional legitimacy of any provision
contained therein.
281. It follows, therefore, that in view of the clarification and
reformulation of the principles laid down in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) , the said decision shall not be regarded as the sheet
anchor for the interpretation of the IR Code or any of its provisions,
should such a question arise in the future. Any issue arising under
the IR Code shall necessarily fall to be determined on the basis of
its own text, scheme, object, and legislative framework,
uninfluenced by the reformulation of the Triple Test undertaken in
the present judgment.
282. Insofar as the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 is
concerned, it is an undisputed position that the amendment was
never brought into force. In the absence of a notification
effectuating its commencement, the amendment never acquired
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operative legal effect and therefore does not govern the controversy
before us.
283. Consequently, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for this
Court to examine its correctness, applicability, wisdom, or potential
impact. Any such exercise would be wholly academic and would
travel beyond the scope of the issues that arise for determination
in the present reference. We accordingly refrain from expressing
any opinion on the merits or consequences of the said amendment.
284. Our observations are confined exclusively to the interpretation of
Section 2(j) of the ID Act and the jurisprudence that has evolved
around the Triple Test as formulated in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) . Any questions arising under the IR Code are left open for
determination in an appropriate case.
H. C ONCLUSION
285. As we conclude this judgment, we return to the metaphor that
formed the overture to this journey: the albatross around the
mariner’s neck. The controversy surrounding the definition of
‘industry’ has, for many years, weighed heavily upon this branch of
industrial jurisprudence, resurfacing time and again despite
repeated attempts at resolution. It is our sincere hope that the
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present judgment finally lifts that burden and permits the law to
move forward unencumbered.
286. The voyage, however, has not been a short one. Having called at
many ports and traversed long stretches of uncertain and often
mist-laden waters, this Court has repeatedly been required to
navigate competing currents of thought in its search for a
principled and workable understanding of Section 2(j). As that
journey now draws to a close, it is our earnest hope that the present
adjudication serves as a reliable beacon for courts and tribunals at
various levels, bringing a greater measure of coherence, certainty,
and finality to a question that has engaged judicial attention for
decades.
287. Before parting with the matter, we consider it appropriate to
briefly recapitulate the principal conclusions that emerge from the
foregoing analysis:

i. The present reference has been validly made and rightly
entertained. No legitimate doubt can be cast upon its
maintainability, and the reference is accordingly answered on
the merits.

ii. In our considered view, certain aspects of the Triple Test and
the accompanying guidelines formulated in Bangalore
Page 149 of 154

Water Supply (supra) were susceptible to further
refinement. While the essential framework laid down therein
has stood the test of time, we are of the opinion that some of
its constituent elements could have been articulated
differently in that judgment so as to better reflect the scope
and contours of Section 2(j). Accordingly, in our view, the
Triple Test would have been more appropriately structured,
hypothetically speaking, in the following terms:
“I. Industry under Section 2(j) will be defined as:
(a) Where there exists: (i) a systematic activity; (ii)
organised through cooperation between employer and
employee; and (iii) the production, distribution, or
provision of goods or services possessing a
discernible commercial character that is
analogous to trade or business and calculated to
satisfy material human wants and wishes (as
distinguished from activities that are purely spiritual or
religious in nature, though not excluding the provision
of material goods or services merely because they are
associated with a religious objective), a prima facie
presumption shall arise that the undertaking
constitutes an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section
2(j).
(b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is
irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private, or
any other sector.
(c) The true focus is functional and the decisive test is
the nature of the activity and the existence of employer-
employee relations.
(d) If the organisation is a trade or business, it does not
cease to be one merely because philanthropy animates
the undertaking in its official documentation but
on enquiry it is found otherwise .
Page 150 of 154


II. Although section 2(j) uses words of the widest
amplitude in its two limbs, their meaning cannot be
magnified to overreach itself.
(a) ‘Undertaking’ must suffer a contextual and
associational shrinkage as explained in Banerji and in
this judgment; so also, service, calling and the like. This
yields the inference that all organized activity
possessing the triple elements in I (supra), although not
trade or business, may still be ’industry’ provided the
nature of the activity taken together with the
employer-employee basis bears resemblance to what
we find in trade or business. This takes into the fold of
’industry’ undertakings, callings and services,
adventures’ analogous to the carrying on of trade or
business’. All features, other than the methodology of
carrying on the activity viz. in organizing the
cooperation between employer and employee, may be
dissimilar. It does not, matter, if on the employment
terms there is analogy.

III. Application of these guidelines should not stop short
of their logical reach by invocation of creeds, cults or
inner sense of incongruity or outer sense of motivation
for or resultant of the economic operations. The ideology
of the Act being industrial peace, regulation and
resolution of industrial disputes between employer and
workmen, the range of this statutory ideology must
inform the reach of the statutory definition. Nothing
less, nothing more.
(a) The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) clubs (iii)
educational institutions (iv) cooperatives, (v) research
institutes (vi) charitable projects and (vii) other kindred
adventures, if they fulfil the triple tests listed in I
(supra), cannot be exempted from the scope of section
2(j).

IV. The dominant nature test:
Page 151 of 154

(a) Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify
for exemption, others not, involves employees on the
total undertaking, some of whom Are not ’workmen’ as
in the University of Delhi case or some departments are
not ’productive of goods and services if isolated, even
then, the predominant nature of the services and the
integrated nature of the departments as explained in
the Corporation of Nagpur, will be the true test. The
whole undertaking will be ‘industry’ although those
who are not ’workmen’ by definition may not benefit by
the status.
(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign
functions may qualify for exemption, not the welfare
activities of economic adventures undertaken by
Government or statutory bodies.
(c) Even in departments discharging sovereign
functions if there are units which are industries and
they are substantially severable, then they can be
considered to come within sec. 2(j).
(d) Constitutionally and competently enacted legislative
provisions may well remove from the scope of the Act
categories which otherwise may be covered thereby.
iii. In view of the foregoing, the reformulated Triple Test
articulated in this judgment is to be understood as no more
than our considered opinion on the proper interpretation of
Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is not
intended to displace the governing legal position in respect of
pending proceedings. Consequently, all matters presently
pending before courts, tribunals, labour authorities, or other
fora under the Industrial Disputes Act may be adjudicated in
accordance with the Triple Test laid down in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) .
Page 152 of 154


iv. The present clarification shall operate prospectively in that
sense and shall not reopen, disturb, or otherwise affect
proceedings that have attained finality. Judgments, awards,
settlements, and determinations that are no longer subject to
challenge shall remain undisturbed, notwithstanding the
reformulation of the test set out in this judgment. The same
also applies to proceedings, appeals and other hearings that
are presently in the process of being adjudicated by various
fora;
v. We refrain from entering into an examination of the definition
of ‘industry’ as it presently exists under the IR Code or the
Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982; and
vi. In view of the opinion expressed herein and the hypothetical
reformulation of the principles laid down in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) , the said decision shall not be
regarded as the sheet anchor for the interpretation of the IR
Code or any of its provisions, should such a question arise in
the future.
288. We further clarify that the present judgment is confined to
disputes arising under the ID Act and the interpretation of Section
2(j) thereof. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as
governing disputes arising under any other enactment, nor shall
Page 153 of 154

these observations be treated as determinative of questions that fall
to be decided under a different statutory framework.
289. Ordered accordingly. Pending interlocutory applications, if any,
stand disposed of in the above terms.
290. There shall be no order as to costs.

…………………………..………CJI.
[SURYA KANT]
…………………………..………… J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]
…………………………..………… J.
[ALOK ARADHE]
…………………………..………… J.
[VIPUL M. PANCHOLI]



NEW DELHI
DATED: 20.08.2026
Page 154 of 154

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.897 OF 2002
STATE OF U.P. … APPELLANT
VERSUS
JAI BIR SINGH … RESPONDENT
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1276 OF 2001
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1278 OF 2001
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1279 OF 2001
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6114 OF 2001
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8597 OF 2001
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2409 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2506 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4569 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5101 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6108 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6471 OF 2002
SLP(C) NO.20982 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.355-358 OF 2003
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7994 OF 2004
SLP(C) NO.11291 OF 2004
SLP(C) NO.14085 OF 2004
SLP(C) NO.14127 OF 2004
1

SLP(C) NO.4139 OF 2005
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1273 OF 2007
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1274 OF 2007
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3647 OF 2007
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4646 OF 2007
SLP(C) NO.16301 OF 2007
CIVIL APPEAL NO.296 OF 2008
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1311-1312 OF 2008
SLP(C) NO.3107 OF 2008
SLP(C) NO.4327 OF 2008
SLP(C) NO.4328 OF 2008
SLP(C) NO.4329 OF 2008
SLP(C) NO.16276 OF 2008
SLP(C) NO.17224 OF 2008
SLP(C) ... CC NO.7990 OF 2009
SLP(C) NO.1112 OF 2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3920 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5681 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3119 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7757 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1131 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5519 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8149-8151 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4505-4506 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4507-4508 OF 2013
SLP(C) NOS.12679-12682 OF 2014

2

SLP(C) NO.1857 OF 2016
SLP(C) NO.14156 OF 2021

I N D E X
Reframed Questions: ...................................................................................... 5
Definition of “Industry”: ................................................................................ 7
Submissions: .................................................................................................. 15
Whether reconsideration of Bangalore Water Supply is necessary?: .. 37
“From 1950 to 1991: Planned economy to Liberalisation, Privatisation
and Globalisation (“LPG”): ........................................................................... 48
Industrial Policies from 1951 onwards: A Bird’s eye view:
................... 61
Bangalore Water Supply: ............................................................................. 65
Opinion of Krishna Iyer, J. (for himself, Bhagwati and Desai, JJ.): ............. 67
Opinion of Beg, C.J.:
........................................................................................... 78
Opinion of Chandrachud, C.J.:
.......................................................................... 83
Opinion of Jaswant Singh, J. (on behalf of himself and Tulzapurkar, J.): . 92
Analysis of the Opinions in Bangalore Water Supply:
............................ 95
“Triple Test”: ................................................................................................. 95
Overruling of Safdarjung Hospital:
........................................................... 97
Solicitors’ Case: ........................................................................................... 100
Gymkhana Club: ........................................................................................... 103
Why did Bangalore Water Supply Overrule Both Cases?: ..................... 108
Further Analysis: ......................................................................................... 117
Application of the ratio of Bangalore Water Supply and reference to a
larger Bench:
................................................................................................ 130
Why an expansive definition of “Industry” is necessary ?: .................. 137
Any other issue(s) that may arise during the course of hearing before
the nine-Judge Bench:
................................................................................. 143
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS: ..................................................................... 147

3

O P I N I O N

NAGARATHNA, J.
I have perused the erudite opinions of learned Chief Justice
Surya Kant and learned Brothers Narasimha, Dipankar Datta and
Joymalya Bagchi, JJ. However, I have authored a separate opinion
indicating as to why reconsideration of the judgment of this Court
in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa,
AIR 1978 SC 548 (“Bangalore Water Supply”) is not warranted.
I have also stated that the reference made by a five-Judge Bench
of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Jai Bir Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 1 ,
(“Jai Bir Singh”) was unnecessary.
Nevertheless, I have analysed the judgment of this Court in
Bangalore Water Supply and have concluded that the same does
not call for any interference or modification. Accordingly, I have
answered the questions referred to this nine-Judge Bench.
1.1 What is the meaning and interpretation to be given to the
expression “industry” in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (hereinafter referred to as “I.D. Act” for the sake of
convenience)? This question has resurfaced after a seven-Judge
4

Bench answered it in the case of Bangalore Water Supply nearly
half a century ago. At this stage itself, I observe that Section
2(j) of the ID Act cannot be interpretated from the prism of
Section 2(p) of the IR Code on “hypothetical basis” .
Reframed Questions:

1.2 In State of U.P. vs. Jai Bir Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 1 , (“Jai Bir
Singh”) , a five-Judge Bench of this Court referred for
reconsideration the judgment of this Court rendered by a seven-
Judge Bench in Bangalore Water Supply . This judgment
concerned the interpretation of the expression “industry” as
defined in Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act. Consequently, a seven-Judge
Bench was constituted and by order dated 02.01.2017, the matter
was referred to a nine-Judge Bench. That is how this Bench of nine
Judges has been constituted. By order dated 16.02.2026, the
following four questions have been reframed for the consideration
of the nine-Judge Bench:
“(i) Whether the test laid down in paragraphs 140 to 144
in the opinion rendered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.R.
Krishna Iyer in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage
Board’s case (supra) to determine if an undertaking or
enterprise falls within the definition of “industry” lays
down correct law? And whether the Industrial
Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (which seemingly did
5

not come into force) and the Industrial Relations Code,
2020 (with effect from 21.11.2025) have any legal
impact on the interpretation of the expression
“industry” as contained in the principal Act?

(ii) Whether social welfare activities and schemes or other
enterprises undertaken by the Government
Departments or their instrumentalities can be
construed to be “industrial activities” for the purpose
of Section 2(j) of the ID Act?
(iii) What State activities will be covered by the expression
“sovereign function”, and whether such activities will
fall outside the purview of Section 2(j) of the ID Act?
(iv) Any other issue(s) that may arise during the course of
hearing before the Nine-Judge Bench.”

1.3 The reason for the reference was a perceived conflict between
two decisions of this Court in Chief Conservator of Forests vs.
Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293 (“Jagannath
Kondhare”) (three-Judge Bench) and State of Gujarat vs.
Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar, (2001) 9 SCC 713
(“Pratamsingh Parmar”) (two-Judge Bench). The question before
both the aforesaid Benches was, whether Social Forestry activities
of the State, through a welfare scheme undertaken for the
improvement of the environment, would be covered within the
scope and ambit of the definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of
the I.D. Act. In Jagannath Kondhare , the three-Judge Bench held
that the Social Forestry Department was covered within the
6

definition of “industry” as interpreted by this Court in Bangalore
Water Supply , whereas in Pratamsingh Parmar , the two-Judge
Bench held that the Social Forestry Department did not come
within the ambit of the definition of “industry”.
1.4 Further, different views were expressed with regard to the
understanding of the decision of the seven-Judge Bench in
Bangalore Water Supply . Therefore, the matter was referred to a
five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh and pursuant to the order dated
05.05.2005, Bangalore Water Supply was referred to a larger
Bench of seven Judges and thereafter, this nine-Judge Bench was
constituted.
Definition of “Industry”:
1.5 The centre of controversy in these cases is the interpretation
to be given to the expression “industry” in Section 2(j) of the I.D.
Act. For immediate reference, the said definition is extracted as
under:
“ 2. Definitions .—In this Act, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context,—
xxx
(j) “industry” means any business, trade, undertaking,
manufacture or calling of employers and includes any
calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial
occupation or avocation of workmen;”
(underlining by us)
7

1.6 The aforesaid definition represents a two-fold perspective:
from the point of view of an employer, it means any business, trade,
undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers. The use of the
expression “means” implies that it is exhaustive. From the point of
view of an employee or the workman, the expression “industry”
includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial
occupation or avocation of workmen. The use of the expression
“includes any” implies that from the workman’s point of view, the
expression “industry” is not an exhaustive definition but an
expansive one. The two limbs of the definition are connected by the
word “and”.
1.7 Business, trade, undertaking and manufacture are relatable
to employers’ enterprises in the aforesaid forms wherein there is
employment of workmen. It could also be a calling of the employers
relatable to a service and not necessarily production of goods.
Therefore, production or manufacture of goods or making available
various kinds of services is “industry” from the employers’ point of
view.
1.8 Similarly, from the workmen’s point of view, when they are
engaged in any service, employment, calling or any handicraft,
8

industrial occupation or avocation, they would be working in an
“industry”. But, the interpretation of the word “industry” must be
wholesome and realistic and not in an abstract or from a doctrinal
perspective.
1.9 Having regard to the objects and purposes of the I.D. Act, the
definition of “industry” in Section 2 of the I.D. Act has to be
interpreted in a broad and comprehensive manner and not in a
narrow and myopic way. This is because the I.D. Act is essentially
a social welfare legislation for the protection of workmen as well as
for the protection of those who run the “industry”. Hence, what is
the meaning to be ascribed to the word “industry” is of vital
significance while implementing the I.D. Act and its provisions.
1.10 Section 2(j) was substituted by Section 2(c) of the Industrial
Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982. This was nearly four years after
the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply was pronounced.
However, the said amendment was not notified and therefore not
enforced. By the said amendment made to the I.D. Act, the
definition of “industry” was sought to be amended in the following
terms:
9

“ (j) “industry ” means any systematic activity carried on by
co-operation between an employer and his workmen
(whether such workmen are employed by such employer
directly or by or through any agency, including a
contractor) for the production, supply or distribution of
goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or
wishes (not being wants or wishes which are merely
spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not,—
(i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying
on such activity; or
(ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make
any gain or profit, and includes—
(a) any activity of the Dock Labour Board
established under section 5A of the Dock Workers
(Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948);
(b) any activity relating to the promotion of sales
or business or both carried on by an
establishment, but does not include—
(1) any agricultural operation except where
such agricultural operation is carried on in an
integrated manner with any other activity
(being any such activity as is referred to in the
foregoing provisions of this clause) and such
other activity is the predominant one.
Explanation:—For the purposes of this sub-
clause, “agricultural operation” does not
include any activity carried on in a plantation
as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the
Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951); or
(2) hospitals or dispensaries; or
(3) educational, scientific, research or training
institutions; or
(4) institutions owned or managed by
organisations wholly or substantially engaged
in any charitable, social or philanthropic
service; or
10

(5) khadi or village industries; or
(6) any activity of the Government relatable to
the sovereign functions of the Government
including all the activities carried on by the
departments of the Central Government
dealing with defence research, atomic energy
and space; or
(7) any domestic service; or
(8) any activity, being a profession practised
by an individual or body of individuals, if the
number of persons employed by the individual
or body of individuals in relation to such
profession is less than ten; or
(9) any activity, being an activity carried on by
a co-operative society or a club or any other
like body of individuals, if the number of
persons employed by the co-operative society,
club or other like body of individuals in
relation to such activity is less than ten.”
(underlining by us)

As the said definition had not yet been enforced, a five-Judge
Bench of this Court in Jai Bir Singh thought it necessary to refer
the matter to a larger Bench.
1.11 It is also necessary to take note of the fact that recently, the
Parliament has enacted the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (“IR
Code”, for the sake of convenience), wherein Section 2(p) defines
the word “industry” as under:

11

“ 2. Definitions. — In this Code, unless the context
otherwise requires, —
xxx
(p) “industry” means any systematic activity carried on by
co-operation between an employer and worker (whether
such worker is employed by such employer directly or by
or through any agency, including a contractor) for the
production, supply or distribution of goods or services with
a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being wants
or wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature),
whether or not,—
(i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying
on such activity; or
(ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make any
gain or profit, but does not include —
(i) institutions owned or managed by
organisations wholly or substantially engaged in
any charitable, social or philanthropic service; or
(ii) any activity of the appropriate Government
relatable to the sovereign functions of the
appropriate Government including all the
activities carried on by the departments of the
Central Government dealing with defence
research, atomic energy and space; or
(iii) any domestic service; or
(iv) any other activity as may be notified by the
Central Government;”
(underlining by us)

1.12 In the case of Coir Board, Ernakulam, Cochin vs. Indira
Devi P.S., (1998) 3 SCC 259, (“Coir Board”) the question was, as
to whether, the appellant-Coir Board, Ernakulam Cochin, that had
12

been established under the Coir Industry Act, 1953 (for short,
“1953 Act”) was an “industry” or not, to determine the applicability
of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act. A perusal of the Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the said 1953 Act revealed that the
functions of the Board under Section 10 included promotion of the
exports of coir products; regulating the production of husks; coir
yarn and coir products; encouraging and assisting scientific,
technological and economic research into the coir industry;
collecting relevant statistics; fixing standards and inspecting coir
products; improving the marketing of coconut husk and coir
products; setting up or assisting in the setting up of marketplaces
for coir products; ensuring remunerative returns for coir products;
promoting cooperative organisation among producers of coir
products; licensing of spaces to store and sell the coir products;
advising on matters relating to the coir industry and other ancillary
matters as may be prescribed. It was noted that the Coir Board
maintained showrooms and sales depots for the purpose of
marketing of coir products and contained samples of coir products
for potential manufacturers/merchants to consider. Certain
temporary clerks and typists who had been employed by the Coir
13

Board were discharged. They alleged wrongful termination that was
not in accordance with the provisions of the I.D. Act. The two-
Judge Bench of this Court, as opposed to applying the test laid
down by the seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Bangalore Water
Supply , which was binding on it, to the given factual matrix
instead proceeded to note the existence of prevailing uncertainty in
the application of the said test for over two decades, making a re-
examination of Bangalore Water Supply necessary. It was then
directed that the matter be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice
to determine if a larger Bench was to be constituted to reconsider
the decision of this Court in Bangalore Water Supply . In my
view, such a reference was entirely unwarranted and unnecessary.
1.13 Subsequently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Coir
Board, Ernakulam, Kerala State vs. Indira Devai P.S, (2000)
1 SCC 224 (“Coir Board-II”) rightly held that the judgement in
Bangalore Water Supply did not require any reconsideration on
a reference made by a two-Judge Bench of this Court, which was
bound to follow it having regard to the facts of the case.
14

Submissions:
2. We have heard learned Attorney General Sri R.
Venkataramani, learned ASG and learned senior counsel
appearing for the respective States contending the necessity of
reconsidering the judgment of this Court in Bangalore Water
Supply . We have also heard learned senior counsel Ms. Indira
Jaising, Sri Chander Uday Singh as well as other counsel who have
contended that the said judgment would not call for any
reconsideration at this point of time. We have also heard learned
senior counsel and amicus curiae Sri Partha Sarathi Sengupta and
Sri J.P. Cama who have made their submissions which are
diametrically opposed to each other.
2.1 On behalf of the Union of India, learned Attorney General for
India submitted that to determine what constitutes “industry”
under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act, one has to explain the meaning
of all the terms in the definition, such as “business”, “trade”,
“manufacture”, etc. Thus, it becomes important to gather
principles common to all such terms and activities. The principles
and tests (including the “triple test”) expounded in paragraphs 140
and 141 of Bangalore Water Supply is thus an expression of
15

factors and attributes that are common to all these activities. These
principles and tests do not seem to suffer from any inconsistencies
or fallacies.
2.2 Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act does not by itself provide any
guidance as to how inclusions or exclusions within the provision
must be considered. In this sense, Section 2(j) was a skeletal
statutory provision leaving it open to contextual interpretation by
the judiciary. In Bangalore Water Supply , the Supreme Court
gave such an exposition of the meaning of “industry” in its
understanding of what the object and purpose of the I.D. Act is.
2.3 Therefore, it was submitted that the principles laid down in
Bangalore Water Supply are not in conflict, or inconsistent, with
the definition of “industry” in Section 2(j) under a social justice
premise underlying the I.D. Act. The “triple test” is good law.
However, simultaneously, the definition of “industry” under the
1982 Amendment may be used as an interpretative tool to
circumscribe an overbroad application of the “triple test”. This
Amendment may be used in interpreting cases pending or filed as
on 21.11.2025, after which the IR Code shall apply.
16

2.4 With regard to the exclusion of sovereign functions of the
State, learned Attorney General submitted that the nature of
sovereign functions is inherently linked to the evolving role of the
State. While activities that were once sovereign in nature could
move to the realm of private enterprise, newer forms of
governmental responsibility could also emerge due to
technological, economic or institutional developments.
2.5 However, it was submitted that an indiscriminate
application of the “triple test” to sovereign/government functions
has led to an over broad interpretation of “industry” that blurs the
distinction between commercial activities and constitutionally
mandated sovereign functions. Social welfare programmes are
undertaken in discharge of the State’s constitutional and sovereign
obligations to promote public welfare and socio-economic
development. Therefore, they differ fundamentally from economic
undertakings engaged in trade, business or the commercial
production of goods and services.
2.6 It was contended that in the 1982 Amendment to the I.D.
Act, as well as the IR Code, the legislative policy indicated is an
intention to exclude welfare and sovereign governmental functions
17

from the scope of the definition of “industry”. Therefore, such
activities must remain outside the scope of “industry” even under
the original definition under the I.D. Act.
2.7 It was submitted that some functions are inherently and
inalienably sovereign, namely (i) defense of the nation; (ii)
maintenance of public order; (iii) administration of justice; (iv)
legislative and policy-making authority; (v) citizenship and
naturalisation; (vi) passports and visas; and (vii) core regulatory
and coercive powers of the State, which may relate to public
purpose or common good fields. All governance functions are all
public purpose functions. Beyond these categories, the
classification of sovereign and governmental functions is to be
contextually determined.
2.8 It was submitted that the Executive is better-positioned to
make an initial determination of whether the State considers
functions to be sovereign or of a public purpose. Judicial review
would be available to make sure that this determination is not
arbitrary or violative of constitutional provisions or principles.
However, it was submitted that judicial review should not extend
to constructing an exhaustive definition of sovereign functions.
18

2.9 Learned Attorney General further contended that it is
important to have an element of ‘severability’ in assessing
sovereign functions, i.e., that there may be activities in furtherance
of State policy that do not themselves carry a sovereign function
element. However, severability must not be applied in an overbroad
manner, which would lead to an artificial fragmentation of
governmental functions. This might restrict the State’s ability to
implement welfare programmes. It was urged that the Court must
accord importance to the functional identity of an organisation or
enterprise to determine whether it is performing a sovereign
function.
2.10 Learned Additional Solicitor General (ASG) Sri KM Nataraj,
appearing on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, submitted that
the Parliament had made an attempt through the Industrial
Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 to redefine the expression
“industry” so as to remove the ambiguities that arose on account
of the expansive interpretation given to the term in Bangalore
Water Supply . This indicates a legislative intent to restrict a
broad interpretation of “industry”. It was submitted that this
amendment may be relied upon as an interpretive aid to adopt a
19

purposive construction that restricts government departments
performing sovereign functions from being brought within the
purview of “industry”.
2.11 It was further submitted by learned ASG that the IR Code
removes interpretational ambiguities through its definition of
“industry” under Section 2(p). One of the exceptions provided in
this definition is for activities “relatable to the sovereign functions
of the appropriate Government”. The phrase “relatable to” expands
the scope of the exception to include activities that bear a nexus
with sovereign functions. The exclusion is not only of primary or
inalienable sovereign functions. The definition also excludes
institutions owned or managed by organisations wholly or
substantially engaged in a charitable, social or philanthropic
service. It further excludes domestic services from the purview of
“industry”, and also allows the Central Government to notify
additional activities that may be excluded from the ambit of
“industry”. This provides flexibility to exclude certain sectors or
activities from the ambit of regulation.
2.12 Learned ASG submitted that the British-colonial concept of
‘sovereign function’ viewed the State as an authority responsible
20

for maintaining order, administering justice and protecting
territorial integrity. Under this framework, welfare activities like
education, healthcare and social security were not under the ambit
of government functions. However, learned ASG submitted that
this understanding is at odds with India being a welfare State in
which the State is enjoined to perform various functions in the
fields of education, healthcare, social welfare, etc. in accordance
with the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the
Constitution of India. It was submitted that wherever the
government undertakes public welfare activities in discharge of its
Constitutional obligations under Part IV, such activities must be
treated as “sovereign functions” and must thus be outside the
purview of the definition of “industry”.
2.13 Learned ASG contended that public employment under the
Government is governed by a distinct legal framework.
Recruitment, service conditions, as well as safeguards against
arbitrary dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, are governed by
Articles 309 and 311 of the Constitution. In addition to these
provisions, Parliament has enacted specific statutes such as the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It provides a structured legal
21

mechanism for service disputes involving government employees.
Therefore, it was submitted that even if sovereign functions are
excluded from the ambit of the I.D. Act, government employees
remain protected through Constitutional and statutory
mechanisms.
2.14 Learned ASG argued that treating government
departments and welfare institutions as “industry” would have
negative consequences, such as making essential public services
subject to strikes and bargaining conflicts. Further, the services of
government employees would be governed by mechanisms under
the I.D. Act, which are incompatible with Constitutional service
protections.
2.15 In sum, learned ASG submitted that the IR Code must be
viewed as a clarificatory and remedial legislation, which reflects the
deliberate intention of Parliament to restrict the expansive
definition of “industry” adopted in Bangalore Water Supply and
to exclude sovereign functions including statutory obligations and
welfare responsibilities of the State from the ambit of the I.D. Act.
2.16 Sri Sanjay Hegde, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the State of Karnataka at the outset submitted that an
22

expansive definition of the term “industry” would include the
activities of Government departments which would result in
entities that could never have been covered by the I.D. Act now
being covered by its broad sweep. Therefore, by applying the
principle of noscitur a sociis , the words “industry” and
“undertaking” must be read in the context of the words that appear
alongside them, namely “trade, business and manufacture or
calling”.
2.17 It was contended that the decision of six Judges of this
Court in the case of Management of Safdarjung Hospital, New
Delhi vs. Kuldip Singh Sethi, AIR 1970 SC 1407 (“Safdarjung
Hospital”) is right. That the said decision rightly interpreted the
phrase “industry” based on a sound analysis of the text of the
definition under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
2.18 Further, the sovereign function exception to the definition
of the term “industry” as laid down by the majority in Bangalore
Water Supply is too limited, as the Government undertakes a wide
variety of activities such as regulation and planning that may
include acts such as laying down a road or acquiring property. That
acts such as these cannot be termed an “industry” when performed
23

by the Government, even if they may constitute an “industry”
otherwise.
2.19 Sri Shadan Farasat, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the State of Punjab submitted that the “triple test” as laid
down in the case of Bangalore Water Supply is too expansive.
That the overbreadth of the judgment can be corrected by including
the existence of a commercial objective as well as that of physical
or manual labour, as opposed to intellectual services, as
prerequisites in the “triple test” to consider an activity to be an
“industry” within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
2.20 That various other categories of employees already receive
protection under various specific statutory frameworks with
distinct modes of grievance redressal, thereby rendering an
expansive definition of the term “industry” under the I.D. Act
unnecessary.
2.21 Learned senior counsel Sri J.P. Cama, amicus curiae , invited
our attention to the definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the
I.D. Act, submitting that the definition comprised two parts: the
first, in the context of employers and the second, in the context of
workmen. In D.N. Banerji vs. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58
24

(“Banerji”) , this Court held that the length and breadth of the
definition was reinforced by the second part. Subsequently,
learned amicus curiae drew our attention to the definition of
“industrial dispute” under Section 2(k) of the I.D. Act, submitting
that it encompasses disputes between employers and employers,
employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen. In
sum, it was argued that the I.D. Act covers a dispute between
workmen inter se as much as it means a dispute between workmen
and employers.
2.22 With respect to charitable organisations, learned amicus
curiae submitted that pure and simple charities, such as the
government supplying free education, is not “industry”. However,
any charitable institution which contains an employer-employee
relationship is otherwise covered by the definition of “industry”. It
was contended that what is relevant is “what” the activity
performed is, rather than “who” performs the activity.
2.23 With respect to the exclusion of “regal functions”, learned
amicus curiae submitted that the element of regality itself does not
lead to a complete ouster. There might be elements of regal or
sovereign functions that are ‘industrial’. If so, then it is possible to
25

conclude that these elements are also included within the purview
of “industry”. However, in cases concerning the Defence, which is
governed by a dedicated separate law, i.e., the Armed Forces
Tribunal Act, 2007, the I.D. Act would not apply.
2.24 With respect to the “triple test” propounded by Krishna Iyer,
J. in Bangalore Water Supply, learned amicus curiae disagreed
with the principle that an employer-employee relationship is a
determinative factor. This is because even an altruistic
establishment which is clearly outside the purview of “industry”,
may have an employer-employee relationship. Instead, learned
amicus curiae submitted that the test must be two-fold,
corresponding to the separate parts of the definition of “industry”;
first, the entity must be an “industry” in the sense of the terms
used in Section 2(j), i.e., business, trade, manufacture,
undertaking or calling of employers and second, the people
employed therein must be ‘workmen’ in order to fall under the
second part of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act. These two elements – the
‘management’ and ‘labour’ elements must co-exist. An entity that
is a ‘business’, but whose employees are not ‘workmen’ (for
26

instance, if they are sales representatives) is not an “industry”, and
vice-versa .
2.25 Learned amicus curiae contended that not every “employee”
is a ‘workman’. To be a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the I.D.
Act, an employee must be engaged in at least one of the specific
categories of labour mentioned in the definition – manual,
unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory
work. In this vein, learned amicus curiae submitted that Sections
2(j) and 2(s) must coalesce. Mere employer-employee relations are
insufficient, since they exist even in non-industrial or altruistic
entities.
2.26 Learned amicus curiae contended that Krishna Iyer, J. was
not right in holding that profit motive is an irrelevant consideration
in determining whether an entity is an “industry”. Per contra , he
submitted that profit motive is a sine-qua-non for the existence of
a business, trade, etc., which are the terms under the definition of
“industry”. In this vein, learned amicus curiae contended that to be
an “industry”, an entity must fall under one of the categories
specified in the definition, i.e., business, trade, undertaking, etc.
In this regard, the doctrine of ejusdem generis would apply in
27

determining whether an entity is an “industry” in the context of the
terms specified in Section 2(j). In sum, it was submitted that
Krishna Iyer, J. erred insofar as the “triple-test” would include
activities that are not in the nature of a trade or business, such as
clubs and research institutions. The crux of the test cannot be the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, since that would
be over inclusive.
2.27 With respect to social welfare activities and schemes
undertaken by government departments, learned amicus curiae
submitted that if the intention is to make money and pay the people
concerned, it is an “industry”. However, if it is done altruistically
and without any element of financial intention or profit, then it is
not an “industry”.
2.28 Learned senior counsel, Ms. Indira Jaising, on behalf of the
Respondents at the outset submitted that there was no need to
reconsider the judgment of this Court in the case of Bangalore
Water Supply and that the reference ought to be rejected. This is
because there is no conflict between the judgments of the three-
Judge Bench of this Court in Jagannath Kondhare and the two-
Judge Bench of this Court in Pratamsingh Parmar , as the latter
28

was confined to the facts of the case and it was further held therein
that no contention had been raised that the concerned entity was
an “industry”.
2.29 It was contended that the judgment of this Court in the case
of Bangalore Water Supply was a judgement of seven Judges of
this Court, notwithstanding the dissents of Jaswant Singh and
Tulzapurkar JJ. In this context, reliance was placed on the
judgment of this Court in the case of Trimurthi Fragrances
Private Ltd. vs. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2024) 20 SCC
709 (“Trimurthi Fragrances”) .
2.30 It was further submitted that there was no basis to
reconsider the decision in the case of Bangalore Water Supply
given that all future cases would be determined by the newly
enacted IR Code. That owing to the non-enforcement of the 1982
Amendment of the I.D. Act, the interpretation in the case of
Bangalore Water Supply is the authoritative position of law that
cannot now be challenged.
2.31 It was urged that the definition of the term “industry” in
the case of Bangalore Water Supply is well-founded and based
on the classical principles of interpretation of statutes, particularly
29

beneficial statutes. These principles are to consider the plain
meaning of the section, to look at the object of the I.D. Act, read
the Preamble to the Constitution, to see how the I.D. Act achieves
that object and to interpret the words according to those principles.
2.32 It was submitted that the definition of the term “industry”
as propounded in the case of Bangalore Water Supply serves the
purpose of providing workmen with a means to address their
grievances in relation to the conditions of their employment and
assail unfair treatment. That it serves the purpose of providing a
grievance redressal mechanism for swathes of employees who
otherwise do not have any form of remedy. This is because filing a
civil suit is not a suitable substitute to the remedies available
under the provisions of the I.D. Act, as a civil court can only order
that sufficient damages must be paid to the workman in question
and cannot award reliefs such as reinstatement.
2.33 As regards the sovereign function exception, it was
contended that only those inalienable functions which could not be
subject to judicial review would be narrowly excepted. That this
could not extend to all the welfare activities of the State.
30

2.34 That in the case of charitable purposes, the exclusion of
profit motive as a determinative criterion in the definition of the
term “industry” under Section 2(p) of the IR Code, evinced the
Parliament’s acquiescence to the judgment in the case of
Bangalore Water Supply. That upon the application of the “triple
test”, if an entity was found to be an “industry”, its involvement in
charitable or social welfare activities would not be a reason to
exclude the entity from the applicability of the definition.
2.35 That the Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation (LPG)
policy adopted by the State has resulted in the strategic
disinvestment of the Government from many sectors, thereby
opening these up to the private sector. In this context, the need for
an expansive definition of the term “industry” so as to encapsulate
those who would be affected by such acts of privatisation and
concomitantly, would be without remedies that they were earlier
entitled to, was emphasised.
2.36 It was vehemently contended that the judgment of this Court
in the case of Bangalore Water Supply is necessary to ensure the
possibility of access to justice to all categories of employees,
31

including those who are not covered by either the Constitution or
specific statutes.
2.37 Learned senior counsel for the intervenor – New Trade
Union Initiative in I.A No.4/2016 in Civil Appeal No.897/2002, Sri
Chander Uday Singh, reiterating some of the contentions raised by
Ms. Indira Jaising, at the outset submitted that the judgment of
this Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply has held the
field for over forty-eight years and that the reference to a nine-
Judge Bench of this Court was entirely unwarranted. That on the
basis of the said decision, a large number of matters have been
decided and have attained finality. That it is well-established that
the reopening and reconsideration of otherwise validly decided
cases must be desisted from, except in rare cases of manifest errors
or inconsistencies.
2.38 It was submitted that reasons such as the judgment of this
Court in Bangalore Water Supply and its interpretation of the
I.D. Act being too “worker-oriented” resulting in “industrial
hazards” for those engaged in private enterprise do not pass muster
as reasons to revisit a validly decided decision of this Court.
32

2.39 It was contended that there was unanimity as on the date
of pronouncement of the said judgment among the seven Judges
of this Court that the appeal should be dismissed. That all the
seven Judges of this Court further signed the said order. It was
only a desire to record some areas of convergence and divergence
that caused Chandrachud C.J., Jaswant Singh and Tulzapurkar
JJ. to indicate that they would do so later. That the mere factum
of there being subsequently written opinions, wherein there were
some disagreements with parts of the opinion of Krishna Iyer, J.,
do not on their own indicate a lack of a clear majority.
2.40 It was submitted that there was no conflict between the
decisions of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of
Jagannath Kondhare and a two-Judge Bench of this Court in
Pratamsingh Parmar which could have led the five-Judge Bench
to refer the reconsideration of the judgment in Bangalore Water
Supply to a larger Bench in Jai Bir Singh .
2.41 Learned senior counsel Sri Vijay Hansaria, on behalf of the
respondent in Civil Appeal No.358 of 2003, submitted that the
“triple test” laid down in paragraph 140 of Bangalore Water
Supply expresses characteristics that are inherent, essential and
33

necessary for any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or
calling of employers mentioned in Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
Therefore, the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply does not
travel beyond the legislative wording or intent.
2.42 Learned senior counsel further submitted that Bangalore
Water Supply does not require reconsideration due to the
principle of ‘stare decisis’ . It was contended that binding
precedents may only be reconsidered in narrow circumstances, i.e.,
clear and compelling reasons, manifest incorrectness, erroneous
beyond all reasonable doubt, etc., and that no such circumstance
arises with regard to the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply .
It was urged that after the enforcement of the IR Code on
21.11.2025, any interpretation of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act would
only have a bearing on pending litigation and a restrictive
interpretation would affect the vested rights of workmen.
2.43 Learned senior counsel Gopal Sankaranarayanan, on behalf
of the All India Trade Union Congress, adopted the arguments of
learned senior counsel Ms. Indira Jaising and Mr. Chander Uday
Singh. However, he also specifically submitted that the following
approach may be adopted in considering whether an activity is
34

“industry” within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act – (i) to
examine only the activity to see whether it comes within the words
“undertaking”, ”calling” or “avocation”, which are the widest
phrases in the provision; (ii) to ignore who is carrying out the
activity concerned; and (iii) to ignore the motive behind the activity
as long as it is legal, since a charitable activity cannot be
unregulated. In this sense, it was contended that it is the judgment
of Chandrachud, C.J. that provides the most logical and consistent
approach to interpreting the definition of “industry” in Section 2(j)
of the I.D. Act.
2.44 Learned senior counsel further contended that with the
repeal of the I.D. Act and enactment of the IR Code, any answer to
the reference would be largely academic, since most legacy cases
have already been answered by applying Krishna Iyer, J.’s
judgment in Bangalore Water Supply and therefore any change
in the interpretation of the definition of “industry” under the
repealed I.D. Act cannot be to the disadvantage of the workmen.
2.45 It was also submitted that the distinction between
governmental/non-governmental or sovereign/non-sovereign is
entirely artificial and irrelevant. The objective of regulating the
35

relationship between employers and workers is to ensure
harmonious cooperation, which is critical even in entities
performing sovereign functions. Further, if such entities are not
included within the ambit of “industry”, there would be no
alternative remedies or equivalent mechanisms for resolving the
grievances of the workers, which was in fact why the 1982
Amendment was not enforced by the Central Government.
2.46 Learned senior counsel Sri Partha Sarathi Sengupta, who
has rendered his assistance as an amicus curiae in this matter
submitted that the test laid down in the case of Bangalore Water
Supply should continue to be applied, considering that the said
case has held the field for about half a century. In this context,
reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of
Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor
Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593, (“Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd.”).
2.47 That as the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 has
not been brought into effect, it cannot in any way supersede or
affect the interpretation of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act as propounded
in the case of Bangalore Water Supply. Also, the IR Code cannot
36

have any effect on the definition contained in the I.D. Act, as the
said Code can only have a prospective effect.
2.48 It was further contended that the definition of the term
“industry” as laid down in the case of Bangalore Water Supply is
in line with the Preambular values contained in the Constitution.
Whether reconsideration of Bangalore Water Supply is
necessary?:

3. At the outset, I state that at this point of time, the present
reference would not call for a reconsideration of the judgment in
Bangalore Water Supply for the following reasons:
Firstly, the I.D. Act has been repealed w.e.f. 21.11.2025.
Therefore, the definition of “industry” as per Section 2(j) of the
repealed I.D. Act would be applicable only to those cases which are
pending either before the Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunals,
High Courts or this Court, or those which may arise up to the said
date. Depending upon the nature of the activity, the decision as to
whether the activity would fall within the scope and ambit of the
definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act would have
to be taken and each case would depend on the facts and
circumstances on which it is premised.
37

Secondly , on the repeal of the I.D. Act, a new enactment by
way of the IR Code has now been enforced with effect from
21.11.2025. Section 2(p) of the IR Code contains the definition of
“industry” and the same has been extracted earlier. On a
comparison of the definition of “industry” as found in the I.D. Act
(since repealed) and the definition of “industry” under the IR Code,
we find that there are certain distinctions as well as commonalities.
However, we are not required to opine on the definition of
“industry” under Section 2(p) of the IR Code so as to interpret
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act and to reconsider the judgment of this
Court in Bangalore Water Supply .
the judgment of the seven-Judge Bench in
Thirdly,
Bangalore Water Supply has held the field for nearly half a
century (forty-eight years). The Tribunals and Courts have been
deciding disputes on the touchstone of the said judgment. The new
law containing a new definition cannot at all influence the
interpretation of the repealed definition of “industry” or for that
matter be a reason for a reconsideration of the judgment of this
Court in Bangalore Water Supply .
38

The doctrine of stare decisis meaning literally “to stand by
decided cases” is a cornerstone of legal systems. It requires courts
to follow prior judicial decisions when the same points of law arise
in future cases.
Bangalore Water Supply is not an isolated case. It has
become the foundation upon which both public and private actors
have structured their conduct for about five decades.
Administrative frameworks, commercial arrangements, and
individual rights have all taken form in accordance with the
understanding Bangalore Water Supply provides. Over the
years, this reliance has only deepened and spread, giving rise to a
web of settled expectations that now permeate the legal and
practical order. This is evidenced by the fact that the judgment has
been cited in at least 84 Supreme Court cases. Of these, 31 clearly
follow Bangalore Water Supply in a labour dispute, 20 follow it
in the context of principles of statutory interpretation, 10
distinguish it on facts, 18 refer to it in varying contexts while not
substantially engaging with it but approvingly citing it, and only 5
appear to doubt its correctness. Of these five, one (Bombay
Telephone Canteen Employees’ Association vs. Union of India ,
39

(1997) 6 SCC 723 , (“Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees’
Association”) has been overruled; one (Coir Board) , made a
reference for reconsideration which was later declined; two are the
orders passed in the present proceedings, and the last one
(Physical Research Laboratory vs. K.G. Sharma (1997) 4 SCC
,
257) , (“Physical Research Laboratory”) notes that Bangalore
Water Supply is not exhaustive law on the question of sovereign
functions. Therefore, Bangalore Water Supply is woven into the
warp and weft of labour law. To disturb Bangalore Water Supply
now would neither advance the law nor serve any prospective
purpose. It would merely reopen settled questions within a
framework that the Legislature itself has chosen to leave behind.
In these circumstances, fidelity to stare decisis is not an adherence
to the past for its own sake, but a practical and principled
recognition that continuity, in this case, is itself justice.
Fourthly, any challenge to the definition of “industry” under
the IR Code has to be dealt with on its own merits and on the basis
of commonality with the repealed definition and on the basis of the
judgment of this Court in Bangalore Water Supply only to the
extent it is applicable to the definition of “industry” under the IR
40

Code. Therefore at this stage, the judgment of this Court in
Bangalore Water Supply need not be interfered with.
Fifthly, this nine-Judge Bench has been called upon to
reconsider the dictum of Bangalore Water Supply rendered by a
seven-Judge Bench containing four separate opinions but with a
broadly concurring majority. The said reconsideration would be
only for the purpose of deciding the cases which are pending before
various fora, i.e., the legacy cases inasmuch as the I.D. Act has
itself been repealed. When once the Act has been repealed and has
been substituted by a new enactment, it would not be necessary or
prudent for this nine-Judge Bench to pronounce on the
correctness or otherwise of the judgment of this Court in
Bangalore Water Supply which is a seven-Judge Bench decision,
only for the purpose of reconsidering the definition of “industry”
under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act which has since been repealed. In
other words, assuming for the sake of argument that the reference
is answered to hold that Bangalore Water Supply has not been
correctly decided in as much as the ratio is not correct, it would be
applicable only to the pending cases as the definition in the
repealed I.D. Act and its interpretation may not be useful once the
41

pending cases are decided. This is because the definition of
“industry” in Section 2(p) of the IR Code has to be interpreted on
its own text and context.
The question, therefore, is not whether, Bangalore Water
Supply should continue to regulate future conduct because that
function has already been overtaken by the IR Code. The only
question is if Bangalore Water Supply should be unsettled for
the limited class of disputes to which it still applies. It is in this
altered context that the rationale for overruling Bangalore Water
Supply is further weakened. The usual justification for departing
from precedent, namely, the need to correct the law going forward,
has little purchase where the old governing law (in this case, the
ID Act) has itself been superseded by a new law (in this case, the
IR Code). As such, any reconsideration of Bangalore Water
Supply would operate almost entirely retrospectively, unsettling
rights and liabilities that arose under the ID Act regime which is
no longer in force.
I find that in the above circumstances, it would be appropriate
on our part to not interfere with the dictum in Bangalore Water
Supply and instead, leave it to the Labour Courts, Tribunals, High
42

Courts and, where cases are pending before this Court, to be
decided on the basis of the said judgment as applicable to the facts
and circumstances of each case and without being influenced by
the definition of “industry” under Section 2(p) of the IR Code.

Sixthly, I find that any pronouncement on the correctness or
otherwise of the judgment of this Court in Bangalore Water
Supply would definitely cast its shadow on the definition of
“industry” under Section 2(p) of the IR Code. Rather, we find that
it would be appropriate for the IR Code to be interpreted having
regard to the wording of Section 2(p) therein which defines
“industry”. The new definition of “industry” in Section 2(p) of the
IR Code cannot result in a reconsideration of the judgment of this
Court in Bangalore Water Supply so as to tailor an interpretation
to suit the definition of “industry” under the Section 2(p) of the IR
Code. I also wish to add the caveat that I have not said anything
on the definition of “industry” under Section 2(p) of the IR Code.
Seventhly, I am also of the view that the interpretation of the
definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act in
Bangalore Water Supply has held the field for almost half a
43

century (48 years) since the year 1978. Any reconsideration of the
said dictum at this stage when the definition of “industry” is at the
cusp of being in a new avatar under Section 2(p) of the IR Code
would only unsettle the law applicable under Section 2(j) of the I.D.
Act to the pending cases. Such a situation may result in remand of
cases to the original forum for a reconsideration of the applicability
of the I.D. Act to the pending disputes and consequently result in
fresh revisions, etc., to the higher forum only on the aspect of the
application of the interpretation to be given to Section 2(j) of the
repealed I.D. Act. This would not be in the interest of the parties
engaged in industrial disputes under the repealed I.D. Act as delay,
costs and uncertainty, owing to the reconsideration of the
judgment in Bangalore Water Supply, are not in the interest of
any party or industrial peace. Therefore, only the question of
application of the said interpretation to pending cases would not
entail a reconsideration of the said dictum, particularly having
regard to the fact that the definition of “industry” in Section 2(j) of
the I.D. Act itself is no longer on the statute book and has been
repealed w.e.f. 21.11.2025 and the IR Code has been enforced.
Why should this larger bench of nine Judges embark upon an
44

exercise of interpreting the definition of “industry” under Section
2(j) of the I.D. Act which itself has been repealed? I am of the view
that the entire exercise is now rendered wholly academic and for
this reason also, the reference need not be answered.
Eighthly, there is one more aspect to be taken note of. When
the definition of “industry” was interpreted under Section 2(j) of the
I.D. Act, there were a considerable number of activities which were
undertaken by the Central or State Governments but were not
sovereign functions stricto sensu. On the other hand,
Chandrachud, C.J. in his opinion has expressed that although
running a mint is an activity which is solely within the realm of the
Central Government and is a sovereign function, nevertheless it
would fall within the definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of
the I.D. Act. This means that many activities of the Central or State
Governments which are in the nature of welfare activities or
activities being carried out in a commercial sense or even with or
without profit motives have also been included in the definition of
“industry” under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act, and only certain
activities which are stricto sensu sovereign functions of the State
have been excluded. Therefore, merely because certain activities
45

are being performed by the State does not mean that they are ipso
facto to be excluded from the reach of the said definition. This
would be contrary to the object and purpose of the I.D. Act.
Ninthly, if the Parliament had indeed wanted a different
interpretation than the one offered by this Court in Bangalore
Water Supply , it could have inserted/substituted a new provision
or amended the existing one, to such effect. Keeping precisely this
in mind, the Parliament passed the Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Bill, 1982, which sought to enact a restrictive
definition of industry, one excluding nine categories of
establishment that would otherwise qualify as “industry” under the
‘triple test’ laid down in Bangalore Water Supply . Yet, even after
the passage of the Bill, it was not notified and the ‘triple test’ laid
down in Bangalore Water Supply has effectively remained
untouched. This, by itself, should be taken to mean that
Bangalore Water Supply and the interpretation of “industry”
taken therein had the implicit approval of the Executive and the
Parliament. I say so for two reasons: first, a law that remains
unnotified is, in effect, inchoate. It is, at best, an expression of
legislative intent that has not ripened into operative command.
46

Until such time as it is brought into force, it lacks the capacity to
displace the earlier law declared by this Court. The field, therefore,
continues to be governed by the binding pronouncement of the
Court in Bangalore Water Supply which remains the only
effective statement of law on the point till such time. Second, the
Executive, having consciously refrained from notifying the
enactment, must be taken to have acquiesced to the continuance
of the judicial determination in Bangalore Water Supply . The
power to bring a statute into force is not incidental to its passage.
It is a distinct and separate power. It is for that reason statutes
are often brought into force on a date appointed by the Executive,
to allow, for example, the creation of subordinate legislation or
administrative preparedness. The Parliament has also not debated
about the amendment not being enforced all these decades.
Therefore, where such power to notify is not exercised, the
resulting inaction reflects a deliberate decision to allow the status
quo to endure.
Tenthly, in Bangalore Water Supply , this Court considered
a variety of activities in the backdrop of the state of the economy,
the mood of the nation and the object and purpose of the I.D. Act,
47

which has been discussed above. Moreover, a watershed moment
in the Indian economy was in the year 1991, when the Union
Government headed by the then Prime Minister Sri P.V. Narasimha
Rao initiated a slew of reforms in the economy and in the
administration so as to bring about Liberalisation, Privatisation
and Globalisation (LPG). This could be aptly discussed at this
stage. This is relevant because many of the activities earlier
performed by the State/Central Governments have since been
privatised and private players by themselves or by a public-private
partnership arrangement have been carrying on a variety of
developmental and welfare projects/schemes/ programmes. These
activities in the hands of, inter alia , private parties, would employ
employees/workmen and their interests have to be protected under
the I.D. Act by giving the meaning to the word “industry” as
interpreted in the judgment of this Court in Bangalore Water
Supply . Therefore, for this reason also, the said judgment cannot
be watered down to the detriment of the employees/workmen.
“From 1950 to 1991: Planned economy to Liberalisation,
Privatisation and Globalisation (“LPG”):
4. Like many countries attaining liberation from colonial rule,
the immediate task before independent India was to alleviate its
48

population from poverty and systematically organise its economy.
To that end, India adopted a mixed economy model wherein both
public and private sectors could coexist. Turning to command
economies, the Indian State sought to triumph over inter-regional
disparities in resources and development through economic
planning, an approach that had proven successful in command
economies to bring sustained transformation of resources and
implementation of plans in national interest rather than inefficient
allocation of resources.
4.1 Buttressed by the Bombay Plan, proposed by influential
industrialists, the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 and the
over-expansive vision of the State shared by nearly every political
party, the early years of the Indian Government saw it play a
dominant role in the setting up of heavy enterprises, thereby being
a controller of the economy and resources. Consequently, the
market was not merely strongly regulated but also led by the public
sector, which manifested as State interventions and regulations
with the aim of protecting indigenous industries.
4.2 With that insight, the Planning Commission was set up in
the year 1950 to oversee the entire range of planning, including
49

resource allocation, implementation and appraisal of five-year
plans under the leadership of the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru. In 1951, deterred by the significant loss of foreign reserves
on food imports, India’s First Five-Year Plan focused on agriculture
and irrigation to boost farm output. Some scholars tout this as a
success as the economy grew at 3.6%, instead of the target of 2.1%.
Soon thereafter, the Second Plan, launched in 1956, saw deficit
financing as an acceptable tool for much needed rapid
industrialisation and self-reliance focusing on heavy industries
and capital goods. Coupled with the Industrial Policy Resolution of
1956, the Second Plan initiated the development of the public
sector and ushered in the Licence Raj . The resolution, adopted by
the Parliament in 1956, enumerated as a national objective the
establishment of a socialistic pattern of society and categorised
industries into three groups:
- Schedule A: Industries which were to be exclusively in the
public sector. These were industries of basic and strategic
importance;

- Schedule B: Industries that were to be progressively State
owned and the State would generally set up new enterprises
50

but in which private enterprise would only be expected to
supplement the State effort; and

- Schedule C: All the remaining industries, and their future
development was, in general, left to the initiative and
development of the private sector. However, it was left open to
the State and the private sector was still subject to the Licence
Raj .
4.3 This over-expansion of State control enabled it to undertake
large-scale projects without either reliance on, negotiations with,
or even competition from, the private sector. The construction of
the Bhakra-Nangal Dam, Hirakund Dam, etc., as well as steel
plants in Rourkela, Bhillai and Durgapur were touted by the State
as new “temples of a modern India”.
4.4 However, the substantial peril of curbing the invisible hand
of the economy and enterprising spirit of the private sector was that
the economic policy restricted India to the earmarked industries
and ignored new technologies, innovations and domains that,
though transforming, were not in the horizons of the bureaucracy.
On the other hand, funds were also substantially reallocated away
from agriculture, thereby causing food shortages and a spike in
51

inflation. Furthermore, the State was forced to import foodgrains
which depleted foreign exchange reserves.
4.5 Under the leadership of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri,
the Indian Government was convinced that in the domain of
agriculture, it needed to loosen its tight strings on centralised
planning and price controls and instead focus on technological
development. With India transforming into a food-sufficient and
self-reliant entity after the Green Revolution and introduction of
the Minimum Support Price regime, the role of the Planning
Commission was trimmed.
4.6 In the second half of the 1960s, the severe drought of 1965
increased food grain imports and consequently exacerbated the
balance of payments crisis. To counter the same, in June 1966, the
Union Government devalued the Indian rupee by a sharp 57%,
thereby accelerating inflation although it was aimed at boosting
exports.
4.7 Monumentally, to expand the sources of credit and monitor
the banking system as per the control of the Government’s
planning and economic policy, the Government nationalised
fourteen private banks on 20.07.1969. It was thought that the aim
52

of financial inclusion and ready access to credit for small
agriculturalists could be achieved by State control of the banking
system. Agnostic of immediate profit motive and credit-worthiness,
Banks operated and expanded to the ‘un-banked’. However, in due
course, it has been observed that limited competition and poor
credit assessment severely hampered the efficiency and health of
the banking system.
4.8 Around the 1980s, there was a rising realisation of the harm
from protectionist policies and the merits of a market-led economy.
Therefore, the Sixth Five-Year Plan marked the beginning of
economic liberalisation in India and outlined a series of measures
aimed at boosting the economy’s competitiveness. Notable steps
included removal of large-scale price controls; reductions in import
duties and the beginning of the end of the Licence Raj . In the
following years, large-scale efforts were undertaken to usher in
information technology and telecom revolutions in the country
along with promoting exports and the utility of foreign investment
and capital goods.
4.9 The political economy of the country from the 1950s till the
late 1980s had made it apparent that the underlying political
53

current and rhetoric of an idyllic but industrial society based on a
socialistic pattern had been failing to deliver on the hopes of a
modern lifestyle and Indians’ entrepreneurial spirit. This is despite
the five technological missions initiated in the mid-1980s. It is not
uncertain that the deficit spending of the 1980s led by high
external debt, double-digit inflation, short-term debt reaching
147% of foreign exchange reserves, etc., led to a macroeconomic
crisis that India found itself in at the end of the 1980s. In this
backdrop, amidst a series of negotiations and policy reforms, Prime
Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao spoke to the nation on 09.07.1991 of
the impending need to bring in far-reaching changes and reforms
that would bolster the economy and take it to a modern globalised
world. Recounting the difficulties, he said:
“…For the last eighteen months, there has been paralysis
on the economic front. The last two governments
postponed taking vital decisions. The fiscal position was
allowed to deteriorate. The balance-of-payment crisis
became unmanageable. Non-resident Indians and foreign
leaders became more and more reluctant to lend money to
India.
Consequently, India’s external reserves declined steeply,
and we had no foreign exchange to import even such
essential commodities as diesel, kerosene, edible oil, and
fertiliser. The net result was that when we came to power,
we found the financial position of the country in a terrible
mess. …”

54

4.10 The New Industrial Policy of 1991 put an end to the
shackles that bound the Indian industry into inefficiency and non-
competitiveness. While the opening up of the economy was
gradual, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969
was diluted, allowing market players to scale up without
government approval and automatic approvals for Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) with majority holding and qualifiable foreign
technological agreements were assured along with many other
solutions. One of the many recognisable inflection points in India
was the Budget Speech of 1991 delivered by India’s then Finance
Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh on 24.07.1991 who later became
the Prime Minister of India, who, whilst paraphrasing Victor Hugo
said, “No power on earth can stop an idea whose time has come”.
4.11 The reforms that were to follow have been colloquially
termed as Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation (LPG). In
practice, the country saw the dismantling of the Licence Raj , some
years later an active disinvestment framework and quite openly, an
expression of willingness to let globalised market forces signal
directions to the economy.
55

4.12 Having seen India’s potential and political commitment to a
modern market economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
provided assistance leading to macroeconomic stabilisation. In the
years since, several policies such as import liberalisation,
unrestricted FDI inflows in some sectors, tax exemptions,
promotion of exports, etc., have been adopted, which would have
seemed antithetical to the very idea and core of the Indian economy
to the most earnest well-wishers of India only two decades prior
thereto.
4.13 While the status of health or inequity indicators is not being
used as an aid for constitutional interpretation, we must also note
that the Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation Policy (“LPG
policy” of 1991) can also be credited for providing the much needed
impetus to the Central and State Governments for fulfilling several
goals set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy which had
earlier been difficult to achieve.
4.14 The golden thread throughout India’s economic history
post-independence has been to focus on a transformative socio-
economic growth of the people of India by way of experimentation
through various plans, projects and pipe dreams. The mid-1980s
56

was a turning point when the need for innovation, modernisation
and concomitant avenues for development through five major
technology reforms ushered in the Reforms of 1991 as the country
faced shortages in foreign exchange reserves and there was a crisis
in balance of payments. There has been no looking back since then
including ushering in various schemes/programmes for the welfare
of the people which earlier had not really percolated to deserving
and eligible citizens.
4.15 It is in the period between the late 1960s and early 1980s
that this Court gleaned the thrust to the economic policies of the
State and sought to provide a judicial imprimatur for the success
of the economic policies. Thus, bank nationalisation, road
transport nationalisation, amendments to Land Reforms laws,
urban land ceiling laws, acquisition of lands, abolition of land
tenures, etc. were upheld by this Court while at the same time
tightening the powers of amendment of the Constitution. This was
by the evolution of the basic structure doctrine which found its
voice in Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru vs. State of
Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 (“Kesavananda Bharati”) and was
perpetuated in Minerva Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1980
57

SC 1789 (“Minerva Mills”) and Waman Rao vs. Union of India,
AIR 1981 SC 271, (“Waman Rao”) . Recently, in Property
Owners’ Association vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 18 SCC
1, (“Property Owners’ Association”) a nine-Judge Bench of this
Court has affirmed the judgment in Minerva Mills .
4.16 One cannot lose sight of the precarious condition that India
was in when it gained Independence in August, 1947 and at the
dawn of the Republic in January, 1950. The provisions of the
Constitution have hence sought to achieve a transformation in the
socio-economic conditions of the people of India given the situation
as it emerged in the colonial period. The transition of the Indian
economy towards privatisation and liberalisation is ultimately for
the welfare of the people of India. Heavy capital investment in the
public sector in the early decades after Independence and its
failure to yield good results in the subsequent decades and the
move towards disinvestment and privatisation are all experiments
in achieving the constitutional goals which are constant, but the
path to achieve them may vary with the passage of time. It is in the
above backdrop that the judgments of this Court must be viewed.
58

4.17 In the context of this Reference, what has to be distilled
from the aforesaid discussion is the fact that the growth of
“industry” in India and its contribution to the economy must be
viewed with the development of the economy along with the
industrial policies being implemented from time to time. At the
dawn of independence, the thinking was that State-propelled
industry was the requirement and there was hardly any private
capital investment in industry except limited to certain industrial
families and oligarchies. Further, with the entrenchment of State
control through the Licence Raj, there was hardly any incentive for
industrial investment. The stringent financial position which the
State was faced with in the 1980s ultimately led to the opening of
the economy. Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation (LPG)
was embraced by the Indian economy with the view to, inter alia,
privatise all those State-sponsored or State-managed industries by
handing over of certain industrial units, entities and the
production of goods and services to private hands.
4.18 This significant development in the Indian economy has
resulted in not only private investment in Indian industry but also
growth of industrial production of goods as well as proliferation of
59

the service sector in the Indian economy. Privatisation, inter alia ,
implies that whatever activities were undertaken by the State as a
State-owned or State sponsored project or programme is now being
conducted by private entities or under a public-private
partnership. Therefore, workmen or employees who were working
for public sector units were transformed as workmen or employees
of the private sector. It is in this context that protection of workmen
as envisaged under the I.D. Act assumes relevance and
significance.
4.19 If the provisions of the I.D. Act have to apply to workmen, it
could be only to those who are employed in an “industry” within
the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act. If that is so, a narrowly
tailored definition of “industry” would not assist in maintaining
industrial peace, protection of workmen and employers which are
envisaged under the scheme of the I.D. Act. If this singular factor
is to be borne in mind, then, the interpretation of the definition of
“industry” in Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act has to be broad-based as
per the majority opinion of the Judges of the seven-Judge Bench
and not narrowly tailored.
60


Industrial Policies from 1951 onwards: A Bird’s eye view:
5. In this regard, it would be useful to have a bird’s eye view of
the industrial policies from the year 1951 onwards which have
been enunciated in India.
5.1 The first Industrial Policy in 1948 delineated industries into
four categories. The first (arms and ammunitions, atomic energy
and rail transport) was under the exclusive monopoly of the Central
Government , the second (6 basic industries) was reserved for the
State unless private cooperation was deemed necessary ; the third
(18 industries) was open to the private sector albeit under State
regulation and control ; and the fourth, i.e., the rest of the
industries were left to private enterprise.
5.2 A significant step was the enactment of the Industrial
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, which introduced the
‘licensing’ power of the State to regulate industrial development in
a centralised manner so as to benefit industrial development under
a regulatory regime.
5.3 The next Industrial Policy in 1956 proceeded on the premise
that Parliament had accepted the socialistic pattern of society as
61

the objective of social and economic policy. In its estimation, it was
essential to develop ‘heavy’ and ‘machine-making’ industries, to
expand the public sector and to build up the cooperative sector. In
accomplishing this, the State would assume a predominant
responsibility for setting up industries and transport facilities. An
increasing proportion of private sector activities were to be
developed along co-operative lines.
5.4 Concomitant with these principles was the classification of
industries into three categories:
a) Schedule A: Industries, the future development of which would
be the exclusive responsibility of the State.
b) Schedule B: Industries which would be primarily State-owned.
However, the private sector would supplement the effort of the
State.
c) All remaining industries would fall in the third category, in
which it was expected that their development would take place
by the private sector, although the State was also open to start
any such “industry”.
62

5.5 An extension of this Policy was subsequently brought forth
in the form of the Industrial Policy Statement of 1977, which
focused on the promotion of small and cottage industries in rural
areas and small towns.
5.6 Subsequent policies saw a turn towards liberalisation. The
Industrial Policy Statement of 1980 saw policy changes reflecting
liberalisation. For instance, licensed capacities were allowed to be
automatically expanded up to 25% and ‘broadbanding’ was
permitted in some industries, i.e., industries were allowed to
produce other items in a similar category, without having to apply
for a separate license. The year 1985 saw the delicensing of twenty
five broad industrial categories. For many of the remaining
industries, broadbanding was extended as a benefit.
5.7 These gradual relaxations culminated in the watershed New
Economic Policy of 1991, whose effects have been described earlier.
By 2020, only a few industries such as electronic aerospace,
defence equipment, hazardous chemicals, etc., remained under the
licensing regime. Ten out of the eighteen industries previously
reserved for the public sector were now opened to the private
sector.
63

5.8 In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my view, the decision
of the seven-Judge Bench in Bangalore Water Supply would not
call for any reconsideration. I am of the view that the same
continues to hold the field and is more relevant in the present
scenario.
5.9 Despite the aforesaid reasons and discussion, we however
wish to answer the reference by analysing the judgment of this
Court in Bangalore Water Supply .
5.10 Apart from there being a perceived conflict of opinion as to,
whether, Social Forestry activity comes within the expression
“industry”, as interpreted by the seven-Judge Bench of this Court
in Bangalore Water Supply , another reason was indicated by the
five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh . The five-Judge Bench was of
the opinion that the interpretation given to the word “industry” in
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act was not clear as there were four separate
opinions rendered by the seven-Judge Bench and therefore, a
larger Bench must settle the law. Hence, at this juncture, we distill
the separate opinions rendered by the seven-Judge Bench. This is
in order to ascertain whether the reference to a Larger Bench was
necessary or not. Also, the correctness or otherwise of the
64

judgment in Bangalore Water Supply could also be gone into for
the purpose of answering the questions framed on 16.02.2026.
Bangalore Water Supply:
6. By order dated 21.01.1976 passed in the case of Bangalore
Water Supply (a copy of which has been made available to the
Court by learned Attorney General), a three-Judge Bench of this
Court presided by Krishna Iyer, J., the other two Judges being A.C.
Gupta and N.L. Untwalia, JJ. referred the question, as to whether,
the judgment in Safdarjung Hospital which is a decision of six
Judges was correct or not, to a larger Bench. It was in the above
backdrop that a larger Bench of seven-Judge was constituted in
the case.
6.1 In Bangalore Water Supply , which is a seven-Judge Bench
decision, Krishna Iyer, J. (for himself, Bhagwati and Desai, JJ.)
penned an opinion and Beg, C.J., while generally being in
agreement with the line of thinking adopted and the conclusions
reached by Krishna Iyer, J., nevertheless added his own reasons
for his agreement. These opinions were delivered on 21.02.1978.
However, thereafter on 07.04.1978, Chandrachud, C.J. (as the
learned Chief Justice who succeeded Beg, C.J.), while agreeing
65

with Krishna Iyer, J., nevertheless elaborated on the areas of
concurrence with the judgment rendered by Krishna Iyer, J.
Further, Jaswant Singh, J. (for himself and for Tulzapurkar, J.)
rendered a separate opinion indicating their areas of concurrence
and divergence and opined that the Legislature must step in with
a comprehensive bill to clear up the fog and remove the doubts and
set at rest once and for all the controversy which crops up from
time to time in relation to the meaning of the term “industry”,
rendering it necessary for larger benches of this Court to be
constituted, which are driven to the necessity of evolving a working
formula to cover particular cases.
6.2 However, the thinking that there was no consensus arrived
at on the interpretation to be given to the definition of the word
“industry” under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act by the seven-Judge
Bench was one of the reasons for the reference to a larger Bench
in Jai Bir Singh .
6.3 In the above backdrop, it would be useful to distill the
opinions of the respective Judges in Bangalore Water Supply in
order to ascertain the necessity for a reference to a nine-Judge
Bench.
66

Opinion of Krishna Iyer, J. (for himself, Bhagwati and Desai,
JJ.):

7. On considering the submissions advanced at the bar in
paragraph 46 of Bangalore Water Supply , the following questions
were raised:
“46. …
(1) (a) Are establishments, run without profit motive,
industries?
(b) Are charitable institutions industries?
(c) Do undertakings governed by a no-profit-no-
loss rule, statutorily or otherwise fastened, fall
within the definition in Section 2(j)?
(d) Do clubs or other organisations (like the
Y.M.C.A.) whose general emphasis is not on
profit-making but fellowship and self-service,
fit into the definitional circle?
(e) To go to the core of the matter, is it an
inalienable ingredient of ‘industry’ that it
should be plied with a commercial object?
(2) (a) Should cooperation between employer and
employee be direct insofar as it relates to the
basic service or essential manufacture which
is the output of the undertaking?
(b) Could a lawyer's chambers or chartered
accountant's office, a doctor's clinic or other
liberal profession's occupation or calling be
designated an industry?
(c) Would a university or college or school or
research institute be called an industry?

67

(3) (a) Is the inclusive part of the definition in Section
2 relevant to the determination of an industry?
If so, what impact does it make on the
categories?
(b) Do domestic service drudges who slave without
respite — become ‘industries’ by this extended
sense?
(4) Are governmental functions, stricto sensu ,
industrial and if not, what is the extent of the
immunity of instrumentalities of government?”

7.1 While surveying the decisions of this Court right from
Banerji; Corporation of the City of Nagpur vs. Employees (in
CA No.143 of 1959), AIR 1960 SC 675 (“Corporation of the City
of Nagpur”); State of Bombay vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR
1960 SC 610 (“Hospital Mazdoor Sabha”); Baroda Borough
Municipality vs. Workmen, AIR 1957 SC 110, (“Baroda
Borough Municipality”) as well as cases arising from overseas
jurisdictions, Krishna Iyer, J. affirmed the view that monetary
considerations for service is not an essential characteristic of an
“industry” in a modern State. It was further observed that services,
so long as they form a part of the wealth of a nation, such as
educational services as a form of wealth, are industrial in nature.
This was observed by relying on the dictum of Isaacs, J. in
Federated State School Teachers’ Association at Australia vs.
68

State of Victoria, (1929) 41 CLR 569 , (“ School Teachers’
Association at Australia”) which was also quoted by Subba Rao,
J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in Corporation of the
City of Nagpur .
7.2 While referring to the judgment of this Court in Corporation
of the City of Nagpur and with particular reference to Subba Rao,
J.’s opinion, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J. that two seminal
guidelines of great moment flow from this decision: (i) the primary
and predominant activity test; and (ii) the integrated activity test.
The concrete application of these tests is illustrated in the case of
Corporation of the City of Nagpur . Subba Rao, J.’s views in the
aforesaid case were extracted which, for immediate reference, are
extracted as under:
“17. …
‘The result of the discussion may be summarized thus:
(1) The definition of ‘industry’ in the Act is very
comprehensive. It is in two parts: one part defines it
from the standpoint of the employer and the other
from the standpoint of the employee. If an activity
falls under either part of the definition, it will be an
industry within the meaning of the Act.
(2) The history of industrial disputes and the legislation
recognizes the basic concept that the activity shall
be an organized one and not that which pertains to
private or personal employment.
69

(3) The regal functions described as primary and
inalienable functions of State though statutorily
delegated to a corporation are necessarily excluded
from the purview of the definition. Such regal
functions shall be confined to legislative power,
administration of law and judicial power.
(4) If a service rendered by an individual or private
person would be an industry, it would equally be an
industry in the hands of a corporation.
(5) If a service rendered by a corporation is an industry,
the employees in the departments connected with
that service, whether financial, administrative or
executive, would be entitled to the benefits of the
Act.
(6) If a department of a municipality discharges many
functions, some pertaining to industry as defined in
the Act and other non-industrial activities, the
predominant functions of the department shall be
the criterion for the purpose of the Act.”
(underlining by us)

7.3 In paragraph 91, Krishna Iyer, J. observed as under:
“91. Running right through are three tests:
( a ) the paramount and predominant duty criterion (p.
971);
( b ) the specific service being an integral, non-severable
part of the same activity (p. 960), and
( c ) the irrelevance of the statutory duty aspect.”

7.4 Referring to Gajendragadkar, J.’s, interpretation of the
definition “industry” in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha , the same was
extracted by Krishna Iyer, J. as under:
70

“94. …
The positive delineation of “industry” is set in these
terms:
“... as a working principle it may be stated that an
activity systematically or habitually undertaken for
the production or distribution of goods or for the
rendering of material services to the community at
large or a part of such community with the help of
employees is an undertaking. Such an activity
generally involves the co-operation of the employer
and the employees; and its object is the satisfaction
of material human needs. It must be organised or
arranged in a manner in which trade or business is
generally organised or arranged. It must not be
casual nor must it be for oneself nor for pleasure.
Thus the manner in which the activity in question is
organised or arranged, the condition of the co-
operation between employer and the employee
necessary for its success and its object to render
material service to the community can be regarded
as some of the features which are distinctive of
activities to which Section 2( j ) applies. Judged by
this test there would be no difficulty in holding that
the State is carrying on an undertaking when it runs
the group of hospitals in question.”
Again,
“It is the character of the activity which decides the
question as to whether the activity in question
attracts the provision of Section 2(7); who conducts
the activity and whether it is conducted for profit or
not do not make a material difference.”
(underlining by us)

7.5 However, the aforesaid definition was not quite accepted by
Krishna Iyer, J.
71

7.6 Also, in the context of liberal professions, callings, services,
or undertakings, two reasons given by Gajendragadkar, J. in
Hospital Mazdoor Sabha were adumbrated as under:
i. Doctrine of direct co-operation and the features of liberal
professions were given as good reasons to barricade
professional enterprises from the militant clamour for more by
lay labour; and
ii. That the very concept of the liberal professions has its own
special and distinctive features which do not readily permit the
inclusion of the liberal professions into the four corners of
industrial law. The essential basis of an industrial dispute is
that it is a dispute arising between capital and labour in
enterprises where capital and labour combine to produce
commodities or to render service.
7.7 That this essential basis would be absent in the case of
liberal professions.
7.8 While examining the aforesaid two tests, it was observed by
Krishna Iyer, J. that the established professions namely law,
medicine and the clergy held or continued to hold estate-like
positions. However, in paragraph 110, it was observed that the
72

exclusion of the professions would adversely affect the statutory
intent and effect. In this context, paragraph 110 of the judgment of
Krishna Iyer, J. reads as under:
“110. Many callings may clamour to be regarded as liberal
professions. In an age when traditions have broken down
and the old world professions of liberal descent have begun
to resort to commercial practices (even legally, as in
America, or factually, as in some other countries)
exclusion under this new label will be infliction of injury
on the statutory intent and effect.”
(underlining by us)

7.9 Consequently, it was held that the National Union of
Commercial Employees vs. M.R. Meher, Industrial Tribunal,
Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 1080 (“Solicitors’ Case”) was wrongly
decided. It was also observed that University of Delhi vs. Ram
Nath, AIR 1963 SC 1873, (“Ram Nath”) was wrongly decided, as
education can be and is, in its institutional form, an “industry”.
7.10 In the context of charitable institutions, three categories of
charitable institutions were identified as under:
“126. The first is one where the enterprise, like any other,
yields profits but they are siphoned off for altruistic
objects. The second is one where the institution makes no
profit but hires the services of employees as in other like
businesses but the goods and services, which are the
output, are made available, at low or no cost, to the
indigent needy who are priced out of the market. The third
is where the establishment is oriented on a humane
73

mission fulfilled by men who work, not because they are
paid wages, but because they share the passion for the
cause and derive job satisfaction from their contribution.
The first two are industries, the third not.”
(underlining by us)

7.11 There was also a discussion on whether research institutes
involve collaboration between employers and employees, and it was
observed that even though such institutes are run without a profit
motive, they are nevertheless “industries”.
7.12 In the case of clubs, it was held that even though there may
be an absence of employer-employee cooperation in clubs and they
are exclusive and cater to the needs and pleasures of the members
and not the community as such, nevertheless, they come within
the definition of “industry”.
7.13 It was further observed that Secretary, Madras
Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union vs. Management of the
Gymkhana Club, AIR 1968 SC 554 (“Gymkhana Club”) and
Cricket Club of India Ltd. vs. Bombay Labour Union, AIR 1969
SC 276, (“Cricket Club of India Ltd.”) were not decided correctly.
8. Cooperative Societies too were held to be industries under
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
74

8.1 A reading of paragraphs 159-160 encapsulating the earlier
decisions rendered by this Court also makes for interesting reading
and the relevant part is extracted as under:
“160. …It behoves us, therefore, hopefully to abolish
blurred edges, illumine penumbral areas and overrule
what we regard as wrong. Hesitancy, half-tones and
hunting with the hounds and running with the hare can
claim heavy penalty in the shape of industrial confusion,
adjudicatory quandary and administrative perplexity at a
time when the nation is striving to promote employment
through diverse strategies which need, for their smooth
fulfilment, less stress and distress, more mutual
understanding and trust based on a dynamic rule of law
which speaks clearly, firmly and humanely. If the salt of
law lose its savour of progressive certainty wherewith shall
it be salted? So we proceed to formulate the principles,
deducible from our discussion, which are decisive,
positively and negatively, of the identity of “industry”
under the Act. We speak, not exhaustively, but to the
extent covered by the debate at the bar and, to that extent,
authoritatively, until overruled by a larger Bench or
superseded by the legislative branch.”
(underlining by us)

8.2 Ultimately, in paragraph 161, Krishna Iyer, J. observed as
under:
“161. “Industry', as defined in Section 2( j ) and explained
in Banerji (AIR 1953 SC 58) , has a wide import.
(a) Where (i) systematic activity, (ii) organized by co-
operation between employer and employee (the direct and
substantial element is chimerical) (iii) for the production
and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to
satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious
but inclusive of material things or services geared to
75

celestial bliss e.g. making, on a large scale prasad or food),
prima facie , there is an ‘industry’ in that enterprise.
(b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is
irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private or
other sector.
(c) The true focus is functional and the decisive test is
the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the
employer-employee relations.
(d) If the organization is a trade or business it does not
cease to be one because of philanthropy animating the
undertaking.
II. Although Section 2( j ) uses words of the widest
amplitude in its two limbs, their meaning cannot be
magnified to overreach itself.
(a) ‘Undertaking’ must suffer a contextual and
associational shrinkage as explained in Banerji and in this
judgment; so also, service, calling and the like. This yields
the inference that all organized activity possessing the
triple elements in I, although not trade or business, may
still be ‘industry’ provided the nature of the activity , viz. the
employer-employee basis, bears resemblance to what we
find in trade or business. This takes into the fold of
‘industry’ undertakings, callings and services, adventures
‘analogous to the carrying on the trade or business’. All
features, other than the methodology of carrying on the
activity viz. in organizing the co-operation between
employer and employee, may be dissimilar. It does not
matter, if on the employment terms there is analogy.
III. Application of these guidelines should not stop short of
their logical reach by invocation of creeds, cults or inner
sense of incongruity or outer sense of motivation for or
resultant of the economic operations. The ideology of the
Act being industrial peace, regulation and resolution of
industrial disputes between employer and workmen, the
range off this statutory ideology must inform the reach of
the statutory definition. Nothing less, nothing more.
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(a) The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) clubs, (iii)
educational institutions, (iv) co-operatives, (v) research
institutes, (vi) charitable projects, and (vii) other kindred
adventures, if they fulfil the triple tests listed in I, cannot
be exempted from the scope of Section 2(j).
(b) A restricted category of professions, clubs, co-
operatives and even gurukulas and little research labs,
may qualify for exemption if, in simple ventures,
substantially and, going by the dominant nature criterion,
substantively, no employees are entertained but in
minimal matters, marginal employees are hired without
destroying the non-employee character of the unit.
(c) If, in a pious or altruistic mission many employ
themselves, free or for small honoraria or like return,
mainly drawn by sharing in the purpose or cause, such as
lawyers volunteering to run a free legal services clinic or
doctors serving in their spare hours in a free medical
centre or ashramites working at the bidding of the
holiness, divinity or like central personality, and the
services are supplied free or at nominal cost and those who
serve are not engaged for remuneration or on the basis of
master and servant relationship, then, the institution is
not an industry even if stray servants, manual or
technical, are hired. Such eleemosynary or like
undertakings alone are exempt — not other generosity,
compassion, developmental passion or project.
IV. The dominant nature test:
(a) Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify for
exemption, others not, involves employees on the total
undertaking, some of whom are not ‘workmen’ as in
the University of Delhi case [ University of
v. , (1964) 2 SCR 703 : AIR 1963 SC 1873 :
Delhi Ramlfath
(1963) 2 Lab LJ 335] or some departments are not
productive of goods and services if isolated, even then, the
predominant nature of the services and the integrated
nature of the departments as explained in the Corporation
of Nagpur will be the true test. The whole undertaking will
77

be ‘industry’ although those who are not ‘workmen’ by
definition may not benefit by the status.
(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign
functions, strictly understood, (alone) qualify for
exemption, not the welfare activities or economic
adventures undertaken by government or statutory
bodies.
(c) Even in departments discharging sovereign functions,
if there are units which are industries and they are
substantially severable, then they can be considered to
come within Section 2(j).
(d) Constitutional and competently enacted legislative
provisions may well remove from the scope of the Act
categories which otherwise may be covered thereby.”
V. We overrule Safdarjung, Solicitors' case , Gymkhana ,
Delhi University , Dhanrajgirji Hospital and other rulings
whose ratio runs counter to the principles enunciated
above, and Hospital Mazdoor Sabha is hereby
rehabilitated.”
(underlining by us)
8.3 Paragraph 161(a) extracted above is the “triple test”
enunciated by Krishna Iyer, J.
8.4 Consequently, the appeal filed by Bangalore Water Supply
was dismissed.
Opinion of Beg, C.J.:
9. While stating that he was generally in agreement with the line
of thinking adopted and the conclusions reached by Krishna Iyer,
J., Beg, C.J. observed that Krishna Iyer, J. had not discarded the
tests of “industry” formulated earlier by this Court. In fact, the tests
78

laid down by this Court in Banerji, Corporation of the City of
Nagpur and Hospital Mazdoor Sabha were restored to their
“pristine glory”.
9.1 Further, Beg, C.J. stated that it is likely that a person would
have a subjective notion about “industry” but for objectivity, it is
necessary to first look at the words used in the statute defining
“industry” in an attempt to find the meaning. If the meaning is
clear, then there is no controversy at all. However, if the meaning
of a word is not readily discernible as in the instant case, then a
need for interpretation becomes necessary by discerning the true
meaning and intent of the word “industry”. Beg, C.J. was of the
view that, “Progressive, rational and beneficial modes of
interpretation import and fit into the body of the old what may be
new. It is a process of adaptation for giving new vitality in keeping
with the progress of thought in our times. All this, however, is not
really novel, although we may try to say it in a new way.… Indeed,
even in a modern statute, the meaning of a term such as “industry”
may change with a rapidly changed social and economic structure ”.
Dwelling on the methods of interpretation of a statute in paragraph
13, Beg, C.J. cautioned against any interpretation of the definition
79

of “industry” which would cut down on its sweep. Hence, according
to him, the “ noscitur a sociis rule” or the “ ejusdem generis rule” are
not really useful in defining the term. Paragraph 13 of his judgment
is extracted as under:
“13. It seems to me that the definition was not meant to
provide more than a guide. It raises doubts as to what
could be meant by the “calling of employers” even if
business, trade, undertaking or manufacture could be
found capable of being more clearly delineated. It is clear
that there is no mention here of any profit motive.
Obviously, the word “manufacture” of employers could not
be interpreted literally. It merely means a process of
manufacture in which the employers may be engaged. It
is, however, evident that the term “employer” necessarily
postulates employees without whom there can be no
employers. But, the second part of the definition makes
the concept more nebulous as it, obviously, extends the
definition to “any calling, service, employment, handicraft
or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen”. I have
already examined the meaning of the term “workmen”
which refers us back to what is an “industry”. It seems to
me that the second part, relating to workmen, must
necessarily indicate something which may exclude
employers and include an “industry” consisting of
individual handicraftsmen or workmen only. At any rate,
the meaning of industrial disputes includes disputes
between workmen and workmen also. Therefore, I cannot
see how we can cut down the wide ambit of last part of the
definition by searching for the predominant meaning in the
first part unless we were determined, at the outset, to
curtail the scope of the second part somehow. If we do that,
we will be deliberately cutting down the real sweep of the
last part. Neither “ noscitur a sociis ” rule nor the “ ejusdem
generis ” rule are adequate for such a case.”
(underlining by us)
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9.2 Beg, C.J. was also not satisfied with the use of the phrase
“analogous to “industry”” which was used in the Safdarjung
Hospital case. This was because such a test would exclude the
types of services which are rendered purely for the satisfaction of
spiritual or psychological urges of persons rendering those services
which cannot be bought or sold. For persons rendering such
services, there may be no “industry”. However, for persons who
want to benefit from the services rendered, it could become an
“industry”. But when services are rendered by groups of charitable
individuals to themselves or others out of missionary zeal and
purely charitable motives, there would hardly be any need to
invoke the provisions of the I.D. Act to protect them.
9.3 Beg, C.J. considered another test, namely, that the nature of
the activity will be determined by the conditions which give rise to
the likelihood of occurrence of such disputes and their actual
occurrence in the sphere. This was called a “pragmatic test”. For
instance, the relationships between a doctor and his assistant and
a lawyer and his clerk were considered to be ones which would not
enter the field of “industry”. However, if there is an organised and
systematic form of a business or trade, employing a number of
81

persons, in which disputes could arise between employers and
their employees, it would be termed an industrial activity.
9.4 On sovereign functions, Beg, C.J. observed that instead of
using the expression “sovereign” in relation to the activities of the
State, the expression “governmental functions” was more
appropriate. Therefore, only those services which are governed by
separate rules and constitutional provisions, such as Articles 310
and 311 of the Constitution of India should be excluded from the
sphere of “industry” by necessary implication. Further, certain
public utility services which are carried out by governmental
agencies or corporations are treated by the I.D. Act to be within the
sphere of “industry”. If particular rules treat the employers and
employees of such public utility services to be outside the scope of
the I.D. Act, then the special excludes the applicability of the
general. However, the meaning of the term “industry” has to be
determined in the context of, and for the purposes of, matters
provided for under the I.D. Act.
9.5 Referring to State of Rajasthan vs. Vidhyawati , AIR 1962
SC 933, (“Vidhyawati”) and Rajasthan State Electricity Board,
Jaipur vs. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857 , (“ Mohan Lal”) Beg,
82

C.J. observed that the State today increasingly undertakes
commercial functions and economic activities and services as part
of its duties in a welfare State. That Article 12 of the Constitution
comprehends and includes bodies created for the purposes of
promoting educational and economic interests of the people. As per
Part IV of the Constitution of India, the Directive Principles of State
Policy (Article 46) also deals with the powers of the State to promote
with special care, the educational and economic interests of the
weaker sections of the people. Article 298 of the Constitution
enables the State to carry on any trade or business. Therefore, the
learned Chief Justice opined that to artificially exclude State-run
industries from the sphere of the I.D. Act, unless statutory
provisions expressly or by necessary implication have that effect,
would not be correct. He was also of the view that the question is
one which can only be solved by a more satisfactory legislation on
it.
Opinion of Chandrachud, C.J.:
10. On 07.04.1978, Chandrachud, C.J. gave his opinion, the gist
of which is that Hospital Mazdoor Sabha was correctly decided
insofar as it held that the J.J. Group of Hospitals was an “industry”
83

within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act. With regard to
the exceptions carved out by the Court in favour of activities
undertaken by the Government in the exercise of its inalienable
functions under the Constitution (call it regal, sovereign or by any
other name), Chandrachud, C.J. said that he sees no justification
for excepting these categories of public utility activities from the
definition of “industry”. Thus, according to him, the test is to
consider the nature of the activity and not who engages in it,
regardless of whether the activities undertaken are towards the
fulfilment of the State’s constitutional obligations or in discharge
of its constitutional functions. That the nature of the activity is the
determining factor, which does not change according to who
undertakes it. Citing certain examples, Chandrachud, C.J.
observed that a defence establishment, mint or security press can
be an “industry” even though these activities are, ought to be and
can only be undertaken by the State in the discharge of its
constitutional obligations or functions.
10.1 Therefore, a systematic activity which is organised or
arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally
organised or arranged would be an “industry”, despite the fact that
84

it proceeds from charitable motives. He opined that the twin
considerations of profit motive and capital investment are
irrelevant for determining whether an activity is an “industry”.
Thus, activities which are dominated by charitable motives, either
in the sense that they involve the rendering of free or near-free
services, or in the sense that the profits which they yield are
diverted to charitable purposes, are not beyond the pale of the
definition. That, it is only the legislature which can exempt the
learned and liberal professions of lawyers, atts, doctors, engineers,
chartered accountants and the like from the operation of industrial
laws. Hence, it is difficult by judicial interpretation to create
exemptions in favour of any particular class. Similarly, clubs are
also squarely covered by the definition except to the limited extent
indicated by Krishna Iyer, J. in his judgment.
10.2 Elaborating on the aforesaid aspects, Chandrachud, C.J.
rightly questioned whether the definition should be permitted to
have its full sway, embracing within its wide sweep every activity
which squarely falls within its term or, whether some limitation
ought not to be read into the definition so as to restrict its scope as
reasonably as one may, without doing violence to the supposed
85

intention of the legislature. Touching upon the principles of
statutory interpretation, he opined that the principle known as
“ noscitur a sociis” was rejected by Gajendragadkar, J. speaking on
behalf of the Court in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha . This was on a
consideration of the definition of “industrial dispute” in Section
2(k), “wages” in Section 2(rr), “workman” in Section 2(s) and
“employer” in Section 2(g) as well as the definition of “public utility
service” in Section 2(n) which categorised six public utility services.
Therefore, in running a hospital, the State was running an
“industry”. In Hospital Mazdoor Sabha , it was opined that “ it is
the character of the activity which decides the question as to whether
the activity in question attracts the provision of Section 2(j); who
conducts the activity and whether it is conducted for profit or not do
not make a material difference”.
10.3 However, it was felt that Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act used
words of a very wide denotation and therefore a line had to be
drawn in a fair and just manner so as to exclude some callings,
services or undertakings from the scope of the definition, otherwise
all services and all callings would come within the purview of the
definition, including services rendered by a person in a purely
86

personal or domestic capacity or in a casual manner. Opining that
the interpretation of the word “industry” in Section 2(j) was a
problem far too policy-oriented to be satisfactorily settled by
judicial decisions, Chandrachud, C.J. opined that the Parliament
must step in and legislate in a manner which would leave no doubt
as to its intention.
10.4 Considering the reasoning in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
and the definition sought to be given to the expression “industry”
in Section 2(j) by the Court, Chandrachud, C.J. opined that during
the course of time, many categories of activities were exempted
from the operation of the definition clause. But in Hospital
Mazdoor Sabha it was observed that a Government-run hospital
,
was an “industry” by rejecting the test of noscitur a sociis, as the
said test was applicable in cases of doubt, but if the language was
clear, the definition had to be given the meaning which the words
conveyed and there could be no scope for seeking exceptions.
Chandrachud, C.J. found that there was a contradiction in the
approach of this Court while deciding Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
insofar as this Court rejected the test of “association of words”
while deciding whether the Government-run hospital was an
87

“industry”, but accepted that very test while indicating which
categories of activities would fall outside the definition. The
question thus asked was “if there is no doubt either as to the
meaning of the words used by the legislature in Section 2(j) or on the
question that these are words of amplitude, what justification can
one seek for diluting the concept of “industry” as envisaged by the
legislature?” Consequently, Chandrachud, C.J. held that Hospital
Mazdoor Sabha was correctly decided insofar as it held that
the J.J. Group of Hospitals was an “industry”, but the same could
not be said with regard to the view of the Court that certain
activities ought to be treated as falling outside the definition clause.
10.5 Discussing the exceptions carved out by the Court in
favour of the activities undertaken by the Government in the
exercise of its inalienable functions under the Constitution,
Chandrachud, C.J. found no justification for excepting these
categories of public utility activities from the definition of
“industry”. It was his view that to concede the benefit of an
exception to the State's activities which are in the nature of
sovereign functions is really to have regard not so much to the
nature of the activity as to the consideration of who engages in that
88

activity; for, sovereign functions can only be discharged by the
State and not by a private person. Holding that the question of who
conducts the activities is irrelevant, and rather, the nature of the
activity ought to determine whether they are industries or not, it
was opined that if water supply and sewerage schemes or fire-
fighting establishments run by a Municipality can be industries, so
ought to be the manufacture of coins and currency, arms and
ammunition and the mining of oil and uranium. The fact that these
latter kinds of activities are, or can only be, undertaken by the
State does not furnish any answer to the question of whether these
activities are industries, as when undertaken by a private
individual, they are industries. Hence, when undertaken by the
State, they must be industries as well. Thus, the nature of the
activity is the determining factor and that does not change
according to who undertakes it. This is also supported by Items 8,
11, 12, 17 and 18 of the First Schedule read with Section 2(n)(vi)
of the I.D. Act. These provisions were considered “very significant”
in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha . It was opined that the State does not
trade when it prints a currency note or mints a coin. And yet,
considering the nature of the activity, it is engaged in an “industry”
89

when it does so. It was observed that the question of who conducts
an activity is not relevant to determining whether the activity is an
“industry”, so also the fact that the activity is charitable in nature
or is undertaken with a charitable motive.
10.6 According to Chandrachud, C.J., the subjective motive
force of an activity can be charity, but for the purpose of deciding
whether an activity is an “industry”, one has to look at the process
involved in the activity objectively. The argument that he who does
charity is not doing trade or business misses the point because the
true test is, whether the activity, considered objectively, is
organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is
normally organised or arranged. If so, the activity would be an
“industry” no matter whether the employer is actuated by
charitable motives in undertaking it. It was opined that the jural
foundation of any attempt to except charitable enterprises from the
scope of the definition can only be that such enterprises are not
undertaken for profit. But the concept of profit has been rejected
consistently over the years. It is settled law in this “vexed field” that
the twin considerations of profit motive and capital investment are
irrelevant for determining whether an activity is an “industry”.
90

Therefore, activities which are dominated by charitable motives,
either in the sense that they involve the rendering of free or near-
free services, or in the sense that the profits which they yield are
diverted to charitable purposes, are not beyond the pale of the
definition in Section 2(j). Similarly, it was opined that who the
employer is, and an inquiry into that, is also irrelevant. The inquiry
must be as to why the activity is undertaken and what the
employer does with his profits, if any.
10.7 Further, in order to exempt the liberal professions from the
operation of law, it would require only an amendment by the
Parliament and till then, it would be difficult by judicial
interpretation to create exemptions in favour of any particular
class.
10.8 With regard to clubs, it was observed that the definition
squarely covers them, except to the limited extent indicated by
Krishna Iyer, J. in his judgment. The structure and functioning of
a club, according to Chandrachud, C.J., could not be the relevant
aspect to be considered, and the true test could only be whether
the activity is organised or arranged in a manner in which a trade
or business is normally organised or arranged.
91

10.9 Giving the aforesaid opinion, Chandrachud, C.J. stated
that on the remaining aspects of the case, he had nothing useful
to add to the analysis made by Krishna Iyer, J. in his judgment.
Opinion of Jaswant Singh, J. (on behalf of himself and
Tulzapurkar, J.):

11. Jaswant Singh, J. speaking for himself and Tulzapurkar, J.
at the outset stated that he and Tulzapurkar, J. were in agreement
with the view expressed by Krishna Iyer, J. that the appeal by
Bangalore Water Supply should be dismissed. However, it was
indicated by their earlier order along with Chandrachud J. (as the
learned Chief Justice then was) dated 21.02.1978 that areas of
concurrence and divergence, if any, would be pronounced later.
11.1 Consequently, Jaswant Singh, J. (along with Tulzapurkar,
J.) by a separate order dated 07.04.1978 reiterated what had been
stated by Beg, C.J. and Krishna Iyer, J., i.e., that the definition of
the word “industry” in Section 2(j), which was in two parts, was too
vague and wide and therefore, determining the true scope and
ambit in light of a plethora of decisions which had laid down fresh
tests from time to time was an uphill task. That, despite the width
of the definition, it could not be the intention of the legislature that:
92

(i) Categories 2 and 3 of charities alluded to by Krishna Iyer, J. in
his judgment; (ii) hospitals run on charitable basis or as a part of
the functions of the Government or local bodies like municipalities;
(iii) educational and research institutions, whether run by private
entities or by the Government; and (iv) liberal and learned
professions like that of doctors, lawyers and teachers, the pursuit
of which is dependent upon an individual's own education,
intellectual attainments and special expertise, should fall within
the pale of the definition.
11.2 Jaswant Singh, J. further opined that the definition of
“industry” is limited to those activities systematically or habitually
undertaken on commercial lines by private entrepreneurs with the
co-operation of employees for the production or distribution of
goods or for rendering material services to the community at large
or a part of such community.
11.3 That, in the case of liberal professions, the contribution of
the employees is very minimal in the manner of discharge of their
professional work and hence, the entities pursuing liberal
professions cannot be treated as industries.
93

11.4 It was also felt in various decisions that certain activities,
callings, services and undertakings had to be excluded from the
purview of the definition of “industry”. In this regard,
Gajendragadkar, J.’s observations in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
were quoted. All services and all callings would not come within the
purview of the definition. For instance, service rendered by a
servant purely in a personal or domestic matter or even in a casual
way could not fall within the definition. Thus, the difficulty was
expressed in defining the true connotation of the term “industry”
and therefore, the divergence of opinion in regard thereto on
certain aspects.
11.5 Hence, Jaswant Singh, J. suggested that the legislature
has to take steps with a comprehensive bill to clear up the fog and
remove the doubts and set at rest once and for all the controversy
which would crop up from time to time in relation to the meaning
of the aforesaid term, rendering it necessary for larger Benches of
this Court to be constituted for working out a formula to cover
particular cases.
94

Analysis of the Opinions in Bangalore Water Supply:
12. I have closely perused the four opinions rendered in
Bangalore Water Supply . Although there are four authors, I find
that the said opinions speak in one voice regarding certain
components or aspects, as far as the definition of “industry” is
concerned.
“Triple Test”:
12.1 I find that three out of the four opinions (representing five
out of the seven judges) speak in one voice insofar as the “triple
test” for the definition of “industry” is concerned. The “triple test”,
is the enunciation expressed by Krishna Iyer, J. (on behalf of
himself, Bhagwati and Desai, JJ.) when an enterprise takes the
character of an “industry”. It posits that an enterprise is prima facie
an “industry” if there is:
(i) systematic activity,
(ii) organised by cooperation between employer and employee;
(iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services
calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes.
12.2 In paragraph 165 of Beg, J.’s judgement, it was stated that
he was in agreement with the conclusions of Krishna Iyer, J. and
95

that he “endorses his reasoning almost wholly”. This line of explicit
agreement with Krishna Iyer, J., in conjunction with the fact that
he did not specifically opine on the “triple test”, leads to the
conclusion that he was in concurrence with the same.
12.3 He disagreed with the scope of the exceptions for entities
performing sovereign functions (as will be discussed later).
12.4 Similarly, Chandrachud, C.J. also did not express any
disagreement with the “triple test”. Rather, he expressed his
opinion on specific categories of proposed exceptions. He entirely
disagreed with the blanket sovereign function exception, as also
any exception for charitable institutions, observing that the
“process” involved in an activity was relevant and not its “subjective
motive force”. He also opined that there was no justification for
amending the I.D. Act so as to exclude ‘clubs’ from the operation of
industrial laws. In his conclusion, he stated that “on the remaining
aspects of the case,” he had “nothing useful to add to the penetrating
analysis of the problem made by Brother Krishna Iyer”. Thus, it is
clear that he was also in concurrence with the expression of the
“triple test”.
96

12.5 Jaswant Singh, J., speaking on behalf of himself and
Tulzapurkar, J., while agreeing with the conclusion reached by
Krishna Iyer, J., did not express agreement with the reasons
expressed by him. Per contra , they proposed an alternative
understanding, i.e., that the definition of “industry” was “limited to
those activities systematically or habitually undertaken on
commercial lines by private entrepreneurs with the co-operation of
employees for the production or distribution of goods or for the
rendering of material services to the community at large or a part of
such community”.
12.6 Nonetheless, despite this diversion from the path of the
“triple test”, the opinions of Krishna Iyer, J. (for himself, Bhagwati
and Desai, JJ.), Beg, C.J. and Chandrachud, C.J together account
for five out of the seven Judges on the Bench. Hence, there was
majority support for the concept of the “triple test” as a prima facie
indicator of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
Overruling of Safdarjung Hospital:
13. There is also unanimity of judicial opinion with regard to
overruling of the judgment of this Court in Safdarjung Hospital
97

as the tests laid down by this Court in the said case have not been
approved by the larger bench in Bangalore Water Supply .
13.1 In Safdarjung Hospital , this Court had to determine
whether a hospital could be regarded as an “industry”. The Court
accepted the conclusion in Gymkhana Club , namely that “…before
the work engaged in can be described as an “industry”, it must bear
the definite character of ‘trade’ or ‘business’ or ‘manufacture’ or
‘calling’ or must be capable of being described as an undertaking
resulting in material goods or material services”. Following this, this
Court diverged from the earlier ruling in Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha , holding that the three hospitals under consideration were
not industries, as follows:
(i) With respect to the Safdarjung Hospital , it was held that it
was not engaged in any economic activity analogous to trade
or business. It is only a place where persons can get treated.
Further, it is run as a Department of the Government as part
of the functions of the Government. Therefore, it was not an
“industry”.
98

(ii) The Tuberculosis Hospital, as a wholly charitable and
dominantly research-based institute, was also held to not be
an “industry”.
(iii) Similarly, the Kurji Holy Family Hospital was also held to be
not an “industry”, since its objects were entirely charitable and
distribution of surplus as profit was prohibited.
13.2 In Bangalore Water Supply , Krishna Iyer, J. opined that
Safdarjung Hospital had been erroneously decided, meriting a
reversal of its ratio. According to him, a hospital, which is a welfare
activity and not a sovereign function, cannot be said to be
incapable of being an “industry”. The absence of profit, or its
functions of training and research, do not take the institution out
of the scope of “industry”. Hospitals, research institutions and
training centres are valuable material services to the community,
qualifying for coming within the ambit of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
Therefore, all the three hospitals above were held to be industries.
13.3 With respect to hospitals, the judgment in Safdarjung
Hospital was declared to be incorrect, and Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha correct by Krishna Iyer, J. Beg, C.J. concurred with the
overruling of Safdarjung Hospital , observing that it is not the
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motive of an activity, but the possibility of making it marketable if
desired, that should determine whether it lies within the domain of
“industry”. With Chandrachud, C.J.’s concurrence with the
“penetrating analysis” by Krishna Iyer, J. on the parts on which he
did not specifically opine, we can conclude that the overruling of
Safdarjung Hospital was with a majority support of five-Judge of
the Bench.
Solicitors’ Case:
14. In Solicitors’ Case , a three-Judge Bench of this Court had
to decide whether the respondents therein, a firm of solicitors, was
an “industry” within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
Gajendragadkar, J. (as the learned C.J. then was) referred to his
decision in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha , wherein this Court had
observed as follows:
“17.….as a working principle, it may be stated that an
activity systematically or habitually undertaken for the
production or distribution of goods or for the rendering of
material services to the community at large or a part of
such community with the help of employees is an
undertaking. Such an activity generally involves the
cooperation of the employer and the employees; and its
object is the satisfaction of material human needs. It must
be organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or
business is generally organised or arranged. It must not be
casual nor must it be for oneself nor for pleasure. Thus,
the manner in which the activity in question is organised
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or arranged, the condition of the cooperation between
employer and the employee necessary for its success and
its object to render material service to the community can
be regarded as some of the features which are distinctive
of activities to which Section 2(j) applies.”

14.1 In the Solicitors’ Case , Gajendragadkar, J. elaborated on
the criterion of “cooperation” as follows:
“8. When in the Hospital Case , AIR 1960 SC 610 this Court
referred to the organisation of the undertaking involving
the cooperation of capital and labour or the employer and
his employees, it obviously meant the cooperation
essential and necessary for the purpose of rendering
material service or for the purpose of production…..It
cannot be suggested that every form or aspect of human
activity in which capital and labour co-operate or employer
and employees assist each other is an industry. The
distinguishing feature of an industry is that for the
production of goods or for the rendering of service,
cooperation between capital and labour or between the
employer and his employees must be direct and must be
essential.”
(underlining by us)

14.2 Viewed this way, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that the
service rendered by a solicitor, functioning either individually or
together with partners, was essentially an “individual service” that
depended on the professional equipment, knowledge and efficiency
of the concerned solicitor. Subsidiary work which was purely
incidental had no relation to the professional service ultimately
rendered by the solicitor. A typist, stenographer or servant
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employed to keep a solicitor’s chamber clean were not directly
concerned with the services rendered by a solicitor to their client,
and therefore did not satisfy the necessary test of ‘cooperation’.
Neither did the work of a clerk who typed correspondence or an
accountant who kept accounts had any direct or essential
connection to the advice rendered by a solicitor to a client. There
was thus cooperation between a solicitor and his employees, but
not one that had a direct or immediate relation to the professional
service rendered. Observing thus, Gajendragadkar, J. concluded
that the work of solicitors carried on by a firm was not “industry”
under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
14.3 Gajendragadkar, J. further opined that in a more general
sense, the Legislature could not have intended that such “liberal
professions” would fall within the definition of “industry”. The
“essential basis” of an industrial dispute, i.e., that it was a dispute
between capital and labour in enterprises where they combined to
produce commodities or rendered services, was absent in the case
of liberal professions. A person following a liberal profession did
not carry on his work with active cooperation of his employees.
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Rather, the principal, if not sole, capital that he brought to the
profession was his own special or peculiar intellect and education.
Gymkhana Club:
15. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gymkhana Club
subsequently considered whether the Gymkhana Club , a
members’ club, was an “industry” under the I.D. Act. After further
reviewing prior precedents, Hidayatullah, J. (as the learned Chief
Justice then was) disagreed with the degree of insistence on
partnership between employers and employees in the Solicitors’
Case . According to him, what must be established is “the existence
of an “industry” viewed from the angle of what the employer is doing
and if the definition from the angle of the employer's occupation is
satisfied, all who render service and fall within the definition of
workman come within the fold of “industry” irrespective of what they
do”. Each person doing his appointed task will be a part of the
“industry”, “whether he attends to a loom or merely polishes door
handles”. If a solicitor’s work requires him to take help from people
who are assigned duties, this does not alter the character of his
work. The nature of his work, i.e., the nature of the employer’s
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occupation, is determinative. Subsequently, Hidayatullah, J., held
as follows:
“20. The definition of ‘industry’ is in two parts. In its first
part it means any business, trade, undertaking,
manufacture or calling of employers. This part of the
definition determines an industry by reference to
occupation of employers in respect of certain activities.
These activities are specified by five words and they
determine what an industry is and what the cognate
expression ‘industrial’ is intended to convey. This is the
denotation of the term or what the word denotes. We shall
presently discuss what the words “business, trade,
undertaking manufacture or calling” comprehend. The
second part views the matter from the angle of employees
and is designed to include something more in what the
term primarily denotes. By the second part of the definition
any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial
occupation or avocation of workmen is included in the
concept of industry. This part gives the extended
connotation. If the activity can be described as an industry
with reference to the occupation of the employers, the
ambit of the industry, under the force of the second part,
takes in the different kinds of activity of the employees
mentioned in the second part. But the second part
standing alone cannot define ‘industry’. … ”
(underlining by us)

15.1 The test, therefore, was to find out whether there is an
“industry” under the first part of the definition in Section 2(j) and
then look at the second part, which would show what would be
included from the angle of the employees. As an example,
Hidayatullah, J. observed that while an individual who employed a
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cook got a service from him, the activity of the individual was not
a business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of an
employer. Therefore, it is not an “industry” within the first part of
the definition. The “inclusive part” of the definition, i.e., the second
part, makes the labour force employed in an “industry” an “integral
part” of the same for the purposes of industrial disputes. However,
“industry” is ordinarily something created or undertaken by
employers.
15.2 Therefore, according to Hidayatullah, J., the relevant test
for “industry” is only to gauge the nature of the activity from the
perspective of the employer. Subsequently, he observed as follows:
“23. ...Primarily, therefore, industrial disputes occur when
the operation undertaken rests upon cooperation between
employers and employees with a view to production and
distribution of material goods, in other words, wealth, but
they may arise also in cases where the cooperation is to
produce material services. …
xxx
25. It is, therefore, clear that before the work engaged it
can be described as an industry, it must bear the definite
character of ‘trade’ or ‘business’ or ‘manufacture’ or
‘calling’ or must be capable of being described as an
undertaking resulting in material goods or material
services. Now in the application of the Act, the undertaking
may be an enterprise of a private individual or individuals.
On the other hand, it may not. It is not necessary that the
employer must always be a private individual who carries
on the operation with his own capital and with a view to
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his own profit. The Act in terms contemplates cases of
industrial disputes where the Government or a local
authority or a public utility service may be the employer.
26.The expansion of Governmental or municipal activity in
fields of productive industry is a feature of all developing
welfare states…..Therefore, the word ‘undertaking’ must
be defined as “any business or any work or project which
one engages in or attempts as an enterprise analogous to
business or trade”. This is the test laid down in Banerji ' s
case [(1952) 2 SCC 619 : (1953) SCR 302] and followed in
the Baroda Borough Municipality case [(1957) 1 LLJ 8] . Its
extension in the Corporation case [(1960) 2 SCR 942] was
unfortunate and contradicted the earlier cases.
xxx
27. Next where the activity is to be considered as an
industry, it must not be casual but must be distinctly
systematic. The work for which labour of workmen is
required, must be productive and the workmen must be
following an employment, calling or industrial avocation.
The salient fact in this context is that the workmen are not
their own masters but render service at the behest of
masters. This follows from the second part of the definition
of industry. …”
(underlining by us)

15.3 Holding thus, Hidayatullah, J. turned to the question
whether the Gymkhana Club was an “industry” according to the
above principles. By the second part of the definition, the activities
of the Club are certainly conducted with the aid of employees.
However, the relevant test is whether the Club performs activities
that bring it within the first part of the definition of “industry”.
Specifically, since the Club was not a trade, business, manufacture
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or calling of its members or managing committee, the only question
was whether the Club was an ‘undertaking’.
15.4 According to Hidayatullah, J., it was not. Although the lack
of profit motive was irrelevant, and it was simultaneously true that
the affairs of the Club are organised akin to a business with the
production of material services, all such material goods and
services were for the consumption of the Club’s own members.
Therefore, the Club was said to exist for its members, and it thus
is a self-serving institution. The entry of guests or “outsiders” was
not relevant because if their entry was stopped, there would be no
change in the Club’s essential character.
15.5 While the Club catered to the material needs and wants of
a section of the community, Hidayatullah, J. observed that this was
not enough. It ought to be done as part of a trade or business or as
an undertaking analogous to trade or business, which is
completely absent in the case of a members’ club. The Club was
held to have no existence apart from its members at any given point
of time, and was thus held to be outside the purview of “industry”
under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
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Why did Bangalore Water Supply Overrule Both Cases?:
15.6 In Bangalore Water Supply , Krishna Iyer, J. observed that
a “focal point of contest” before the Bench was as to, whether,
liberal professions are ipso facto excluded from the purview of
“industry”. In this context, he referred to the Solicitors’ Case and
the “two grounds” which Gajendragadkar, J. found to be
determinative, i.e., the doctrine of direct co-operation and the
features of liberal professions.
15.7 Krishna Iyer, J. disagreed with the doctrine of direct co-
operation as a governing test, observing that in the “sophisticated,
subtle, complex, assembly-line operations of modern enterprises, the
test of “direct” and “indirect”, “essential” and “inessential”, will
snap easily. In an American automobile manufactory, everything
from shipping iron ore into and shipping cars out of the vast complex
takes place with myriad major and minor jobs. A million
administrative, marketing and advertising tasks are done. Which,
out of this maze of chores, is direct?”
15.8 As an example, Krishna Iyer, J. observed that an engineer
may lose a competitive contract if his typist were to err. Therefore,
he is in this sense a “direct contributory”. Similarly, no lawyer or
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doctor can impress a client if his public relations job or home work
were poorly done. According to him, the theory of direct co-
operation was an unimpressive improvisation.
15.9 He then referred to Hidayatullah, J.’s opinion in
Gymkhana Club , observing that while both Gymkhana Club and
the Solicitors’ Case were in agreement that “learned professions”
must be excluded, they “flatly contradicted each other” on the
question of direct or effective contribution. Krishna Iyer, J.
observed that the reasoning adopted in Gymkhana Club vis-à-vis
the doctrine of cooperation was appealing. Consequently, he held
that there was no need for insistence upon principles of
partnership, direct nexus, or the contribution of values by
employees. Every employee in a professional office has a role in its
success. Therefore, a member of a “learned or liberal profession”
cannot ipso facto be self-excluded from the operation of the I.D.
Act.
15.10 Krishna Iyer, J. also disagreed entirely with the generalised
exclusion of the “liberal professions” that was propounded in the
Solicitors’ Case . He observed that the “professional immunity
from labour’s demand for social justice because learned
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professions have a halo” stands on a shaky foundation. The “halo”
around the professions does not necessarily mean that they are
“de-industrialized”. The plea of “profession” is irrelevant for
industrial law, unsupported by any legal principle. Krishna Iyer, J.
further held that there was a need for the “decanonisation of the
noble professions”. According to him, the “paradigms of
professionalism” which centred around individual doctors,
lawyers, etc. have been replaced by large solicitors’ firms,
architects’ offices, etc., where one finds a “humming industry”. For
instance, the practice of a physician or surgeon is dependent on
the good performance of their attendant or clerk. Similarly, a
lawyer is dependent on the specialised support of secretaries,
librarians and steno-typists. The modern sophisticated
organisation of expert services has melted the “mystique of
professionalism”. Since the contribution to the success of the
institution comes from everyone’s excellence in their respective
positions and not merely from the professional, such professions
are not exempted from the scope of “industry”. To exempt them
would be to open the floodgates for exemptions under the I.D. Act
according to Krishna Iyer, J.
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15.11 In conclusion, Krishna Iyer, J. held that the Solicitors’
Case was wrongly decided and needed to be overruled. While doing
so, he provided the caveat that some categories of such
professionals may still be exempted – a single lawyer, a rural
medical practitioner or urban doctor with an assistant . This is
because there is no organised labou r in such circumstances.
“Industry” requires a plurality of workmen and not isolated
assistants/attendants. This in my view is a realistic understanding
of the definition.
15.12 In his opinion too, Chandrachud, C.J. disagreed with the
broad exemption to solicitors’ establishments from being
industries. He opined that there was nothing in the language of
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act that evinced an intention to exclude
liberal professions from the ambit of “industry”. The test of direct
or proximate co-operation was also not warranted by the words of
the definition. Further, the test of whether employer-employee
cooperation is the proximate cause of the ultimate product is
impossible to ascertain with assurance or certitude. In fact,
without the active assistance and cooperation of his assistant,
managing clerk, librarian and typist, it will be impossible for a
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solicitor to function effectively. Although the legislature might
eventually exempt such professions from the operation of
industrial laws, it is difficult to provide exemptions by judicial
interpretation under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
15.13 Beg, C.J. too, in his concurring opinion, provided his
assent to the overruling of the Solicitors’ Case through his
endorsement of the opinion and conclusions of Krishna Iyer, J. He
also noted the test that suggests an entity’s status as an “industry”
is the likelihood of occurrence of industrial disputes within it.
Whenever such a dispute could arise, it should be considered
within the sphere of “industry”, but not otherwise. For instance,
the personal relationship between a doctor and his assistant or a
lawyer and his clerk may be such that it requires complete
harmony in the productive activity. Therefore, unless the
operations of the solicitor, lawyer or doctor take on the form of an
organised/systematised business or trade, employing a number of
persons in which a dispute could arise between employers and
employees, they would not enter the field of “industry”. This aligns
broadly with Krishna Iyer, J.’s view, insofar as entities which do
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not have a system of organised labour are excluded from the
purview of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
15.14 Jaswant Singh, J. (on behalf of himself and Tulzapurkar,
J.) disagreed with the inclusion of “liberal and learned professions
like that of doctors, lawyers and teachers, the pursuit of which is
dependent upon an individual’s own education, intellectual
attainments and special expertise” within the definition. According
to him, in the case of liberal professions, the contribution of the
usual type of employees to the value of the end product is “so
marginal that the end product cannot be regarded as the fruit of
the co-operation between the professional and his employees”.
15.15 Nonetheless, the opinions of Krishna Iyer, J., (for himself
and Bhagwati & Desai, JJ.), Beg, C.J. and Chandrachud, C.J.
speak for a majority of five-Judges on the Bench and therefore, the
Solicitors’ Case was conclusively overruled.
15.16 Krishna Iyer, J. also conclusively overruled the opinion
rendered in Gymkhana Club , observing that even a members’ club
like the Gymkhana Club involves cooperation between employers
and employees, organised like a trade and supplying “pleasurable
utilities to members and others”. Further, he disagreed entirely
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with the characterisation of the said Club as a self-serving
institution, insofar as if it were self-service, then there would not
be an expensive establishment and high-paid staff. The members
of a club do nothing to produce these goods or services. Rather,
they are provided by employees who earn wages.
15.17 Krishna Iyer, J. also rejected Hidayatullah J.’s holding
that the Club was a non-industry because it belonged to its
members. According to Krishna Iyer, J., a club may belong to its
members the same way a company belongs to its shareholders and
a cooperative belongs to its members. Nonetheless, if they employ
workmen with whose cooperation goods and services are made
available to a section of the community and the operations are
organised in a manner typical of business method and
organisation, then it would be an “industry”.
15.18 Chandrachud, C.J., while lending his concurrence to
Krishna Iyer, J.’s overruling of Gymkhana Club , opined that not
only are such clubs squarely covered by the definition, but there
was also no justification for amending industrial laws so as to
exclude them from their operation. According to him, it was
irrelevant that “the running of clubs is not a calling of the club or its
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managing committee, that the club has no existence apart from its
members, that it exists for its members though occasionally
strangers also take the benefit of its services and that even with the
admission of guests the club remains a members' self-serving
institution”. Rather, the true test is whether the activity is organised
or arranged in the usual manner of a trade or business.
15.19 Jaswant Singh, J. (on behalf of himself and
Tulzapurkar, J.) did not agree with the overruling of Gymkhana
Club , observing that over time, the need for excluding some
callings, services and undertakings from the purview of “industry”
has been recognised by the Court in multiple cases, including
Gymkhana Club . Nonetheless, with Beg, C.J.’s broad concurrence
with the reasoning and conclusions of Krishna Iyer, J., the
overruling of Gymkhana Club also received majority support of
five-Judges on the Bench.
15.20 I find force in the overruling of the Solicitors’ Case and
Gymkhana Club by the seven-Judge Bench in Bangalore Water
Supply .
15.21 With regard to “liberal professions”, Krishna Iyer, J.
astutely observed that in their modern forms, they are practised
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through sophisticated organisations that involve cooperation
between several categories of employers. Indeed, writing in 1978,
his view was simultaneously contemporary and prescient. Because
today, these professions are practised with organisations that are
even larger and more layered than before. A lawyer’s chamber may
consist of secretaries, researchers, typists, clerks, etc. Can it be
said that they have no role to play in the professional relationship
between a lawyer and his client? We do not think so. It is difficult
to imagine how one could separate the public-facing work of a
lawyer/solicitor from the crucial background work performed in
their office. If an entity otherwise fulfils the relevant test for
determining “industry”, then there is no question of being
exempted merely because of the nature of one’s profession. Such
ipso facto exclusions do not find any legislative support in the
provisions of the I.D. Act.
16. Similarly in the case of members’ clubs, we once again find
that Gymkhana Club was rightly overruled by this Court in
Bangalore Water Supply . As held by Chandrachud, J., the
relevant test is whether the activity is organised in the manner of
a trade or business. We agree with Krishna Iyer, J. that providing
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an ipso facto exclusion for clubs that are owned by members has
no basis in fact or law. Merely because a club is owned by its
members does not make the nature of its employees any different,
nor does it impact the test of whether such employees are involved
in cooperation that produces material goods and services. Rather
than ownership of an entity, the activities performed by it, along
with their organisation or arrangement, are relevant.
Further Analysis:
17. In the order passed in Jai Bir Singh seeking reference of the
judgment in Bangalore Water Supply to a larger Bench, one of
the reasons assigned was that Beg, C.J., who was to retire on the
day following the pronouncement of the judgment in Bangalore
Water Supply did not have the opportunity to read the opinions
of Chandrachud, C.J. and Jaswant Singh, J. (speaking for himself
and Tulzapurkar, J.). However, we note that the opinion rendered
by Krishna Iyer, J. (for himself, Bhagwati and Desai, J.J.) was
categorically approved by Beg, C.J. Therefore, even on the aspect
of numerical strength, four judges shared unanimous opinions.
This is evident from the opinion of Beg, C.J. Even otherwise, after
the retirement of Beg, C.J., Chandrachud, C.J., while analysing the
117

definition of “industry”, has fully concurred with the opinion of
Krishna Iyer, J. and in my view, has in fact strengthened it by
giving it a jurisprudential interpretational basis.
17.1 Further, Jaswant Singh, J. (for himself and Tulzapurkar J.)
opined that they were in agreement with the view expressed by
Chandrachud, C.J. but expressed certain reservations on the
“triple test”.
17.2 Thus, a combined reading of the separate opinions gives
rise to a single interpretation of the meaning of the word “industry”
in Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
17.3 In this regard, I must hold that on the aspect of separate
opinions rendered by Judges of a larger Bench, the judgment of
this Court in Trimurthi Fragrances is instructive. Indira
Banerjee, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench observed as
under:
“19....In view of Article 145(5) of the Constitution of India
concurrence of a majority of the Judges at the hearing will
be considered as a judgment or opinion of the Court. It is
settled that the majority decision of a Bench of larger
strength would prevail over the decision of a Bench of
lesser strength, irrespective of the number of Judges
constituting the majority.”

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17.4 On an analysis of the opinions of the respective Judges, we
find that there was majority support among the Judges of the
seven-Judge Bench on the following aspects:
I. To overrule the judgment of this Court in Safdarjung
Hospital rendered by a Bench of six-Judges.
II. The “triple test” for the definition of “industry” as interpreted
by Krishna Iyer, J. (for himself, Bhagwati and Desai, J.J.) has
been expressly approved by Beg, C.J., and Chandrachud, C.J.
Jaswant Singh, J. and Tulzapurkar, J. expressed an
alternative formulation to “triple test”.
III. The question whether the noscitur a sociis principle of
interpretation has to be applied while interpreting the
definition of “industry” as found in Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act,
has been considered in the following manner:
i. Krishna Iyer, J. (for himself, Bhagwati and Desai, JJ.) did
not find it appropriate to apply the said principle.
ii. Beg, C.J. stated that neither the noscitur a sociis rule nor
the ejusdem generis rule are adequate for the case at hand.
119

iii. Chandrachud, C.J. observed that the reasoning in the case
of Hospital Mazdoor Sabha was that there is no
ambiguity in the language of the definition under Section
2(j) of the I.D. Act so as to warrant the invocation of the
principle of noscitur a sociis. However, the very fact that
there is a need to identify exceptions belies the allegedly
unambiguous nature of the definition and hence, there is
scope to apply the said principle.
iv. Jaswant Singh, J. (for himself and Tulzapurkar, J.) opined
that by applying the principle of noscitur a sociis, the
definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) could not be held
to include Categories 2 and 3 of the charities described in
the opinion of Krishna Iyer, J. Further, hospitals run on a
charitable basis or as a part of the functions of the
Government or local bodies like municipalities and
educational and research institutions, whether run by
private entities or by the Government, as well as liberal
professions could not be included within the scope and
ambit of the definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of
the I.D. Act.
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17.5 Be that as it may. The point that emerges is that there was
unanimity on the definition of “industry” insofar as what was to be
included in the said definition.
17.6 Insofar as what activities have to be excluded from the said
definition, it is noted that with regard to sovereign functions/regal
functions or governmental functions:
i. Krishna Iyer, J. (for himself, Bhagwati and Desai, JJ.) quoted
with approval Subba Rao, J.’s observation in Corporation of
the City of Nagpur that sovereign functions of the State are
the “primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional
government”. He further stated that “ Articles 309 to 311 of the
Constitution of India, enactments dealing with the Defence
Forces and other legislation dealing with employment under
statutory bodies may, expressly or by necessary implication,
exclude the operation of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ”. In
his conclusion, he held that only strictly understood sovereign
functions qualify for the exclusion, rather than welfare
activities or “economic adventures” that are undertaken by
governments or statutory bodies.
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Further, he invoked the concept of ‘severability’, whereby
even if a department discharges a sovereign function, it may
contain units which are industries, and if such units are also
“substantially severable”, then they are not excluded from
being “industry”.
ii. Beg, C.J. expressed his displeasure with the term ‘sovereign
function’, opining that the term “sovereign” should be reserved
for the sphere of ultimate decisions. Rather, in relation to the
activities of the State, ‘sovereign functions’ can be understood
more appropriately as “governmental” functions, insofar as
only those services which are governed by separate rules and
constitutional provisions, such as Articles 310 and 311 of the
Constitution, should be excluded from the definition of
“industry”.
iii. Chandrachud, C.J. disagreed entirely with the exclusion of
activities undertaken by the Government in the exercise of its
inalienable functions, be it “regal, sovereign or by any other
name”, from the purview of the definition of “industry”. He
opined that if the nature of the activity is relevant, and not who
performs it, then, it is irrelevant to enquire whether the activity
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is conducted by the State, or if it is conducted in fulfilment of
its constitutional obligations or constitutional functions.
According to him, if the State’s inalienable functions are
excluded from the definition of “industry”, it amounts to
rejecting the “fundamental test” of whether an entity is an
“industry”, i.e., the nature of the activity performed. The
learned Chief Justice, therefore, suggested that a strict
interpretation of what can be included within sovereign
functions of the State must be made.

iv. Jaswant Singh, J. (for himself and Tulzapurkar, J.) did not
opine on the sovereign function exception.
17.7 With regard to the exclusion of charitable institutions from
the definition of “industry”:
i. Krishna Iyer, J. (for himself, Bhagwati and Desai, JJ.) held that
while industries are systematic and organised activities,
charities which do not possess this feature are not “industry”.
He established a “trichotomy” or a three-fold classification of
charitable enterprises as under:
(a) The first category comprises businesses where
a whole or substantial part of the profits are diverted
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to charity. Krishna Iyer, J. held that if a business is
run for the production and supply of goods and
services with a profit motive, it is an “industry”,
irrespective of whether the whole or a substantial part
of such profit is diverted for purely charitable
purposes.
(b) The second category comprises goods and
services produced for supply to the needy without
charging a price or receiving a negligible return. Once
again, according to Krishna Iyer, J., this does not take
the unit out of the purview of “industry”, since as far
as the workmen are concerned, it does not matter
whether the products produced are delivered free to
the poor.
(c) The third category comprises entities where
“philanthropic devotion” is itself the basis for the
establishment. If the institution is headed by someone
who is dedicated to a mission and passionately
pursues it, while attracting others to the institution,
not for wages but for sharing in the cause, then the
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undertaking is not “industrial”. In such cases, there is
no economic relationship between the head of an
institution and those who are attracted to the mission.
Krishna Iyer, J. illustrated this concept through the
example of an ‘Ashram’ , with a ‘guru’ as its head along
with a band of disciples, devotees and priestly
subordinates. Here, even if the subordinates perform
duties such as cooking and cleaning among others,
the nature of the relations is such that the Ashram is
not an “industry” within the meaning of Section 2(j) of
the I.D. Act.

ii. Beg, C.J. opined that services which are rendered purely for
the satisfaction of spiritual or psychological urges of the
persons rendering them, are excluded from the purview of
“industry”. When services are rendered by groups of charitable
individuals out of missionary zeal and purely charitable
motives, there would hardly be any need to invoke the
provisions of the I.D. Act to protect them.

iii. Chandrachud, C.J. did not agree with the exclusion of
charitable institutions from the purview of “industry”. He
125

opined that a systematic activity which is organised or
arranged akin to a trade or business would be an “industry”
despite the fact that it proceeds on charitable motives. While
the “subjective motive force” of an activity may be charity, to
decide whether the activity is an “industry”, one has look at the
process involved in the activity objectively.
iv. Jaswant Singh, J. (for himself and Tulzapurkar, J.) opined that
the second and third categories of charities delineated by
Krishna Iyer, J. are not included within the definition of
“industry”.
17.8 Thus, what emerges on a reading of the opinions expressed
in the four opinions of Bangalore Water Supply can be
summarised as under:
(i) There was consensus among the five Judges who constituted
the majority regarding the “triple-test” and its applicability to
determine if an entity was an “industry” or not within the
meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
(ii) As to whether the legal maxim noscitur a sociis would apply to
the definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act,
Krishna Iyer, J (speaking for himself, Desai and Bhagwati JJ)
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and Beg, C.J held that the principle would not apply so as to
restrict the definition, whereas Chandrachud, C.J., and
Jaswant Singh J. (speaking for himself and Tulzapurkar, J.)
held that the maxim would apply.
(iii) With respect to the exclusion of ‘sovereign functions’, there was
an explicit disagreement between Chandrachud, C.J., who
held that no such exclusion should be granted and the
opinions of Krishna Iyer, J. and Beg, C.J. However, there was
unanimity with regard to certain types of sovereign functions
which have to be excluded. Even between the opinions of the
Krishna Iyer, J. and Beg, C.J., there are certain differences.
Beg, J. limited the exclusion to cases where services are
governed by separate rules and constitutional provisions.
Krishna Iyer, J. provided a broader scope for exclusion through
his observation that apart from Articles 309 and 311 of the
Constitution, other legislation dealing with employment under
statutory bodies may also exclude the operation of the I.D. Act.
This is under the State Education enactments providing for
separate tribunals for remedies to persons working in
educational institutions covered under the said enactments.
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Further, lending another nuance, he opined that even within
bodies that perform inalienable functions of the State, certain
departments may be severable and separately considered as
“industries”.
(iv) Regarding the exclusion of charities and charitable
institutions, Chandrachud, C.J. once again disagreed entirely
with the exclusion. Krishna Iyer, J. propounded the
“trichotomy” of charitable institutions where only the third
category, i.e., where philanthropic devotion is itself the basis
of the establishment, was excluded from the purview of
“industry”. Beg, C.J. also appeared to agree with the exclusion
of the third category, insofar as services rendered out of
“missionary zeal and purely charitable motives” and “purely for
the satisfaction of spiritual or psychological urges” were held
to be outside the scope of “industry”. Per contra , Jaswant Singh
and Tulzapurkar, JJ. held that the second category was also
excluded, i.e., where production is for the needy without
charging a price or a negligible price, since it did not constitute
production on commercial lines.
128

According to Jaswant Singh and Tulzapurkar, JJ., the
definition is limited to those activities systematically undertaken
on commercial lines by private entrepreneurs with the cooperation
of employees for the production of goods or services for the
community. Jaswant Singh, J. did not indicate any disapproval of
the majority’s view that profit should be irrelevant to the inquiry as
to what qualifies as “industry”. Yet, at the same time, he insisted
that “industry” must mean activities undertaken “ on commercial
lines ”. In my view, this requirement of commerciality is
conceptually unsound to the extent it divorces commerciality from
the very feature that ordinarily defines it, namely profit. If profit is
irrelevant, it is unclear what work the requirement of
commerciality is intended to perform. To insist that commerciality
survives independently of profit deprives the term of its content,
leaving no basis on which to distinguish commercial from non-
commercial activities. The dissenting opinion of Jaswant Singh, J.
provided no criteria for identifying when an activity is commercial
to constitute an “industry” thereby introducing ambiguity
particularly when the majority’s opinion itself says that that an
activity should resemble trade or business. While at first blush, the
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requirement appears to narrow the definition, commerciality,
actually, is a vague and subjective standard and leaves courts to
determine its content on a case-by-case basis without any coherent
doctrinal foundation. In this sense, it ends up complicating, rather
than clarifying, the definition of “industry”.
Application of the ratio of Bangalore Water Supply and
reference to a larger Bench :

18. However, difficulty may have arisen in the application of the
said judgment to various activities undertaken by the Government
or by private entities despite there being a broad consensus
between the opinions of the Judges of the seven-Judge Bench. It is
in the above backdrop that subsequently in the cases of
Jagannath Kondhare and Pratamsingh Parmar , with regard to
the activity of social forestry undertaken by the State, there was an
alleged divergent opinion on whether it would be “industry” within
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.
18.1 A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Jagannath
Kondhare opined that the Pachgaon Parwati Scheme undertaken
by the Forest Department was outside the ‘sovereign function’
exclusion. The Court noted that if the exclusion is applied to all
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welfare activities, then the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply
would be eroded. Hansaria, J., speaking for the Court, expressed
reluctance to do so in view of Krishna Iyer J.’s holding in
Bangalore Water Supply that sovereign functions should be
strictly understood and also that units may be ‘severed’ and
considered industries. Accordingly, since the concerned Scheme
involved the selection of an area for the creation of a park for the
benefit of the urban population, the Court held that such work
could have been undertaken by an agency which is not an
instrumentality of the State. The same was held not to be an
inalienable/inescapable State function, and hence outside the
purview of the ‘sovereign function’ exclusion.
18.2 On the other hand, in Pratamsingh Parmar , which was a
two-Judge Bench decision concerning the question of whether the
Forest Department in the State of Gujarat could be held to be an
“industry”, it was observed that ordinarily a Government
Department cannot be held to be an “industry”, as the sovereign
function exception would apply. It further held that on the basis of
the factual pleadings of the said case, the decision of this Court in
Jagannath Kondhare would not be applicable, i.e., that there was
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no pleading with regard to the nature of the Forest Department and
the duty being discharged by the appellant in relation to the
activities undertaken by the said entity. Hence, the Forest
Department was held not to be an “industry” by virtue of the
sovereign function exception.
18.3 On a closer examination, however, I find that there was in
fact no apparent conflict between the decisions in Jagannath
Kondhare and Pratamsingh Parmar . In the former, it was held
that if the sovereign function exception were applied to include all
welfare activities, this would erode the ratio of Bangalore Water
Supply . The concerned Scheme was deemed not to be an
inalienable/inescapable State function and that it could have been
conducted by an agency which was not a State instrumentality.
Hence, the Forest Department was held, in the facts of that case,
to be within the purview of “industry”. In Pratamsingh Parmar ,
however, the ratio of Jagannath Kondhare was held not to apply
because the respondent had made no assertion of fact in
establishing that the establishment to which he had been
appointed was an “industry”. In the absence of any assertion by
the respondent indicating the nature of duty discharged as well as
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the nature of the establishment where he had been recruited, the
principles in Jagannath Kondhare could not and should not be
applied.
18.4 Therefore, what we infer is that clearly, contrary to what
was observed by Jai Bir Singh , i.e., the 2005 reference order,
there was no “cleavage of opinion” between the two cases with
regard to the applicability of Bangalore Water Supply . It was
therefore unnecessary on the part of the Bench in Jai Bir Singh
(5-J) to hold that the cases had “culled out differently” the ratio of
Bangalore Water Supply . The conclusion of Pratamsingh
Parmar , i.e., that the Forest Department of the State of Gujarat
was not an “industry”, was based on lack of a specific pleading of
facts warranting the extension of Jagannath Kondhare ’s
reasoning to the case. It is indeed trite to say that each case turns
on its facts. Therefore, the finding that the factual pleadings on
record failed to make out a case for application of Jagannath
Kondhare , does not imply that the cases were divergent in their
application or understanding of the ratio of Bangalore Water
Supply .
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18.5 In order to reconcile the opinions of the two-Judge Bench
and the three-Judge Bench, a five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh
thought it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger bench. One of
the premises for the reference was that there was no consensus
between the Judges of the seven-Judge Bench, which we find to be
an incorrect inference. Therefore, I wonder why at all the five-Judge
Bench referred the matter to a larger Bench. In other words,
whether the reference to a larger Bench was necessary at all?
18.6 In fact, the five-Judge Bench ought to have appreciated the
fact that the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of
Jagannath Kondhare proceeded only on the facts of the said case
and it was held that the activity involved therein was covered within
the definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act for
which reasons were assigned. In Pratamsingh Parmar , the Forest
Department of the State was held not to be an “industry” based on
the factual pleadings of the case. In Jai Bir Singh , the five-Judge
Bench being a larger Bench could have either reconciled the
aforesaid two decisions or overruled one of them in case of
necessity. Instead, the five-Judge Bench adopted a third and
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strange path of questioning the correctness of the judgment of the
seven-Judge Bench in Bangalore Water Supply .
18.7 The five-Judge Bench ought to have applied the ratio of
Bangalore Water Supply to the facts of the case in Jai Bir Singh.
Instead, in Jai Bir Singh , the five-Judge Bench took note of the
fact that Krishna Iyer, J. (speaking for himself, Bhagwati and
Desai, JJ.) had observed in Bangalore Water Supply that the
principles applicable for interpreting the expression “industry”
under the I.D. Act were formulated. However, the same was
subject to being overruled by a larger Bench or superseded by
legislation. But the aforesaid statement nowhere indicates any
doubt raised by Krishna Iyer, J. on his opinion. In fact in
paragraphs 140 to 144 of his opinion, it was categorically stated
that the principles including the “triple test” as well as ‘the
dominant nature test’ would be applicable to the facts of every case
in order to determine whether the entity is an “industry” within the
meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act. Merely because Jaswant
Singh, J. (for himself and Tulzapurkar, J.), through their separate
opinion, stated that the definition of “industry” in Section 2(j) of the
I.D. Act covered only such activities “systematically and habitually
135

carried on” commercial lines “for production of goods or for
rendering material services to the community” , which was a
dissenting opinion and in line with the opinion of Gajendragadkar,
J. in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha , (wherein it had been stated that
the definition of the I.D. Act was very wide and “a line has to be
drawn in a fair and just manner” to exclude some callings, services
or undertakings which do not fit in with the provisions of the I.D.
Act), could not have resulted in per se questioning the correctness
of the judgment of this Court in Bangalore Water Supply .
18.8 In fact, Jaswant Singh, J. also opined that the legislature
should step in with a comprehensive bill to remove doubts and set
at rest once and for all the controversy in relation to the meaning
and interpretation of the word “industry” under Section 2(j) of the
I.D. Act. The same has happened only recently when the IR Code
has been given effect to since November 2025.
18.9 Therefore, the interpretation of the expression “industry” as
made by Krishna Iyer, J. as well as by other Judges of the seven-
Judge Bench who formed the majority would hold the field and
apply to all pending cases.
136

18.10 Since the I.D. Act has now been repealed and IR Code
has been enacted, which has a detailed definition of “industry” in
Section 2(p) of the IR Code, it would also be unnecessary to also go
into the correctness or otherwise of the reasons assigned by the
five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh so as to consider the definition
of “industry” in the pending cases particularly when I have
analysed the judgments in Bangalore Water Supply and am in
agreement with the majority opinions.
18.11 Moreover, merely because there was difficulty in the
application of the judgment of this Court in Bangalore Water
Supply to the facts of a particular case before a Bench, is no reason
to question the correctness of the judgment in Bangalore Water
Supply by making a reference to a larger Bench.
Why an expansive definition of “Industry” is necessary ?:
19. Reconnecting with the discussion made earlier, I observe that
domestic economic reforms in India in the year 1991 were also
accompanied by globalisation and trade liberalisation. As an
example, import licensing was first abolished for capital and
intermediate goods, and subsequently altogether. The foreign
investment policy of the country was also progressively liberalised.
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Along with the increased worker-vulnerability owing to
privatisation and the consequent lack of statutory service rules,
the pressure to reduce costs may result in companies attempting
to structure themselves outside the purview of “industry”, enabling
them to escape regulatory laws and associated labour costs. This
further amplifies the need for an expansive definition of “industry”.
19.1. Further, the industrial activities which were being
carried out by the State through Public Sector Units (PSUs) have
been privatised, and private entities and individuals are now
carrying forward those activities in their individual names or in the
names of their entities or corporates. Thus, certain activities which
were being undertaken by the State such as production of goods
and services are now being undertaken by private persons, whether
individuals or corporates. Therefore, the changes in the nature of
the economy, economic thinking and the drastic consequences
flowing from the same including the initiation of Reforms in the
year 1991, which have continued for the last thirty-five years, have
also to be borne in mind.
19.2 If the above historical perspective is kept in mind and
the changes in the form of Reforms brought about in the Indian
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economy over three decades are also taken into consideration, I am
of the view that the definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the
I.D. Act must be given a broad but realistic meaning so as to not
curtail the object and purpose of the I.D. Act. The object and
purpose of the I.D. Act have been discussed above. What the I.D.
Act ultimately intends is to ensure industrial peace in the country
and to ensure harmony in industrial relations, not only between
employers and employees, but between employers and employers
and workmen and workmen, so that the nation as a whole develops
economically and socially.
19.3 In the above backdrop, what should be the approach in
the interpretation to be made to the definition of “industry” under
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act? Should it be narrowed down or should
it be maintained in terms of what was interpreted by this Court in
Bangalore Water Supply ?
19.4 The salience and necessity of an expansive definition of
“industry” under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act is exemplified through
a consideration of the nature and scheme of the I.D. Act. A perusal
of the I.D. Act reveals its breadth in the multitude of issues it is
intended to regulate, in its attempt to harmonise labour relations
139

in India. Enacted a few months prior to Indian Independence, it
was anticipated that as the country embarked on a path towards
economic development and embraced industrialisation, that the
interests of the working class would not always align with those of
their employers. There was thus a need for mechanisms to prevent
the exploitation of workers and the guarantee of fair working
conditions while also ensuring speedy and efficient resolution of
disputes, the prevention of strong-arming by collectives of workers,
to resolve disputes between various employers and to ensure
modes for the State to intervene when necessary. It is indubitable
that the purpose of the I.D. Act in establishing a tripartite
stakeholder model of intervention and dispute resolution is to serve
as a balancing force, wherein a check is kept to prevent excesses
by any one stakeholder, be it the workmen, employer or the State.
This tripartite structure is reflected under Section 2(k) of the I.D.
Act, where the term “industrial disputes” is defined expansively so
as to include disputes between various stakeholders, including
disputes between workmen and employer, employer and employer
and workmen and workmen, so long as the dispute is relatable to
the employment or non-employment of any person, the terms of
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their employment or the conditions of labour, with the State
serving as an enabling and modulating force.
19.5 Chapter II of the I.D. Act concerns the constitution of
various authorities under the I.D. Act, including the Works
Committees, Conciliation Officers, the Board of Conciliation,
Courts of Inquiry, Labour Courts and Tribunals. Chapter III
concerns the process by which disputes may be referred to the
relevant adjudicatory authority. Chapter IV details the powers and
duties of the aforementioned authorities under Chapter II. Chapter
V concerns strikes and lock-outs and the stipulations that must be
adhered to for these to be considered valid modes of redressal of
grievances. Chapter VA concerns lay-offs and retrenchment and
the entitlements of workmen to compensation and other benefits if
they are subject to either. Chapter VC concerns unfair labour
practices. Chapter VI concerns the penalties to be imposed for
various infractions of the provisions of the I.D. Act, including
conducting illegal strikes and lock-outs, instigation and closure
without notice among others.
19.6 Thus, any definition of the term “industry” under
Section 2(j) involves a consideration as to, whether, the range of
141

protections accorded under the I.D. Act to all stakeholders and not
merely the workmen, the various modes of dispute resolution, the
procedural formalities that must be complied with as well as the
penalties to be imposed would apply to a particular entity or not.
In light of this, the need for an expansive definition so that the
widest array of entities and all the stakeholders involved therein
may avail of the protections under the I.D. Act and also be bound
by its restrictions becomes critical and necessary.
19.7 I also reiterate that having regard to privatisation of
industries being rigorously implemented by the State and the
transfer of many activities of the State including social welfare
activities into the hands of private persons and entities, the
definition of “industry” under Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act cannot be
curtailed or given a restricted meaning. That would not, in my view,
enhance the object and purpose of the I.D. Act which is very much
relevant for considering the cases pending before the Tribunals or
the Courts concerning employers as well as workmen.
19.8 A consequence of the advent of the liberalisation,
privatisation and globalisation (LPG) reforms in India is the
bolstering of the bargaining power of one stakeholder in the
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tripartite stakeholder model envisioned under the I.D Act in
particular, namely, the employers in the private sector. With a
decrease in regulation, with disinvestment and the retreat of the
State from various industries, the protections available to workmen
who were earlier protected by virtue of being employed by the State
have now been eroded. The corollary to this is that employers
possess what could be termed as a supercharged version of the
bargaining power that was sought to be kept under check earlier,
wherein market forces along with concomitant pressures on the
State to ensure economic growth and development results in an
augmented form of worker vulnerability. An expansive definition of
the term “industry” thus serves the purpose of acting as a
mitigating force and a bulwark against this skewed bargaining
power turning especially exploitative, by allowing for the State to
not completely abdicate its obligations as a stakeholder to
intervene when necessary.
Any other issue(s) that may arise during the course of hearing
before the nine-Judge Bench:
20. In the realm of statutory interpretation, a provision of law and
the judgment of the Apex Court interpreting the same would
definitely have a bearing while considering another provision which
143

has substituted the earlier provision which was interpreted by the
Apex Court, either by way of repeal of the Act in which that
provision was found or the substitution of that provision by way of
an amendment in the very same Act. Prospective overruling of an
interpretation given to a provision of law by a judgment of this
Court, on the basis of a new substituting enactment containing a
similar provision, is not permissible. The interpretation of the
earlier provision governs the period during which that provision is
in force and its replacement by a similar provision does not
retrospectively nullify the interpretation of a Court. A later
enactment may change the law but it cannot retrospectively change
what the earlier enactment or a provision therein was judicially
interpreted to mean.
20.1 In the instant case, Section 2(j) of the ID Act and the judgment
in respect thereof, namely Bangalore Water Supply will
necessarily have to be taken into consideration while interpreting
Section 2(p) of the IR Code where there are commonalities or
similarities in the two provisions. But we are now considering
whether the interpretation of Section 2(j) of ID Act in Bangalore
Water Supply is correct or not. For that purpose, Section 2(p) of
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the IR Code cannot form the basis for narrowing down the scope
and ambit of Section 2(j) of the ID Act.
20.2 In the present case, we are placed in a unique position as a
provision in a repealed enactment is coming up for reconsideration
in the face of a substituted statute namely the IR Code. If the
intention of the Parliament is to give a restrictive meaning to the
word “industry” in Section 2(p) of the IR Code, that cannot cloud
our interpretation of Section 2(j) of the ID Act. This nine-Judge
bench is unanimous in observing that we have not opined anything
about Section 2(p) of the IR Code which gives the definition of
“industry”. If that is so, the same cannot be the basis or rationale
for narrowing down the definition of “industry” in Section 2(j) of the
ID Act. In other words, Section 2(p) of the IR Code cannot be
considered hypothetically and be at the back of our minds while
interpreting Section 2(j) of the ID Act. It is one thing to refrain from
observing anything on Section 2(p) of the IR Code but it is quite
another and not right, to state that while interpreting the said
provision, the judgment of this Court in Bangalore Water Supply
interpreting Section 2(j) has to be given a go-by. In fact, the
earlier case law on the corresponding provision is relevant and may
145

be highly persuasive, even binding, if the statutory language is,
after judicial determination, found to be identical. This cardinal
principle of interpretation has been observed by Lord Justice
James in Greaves v. Tofield (1880) 14 Ch. D. 563 at 571 as
follows:
“If an Act of Parliament uses the same language which was
used in a former Act of Parliament referring to the same
subject, and passed with the same purpose, and for the
same object, the safe and well-known rule of construction
is to assume that the legislature when using well-known
words upon which there have been well-known decisions
uses those words in the sense which the decisions have
attached to them.”

As also noted in Justice G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory
th
Interpretation, 15 Edition, the application of this rule of
construction has the merit of allowing the use of the earlier statute
to throw light on the meaning of the same expression used in the
later statute.
20.3 My learned Brother Narasimha, J. in paragraph No.23 of his
opinion has opined as under:
“23. My primary concern is that the litigation that has
surrounded the interpretation of Section 2(j) should not
cast its shadow on the new Industrial Code. We need to
break away from the perpetuating interpretative cycle that
146

has afflicted Section 2(j) and protect the Industrial
Relations Code, 2020, from any preconceived notions. For
effective and efficient interpretation and development of the
industrial law, Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations
Code, 2020, must be freed of the bondage of ratio in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) or any new definitions that
we may propose while deciding the Reference. In fact,
Hon’ble Chief Justice as well as my sister and brother
Judges have categorically stated that the views of the nine-
Judge Bench should not have a bearing on the
interpretation that may subsequently be given to the
definition of Industry under Section 2(p) of the Industrial
Relations Code, 2020. I am in full agreement with such a
declaration. I think it is necessary.”
(underlining by me)

I emphatically say that if the above declaration is to apply then
the entire exercise of giving a new interpretation to Section 2(j) of
the ID Act is wholly unnecessary and only academic in nature.
Then the reformulation of the Triple Test would also have no
bearing.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS:
21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that
the Reference to a nine-Judge Bench was not necessary in view of
my reasoning in paragraphs 18 to 18.11. Secondly, the reference
need not be answered at the present juncture.
147

Even otherwise, on a deep analysis of the judgment of this
Court in Bangalore Water Supply, I find that it does not call for
reconsideration.
A. That the Reference made by the five-Judge Bench to this
nine-Judge Bench on a perception that there was a conflict in
the decisions of this Court in Jagannath Kondhare (three-
Judge Bench) and Pratamsingh Parmar (two-Judge Bench),
for the purpose of reconsideration of the seven-Judge Bench
judgment in Bangalore Water Supply , was misconceived,
and therefore the Reference itself was uncalled for.
B. I have summarised the ten reasons why the Reference need not
be answered at this juncture:
a. The I.D. Act itself has been repealed w.e.f.
21.11.2025.

b. A new enactment by way of the IR Code has been
enforced w.e.f. 21.11.2025, containing a new
definition of “industry” in Section 2(p) thereof.

148

c. The judgment of the seven-Judge Bench in
Bangalore Water Supply has held the field for
nearly half a century (48 years).

d. In Bangalore Water Supply , there is broad
consensus of opinion expressed in the concurring
judgments of Krishna Iyer, J. (for himself,
Bhagwati and Desai, JJ.), Beg, C.J. and
Chandrachud, C.J., who together comprised the
majority of five Judges. The points of convergence
and divergence discussed by Jaswant Singh, J.
(for himself and Tulzapurkar, J.) do not in any way
dilute the ratio of the judgments interpreting the
definition of “industry” in Section 2(j) of the I.D.
Act, by the majority of five Judges.

e. Any pronouncement on the correctness or
otherwise of the judgment of this Court in
Bangalore Water Supply would definitely cast
its shadow on the definition of “industry” under
Section 2(p) of the IR Code and for this reason
149

also, the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply
does not require reconsideration.

f. The application of the ratio of the judgment in
Bangalore Water Supply in respect of various
activities in order to ascertain whether such
activities come within the definition of the word
“industry” in Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act, cannot
result in a reconsideration of the correctness of
the judgment of the seven-Judge Bench in
Bangalore Water Supply .


g. When the judgment of the seven-Judge Bench of
this Court in Bangalore Water Supply was
rendered in the year 1978, there were
innumerable activities which were embarked upon
by the State itself. However, the ushering in of the
reforms of 1991 in the form of liberalisation,
privatisation and globalisation has resulted in a
total change in the policy of the Union and the
State Governments, whereby several activities of
150

the Union and State Governments have now been
privatised, liberalised or globalised. Hence, it is in
the interest of the employers, workmen and
industrial activity, as well as the Indian economy
itself, that the definition of “industry” in Section
2(j) of the I.D. Act as interpreted by this Court in
Bangalore Water Supply be followed insofar as
the pending cases before the Labour Courts,
Industrial Tribunals, High Courts and this Court
are concerned.

h. The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 1982,
passed by the Parliament to overcome the
judgment in Bangalore Water Supply , remained
unnotified and thereby inchoate to this date. The
judgment in Bangalore Water Supply , therefore,
should be taken to have received the acquiescence
even of the Parliament and the Executive and,
therefore, no interference by this Court is called
for.
151

i. Any reconsideration of the judgment in
Bangalore Water Supply will cause the disputes
pending under the erstwhile I.D. Act to be now
remanded to their original fora for reconsideration
in light of a change in law under the I.D. Act. Such
re-consideration will not be in keeping with the
declared objectives of the I.D. Act, namely,
industrial peace and certainty and relief for
parties under the said Act.

j. The State undertakes many functions which are
not stricto senso sovereign. Merely because a
function is performed by the State ought not to
mean that it qualifies for being exempted from the
definition of “industry” under the I.D Act.
Therefore, no reconsideration of the dicta in
Bangalore Water Supply , insofar as the
“sovereign functions exception” is concerned, is
called for.
C. However, on reconsideration of the judgment of this Court in
Bangalore Water Supply as above, I hold that the majority
152

judgments of the seven-Judge Bench is good law and therefore,
binding. Consequently, I am of the view that the questions referred
for the consideration of this Bench would have to be answered in
the following manner:

S. No. Questions Answers
1.
Whether the test laid
down in paragraphs 140
to 144 in the opinion
rendered by Hon’ble Mr.
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer
in Bangalore Water
Supply to determine if an
undertaking or enterprise
falls within the definition
of “industry” lays down
correct law? And whether
the Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Act, 1982
(which seemingly did not
come into force) and the
Industrial Relations Code,
2020 (with effect from
21.11.2025) have any
legal impact on the
interpretation of the
expression “industry” as
contained in the principal
Act?

Yes, the test laid down in
paragraphs 140 to 144 in
the opinion rendered by
Krishna Iyer. J. in
Bangalore Water Supply
to determine if an
undertaking or enterprise
falls within the definition of
“industry” lays down the
correct law. The opinions
of Beg, C.J. and
Chandrachud, C.J. are an
elaboration of the
reasoning of Krishna Iyer,
J, as they elaborate on
points of concurrence.
Both the learned Chief
Justices explicitly voiced
their concurrence with the
majority of Krishna Iyer,
J.’s reasoning and
conclusions. Hence, on a
comprehensive reading,
the majority formed by the
opinions of Krishna Iyer, J.
(for himself, Bhagwati and
Desai, JJ.); Beg, C.J. and
Chandrachud, C.J. would
not call for any
reconsideration.





153

S. No. Questions Answers
The Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Act, 1982
and the IR Code, 2020
(w.e.f. 21.11.2025) do not
have any legal impact on
the interpretation of the
expression “industry” as
contained in Section 2(j) of
the I.D. Act (since repealed
and substituted by Section
2(p) of the IR code, 2020
w.e.f. 21.11.2025).

2.
Whether social welfare
activities and schemes or
other enterprises
undertaken by the
Government Departments
or their instrumentalities
can be construed to be
“industrial activities” for
the purpose of Section 2(j)
of the I.D. Act?
Social welfare activities
and schemes or other
enterprises undertaken by
the Government Departments
or their instrumentalities can
be construed to be “industrial
activities” for the purpose of
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act
depending upon the nature of
the activities. The mere fact
that many social welfare
activities and schemes or
other enterprises are
undertaken by Government
Departments or their
instrumentalities per se do
not exclude them from the
definition of “industry” under
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act.

In fact, many such
activities are now being
carried out by private
enterprises, entities and
individuals or in the form of
public-private partnerships.
Hence, the test of who carries
154

S. No. Questions Answers
out the activity is not
relevant. Rather, what the
nature of the activity is and
all other relevant factors of
the activity have to be
considered to determine
whether the activity is an
“industrial activity” within
the meaning of Section 2(j) of
the I.D. Act.

3.
What State activities will
be covered by the
expression “sovereign
function”, and whether
such activities will fall
outside the purview of
Section 2(j) of the I.D.
Act?

The determination of State
activities which would be
covered by the expression
“sovereign function”, and
whether such activities will
fall outside the purview of
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act
would again depend upon the
nature of the activity. The
interpretation given to the
aforesaid provision in
Bangalore Water Supply
excludes certain activities
from the operation of the
“sovereign function
exception” and consequently,
places them within the scope
of the definition of “industry”.
The dominant nature of the
activity rather than the
dominant purpose of the
activity is a relevant factor.



4.
Any other issue(s) that
may arise during the
course of hearing before
the nine-Judge Bench.
The issue that arose
during the course of hearing
before this Bench was,
whether, the interpretation of

155

S. No. Questions Answers

the word “industry” in Section
2(p) of the IR Code could be
applied to reconsider the
seven-Judge Bench decision
of this Court in Bangalore
Water Supply , by giving a
narrow interpretation to
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act? In
other words, whether Section
2(p) of the IR Code could cast
its shadow on Section 2(j) of
the I.D. Act so that the
interpretation of Section 2(j)
of the I.D. Act could be
aligned with Section 2(p) of
the IR Code?

In my view, the
interpretation of the word
“industry” in Section 2(j) of
the I.D. Act may have a
bearing on the interpretation
of Section 2(p) of the IR Code
and not vice versa.
There can be no
interpretation given to
Section 2(j) of the ID Act on
the basis of the definition
under Section 2(p) of the IR
Code.


22. The Reference is answered accordingly in the aforesaid terms.
I place on record my sincere appreciation of the valuable
assistance rendered by learned Attorney General, learned senior
156

counsel, learned counsel and learned instructing counsel as well
as learned amicus curiae appearing for the respective parties.

………………….………………J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)

NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 20, 2026
157

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 897 OF 2002

STATE OF U.P. ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

JAI BIR SINGH …RESPONDENT(S)
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4646 OF 2007
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3647 OF 2007
SLP (C) NO. 1112 OF 2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3920 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3119 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6114 OF 2001
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6108 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1276 OF 2001
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1279 OF 2001
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1278 OF 2001
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6471 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2506 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8597 OF 2001
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4569 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5101 OF 2002
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2409 OF 2002
SLP (C) NO. 20982 OF 2002
Page 1 of 18

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 355-358 OF 2003
SLP (C) NO. 14085 OF 2004
SLP (C) NO. 11291 OF 2004
SLP (C) NO. 14127 OF 2004
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7994 OF 2004
SLP (C) NO. 4139 OF 2005
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1274 OF 2007
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1273 OF 2007
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1311-1312 OF 2008
SLP (C) NO. 16301 OF 2007
SLP (C) NO. 3107 OF 2008
SLP (C) NO. 4327 OF 2008
SLP (C) NO. 4329 OF 2008
SLP (C) NO. 4328 OF 2008
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 296 OF 2008
SLP (C) NO. 16276 OF 2008
SLP (C) NO. 17224 OF 2008
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5519 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5681 OF 2010
SLP (C)… CC NO. 7990 OF 2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7757 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1131 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8149-8151 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4505-4506 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4507-4508 OF 2013
SLP (C) NOS. 12679-12682 OF 2014
Page 2 of 18

SLP (C) NO. 1857 OF 2016
SLP (C) NO. 14156 OF 2021

J U D G M E N T
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.

1. A statute that creates Conciliation Officers, Labour Courts and
Industrial Tribunals and hands them the power to order reinstatement and
compel settlements needs to say with precision who falls within its reach.
Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was Parliament’s attempt
to say so. However, it neither settled its boundaries nor specified its
constituents with certainty. It opened it. For more than 30 years, hospitals,
universities, co-operative societies, gymkhana clubs and Government
departments went to court to argue whether they are covered or not under
that definition. The dispute persisted for over four decades, ultimately
assuming such proportions as to warrant reference to a seven-judge
Bench of the Supreme Court, which rendered its decision in Bangalore
1
Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa .
2. Section 2(j), read literally, is wide enough to describe a factory and
a family kitchen in the same breadth, and, on other readings, narrow
enough to exclude workers it clearly meant to protect. So, the litigation

1
(1978) 2 SCC 213.
Page 3 of 18

continued despite the verdict of the seven-judge Bench. This nine-Judge
Bench is now assembled to resolve the persisting eight-decade
uncertainty.
3. The process of adjudication that we have undertaken is no different
from the process undertaken by any of the Benches that delivered their
judgments, till, of course, overruled by later determinations. The process
of references, reconsiderations, reconstructions and then judgments
cancelling each other continued, and may even continue before an
eleven-Judge Bench to reconsider the views expressed by us. The
problem, as I understand is not so much in our understanding of the
definition of “Industry”, but in the way the definition is formulated. It suffers
from certain structural errors.
4. We are told that this Court has no option except to keep interpreting
and delivering its verdict. There is also a great disconnect between the
legislature and the courts, i.e., between laws formulated by the parliament
and interpretations rendered by the Courts. Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo,
while addressing the Bar Association of New York, said;
“The Courts are not helped as they could and ought to be in the
adaptation of law to justice. The reason they are not helped is because
there is no one whose business it is to give warning that help is
needed.... We must have a courier who will carry the tidings of
distress.... Today Courts and legislature work in separation and
aloofness. The penalty is paid both in the wasted effort of production
and in the lowered quality of the product. On the one side, the judges,
left to fight against anachronism and injustice by the methods of
Judge-made law, are distracted by the conflicting promptings of justice
and logic, of consistency and mercy, and the output of their labours
Page 4 of 18

bears the tokens of the strain. On the other side, the Legislature,
informed only casually and intermittently of the needs and problems of
the Courts, without expert or responsible or disinterested or systematic
advice as to the workings of one rule or another, patches the fabric
here and there, and mars often when it would mend. Legislature and
Courts move on in proud and silent isolation. Some agency must be
2
found to mediate between them.”

5. There must be some way out of this perpetuating cycle. In Yash
3
Developers v. Harihar Krupa Coop. Housing Society Ltd. , this Court
recognised the obligation of the executive government to conduct
performance audits of statutes. This Court declared that reviewing and
assessing the implementation of a statute is an integral part of the Rule of
Law. It is in recognition of this obligation of the executive government that
the Court held that constitutional courts can direct Governments to carry
out a performance audit of statutes. The reasoning of the Court is as
follows;
“58. Four aspects for achieving justice are well founded and
articulated as: (i) distribution of advantages and disadvantages of
society, (ii) curbing the abuse of power and liberty, (iii) deciding
4
disputes, and (iv) adapting to change. Adapting to change is important
for achieving justice, as failure to adapt produces injustice and is, in a
sense, an abuse of power. Thus, failure to use power to adapt to
change is in its own way an abuse of power. In fact, the issue is not
one of change or not to change, but of the direction and the speed of
change and such a change may come in various ways, and most
effectively through legislation. Legal reform through legislative
correction improves the legal system and it would require assessment
of the working of the law, its accessibility, utility and abuse as well.

The Executive branch has a constitutional duty to ensure that the
59.
purpose and object of a statute is accomplished while implementing it.
It has the additional duty to closely monitor the working of a statute
and must have a continuous and a real time assessment of the impact
that the statute is having. As stated above, reviewing and assessing

2
Also cited by Krishna Iyer, J. in Bangalore Water Supply (supra).
3
(2024) 9 SCC 606.
4
See: “Justice in Adapting to Change”, in R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence , pp. 305-327 (5th Edn., 2013).
Page 5 of 18

the implementation of a statute is an integral part of Rule of Law. The
purpose of such review is to ensure that a law is working out in practice
as it was intended. If not, to understand the reason and address it
quickly. It is in this perspective that this Court has, in a number of
cases, directed the Executive to carry a performance/assessment
audit of a statute or has suggested amendments to the provisions of a
particular enactment so as to remove perceived infirmities in its
5
working.

6. If proceedings initiated under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, are
interdicted at the very threshold on the ground of a jurisdictional fact that
the entity in question is not an industry as per the definition, and this
question is raised frequently, and judicial review Courts keep staying the
proceedings, then the very purpose and object of the beneficial legislation
is lost. This Court cannot be a silent spectator of this phenomenon.
Addressing such a situation arising due to legislative and executive
actions, this Court recognised the role of judiciary in the following terms;
Constitutional courts are fully justified in giving such directions as
60.
they are in a unique position of perceiving the working of a statute
while exercising judicial review, during which they could identify the
fault-lines in the implementation of a statute….

61 ….Though cases are decided on their own merit and the lis
disposed of, what is left behind is the institutional memory of the Court
about the working of the statute and its interpretation preserved as
precedents. Over a period of time, a critical mass of adjudicatory
determinations on the working of the statute is built. This critical mass,
coupled with the experiences gained by the Judges and the Court on
the working of the statute, is of immense value for auditing the working
of the legislation. It enables the court to assess whether the purpose
and object of the Act is being achieved or not.

(…)

64. … In such circumstances, the judicial role does encompass, in this
Court's understanding, the power, nay the duty to direct the executive

5
State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar , (2011) 10 SCC 404; Pravin Electricals (P) Ltd. v. Galaxy Infra & Engg.
(P) Ltd. , (2021) 5 SCC 671; Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand , (2010) 7 SCC 667; Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech
Ltd. , (2024) 5 SCC 313; Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India , (2019) 3 SCC 224.
Page 6 of 18

branch to review the working of statutes and audit the statutory impact.
It is not possible to exhaustively enlist the circumstances and
standards that will trigger such a judicial direction. One can only state
that this direction must be predicated on a finding that the statute has
through demonstrable judicial data or other cogent material failed to
ameliorate the conditions of the beneficiaries. The courts will also do
well, to arrive the very least, at a prima facie finding that much statutory
schemes and procedures are gridlocked in bureaucratic or judicial
quagmires that impede or delay statutory objectives. This facilitative
role the judiciary compels audit of the legislation, promote debate and
6
discussion but does not and cannot compel legislative reforms.”
(emphasis supplied)

7. Following the above mandate, on an empirical examination, we find
7 8 9
that Benches of varied quorum – four-judge, to a five-judge, to six and
10
a seven-judge bench of this Court attempted to find certainty in the
meaning of the expression ‘industry’. Further, there are at least 14 three-
judge bench decisions and more than 27 two-judge bench verdicts of this
Court grappling with the same issue. It is in this context that the
interpretation clause, i.e., the definition of Industry under Section 2(j),
needs to be examined.
8. Section 2(j) opens with the standard phrase of a legal definition:
“industry means….” But the mere grammatical form of a definition does
not guarantee that the sentence following it actually performs the function
a definition is supposed to perform. Law needs a definition, not an
explanation. Telling a labour officer why industrial disputes need to be

6
Yash Developers (supra).
7
Baroda Borough Municipality v. Workmen, (1956) 2 SCC 535.
8
D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee, (1952) 2 SCC 619.
9
Management of Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi v. Kuldip Singh Sethi, (1970) 1 SCC 735.
10
Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213.
Page 7 of 18

resolved expeditiously, or how to prioritise either the labour or the capital
on a certain philosophy, does not tell him whether the hospital in front of
him is, or is not, within his jurisdiction. Section 2(j) is written in the
grammatical shape of a definition; whether it actually behaves like one
has been the question. What then is a good definition?
9. Definitions have a purpose to subserve. Every act of
communication, spoken, written or argued in a court, relies on a shared
understanding of what the words mean. In legal reasoning, this shared
understanding is not an informal assumption but the very ground on which
arguments are built, precedents applied, and judgments rendered. It is
therefore compelling that we must have a rigorous and testable framework
for what a definition must do and what disqualifies it.
10. To start with, a definition is neither an explanation nor a description
of the subject; it is a precision instrument, whose function is to mark the
boundary of a concept. It is not usage or convenience, but a matter of
epistemological precision.
11. The structure of a definition consists of three elements: the subject
matter- for example, “Industry” as in this very case, its properties - that is,
the characteristic qualities or features that reside in the subject matter and
then the relationship or connection between the two, i.e., the subject
matter and its properties. If any one of these elements is uncertain, then
cognisance of the subject matter becomes indeterminate. This
Page 8 of 18

indeterminacy arising due to uncertainty in/of the property(ies) of an
‘industry’ and their relationship with the subject matter has, in my opinion,
been the fundamental problem in the definition of Industry.
12. The definition of a definition can be explained as comprising of two
parts. In the first place, a definition must convey a property or a character
held in common with nothing else . In other words, the defining property
must be unique to the class – present in every genuine member and
absent in everything that is not a member. Secondly, the property or
quality of the subject matter of the definition must survive three
independent tests: free from overextension , free from underextension ,
and also avoid structural impossibility .
13. Cognition of similar properties residing in all members of the defined
class, coupled with exclusion of everything outside the defined class, and
including every genuine member of the class, is the basis for certainty.
The dual test of exclusion of dissimilar and inclusion of similar properties
is integral to a valid definition. Any definition must be tested against both
purposes independently. Passing one test while failing the other produces
a definition that is either over-broad or over-narrow and is termed
ineffective; in fact, it results in a defective definition.
14. The discussion about the compelling need to have a correctly
formulated definition is only to indicate that the resolution of a dispute
concerning a jurisdictional fact based on a defined term does not flow out
Page 9 of 18

of the interpretations when fundamental defects of over-inclusion, under-
inclusion and certain improbabilities come to be associated with
definitions. This problem cannot be brushed away on the grounds that the
solution is within the legislative province.
15. However, a detailed analysis of the definition in Section 2(j) is not
necessary as the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, along with the definition of
‘industry’ under Section 2(j), is now repealed. In its place, w.e.f.
21.11.2025, the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 has come into force and
“industry” stands redefined under Section 2(p) of the 2020 Code. It is far
more important to deal with the consequences of such repeal on the
Reference to this nine-judge Bench for authoritative pronouncement.
16. On the preliminary issue, I believe there is no illegality in the
procedure adopted for referring the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) to the bench of nine judges. The Reference is not in violation of
11
the principles laid down by the Dawoodi Bohra . I am also of the opinion
that, but for the repeal, it would have been necessary to examine the
merits of the matter, as I have no doubt in mind that the definition of
‘industry’ under Section 2(j) of the repealed Act, as it stood, had certain
core as well as peripheral linguistic problems leading to uncertainty
throughout its lifetime. I need not elaborate on this as Justice Krishna Iyer

11
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673.
Page 10 of 18

himself mentioned about the need for a better definition as also the judicial
struggle for certainty about the scope and content of ‘industry’ from the
very commencement of the Act. In his erudite opinion, Hon’ble Chief
Justice has also referred to a number of decisions of this court after
Bangalore Water Supply (supra), seeking settlement and certainty about
the core and content of the definition. Therefore, the need to address the
issue relating to the accurate scope of ‘industry’ under Section 2(j) was
compelling when the Reference was made; however, for the reasons to
follow and the position that has been taken, it is not necessary to answer
the questions referred on merits. I will, in short, first refer to the perspective
in which Hon’ble Chief Justice and my sister and brother judges have
viewed the Reference on.
17. Hon’ble Chief Justice has suggested that the focus on interpreting
the repealed Section 2(j) should shift towards the activity of the enterprise
rather than the relationship between various actors and the organisational
structure of the enterprise per se. In construing the text and structure of
the statute, it was felt that industrial activity cannot be wholly divorced from
commercial character. Thus, industrial activity can be seen as an
undertaking carried on in an organised and systematic manner, involving
cooperation between employer and employee, possessing some degree
of commercial character. The Hon’ble Chief Justice has concluded that
the commercial nature of the activity has to be a relevant factor and cannot
Page 11 of 18

be disregarded altogether. At the same time, the opinion reiterates the
well-established position that the presence and absence of a profit motive
is not a determinative criterion and hence, even charitable and welfare-
oriented activities would not automatically stand excluded from the ambit
of the Act, depending on the nature and character of the activity
undertaken. Further, the subtle distinction between activities carried on
predominantly along commercial lines and those pursued primarily for
public welfare, education, charitable, or humanitarian purposes is
highlighted. A similar approach is suggested for construing sovereign
functions performed by the State. In the ultimate analysis, a closer scrutiny
and a case to case approach for classification of entities as ‘industry’,
having regard to totality of circumstances is suggested.
18. In this perspective, the triple test could be calibrated, introducing
commerciality as the primary test. As far as the reconsideration of
institutional categorisation is concerned, it was felt that an approach that
proceeds primarily by reference to pre-determined categories risks
pigeonholing institutions without adequate examination of the true nature
and dominant character of the activity undertaken. As regards the inquiry
is concerned, it is based on substance rather than form, i.e., it is the nature
and character of the activity undertaken in conjunction with other indicia
that will guide the interpretation.
Page 12 of 18

19. On the other hand, Sister Nagarathna has categorically held that the
majority judgment in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) is good law and
binding. She has also given detailed reasons as to why the Reference
need not be answered at the present juncture, by also holding repeal of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and introduction of Industrial Relations
Code, 2020, w.e.f. 21.11.2025 as reasons for not answering the
Reference.

20. Brother Datta has reiterated the above position by holding the
Reference not maintainable and the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) being good law. He has observed that the statutory framework
under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and its judicial
exposition in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) are in complete harmony
and without any quarrel.
21. On the other hand, Brother Bagchi, in agreement with Hon’ble Chief
Justice, has held the Reference valid and maintainable. However, on
merits of the matter, Brother Bagchi finds the ratio in the seven-Judge
judgment a good law which ought to be retained for the reason that the
Industrial Relations Code is enforced w.e.f. 21.11.2025. He also observes
that any pronouncements on the correctness or otherwise of the judgment
in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) would cast its shadow on the definition
of Industry under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020,
which should rather be interpreted independently.
Page 13 of 18

22. I have no difficulty in appreciating and understanding the
perspectives in which interpretations on repealed Section 2(j) are given
by the majority in Bangalore Water Supply (supra), as well as the opinions
of Hon’ble Chief Justice, and my sister and brother Judges’ while
answering the Reference. Section 2(j) is open-textual, and interpretations
based on the wording of repealed Section 2(j) permit wide and narrow
constructs. It is about this very text that, while noting the “zig-zag course
of the landmark cases and the tangled web of judicial thought…, resulting
from obfuscation of the basic concept of ‘industry’…” , Justice Krishna Iyer
suggested that “ a careful, prompt amendment of Section 2(j) would have
pre-empted this docket explosion before tribunals and courts ”. The impact
of interpreting the repealed definition of Section 2(j) is writ large, and the
litigation that it has generated during its lifetime, commencing its birth on
11.03.1947, to its repeal on 21.11.2025, is self-evident.
23. My primary concern is that the litigation that has surrounded the
interpretation of Section 2(j) should not cast its shadow on the new
Industrial Code. We need to break away from the perpetuating
interpretative cycle that has afflicted Section 2(j) and protect the Industrial
Relations Code, 2020, from any preconceived notions. For effective and
efficient interpretation and development of the industrial law, Section 2(p)
of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, must be freed of the bondage of
ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) or any new definitions that we
Page 14 of 18

may propose while deciding the Reference. In fact, Hon’ble Chief Justice
as well as my sister and brother Judges have categorically stated that the
views of the nine-Judge Bench should not have a bearing on the
interpretation that may subsequently be given to the definition of Industry
under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. I am in full
agreement with such a declaration. I think it is necessary.

24. Section 2(j), along with the entirety of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, on 21.11.2025, was repealed, lock, stock and barrel and from the
very same day, the new Industrial Relations Code, 2020, has come into
force. Section 2(p) of the Code defining “Industry” is not given
retrospective effect. For transactions involving industrial disputes prior to
21.11.2025, it is only the repealed Section 2(j), as interpreted in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) , that would hold the field. The ratio in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) alone would apply for disposing of all the pending
cases in which the interpretation of 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, is involved.

25. If by answering the Reference, the nine-Judge Bench modifies the
ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra), then it will have the effect of
creating the third category that would apply exclusively to the pending
cases. After the decision in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) in 1978,
thousands of cases would have been disposed of in accordance with the
ratio laid down therein, and I see no justification for not applying the said
Page 15 of 18

ratio to the pending cases. It is not advisable to modify the ratio in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) only for the purpose of disposing of the
few pending cases, particularly when we are making it clear that the
principles that the nine-Judge Bench will have no bearing on the
interpretation of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.

26. Yet another reason for the nine-Judge Bench to refrain from
modifying the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) is that an
interpretation that restricts the scope and ambit of expression ‘Industry’ in
the repealed Section 2(j) will have the effect of excluding certain entities
from being an ‘Industry’. Such an interpretation will have the direct
consequence of a number of pending cases moving out of the regulatory
regime of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In such an event, industrial
disputants who have been contesting the case for years would have to
seek ordinary civil remedies. It would be a sad story if we were to ask
them to file fresh suits before the Civil Court. The consequences are
serious, unnecessary, and contrary to the fundamental principle of easy,
effective, and expeditious judicial remedies, an integral part of access to
justice.
27. In conclusion, the questions referred for consideration of this bench
are answered as follows:
Page 16 of 18

i. The procedure by which the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
has been referred for reconsideration to a bench of nine judges is
valid.
ii. The endeavour of various decisions of the Court after Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) , leading to the Reference by Jai Bir Singh to
bring about certainty about what ‘industry’ entails, is justified. The
Reference can be answered on merits.
iii. While an authoritative interpretation of the definition “Industry” was
compelling at the time of the Reference, such a determination has
now become unnecessary, with the repeal of the said provision with
effect from 21.11.2025.
iv. With the advent of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, with effect
from 21.11.2025, the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) is now
confined to cases arising under the repealed Act. It is prudent to
dispose of the pending cases on the basis of the ratio laid down in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) without attempting to create a third
set of principles applicable only to pending cases.
v. It is important to ensure that the future interpretation of the definition
of ‘Industry’ under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code,
2020, is not burdened by the existing interpretations based on the
repealed Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
Page 17 of 18

Industrial Relations Code, 2020, should be interpreted on its own
text and in its context alone.
vi. Further, if the Nine-Judge Bench modifies and restricts the ratio laid
down in Bangalore Water Supply (supra), it will have the serious
effect of excluding certain entities from the fold of the “Industry” as
defined under Section 2(j) of the repealed Act. This will have the
consequence of excluding long-pending disputes from the
regulatory regime of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the
parties will be relegated to remedies before the Civil Court. It is
therefore necessary to dispose of the disputes arising under the
repealed Act on the basis of the ratio laid down in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra).

………………………………....J.
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 20, 2026

Page 18 of 18

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 897 OF 2002
STATE OF U.P. … APPELLANT
VS.
JAI BIR SINGH … RESPONDENT
WITH

C.A. No.4646/2007, C.A. No.3647/2007, SLP(C) No.1112/2009,
C.A. No.3920/2010, C.A. No.3119/2011, C.A. No.6114/2001,
C.A. No.6108/2002, C.A. No.1276/2001, C.A. No.1279/2001,
C.A. No.1278/2001, C.A. No.6471/2002, C.A. No.2506/2002,
C.A. No.8597/2001, C.A. No.4569/2002, C.A. No.5101/2002,
C.A. No.2409/2002, SLP(C) No.20982/2002,
C.A. Nos.355-358/2003, SLP(C) No.14085/2004,
SLP(C) No.11291/2004, SLP(C) No.14127/2004,
C.A. No.7994/2004, SLP(C) No.4139/2005, C.A. No.1274/2007,
C.A. No.1273/2007, C.A. Nos.1311-1312/2008,
SLP(C) No.16301/2007, SLP(C) No.3107/2008,
SLP(C) No.4327/2008, SLP(C) No.4329/2008,
SLP(C) No.4328/2008, C.A. No.296/2008,
SLP(C) No.16276/2008, SLP(C) No.17224/2008,
C.A. No.5519/2012, C.A. No.5681/2010,
SLP(C) …. CC No.7990/2009, C.A. No.7757/2011,
C.A. No.1131/2012, C.A. Nos.8149-8151/2012,
C.A. Nos.4505-4506/2013, C.A. Nos.4507-4508/2013,
SLP(C) Nos.12679-12682/2014, SLP(C) No.1857/2016,
AND SLP(C) No.14156/2021
Page 1 of 75

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J. (F OR H IMSELF AND U JJAL B HUYAN , J.)
This judgment is divided into the following sections:
ABLE OF ONTENTS
T C
RELUDE
P .......................................................................................... 3
C ONSTITUTION B ENCH – A Q UESTION OF W HAT , N OT H OW M ANY ................ 6
G ENESIS OF THE R EFERENCE ................................................................. 9
B EYOND L ABOUR L AW – A Q UESTION OF C REDIBILITY ............................. 11
W HAT DID B ANGALORE W ATER S UPPLY ( SUPRA ) PRECISELY LAY DOWN ? ...... 12
O PINION OF H ON ’ BLE K RISHNA I YER , J. ( FOR HIMSELF , H ON ’ BLE B HAGWATI
AND ON BLE ESAI
H ’ D , JJ.) ............................................................... 12
C ONCURRENCE OF H ON ’ BLE B EG CJ. .................................................. 14
PINION OF ON BLE INGH FOR HIMSELF AND ON BLE ULZAPURKAR
O H ’ S , J. ( H ’ T ,
J.) ............................................................................................. 16
C ONCURRENCE OF H ON ’ BLE C HANDRACHUD , J. ..................................... 17
A RGUMENTS BY A TTORNEY G ENERAL ..................................................... 19
P RELIMINARY O BJECTION TO THE R EFERRING J UDGMENT , W HETHER V ALID ? . 21
R EFERRING J UDGMENT – O THER R EASONS FOR THE R EFERENCE .................. 26
HEN CAN A REFERENCE BE MADE TO A LARGER ENCH UDICIAL UIDANCE
W B – J G 30
E XAMINING J AI B IR S INGH [5-J] – A F ALTERING R EFERENCE ................... 35
ESTORING LARITY TO THE EFINITION OF NDUSTRY IN ECTION
R C D ‘I ’ S 2(j) ... 64
C ONCLUSION ................................................................................... 72


Page 2 of 75

P RELUDE
1. A single definition in a pre-independence statute, since repealed after a
little less than 8 (eight) decades of its existence, has troubled the
Supreme Court of India without end. Prior to its repeal by the Industrial
1 2
Relations Code, 2020 , the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had defined
“industry” in Section 2(j): a definition which has, perhaps, been the most
litigated word in Indian labour jurisprudence, as would unfold hereafter.
2. Though the ID Act was enacted as a tool for securing industrial peace
and harmony, what counts as an industry – private business, welfare
work or government service – has been the focal point of discussion
since long. Benches have differed time and again in deciding, what
should the law cover – is it only business, or also schools, hospitals, and
government services? Even today, this Court remains engaged with the
same question it faced in 1952: “what is an industry?”, and a split verdict
is on the anvil.
3
3. Such engagement began with D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee [5-J] ,
where a municipality’s conservancy department was held to be an
industry. Close on the heels followed Baroda Borough Municipality v.
4
Workmen & Ors [4-J] , where it was held that municipal undertakings
can constitute an “industry” if their activities are analogous to trade or
5
business. In State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha [3-J] ,

1
2020 Code
2
ID Act
3
AIR 1953 SC 58
4
AIR 1957 SC 110
5
(1960) 2 SCR 866
Page 3 of 75

the Court held that a government-run hospital can constitute an
“industry”. It emphasised that profit motive is irrelevant; what matters
is systematic activity organised through employer–employee
cooperation. A broad interpretation of “industry” was adopted,
extending it to welfare and service-oriented institutions like hospitals.
6
The decision in Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees
[3-J] , rendered a couple of months after Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
(supra) by the same bench, held inter alia that the definition of the word
“industry” is very comprehensive and if a department of a municipality
discharges many functions, some pertaining to industry as defined in
the ID Act and other non-industrial activities, the predominant functions
of the department shall be the criterion for the purposes of the ID Act.
7
In Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union v. Gymkhana Club
[3-J] , this Court referred to D.N. Banerji (supra), distinguished it and
held that the Madras Gymkhana Club does not constitute an “industry”
as it was not carrying on activities analogous to trade or business for
8
the public. Later, Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi [6-J]
excluded hospitals from “industry”. Then came Bangalore Water
9
Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa [7-J] , which
rehabilitated Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) while overruling
Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union (supra), Safdarjung

6
(1960) 2 SCR 942
7
(1968) 1 SCR 742
8
(1970) 1 SCC 735
9
(1978) 2 SCC 213
Page 4 of 75

Hospital (supra) and certain other decisions. It laid down the triple test
and dominant-nature doctrine for identification of an industry.
Interpretation of the word “industry” made in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra), however, started gathering doubt towards the end of the last
10
century and ultimately, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh [5-
J] considered it appropriate to make a reference by a detailed
11
judgment .
4. Curiously, despite the Parliament amending the definition of “industry”
in Section 2(j) by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act
12
No. 46 of 1982) , it was not enforced and, thus, remained a dead letter
ever since.
5. Reading of each of the aforesaid precedents would reveal that this Court
has swung between text and purpose, thereby veering between narrow
and broad constructions, creating a body of law that is simultaneously
landmark and labyrinthine. The phases of conflict can be captured by
observing that while D.N. Banerji (supra) in 1952 advocated
expansion, Safdarjung Hospital (supra) in 1970 imposed tests that
were restrictive, Bangalore Water Supply (supra) in 1978
authoritatively felt inclined towards laying down the expansive triple
test, thereby walking the path of re-expansion, Jai Bir Singh [5-J]
(supra) preferred to make a reference in 2002 and now, in 2026, the

10
(2005) 5 SCC 1
11
the referring judgment, wherever the context requires
12
1982 amendment
Page 5 of 75

present 9-Judge Bench is constituted to reconsider all the precedents on
the point and to settle the law, hopefully, once and for all.
C ONSTITUTION B ENCH – A Q UESTION OF W HAT , N OT H OW M ANY
6. Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) opens by recording that the “ … appeal along
with other connected cases has been listed before this Constitution
Bench of five Judges on a reference made by a Bench of three Hon’ble
Judges … ”. It is this reference to itself as a Constitution Bench that
triggers the need for a clarification, given the fact that this 9-Judge
Bench too is referred to in the “N OTE ” portion of the cause-lists published
th th th
for 17 , 18 and 19 March, 2026 (i.e., the days when the reference
was heard) as a Constitution Bench.
7. Article 145 of the Constitution provides for “Rule of Court, etc”. Clause
(3) thereof stipulates the minimum number of judges who are to sit “for
the purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law
as to the interpretation of this Constitution or for the purpose of hearing
any reference under Article 143” . On its own terms, the minimum
number shall be five. The proviso to clause (3) guides the course of
action where the Court, consisting of less than 5 (five) Judges may, refer
the question arising for opinion in an appeal under the Part, other than
an appeal under Article 132, to a Court to be constituted in terms of
clause (3) upon recording the requisite satisfaction. Thus, it seems to
be plain that a reference to a Constitution Bench can originate from
clause (3), the strength of which shall not be less than five, when such
reference necessarily involves either a substantial question of law as to
Page 6 of 75

the interpretation of the Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any
reference under Article 143 (emphasis supplied). Also, in a case covered
by the proviso to clause (3) of Article 145, a Bench of 5 (five) Judges
may be required to be constituted. Thus, it is only when a Bench
consisting of no less than 5 (five) Judges is constituted in the scenarios
contemplated in clause (3) of Article 145 can such Bench be validly
regarded as a Constitution Bench.
8. Not every Bench of 5 (five) or more judges, therefore, is a Constitution
Bench. As is evident from the preceding discussion, Article 145(3) makes
the test one of subject matter: a minimum of 5 (five) Judges must sit
only when the case involves “a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of this Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any
reference under Article 143”. Cases covered by the proviso have an
additional requirement. The determination of the substantial question of
law as to the interpretation of this Constitution must be necessary for
the disposal of the appeal. The strength alone does not satisfy the
clause. Benches of 5 (five) or more could also be constituted for other
reasons – to resolve conflicts of opinion between decisions of smaller
Benches, to settle important questions of law (not necessarily requiring
constitutional interpretation) or to reconsider the opinion of an earlier
Bench of equal strength. This power flows from the Supreme Court’s
13
inherent jurisdiction and is regulated by Rule 2 of Order VI of the

13
Where in the course of the hearing of any cause, appeal or other proceeding, the Bench
considers that the matter should be dealt with by a larger Bench, it shall refer the matter
to the Chief Justice, who shall thereupon constitute such a Bench for the hearing of it.
Page 7 of 75

14
Supreme Court Rules, 2013 . Whenever a Bench doubts an earlier
decision and refers the question requiring an answer to the Hon’ble the
15
Chief Justice of India for constitution of a “larger Bench” (emphasis
supplied) and if, in fact, such larger Benches are constituted, such
Benches though numerically large are not Constitution Benches within
Article 145(3) unless a substantial question as to the interpretation of
the Constitution arises for an answer. They are, properly, to be regarded
as larger Benches. The difference is etymological: a Constitution Bench
takes its name from the Constitution it interprets; a larger Bench takes
its name from the size needed to settle precedent. To put it differently,
a Constitution Bench speaks for the Constitution while a larger Bench
speaks for certainty in the law. Thus, strength alone does not make a
Bench a Constitution Bench.
9. It is important to remember that the power of this Court to interpret the
Constitution is not dependent on the numerical strength of the Bench.
As the guardian of the Constitution, even a Single Bench may interpret
a constitutional provision where the issue arising so demands, yet,
designating every bench of 5 (five) or more Judges as a Constitution
Bench – irrespective of whether any constitutional question falls for
determination – detracts from the term’s constitutional purpose.
10. In the present reference, this Bench of 9 (nine) Judges is primarily
tasked to decide a reference under Rule 2 of Order VI of the 2013 Rules

14
2013 Rules
15
Chief Justice
Page 8 of 75

and, therefore, in the detailed opinion that follows, we would consciously
not refer to any Bench consisting of 5 (five) or more Judges (which had
the occasion to deal with the issue of meaning of the word “industry”)
as a Constitution Bench.
ENESIS OF THE EFERENCE
G R
11. This Bench of 9 (nine) Judges has been constituted by the Chief Justice
nd
pursuant to the order dated 2 January, 2017 of a bench of 7 (seven)
16
Judges in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh [7-J] . Jai Bir
Singh [7-J] (supra), considering the serious and wide ranging
implications of the issue that fell for determination as also the fact that
serious doubts had been expressed in Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) about
the correctness of the view taken in Bangalore Water Supply (supra),
was of the view that the said decision requires reconsideration and,
accordingly, ordered the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice for
constitution of a 9-Judge Bench.
12. The seed for the reference to the 5-Judge Bench, as aforesaid, was
st
however sown by a Bench of 3 (three) Judges in its order dated 31
17
January, 2002 in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh [3-J] . The
said order reads as follows:
Leave granted.
One of the contentions which arises for consideration is whether the
Social Forestery (“sic forestry”) Department, which is a Welfare Scheme
of the Government, is an ‘Industry’ or not? Our attention has been drawn
to the two decisions of this Court. The first decision is reported as Chief
Conservator of Forests and Anr. vs. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare and Anr.

16
(2017) 3 SCC 311
17
C.A. No. 897 of 2002
Page 9 of 75

(1996) 2 SCC 293 in which a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that the
Forest department of the State was an ‘Industry’ even when it was
undertaking a Welfare Scheme of Social Forestery (“sic forestry”)
Department. On the other hand, another Bench of this Court (though of
two-Judges) in the case of State of Gujarat & Ors. vs. Pratamsingh Narsinh
Parmar JT 2001 (3) SC 26 has taken a different view and has sought to
distinguish the earlier decision in Chief Conservator of Forests case
(supra). In our opinion, it is an important question of law as to whether
the Welfare Scheme of the Government, like the Social Forestery (“sic
forestry”), would be regarded as an ‘Industry’. The matter is of
considerable public importance, to be decided by a larger Bench. We,
therefore, direct that the papers be laid before Hon’ble the Chief Justice
for appropriate orders.
In the meanwhile, we direct that the respondent would be reinstated
st
w.e.f. 1 February, 2002 but for the time being no back wages need to be
paid. Back wages will be subject to the outcome of the appeal.
(underlining in original)

13. Prior to constitution of this 9-Judge Bench, a 3-Judge Bench presided
over by the Chief Justice of India considered the issue of case
management required for final hearing of the appeals connected with
th
Jai Bir Singh [3-J] (supra). We find that by an order dated 16
February, 2026, the 3-Judge Bench framed certain issues for
consideration of the 9-Judge Bench, presumably because no question
was framed in the referring judgment by the 5-Judge Bench. The issues
th
framed by the order dated 16 February, 2026 are reproduced
hereunder:
1. The instant appeals have been referred to a Nine-Judge Bench to consider
the correctness of the judgment rendered by a Seven-Judge Bench in
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC
213 and concomitantly to also re-consider the interpretation of the
expression “industry” as defined in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (for short, `the ID Act’). A Nine-Judge Bench, to be constituted
by Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India separately, through an administrative
order, in our considered opinion, will have to adjudicate the following broad
issues:
(i) Whether the test laid down in paragraphs 140 to 144 in the opinion
rendered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Bangalore Water
Supply and Sewerage Board’s case (supra) to determine if an
undertaking or enterprise falls within the definition of “industry” lays
Page 10 of 75

down correct law? And whether the Industrial Disputes (Amendment)
Act, 1982 (which seemingly did not come into force) and the
Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (with effect from 21.11.2025) have
any legal impact on the interpretation of the expression “industry” as
contained in the principal Act?
(ii) Whether social welfare activities and schemes or other
enterprises undertaken by the Government Departments or their
instrumentalities can be construed to be “industrial activities” for the
purpose of Section 2(j) of the ID Act?
(iii) What State activities will be covered by the expression
“sovereign function”, and whether such activities will fall outside the
purview of Section 2(j) of the ID Act?
(iv) Any other issue(s) that may arise during the course of hearing
before the Nine-Judge Bench.

B EYOND L ABOUR L AW – A Q UESTION OF C REDIBILITY

14. The long pendency of the reference arising out of Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) and the uncertainty that has followed does adversely
reflect on institutional resolve. Parliament’s 1982 amendment to the ID
Act sought to introduce a modified definition of “industry” in response
to the Court’s broad interpretation. Sadly, it was never brought into
force. For years together, the amendment remained dormant creating
uncertainty instead of settling the law. The later references in 2005 and
2017, both seeking reconsideration, only extended this period of
indecision. As a result, there has been no final ruling and the legal
position has remained unclear. Even when born of judicial caution, delay
of this order diminishes the Court’s institutional credibility.
15. If a settled precedent is doubted, the Court must offer a clear and
workable alternative. Doubt, without direction, only compounds
uncertainty. The law ought not to oscillate indeterminately, for, when a
question of this magnitude remains undecided for decades, it erodes
Page 11 of 75

both the finality of judicial pronouncements and the stability an
institution like this Court is meant to secure. Neither the mere passage
of time nor the constitution of a 9-Judge Bench can, ipso facto , justify
reopening settled law; yet, considerations of institutional credibility
require this Bench to authoritatively settle, one way or the other,
whether the interpretation of “industry” in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) should be left untouched or be diluted as Jai Bir Singh [5-J]
advocates.
16. In fine, this Bench must do more than settle the meaning of “industry”:
it must restore confidence that the Court speaks with clarity, authority,
and finality.
17. Bearing in mind that institutional credibility is non-negotiable, the
lingering uncertainty around Bangalore Water Supply (supra) must
now be set to rest.
W HAT DID B ANGALORE W ATER S UPPLY ( SUPRA ) PRECISELY LAY DOWN ?
18. It would be most appropriate at this stage, to remind ourselves of what
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) laid down. The conclusions from the
lead judgment are quoted first, followed by a resume of what the other
Hon’ble Judges in their respective opinions had expressed.
O PINION OF H ON ’ BLE K RISHNA I YER , J. ( FOR HIMSELF , H ON ’ BLE B HAGWATI AND
H ON ’ BLE D ESAI , JJ.)

19. Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) summed
up the discussion in the manner following:
I
Page 12 of 75

140. ‘Industry’, as defined in Section 2( j ) and explained in Banerji , has a
wide import.
“( a ) Where ( i ) systematic activity, ( ii ) organized by co-operation between
employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is chimerical)
( iii ) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated
to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive
of material things or services geared to celestial bliss e.g. making, on a
large scale prasad or food), prima facie, there is an ‘industry’ in that
enterprise.
( b ) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture
in the public, joint, private or other sector.
( c ) The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the
activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations.
( d ) If the organization is a trade or business it does not cease to be one
because of philanthropy animating the undertaking.”
II
141. Although Section 2( j ) uses words of the widest amplitude in its two
limbs, their meaning cannot be magnified to overreach itself.
( a ) ‘Undertaking’ must suffer a contextual and associational shrinkage as
explained in Banerji and in this judgment; so also, service, calling and the
like. This yields the inference that all organized activity possessing the triple
elements in I, although not trade or business, may still be ‘industry’
provided the nature of the activity , viz. the employer-employee basis, bears
resemblance to what we find in trade or business. This takes into the fold
of ‘industry’ undertakings, callings and services, adventures ‘analogous to
the carrying on the trade or business’. All features, other than the
methodology of carrying on the activity viz. in organizing the co-operation
between employer and employee, may be dissimilar. It does not matter, if
on the employment terms there is analogy.”
III
142. Application of these guidelines should not stop short of their logical
reach by invocation of creeds, cults or inner sense of incongruity or outer
sense of motivation for or resultant of the economic operations. The
ideology of the Act being industrial peace, regulation and resolution of
industrial disputes between employer and workmen, the range off this
statutory ideology must inform the reach of the statutory definition. Nothing
less, nothing more.
“( a ) The consequences are ( i ) professions, ( ii ) clubs, ( iii ) educational
institutions, ( iv ) co-operatives, ( v ) research institutes, ( vi ) charitable
projects, and ( vii ) other kindred adventures, if they fulfil the triple tests
listed in I, cannot be exempted from the scope of Section 2( j ).
( b ) A restricted category of professions, clubs, co-operatives and even
gurukulas and little research labs, may qualify for exemption if, in simple
ventures, substantially and, going by the dominant nature criterion,
substantively, no employees are entertained but in minimal matters,
marginal employees are hired without destroying the non-employee
character of the unit.
( c ) If, in a pious or altruistic mission many employ themselves, free or for
small honoraria or like return, mainly drawn by sharing in the purpose or
cause, such as lawyers volunteering to run a free legal services clinic or
doctors serving in their spare hours in a free medical centre or ashramites
working at the bidding of the holiness, divinity or like central personality,
Page 13 of 75

and the services are supplied free or at nominal cost and those who serve
are not engaged for remuneration or on the basis of master and servant
relationship, then, the institution is not an industry even if stray servants,
manual or technical, are hired. Such eleemosynary or like undertakings
alone are exempt — not other generosity, compassion, developmental
passion or project.”
IV
143. The dominant nature test :
“( a ) Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify for exemption,
others not, involves employees on the total undertaking, some of whom are
not ‘workmen’ as in the University of Delhi case (AIR 1963 SC 1873) or
some departments are not productive of goods and services if isolated, even
then, the predominant nature of the services and the integrated nature of
the departments as explained in the Corporation of Nagpur will be the true
test. The whole undertaking will be ‘industry’ although those who are not
‘workmen’ by definition may not benefit by the status.
( b ) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign functions, strictly
understood, (alone) qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or
economic adventures undertaken by government or statutory bodies.
( c ) Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units
which are industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be
considered to come within Section 2( j ).
( d ) Constitutional and competently enacted legislative provisions may well
remove from the scope of the Act categories which otherwise may be
covered thereby.”
(emphasis supplied)

C ONCURRENCE OF H ON ’ BLE B EG CJ.

20. Hon’ble Beg, CJ. while concurring with Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. observed
that where statutory language is imprecise or admits of ambiguity, the
Court may legitimately discharge a quasi-legislative function; however,
such an exercise, must remain within well-defined limits so as not to
trench upon the exclusive domain of the legislature. His Lordship
appeared to favour a constructive and creative approach to
interpretation, not dissimilar to that adopted by Lord Denning, albeit
tempered by judicial restraint.
a) Hon’ble Beg, CJ. further opined that the judgment of Hon’ble Krishna
Iyer, J. did not discard the earlier judicial tests for determining
Page 14 of 75

“industry”, but rather reaffirmed those principles as enunciated in
precedents such as D. N. Banerji (supra), Corporation of the City
of Nagpur (supra), and Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra).
b) On the approach to statutory interpretation, Hon’ble Beg, CJ.
underscored that where the literal meaning proves inadequate, the
interpretative process must necessarily travel beyond the text, with
the statute being read as a whole rather than in isolated fragments.
c) The inherently dynamic character of the term “industry”, it was ruled,
by Hon’ble Beg, CJ. is a concept that evolves in tandem with societal
developments. Thus, modern welfare legislation such as the ID Act
warrants a progressive, and not a narrow or pedantic, construction.
d) Hon’ble Beg, CJ. remarked upon the lack of precision and circular
nature of the definition of “industry”, particularly in view of the
interdependence between “industry” and “workman” under Section
2(s). The definition was intended to serve as a guiding framework
rather than an exhaustive delineation and did not predicate the
existence of “industry” upon a profit motive.
e) Traditional canons of construction such as ejusdem generis and
noscitur a sociis would not, according to Hon’ble Beg, CJ., furnish a
complete or satisfactory solution. Expressions such as “manufacture”
were indicative of processes in which employers are engaged, the
concept of an “employer” necessarily presupposing employee.
f) Hon’ble Beg, CJ. cautioned against employing the phrase “analogous
to industry” as a restrictive device and indicated that earlier narrow
Page 15 of 75

interpretations warranted reconsideration. Finally, His Lordship held
that services governed by distinct constitutional or statutory regimes,
particularly those under Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution,
ought to be excluded from the purview of “industry” by necessary
implication. In conclusion, it was observed that the meaning of
“industry” must be ascertained contextually, having due regard to the
scheme and object of the ID Act, and confined to the purposes for
which the legislation was enacted.
O PINION OF H ON ’ BLE S INGH , J. ( FOR HIMSELF AND H ON ’ BLE T ULZAPURKAR , J.)

21. Taking a nuanced stand, Hon’ble Singh, J. observed that the definition
of “industry” ought to be confined to those activities which are
systematically or habitually undertaken on commercial lines by private
entrepreneurs, in cooperation with employees, for the production or
distribution of goods or for rendering material services to the community
or a section thereof.
a) Hon’ble Singh, J. took the view that such a definition would necessarily
exclude charitable institutions, hospitals run on a charitable basis or
as part of governmental or municipal functions, educational and
research institutions, and liberal professions such as those of doctors,
lawyers, and teachers. It was reasoned that in the case of such
professions, the contribution of employees to the ultimate service
rendered is minimal and cannot be said to constitute the product of
meaningful cooperation between employer and employee.
Page 16 of 75

b) In support of this restrictive construction, reliance was placed upon
the judgment of Hon’ble Gajendragadkar, J. in Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha (supra), wherein it was emphasised that a line must be drawn
in a fair and reasonable manner within the wide statutory definition
under Section 2(j), so as to exclude certain categories of services.
Particular reference was made to services rendered in a purely
personal, domestic, or casual capacity which, it was held, ought not
to be brought within the sweep of the definition. Accordingly, it was
cautioned that the words employed in Section 2(j) ought not to be
accorded their widest possible meaning.
C ONCURRENCE OF H ON ’ BLE C HANDRACHUD , J.

22. In His Lordship’s concurring opinion with Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. and
Hon’ble Beg, CJ., Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. observed that His Lordship
was unable to concur with the dissenting opinion of Hon’ble Singh and
Hon’ble Tulzapurkar, JJ. While expressing partial disagreement with the
decision in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra), His Lordship
acknowledged that the conclusion therein - that the J.J. Group of
Hospitals managed by the State Government constituted an “industry”
- was correctly arrived at. However, His Lordship did not approve of the
judicially crafted exceptions engrafted upon the statutory definition in
that decision.
a) Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. reiterated that the interpretative principle of
noscitur a sociis stood expressly rejected by Hon’ble Gajendragadkar,
J. in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra). In that context, the
Page 17 of 75

interrelated statutory definitions of “industrial dispute” under Section
2(k), “wages” under Section 2(rr), “workman” under Section 2(s), and
“employer” under Section 2(g), along with “public utility service”
under Section 2(n), were required to be read conjointly and affirmed
that it is the intrinsic character of the activity that determines whether
it falls within Section 2(j), and not the existence of profit motive,
capital investment, or a quid pro quo element, all of which were held
to be irrelevant considerations.
b) At the same time, Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. noted that the Court, in
Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra), had proceeded to carve out
exclusions from the otherwise wide amplitude of Section 2(j) by
delineating certain callings, services, or undertakings as falling
outside its scope. Such an exercise, it was observed, was overly
policy-oriented and more appropriately within the legislative domain.
In particular, the exclusion of sovereign functions of the State was
regarded as judicially unwarranted.
c) Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. proceeded to articulate that any activity
which is systematically or habitually undertaken on commercial lines
by private entrepreneurs, with the cooperation of employees, for the
production or distribution of goods or for rendering material services
to the community or a segment thereof, would fall within the ambit of
an “undertaking” under Section 2(j).
d) According to Hon’ble Chandrachud, J., sovereign functions are not
automatically excluded from Section 2(j); the decisive test is the
Page 18 of 75

nature of the activity, not the identity of the actor. Even inherently
State activities like currency manufacture could qualify as an
“industry” if hypothetically performed by private persons, as
supported by the First Schedule and Section 2(n)(vi).
e) Consistent with this approach, Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. reiterated that
the presence or absence of profit motive is immaterial in determining
whether a given activity constitutes an “industry”.
f) On the inclusion of professions, Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. held that
liberal professions such as those of lawyers and doctors would also
fall within the ambit of “industry”. The test that the production of
goods or material services must be the direct and proximate result of
cooperation between employer and employee was characterised as
inherently subjective and likely to engender uncertainty in the
application of the law.
g) Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. also expressed agreement with the inclusion
of clubs within the fold of “industry”, broadly in line with the reasoning
adopted by Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J.
A RGUMENTS BY A TTORNEY G ENERAL
23. Mr. Venkataramani, learned Attorney General for India, appearing for
the Union of India, took us extensively through Jai Bir Singh [5-J]
(supra) and sought to highlight the reasons for the reference. He
submitted that the core principles laid down in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra), viz. the triple test of systematic organised activity,
employer-employee cooperation, and production or distribution of goods
Page 19 of 75

and material services geared to satisfy human wants, represent a
correct exposition of law under Section 2(j) of the ID Act and call for no
reconsideration. He, however, urged that the application of the test
requires caution. Charitable institutions, sovereign functions and State
welfare schemes cannot be mechanically brought within the definition
merely because they involve organised labour; such an approach would
ignore the constitutional character of a modern welfare State. Further,
he submitted that the un-notified 1982 Amendment (by which the
Parliament indicated its disagreement with the expansive approach to
define the term industry as proposed in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) and sought to narrow down the scope of the definition by
excluding several welfare and non-commercial institutions) and the
2020 Code [which retains the triple test in principle, however excludes
charitable/philanthropic institutions, sovereign government functions
(including defence, atomic energy, space), domestic services and other
activities notified by the Central Government] reflects the parliamentary
intent to exclude non-commercial and welfare activities from the ambit
of “industry”. Even though the 1982 Amendment was not notified, it and
the 2020 Code can still serve as an interpretative aid to understand
legislative intent – which is a more restrictive reading of “industry”.
Next, it was submitted that social welfare activities and schemes
undertaken by Government departments or their instrumentalities
should not be construed as industrial activities. Lastly, as regards
“sovereign function”, after referring to various precedents, it was
Page 20 of 75

submitted that this Court has consistently refused to give an exhaustive
definition of the word. Building on this argument, it was submitted that
the same must remain flexible and not attempted to be exhaustively
defined. At the same time, certain functions remain inherently and
inalienably sovereign, forming the core attributes of Statehood, such as
defence of the nation, maintenance of public order, administration of
justice, legislative and policy-making functions, and matters relating to
citizenship, passports, and other coercive or regulatory powers. Beyond
this limited core, however, the classification of governmental activities
must be contextual and capable of severability, bearing in mind the
expanding role of the State in a welfare framework. The executive is
best placed to identify such functions, subject to limited judicial review
to prevent arbitrariness. In fine, while the triple test remains sound, its
application must be tempered by legislative intent and constitutional
context so that welfare and sovereign functions remain outside the
purview of industrial adjudication under the Act.
RELIMINARY BJECTION TO THE EFERRING UDGMENT HETHER ALID
P O R J , W V ?
24. Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned senior counsel, opposing the reference
contended, at the outset, that there was no conflict of views between
the opinions expressed in Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath
18
Maruti Kondhare and State of Gujarat v. Pratamsingh Narsinh
19
Parmar . Though Jai Bir Singh [3-J] (supra) recorded that the latter

18
(1996) 2 SCC 293
19
(2001) 9 SCC 713
Page 21 of 75

decision took a view different from the one in the former and
distinguished it, the ground for such distinction, i.e., deficiency in
pleadings, was not taken note of and, as such, no doubt was cast on the
proposition laid down by the former decision. In any event, whether or
not the Social Forestry Division could be regarded as an “industry” was
the limited question that was referred by Jai Bir Singh [3-J] (supra)
and not that Bangalore Water Supply (supra) requires
reconsideration. According to her, Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) while
making a further reference to a 7-Judge Bench trenched beyond its
jurisdiction and this Court ought to return the reference as incompetent.
25. This particular contention necessitates recording of a full and complete
satisfaction that a conflict of opinion did exist, which required resolution
by a larger Bench. Notwithstanding that a 9-Judge Bench is presently
seized of the matter to reconsider the opinion expressed in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra), we have to enter a caveat. In our considered
opinion, any reference made by a Bench of lesser strength to a larger
Bench in course of hearing a legal issue is in furtherance of and/or to
facilitate the core judicial function of the apex court of the country to
expound the law authoritatively for the same to be binding on all in
terms of Article 141 of the Constitution. Indubitably, a reference to a
larger Bench requires careful deliberation, not a casual or routine
exercise. If the Bench referring an issue for reconsideration by a larger
Bench, in its order of reference, fails to consider all relevant aspects and,
consequently, the larger Bench hearing the reference finds the same to
Page 22 of 75

be flawed and, thus, incompetent, it is well within the authority and
competence of the larger Bench, upon hearing the parties, to return the
reference without answering it. Merely because the reference has
spiralled up to a larger Bench of 9 (nine) Judges over the years ought
not to be considered an overriding factor, particularly when Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) has held the field for a little less than half a
century and a new legislation is in place today defining “industry” for the
th
purpose of the 2020 Code, with effect from 7 February, 2026.
26. We find substance in the contention of Ms. Jaisingh that there was,
indeed, no conflict between Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (supra) and
Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar (supra). This, we say, for the reason
that the latter decision of a bench strength of 2 (two) Judges while
neither doubting nor disputing the principle of law enunciated in the
former decision of 3 (three) Judges held, on facts, that the principle so
enunciated does not apply in the facts owing to omission on the part of
the respondent in the civil appeal to assert relevant facts in his writ
petition before the high court. We can do no better than reproduce the
relevant paragraphs from Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar (supra)
hereunder:
5. If a dispute arises as to whether a particular establishment or part of it
wherein an appointment has been made is an industry or not, it would be
for the person concerned who claims the same to be an industry, to give
positive facts for coming to the conclusion that it constitutes “an industry”.
Ordinarily, a department of the Government cannot be held to be an
industry and rather it is a part of the sovereign function. To find out whether
the respondent in the writ petition had made any assertion that with regard
to the duty which he was discharging and with regard to the activities of
the organisation where he had been recruited, we find that there has not
been an iota of assertion to that effect though, no doubt, it has been
Page 23 of 75

contended that the order of dismissal is vitiated for non-compliance with
Section 25-F of the Act. The State in its counter-affidavit, on the other hand,
refuted the assertion of the respondent in the writ petition and took the
positive stand that the Forest Department cannot be held to be an industry
so that the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act cannot have any
application. In the absence of any assertion by the petitioner in the writ
petition indicating the nature of duty discharged by the petitioner as well
as the job of the establishment where he had been recruited, the High Court
wholly erred in law in applying the principles enunciated in the judgment of
this Court in Jagannath Maruti Kondhare to hold that the Forest Department
could be held to be “an industry”.
6. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court
have failed to carefully examine the ratio of this Court’s judgment in
Jagannath Maruti Kondhare case inasmuch as in para 15 of the said
judgment, the Court has quoted the assertions made in the affidavit of the
Chief Conservator of Forests and then in para 17, the Court held that the
scheme undertaken cannot be regarded as a part of the sovereign function
of the State. We are afraid that the aforesaid decision cannot have any
application to the facts of the present case where there has not been any
assertion of fact by the petitioner in establishing that the establishment to
which he had been appointed is “an industry”. In this view of the matter,
we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the learned Single
Judge as well as the Division Bench committed serious error of law in
holding that to the appointment in question, the provisions of the Act apply.
We would accordingly set aside the judgment of the Division Bench as well
as that of the learned Single Judge and hold that the writ petition would
stand dismissed.
(emphasis supplied)
27. A reading of the above passages would leave none in doubt that the
principle of law laid down in Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (supra) was
not applied in Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar (supra) because of
deficient pleadings. The 2-Judge Bench in Pratamsingh Narsinh
Parmar (supra) was perfectly justified in its approach having regard to
the settled law that one additional or different fact can make a world of
difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same
principles are applied in each case to similar facts. Jai Bir Singh [3-J]
(supra) though did not advert to any existing conflict of opinion, required
the larger Bench’s consideration limited to the point indicated in such
Page 24 of 75

order, i.e., whether the Welfare Scheme of the Government, like the
Social Forestery, would be regarded as an industry.
28. Nonetheless, once the matter moved to the larger Bench in Jai Bir
Singh [5-J] (supra), it did not restrict its scrutiny to the point referred
but broadened the scope of discussion not strictly in line with what was
referred. The opening paragraphs of the referring judgment read as
follows:
1. This present appeal along with other connected cases has been listed
before this Constitution Bench of five Judges on a reference made by a
Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court finding an apparent conflict
between the decisions of two Benches of this Court in the cases of Chief
Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare of three Judges and
State of Gujarat v. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar of two Judges .
2. On the question of whether “Social Forestry Department” of State, which
is a welfare scheme undertaken for improvement of the environment, would
be covered by the definition of “industry” under Section 2( j ) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, the aforesaid Benches (supra) of this Court culled out
differently the ratio of the seven-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the
case of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (shortly
hereinafter referred to as Bangalore Water case ). The Bench of three Judges
in the case of Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare
based on the decision of Bangalore Water case came to the conclusion that
“Social Forestry Department” is covered by the definition of “industry”
whereas the two-Judge Bench decision in State of Gujarat v. Pratamsingh
Narsinh Parmar took a different view.
3. As the cleavage of opinion between the two Benches of this Court seems
to have been on the basis of the seven-Judge Bench decision of this Court
in the case of Bangalore Water , the present case along with the other
connected cases, in which correctness of the decision in the case of
Bangalore Water is doubted, has been placed before this Bench.
(emphasis supplied)
29. We may, at once, notice that from the very inception, Jai Bir Singh [5-
J] (supra) proceeded on the premise as if there was a cleavage of
opinion between Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (supra) and
Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar (supra) which, for reasons assigned in
the aforesaid paragraphs, is incorrect.
Page 25 of 75

30. The preliminary objection of Ms. Jaisingh, therefore, appears to be of
substance and valid.
R EFERRING J UDGMENT – O THER R EASONS FOR THE R EFERENCE
31. Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra), thereafter, proceeded to assign multiple
reasons why Bangalore Water Supply (supra) merits reconsideration.
Rather than extensively quoting from the opinion expressed in the
referring judgment, we consider it appropriate to encapsulate the same
hereunder:
(i) The decision in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) is not based on
the unanimous opinion of the Judges comprising the Bench. The
majority comprised of 5 (five) Judges. While 3 (three) Judges had
agreed to a common opinion, 2 (two) of the Judges comprising the
majority had given separate opinions projecting a view partly
different from the views expressed in the common opinion. Hon’ble
Beg, CJ., who was presiding over the Bench having retired, had no
opportunity to see the opinions delivered by the other Judges
subsequent to his retirement. The author of the lead opinion (Hon’ble
Krishna Iyer, J.) and the two Judges (Hon’ble Bhagwati and Hon’ble
Desai, JJ.) who spoke through him did not have the benefit of the
dissenting opinion of the other two Judges (Hon’ble Singh and Hon’ble
Tulzapurkar, JJ.) and the separate partly dissenting opinion of
another Judge (Hon’ble Chandrachud, J.), as those opinions were
prepared and delivered subsequent to the delivery of the judgment
in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) . In such a situation, the
Page 26 of 75

referring judgment opined that it is difficult to ascertain whether the
opinion of Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. given on his own behalf and on
behalf of Hon’ble Bhagwati and Hon’ble Desai, JJ., can be held to be
an authoritative precedent which would require no reconsideration
even though the Judges themselves expressed the view that the
exercise of interpretation done by each one of them was tentative
and was only a temporary exercise till the legislature stepped in.
(ii) The worker-oriented approach in construing the definition of
“industry” by the Bench in Bangalore Water Supply (supra),
unmindful of the interest of the employer or the owner of the industry
and the public, who are the ultimate beneficiaries, is a one-sided
approach and not in accordance with the ID Act.
(iii) The notion of sovereign functions ought to expand to encompass
public welfare initiatives undertaken by the Government in fulfilment
of its constitutional responsibilities, thereby excluding them from the
ambit of “industry”. Despite the 1982 Amendment having amended
the definition of “industry”, the amended definition remains
unenforced, perpetuating uncertainty. The judicial interpretation of
the term “industry” in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) appears to
be a hindrance to implement the amended definition. Bearing in mind
the object of the ID Act, interpretation of the word “industry” must
be a balanced one having regard to the interest of the workers, the
employers as well as the public.
Page 27 of 75

(iv) The view expressed by a 6-Judge Bench in Safdarjung Hospital
(supra) [which was overruled in Bangalore Water Supply (supra)]
was unanimous. It was held in Safdarjung Hospital (supra) that
although profit motive is irrelevant, in order to encompass the activity
within “industry” the “activity must be analogous to trade or business
in a commercial sense” and mere enumeration of “public utility
service” in Section 2(n) of the ID Act read with the First Schedule
thereof should not be held decisive. This interpretation was affirmed,
suggesting that Bangalore Water Supply (supra), not being a
unanimous decision, was not quite right in overruling Safdarjung
Hospital (supra).
20
(v) In Coir Board, Ernakulam v. Indira Devi P.S. [2-J] , an order
for reference to a larger bench of more than 7 (seven) Judges was
made to reconsider Bangalore Water Supply (supra). A Bench
presided over by the Chief Justice, however, expressed in Coir Board
21
Ernakulam State Kerala v. Indira Devai P.S. [3-J] that, in its
opinion, Bangalore Water Supply (supra) does not require any
reconsideration on a reference being made by a 2-Judge Bench,
which is bound by the larger Bench judgment. Thus, the reference
sought by the bench of two Judges to a larger Bench of more than 7
(seven) Judges was declined in Coir Board Ernakulam [3-J]
(supra). The workers argued before Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) that

20
(1998) 3 SCC 259
21
(2000) 1 SCC 224
Page 28 of 75

the observations in paragraph 19 of Coir Board Ernakulam [2-J]
(supra) were unsupported by any material on record. However, Jai
Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) rejected this criticism and held that the
observations in Coir Board Ernakulam [2-J] (supra) did have a
valid basis. Further, it was held that the experience of Judges in the
apex court is not derived from the case in which the observations
were made; the experience was from the cases regularly coming
before it through the Labour Courts. According to Jai Bir Singh [5-
J] (supra), past experience indicated the majority view in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) having led to numerous awards passed by
industrial tribunals/labour courts favouring reinstatement of
workmen and significant amounts on account of back wages,
ultimately forcing employers with limited resources to shut down,
adversely affecting employers, workers and the public.
(vi) Though the legislature, subsequent to Bangalore Water Supply
(supra), amended the definition of the word “industry”, due to the
lack of will both on the part of the legislature and the executive, the
amended definition, for a long period of 23 (twenty-three) years, has
remained dormant. It was pointed out to the Bench, as recorded in
paragraph 8 of the referring judgment, that “… earlier an attempt was
made to seek enforcement of the amended Act through this Court”
22
and reference was made to Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India .
The referring judgment records, the Union came forward with an

22
(1988) 4 SCC 54
Page 29 of 75

explanation that for employees of the categories of industries
excluded under the amended definition, no alternative machinery for
redressal of their service disputes has been provided by law and,
therefore, the amended definition was not brought into force.
Pressing demands of the competing sectors of employers and
employees and the helplessness of the legislature and the executive
in bringing into force the Amendment Act, were seen as compelling
reasons in Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) to make the reference (see:
paragraph 45).
HEN CAN A REFERENCE BE MADE TO A LARGER ENCH UDICIAL UIDANCE
W B – J G
23
32. It is considered apposite to first refer to Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT
[7-J] , a precedent which was available for Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra)
to follow. Certain principles were enunciated in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd.
(supra) with regard to what constitutes grounds for a valid reference or
review of prior decisions of the Supreme Court. Arising out of a tax
matter, this Court rejected the revenue’s contention that its earlier
24
decisions in New Jehangir Vakil Mills v. CIT [2-J] and Petlad
25
Turkey Red Dye Co. Ltd, Petlad v. CIT [5-J] required
reconsideration. In so rejecting, Hon’ble Gajendragadkar, CJ. speaking
for the 7-Judge Bench held that:
23. In dealing with the question as to whether the earlier decisions of this
Court in New Jehangir Mills case [AIR 1959 SC 1177], and Petlad Co. Ltd.
case [AIR 1963 SC 1484] should be reconsidered and revised by us, we

23
AIR 1965 SC 1636
24
AIR 1959 SC 1177
25
AIR 1963 SC 1484
Page 30 of 75

ought to be clear as to the approach which should be adopted in such cases.
Mr Palkhivala has not disputed the fact that in a proper case, this Court has
inherent jurisdiction to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions, and so,
the abstract question as to whether such a power vests in this Court or not
need not detain us. In exercising this inherent power, however, this Court
would naturally like to impose certain reasonable limitations and would be
reluctant to entertain pleas for the reconsideration and revision of its earlier
decisions, unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial
reasons to do so. It is general judicial experience that in matters of law
involving questions of construing statutory or constitutional provisions, two
views are often reasonably possible and when judicial approach has to make
a choice between the two reasonably possible views, the process of decision
making is often very difficult and delicate. When this Court hears appeals
against decisions of the High Courts and is required to consider the
propriety or correctness of the view taken by the High Courts on any point
of law, it would be open to this Court to hold that though the view taken by
the High Court is reasonably possible, the alternative view which is also
reasonably possible is better and should be preferred. In such a case, the
choice is between the view taken by the High Court whose judgment is
under appeal, and the alternative view which appears to this Court to be
more reasonable; and in accepting its own view in preference to that of the
High Court, this Court would be discharging its duty as a court of appeal.
But different considerations must inevitably arise where a previous decision
of this Court has taken a particular view as to the construction of a statutory
provision as, for instance, Section 66(4) of the Act. When it is urged that
the view already taken by this Court should be reviewed and revised, it may
not necessarily be an adequate reason for such review and revision to hold
that though the earlier view is a reasonably possible view, the alternative
view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable. In
reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court should ask itself
whether in the interests of the public good or for any other valid and
compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should be
revised. When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under
Article 141, binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it
must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and
maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law
in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its
earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears
to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law
uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. That
is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisfied that its
earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the
error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous,
the Court must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its
members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible
or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any
principles which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with
the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always
depend upon several relevant considerations:—What is the nature of the
infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier
view is based? On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the
question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the Court not drawn to
Page 31 of 75

any relevant and material statutory provision, or was any previous decision
of this Court bearing on the point not noticed? Is the Court hearing such
plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view? What
would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on
public good? Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent
occasions either by this Court or by the High Courts? And, would the
reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or
mischief? These and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne
in mind whenever this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to
review and revise its earlier decisions. These considerations become still
more significant when the earlier decision happens to be a unanimous
decision of a Bench of five learned Judges of this Court.

25. …………… The principle of stare decisis, no doubt, cannot be pressed into
service in cases where the jurisdiction of this Court to reconsider and revise
its earlier decisions is invoked; but nevertheless, the normal principle that
judgments pronounced by this Court would be final, cannot be ignored, and
unless considerations of a substantial and compelling character make it
necessary to do so, this Court should and would be reluctant to review and
revise its earlier decisions. …….
(emphasis supplied)

33. The ratio decidendi , when culled out, is that for revising or reviewing its
earlier decisions multifarious considerations must arise which inter alia
include i) whether it is in the interests of public good; ii) the nature of
the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review or revision of the
earlier view is based; iii) whether the earlier decision has been followed
on subsequent occasions by the Supreme Court or the High Courts; iv)
whether on the earlier occasion some patent aspects of the question
before the Court remained unnoticed; and v) would the reversal of
earlier decision result in public inconvenience, hardship or mischief.
Furthermore, the Court held that it is imperative on it to maintain a
certain degree of certainty, consistency and continuity in the
interpretation of law in the country. Therefore, before a previous
decision is pronounced to be erroneous, the Court must be satisfied that
Page 32 of 75

a revision of such a decision is justified and there are valid and
compelling reasons for the same.
26
34. Not too long ago, in Dr Shah Faesal v. Union of India [5-J] , a
specific issue was framed:
“ 16.1. (i) When can a matter be referred to a larger Bench?”
In answer thereto, this Court speaking through Hon’ble N.V. Ramana,
CJ. observed:
17. This Court’s jurisprudence has shown that usually the courts do not
overrule the established precedents unless there is a social, constitutional
or economic change mandating such a development. The numbers
themselves speak of restraint and the value this Court attaches to the
doctrine of precedent. This Court regards the use of precedent as
indispensable bedrock upon which this Court renders justice. The use of
such precedents, to some extent, creates certainty upon which individuals
can rely and conduct their affairs. It also creates a basis for the
development of the rule of law. As the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, John Roberts observed during his Senate confirmation
hearing, “ It is a jolt to the legal system when you overrule a precedent.
Precedent plays an important role in promoting stability and even-
handedness ”. [Congressional Record—Senate, Vol. 156, Pt. 7, 10018 (7-6-
2010).]

18. Doctrines of precedents and stare decisis are the core values of our
legal system. They form the tools which further the goal of certainty,
stability and continuity in our legal system. Arguably, Judges owe a duty to
the concept of certainty of law, therefore they often justify their holdings
by relying upon the established tenets of law.

19. When a decision is rendered by this Court, it acquires a reliance interest
and the society organises itself based on the present legal order. When
substantial judicial time and resources are spent on references, the same
should not be made in a casual or cavalier manner. It is only when a
proposition is contradicted by a subsequent judgment of the same Bench,
or it is shown that the proposition laid down has become unworkable or
contrary to a well-established principle, that a reference will be made to a
larger Bench. …
(emphasis supplied)


26
(2020) 4 SCC 1
Page 33 of 75

35. This Court cautioned that a reference “should not be made in a casual
or cavalier manner” and, inter alia , should be made only when it is
shown that the proposition laid down in a case has become unworkable
or is contrary to a well-established principle.
36. A few months before the decision in Shah Faesal (supra), this Court in
Srimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative
27
Assembly [3-J] had reiterated the same law. It was held:
157. There is no doubt that the requirements under Article 145(3) of the
Constitution have never been dealt with extensively and, more often than
not, have received mere lip service, wherein this Court has found existence
of case laws which have already dealt with the proposition involved, and
have rejected such references. Normatively, this trend requires
consideration in appropriate cases, to ensure that unmeritorious references
do not unnecessarily consume precious judicial time in the Supreme Court.
158. In any case, we feel that there is a requirement to provide a
preliminary analysis with respect to the interpretation of this provision. In
this context, we need to keep in mind two important phrases occurring in
Article 145(3) of the Constitution, which are, “substantial question of law”
and “interpretation of the Constitution”. By reading the aforesaid provision,
two conditions can be culled out before a reference is made:
( i ) The Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question
of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution;
( ii ) The determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the
case.
159. We may state that we are not persuaded for referring the present
case to a larger Bench as the mandate of the aforesaid Article is that this
Court needs to be satisfied as to the existence of a substantial question of
law on the constitutional interpretation. However, this does not mean that
every case of constitutional interpretation should be compulsorily referred
to a Constitutional Bench.
160. Any question of law of general importance arising incidentally, or any
ancillary question of law having no significance to the final outcome, cannot
be considered as a substantial question of law. The existence of substantial
question of law does not weigh on the stakes involved in the case, rather,
it depends on the impact the question of law will have on the final
determination. If the questions having a determining effect on the final
outcome have already been decided by a conclusive authority, then such
questions cannot be called as “substantial questions of law”. In any case,
no substantial question of law exists in the present matter, which needs
reference to a larger Bench. The cardinal need is to achieve a judicial

27
(2020) 2 SCC 595
Page 34 of 75

balance between the crucial obligation to render justice and the compelling
necessity of avoiding prolongation of any lis.
(emphasis supplied)

37. In short, the Court emphasized that references to a larger Bench (for
matters involving substantial question of law as to interpretation of
Constitution) should be made only in exceptional circumstances and not
as a matter of routine. It cautioned that unmeritorious references
unnecessarily consume judicial time. Moreover, a question that has
already been settled by an authoritative decision cannot be regarded as
a substantial question of law.
E XAMINING J AI B IR S INGH [5-J] – A F ALTERING R EFERENCE
38. We have the highest of regard for the Hon’ble Judges who comprised
the Bench in Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra). Nonetheless, upon threadbare
examination of the referring judgment, we cannot but regret our inability
to concur therewith. None of the reasons noted above appear to us at
all convincing and/or compelling requiring a reference to be made. For
reasons more than one, the referring judgment is not free from
fundamental flaws. Painfully, we venture to say why each of the reasons
assigned by the 5-Judge Bench, noted by us in the six sub-paragraphs
of paragraph 31, are not justified and/or acceptable. Our answers are
given hereunder, seriatim .
(i) Decision in Bangalore Water Supply (supra), not unanimous?
a) It seems that Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) missed the woods for the
tree. A major portion of the referring judgment (paragraphs 11 to
21) is devoted to the thought process germinating in the mistaken
Page 35 of 75

conclusion that Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was not a
unanimous decision. The judgment in Bangalore Water Supply
st
(supra) was pronounced on 21 February, 1978, a day prior to
Hon’ble Beg, CJ. demitting office. Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J.
pronounced the lead judgment speaking for himself, as well as
Hon’ble Bhagwati and Hon’ble Desai, JJ. Hon’ble Beg, CJ. also
pronounced his supplementing/concurring judgment. From the
opening paragraph of the judgment of Hon’ble Chandrachud, J.
th
pronounced on 7 April, 1978 [paragraph 171 of the SCC report], it
st
is found that His Lordship on 21 February, 1978 had dictated a short
order on behalf of himself and his brethren, Hon’ble Singh and
Hon’ble Tulzapurkar, JJ. [referred to in paragraph 170 of the SCC
report] expressing agreement with the views of Hon’ble Krishna Iyer,
J. and Hon’ble Beg, CJ. that the appeal of Bangalore Water Supply
and Sewerage Board be dismissed. It was also recorded that the area
of concurrence or divergence with the rest of the judgment, if
th
necessary, would be indicated later. It was only on 7 April, 1978,
much after Hon’ble Beg, CJ. had demitted office, that the judgments
penned by Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. for himself and Hon’ble Singh, J.
(for himself and Hon’ble Tulzapurkar, J.) were placed in the public
domain. The opinion of Hon’ble Singh, J. was circulated first among
the Hon’ble Judges, as it appears from the opinion of Hon’ble
Chandrachud, J. His Lordship noticed “divergent views expressed by
Jaswant Singh and Tulzapurkar, JJ. on certain aspects of the matter”
Page 36 of 75

and having “given a further thought to the frustrating question as to
what falls within and without” the statutory concept of “industry”,
was “unable to accept the basis on which Jaswant Singh and
Tulzapurkar, JJ. have expressed their dissent” . Significantly, neither
did Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. nor Hon’ble Singh, J. disagree with
either Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. or Hon’ble Beg, CJ. insofar as the
outcome (read: dismissal) of the appeal before the 7-Judge Bench.
b) Each Hon’ble Judge being a member of a Bench of the apex court
has the freedom to express his own view regarding a specific
question. It is well-nigh conceivable that multiple Judges on the
Bench may arrive at a conclusion, which is congruent, but the line of
thinking, the analytical pathways and the underlying reasoning
employed to attain it exhibit some degree of variability. Therefore,
in essence, disparate approaches could yield a singular, concordant
result. Different shades of interpretation of the definition of
“industry” by the Hon’ble Judges and the reasoning given in each of
the individual opinions for reaching the same conclusion of the
appeal deserving dismissal notwithstanding, to emphatically state
that the 7-Judge Bench was divided in its opinion [with Hon’ble
Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the majority and Hon’ble Singh, J.
speaking for the minority] or that Hon’ble Chandrachud, J., on the
one hand, partly dissented with the majority and, on the other, that
Hon’ble Singh and Hon’ble Tulzapurkar, JJ. dissented with the
majority is, in our appreciation and analysis of what is evident,
Page 37 of 75

narration of a version of events that seem to diverge from factual
accuracy. The starting point of discussion in Jai Bir Singh [5-J]
(supra) [after the first three paragraphs which missed noting that
there was no cleavage of opinion (as demonstrated above)] took off
at a tangent, ignoring what was so very vital and important: the
opening words of Hon’ble Chandrachud, J.’s opinion. In fact, it is
conspicuous by its absence in the referring judgment. Thus, the very
foundation of the referring judgment is tenuous and, unwittingly, has
yielded an undesirable outcome of Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) being doubted based on an untenable reason (emphasis
supplied).
c) Discussion in the referring judgment to drive home the point that the
judgment of Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. and the concurring opinion of
Hon’ble Beg, CJ. were rendered without looking into the opinions of
Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. and Hon’ble Singh, J. is, in our opinion,
wholly irrelevant and serves no purpose at all for doubting the
efficacy of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) as a binding
precedent. It does not appear from the opinions of Hon’ble
Chandrachud, J. and Hon’ble Singh, J., rendered subsequently, that
Their Lordships had no occasion to peruse the judgment of Hon’ble
Krishna Iyer, J. and the concurring opinion of Hon’ble Beg, CJ. before
the same were pronounced. Their Lordships might have had genuine
st
reasons impeding rendering of the respective opinions by 21
February, 1978; but any delayed rendering of opinions by Their
Page 38 of 75

Lordships could not have formed the basis of a reference on the
specious ground that neither Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. nor Hon’ble
Beg, CJ. had the occasion to peruse such subsequent opinions.
d) Quite apart, labelling the judgment of Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) as not unanimous and critically
viewing it in light of the reasons assigned by Hon’ble Singh, J. for
himself and Hon’ble Tulzapurkar, J. for expressing disagreement,
and not doubt, with the purpose of making a reference for a
reconsideration of the meaning of “industry” as propounded in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) proceeds on a patent ignorance
28
of the dictum in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh read with
Article 145(5) of the Constitution.
e) Law seems to be well settled that it is the numerical strength of the
Bench that matters and not whether an Hon’ble Judge or a couple of
Hon’ble Judges on the Bench has/have differed forming the minority.
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) has to be seen as the judgment
of a 7-Judge Bench and not as a split verdict (emphasis supplied).
This, possibly escaped the attention of the 5-Judge Bench.
f) To find a precedent, one need not travel too far back. Aligarh
29
Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal is a decision of fairly
recent origin where a 7-Judge Bench overruled S. Azeez Basha v.
30
Union of India , a unanimous decision rendered by a 5-Judge

28
(1989) 2 SCC 754
29
(2025) 6 SCC 1
30
AIR 1968 SC 662
Page 39 of 75

Bench. Incidentally, Aligarh Muslim University (supra) was
decided by a majority of 4:3 and, thus, factually 4 (four) Hon’ble
Judges overruled a unanimous 5-Judge Bench decision; yet, in law,
the effect is that Aligarh Muslim University (supra) has to be seen
as overruling the unanimous 5-Judge Bench decision in S. Azeez
Basha (supra) because of the strength of the Bench (seven).
g) Per the law as it stands now, the numerical strength of the Bench
irrespective of the differences in reasoning adopted by the Hon’ble
Judges comprising such bench would be determinative of the binding
nature of a judgment and not the number of Judges comprising the
majority.
(ii) Worker-oriented approach?
a) A judgment should not and cannot be characterised as “worker-
oriented”, merely because its ultimate outcome happens to favour
the working class. It is axiomatic that judicial determinations are
founded on reasons; it is those reasons that sustain the conclusion.
Where the reasons are sound, the ultimate conclusion has to be
respected and not viewed with reproach simply because it follows a
particular path. The proper course, if at all the judgment is to be
doubted, is to test the reasoning on which the conclusion rests and
then to explain why it calls for reconsideration. To question a
judgment solely on the ground that its outcome is labour-centric is,
in our considered view, not only untenable but an egregious breach
of Article 141 discipline. Be that as it may!
Page 40 of 75

b) The criticism of the opinion penned by Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. in
Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) as evincing a one-sided approach in
favour of the workers, with respect, fails to comprehend that the ID
Act is a social welfare legislation. Construing such a legislation in
favour of labour is a settled canon. To fault Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) for taking such a view is to fault the statute itself,
which amounts to a glaring error of interpretive method.
c) The referring judgment also does not take into account precedents
of this Court acknowledging that the ID Act is a social welfare
legislation, which has been enacted in the interest of workmen.
31
d) Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd.
is a reminder of the settled law that in construing the provisions of
a welfare legislation like the ID Act, the Courts should adopt what
is described as a beneficent rule of construction. If two
constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on the section,
it follows that the construction which furthers the policy and object
of the enactment and is more beneficial to the employees, has to
be preferred. It was also emphasized that the ID Act, which intends
to improve and safeguard the service conditions of an employee,
demands an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative
purpose.

31
(1973) 1 SCC 813
Page 41 of 75

e) In Workmen of Indian Standards Institution v. Management
32
of Indian Standards Institution [3-J] , speaking for the
majority, Hon’ble Bhagwati, J. after considering Safdarjung
Hospital (supra) highlighted that the ID Act is a legislation
intended to bring about peace and harmony between management
and labour in an “industry” so that production does not suffer and
at the same time, labour is not exploited and discontented;
therefore, the tests must be so applied as to give the widest
possible connotation to the term “industry”. It was also observed
that whenever a question arises whether a particular concern is an
“industry”, the approach must be broad and liberal and not rigid or
doctrinaire; such an interpretation ought to be made which would
advance the object and purpose of the legislation and give full
meaning and effect to it in the achievement of its avowed social
objective.
f) A few months before the referring judgment was delivered, this
Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. v National Union
33
Waterfront Workers [5-J] , though dealing with a different
labour legislation, propounded that after the advent of the
Constitution of India, the State is under an obligation to improve
the lot of the workforce. Referring to Article 23 (prohibiting, inter
alia, begar and other similar forms of forced labour), Article 38

32
(1975) 2 SCC 847
33
(2001) 7 SCC 1
Page 42 of 75

(mandating the State to secure a social order for promotion of
welfare of the people and to establish an egalitarian society), Article
39 (enumerating the principles of policy of the State which include
welfare measures for the workers), Article 43 (requiring the State
to endeavour to secure, by a suitable legislation or economic
organisation or in any other way for all workers, agricultural,
industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work
ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and
social and cultural opportunities), Article 43-A (enjoining the State
to take steps by suitable legislation or in any other way to secure
the participation of workers in the management of undertakings,
establishment, or other organisations engaged in any industry) and
Articles 14 and 16 enshrining the guarantee of equality before law
and equality of opportunity in public employment, with the
Preamble to the Constitution as the lodestar guiding those who find
themselves in a grey area while dealing with and interpreting a
beneficial legislation enacted to give effect to the Directive
Principles of State Policy which is otherwise constitutionally valid, it
was held that the consideration of the Court cannot be divorced
from those objectives. Should there be any ambiguity in the
language of a beneficial labour legislation, the 5-Judge Bench was
emphatically unanimous that the Courts have to resolve the
quandary in favour of conferment of, rather than denial of, a benefit
Page 43 of 75

on the labour by the legislature but without rewriting and/or doing
violence to the provisions of the enactment.
g) Notwithstanding the aforesaid observations, if one were to proceed
further on this path of enquiring into what the ID Act ought to
signify in terms of its perceived policy objectives, i.e., whether
worker-centric or employer-centric, this Court would, in effect, be
treading the very ground that invites criticism of the approach
adopted in the referring judgment , as can be evinced from the
paragraphs below:
32. In the judgment of Bangalore Water [(1978) 2 SCC 213:1978
SCC (L&S) 215] Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for himself and on behalf
of the other two Hon’ble Judges agreeing with him proceeded to deal
with the interpretation of the definition of “industry” on a legal
premise stating thus: (SCC p. 230, para 12)
“ A worker-oriented statute must receive a construction where,
conceptually, keynote thought must be the worker and the
community, as the Constitution has shown concern for them, inter
alia, in Articles 38, 39 and 43 .”
(emphasis supplied in original)
33. With utmost respect, the statute under consideration cannot be
looked at only as a worker-oriented statute. The main aim of the
statute as is evident from its preamble and various provisions
contained therein, is to regulate and harmonise relationships
between employers and employees for maintaining industrial peace
and social harmony. The definition clause read with other provisions
of the Act under consideration deserves interpretation keeping in
view interests of the employer, who has put his capital and expertise
into the industry and the workers who by their labour equally
contribute to the growth of the industry. The Act under consideration
has a historical background of industrial revolution inspired by the
philosophy of Karl Marx. It is a piece of social legislation. Opposed to
the traditional industrial culture of open competition or laissez faire ,
the present structure of industrial law is an outcome of long-term
agitation and struggle of the working class for participation on equal
footing with the employers in industries for its growth and profits. In
interpreting, therefore, the industrial law, which aims at promoting
social justice, interests both of employers, employees and in a
democratic society, people, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the
industrial activities, have to be kept in view.
(emphasis supplied)

Page 44 of 75

h) In this context, it must be observed that the decision in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) could not have been subjected to
reconsideration in a reference merely on the basis of a perceived
need to substitute the policy view that informed it. The exercise of
reference jurisdiction is intended to correct defects in reasoning,
not disagreement with policy. To entertain such a judicial course
would be to traverse de hors the settled confines of judicial
discipline, which proscribes questioning a precedent solely on the
ground that an alternative policy perspective may seem more
desirable.
i) Viewed through the prism of the above-referred decisions [referred
to in sub-paragraphs (d) to (f)] and many others, which are not
referred to here (to avoid prolixity), and considering the objective
of the ID Act, we disagree with the departure made in the referring
judgment from the earlier liberal interpretation without proper
justification. The only justification that can reasonably be traced is
to protect the industry, and by extension the employer. We propose
to discuss these facets a little later while dealing with the sixth
reason. In any event, the shift appears unwarranted given the way
this Court previously interpreted legislations origin whereof is
traceable to the Directive Principles of State Policy.
(iii) Sovereign Functions
a) In our view, the continued invocation of the idea of “sovereign
functions” as a threshold device to exclude an activity from the
Page 45 of 75

definition of “industry” is misplaced. In Bangalore Water Supply
(supra), Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. did recognise a limited exception
for sovereign functions, but the judgment itself shows the difficulty
in defining what exactly falls within that category. Furthermore,
Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. had also acknowledged in his opinion that
even the inalienable functions of the State might have some
elements of “industry”, which could be severable so as to bring
34
them within the ambit of “industry” under Section 2(j) .
b) This lack of clarity was later noticed in the referring judgment,
where it was pointed out that there was no unanimity amongst the
Hon’ble Judges on the meaning and contours of “sovereign
functions”. Hon’ble Beg, CJ., in fact, expressed doubt about the use
of the term altogether and suggested that exclusion should depend
only on whether a service is governed by distinct constitutional or
statutory rules, such as those under Articles 310 and 311 of the
35
Constitution . Hon’ble Chandrachud, J. went a step further and
opined that sovereign function did not call for any exemption from
the definition of “industry”. His Lordship held that it is the nature of
the activity that matters, not the identity of the employer. If an
activity would be an industry when carried on by a private person,
it does not cease to be so merely because it is undertaken by the
36
State .

34
[see paragraph 143(b) of Bangalore Water Supply (supra)].
35
[see paragraph 163 of Bangalore Water Supply (supra)].
36
[see paragraph 179 of Bangalore Water Supply (supra)].
Page 46 of 75

c) The said reasoning is also fortified by the scheme of the ID Act
itself. The First Schedule [which provides for a list of “industries
which may be declared to be public utility services under sub-clause
(vi) of clause (n) of section 2” when “public emergency or public
interest so requires”] includes industries (emphasis supplied) such
as “Defence establishment” (Entry 8), Fire Brigade Service (Entry
10), India Government Mints (Entry 11), India Security Press (Entry
12), Service in the Uranium industry (Entry 19) and Services in the
Bank Note Press, Dewas (Entry 22) – areas which are ordinarily
understood as sovereign functions. The legislative intent is clear
and unequivocal. The legislature did not intend to exclude industries
associated with sovereign functions from the definition of
“industry”.
d) These inclusions predate Bangalore Water Supply (supra).
However, the legislative interventions that ensued the judgment
further accentuate the same intent. Notably, these include the
Currency Note Press (Entry 25), Services in the International
Airports Authority of India (Entry 27), and Industrial establishments
manufacturing or producing Nuclear Fuel and components, Heavy
Water and Allied Chemicals and Atomic Energy (Entry 28).
e) This shows that the legislature did not intend to exclude such
activities merely because they are performed by the State. The
arguments noticed in the referring judgment, which seek either to
expand “sovereign functions” to cover all welfare activities or to
Page 47 of 75

confine it narrowly to inalienable functions, only highlight the
confusion surrounding the concept. In either case, what is
“inalienable functions” becomes uncertain and subjective.
f) For these reasons, we are of the view that whether an activity is
described as a “sovereign function” has little relevance in
determining if it is an “industry” under Section 2(j). The correct
approach, therefore, is to apply the functional test laid down in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra), focusing on the nature of the
activity and the employer-employee relationship. Any exclusion
must emanate from a clear constitutional or statutory provision,
and not from an uncertain and undefined notion of sovereignty.
(iv) Decision in Safdarjung Hospital (supra)
a) Safdarjung Hospital (supra) was expressly overruled by
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) but, according to Jai Bir Singh
[5-J] (supra), the former was rightly decided and presents the
correct position of law as to what is and what is not comprehended
within “industry”.
b) Question arising for decision in Safdarjung Hospital (supra) was
whether a hospital is an “industry” within the meaning of the ID
Act. A restricted meaning was attributed to the word “industry” by
observing that industry would mean only trade and business,
manufacture or undertaking analogous to trade or business for the
production of material goods or wealth or material services. It is
Page 48 of 75

not necessary that there must be a profit motive but the enterprise
must be analogous to trade or business in the commercial sense.
c) Probing further, it is found that the 6-Judge Bench in Safdarjung
Hospital (supra) discussed whether a public utility service is
susceptible of being classified as an industry, merely by reason of
its inclusion in the First Schedule by the Parliament or by the
executive. Under consideration was Entry 9 of the First Schedule,
viz. “service in hospitals and dispensaries”. The Court rejected the
contention that every public utility service included in the First
Schedule would be classified as an “industry”. In doing so, the Court
first discussed Section 2(n)(vi) of the ID Act which states that any
industry specified in the First Schedule which the appropriate
Government may, if satisfied that public emergency or public
interest so requires, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare
to be a public utility service. The Court held that the services
mentioned in the First Schedule have to answer the test of an
“industry” run on commercial lines to produce something which the
community can use. These goods are brought into existence in a
commercial way analogous to a business where such production
takes place. The Court also held that entries in the First Schedule
are general in nature. For e.g. “Coal” by itself is not an industry;
but certain aspects of dealing in it can be classified as an industry.
However, the Parliament cannot add something which was not an
industry in the first place. In conclusion, the Court held that mere
Page 49 of 75

notification in the First Schedule is insufficient to convert non-
industries under the ID Act to industries.
d) With all the respect, reverence and admiration we have for the
author of the decision in Safdarjung Hospital (supra) and the
other Hon’ble Judges comprising the 6-Judge Bench, we find
ourselves unable to subscribe to the line of reasoning that was
adopted to rule in favour of the appellants/hospitals of not being
covered by the definition of “industry”. Why it does not commend
to us is sought to be explained with reference to a simple illustration
as well as the provisions of the ID Act.
e) Let us assume that a technician is employed by the management
of a hospital pursuant to a service agreement on monthly wages in
a hospital having an X-ray unit. Patients are advised by the doctor
to undergo X-ray examination. The technician is required to position
the affected part of the patient’s body under the X-ray machine.
Once the image is captured, the condition of the affected part is
reflected on the plate which along with a report of the radiologist is
made over to the patient. The technician is not concerned whether
the hospital is run for profit or as a charity; his concern is confined
to performing the work for which he has been hired to the best of
his ability and the payment of wages due for the work performed
by him. Can it be contended with any degree of conviction that the
37
work performed by the technician is not part of a systemic activity

37
considered in greater details, at a later part of this opinion
Page 50 of 75

carried on in cooperation between the employer and the workman
and is, therefore, not covered by the expression “industry” as
defined in Section 2(j) of the ID Act? We think not. It would,
however, be an entirely different proposition if it is shown by the
management that the technician, fully aware of the charitable
nature of the hospital, did not intend to enter into and there was,
in fact, no employer-employee relationship but agreed to put in
gratuitous work for an honorarium.
f) Moving now to the statutory scheme of the ID Act, more particularly
Sections 2(n)(vi) and 22 read with the First Schedule [the heading
of which reads “I NDUSTRIES WHICH MAY BE DECLARED TO BE P UBLIC U TILITY
S ERVICES U NDER S UB -C LAUSE (VI) OF C LAUSE (N) OF S ECTION 2”], it
transpires that the Parliament has been conferred power to include
certain industries (emphasis supplied) falling under the ambit of
public utility services as defined in the ID Act. It rightly presupposes
that the other entries, including those noted in the previous
segment, in the First Schedule are industries whether wholly or in
part. To say that after inclusion, the entries would then have to
satisfy the test of an “industry” under the ID Act in a separate
inquiry based on whether production of goods is on commercial
lines which the community can use or whether such goods are
brought into existence in a commercial way analogous to a business
where such production takes place, that would run contrary to the
express statutory scheme as mentioned hereinabove (emphasis
Page 51 of 75

supplied). When the language of the statute is plain and clear and
no absurd result is produced, it is not proper to read in the statute
what does not appear or is not intended by its object. If one reads
Section 2(n)(vi) with the First Schedule, the legislative intent is
clear that the stated industries included in pursuance of such clause
[clause (vi)] are providing public utility services and hence ought
to be protected from strikes as in Section 22(1). Entry 9 is relatable
to “services in hospitals and dispensaries”. Though this entry was
not there in the ID Act, as originally enacted, by a legislative
amendment it was included in the First Schedule.
g) Rightly so, Safdarjung Hospital (supra) stands expressly
overruled by Bangalore Water Supply (supra).
(v) Reliance on Coir Board, Ernakulam [2-J] (supra), misplaced
a) Reliance placed by Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) on the decision of
Coir Board Ernakulam [2-J] (supra) to draw support for the view
that Bangalore Water Supply (supra) requires reconsideration to
our mind, again, is quite unsound. The request for a reference
having been declined in Coir Board Ernakulam [3-J] (supra) and
the appeals having been directed to be listed before the appropriate
Bench for further proceedings, the order attained finality insofar as
the question of reference of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) to
a larger Bench is concerned. However, in the process of its
reasoning, the referring judgment resurrected the view in Coir
Board Ernakulam [2-J] (supra) as if the Bench in Jai Bir Singh
Page 52 of 75

[5-J] (supra) were exercising intra-court appellate jurisdiction over
the order passed in Coir Board Ernakulam [3-J] (supra). This
was plainly impermissible.
b) That apart, reference made by Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) to past
experience of the Supreme Court [since the time Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) has been holding the field] being flooded with
litigation arising from numerous awards of reinstatement with huge
amounts as back wages, has left us disturbed and dazed,
interminably, so to say. With respect, it is beyond our
comprehension that such a ground could at all have weighed in the
mind of the 5-Judge Bench as imperative, to make a reference. If
the justice of a case before the tribunal/court arising out of an
industrial dispute demands reinstatement of a workman/workmen
with back wages, obviously upon a satisfaction being reached that
the termination is illegal, and the same is reflected in the award, it
is indeed unimaginable and sad that such awards were
characterised as burdensome and a critical view thereof is taken to
refer Bangalore Water Supply (supra) to a larger Bench. The
overarching preambular promise to secure justice for all seems to
have passed into oblivion while the 5-Judge Bench made the
observation in paragraph 35 of the referring judgment that “awards
granting heavy packages of back wages, sometimes result in taking
away the very substratum of the industry” . More than anything
else, this clearly evinces a drift towards a “pro-employer/anti-
Page 53 of 75

labour” approach without supporting reasons, which we find to be
repugnant and odious.
(vi) Reference to Aeltemesh Rein (supra), untenable
a) Reference to Aeltemesh Rein (supra) by the 5-Judge Bench
appears to be a plain and simple mistake. However, it is unknown
to what extent such mistake had a bearing on the decision-making
process. Aeltemesh Rein (supra) centred around non-
enforcement of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and had, not
even remotely, anything to do with the ID Act. In any event, the
observation made in paragraph 45 of the referring judgment that
“the pressing demands of the employers and the employees and
the helplessness of the legislature and the executive in bringing into
force the Amendment Act” , i.e., the amended definition of
“industry” post-1982, is an imperative for a reference casts grave
doubts about the acceptability of such a reason. Aeltemesh Rein
(supra) and the decisions referred to therein are authorities for the
proposition that even the Supreme Court cannot issue a mandamus
to the Central Government to notify a particular law, enacted by
the legislature. Once this proposition is accepted, it defies reason
as to why (despite the legislature having amended the definition of
“industry” accepting the interpretation placed on such word by the
7-Judge Bench) this Court should be goaded to revisit such
interpretation. Certainly, the legislature and the executive are no
pushovers. All three organs have their independent spheres of work
Page 54 of 75

and each organ must be left free to do what the Constitution ordains
it to do. Mr. C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel for a particular trade
union is right in contending that the gun is sought to be placed on
the Court’s shoulder to fire. We conclude by observing that the
reason in paragraph 45 of the referring judgment falls far short of
an acceptable reason for ordering a reference and is plainly
unacceptable.
b) Moreover, the referring judgment records that in Aeltemesh Rein
(supra), the Union of India had offered an explanation that, “for
employees belonging to categories of industries excluded under the
amended definition, no alternative mechanism for redressal of
service disputes had been provided, and that this constituted the
reason for not bringing the amended definition into force” .
However, upon repeated reading of Aeltemesh Rein (supra), we
are unable to locate any such observation, submission, or
explanation attributed to the Union of India. The record of that
decision does not reflect the reasoning ascribed to it in the referring
judgment. In the absence of any such material in the original
judgment, we are constrained to hold that the referring judgment
proceeds on an erroneous premise in this regard, having attributed
to Aeltemesh Rein (supra) a position that is not borne out from
the text of the decision.
Page 55 of 75

nd
39. The short order dated 2 January, 2017 in Jai Bir Singh [7-J] (supra),
noticed above, did not go as far to examine the reasons for the reference
in depth as we have undertaken; hence, no discussion is found there.
40. Moving ahead, there is one other aspect that bears serious
consideration. It is premised on the observations made by this Court in
38
State of Tamil Nadu v. Nellai Cotton Mills Ltd. [2-J].
41. The genesis of the lis in Nellai Cotton Mills (supra) traces back to the
enactment of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of
Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1982, which was brought into force
with the object of conferring permanent status upon workmen who had
rendered continuous service for a period of 480 days within 24 calendar
months in an industrial establishment. Section 3 of the said enactment,
being pivotal, not only mandated such conferment but also elaborated
the concept of “continuous service” by including interruptions
occasioned by sickness, authorised leave, strike, lockout, and other
contingencies. The Explanation appended thereto bore significance
inasmuch as it expanded the computation of days worked to include
periods of lay-off, leave with wages, temporary disablement and
maternity leave.
42. The constitutional validity of the said enactment came to be assailed
before the High Court of Madras in a cluster of writ petitions by several
industrial establishments. Upon consideration, the High Court partly

38
(1990) 2 SCC 518
Page 56 of 75

allowed the challenge, inter alia , holding the Explanation to Section 3 to
be unenforceable and redundant, striking down a portion of Section 3(2)
on the anvil that it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the
employer’s rights, and clarifying that apprentices and badli workers
would not fall within the ambit of “workman” for the purposes of the
provision. The High Court further held that the Act would neither
supersede settlements between employers and workmen nor operate
retrospectively.
43. Aggrieved thereby, the State preferred an appeal and, during its
pendency, introduced amendments by way of Amending Act 44 of 1985
with a view to obviate the practical impediments highlighted in the
judgment. The Amendment Act recalibrated the Explanation to Section
3 by deeming certain periods as amounting to continuous service and
introduced an additional Explanation expanding the meaning of “law” to
subsume awards, agreements and settlements as well. A validation
clause was also incorporated vide the amending Act to retrospectively
validate actions taken under the principal Act.
44. In this backdrop, the interpretative question arose as to whether the
subsequent legislative amendments evinced an intention to depart from,
or to endorse, the construction placed by the High Court.
45. It is in this milieu that the principle assumes relevance that subsequent
legislative action/inaction, post any judicial engagement with the
legislation, may furnish a legitimate indicator to discern legislative
approval or disapproval of the ratio laid down in the judgment.
Page 57 of 75

Interestingly, while the legislature therein addressed certain operational
difficulties through the amendment, it did not re-enact or validate the
portion invalidated by the High Court, thereby lending credence to the
inference that the judgment of the High Court stood accepted to that
limited extent.
46. It would be profitable for the present discussion to quote the relevant
paragraph from such decision hereinbelow:
8. When the Act has been judicially interpreted, courts may study the
subsequent action or inaction of the legislature for clues as to legislative
approval or disapproval of judicial interpretation. After the statute has
been judicially interpreted in a certain way and if the legislature by
taking note of the judgment amended the statute appropriately so as to
give it a different meaning from the one asserted by the courts, or not
giving any different meaning from the view taken by the court, it may
be argued with some justification that the legislature has expressly or
by implication ratified the judicial interpretation. In the instant case, the
legislature has expressly taken note of the High Court verdict and
removed the practical difficulties caused thereby in implementing the
provisions of the Act, by appropriate amendments. No provision,
however, was inserted to rewrite and validate the portion which was
struck down by the High Court. It could therefore, be reasonably held
that the legislature has accepted the judgment of the High Court to the
extent indicated.
(emphasis supplied)
47. The exposition of law in Nellai Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) is that events
transpiring after a judicial interpretation of a term in an opinion are
material to ascertain the legislative approach of approval or disapproval
of such interpretation. If approved, the legislature may not intervene;
however, if it is disapproved, the legislature may step in with a
legislation to remove the basis of such interpretation. With utmost
respect, this exposition in Nellai Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) does not
appear to have engaged the attention of either Jai Bir Singh [3-J]
Page 58 of 75

(supra) or Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra). Though Nellai Cotton Mills
Ltd. (supra), being a 2-Judge Bench decision was not binding on
Benches of larger strength, Coir Board Ernakulam [2-J] (supra) was
certainly bound unless it differed. Nevertheless, the exposition in Nellai
Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) leaves its own imprint, particularly when read
with the caveat in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) that its
construction of “industry’ was, prima facie , to endure till the legislature
steps in to substitute it by a more precise definition. Parliament by the
1982 amendment did step in. It did not completely disapprove
Bangalore Water Supply (supra): the triple test was approved but the
definition of “industry” was calibrated by narrowing its width as
explained therein by excluding hospitals, charitable institutions, clubs,
etc. What none could scarcely have imagined was that, though the
legislature did act and step in by partial approval and partial disapproval,
the executive would stall the enforceability of the new/amended
definition. It is evident from the Lok Sabha records that enforcement of
the amended definition of “industry” was deferred pending review due
to representations submitted by stakeholders, while all other provisions
of the 1982 amendment were brought into force. For four decades
thereafter, both the legislative and executive wings accepted the status
quo - the 1982 amendment on paper, Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) in practice till such time the 2020 Code was enacted and
enforced quite recently. To equate such executive deferral with
legislative acquiescence is to invert separation of powers. Thus, when
Page 59 of 75

legislative response had intervened to calibrate Bangalore Water
Supply (supra), the will of the people did not translate into law for a
reason not anticipated, and the political branches themselves
acquiesced in the prevailing arrangement since 1985, it is indeed
questionable whether the reference made by Jai Bir Singh [3-J]
(supra) did clothe Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) with the competence and
authority to doubt Bangalore Water Supply (supra), rendering the
reconsideration otiose.
48. Proceeding further ahead, we may observe that the doctrine of stare
decisis enjoins that a precedent, particularly one laid down by a larger
bench of 7 (seven) Judges and followed for decades, be revisited only
upon satisfaction of exacting tests: manifest error, public mischief, or a
conflict of decisions of coordinate Benches. Mere disagreement with a
prior view or the mere passage of time requiring a relook does not
warrant a reference to a larger Bench. Judged by that standard, Jai Bir
Singh [5-J] (supra) carries chinks in its armour too prominently so as
to justify unsettling Bangalore Water Supply (supra). Jai Bir Singh
[5-J] (supra) neither identified any ‘manifest error’ nor inter-bench
conflict; at its extreme, it only had a policy discomfort with the width of
the triple test. Unfortunately, Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) pointed to no
alternative workable formulation to the triple test it faulted, and omitted
in undertaking the inquiry required by Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. (supra)
as to why a 27-years old rule settled across multiple Benches should be
unsettled. Its reliance on Safdarjung Hospital (supra), a precedent
Page 60 of 75

Bangalore Water Supply (supra) had expressly overruled, further
offended settled canons of precedent. In seeking to pierce the patina of
permanence that Bangalore Water Supply (supra) had acquired, Jai
Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) fails the procedural discipline [emphasized in
Shah Faesal (supra)] and the substantive discipline of stare decisis .
Sadly, Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) sought to destabilise the old order
without erecting any jurisprudential structure to replace it.
39
49. In Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. [5-J] , this Court, after
considering a series of precedents, reiterated the principle of binding
precedent in following words:
22. A careful perusal of the above judgments shows that this Court took
note of the hierarchical character of the judicial system in India. It also held
that it is of paramount importance that the law declared by this Court should
be certain, clear and consistent. As stated in the above judgments, it is of
common knowledge that most of the decisions of this Court are of
significance not merely because they constitute an adjudication on the
rights of the parties and resolve the disputes between them but also
because in doing so they embody a declaration of law operating as a binding
principle in future cases. The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost
importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes
certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency
promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for
consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this
Court. … .
(emphasis supplied)

50. We should not be misunderstood in our critique of the referring
judgment as if, being part of the 9-Judge Bench that has been
constituted, we are sitting in appeal thereagainst. This exercise has been
necessitated solely for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether due
process had been followed or not.

39
(2002) 4 SCC 234
Page 61 of 75

51. Finally, the raison d’être behind the referring judgment to make the
reference is captured in the first couple of lines of paragraph 24, reading
thus:
24. In any case, no such inhibition limits the power of this Bench of five
Judges which has been constituted on a reference made due to apparent
conflict between judgments of two Benches of this Court. As has been
stated by us above, the decision in Bangalore Water is not a unanimous
decision.

52. We unhesitatingly conclude by recording that the reasoning in Jai Bir
Singh [5-J] (supra) does not satisfy the aforementioned principles for
reviewing earlier decisions of this Court as laid down in Keshav Mills
Co. Ltd. (supra). To reconsider the definition of “industry” and giving it
a narrower frame than what is elaborated in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) would run contrary to public good. It would result in defeating
the purpose of the ID Act which, undoubtedly, is a social welfare and
worker-oriented legislation. Furthermore, since 1978, the decision in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) has been followed/relied on by this
40
Court in at least 84 decisions and no compelling reasons do appear for
disturbing the field set by it. We are also unable to accept the reasons
given in Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra), which inter alia include the
Government’s difficulty and reluctance in bringing the amended
definition of “industry” into force, as either valid or sufficiently
compelling for the present reference. Lastly and most importantly, to
reconsider the decision at this distance of time would inevitably result in
tremendous public inconvenience and hardship for the workmen as well

40
list furnished by Mr. C.U. Singh
Page 62 of 75

as other parties embroiled in pending reference / litigation under the ID
Act.
53. Having furnished our own reasons as to why the reasons given in Jai
Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) and Jai Bir Singh [7-J] (supra) are insufficient
to warrant a reference, we record having failed to find any discussion
there on how the decision in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) has
become unworkable. Not to speak of the tests laid down in Keshav Mills
Co. Ltd. (supra), even in view of the principles laid down in Dr Shah
Faesal (supra), there does not exist any valid ground which could justify
referring Bangalore Water Supply (supra) to a larger Bench.
54. Arguendo , assuming for once, that Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
has become unworkable, declaring it so at a point when the ID Act no
longer survives in the same form, and when the number of pending
cases before the Industrial Tribunals and the Labour Courts may not be
substantial, is a factor that militates against the need for
reconsideration. If reconsideration was indeed required, the same ought
to have been undertaken soon after the opinion in Jai Bir Singh [5-J]
(supra) was expressed in 2005; or even in 2017, soon after Jai Bir
Singh [7-J] (supra) referred the issue to the Chief Justice for
constituting a 9-Judge Bench. This reference has come before this 9-
Judge Bench only 9 (nine) years after Jai Bir Singh [7-J] (supra). The
numbers may be a mere coincidence but the coincidence ends there:
the intervening years have hardened the law on the ground, and the
Court now faces a test of doctrine and of institutional resolve.
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55. When a reference itself lingers for more than 2 (two) decades, the
doctrine of stare decisis is tested twice over – first against the standards
set by Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) and second, against the Court’s
own inability to give finality. Bangalore Water Supply (supra) has
been applied by smaller Benches of this Court, the high courts, the
tribunals, and employers every day of that delay. To disturb it now
without meeting the highest threshold would suggest that judicial doubt,
not judicial reasoning, drives the law.
56. It is trite, no court should feel inhibited to do whatever the justice of a
case demands, based on the principle of ex debito justitiae ; but a little
more introspection could have dispelled the unfounded notion that
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) requires reconsideration and,
thereby, clear the doubt as to its efficacy as a binding precedent.
57. In fine, while Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra) omitted to consider several
precedents which is striking, the coup de grace is its failure to notice
that Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was self-limiting.
58. We, thus, have no hesitation to reject the reference.
R ESTORING C LARITY TO THE D EFINITION OF ‘I NDUSTRY ’ IN S ECTION 2(j)
59. Having said thus, we intend to assign our brief reasons why the
elaborate and enlightening opinion in Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
on interpretation of the term “industry” in the ID Act requires no
tinkering at all, much less any reconsideration.
60. Primarily the question before this larger Bench is, how to interpret
Section 2(j) of the ID Act defining “industry”? Hence, it would be
Page 64 of 75

profitable to begin by reading portions of the definition clause [Section
2 of the ID Act] and then some of the other provisions having a bearing
on the said question. The need to navigate through the ID Act itself
arises owing to scant reference being made to it by learned senior
counsel/counsel for the parties advocating a reconsideration of
Bangalore Water Supply (supra).
61. Relevant clauses of Section 2 read as under:
“Section 2. - In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject
or context,-

( j ) ‘industry’ means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or
calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment,
handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.
( g ) ‘employer’ means—
( i ) in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any
department of the Central Government or a State Government, the
authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed, the
head of the department;
( ii ) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority,
the chief executive officer of that authority.
( s ) ‘workman’ means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any
industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical
or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment
be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this
Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has
been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a
consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or
retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such
person—
( i ) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act,
1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
( ii ) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee
of a prison; or
( iii ) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
( iv ) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding
ten thousand rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the
duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him,
functions mainly of a managerial nature.
( k ) ‘industrial dispute’ means any dispute or difference between employers
and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen
and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment
or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person;
( n ) ‘public utility service’ means—
Page 65 of 75

( i ) any railway service or any transport service for the carriage of
passengers or goods by air;
( i-a ) any service in, or in connection with the working of, any major port or
dock or any industrial establishment or unit engaged in essential defence
services;
( ii ) any section of an industrial establishment, on the working of which the
safety of the establishment or the workmen employed therein depends;
( iii ) any postal, telegraph or telephone service;
( iv ) any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public;
( v ) any system of public conservancy or sanitation;
( vi ) any industry specified in the First Schedule which the appropriate
Government may, if satisfied that public emergency or public interest so
requires, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a public utility
service for the purposes of this Act, for such period as may be specified in
the notification:
Provided that the period so specified shall not, in the first instance, exceed
six months but may, by a like notification, be extended from time to time,
by any period not exceeding six months, at any one time, if in the opinion
of the appropriate Government, public emergency or public interest
requires such extension;
…”.

62. Pausing for a moment, it would be worthwhile to understand what the
objective of a definition clause is. Useful reference can be made to the
41
decision in SBI v. M.J. James where, after noting precedents and
Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, this Court speaking through
Hon’ble Sanjiv Khanna, J. ruled that:
“ 20. … The objective of definition clauses is to avoid frequent repetition in
describing the subject-matter to which the word or expression is intended
to apply. [Nahalchand Laloochand (P) Ltd. v. Panchali Cooperative Housing
Society Ltd. : (2010) 9 SCC 536]. This is useful when the same word or
expression is used more than once in the same enactment [Bhagwati
Developers (P) Ltd. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. : (2013)
9 SCC 584]. The raison d’être behind the definition clause is that while
interpreting a provision, the defined word or expression would carry the
same meaning as the defined words or expression are employed and used
by the maker in the sense appropriate to the definition. The definition can
be with the intent to attract a meaning already established by law; expand
the meaning by adding a meaning; or narrow the meaning by exclusion
[Part XII, Rules of Construction Laid Down by Statute, Sections 199 and
th
200 at p. 517, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, Indian Reprint, 6
Edn.]. This general rule of construction laid down by the enactment is
subject to the context. Albeit, the interpreter, to deviate from the defined
meaning, should record reasons to show that the word/expression in that

41
(2022) 2 SCC 301
Page 66 of 75

particular provision carries a different meaning. Contrary context is not to
be assumed or accepted easily, in the absence of indication and reason to
differ from the defined meaning. The repugnancy will arise when the
definition meaning does not agree with the subject in the context.

63. Now reverting to the definition of the word “industry” noted above, it
means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of
employers; and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft,
or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.
64. To carry forward the discussion, one may trace what trade, business,
undertaking, etc. appearing in Section 2(j) means in the common
parlance.
(i) Trade means exchange of goods for goods or goods for money.
(ii) Business means an enterprise which is an occupation as
distinguished from pleasure.
(iii) Undertaking is a word of variable meaning. As a noun, it can mean
a formal promise or an assurance. The said word, as a noun, can be
also used interchangeably with a project or enterprise or even
business. However, when used in the sense of undertaking a
business, it is a transitive verb. In the given context, the noun would
fit into the second meaning.
(iv) Manufacture is a kind of productive activity in which the making of
articles or material (often on a large scale) is by physical labour or
mechanical power.
(v) Calling denotes the following of a profession or trade.
Page 67 of 75

(vi) Service again has different shades of meaning. Work done for
somebody fits the context best.
(vii) Employment is a noun derived from the word ‘employ’, which is a
transitive verb. The word ‘employ’ for the purpose of understanding
employment would mean payment made by one to the other in lieu
of work done by him. A common example would be, the company
employs hundreds of persons.
(viii) Insofar as workmen are concerned, apart from calling, service and
employment, we find the words “handicraft, or industrial occupation
or avocation of workmen”.
(ix) Handicraft is an activity needing skill with the hands as well as artistic
ability. An object that is produced by this activity is also called
handicraft. The first meaning is what seems apt in the context.
(x) Industrial occupations refer to jobs focused on transforming
materials into finished products and are characterised by being
manual-labour intensive.
(xi) Finally, avocation is some activity which is done for enjoyment and
pleasure outside of one’s regular profession; it is sort of a non-work
interest.
65. We find no reason to deviate from the common parlance meaning of
these words/nouns while construing the defined meaning of the noun
“industry”.
66. Now, the word “industry” wherever it is used in the ID Act has to be
understood by tracing its meaning to Section 2(j) unless, of course, the
Page 68 of 75

context otherwise requires. The word “industry” is used in various
42
provisions of the ID Act where it is to be read as a noun. However, at
43
least in 3 (three) sections of the ID Act , the words “industry being
carried out” have been used. While ascertaining the meaning of such a
phrase, one needs to fall back on Section 2(j). Thus, “industry being
carried out” would be akin to trade or business or undertaking or
manufacture or employment or handicraft or industrial occupation being
carried out. When the statute says “industry being carried out”, the
focus is on the action, making “industry” describe an activity in the sense
of a verb. Similarly, when read like trade or business or employment or
handicraft or industrial occupation being carried out, all these words
which are nouns, i.e., trade, business, undertaking, employment,
handicraft, industrial occupation, etc. are more like activities, focusing
on the action involved in course thereof, thereby leaning towards a verb
rather than a noun. Although Section 2(j) has a ‘means’ part as well as
an ‘includes’ part, each such part is not to be read in isolation but both
parts are to be read in conjunction to understand what the word
“industry” connotes qua both employer and workmen.
67. It is this planned, organised, regular, interconnected and continuous
activity carried out by the employer and the workmen in collaboration
with each other according to a system or method – not a random or one-
off – for an identified purpose is what is a systematic activity. According

42
Sections 2(ee), 2(i), 2(j), 2(q), 2(n), 2(s), 9B, 10H, 25F, 36
43
Sections 2(a)(i), 2(g), 2(ka)
Page 69 of 75

to Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. the activity must be systematic in the sense
of being organised as a system. Such prong is now read by courts as
systemic activity. Though the word used was systematic, the meaning
given was systemic. Core systemic activities in a typical industry would
include procurement, production/manufacturing, quality control, human
resources management, inventory and logistics, marketing and sales,
finance and accounts maintenance, research and development, and
compliance of statutory requisites. To wit, manufacture is a systemic
activity which would ordinarily include procurement, processing and
assembling of raw materials and distribution of the finished product
through coordinated steps. When the Bench referred to systemic activity
in Bangalore Water Supply (supra), it pointed to this web of
organised, interdependent functions.
68. Thus, systemic activity is the foundation on which the legal concept of
“industry” rests.
69. Though the ultimate object of undertaking such systemic activity
resulting in the production of goods and materials, provision of services,
generation of energy, and the like is to cater to human needs and fulfil
desires, in reality as well as in law, the motive that drives an employer
to run an industry and the object with which a workman puts his labour
are distinct and different. At the advent of the ID Act in 1947, industries
were synonymous with profit making establishments. However, over the
course of decades, manufacturing and consequently, industries, have
evolved in a dynamic manner. Profit no more remains the fulcrum of an
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industry. Thus, as enunciated above, profit need not be a sine qua non
for an industry and even a non-profit making establishment would be
classified as an industry. To a poor workman, the employer’s gains from
the activity are immaterial; his concern is with the wages earned at the
end of the day/month.
70. Leaving aside legal semantics and reading each word used in clause (j)
of Section 2, it is clear that the several expressions which appear after
‘means’, viz. business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling, and
after ‘includes’, viz. calling, service, employment, handicraft, industrial
occupation, avocation, are activities which satisfy the triple test as
propounded by Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. and, therefore, are covered by
the definition of “industry” in the ID Act (emphasis supplied). In this
context, the expressions business, trade, undertaking, manufacture,
calling, service, employment, etc. have been used in the sense of a noun
and the adjective ‘any’, qualifying such noun (the activities), should be
given its ordinary meaning; it cannot be given a restricted meaning so
that the activities other than trade and business, if they do not align
with or are not related with trade or business, would remain out of the
purview of the word “industry” (emphasis supplied).
71. In our considered opinion, the statutory framework engrafted in Section
2(j) of the ID Act and the judicial exposition for determining what
constitutes an “industry”, namely, the triple test, operate in complete
harmony, each reinforcing the other (emphasis supplied).
Page 71 of 75

72. Even, the learned Attorney did not find fault with the triple test but he
only appealed for exercise of caution. The learned Attorney, in fact,
expressly accepted the continued validity of the triple test as a sound
exposition of law under the ID Act, and limited his submission to cautious
application of the said test. Be that as it may, we advert to the
concession of the learned Attorney only in passing, for it does not
constitute the basis of our determination.
C ONCLUSION
73. This briefly is our understanding of the word “industry” which, in our
considered opinion, aligns with the meaning attributed to it in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra).
74. The discussion on the topic would, however, remain incomplete without
noticing paragraph 145 of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) where
Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. made it clear that the meaning attributed to the
word “industry” was transient in nature. The relevant passage reads:
145. We conclude with diffidence because Parliament, which has the
commitment to the political nation to legislate promptly in vital areas like
Industry and Trade and articulate the welfare expectations in the
“conscience” portion of the Constitution, has hardly intervened to re-
structure the rather clumsy, vapourous and tall-and-dwarf definition or tidy
up the scheme although judicial thesis and anti-thesis, disclosed in the two-
decades-long decisions, should have produced a legislative synthesis
becoming of a welfare state and socialistic society, in a world setting where
ILO norms are advancing and India needs updating. We feel confident, in
another sense, since Counsel stated at the bar that a bill on the subject is
in the offing. The rule of law, we are sure, will run with the rule of life —
Indian life — at the threshold of the decade of new development in which
labour and management, guided by the State, will constructively partner
the better production and fair diffusion of national wealth. We have stated
that, save the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board appeal, we are
not disposing of the others on the merits. We dismiss that appeal with costs
and direct that all the others be posted before a smaller Bench for disposal
on the merits in accordance with the principles of law herein laid down.
Page 72 of 75

75. What was conceived as an interim judicial formulation, however, has,
through more than four decades of executive inertia, acquired the
character of settled law. Time, by itself, cannot confer permanence upon
what was intended to be transient; yet, neither can the passage of time
and consistent reliance upon a legal position be disregarded without
compelling justification. In our considered view, the reference before us
discloses no such justification.
76. To be clear: the reference made by Jai Bir Singh [5-J] (supra),
followed by Jai Bir Singh [7-J] (supra), was not necessary and serves
no practical, jurisprudential or doctrinal purpose. The reference seeks to
disturb a quietus that has held the field for nearly half a century. The
uninterrupted application of the law in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) having converted an arrangement, transient in origin, into the
institutional and in light of the 2020 Code becoming operational since
February, 2026, we conclude by observing that while the reference
requires no answer, it must be said plainly: Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) does not require reconsideration (emphasis supplied). Finality in
law would be undermined without any corresponding public interest
being served. We must remember: institutional credibility lies in
respecting finality, not in perpetuating doubt; and, absent compelling
justification, none of which exists here, the chapter must be treated as
closed.
Page 73 of 75

77. In light of the foregoing discussions, we answer the three questions
th
framed by the 3-Judge Bench vide order dated 16 February, 2026 as
follows:
Question (i) – The opinion rendered by Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) [for 3 (three) of the member Judges
of the 7-Judge Bench, with which Hon’ble Beg, CJ. and Hon’ble
Chandrachud, J. concurred], correctly interprets “industry” as defined in
Section 2(j) of the ID Act. The 1982 amendment and the definition of
“industry” in the 2020 Code would have no impact on the interpretation
of the expression “industry” as contained in the ID Act, which was to
remain operational till legislature stepped in with a new legislation.
Question (ii) – The question has to be answered in the affirmative in
view of our reasoning above.
Question (iii) – In view of the conclusions recorded in the precedents
which were affirmed by Bangalore Water Supply (supra) and regard
being had to our concurrence with the said decision, this question is
redundant and we need not separately explore which of the activities
would constitute “sovereign functions”.
78. We, therefore, order that all pending references arising out of industrial
disputes made under the ID Act ought to be taken to its logical
conclusion in accordance with the law on interpretation of the word
“industry” subsisting prior to operationalisation of the 2020 Code.
79. Since the Bench was informed of a likely challenge to the 2020 Code,
nothing observed here shall have any effect on such challenge.
Page 74 of 75

80. To conclude, we reject the reference for the reasons discussed above
and hold that the term “industry” as interpreted and explained in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) requires no reconsideration.
81. All pending matters may now be placed before an appropriate Bench,
upon obtaining orders from the Chief Justice.
82. We sincerely appreciate the efforts of the learned Attorney, all learned
senior counsel/counsel for the parties and the learned amici curiae, Mr.
Jamshed Cama and Mr. P.S. Sen Gupta, senior advocates for their
wholehearted and erudite assistance in enlightening us to facilitate
rendition of this opinion.


………………………………….J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)





………………………………….J.
(UJJAL BHUYAN)


NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 20, 2026.

Page 75 of 75

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


CIVIL APPEAL NO.897 OF 2002


State of Uttar Pradesh …..Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Jai Bir Singh …..Respondent(s)

WITH

Civil Appeal No.1276/2001
AND
Civil Appeal No.1278/2001
Civil Appeal No.1279/2001
Civil Appeal No.6114/2001
Civil Appeal No.8597/2001
Civil Appeal No.2409/2002
Civil Appeal No.2506/2002
Civil Appeal No.4569/2002
Civil Appeal No.5101/2002
Civil Appeal No.6108/2002
Civil Appeal No.6471/2002
SLP(C) No.20982/2002
Civil Appeal No.355-358/2003
Civil Appeal No.7994/2004
SLP(C) No.11291/2004

1

SLP(C) No.14085/2004
SLP(C) No.14127/2004
SLP(C) No.4139/2005
Civil Appeal No.1273/2007
Civil Appeal No.1274/2007
Civil Appeal No.3647/2007
Civil Appeal No.4646/2007
SLP(C) No.16301/2007
Civil Appeal No.296/2008
Civil Appeal No.1311-1312/2008
SLP(C) No.3107/2008
SLP(C) No.4327/2008
SLP(C) No.4328/2008
SLP(C) No.4329/2008
SLP(C) No.16276/2008
SLP(C) No.17224/2008
SLP(C) No.1112/2009
SLP(C) No.7990/2009
Civil Appeal No.3920/2010
Civil Appeal No.5681/2010
Civil Appeal No.3119/2011
Civil Appeal No.7757/2011
Civil Appeal No.1131/2012
Civil Appeal No.5519/2012
Civil Appeal No.8149-8151/2012

2

Civil Appeal No.4505-4506/2013
Civil Appeal No.4507-4508/2013
SLP(C) No.12679-12682/2014
SLP(C) No.1857/2016
SLP(C) No.14156/2021




TABLE OF CONTENTS



INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 4
TRACING THE REFERENCE ................................................................................... 5
DEFINITION OF INDUSTRY: PRE-BANGALORE MUSINGS ................................... 18
BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY – RATIO DECIDENDI ............................................. 24
A. Opinion of Krishna Iyer, J. ............................................................. 24
B. Concurring opinions of M.H. Beg, C.J., and Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. 32

C. Dissenting opinion of Jaswant Singh, J. ........................................ 34
LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTIONS POST BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY .................. 36
ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................. 38
A. Formulation of the triple test and interpretation of ‘Undertaking’ with
respect to ‘Noscitur A Sociis’ in Bangalore Water Supply .......................... 38
B. Do sovereign functions include ‘welfare activities’? ......................... 52
C. Charitable Undertakings ............................................................... 63
D. Temples ........................................................................................ 65
E. Educational Institutions ................................................................. 66
F. Clubs ............................................................................................ 68
G. Liberal Professions ........................................................................ 69
STARE DECISIS AND RECONSIDERATION OF BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY ..... 70
A. Is Bangalore Water Supply ratio patently erroneous? .................... 73
B. Does the ratio require reconsideration in light of changed
circumstances? ...................................................................................... 74
C. Would unsettling the ratio cause greater public harm than good? . 78
IMPACT OF LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS ON BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY ...... 79
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 81


3

J U D G M E N T

Joymalya Bagchi, J.

1. I am in humble agreement with the opinions of the Hon'ble the Chief
Justice and my revered brother Justice Narasimha, that the reference
was validly made. But with the deepest respect and humility, I am unable
to agree with the reformulation of the triple test propounded in Bangalore
1
Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A Rajappa vis-a-vis the definition of
“industry” by Hon’ble the Chief Justice. In this regard, I respectfully
concur with the opinions of my revered sister Justice Nagarathna and
revered brother Justice Datta, that the triple test propounded in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) correctly determines the scope and
2
ambit of "industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . However, I
am ad idem with the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and my revered colleagues
on the final outcome that the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
would be confined to disputes pending under the repealed law, and the
3
new law, namely the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 shall be
independently interpreted.

2. With these prefatory words, I proceed to answer the reference.

INTRODUCTION

3. The present reference is the culmination of nearly five decades of judicial
experiment with the definition of “industry” in Section 2(j) of the ID Act,

1
(1978) 2 SCC 213
2
Hereinafter “ID Act”
3
Hereinafter “IR Code”


4

a provision situated within a legislative framework designed to preserve
industrial peace, secure social harmony, and balance the competing
claims of labour, capital, and the consuming public.

4. Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was an inclusive interpretive exercise to
distil the true import of the word “industry”. Speaking through Krishna
Iyer, J., the majority articulated what has since come to be known as the
“triple test”, expanding the definition to cover any systematic activity
organised through employer employee cooperation for the production or
4
distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants .
Interrogating this expansive understanding of industry forms the
backdrop of the present reference. Though for four decades Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) sought to settle the law, its breadth continued to
be a source of continuing debate. The definition, as interpreted, brought
within the sweep of industry a wide range of activities in the nature of
welfare schemes, Government departments, statutory bodies, hospitals,
educational and religious institutions, clubs, research bodies and liberal
professions. In doing so, it set into motion a series of judicial responses
- some accepting, some refining, and others quietly resisting its reach.


TRACING THE REFERENCE


5. To understand how the reference questioning Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) came into being, it is necessary to refer to the first inflection point

4
See Para 140

5

in this long journey, namely, Coir Board, Ernakulam, Cochin & Anr v.
5
Indira Devai P.S. & Ors (2J) . A two Judge Bench, while applying
Bangalore Water Supply (supra), recorded reservations as to its
correctness and the matter was directed to be placed before the Chief
Justice to consider whether a larger Bench should be constituted to
reconsider the decision in (supra).
Bangalore Water Supply

6. The proposed reference in Coir Board (2J) (supra) came to be placed
before a three Judge Bench in Coir Board, Ernakulam, Kerala State & Anr
6
v. Indira Devai P.S. & Ors (3J) . The request for reference was declined on
two grounds. First, the Bench was of the view that a two Judge Bench
could not seek reconsideration of Bangalore Water Supply (supra), which
had been rendered by a seven Judge Bench. Secondly, on merits, it found
no occasion to reopen the issue, since the ratio in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) had held the field for more than two decades and
Parliament had, in the meantime, introduced a new definition of
7
“industry” , though the amended provision had not yet been brought into
force.

7. The present reference stems from the doubt expressed with regard to the
expansive formulation of the definition of industry in State of Gujarat &
8
Ors v. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar , where the Court was called upon to
consider whether the Forest Department is an “industry”. The Bench

5
(1998) 3 SCC 259
6
(2000) 1 SCC 224
7
Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act No. 46 of 1982)

8
(2001) 9 SCC 713

6

noted that the High Court had erred in mechanically following an earlier
case, namely, Chief Conservator of Forests & Anr v. Jagannath Maruti
9
Kondhare & Ors (where the same question had arisen), without
examining the factual matrix that the employee had failed to assert the
nature of duties discharged by him and the character of the
establishment in which he had been recruited, so as to prove that the
latter was an “industry”. While distinguishing Chief Conservator (supra)
on facts, the Bench observed that “ ordinarily, a department of the
Government cannot be held to be an industry and rather it is a part of the
sovereign function .” This observation appears to sit uneasily with the
ratio in Chief Conservator (supra), where the three Judge Bench had
given a restricted meaning to sovereign functions, to be understood as
such functions for which the State is not answerable in a Court of law,
and not to include public and statutory duties. Noticing the cleavage
between Chief Conservator and Narsinh Parmar (supra), the three Judge
10
Bench in State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh (3J) directed as follows:

“ The matter is of considerable public importance, to
be decided by a larger Bench. We, therefore, direct
that the papers be laid before Hon’ble the Chief
Justice for appropriate orders.”


9
(1996) 2 SCC 293
10
Order dated 31.01.2002 in SLP (C) No. 10411/2001 – State of UP v. Jai Bir Singh

7

8. The matter thereafter reached the five Judge Bench in State of U.P. v. Jai
11
Bir Singh (5J) . The Bench culled out several foundational reasons for
doubting the Bangalore Water Supply (supra) ratio, namely:

I. Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was not unanimous, and the
principal opinion of Krishna Iyer, J., did not have the benefit of the
separate opinions delivered later by the other judges. Further, the
judges themselves treated the interpretive exercise as provisional
12
pending legislative intervention

II. Parliament had amended the definition of industry by Act 46 of
1982, yet the amended provision had remained unenforced for more
than two decades. This prolonged non-enforcement was viewed not
merely as legislative inaction, but as reflecting the difficulty faced
by the legislature and executive in bringing the amended law into
13
force after Bangalore Water Supply (supra)

III. The working experience of the law after Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) had revealed practical difficulties, including proliferation of
industrial claims, awards of heavy back wages, and the possible
consequences of an overextended definition on employers,
14
employees, and the public


11
(2005) 5 SCC 1
12
See Paras 24-25
13
See Paras 21 & 40
14
See Para 35

8

IV. A purely workman centric reading of the ID Act could not be
accepted, since the statute was intended to harmonise employer
15
employee relations in the larger interest of industrial peace

V. The narrow treatment of sovereign functions in Bangalore Water
(supra) required reconsideration, particularly because
Supply
welfare activities undertaken by the State in discharge of its
obligations under Part IV may also bear a sovereign character in a
16
constitutional democracy

VI. The restrictive principle in Safdarjung Hospital (supra) had
considerable force. Although profit motive may not be determinative,
the activity must still be analogous to trade or business in a
commercial sense, especially when applied to institutions such as
hospitals and schools, where industrial action may frustrate their
17
core public purpose

9. On the cumulative force of these aforestated reasons, the Bench
18
concluded as follows :

“Let the cases be now placed before Hon'ble Chief
Justice of India for constituting a suitable larger
Bench for reconsideration of the judgment of this
Court in the case of Bangalore Water”


15
See Paras 32-33 & 37
16
See Para 38
17
See Paras 41-42
18
See Para 46

9

10. When the matter was placed before the Chief Justice, presumably
bearing in mind the lesser strength in Jai Bir (5J), the Chief Justice
placed the matter for reconsideration of the ratio in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) before a bench of co-equal strength, that is, a seven Judge
19
Bench. The seven Judge Bench in State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh (7J) ,
presided over by the Chief Justice, accepted the doubts expressed by the
five Judge Bench about the correctness of the view taken in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) and noted the issue that fell for determination had
wide ranging implications. The appeals were directed to be placed before
the Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate nine Judge Bench to
answer the questions raised in the reference order passed by the five
Judge Bench. Accordingly, the present nine Judge Bench came to be
constituted.

11. Before turning to the arguments advanced during the course of hearing
and examining the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) on merits,
one preliminary objection may be noticed. Ms. Jaising strenuously
argued that the two Judge Bench in Narsinh Parmar (supra) did not take
a different view from that of the judgment in Chief Conservator (supra).
According to her, Narsinh Parmar (supra) merely distinguished Chief
Conservator (supra) on facts. It was, therefore, urged that the subsequent
references made in Jai Bir by Benches of lesser strength, doubting the
correctness of Bangalore Water Supply (supra), a seven Judge Bench
decision, were not maintainable.

19
(2017) 3 SCC 311

10

12. I am unable to agree with this demurrer. The validity of the present
reference cannot be tested solely by reference to the original trigger.
When the matter reached the five Judge Bench in Jai Bir (5J) (supra), the
Court did not rest the reference merely on the perceived tension between
(supra) and (supra). It doubted the
Chief Conservator Narsinh Parmar
ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) for various other reasons and
directed that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice for
constitution of a suitable larger Bench. Thereafter, the Chief Justice,
keeping in mind that Jai Bir (5J) (supra) was a Bench of lesser strength
than Bangalore Water Supply (supra), a seven Judge Bench decision,
placed the matter before a Bench of co-equal strength for consideration.
That seven Judge Bench, in turn, directed that the matter be placed
before the Chief Justice for constitution of a nine Judge Bench. Such
state of affairs squarely falls in line with the settled position of law
governing references, as laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra
20
Community v. State of Maharashtra .

13. In Dawoodi Bohra (supra), a two Judge Bench sought reconsideration of
the five Judge Bench decision in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb
21
v. State of Bombay , and directed that the case be listed before a seven
22
Judge Bench . Pursuant to such direction, the matter initially came up
before a seven Judge bench and subsequently was placed before a five

20
(2005) 2 SCC 673, See Para 12
21
1962 SCC OnLine SC 143
22
WP (C) No. 740/1986, order dated 18.03.1994

11

Judge bench to consider the validity of such reference. While laying down
the governing principle that a Bench of lesser strength is bound by the
law declared by a Bench of larger strength and cannot dissent from or
disregard such law, the five Judge Bench in Dawoodi Bohra (supra)
underscored that where a Bench of lesser strength entertains doubt
about the correctness of a larger Bench decision, it may only invite the
attention of the Chief Justice to that doubt. The Chief Justice is not
bound to constitute a larger Bench in every such case and, as master of
the roster, retains the discretion to place any matter before a Bench of
such strength as he considers appropriate. Applying that principle to the
facts of Dawoodi Bohra (supra), the Bench held that the matter should
first be placed before a Bench of five Judges, and not directly before a
larger Bench of seven Judges. It was only if that co-equal Bench doubted
the correctness of Sardar Syedna (supra) that it could opine in favour of
a reference to a larger Bench of seven Judges, or such other strength as
the Chief Justice, in exercise of his power to frame the roster, may deem
fit to constitute.

14. The ratio in Dawoodi Bohra (supra) again fell for interpretation before a
23
seven Judge Bench in Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal . In
Aligarh Muslim University (supra), the preliminary objection was that the
two Judge Bench in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya v. District Inspector of
24
Schools could not have directly referred the correctness of S. Azeez

23
(2025) 6 SCC 1

24
WPs (C) Nos. 54-57 of 1981, order dated 26-11-1981 (SC)

12

25
Basha v. Union of India , a five Judge Bench decision, to a seven Judge
Bench. Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) concerned an institution founded
in 1938 and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 in
1940. A two Judge Bench found that the case raised questions as to
whether an institution established mainly by a minority, but with
participation from members of other communities, could claim the
protection of Article 30(1), and whether subsequent registration as a
society altered its minority character. Since certain observations in Azeez
Basha (supra) bore upon these questions and its correctness had also
been doubted, the Bench directed that the matter be placed before the
Chief Justice for being heard by a Bench of at least seven Judges. The
matter was thereafter tagged with T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of
26
Karnataka before an eleven Judge Bench, where a similar question on
the indicia of a minority educational institution was framed, but left
unanswered. The decision stated that a regular Bench would adjudicate
the question. However, the regular Bench also disposed of the matter
27
without answering the query .

15. When the question arose again in Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh
28
Agarwal , a three Judge Bench presided over by the Chief Justice
noticed that Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) had already referred the
correctness of Azeez Basha (supra) on the same issue to a seven Judge

25
1967 SCC OnLine SC 321
26
(2002) 8 SCC 481
27
Shahal H. Musaliar v. Union of India , 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1479
28
(2020) 13 SCC 737

13

Bench, but no authoritative answer had yet been rendered. The three
Judge Bench, therefore, directed that the matter be placed before a seven
Judge Bench. It was in this backdrop that the majority in Aligarh Muslim
University (supra) affirmed the ratio in Dawoodi Bohra (supra) and held
as follows:

“ 40. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra
Community, a Constitution Bench discussed the
legal precepts which apply to orders of reference
and reiterated the position of law as below

40.1. Decisions of this Court rendered by a Bench
of larger strength are binding on Benches of a less
or equal strength;

40.2. If a Bench of lower strength is doubtful about
the correctness of a judgment delivered by a Bench
of larger strength, it cannot disagree or dissent
from the view taken by the larger Bench. In case of
doubt, it can invite the attention of the Chief Justice
of India to its opinion and request the Chief Justice
to list the matter before a Bench, the strength of
which is greater than that which delivered the
judgment which has been doubted;

40.3. The correctness of the view taken by any
Bench can only be doubted by a Bench of equal
strength. The matter will then be placed for hearing
before a Bench of greater strength;

40.4. There are two exceptions to the rules
discussed above:


14

(i) The discretion of the Chief Justice is
not bound by the rules. As the master of
the roster, the Chief Justice may list any
case before any Bench of any strength;

(ii) Despite the rules discussed above,
if a particular case has come up for
hearing before a Bench of larger strength
and that Bench is of the opinion that the
judgment of the Bench of lower strength
requires reconsideration or correction, or is
otherwise doubtful of its correctness, it
may dispense with the need for a
reference in the terms described above or
an order of the Chief Justice and hear the
matter for reasons given by it.

41. The position of law laid down in Central Board
of Dawoodi Bohra Community is correct. The
decisions of a larger Bench are binding precedent,
and judicial discipline and propriety dictate that
Benches of lower strength must adhere to such
decisions. This will also avoid inconsistencies in
the development of law. Questions concerning the
correctness of judgments must ordinarily be
referred only by a Bench which is equal in strength
to the Bench whose judgment is doubted. We also
agree with the two exceptions to this rule, as
detailed by this Court in Central Board of Dawoodi
Bohra Community. They must remain exceptions
and not transmogrify into the rule itself.”


15

16. Interpreting the ratio in Dawoodi Bohra (supra) as aforesaid, the majority
held that the reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra), while doubting
but not dissenting from Azeez Basha (supra), a five Judge Bench
decision, to the Chief Justice for constitution of a seven Judge Bench,
fell within the permissible limits laid down in Dawoodi Bohra (supra), as
29
explained in sub-para 40.2 .

17. It may not be out of place to note that in Aligarh Muslim University
(supra), the minority view did not doubt the ratio in Dawoodi Bohra
(supra) but interpreted sub-para 40.2 differently. Kant, J. (as he then
30 31
was) , and Sharma, J. , interpreted sub-para 40.2 to mean that a Bench
of lesser strength, upon doubting the correctness of a decision rendered
by a Bench of larger strength, could not request the Chief Justice to
constitute a Bench larger than the Bench whose decision was doubted,
unless the Chief Justice was himself a member of the referring Bench.
Such Bench of lesser strength could only direct placing of the matter
32
before the Chief Justice for appropriate directions. Datta, J. ,
understood sub-para 40.2 to mean that if a two Judge Bench doubts the
correctness of a larger Bench decision, it may place the matter before the
Chief Justice for constitution of a three Judge Bench, and the matter
may thereafter move, if necessary, to Benches of progressively larger

29
See Para 42
30
See Paras 259-268
31
See Paras 646-660
32
See Paras 400-413

16

strength, but not directly to a Bench larger than the Bench whose
decision is under doubt.

18. If the course by which the correctness of the ratio in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) came to be referred is traced, it becomes clear that a
Bench of lesser strength ( (5J)) expressed doubt as to that ratio
Jai Bir
and placed the matter before the Chief Justice for constituting a larger
Bench for reconsideration of the decision in Bangalore Water Supply
33
(supra) . The Bench did not specify the strength of the suitable larger
Bench and left it to the discretion of the Chief Justice, who correctly
placed the matter, in the first instance, before a Bench of co-equal
strength, namely, a seven Judge Bench. Thereafter, the seven Judge
Bench, which included the Chief Justice himself, considered it
appropriate that the matter be referred to a nine Judge Bench. The
course thus adopted does not run counter to Dawoodi Bohra (supra),
understood in terms of the majority opinion in Aligarh Muslim University
(supra). Even tested in the minority view expressed by Kant, J., (as he
then was) and Sharma, J., in Aligarh Muslim University (supra), the
reference by the seven Judge bench presided over by the then Chief
Justice to the present nine Judge bench cannot be faulted. The reference,
having travelled from a three Judge bench to a five Judge bench to a
seven Judge bench and ultimately the present nine Judge bench, is also
in consonance with the other minority view expressed by Datta, J.


33
See Para 46

17

19. Given this situation, it would not be proper to decline to answer the
reference at the threshold on account of the form or manner in which the
matter came to be placed before this Bench. There is, in any event, a
clear distinction between making a reference and answering one. A
referring Bench only records why, in its view, the existing position of law
may require reconsideration by a Bench of larger strength. The larger
Bench is not bound by those reasons. It may accept them, reject them,
or answer the issue on an altogether different footing. That inquiry
belongs to the merits of the matter before the larger Bench.


DEFINITION OF INDUSTRY: PRE-BANGALORE MUSINGS


20. In light of the above discussion, I may now proceed to examine the ratio
in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) on merits. That inquiry must begin,
not with Bangalore Water Supply (supra) in isolation, but with the line of
cases through which this Court grappled with the definition of industry
and gradually identified the elements which later crystallised into the
triple test.


21. Section 2(j) of the ID Act defines “industry” as follows:

“industry "means any business, trade,
undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers
and includes any calling, service, employment,
handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of
workmen”


18

22. Historically, the statutory formulation of Section 2(j) of the ID Act may
be traced to the definition contained in the 1911 Amendment of Section
4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904 of
Australia which defined “industry” in the following terms:

“Industry includes-

(a) any business, trade, manufacture, undertaking,
or calling of employers, on land or water;

(b) any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or
industrial occupation or avocation of employees, on
land or water; and

(c) a branch of an industry and a group of
industries”

Consequently, this Court has consistently drawn inspiration from the
observations of the highest Constitutional Court of Australia while
determining the contours of Section 2(j) of the ID Act.

23. The first significant step in this interpretive discourse was D.N. Banerji
34
v. P.R. Mukherjee & Ors , where the Court was faced with the question
whether a municipality, while discharging its normal civic duties and not
trade and business, could fall within the ambit of “industry”. Rejecting a
narrow understanding of “industry”, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J.,
construed Section 2(j) in light of the object of the ID Act, holding that the
term could not be confined to profit-oriented trade or business,

34
(1952) 2 SCC 619

19

particularly when the separate use of undertaking and the latter part of
the definition indicated a wider legislative reach covering the calling,
35
service, employment, industrial occupation or avocation of workmen .

24. Relying on the decision of the Australian High Court in Federated
Municipal & Shire Council Employees’ Union of Australia v. Melbourne
36
Corporation , the Bench held that profit motive or capital investment
was not essential, and that the real test lay in the nature of the activity.
Thus, if an activity would constitute an industry in the hands of a private
person, it would not lose that character merely because it was carried on
by a municipality without profit motive. What mattered was whether the
activity involved systematic cooperation between employer and
employees for the satisfaction of human wants, in a manner analogous
37
to trade or business .

25. The principle that the nature of the activity must prevail over the
character of the body performing it was carried further in Corporation of
38
the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees , where Subba Rao, J., examined
whether the activities of the Nagpur Corporation (including departments
like tax collection etc.) fell within the definition of “industry”. The Bench
declined to apply the rule of noscitur a sociis to narrow the definition,
holding that the legislative intention of preserving industrial peace
mandated a broader construction. It further held that the definition was

35
See Paras 13-17
36
(1918) 26 CLR 508
37
See Paras 23-26
38
1960 SCC OnLine SC 45

20

in two parts and both parts should be read independently. Its first part
viewed industry from the standpoint of the employer, while the latter part
from the standpoint of an employee. If an activity answered either part,
39
it fell within the definition . To deal with situations where the same
municipal body or department discharged multiple functions, some
industrial and others non-industrial, the Bench evolved the
“predominant nature test”, under which the undertaking was to be
viewed as an integrated whole and classified according to its dominant
40
function .

41
26. In State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha , the Bench was required
to address whether hospitals could constitute an industry under Section
2(j). The Bench referred to the dual-chambered character of the definition
industry and held that both parts of the definition contained wide
expressions which amplified one another, calling for an expansive
42
interpretation, as opposed to a restrictive one . The Bench emphasised
that the inquiry turned on the nature of the activity, not the presence of
43
profit, capital investment, or a strict commercial form . Holding so, it
proceeded to give an in-principle definition of the term undertaking to
include (I) any activity systematically or habitually undertaken (II) with
the co-operation of the employer and employees (III) for the production

39
See Paras 9-10 & 13-18
40
See Paras 16-18
41
1960 SCC OnLine SC 44
42
See Paras 8-11
43
See Para 11 & 13

21

or distribution of goods or for rendering of material services to the
44
community for the satisfaction of human needs .

27. It is also relevant to bear in mind that after giving a working definition of
industry in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra), Gajendragadkar, J., drew a
“ ” exempting certain activities, namely, personal or
fair and just line
domestic services and primary inalienable sovereign functions of the
45
State, from the ken of industry . In fact, the decision in Hospital
Mazdoor (supra) sowed the seed that ultimately sprouted into the
comprehensive definition of industry in Bangalore Water Supply (supra).

28. Soon after the pronouncement of Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra), the
46
wide definition of industry was questioned and liberal professions ,
47 48
education and private clubs were carved out of its definitional orbit.
This restrictive trajectory finally reached its zenith when the ratio in
Hospital Mazdoor (supra) was referred to a six Judge Bench in
49
Management of Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi v. Kuldip Singh Sethi .


29. In Safdarjung Hospital (supra), the question was whether Government
and charitable hospitals could be treated as industries merely because
they were organised undertakings rendering services with the assistance

44
See Para 17
45
See Para 12 & 14
46
National Union of Commercial Employees & Anr v. M.R. Meher, Industrial Tribunal, Bombay
& Ors , 1962 SCC OnLine SC 132, Paras 12-14
47
University of Delhi and Anr v. Ram Nath and Ors, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 117, Paras 5-17.
48
Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union v. Management of the Gymkhana Club,
1967 SCC OnLine SC 51, Para 19, 29-31; Cricket Club of India Ltd. v. Bombay Labour Union,
1968 SCC OnLine SC 132, Paras 4 & 7-10
49
(1970) 1 SCC 735

22

of employees. Answering in the negative, the Bench dismantled the
reasoning in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) which, according to it, had
read two parts of the definition in Section 2(j) in isolation and not in an
integrated manner as two counterparts of one industry. A workman
could be regarded as employed in an industry only where his service was
rendered in aid of an employer’s undertaking which itself bore the
character of trade, business, manufacture, undertaking or calling in the
commercial sense.

30. The Bench further held that Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) had
misapplied the observations of Issacs and Rich, JJ., in Melbourne
Corporation (supra) that the cooperation between capital and labour in
producing goods or services for the satisfaction of human wants and
desires would mean any activity where such goods or services were
produced by a Government department or charitable institution since
the same could be produced by a private person. As per Safdarjung
Hospital (supra), this expression was used in Melbourne Corporation
(supra) to merely distinguish the activities of the Government in
industrial venture, though bereft of profit-making or absence of capital
investments, and not to attribute the character of industrial activity to
services undertaken by Government as public duties and even by
50
individuals for charitable purposes .


50
See Paras 24-25

23

31. It is against this background of doctrinal uncertainty that Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) came to be decided. By then, the law under Section
2(j) had entered a difficult terrain. On one side stood D.N. Banerji (supra),
Corporation of the City of Nagpur (supra), Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
(supra), which had given the definition a broad and functional reach. On
51 52
the other stood (supra) , (supra) ,
National Union University of Delhi
53 54
Madras Gymkhana Club (supra) , Cricket Club of India (supra) , and
finally Safdarjung Hospital (supra), which had sought to confine that
reach by insisting upon an activity analogous to trade or business in a
commercial sense. The task before the seven Judge Bench in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) was, therefore, to reconcile a body of precedent
which had pulled the definition of industry in competing directions.



BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY – RATIO DECIDENDI


A. Opinion of Krishna Iyer, J.


32. Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for himself, Bhagwati and Desai, JJ.,
undertook that exercise by returning to the object and purpose of the ID
Act, namely industrial peace and resolution of industrial disputes. The
Hon’ble Judge opined that a narrow doctrinaire approach to fit the
definition within the traditional frame of industry or business in a
commercial sense would be a misfit for the ever-evolving activities of a

51
Excluded ‘Liberal Professions’
52
Excluded ‘Educational Institutions’
53
Excluded ‘Self-serving Clubs’

54
Id

24

diverse nature that cater to the growing needs of a welfare State, and
would ultimately defeat the very object of the legislation itself. To achieve
this end, Krishna Iyer, J., while endorsing the broad formulation in
Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) proceeded to give a more comprehensive
working definition which would “ abolish blurred edges, illumine
55
” . In doing so,
penumbral areas and over-rule what we regard as wrong
the Court expressly overruled the restrictive line of authority represented
by Safdarjung Hospital (supra), National Union (supra), University of Delhi
(supra), and Madras Gymkhana Club (supra). The comprehensive
working definition so formulated by Krishna Iyer, J., commonly referred
to as the “triple test”, may be best expressed in his own words:

“ 140. “Industry”, as defined in Section 2(j) and
explained in Banerji, has a wide import.

“(a) Where (i) systematic activity, (ii) organized by
co-operation between employer and employee (the
direct and substantial element is chimerical) (iii) for
the production and/or distribution of goods and
services calculated to satisfy human wants and
wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of
material things or services geared to celestial bliss
e.g. making, on a large scale, prasad or food),
prima facie, there is an ‘industry’ in that enterprise.

(b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is
irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private
or other sector.


55
See Paras 137-139

25

(c) The true focus is functional and the decisive test
is the nature of the activity with special emphasis
on the employer-employee relations.

(d) If the organization is a trade or business it does
not cease to be one because of philanthropy
animating the undertaking.”

141. Although Section 2(j) uses words of the
widest amplitude in its two limbs, their meaning
cannot be magnified to overreach itself.

“(a) ‘Undertaking’ must suffer a contextual and
associational shrinkage as explained
in Banerji and in this judgment; so also, service,
calling and the like. This yields the inference that
all organized activity possessing the triple
elements in I, although not trade or business, may
still be ‘industry’ provided the nature of the
activity, viz. the employer-employee basis, bears
resemblance to what we find in trade or business.
This takes into the fold of ‘industry’ undertakings,
callings and services, adventures ‘analogous to
the carrying on of the trade or business’. All
features, other than the methodology of carrying on
the activity viz. in organizing the co-operation
between employer and employee, may be
dissimilar. It does not matter, if on the employment
terms there is analogy.”

142. Application of these guidelines should not
stop short of their logical reach by invocation of
creeds, cults or inner sense of incongruity or outer
sense of motivation for or resultant of the economic

26

operations. The ideology of the Act being industrial
peace, regulation and resolution of industrial
disputes between employer and workmen, the
range of this statutory ideology must inform the
reach of the statutory definition. Nothing less,
nothing more.

“(a) The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) clubs,
(iii) educational institutions, (iv) co-operatives, (v)
research institutes, (vi) charitable projects, and (vii)
other kindred adventures, if they fulfil the triple
tests listed in I, cannot be exempted from the scope
of Section 2(j).

(b) A restricted category of professions, clubs, co-
operatives and even gurukulas and little research
labs, may qualify for exemption if, in simple
ventures, substantially and, going by the dominant
nature criterion, substantively, no employees are
entertained but in minimal matters, marginal
employees are hired without destroying the non-
employee character of the unit.

(c) If, in a pious or altruistic mission many employ
themselves, free or for small honoraria or like
return, mainly drawn by sharing in the purpose or
cause, such as lawyers volunteering to run a free
legal services clinic or doctors serving in their spare
hours in a free medical centre
or ashramites working at the bidding of the
holiness, divinity or like central personality, and
the services are supplied free or at nominal cost
and those who serve are not engaged for
remuneration or on the basis of master and servant

27

relationship, then, the institution is not an industry
even if stray servants, manual or technical, are
hired. Such eleemosynary or like undertakings
alone are exempt — not other generosity,
compassion, developmental passion or project.”

143. The dominant nature test:

“(a) Where a complex of activities, some of which
qualify for exemption, others not, involves
employees on the total undertaking, some of whom
are not ‘workmen’ as in the University of Delhi
case [University of Delhi v. Ram Nath], or some
departments are not productive of goods and
services if isolated, even then, the predominant
nature of the services and the integrated nature of
the departments as explained in the Corporation of
Nagpur will be the true test. The whole undertaking
will be ‘industry’ although those who are not
‘workmen’ by definition may not benefit by the
status.

(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses,
sovereign functions, strictly understood, (alone)
qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or
economic adventures undertaken by government or
statutory bodies.

(c) Even in departments discharging sovereign
functions, if there are units which are industries
and they are substantially severable, then they
can be considered to come within Section 2(j).


28

(d) Constitutional and competently enacted
legislative provisions may well remove from the
scope of the Act categories which otherwise may be
covered thereby.

144. We over-rule Safdarjung, Solicitors' case,
Gymkhana, Delhi University, Dhanrajgirji Hospital
and other rulings whose ratio runs counter to the
principles enunciated above, and Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha is hereby rehabilitated.”

33. The central shift brought about by this formulation was that the
expression analogous to trade or business was not to be searched for in
the commercial object of the undertaking. The relevant resemblance lay
in the manner in which the activity was carried on. An activity, though
not trade or business in the ordinary sense, could still fall within Section
2(j) if it involved systematic activity organised through cooperation
between employer and employee for the production or distribution of
goods or services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes. The
analogy, therefore, was not in the motive which prompted the activity,
nor in the destination of its output, but in the organisation of work and
the relationship between labour and management. Once these elements
were present, absence of profit motive, absence of a gainful objective, the
public or private character of the venture, or the philanthropic object
animating it, did not by itself take the activity outside the definition.


34. On this anvil, Krishna Iyer, J., rejected the cramped approach that had
sought to place liberal professions, educational institutions, research

29

bodies, charitable establishments, clubs, and cooperatives beyond the
purview of industries. The Court made it plain that no activity could
claim exemption merely by virtue of its label. The focus must remain
fixed on the nature of the activity itself. Therefore, the real question was
whether the undertaking, in its actual working, satisfied the three
elements identified by the Court. If it did, the institution could not claim
immunity by invoking its purpose or description. If it did not, the statute
would not apply merely because some persons were employed in its
establishment.

35. At the same time, Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was equally conscious
that industry could not be magnified to include casual or non-systematic
activities. A simple venture would not become an industry where,
substantially and by its dominant nature, it retained an unorganised or
casual character and only a few employees were engaged. In liberal
professions, Krishna Iyer, J., exempted individual professionals with
marginal employee engagement in contradistinction to organised
professional activity. Similarly, a pious or altruistic mission would not
become an industry where those associated with it were themselves
inspired by charity and served the cause free of remuneration, or for
small honoraria, without being engaged on the basis of a master-servant
relationship. In such cases, the presence of stray manual or technical
staff was not decisive.

36. Krishna Iyer, J., then supplied the rule for composite undertakings
through the dominant nature test, as explained in Corporation of the City

30

of Nagpur (supra). Where an undertaking consisted of several activities,
some capable of exemption and others not, its character was not to be
determined by breaking it into isolated departments or by treating
incidental features as controlling. The true inquiry was into the
predominant nature of the services rendered and the integrated
character of the departments. If, so viewed, the undertaking bore an
industrial character, it would fall within Section 2(j) as a whole, although
persons who were not workmen within the meaning of the ID Act would
not acquire that status merely because the undertaking was an industry.

37. The aforestated principle informed the treatment of Government
departments. Sovereign functions, strictly understood, alone qualified for
exemption, and not welfare activities or economic ventures undertaken
by Government or statutory bodies. Even in a department discharging
sovereign functions, a substantially severable unit bearing an industrial
character could still be brought within Section 2(j). The formulation was
56
also made subject to any constitutional or statutory provision which,
expressly or by necessary implication, removed particular categories
from the operation of the ID Act.

38. The opinion of Krishna Iyer, J., however, was not the only voice in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra). Beg, C.J., and Chandrachud, C.J.,
delivered separate opinions broadly agreeing with the ratio of Krishna
Iyer, J., while Jaswant Singh, J., speaking for himself and Tulzapurkar,

56
Articles 309 to 311 of the Constitution of India, the enactments dealing with the Defence
Forces and other legislation dealing with employment under statutory bodies (See Para 50)

31

J., partly dissented. It is therefore necessary to notice those opinions and
the concurrences, qualifications and disagreements with the formulation
enunciated by Krishna Iyer, J.


B. Concurring opinions of M.H. Beg, C.J., and Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J.



57
(i) M.H. Beg, C.J .


39. Beg, C.J., expressly agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of
Krishna Iyer, J., and held that, having regard to the preamble, legislative
history, constitutional setting, and socio-economic conditions in which
the ID Act operates, was not an appropriate tool for
noscitur a sociis
construing the term “industry”.

40. In relation to Governmental activity, Beg, C.J. was clear that the mere
presence of the State could not exclude the application of the ID Act,
since the modern State had entered fields of industry, trade, public
transport, public utilities and welfare services. Exclusion would arise
only where constitutional provisions such as Articles 310 and 311,
separate service rules, or special enactments displaced the general law
expressly or by necessary implication. The same functional approach
informed his treatment of liberal professions and charitable institutions.
If the work of a lawyer or doctor assumed an organised and systematised
form comparable to business or trade, employed several persons, and
generated conditions in which disputes could arise between employer

57
See Paras 146-169

32

and employees, it could fall within Section 2(j). Likewise, when services
rendered by individuals arise out of missionary zeal and purely
charitable motives, they would be excluded from the ambit of the ID Act.


58
(ii) Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J.


41. Chandrachud, C.J., accepted the definition formulated by Krishna Iyer,
J., in toto , but observed that, once Section 2(j) was found to employ words
of deliberate width, the task of identifying what limitations should be
read into it was a matter of policy, and where the language was clear, the
definition had to be given the meaning its words conveyed, leaving no
scope for judicially devised exceptions. The Hon’ble Judge saw little
justification for excluding even inalienable sovereign functions once the
nature of the activity bore an industrial character. If municipal water
supply, sewerage and firefighting establishments could be industries,
there was no reason why activities such as manufacture of coins and
currency, arms and ammunition, or winning of oil and uranium should
stand excluded merely because they were carried on by the State.


42. Similarly, for liberal professions, Chandrachud, C.J., rejected any broad
immunity. The test of direct and proximate cooperation between
employer and employee was, in his view, too uncertain, since assistants,
managing clerks, librarians or typists may not produce the final
intellectual product, but without their active assistance the professional
establishment may not function effectively. The same approach governed

58
See Paras 171-183

33

charitable enterprises and clubs. Charity, membership structure, self-
serving character, or limited access to members and guests could not be
decisive. The real inquiry was whether the activity was organised or
arranged in the manner in which trade or business is normally
organised.


59
C. Dissenting opinion of Jaswant Singh, J.


43. Jaswant Singh, J., speaking for himself and Tulzapurkar, J., agreed with
the dismissal of the appeal made by Bangalore Water Supply Board, but
did not accept the wider formulation adopted by Krishna Iyer, J. In his
view, Section 2(j) would be attracted only where the activity was
systematically or habitually undertaken on commercial lines, with the
cooperation of employees, for the production or distribution of goods or
for rendering material services to the community or a section of it. This
conclusion was reached by applying noscitur a sociis . The words in
Section 2(j) had to take colour from their setting and from the associated
expressions used in the definition.

44. Such an understanding had direct consequences for charitable and
welfare institutions. Hospitals run on a charitable basis, or as part of the
functions of Government, municipalities or local bodies, were not to be
brought within the reach of Section 2(j). The same reasoning extended to
educational and research institutions, whether run privately or by
Government. Their object, structure and manner of functioning were

59
See Paras 184-187

34

treated as insufficiently connected with activity undertaken on
commercial lines for the production of goods or rendering of material
services.

45. Liberal and learned professions were also placed outside the definition.
The dissent treated professions such as those of doctors, lawyers and
teachers as resting upon the individual’s education, intellectual
attainments and special expertise. In such cases, the work of the usual
type of employees was considered too remote from the final service
rendered to the client, patient or student. The end product could not, on
this view, be treated as the result of industrial cooperation between the
professional and his employees.

46. Krishna Iyer, J., in his principal opinion, had shifted the emphasis away
from commercial analogy to the organised employer employee basis of
the activity. However, the dissent insisted that Section 2(j) was not
attracted unless the organised activity also bore the character of an
undertaking carried on commercial lines.


47. Before proceeding further, it is imperative, at the very outset, to answer
some arguments which were advanced to the effect that the opinions of
Chandrachud, C.J., and Jaswant Singh, J., were delivered on a later date
and Beg, C.J., did not have the benefit of going through the other two
opinions. This is also one of the reasons for reference given in Jai Bir (5J)
(supra). I am afraid that the retirement of Beg, C.J. before he could

35

peruse the deferred opinions does not affect the majority view or its
binding effect.

48. Firstly, it is trite that when multiple opinions are handed down by a
polyvocal Bench, the majority view binds the minority and constitutes
60
the view of the Bench itself . Secondly, the deferred opinion delivered by
Chandrachud, C.J., concurs with the majority view. Even for argument's
sake, if we were to assume that Beg, C.J. could have been persuaded by
the minority opinion of Jaswant Singh, J., to alter his view, the opinion
penned by Krishna Iyer, J., concurred in by Chandrachud, C.J., would
nonetheless have remained the majority one.


LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTIONS POST BANGALORE WATER SUPPLY


61
49. Parliament, by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 ,
amended the definition of “industry”. The triple test was broadly retained
to identify entities falling within the ambit of Section 2(j) of the ID Act,
subject to exceptions enumerated therein. However, the 1982
Amendment Act was never brought into force.

50. The ID Act has since been repealed upon the coming into force of the IR
62
Code, 2020 , which defines “industry” under Section 2(p) in the
following terms:


60
Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2024) 20 SCC 709, See Para 19
61
Hereinafter “1982 Amendment Act”
62
Enforced w.e.f. 21.11.2025, vide S.O. 5320(E)

36

“ p) "industry" means any systematic activity
carried on by co-operation between an employer
and worker (whether such worker is employed by
such employer directly or by or through any
agency, including a contractor) for the production,
supply or distribution of goods or services with a
view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being
wants or wishes which are merely spiritual or
religious in nature), whether or not, —

(i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of
carrying on such activity; or

(ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make
any gain or profit,
but does not include —

(i) institutions owned or managed by organisations
wholly or substantially engaged in any charitable,
social or philanthropic service; or

(ii) any activity of the appropriate Government
relatable to the sovereign functions of the
appropriate Government including all the activities
carried on by the departments of the Central
Government dealing with defence research, atomic
energy and space; or

(iii) any domestic service; or

(iv) any other activity as may be notified by the
Central Government”

51. It is at this cusp of transition from the ID Act to a new industrial law
regime that this Bench has assembled to answer the following questions:

37

“ (i) Whether the test laid down in paragraphs 140
to 144 in the opinion rendered by Hon’ble Mr.
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Bangalore Water
Supply and Sewerage Board’s case (supra) to
determine if an undertaking or enterprise falls
within the definition of “industry” lays down
correct law? And whether the Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Act, 1982 (which seemingly did not
come into force) and the Industrial Relations Code,
2020 (with effect from 21.11.2025) have any legal
impact on the interpretation of the expression
“industry” as contained in the principal Act?

(ii) Whether social welfare activities and schemes
or other enterprises undertaken by the Government
Departments or their instrumentalities can be
construed to be “industrial activities” for the
purpose of Section 2(j) of the ID Act?

(iii) What State activities will be covered by the
expression “sovereign function”, and whether such
activities will fall outside the purview of Section 2(j)
of the ID Act?

(iv) Any other issue(s) that may arise during the
course of hearing before the Nine-Judge Bench.”


ANALYSIS

A. Formulation of the triple test and interpretation of ‘Undertaking’
with respect to ‘Noscitur A Sociis’ in Bangalore Water Supply


38

52. In the aftermath of the Second World War, industrial unrest had begun
to intensify, and the limitations of the existing legal framework had
become impossible to ignore. It was in these circumstances that the ID
Act came to be enacted, with the preamble making its legislative purpose
unmistakably clear:

“An Act to make provision for the investigation and
settlement of industrial disputes, and for certain
other purposes”

53. The ID Act pursues this preambular object through a negotiated balance
between the interests of labour, capital, and the State, ensuring that
productivity is never chased in oblivion of the rights of workers. Though
the ID Act preceded the Constitution, its welfare-oriented scheme reflects
the social philosophy which the Constitution later institutionalised.
Article 38 requires the State to secure a social order informed by political,
economic and social justice, and to minimise inequalities in status,
income and opportunity. Article 39 carries that commitment into the
economic sphere by directing the State to ensure adequate means of
livelihood and prevent concentration of wealth to the common detriment.
Article 43 completes that vision by contemplating living wages, humane
conditions of work and a decent standard of life for all workers. These
directives ought to be read harmoniously with the fundamental rights to
equality and human dignity, collectively embodying the constitutional
promise that each individual is entitled to a dignified life rather than a
mere animal existence. This acknowledgement while binding the State to

39

63
a particular economic philosophy , seeks a fine balance between the
individuals’ pursuit of higher productivity and wealth and the rights of
employees to a fair and humane life, including effective access to justice
through a responsive grievance redressal mechanism. Any interpretation
of the ID Act must remain profoundly conscious of the reality that true
industrial efficacy emanates from industrial peace, not from trampling
the rights of a key stakeholder.

54. The salient features of the ID Act are as follows:


i) It establishes a structured institutional framework comprising
64 65
Works Committees , Conciliation Officers , Boards of
66 67 68
Conciliation , Courts of Inquiry , Labour Courts , Industrial
69 70
Tribunals and National Tribunals for the investigation and
settlement of industrial disputes

ii) It empowers the appropriate Government to refer industrial disputes
71
for adjudication , while also permitting the parties to submit
72
disputes to voluntary arbitration


63
See Property Owners Association & Ors v. State of Maharashtra & Ors , (2024) 18 SCC 1
64
Section 3, ID Act
65
Section 4, ID Act
66
Section 5, ID Act
67
Section 6, ID Act
68
Section 7, ID Act
69
Section 7-A, ID Act
70
Section 7-B, ID Act
71
Section 10, ID Act
72
Section 10-A, ID Act

40

iii) It regulates strikes and lock-outs, particularly in public utility
73
services , and prohibits their commencement or continuance
during specified stages of conciliation, arbitration and adjudicatory
74
proceedings

iv) It enables the appropriate Government to declare specified
industries or services as public utility services where uninterrupted
75
operation is necessary in the public interest

v) It prescribes substantive and procedural safeguards governing lay-
off, retrenchment, transfer and closure of undertakings, including
requirements of notice, compensation and, in specified cases, prior
76
Governmental permission

vi) It accords binding force to settlements and adjudicatory awards
77
upon the parties and other persons covered by the statute , and
regulates the period for which such settlements and awards remain
78
operative

vii) It protects workmen against punitive or prejudicial action during the
79
pendency of industrial proceedings and empowers adjudicatory
authorities to examine the legality and proportionality of discharge
80
or dismissal

73
Section 22, ID Act
74
Section 23, ID Act
75
Section 2(n)(vi), ID Act
76
Chapter VA, ID Act
77
Section 18, ID Act
78
Section 19, ID Act
79
Section 33, ID Act
80
Section 11-A, ID Act

41

55. The ID Act achieves its purpose and ensures access to justice by
providing a remedial framework that is far more efficacious, specialised,
and socially responsive for resolution of industrial conflict and
preservation of industrial peace than the labyrinth of ordinary civil law
81
remedies, which a workman can ill-afford . Section 2(s) of the ID Act
defines ‘workman’ as follows:

“‘Workman’ means any person (including an
apprentice) employed in any industry to do any
manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational,
clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward,
whether the terms of employment be express or
implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding
under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute,
includes any such person who has been dismissed,
discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as
a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal,
discharge, or retrenchment has led to that
dispute...”


56. Only an individual who classifies as a ‘workman’ engaged in an ‘industry’
82
in case of an ‘industrial dispute’ can seek refuge under the protective
garb of the ID Act and avail the unique remedies contemplated therein
such as reinstatement, back-wages, regularisation, retrenchment

81
Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad , (2002) 2 SCC 542
(See Paras 5-6)
82
As defined in Section 2(k) - "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between
employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and
workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of
employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person

42

83
compensation and collective settlements . These stand in marked
contrast with civil remedies, which move through the slower, adversarial
grammar of private litigation. As correctly pointed out by Ms. Jaising, the
‘security of tenure’ guised as reinstatement under Section 11A of the ID
Act has no true equivalent in ordinary civil law. By virtue of this
provision, the Labour Courts can not only examine whether a dismissal
is unfair or disproportionate but also, where necessary, direct
reinstatement or substitute the punishment imposed with a lesser
penalty. On the contrary, an ordinary Civil Court, constrained by the
traditional common law conception of “master and servant”, may at best
award damages for wrongful termination. Constitutional remedies, too,
cannot always serve as an adequate substitute, particularly where
industrial conflicts involve disputed questions of fact.

57. Perhaps, the greatest achievement of the ID Act is in instilling a spirit of
84
dialogue that starts at the workplace itself, through works committees ,
85 86
conciliation officers , and boards of conciliation , all intended to
prevent industrial tensions from crystallising into open conflict. At the
heart of this architecture lies collective bargaining, through which the
otherwise scant bargaining power of an individual workman is
strengthened by the representative voice of the union, and disputes
concerning conditions of employment are resolved by agreement rather

83
S. 11 & 11A, ID Act (Also see Chapter VA & VB, ID Act)
84
S.3, ID Act
85
S.4 & 12, ID Act
86
S.5 & 13, ID Act

43

than coercion. Industrial democracy is the bedrock of the ID Act, with
the individual workman receding into the background and the union
espousing the common cause of the body of workmen.

58. Section 18 of the ID Act gives legal effect to voluntary collective
bargaining by recognising settlements arrived at both within and outside
conciliation proceedings. While a settlement arrived at otherwise than in
the course of conciliation binds the parties to the agreement under
Section 18(1), a settlement reached during conciliation is accorded an
extended binding force under Section 18(3), encompassing not merely
the immediate parties but all persons and workmen statutorily
connected with the industrial dispute.

59. Even if matters reach the stage of adjudication in a courtroom, disputes
87 88
are entrusted to Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals possessing
the requisite subject-matter expertise. The pro-welfare approach of the
ID Act is further reinforced by the fact that post adjudication, if the
workman is entitled to more favourable benefits under any other law,
award, or contract of service than those already bestowed by the ID Act,
89
he may avail the same .

60. The ID Act is not an ordinary commercial statute but a beneficial social
legislation providing a complete code for resolution of industrial disputes.
Its provisions must receive a purposive construction that advances the

87
S.7, ID Act
88
S.10, ID Act
89
Proviso to S. 25J, ID Act

44

90 91
remedy and sustains the object of the larger legislative scheme . To
ensure that the ID Act baulks a restrictive definition of industry or
industrial disputes, Bangalore Water Supply (supra) while approving the
92
wide and inclusive interpretation adopted in D.N. Banerji (supra) ,
93
Corporation of the City of Nagpur (supra) and Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
94
(supra) , rejected the associational shrinkage of the term undertaking
to a mere synonym of trade and business in the commercial sense.

61. Ld. Amicus, Mr. Cama, disputes such an expansive construction and
contends that the legislature, by employing the expression “means” in
Section 2(j), intended to provide an exhaustive definition confined only
to activities answering a narrow commercial understanding of trade or
business. Relying on the interpretation adopted in Safdarjung Hospital
(supra), he further submits that unless an undertaking satisfies the
commercial requirements contained in the first exhaustive part of
Section 2(j), the latter part of the definition cannot be invoked.


62. I am unable to accept the interpretation canvassed by Mr. Cama, for the
following reasons. Firstly , the definition clause, comprises two limbs. The
first limb, though prefaced by the word “means” which ordinarily denotes
an exhaustive definition, must be read holistically with the second limb
which is couched in wide and inclusive terms. The usage of the word

90
Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd. , (2004) 1 SCC 702, See
Paras 23-25 & 27
91
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut , (2007) 3 SCC 700, See Paras 27, 28, 30 &
33; Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras , (1953) 1 SCC 492, See Para 9
92
See Paras 13-17
93
See Para 18
94
See Para 10

45

“includes” followed by expressions of wide import such as calling, service,
handicraft and industrial occupation and avocation of workmen in the
second limb of the definition industry, indicates that the legislature did
not intend the definition to remain confined within rigid or exhaustive
limits of the first limb. Rather, it widened the scope of the expression so
as to bring within its fold matters which may not be expressly
enumerated in the definition clause. Read in this manner, the structure
of Section 2(j) itself resists the restrictive interpretation advanced by Mr.
Cama.

63. Secondly, Mr. Cama’s argument that the two limbs of the word industry
must be read conjunctively, i.e., an activity would fall within the
definition of industry when it satisfies the exhaustive test qua the
employer irrespective of the inclusive definition qua the employee, even
if accepted, would not justify a restrictive reading of the first limb of the
definition. The first limb of the definition itself employs expressions of
considerable breadth. The term “undertaking”, for instance, though
95
undefined under the ID Act, is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as
follows:

“A task or project, especially one that is important
and/or difficult”


95 th
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2005) 7 Edn, Oxford University Press 1667

46

Hence, in common parlance, the term is not restricted to trade and
commerce alone and may include any activity. Equally expansive is the
term “calling”. The dictionary meanings of the term read thus:

“A strong desire or feeling of duty to do a particular
job, especially one in which you help other people;
96
a profession or career.”

“Carrying on a school is calling; the profession of
97
teaching is a calling.”


The lexical import of calling makes it clear that the expression carries an
exceptionally broad sweep, which can be extended to diverse fields such
as professions, spiritual pursuits, education and charitable activities.
Thus, even in their ordinary and everyday sense, these expressions travel
far beyond the narrow world of commerce and profit. It is for this very
reason that this Court in D.N. Banerji (supra), Corporation of the City of

Nagpur (supra) and Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) recognised the
inherently wide import of the term “undertaking”. To confine such wide
words within a commercial window would be to lose sight of the very
object for which industrial law came into being.

64. Finally, the ID Act essentially deals with the terms of organised
engagement between employer and employee for the production of goods
and services that satisfy human wants and needs. Whether such goods

96
Id
97
Greenberg D (ed), Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (8th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2012)

47

or services (having material worth) are consumed on commercial or
altruistic lines does not affect the relationship between the employer and
employee engaged in bringing them into existence. The ‘heart and soul’
of the definition lies in this structured cooperation, and not in the profit
motive or commercial character of the undertaking. The expression
analogous to trade or business used in earlier judgments, starting from
D.N. Banerji (supra), must necessarily mean any activity whose
‘systematic and organised’ cooperation between employer and employee
is akin to trade and commerce. Viewed thus, Mr. Cama’s argument,
premised on Safdarjung Hospital (supra), that the expression industry
must be confined to activities pursued for a commercial purpose, does
not warrant acceptance. Krishna Iyer, J., by correctly shifting the focus
from profit/business motive to the nature of the activity, has developed
a formulation that wholly aligns with the object of the ID Act. In doing
so, the definition rightly makes room for exclusion of casual, sporadic
and unorganised activities, such as domestic service, small informal
associations of persons, or individual professional practice, in
contradistinction to social clubs or firms of professionals which are
established and run systematically through an organised employer
employee structure.

65. Petitioners have further argued that the expressions “business”, “trade”,
“undertaking”, “manufacture” and “calling” occurring in Section 2(j)
must be interpreted in light of the maxim Noscitur a Sociis , under which
associated words derive colour and meaning from one another. According

48

to them, the word “undertaking”, being placed alongside “business” and
“trade”, cannot be construed in isolation so as to include every organised
activity, but must be confined to undertakings bearing a commercial
character.

66. The principle of Noscitur a Sociis stipulates that words derive meaning
98
from the company they keep . When words susceptible of analogous
meanings are grouped together, the more general expression may
legitimately draw colour from the narrower expressions surrounding it
and may thus be confined to a cognate sense. However, this Court in
99 100
D.N. Banerji (supra), Corporation of the City of Nagpur (supra) and
101
Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) had declined to apply Noscitur a Sociis
for confining the word “undertaking” only to commercial or profit-
oriented activities. The prevailing understanding was that the wider
phraseology of Section 2(j) was consciously adopted to ensure that the
definition remained sufficiently broad to respond to the changing realities
of organised industrial activity and the larger objective of preserving
industrial peace in a welfare State. In Bangalore Water Supply (supra),
102 103
the opinions of Beg, C.J. , and Chandrachud, C.J. , echoed the same
sentiment and did not apply Noscitur a Sociis as an interpretive tool to
read down the width of Section 2(j). Per contra, the partly dissenting

98 th
Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes , 11 edn, p. 321
99
See Para 17
100
See Paras 9-10
101
See Para 13
102
See Paras 147-169
103
See Paras 170-183

49

opinion of Jaswant Singh, J., departed from this line of reasoning and
applied Noscitur a Sociis in a far more restrictive sense so as to curtail
the ambit of industry to activities bearing a distinctly commercial
character.

67. It is relevant to note that Krishna Iyer, J., does not outrightly reject the
application of Noscitur a Sociis , but adopts a far more nuanced stance.
The Hon’ble Judge accepted that the expression undertaking must
indeed “ suffer a contextual and associational shrinkage ” and should
derive colour from the surrounding expressions like trade and
104
business , which are to be understood as systematic activities
producing goods and services through organised cooperation between
employer and employee. But while invoking Noscitur a Sociis , the relevant
enquiry was still anchored on the nature of activity and not the
commercial motive of the employer. Therefore, if an undertaking
answered the functional formulation of the triple test, it would be deemed
to be analogous to trade or business and consequently, an industry.


68. The ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra), whether viewed through the
approach of Beg, C.J., and Chandrachud, C.J., who declined to apply
Noscitur a Sociis to define ‘undertaking’ in a restrictive manner, or
through the more textured understanding adopted by Krishna Iyer, J.,
advances the object of the Act far more effectively than the narrow
construction favoured by Jaswant Singh, J., which proceeds on the

104
See Para 13

50

assumption that undertaking must derive a purely commercial colour
from the accompanying terms trade and business. Noscitur a sociis , being
a tool of purposive interpretation, cannot be applied in a manner that
defeats the very purpose of the legislation.

69. One must always bear in mind that a workman seldom enters the field
of negotiation as an equal. Across the table, often stands an employer
larger than him in every conceivable sense, armed with greater resources
and bargaining strength. The ID Act attempts to soften that imbalance.
It gives the solitary worker a language through which he may collectively
speak, and a one-stop forum before which his grievance is effectively
remedied. The legislation seeks to ensure that industrial relations do not
harden into a landscape where unequal bargaining power alone
determines outcomes. It was with this larger constitutional and social
vision in mind that Krishna Iyer, J., formulated the triple test in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra). The test was never intended to erase all
limits upon the definition of “industry”, but to preserve industrial peace
through civilised dialogue and prompt adjudication wherever organised
human effort and labour converge in a form capable of generating claims,
demands, tensions and stress.

70. In light of such discussion, I hold that the test laid down in paragraphs
140 to 144 in the opinion rendered by Krishna Iyer, J., in Bangalore
Water Supply to determine if an undertaking or enterprise falls within
the definition of “industry” lays down correct law. Having affirmed the

51

triple test, the next stage of analysis would be its application vis-à-vis
the different categories of activity, starting with sovereign functions.

B. Do sovereign functions include ‘welfare activities’?


71. Sovereign functions are not excluded by any express words in Section
2(j) of the ID Act. The exclusion has been recognised by judicial
interpretation, because certain functions of the State are so closely tied
to its core identity that they cannot be treated as ordinary industrial
activity. The danger lies in allowing a narrow exception, meant for truly
inalienable functions of the State, to expand into a general protection for
every activity undertaken by the Government.

72. Traditionally, sovereign was understood as regal, that is, the King. From
this perspective, Crown functions which cannot be delegated were
understood as ‘sovereign’. In a constitutional democracy, sovereign
powers vest in the people and the State exercises them as a
representative of the ‘will of the people’. That is to say, the State is
answerable to none but the people while exercising sovereign powers.
Unlike statutory or even constitutional powers where the State is
amenable to judicial review, in exercise of sovereign powers, the State as
the representative of vox populi is only answerable to the populus in the
political-democratic domain. The task is to then isolate that narrow
inalienable and non-justiciable field of activities without letting
sovereignty become a convenient shield for every public, statutory, or

52

welfare-oriented enterprise, and the cue for resolving this quandary lies
105
in the opinion of this Court in N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P. .

73. Although born within the law of torts, the decision in Nagendra Rao
(supra) serves as a vital compass for defining the modern content of
inalienable sovereign functions. Writing for the Court, Sahai, J., held
that only when a State was carrying on activities which are politically
and jurisprudentially categorised as pure acts of State did they remain
insulated from the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Courts. A citizen cannot
sue the Government for negligence in making a law or for policy
decisions, because in this exclusive sphere, the jurisdiction of the Courts
is impliedly barred as a matter of public interest. Nagendra Rao (supra)
also sounds a profound caution by declaring that the immunity of the
106
State terminates precisely where this narrow sovereign core ends .

74. The judgment in Chief Conservator (supra) serves as the vital bridge
carrying the principles of Nagendra Rao (supra) directly into the specific
terrain of industrial jurisprudence. When the State sought to extend the
protective guard of sovereignty over the entire Forest Department, the
three judge Bench drawing inspiration from Nagendra Rao (supra)
confirmed that the sovereign shell covers only those core functions
“which are indicative of external sovereignty and are political in
107
nature” . For these activities, the State is fundamentally not

105
(1994) 6 SCC 205
106
See Paras 23-25
107
See Para 12

53

answerable in an ordinary Court of law. Because this sovereign core is
so uniquely confined, the vast expanse of the State’s welfare activities
irrespective of their public utilitarian import cannot fall within the
immunized sovereign core.

75. Various public duties may be vested in the State through primary
legislation or even under the Constitution. These statutory or
constitutional duties, even those undertaken to achieve the lofty ideals
of Part IV, do not, merely by the strength of their public character or
welfare nature, constitute sovereign functions, unless such functions
form the core of a nation's sovereign existence. Such reasoning draws a
clear distinction between the inalienable sovereign powers of a nation, in
exercise of which the State is answerable to the people, and its
constitutional and statutory duties, including welfare activities, where
the State is amenable to judicial review under the constitutional scheme.
Importing such a narrow sovereign exception while testing whether a
Governmental activity constitutes an industry fits well with the purposive
interpretation of the ID Act, furthering its objective of ensuring industrial
peace and the seamless adjudication of industrial disputes in all
conceivable spheres of Governmental activity, welfare or otherwise. Even
within the core sovereign area, Bangalore Water Supply (supra) was right
to hive off substantial severable units that operate as industries under
the law.

76. In such view of the matter, there is no wrong in saying that the contours
of sovereignty have steadily contracted as the modern State has moved

54

from command to service, from prerogative to responsibility, and from a
distant ruler to an everyday employer, regulator and provider. Two
working tests may be invoked for locating that narrow sovereign core.
The first is the test of non-justiciability and absolute immunity
articulated in Nagendra Rao (supra) and applied to industrial law by
(supra), which looks at whether the state's action is
Chief Conservator
purely political and completely insulated from the scrutiny of ordinary
Civil Courts. The second is the private person test/inalienability test,
which runs through D.N. Banerji (supra), Nagpur Corporation (supra),
Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra), and Agricultural Produce Market
Committee (supra). If the activity is of a kind that private persons or non-
State agencies may perform, it cannot be described as essentially and
inalienably sovereign in the strict sense, for such a function is one which
is inseparable from the State and can be performed only by the State.

77. These tests point towards a restricted domain comprising functions such
as defence, foreign affairs, war and peace, treaty making, legislation,
taxation, eminent domain, core police power, justice, maintenance of law
and order, internal and external security, repression of crime and grant
of pardon. Even while indicating these categories, caution is necessary.
The boundaries of sovereignty cannot be fixed by yesterday’s
assumptions. Frédéric Mégret, writing on “inherently sovereign
108
functions” traces how power once concentrated in the State has, in

108
Frédéric Mégret, Are There “Inherently Sovereign Functions” in International Law?,
American Journal of International Law, Volume 115, Issue 3, July 2021, pp. 452 - 492

55

modern times, been steadily unbundled into private hands, with
privatisation reaching areas once instinctively associated with
sovereignty, including policing, military activity, intelligence, prisons and
border control.

78. Therefore, ordinary administrative, developmental or welfare activities of
the State cannot, by any automatic rule, be treated as naturally immune.
The question must always be whether the function is so bound to the
constitutional personality of the State that it cannot be alienated,
delegated, or made answerable in the ordinary course of civil
adjudication or constitutional torts. Everything outside that small
chamber must return to the discipline of Section 2(j).

79. Mr. Nataraj, ASG, attacks this premise by arguing that while Bangalore
Water Supply (supra) purports to exclude primary and inalienable
functions, it fails to provide a workable methodology for identifying them
amid contemporary governance. He contends that the realities of the
modern state involve deep layers of delegation, outsourcing, and
incidental assistance, warning that reading inalienability with literal
rigidity would inevitably reduce the sovereign exception to a vanishing
point. Mr. Sanjay Hegde elevates this critique by submitting that in an
Indian welfare setting, the focus must shift away from a narrow
preoccupation with alienability, arguing instead that the Court must
weigh the source of power, the gravity of constitutional obligations, and
the breadth of public purpose. Taking a more cautious stance, Mr.
Venkataramani, Attorney General, submits that the concept cannot be

56

frozen into a static catalogue and suggests that the executive remains
better situated to determine what possesses a sovereign character in any
given context.

80. These contentions undoubtedly identify a genuine operational
complexity, because the category of sovereign functions cannot be
reduced to a rudimentary checklist sealed for all time. However, the
remedy for a fluid and evolving role of a welfare State cannot be to make
sovereignty co-extensive with every statutory duty or constitutional
aspiration. Environmental protection, irrigation, sanitation, hospitals,
and public utilities may all be matters of deep constitutional importance,
but the test remains whether the function belongs to the core, non-
justiciable authority of the State. While primary inalienable political
actions stand outside the ID Act, organised Government enterprises
rendering public services, implementing schemes or pursuing welfare
objectives through employees cannot be excluded merely because the
work carries a public purpose or a constitutional duty. As correctly
submitted by the Respondents, to dilute the decision of this Court in
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) would be to create a large and
unprincipled exemption for Government departments, unless such
activities are governed by special laws which substitute for the ID Act by
providing equally effective and efficacious remedies in the arena of
employer employee disputes.

81. A careful reading of the post Bangalore Water Supply (supra) decisions
shows that this Court has not permitted Government departments or

57

statutory bodies to claim immunity merely by invoking public character.
109
In Des Raj v. State of Punjab , the Irrigation Department was held to
fall within Section 2(j) on the application of the dominant nature test,
and this position was later reaffirmed in Agricultural Produce Market
110
Committee v. Ashok Harikuni , where this Court held that statutory
creation, regulatory powers and levy of fees do not, by themselves, confer
sovereign character on the market committee. The reliance placed by the
111
Petitioners on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Somdutt Sharma , does not
carry the matter further, since that case concerned the narrower
question whether the Irrigation Department was a “factory” for the
purposes of Chapter VB, and not whether it was an “industry” under
Section 2(j). A department may not be a factory but could yet be an
112
industry. Likewise, General Manager, Telecom v. A. Srinivasa Rao ,
restored the binding force of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) by
113
overruling Sub-Divisional Inspector of Post, Vaikam v. Theyyam Joseph
and Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees’ Association, Prabhadevi v.
114
Union of India , to the extent they had treated postal and
telecommunication functions as part of the inalienable sovereign core.
These decisions serve as a persistent reminder that the promise of
industrial justice must remain accessible to all those who labour within
the vast and varied machinery of the welfare State.

109
1988 SCC OnLine SC 141
110
(2000) 8 SCC 61
111
(2021) 12 SCC 53
112
(1997) 8 SCC 767
113
(1996) 8 SCC 489
114
(1997) 6 SCC 723


58

82. Ld. Amicus Mr. Partha Sarathi rightly reminds us that the legislature
has left numerous footprints of its intent to bring State entities within
the statutory fold. For example, Section 2(a) specifically contemplates
industries carried on by or under the authority of the Central
Government and Section 2(n), read with the First Schedule, explicitly
weaves railways, major ports, defence establishments, and hospitals into
the framework of public utility services.

83. Safdarjung Hospital (supra) noticed this scheme of public utility services
but read it through the wrong lens. It held that an entry in the First
Schedule does not itself make an activity an industry, and that the
activity must first answer the test of “industry” before it can be declared
a public utility service. The error lay in the test it applied. By insisting
that the activity must be analogous to trade or business in a commercial
sense, Safdarjung Hospital (supra) drained the First Schedule of its real
significance. Once that commercial approach is rejected, as it must be,
the inclusion of hospitals, defence establishments, fire brigade services,
railways, ports and similar services shows that Parliament did not regard
public or statutory character, Governmental control, absence of profit, or
welfare purpose as reasons for exclusion. The statutory scheme treats
such services not as strangers to industrial law, but as sensitive sectors
requiring special regulation.

84. This legislative design carries its own safeguard. Having drawn public
utility services into the ID Act, Parliament did not leave their regulation

59

unguarded. The ID Act itself subjects such services to a stricter
discipline, requiring under Section 22 advance notice of any strike or
lock-out and a mandatory cooling-off period before industrial action may
commence, over and above the general restrictions in Section 23 that
operate during conciliation, adjudication and arbitration across all
industrial establishments. Where even this is found wanting, the
Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1981 furnishes a further and more
direct safeguard, empowering the appropriate Government to prohibit
strikes in services it notifies as essential, so that the continuity of vital
services is preserved without disturbing their underlying character as
industries. The norm, therefore, is to treat these public utility services as
industries under the ID Act. Relief from the ordinary incidents of
industrial action is the exception, available only where the public interest
so demands, and even then, it operates not by removing these services
from the ID Act but by regulating the exercise of industrial action through
the safeguards the law itself provides and the procedure it prescribes.


85. The repercussions of a contrary view are far from academic and they
strike most heavily at those on the lowest rungs of public employment.
Many of these workers endure severe occupational hazards and social
vulnerability, yet a blanket exclusion of Government departments would
mean that the very people who most require the protection of the law are
the first to be denied it. It would be a profound irony if a doctrine
intended to safeguard the State is used to unprotect labour. This also
offends the equality principle enshrined in Article 14, for a gardener,

60

driver, or maintenance employee does not perform a different species of
labour simply because their wage slip bears the seal of the State.

86. It is not a sufficient answer to suggest that Government employees are
protected elsewhere by Articles 309 to 311 of the Constitution, as those
provisions protect only those who hold civil posts and do not cover the
vast army of daily wagers, casual workers, or contractual employees.
Service rules, where they exist, do not occupy the same field as the ID
Act, which provides a forum for conciliation, adjudication, protection
against retrenchment, regulation of changes in service conditions, and
scrutiny of unfair labour practices. To remove that field through an
enlarged idea of sovereignty is not to preserve governance, but to close
the statutory door on those who were meant to enter through it.

87. The apprehension of the Petitioners that the application of the ID Act will
burden Government departments with litigation is also overstated, for
the Act is not a hindrance to good administration, but a framework for
redressing industrial conflict and ensuring industrial peace. Bringing an
organised Government activity within the ID Act is a method of
preserving order within administration, as public governance becomes
more arbitrary, not stronger, when workers are pushed outside remedies.
115
In Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand , this Court held that the State, as
a model employer, bears a heightened obligation to act with fairness,
dignity and constitutional responsibility towards those who serve it.

115
2026 SCC OnLine SC 129

61

Therefore, if the State organises labour and accepts the fruit of that work,
it should not be eager to retreat into the sanctuary of sovereignty the
moment statutory rights are asserted. A State which claims to be a model
employer cannot wear the Crown when the worker asks for a remedy.

88. For these reasons, treatment of sovereign functions by Krishna Iyer, J.,
in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) calls for affirmation as a principled
adjustment between State authority and State accountability. It leaves
untouched the inalienable core of Government, but refuses to allow
welfare, service and organised administration to be withdrawn from
Section 2(j) merely by invoking public purpose. To side with the
Petitioners would invariably convert sovereignty from a narrow
inalienable core function into a convenient escape from labour law. That
course must necessarily be rejected.

89. Narsinh Parmar (supra) runs counter to the ratio in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) and is not good law insofar as it casts a procedural burden
on a workman to claim relief under the ID Act against a blanket
presumption of sovereign immunity for all Government departments.
This view is wholly erroneous as it traces sovereignty to the structure,
i.e., to the State and not to the nature of the activity, i.e., which
inalienable functions are accountable solely through democratic
processes. To allow a general presumptive bias regarding the sovereign
character of Government departments to become a governing rule would
be to place a mask of immunity upon the State at the very threshold of
litigation. This would effectively require the workman to break through a

62

wall of State privilege before the actual organisation of work is ever
examined.

C. Charitable Undertakings


90. In Bangalore Water Supply (supra), Krishna Iyer, J., identified three
categories of charitable enterprises. The first comprises enterprises that
earn profits in the ordinary course but divert the whole or a substantial
part of such profits to altruistic objects. The second comprises
institutions that make no profit but employ workers on ordinary
economic terms to produce or supply goods and services that are made
available, at low or no cost, to those who cannot afford them. The third
comprises establishments oriented towards a humane mission, where
persons work not for wages but out of shared devotion to the cause, such
as ashrams or spiritual orders. The Court held that the first two
categories are industries, since in both cases there exists a systemic and
organised cooperation between employer and employee, and the
destination of the profits or the presence of a charitable object makes no
difference to that relationship. The third category alone falls outside the
definition, not because of any charitable character, but because no
economic relationship of employer and employee, as ordinarily
116
understood, exists at all .

91. The aforesaid classification is reasonable and has a rational nexus with
the object of the ID Act. What is decisive under the Act is the nature of

116
See Paras 102-111

63

the relationship between the institution and those it employs to carry out
its activity. So long as that relationship bears the hallmarks of ordinary
employment, wages paid for work done, and an organised, systematic
cooperation between employer and employee, the institution falls within
the definition of industry, regardless of whether its object is charitable or
its surplus is devoted entirely to public good. So far as the workman is
concerned, it matters little whether the products of his labour are made
available to the poor free of charge, for he contributes his labour in return
for wages and conditions of service exactly as he would for any
commercial employer. The fallacy in contending otherwise lies in shifting
the focus from the worker and the industrial activity to the disposal of
the end product, a consideration with which the ID Act has nothing to
117
do. It is only where an employer-employee relationship is absent and
both the stakeholders combine in an altruistic manner to produce goods
and services for charity, as in the third category identified in Bangalore
Water Supply (supra), that the institution escapes the definition, and
even then, the exclusion rests on the nature of employment itself being
on charitable lines and not on the charitable nature of the enterprise.

92. One may be tempted to argue, at this stage, that charitable institutions
ought to be accorded the same exemption under the ID Act as they are
118
under other statutes, such as the Income Tax Act . This argument,
however, proceeds on a flawed equation of two enquiries that serve

117
See Para 107
118
Sections 11 to 13, The Income Tax Act, 1961

64

entirely different purposes. The Income Tax Act brings profits and gains
to tax, and exemptions under Sections 11 to 13 thereof proceed on the
footing that income applied towards charitable purposes such as relief of
the poor, education or medical relief is not income retained for private
gain and ought not to bear the same burden as commercial profit. The
exclusion of charity from the rigours of that statute is for an enquiry into
taxability and hence is necessarily an enquiry into the character of the
income and the purpose to which it is applied. The ID Act, however,
proceeds on an altogether different footing. Its object is not the taxation
of income or the regulation of profit, but the resolution of industrial
disputes and the maintenance of industrial peace between employers
and employees. Viewed thus, the charitable or non-profit character of an
institution, which is determinative of its treatment under the Income Tax
Act, has no bearing whatsoever on the existence of an employer-employee
relationship or on the organised cooperation between the two that the ID
Act seeks to regulate.

D. Temples


93. Petitioners have argued that temples should be kept outside the rigours
of the ID Act as their main function is wholly spiritual and religious in
character, directed solely towards the satisfaction of the devotional needs
of worshippers, and incapable of being bought and sold in any
commercial market. It was further urged that the right to close down an
undertaking is not applicable to temples and that application of

65

principles of industrial law to temples would disrupt the daily conduct of
worship for thousands of devotees.

94. Such contention is wholly misguided. Similar to charitable institutions,
the object and motive of the employer to establish a temple for religious
and spiritual pursuits is not the correct parameter with regard to its
inclusion or exemption from industrial law. As rightly pointed out by
Krishna Iyer, J., it would amount to an unreasonable and hostile
classification if employees engaged in the preparation of ladoos are
treated differently with regard to adjudication of their disputes on the
criterion whether such ladoos are sold for profit or offered as prasadam
to a deity. Further, inapplicability of the closure clauses under the ID Act
to a temple would give little solace to the cooks, sweepers and watchmen
engaged by the temple administration when they are subjected to unfair
labour practices, including retrenchment. Inapplicability of certain
provisions of the Act due to the peculiar nature of the establishment
cannot be a criterion to defeat the applicability of the statute itself.

E. Educational Institutions


95. The absence of a profit motive, the vocational or charitable character of
an activity, or the perceived social nobility of its object does not, by itself,
remove an undertaking from the ambit of Section 2(j) of the ID Act. The
inquiry must instead be directed towards the organised relationship
between the institution and those engaged in carrying on its activities. It
is this same focus on the character of the cooperation between employer

66

and employee that assumes significance in considering educational
establishments. Educational institutions must not be judged from the
relation between the undertaking and the consumers of their output, but
from the nature of the relationship between the promoters or owners of
such entity and their employees who directly or incidentally contribute
to the production of such output. It is true educational institutions are
established to impart knowledge and such activities are carried on by
teachers who may not fall within the definition of “workman”.
Notwithstanding such character, these institutions also engage various
other employees who fall within the definition and participate in
organised systematic activity, directly or incidentally contributing to
creation of services catering to human needs.

119
96. In T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) , an eleven Judge Bench construing
Article 19(1)(g) held that education falls within the expression
"occupation", even where no element of profit is involved, since the
establishment and running of an educational institution employing
teachers and administrative staff to impart knowledge to students is an
activity undertaken as a means of livelihood or a mission in life. In
reaching that conclusion, the Court gave "occupation" a wide
connotation embracing a calling, trade or business. The significance of
this lies in the vocabulary employed, for these are the very expressions
used in the definition of "industry" under Section 2(j), which, as already
discussed, carry an exceptionally broad sweep extending well beyond

119
See Paras 20-25

67

commerce and profit. If education, though long regarded as charitable
and never treated as a trade or business for profit, nonetheless answers
the description of "occupation" for the purposes of Article 19(1)(g), there
is no reason in principle why the systematic and organised activity of
running an educational institution, contributed directly or incidentally,
through an employer employee (who is a workman) relationship, should
not equally answer the description of industry under Section 2(j).


F. Clubs


97. Most clubs, whether gentlemen's clubs, service clubs or sports clubs,
when examined from the industrial angle, project a picture typical of
employers hiring employees for wages to render services and supply
goods on a systematic basis at specified hours, with the club
management providing the capital, raw material and appliances while
cooks, waiters, bell boys and other staff render the services for which
members pay by way of subscriptions or bills. The character of a club
being exclusive of members and their families or friends, and run
through their contributions and services, does not change the organised
and systemic nature of activity undertaken in producing goods and
services which may be solely for the consumption of its own members.
The relationship between such club members and staff engaged by them
bears the hallmark of an organised systematic engagement akin to an
employer employee relationship in a commercial enterprise amenable to
the ID Act.

68

98. Madras Gymkhana Club (supra) incorrectly applied the exclusivity test
thus excluding clubs and similar institutions from the ambit of industry.
The only exception, as rightly pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J., in cases of
such clubs or self-serving institutions would be small entities like casual
association of persons where engagement of employees is marginal. Large
clubs, organised on corporate lines, maintaining big establishments with
multitudinous employees and running in an organised, systematic
manner would, by no means, be treated at par with the exempted casual
associations. Madras Gymkhana Club (supra) has failed to appreciate
that the scale of operation of such voluntary associations is a relevant
criterion in determining whether the engagement of employees follows an
organised and systematic structure.

G. Liberal Professions


99. A solicitor's firm, a medical polyclinic or an architect's office, where a
body of employees works in coordination to enable professional services
to be delivered to clients and patients, displays every feature of an
industry within the meaning of Section 2(j). The professional standing of
the person at its head cannot place the establishment as a whole beyond
the reach of the ID Act. Nor can it be said that the solicitor's clerk, the
stenographer or the librarian contributes nothing merely because the
legal advice ultimately rendered is the product of the solicitor's own skill,
for without their assistance the solicitor could not function at all. The
dignity or intellectual character of a profession has no bearing on the

69

only question the definition asks, which is whether the establishment
functions through organised cooperation between employer and
employee for the rendering of services to those it serves.

100. This conclusion must, however, be confined to establishments where
such organised labour genuinely exists. A single practitioner, whether a
lawyer, a rural doctor or a small-town engineer, working alone or with a
solitary assistant, cannot be said to run an industry. This is not because
that assistant's work is unimportant, but because the organisational
structure which the concept of industry presupposes is simply absent. It
is this distinction, between the organised professional establishment and
the solitary practitioner, that ought to govern the application of the
definition to liberal professions.




STARE DECISIS AND RECONSIDERATION OF BANGALORE
WATER SUPPLY

101. Having approved the majority view in Bangalore Water Supply (supra), I
shall now examine whether its ratio nonetheless calls for reconsideration
when tested against the well settled principles of stare decisis.

102. Stare decisis, literally understood, requires Courts to stand by things
decided and not to disturb what is settled. The underlying logic of the
doctrine is to promote certainty and consistency in judicial decisions and
enable an organic development of the law, while providing assurance to

70

the individual regarding the consequences of transactions forming part
120
of daily affairs . Yet, continuity does not require the Court to preserve
demonstrable error or compel the law to remain fixed while the world to
which it applies has materially changed. Stare decisis is a principle of
continuity, not a command of immobility, and this Court has broadly
recognised three exceptional situations in which departure from the
doctrine is warranted.

103. In Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar , this Court held that
nothing in the Constitution prevents it from departing from a previous
decision if convinced of its error and its baneful effect on the general
121
interests of the public . It is not enough that the earlier decision is
debatable, that some of its expressions are broad, or that another
construction may appear preferable. The first exception to stare decisis
is applicable only when the error is manifest in principle or method and
sufficiently grave that its continuation perpetuates injury to the
administration of law or the general public. As laid down in Raghubir
Singh (supra), a legal rule, once authoritatively declared, does not remain
open for reconsideration merely because another interpretation is also
reasonably possible, or because a later Bench might have chosen
122
differently had the question arisen before it in the first instance .


120
Union of India & Anr v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) By Lrs. Etc , (1989) 2 SCC 754, See Para 9
121
1955 SCC OnLine SC 2, See Para 22
122
See Paras 21-24

71

104. The second exception is attracted where a rule, though sound when
declared, has ceased to fit the conditions upon which it was premised. In
Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay
123
& Ors , this Court observed:

“As in life so in law things are not static. Fresh
vistas and horizons may reveal themselves as a
result of the impact of new ideas and developments
in different fields of life. Law, if it has to satisfy
human needs and to meet the problems of life, must
adapt itself to cope with new situations”

Such adaptation is warranted when later experience demonstrates that
the rule rests upon factual assumptions which no longer hold, has
become incapable of consistent application, or frustrates rather than
advances the purpose it was intended to serve. However, it must be borne
in mind that although law must change with time, it cannot be so fickle
124
as to change with every change of guard .

105. The third exception concerns the consequences of reversal. In Keshav
125
Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax , this Court held that an
earlier decision should be reviewed only for compelling and substantial
reasons. Among the matters which must enter that assessment are
whether the earlier view has been followed in subsequent decisions,
whether people and institutions have acted upon it, and whether its

123
(1974) 2 SCC 402, See Para 22
124
State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat , (2005) 8 SCC 534, See Paras 171-
174
125
1965 SCC OnLine SC 80, See Para 23

72

reversal would produce “public inconvenience, hardship or mischief”.
Therefore, the longer a rule has endured, the more closely it is integrated
into the administration of a statute, and the greater the reliance placed
upon it, the more compelling must be the justification for its
displacement.


106. Therefore, three inquiries assume particular importance when
reconsideration of a long-standing precedent is sought:

i. Whether the earlier ruling is patently erroneous, and its continued
enforcement injurious to the public interest?

ii. Whether a substantial alteration in social, economic, technological
or legal conditions has rendered the rule unworkable, outmoded
or bereft of its original justification?

iii. Whether the dislocation, inequity and public harm likely to be
caused by unsettling the decision would outweigh any juridical
benefit secured by its reversal?


107. I shall now test the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) against these
three considerations.

A. Is Bangalore Water Supply ratio patently erroneous?


108. For the reasons already discussed, the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) cannot be characterised as patently erroneous. It lies closest to
the object of the ID Act, which is concerned not with the commercial

73

identity of an establishment but with the orderly resolution of industrial
conflict wherever labour is organised under an employer in a systematic
activity for the production of goods or the rendering of services.

B. Does the ratio require reconsideration in light of changed
circumstances?

109. Tennyson’s familiar lines capture the necessity which sometimes
126
compels a settled rule to yield :

“The old order changeth, yielding place to new,
And God fulfils Himself in many ways,
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.”


A legal rule may require reconsideration where the circumstances to
which it applies have so substantially altered that the rule now operates
outside its original context. This too was among the reasons which
prompted the five Judge Bench in Jai Bir (5J) (supra) to make the
reference, for it took the view that the working experience of the law after
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) had revealed practical difficulties,
including the proliferation of industrial claims, awards of heavy back
wages, and the possible consequences of an overextended definition on
employers, employees and the public. Thus, the question is whether the
economic and technological transformations since Bangalore Water

126
Alfred, Lord Tennyson, “The Passing of Arthur” in Idylls of the King

74

Supply (supra) have rendered its definition of industry outmoded or, on
the contrary, reinforced the necessity for its continued application.

110. The advancement of technology has brought automation and
computerisation into the means of production and has enhanced the
efficiency and quality of goods and services. Such development is part of
the march of science and civilisation and is most welcome. Its
consequential impact, however, is a diminution of the role of human
agency in the production of goods and services. Work once performed by
a large body of labour may now be undertaken through machines,
algorithms and automated systems requiring a substantially smaller
workforce. Increasing shift of businesses to e-commerce platforms while
enabling easier access to goods and services through e-aggregators has
dismantled the organised labour sector and given rise to gig-
127
employments with little or no employment rights .

111. Coupled with these transformative changes in commerce and means of
production, the advent of a globalised economy has increased manifold
the potential movement of capital across national boundaries. Capital
has become more mobile, technologically amplified and capable of swiftly
switching from one area of activity to another. Labour, by contrast,
remains locally embodied, and its demand restricted by geographic and
other limitations. This evolving matrix has increased the gradient

127
As per 2025-26 Economic Survey of India, the workers in the gig sectors have increased
to 12 million in F.Y. 2025 from 7.7 million in F.Y. 2021. They now represent 2% of the total
workforce in India and are projected to constitute 6.7% of the workforce by 2029-30,
contributing ₹ 2.35 lakh crore to India’s GDP

75

between capital and labour and has produced a more unequal bargaining
plane between the two in recent times. The displacement or increasing
marginalisation of manual labour does not make industrial protection
irrelevant. It makes the preservation of an effective remedial framework
more imperative.


112. The response of the State to automation, liberalisation and globalisation
is principally a matter of legislative and executive policy, in which Courts
are ordinarily slow to intervene. The approach of the Court to these
emerging challenges should not be to impede technology, arrest
economic reform or choose between competing models of economic
policy, but should essentially be rooted in constitutional obligations and
sensitivities. It must ensure that constitutional guarantees of equality
and human dignity, illuminated by the Directive Principles and
particularly Articles 38 and 39, remain assured to those whose
bargaining positions are becoming increasingly unequal.

113. The continued application of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) does not
depend upon a socialistic pattern of State ownership or economic
governance. It rests upon the more elementary proposition that where
capital organises labour for the systematic production of goods or
rendering of services, the law must provide a level and accessible field for
resolution of disputes between them. The ID Act remains the surest
statutory platform for such resolution. Its machinery enables disputes to
be addressed through conciliation and adjudication before they harden
into industrial unrest. That objective is as relevant to a liberalised

76

economy as it was to the economic order in which the statute was
enacted.

114. It is often suggested that industrial legislation is unduly sympathetic to
employees and thereby hinders commercial output, economic efficiency
or the functioning of altruistic institutions. This misconception proceeds
from an erroneous perspective that the rights of one stakeholder must
be curtailed either to increase output or to relieve certain employers from
industrial obligations. Such an outcome-oriented approach to beneficial
legislation is fallacious. On a jurisprudential plane, Courts interpret
legislation by reference to its object, purpose and the rights and
obligations which it creates. They do not first select a desirable economic
outcome and then constrict the statutory text to secure it.

115. Further, when a law provides access to justice and adjudication in
disputes between stakeholders occupying unequal positions, their
relative status cannot be ignored. Where the bargaining field is
substantially lopsided, a beneficial enactment must receive a
construction which extends its ameliorative sweep to the disadvantaged
group rather than augmenting the position of the already powerful. This
does not require every dispute to be decided in favour of the employee. It
requires that the employee is not denied the statutory forum itself by an
artificial narrowing of the jurisdictional threshold.

116. Seen against these changes, a rights-based approach giving the widest
reasonable coverage to systematic and organised activity conducted

77

through cooperation between an employer and employees is not an
anachronism. It is a means of ensuring smooth, effective and, where
necessary, adjudicated resolution of industrial disputes. The reduction
in the numerical strength of labour through automation cannot become
a reason to weaken the protection available to those who remain. The law
must not allow the rights of labour to be forgotten in the rush for greater
efficiency and profit.

C. Would unsettling the ratio cause greater public harm than good?




117. The final consideration is the effect which overruling Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) would have upon the administration of industrial law.
Decisions construing statutes attract a particularly strong claim to
continuity. Parliament may amend the provision if the judicial
construction does not accord with its policy. Where the legislature has
allowed an interpretation to govern for several decades and thereafter
replaces the statute prospectively, a Court should be slow to alter the
settled meaning of the former enactment for the residual class of matters
governed by it.

118. It is all the more inadvisable, in the case of a sunset legislation like the
ID Act, to unsettle the existing state of law and affect rights of individuals
which are at various stages of adjudication. For nearly five decades,
Courts, tribunals, employers, employees and trade unions have ordered
their conduct and litigation upon the understanding that the triple test
governs Section 2(j). References have been made, claims entertained,

78

settlements reached, awards rendered and remedies granted or refused
on that basis. Numerous proceedings instituted under the ID Act remain
at different stages of the judicial hierarchy. To substitute a new test at
this stage would alter the jurisdictional premise upon which these
proceedings were commenced and contested. No exceptional
circumstances could be demonstrated to take recourse to such a drastic
stance.

119. One has to keep in mind that the disputes arising after the
commencement of the IR Code are governed by the new definition which
Parliament has enacted in Section 2(p). The practical effect of altering the
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) ratio would thus fall upon legacy rights,
liabilities and proceedings arising under the repealed ID Act. It would
change the goalposts after parties have travelled substantial distances
through the adjudicatory process and would require pending matters to
be reassessed under a standard of which the parties were unaware when
the causes of action arose. The triple test in Bangalore Water Supply
(supra) has, for nearly five decades, kept the doors of industrial
adjudication open to those who labour within organised undertakings.
Those doors I decline to close.

IMPACT OF LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS ON BANGALORE
WATER SUPPLY



79

120. The final aspect to be considered is whether the provisions of an inert
legislation can cast a shadow on adhering to the wide and inclusive
interpretation of industry under the repealed ID Act.

121. A judgment interprets an existing law to further its object and purposes
and Bangalore Water Supply (supra) seeks to achieve that end to the
fullest extent. The narrow scope of the 1982 Amendment Act and the IR
Code did not fall for interpretation in Bangalore Water Supply (supra). It
may be argued that such amendment or new law is an expression of the
legislative will to give a narrow interpretation to the expression ‘industry’.
The object and purpose of the ID Act, therefore, need to be reviewed and
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) revisited.

122. A legislature has ample powers to amend/repeal an existing law to
address present necessities. To achieve such end, the legislature may
even delegate power to the executive to give retrospective operation to
such amendment/repeal. In such cases, the substratum of the law
changes retrospectively rendering the applicability of existing precedents
to the relevant law subject to legislative changes. The delegated power to
notify the date and manner of operation of an amendment is a legislative
process. Courts do not have the power to give effect to an inert
amendment which has not been notified, far less direct its retrospective
128
operation . Such power cannot be traced to judicial legislation in the
occupied field as it would amount to encroaching on an existing law.

128
Aeltemesh Rein, Advocate, Supreme Court of India v. Union of India & Ors , (1988) 4 SCC
54, See Paras 5 - 6

80

123. Admittedly, the executive chose not to notify the 1982 Amendment Act
for more than four decades. This merely shows the State’s disinclination
and lack of unanimity in giving effect to such amendment. The judiciary
ought not use such inert provisions kept on the back burner as an
interpretative tool to revisit a binding precedent. What the Court cannot
do directly, i.e., issue a mandamus to notify an inert amendment, it
cannot indirectly do by referring to a stillborn amendment to reconsider
the Bangalore Water Supply (supra) ratio.

124. Parliament has now made its own prospective adjustment through
Section 2(p) of the IR Code. It retained the systematic employer-worker
cooperation test while expressly excluding certain charitable, social,
philanthropic and sovereign activities. It would be incongruous for this
Court to take exclusions designed for the new Code and project them
backwards into Section 2(j) of the ID Act, especially when there is no
provision which gives Section 2(p) of the IR Code retrospective operation
over causes governed by the repealed ID Act. The new definition being
wisely made prospective in operation ought not, by way of judicial
rethinking, affect the contours of a binding precedent.

CONCLUSION


125. In light of such discussion, I answer the reference in the following
manner:


81

I. The manner in which the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra)
has been referred for reconsideration is in conformity with the law
declared in Dawoodi Bohra (supra), as affirmed in Aligarh Muslim
University (supra). As such, the reference requires to be answered
on merits.

II. On merits, I hold the triple test laid down by Krishna Iyer, J., in
paragraphs 140-144 of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) exhibits a
rare felicity in judicial interpretation. Through such triple test,
Bangalore Water Supply (supra) while remaining faithful to the
text, extended the beneficial object of the law to all employer
employee disputes wherever the stakeholders are engaged in an
organised systematic activity akin to trade and commerce to
produce goods and services for the satisfaction of human needs
and did not restrict it merely to activities which are run on
commercial lines. The criticism that it converts every organised
human endeavour into an industry is misplaced, for the triple test,
in fact, carves out just and proper exceptions in cases of casual
and non-systematic activities like domestic service, individual
professionals, small and unorganised clubs/association of
persons.

III. In a constitutional democracy, the concept of sovereignty has
undergone a jurisprudential contraction and is restricted to core
inalienable duties for which the State is not answerable to Courts

82

of law but to the people in a political-democratic discourse. Viewed
from this perspective, welfare activities of the State and schemes
undertaken by Government departments and their
instrumentalities are not, by reason only of their public, charitable
or welfare character, placed beyond Section 2(j). Mere vesting of a
duty in the State by statute or by the Constitution, even a duty
undertaken to fulfil the lofty mandate of Part IV, does not clothe it
with sovereign immunity from industrial law. Articles 309 to 311
give little solace as they cover a narrow sliver of civil posts. In these
circumstances, unless appropriate legislation engrafting equally
efficacious remedies for access to justice is passed, to exempt
statutory or welfare activities discharged by Government
departments or their instrumentalities from the beneficial scope of
the ID Act on the specious plea of sovereign functions would leave
a great multitude of workmen engaged in the organised
undertakings of the State without the remedies which the said Act
was enacted to secure.


IV. From the lens of industrial law, charitable undertakings, temples
and educational institutions are all viewed not by the spiritual,
religious or benevolent object they pursue, but by the character of
the employer employee relationship through which they function.
Where such activities are carried on through an organised and
systemic relationship between employer and employee, they
answer the triple test and the absence of profit or the presence of

83

a benevolent object does not take them outside the ambit of the
beneficial legislation.

V. The 1982 Amendment Act was never notified. It is settled law that
Courts cannot direct the Government to notify an amendment
which is a part of the legislative process. In view of such
disinclination, it would be wrong to rely on an inert law to redraft
the Bangalore Water Supply (supra) ratio. Similarly, the new
definition of industry in the IR Code has been given prospective
operation and in light of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
preserving rights and liabilities acquired or incurred under the
repealed law, the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) dealing
with cases under the repealed ID Act ought not to be disturbed
with reference to the new definition.

VI. The ratio in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) applies to a sunset
legislation dealing with legacy matters and has been consistently
followed for decades. Given this situation, in view of the settled
principles of stare decisis, such interpretation which yields to no
manifest error, needs to be retained keeping in mind the fact that
the economic and technological changes since it was decided have
weakened rather than strengthened the case for revisiting it. To
overrule it now, would unsettle rights and proceedings doing more
harm than good.


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VII. However, it is apposite to note that the ratio in Bangalore Water
Supply (supra) limited itself till a new definition was introduced.
As a new law redefining “industry” has come into force, the ratio
in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) would remain restricted to the
proceedings pending under the repealed law and the provisions of
the new law, i.e. IR Code shall be independently interpreted.

………………………….J
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
NEW DELHI
AUGUST 20, 2026

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