SATYA NARAYAN S/O SHRI KHARBUJA, vs THE H.D.F.C IRGO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
- Court
- Rajasthan High Court
[2026:RJ-JP:40985-DB]
REPORTABLE
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
Judgment Reserved on: 01.10.2026
Judgment delivered on:_18.11.2026
Judgment (Full) uploaded on: _18.11.2026
D.B. Civil Reference No. 1/2022
CNR: RJHC020173552022 | URN: CREF / 2U / 2022
1. Satya Narayan S/o Shri Kharbuja, aged 53 years, R/o Village
Theekariya Kalan, District Bundi, Rajasthan.
2. Dhapu Bai W/o Shri Satya Narayan, Aged About 54 Years, R/o
Village Theekariya Kalan District Bundi, Rajasthan.
3. Kumari Ritika D/o Late Shri Hemraj, Aged About 11 Years,
minor through her guardian and grand father Shri Satya
Narayan Aged 53 Years R/o Village Theekariya Kalan District
Bundi, Rajasthan.
----Petitioners
Versus
1. The H.D.F.C Irgo General Insurance Company Limited, Raman
House, H.T. Parekh Marg, 159, Bac Way Reclamation, Mumbai,
Having Its Branch Office At Kota (Raj.) (Ins Co.)
2. Akhtar Khan Son Of Shri Kanni Khan Muslman, R/o Theekari,
Dist. Alwar (Driver.)
3. Jitendra Singh Akherjot, Son Of Shri Prahlad Singh Rajput, R/o
2 B, Naya Kheda, Vivekanand Colony, Jaipur. (Owner)
4. Principal Chief Commissioner, Income Tax Department Statue
Circle , Jaipur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rahul Joshi
Mr. Ashish Saxena with
Mr. Harshit Mittal
Mr. Sandeep Mathur with
Mr. Vinay Mathur
Mr. Daksh Pareek
Ms. Manasvita Sharma
Mr. Naman Maheshwari
Mr. Vishwas Fatehpuria
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Virendra Agrawal with
Mr. Prakhar Agrawal
Mr. Shantanu Sharma with
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Mr. Parth Vashistha
Mr. Sandeep Pathak
Mr. Nitin Jain
FULL BENCH
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY K. AGRAWAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BHUWAN GOYAL
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
Sanjay K. Agrawal, CJ
For the sake of convenience, this judgment is divided in
following parts:
S.
Part Particulars Page
No
Nos.
Facts leading to the Larger Bench on
3
question of law
1. Part-I
Proceedings before the Supreme
4
Court
2. Part-II
The Statutory Framework (Motor
Vehicles Act and Income Tax Act,
1961)
3. Part-III
5
The nature of Motor Accident
Compensation: Restitution, Not
Income
4. Part-IV
7
Interest under Section 171 forms an
integral, inseparable and inalienable
part of the compensation:
5. Part-V
11
Such interest is merely compensatory
and is not ‘interest’ in common
parlance or within section 2(28A) of
the Income Tax Act, 1961.
6. Part-VI
22
Sections 56(2)(viii), 145B(1) and
194A do not create a charge on a
receipt which is not income
7. Part-VII
31
The decisions of this Court and other
35
decisions on the TDS machinery
8. Part-VIII
The Income Tax Act, 2025 and the
exemption inserted by the Finance
Act, 2026
9. Part-IX
37
Summary of propositions and answer
40
to the referred question
10. Part-X
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PART-I: Facts leading to the Larger Bench on question of law
1. The Petitioners are claimants in a motor accident claim. Their
claim petition was allowed by the learned Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, which awarded compensation together with simple interest
under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter
called as “the MV Act”). At the time of payment of the awarded
amount, the Respondent–Insurance Company deducted tax at
source on the interest component. The Petitioners contend that the
interest so awarded is not income exigible to tax and that the
Insurance Company was not required to deduct tax at source
therefrom.
2. A Division Bench comprising of Hon’ble the Chief Justice and
Uma Shanker Vyas, J of this Court, by order dated 18.02.2022,
noticing that a coordinate Division Bench of this Court in Smt.
1
Sharda Pareek Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr.
held such interest to be taxable, whereas the Bombay High Court in
2
Rupesh Rashmikant Shah v. Union of India & Ors had held
that interest up to the date of the award is not exigible to tax and
that the Madras High Court in the case of Cholamandalam
3
General Insurance Co. Ltd v. M. Ashok Kumar and Ors . had
also referred the question to a Larger Bench. The said Bench in view
of the conflicting view on the issue referred the following question
of law:
“Whether the interest payable on motor accident
claim compensation is exigible to tax and
resultantly is the insurance company required to
deduct tax at source while making such payment
to the claimants?”
1 (2019) 416 ITR 441 (Raj)
2 (2019) 417 ITR 169 (Bom)
3 (2020) SCC OnLine Madras 1011
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3. Pursuant to the order dated 18.02.2022, Hon’ble the Chief
Justice has constituted this Full Bench. This is how this reference is
before us for consideration.
Part-II: Proceedings before the Supreme Court
4. When the matter was posted before this Court, the Bar at
large, represented by various stakeholders, illustratively Insurance
Companies, Standing Counsels for Income Tax Departments,
Assessees and the claimants, submitted that the matter needs early
adjudication for following reasons:
(i) the matter pertains to motor accident claim
compensation;
(ii) the applicants/litigants are suffering at large on account
of matter being pending for a long period of time ever since
2018
(iii) there being no prohibition by the Supreme Court in
Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.20629-20631/2017-
Sharda Pareek Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income
Tax & Anr. , leave has been granted by the Supreme Court
vide order dated 11.03.2019.
(iv) the Bench should answer the reference in the spirit of
Rule 59 of the Rules of the High Court of Rajasthan, 1952,
which is reference jurisdiction of this Court.
(v) the Legislature in its wisdom, w.e.f. 01.04.2026, to put
an end to controversy on the above subject matter, vide
Income Tax Act, 2025 has exempted interest awarded under
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to an individual or his legal
heir by a new entry in Schedule III at Serial no.38 B read
with Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 2025. It also
provides that no tax shall be deducted at source on such
interest credited or paid to an individual under Section
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393(4) of the Income Tax Act, 2025 (Stable, Sl. No.7, as
amended).
5. In the light of the earnest request of the Bar members, the
prayer made by the suffering parties and to put certainty in the
taxation matters, all the members of this Bench have drawn
consensus that the issue needs expeditious adjudication, which will
be subject to appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
PART-III: The Statutory Framework (Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 and Income Tax Act, 1961)
6. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Section 166 of the MV Act enables the
injured person or the legal representatives of a deceased victim to
apply for compensation. Section 168(1) of the MV Act requires the
Claims Tribunal, after holding an inquiry, to make an award
“determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be
just”. Section 171 of the MV Act empowers the Tribunal, where it
allows a claim, to direct that “in addition to the amount of
compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and
from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it
may specify”. Section 173 of the MV Act provides for an appeal
against the award, and Section 174 of the MV Act provides for
recovery of “any amount ... due ... under an award” as an arrear of
land revenue. The interest is thus quantified within, and recovered
as part of, the very award by which just compensation is
determined.
7. Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1961
Act”). Section 4 of the 1961 Act specifies that the charge is on “total
income”. Section 2(24) of the 1961 Act contains an inclusive
definition of “income” which does not specifically include either
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motor accident compensation or interest forming part thereof.
Section 2(28A) of the 1961 Act defines “interest” as interest
payable in any manner “in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt
incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right or
obligation)”. Section 56(1) of the 1961 Act charges “income of every
kind” not chargeable under any other head as “Income from other
sources”. The Finance (No.2) Act, 2009 (w.e.f. 01.04.2010) inserted
Section 145A(b) (now Section 145B(1) ) of the 1961 Act, deeming
interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation to be
income of the year of receipt; Section 56(2)(viii) of the 1961 Act,
classifying “income by way of interest received on compensation or
on enhanced compensation” under the residuary head; and Section
57(iv) of the 1961 Act, allowing a deduction of fifty per cent of such
income. As per the legislative intendment, these amendments were
made “with a view to mitigating the hardships” caused by Rama
4
Bai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, A.P., Hyderabad & Ors. ,
which required arrears of interest on delayed or enhanced
compensation in land acquisition cases to be taxed on ‘accrual’
basis.
8. Section 194A(1) requires deduction of tax at source on
“income by way of interest” other than interest on securities. Clause
(ix) of Section 194A(3), inserted by the Finance Act, 2003 w.e.f.
01.06.2003, excluded interest on compensation awarded by the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal not exceeding Rs.50,000/- in a
financial year; by the Finance Act, 2015 (w.e.f. 01.06.2015) it was
substituted by clauses (ix) (no TDS on credit of such interest) and
(ixa) (no TDS on payment where the aggregate paid during the
financial year does not exceed Rs.50,000/-).
4 (1990) 181 ITR 400 (SC)
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9. Income Tax Act, 2025 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2025
Act”), coming into force from 01/04/2026, contains corresponding
provisions as follows: Section 92(1) and 92(2)(i) (to Sections 56(1)
and 56(2)(viii)); Section 278(1) (to Section 145B(1)); and Section
393 (to Section 194A). Further, the Finance Act, 2026 has amended
Schedule III [TABLE : Sl. No. 38B] (read with Section 11) to
unconditionally exempt, in the case of an individual or his legal heir,
any income in the nature of interest under the MV Act, and has
amended item (iv) in Section 393(4) so that no tax is to be
deducted at source on interest on compensation awarded by a
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to an individual. These are
examined in Part VIII.
PART-IV: The nature of Motor Accident Compensation:
Restitution, Not Income
10. The starting point is the nature of the principal sum.
Compensation under the MV Act is awarded on the principle of
restitutio in integrum, to place the victim or his dependants, so far
as money can, in the position in which they would have been but for
the accident. The Supreme Court in the matter of General
Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation,
5
Trivandrum Vs. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) & Ors. , explained
the measure of damages thus:
“8. The measure of damage is the pecuniary loss suffered
and is likely to be suffered by each dependent. Thus
“except where there is express statutory direction to the
contrary, the damages to be awarded to a dependent of a
deceased person under the Fatal Accidents Acts must take
into account any pecuniary benefit accruing to that
dependent in consequence of the death of the deceased. It
is the net loss on balance which constitutes the measure of
damages. …”
5 (1994) 2 SCC 176
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The 9. assessment of damages to compensate the
dependants is beset with difficulties because from the
nature of things, it has to take into account many
imponderables, e.g., the life expectancy of the deceased
and the dependants, the amount that the deceased would
have earned during the remainder of his life, the amount
that he would have contributed to the dependants during
that period, the chances that the deceased may not have
lived or the dependants may not live up to the estimated
remaining period of their life expectancy, the chances that
the deceased might have got better employment or income
or might have lost his employment or income altogether.”
6
11. Most recently in Shishu Pal & Ors. Vs. Surjeet & Ors. , the
Supreme Court reiterated as under:
“7. … Although it is never possible to fully compensate for
the loss of a person who has been an integral part of a
person’s family, the idea of ‘just and fair’ compensation
requires that an amount of money be paid to the claimants
that would, as far as possible, place them in a position as
if the unfortunate incident of the death of their loved one
had not taken place. For whatever reason, when this takes
twenty years, the suffering is only compounded further.”
12. The Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in
Court on its own Motion v. H.P. State Co-operative Bank
7
Ltd . , held as under:
“13. While going through the said provisions of law,
one comes to the inescapable conclusion that the
mandate of the said provisions does not apply to the
accident claim cases and the compensation awarded
under the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be said to be
taxable income. The compensation is awarded in lieu of
death of a person or bodily injury suffered in a
vehicular accident, which is damage and not income.
14. Chapters X and XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
provides for grant of compensation to the victims of a
vehicular accident. The Motor Vehicles Act has
undergone a sea change and the purpose of granting
compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is to
ameliorate the sufferings of the victims so that they may
be saved from social evils and starvation, and that the
victims get some sort of help as early as possible. It is
just to save them from sufferings, agony and to
rehabilitate them. We wonder how and under what
6 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1114
7 (2014) 52 taxmann.com 151 (HP)
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provisions of law the Income Tax Authorities have
treated the amount awarded or interest accrued on term
deposits made in Motor Accident Claims cases as
income. Therefore, the said Circular is against the
concept and provisions referred to hereinabove and runs
contrary to the mandate of granting compensation.”
13. The Madras High Court in The Managing Director, Tamil
Nadu State Transport Corporation (Salem) Ltd. v.
8
Chinnadurai , observed as under:
“13. The question is whether the provisions of the
Income-tax Act 1961, and more specifically, whether
the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal to the victim can be classified as a
taxable income under the Income Tax law?. The
answer to this question in the opinion of this Court
is in the negative. Compensation cannot be
categorized or even described as income as it has
already been stated that the intention of the
legislature in awarding compensation to the victims
of Motor Accident cases is to restitute them and
rehabilitate them.”
14. The Karnataka High Court, which had earlier in Oriental
9
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chennabasavaiah left the claimant to
seek a refund of the TDS, has since, by its order dated 09/08/2018
in MFA No. 103954 of 2017, held that compensation for injuries and
the interest thereon cannot be termed income. That order was
followed in W.P. No. 100887 of 2022 and most recently in Smt. B.L.
Chudamani v. The Deputy Director of Income Tax,
10
Centralized Processing Center & Ors. , where the
compensation awarded to the claimant for the death of her son in a
road accident had been enhanced in appeal from Rs.12,22,400/-to
Rs.46,16,100/- and a sum of Rs.2,52,379/- had been deducted as
tax. The writ petition was allowed with liberty to the claimant to
apply to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer for refund, to be decided
8 (2016) 385 ITR 656 (Madras)
9 W.P. No.49878/2012, dt. 18.02.2015
10 Neutral Citation No.2026:KHC:39278
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in the light of the order dated 09/08/2018. The Court recorded, and
extracted the reasoning of the said order, thus:
“3. This Court, referring to Section 194A of the Income Tax Act,
1961 [for short, ‘the Act’], has opined that the compensation
for the injuries payable by the wrongdoer with interest on such
compensation cannot be termed as ‘income’ and the concerned
would be at liberty to seek refund from the competent
authority. …”
“7. The very language of Section 194A of the Act shows that
the tax is deductible if payment is made as income by way of
interest. Whether the compensation awarded for the injuries to
a person payable by the wrong doer and the interest accrued
thereon on such compensation can be termed as income is the
question.
8. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haryana Urban
Development Autority Vs. Dev Dutt Gandhi, (2005) 9 SCC 497,
has held that where the amounts are being directed to be paid
as compensation for mental harassment and agony and failure
of public duty, are not income and there is no question of
deduction of TDS from that.”
15. That the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in The
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chief Commissioner of Income
11
Tax (TDS) , held as under:
“56. We are of the view that compensation under the
award of the MACT is not income. The expression
"income" used in the Entry 82 of List I of Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution can be given widest meaning.
Under section 2(24), the definition is inclusive and not
exhaustive. In the absence of any express provision to the
contrary, income can be held to refer to something earned.
What is received as compensation for loss in one or the
other form may not be income.”
66. In the context of compensation received under the Motor
Vehicles Act, the compensation is either on account of loss of
earning capacity on account of death or injury or on account of
pain and suffering. Such receipt is not by way of earning or
profit. Award of compensation is on the principle of restitution
to place the claimant in the same position in which he would
have been had the loss of life or injury not been suffered….”
11 (2022) 445 ITR 300 (Guj)
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16. The principle that a sum paid to make good the destruction of
a source of income is not itself income, even if measured by the
income lost, was approved by the Supreme Court in Senairam
12
Doongarmall v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Assam , quoting
13
Sutherland v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue , as under:
“Now it is quite clear that if a source of income is
destroyed by the exercise of the paramount right ...
and compensation is paid for it, that that is not
income, although the amount of compensation is the
same sum as the total of the income that has been
lost.”
17. The compensation for loss of dependency or loss of earning
capacity in a motor accident claim is precisely a compensation for
destruction of the source of income viz. the life or the earning
capacity of the victim. A capital receipt of this nature is outside the
ambit of income unless specifically brought within it Shrimant
14
Padmaraje R. Kadambande v. Commissioner of Income Tax .
Where the Legislature has intended to tax compensation, it has
done so expressly, for instance, Section 28(ii) and Section 56(2)(xi)
of the 1961 Act (now Section 92(2)(j) of the 2025 Act). There is
no provision bringing motor accident compensation, or the
interest which forms part of it, within the charge of income tax.
PART-V: Interest under Section 171 forms an integral,
inseparable and inalienable part of the compensation:
A. The text and structure of the MV Act
18. The text of Section 171 of the MV Act itself evinces the
dependent and accessory character of the interest. The power to
award interest arises only “where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim
12 (1961) 42 ITR 392 (SC )
13 (1918) 12 TC 63
14 (1992) 195 ITR 877 (SC)
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for compensation”; the interest is “in addition to the amount of
compensation”, that is, it is calculated upon, and
added/supplemented to, the compensation determined under
Section 168; its rate and starting date are fixed by the Tribunal in
the award itself; and it cannot run from a date earlier than the
making of the claim. The interest has no existence independent of
or dehors the compensation: if no compensation is awarded, no
interest can be awarded; if the compensation is reduced, set aside
or enhanced in appeal, the interest abates or is enhanced
consequential to it. The maxim accessorium non ducit sed sequitur
suum principale i.e. the accessory does not lead but follows its
principal applies with full force.
19. The MV Act treats the award, comprising compensation and
interest, as a single composite unit. The Tribunal makes one award
under Section 168; an appeal under Section 173 lies against that
award; and Section 174 enables recovery of “any amount ... due ...
under an award” as a composite sum. The claimant has no separate
cause of action for interest, cannot sue for it independently of the
claim for compensation, and cannot deal with it apart from the
award. In this sense the interest is inalienable from the
compensation, it cannot be severed, separately asserted or
separately enforced, and inseparable from it, being computed
upon it and existing only by reason of it.
20. The Supreme Court has held that the Tribunal must consider
interest as part of its adjudication even without a specific plea,
because interest is “consequential in the eyes of law”. In Abati
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Bezbaruah v. Deputy Director General, Geological Survey of
15
India & Anr. , it was elucidated as under:
“18. … The rate of interest must be just and reasonable
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case
and taking all relevant factors including inflation, change
economy, of policy being adopted by the Reserve Bank of
India from time to time, how long the case is pending,
permanent injuries suffered by the victim, enormity of
suffering, loss of future income, loss of enjoyment of life,
etc., into consideration. No rate of interest is fixed under
section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Varying rates
of interest are being awarded by Tribunals, High Courts
and the Apex court. Interest can be granted even if
claimant does not specifically plead for the same as it is
consequential in the eyes of law. Interest is compensation
for forbearance or detention of money and that interest
being awarded to a party only for being kept out of money
which ought to have been paid to him. …”
21. The factors which the Supreme Court directs the Tribunal to
weigh in fixing the rate of interest — permanent injuries suffered by
the victim, enormity of suffering, loss of future income, loss of
enjoyment of life, are the very heads under which compensation is
assessed. The interest is thus calibrated by reference to the injury
itself. It is not a market return on a sum of money; it is a further
element in the measure of the loss.
B. The Supreme Court on the nature of interest under Section
171 of the MV Act
22. In Dharampal & Ors. v. U.P. State Road Transport
16
Corporation , the Supreme Court, relying upon National
17
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur & Ors. , held as under:–
“9. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur
[(2004) 2 SCC 370] this court has held that the provisions
require payment of interest in addition to compensation
already determined. Even though the expression “may” is
used, a duty is laid on the Tribunal to consider the question
of interest separately with due regard to the facts and
15 (2003) 3 SCC 148
16 (2008) 12 SCC 208
17 (2004) 2 SCC 370
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circumstances of the case. It was clearly held in the said
decision that the provision of payment of interest is
discretionary and is not and cannot be bound by rules.”
“10. Interest is compensation for forbearance or detention
of money, which ought to have been paid to the claimant.
No rate of interest is fixed under section 171 of the Act and
the duty has been bestowed upon the court to determine
such rate of interest. …”
23. In Kaushnuma Begum (Smt.) v. New India Assurance
18
Co. Ltd. & Ors. (para 24), followed in United India Insurance
19
Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan & Ors. , the Supreme Court
fixed the rate of interest under Section 171 with reference to the
changing economy and bank rates, recognising that the interest
serves to preserve the value of the compensation which ought to
have been paid to the claimant from the date of the claim. The
Supreme Court thus consistently describes the interest as
compensation, compensation for the claimant being kept out of the
very compensation to which he was entitled, and as part of the duty
of the Tribunal in determining a just award.
24. The reason why interest for the period of adjudication is an
integral part of just compensation lies in the method of computation
itself. The Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) v. Delhi
20
Transport Corporation & Ors. , froze the computation as on the
date of the accident as under:
“46. In this case, the accident and death occurred in the
year 1988. The award was made by the Tribunal in the year
1993. The High Court decided the appeal in 2007. The
pendency of the claim proceedings and appeal for nearly
two decades is a fortuitous circumstance and that will not
entitle the appellants to rely upon the two pay revisions
which took place in the course of the said two decades. If
the claim petition filed in 1988 had been disposed of in the
year 1988-89 itself and if the appeal had been decided by
18 (2001) 2 SCC 9
19 (2002) 6 SCC 281
20 (2009) 6 SCC 121
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the High Court in the year 1989-90, then obviously the
compensation would have been decided only with reference
to the scale of pay applicable at the time of death and not
with reference to any future revision in pay scales.”
25. Since the claimant is denied the benefit of every subsequent
rise in income, prices or the value of money while the claim is
pending, the only instrument by which the Tribunal can render the
compensation “just” on the date of the award is the award of
interest for the period of adjudication. Further, in Susamma
Thomas (supra) (Paras 16 & 17) the Supreme Court explained that
the multiplier itself represents the number of years’ purchase on
which the loss of dependency is capitalised, on the footing that the
claimant will draw interest and capital from the lump sum. The lump
sum is thus computed on the assumption that it will be available to
the claimant from the outset; the interest for the period of
adjudication is what restores that assumption when the award
comes years later. The interest is, therefore, part of the arithmetic
of just compensation itself.
C. Rupesh Rashmikant Shah (supra) : interest is part of, and
an accretion to, the compensation
26. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, after an
exhaustive review of the Supreme Court judgments, expounded as
under:
“48. … The multiplier theory proceeds on the basis that
with interest that may be earned on the compensation and
a portion drawn from the capital, should be equivalent to
what the deceased would have contributed to his family. At
the end of the period, the capital should be completely
utilised. It is, therefore, that while awarding compensation,
though the Claims Tribunal awards future loss in praesenti,
interest is awarded for the period between filing of the
Claim Petition till passing of the award and, therefore, as
held by the Supreme Court in the case of Abati Bezbaruah
(supra) and Dharampal (supra), such interest is considered
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to be part of compensation, and accretion to the
compensation since the same is awarded for the
compensation which is ascertained with reference to an
earlier date i.e., the date of accident. At the same time,
courts have not approved granting interest on future
expenditure.”
“55. … Culmination of discussion in these judgments would
be that such interest is compensatory in nature and will
thus, form part of the compensation itself. Compensation is
computed with reference to the date of accident. All
calculations of multiplicand and multiplier are based on
such reference point. But computation by the Tribunal takes
time. If compensation is revised by the High Court it takes
further time. Interest is awarded keeping in mind the rate
inflation. of Effort thus is to award just compensation.
Awarding interest for delayed computation of compensation
is therefore integral part of this exercise.”
“56. … The interest for the period between the filing of the
claim petition and passing of the award thus, is for the
period when the claimant for the first time approached the
Claims Tribunal asking the Tribunal to assess and award
compensation and the time consumed in disposing of the
Claim Petition. … At the same time, as noted, the Courts do
not award interest on future expenditure since the amount
is being paid to the claimant for an expenditure which may
be incurred at a later point of time. This dichotomy, thus,
between awarding interest on future income while not
awarding interest for future expenditure brings out the true
character of the interest being awarded.”
27. The “dichotomy” noticed by the Bombay High Court is decisive
of the inseparability of the interest. If the interest were a return on
money, it would be payable on every rupee of the award
irrespective of the head. It is withheld on future expenditure, and
allowed on future loss of income, only because it is an element in
the measure of each particular head of loss. It cannot, therefore, be
detached from the compensation and treated as a free-standing
yield.
D. The Analogy of the land acquisition law: Interest which is
an accretion to compensation is ‘compensation
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28. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax,
21
Faridabad v. Ghanshyam (HUF) , drew a fundamental
distinction between interest which is an accretion to the value of the
property (Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) and interest
for delay in payment of an amount already determined (Section
34), and held the former to be part of the compensation as under:
“50. It is true that “interest” is not compensation. It is
equally true that Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act refers to
compensation. But as discussed hereinabove, we have to
go by the provisions of the 1894 Act which awards
“interest” both as an accretion in the value of the lands
acquired and interest for undue delay. Interest under
Section 28 unlike interest under Section 34 is an
accretion to the value, hence it is a part of enhanced
compensation or consideration which is not the case with
interest under Section 34 of the 1894 Act. …”
“55. It is important to note that compensation, including
enhanced compensation/consideration under the 1894
Act, is based on the full value of property as on date of
notification under Section 4 of that Act. When the
Court/Tribunal directs payment of enhanced
compensation under Section 23(1A), or Section 23(2) or
under Section 28 of the 1894 Act it is on the basis that
award of Collector or the Court, under reference, has not
compensated the owner for the full value of the property
as on date of notification.”
29. The interest under Section 171 of the MV Act for the period of
adjudication is precisely of species of Section 28 of Land Acquisition
Act in so much as the compensation is fixed with reference to the
date of the accident (as land compensation is fixed with reference
to the date of the Section 4 notification), and the interest is
awarded by the adjudicating forum itself because, without it, the
claimant would not have been compensated for the full value of the
loss. Applying the ratio decidendi in Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra),
the Gujarat High Court in Movaliya Bhikhubhai Balabhai v.
21 (2009) 8 SCC 412
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22
Income-Tax-Officer (TDS) & Anr. , held (as extracted in
Rupesh Rashmikant Shah (supra), para 25) as under:
“The upshot of the above discussion is that since interest
under section 28 of the Act of 1894, partakes the
character of compensation, it does not fall within the
ambit of the expression “interest” as contemplated in
section 145A of the Income-tax Act.”
30. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sunder v.
23
Union of India , similarly treated the “amount awarded” as the
aggregate of every component computed under the statute
(including solatium), rejecting a fragmented reading of the award.
By parity, the award under Sections 168 and 171 of the MV Act is a
single aggregate of compensation and the interest which accretes to
it.
E. The High Courts on the inseparable character of MACT
interest
31. The Gujarat High Court in The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
(supra) explained why the land acquisition amendments cannot be
transposed to the MV Act as under:
“48. The compensation received under the compulsory
acquisition of land is in any case taxable under Section 45
as the Capital Gains and therefore, the issue under the
Land Acquisition with regard to interest under Sections 28
and 34 i.e limited to the extent that the same would be
taxable under Section 56(2)(viii) (Section 34 interest) or
Section 45 the Capital Gains (Section 28 interest that is
part of the compensation) and therefore, only the year of
its taxability is decided by Section 145A(b) and not the
taxability of interest on the compulsory acquisition of
land. Whereas under the Motor Vehicles Act, the
compensation itself is exempt. The nature of interest,
therefore, would assume significance and cannot be given
the same treatment as interest on compensation under
the Land Acquisition Act and be taxed by operation of
Section 145A(b).”
22 (2016) 388 ITR 343 (Guj)
23 (2001) 7 SCC 211
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74. Our final conclusion may be summarized as under: [a]
The interest awarded by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal
u/s 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 is not taxable
under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The interest awarded in
the motor accident claim cases from the date of the Claim
Petition till the passing of the award, or in the case of
Appeal, till the judgment of the High Court in such appeal,
would not be exigible to tax, not being an income. … [c]
The Insurance Companies or the owners of the motor
vehicles depositing the requisite amount in due compliance
with the awards of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals
shall deposit the full amount with the Tribunal and shall
not deduct tax u/s 194A of the Income Tax Act on the
interest awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.”
32. the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
C ommissioner of Income Tax Vs. Oriental Insurance Co.
24
Ltd. , held as under:
“41. To our opinion, the award of compensation under
motor accidents claims cannot be regarded as income.
The award is in the form of compensation to the legal
heirs for the loss of life of their bread earner. Hence the
interest on such award also cannot be termed as income
to the legal heirs of the deceased or the victim himself.”
33. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Atar Singh Bhadouria v.
25
The New India Insurance Co mpany Limited , after considering
the aforesaid Supreme Court authorities and the judgments of the
Bombay and Gujarat High Courts, held that interest awarded from
the date of the claim petition till the award or appellate judgment is
compensatory, forms part of the compensation and is not exigible to
tax, and directed the amount deducted as TDS to be made over to
the claimant.
34. The Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
26
Nirmal Devi @ Nirmal Verma v. Union of India & Anr. , after
considering Rupesh Rashmikant Shah (supra), the judgments of
the Gujarat, Allahabad and Madras High Courts, and the earlier
24 (2012) 2011 Taxmann 369 (All)
25 Neutral Citation No.2025:MPHC-GWL:4322
26 Neutral Citation No.2023:PHHC:105557-DB
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decisions of that Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Savitri Devi (CR No. 6784 of 2016, 04/04/2018), National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Janki (CR No. 6320 of 2016,
08/08/2019) and Drawing & Disbursing Officer Vs. Income
27
tax Officer , held as under:
“7. … Needless to say here that the compensation under
motor accident claims is given to the legal heirs of the
deceased for loss of life of their bread earner or to the
victim in case of permanent disablement or injuries. The
recipients of such award might not even come within the
ambit of Act, 1961 and that is why, there have been
several pronouncements that award of compensation
under motor accident claims cannot be regarded as
income of the interest on such awards also cannot be
termed as income to legal heirs of the deceased or to the
victim himself. …”
“8. In view of ratio of law as laid down in the above cited
authorities, there is no hesitation to hold that the
compensation awarded under MV Act by MACT or the
interest on the said compensation amount cannot be
termed as income. …”
35. In Nirmal Devi (supra) the claimant had suffered TDS of
Rs.1,23,919/-and had, in addition, paid tax of Rs.2,13,631/- while
filing her return for A.Y. 2019-20 by offering the interest to tax. The
Revenue’s objection that, having offered the interest to tax and
availed of the TDS credit, she could not claim a refund (paras 2 and
4) did not find favour, and the Court directed refund (para 9) as
under:
“9. … Since the upshot of the discussion as made above is
that no tax was exigible and could be deducted from the
amount of interest awarded to the petitioner by MACT
from the date of filing of claim petition till the date of
passing of the award and interest awarded on enhanced
amount of compensation by High Court in the appeal filed
by the petitioner, till the judgment of the High Court, the
same not being income, therefore, the tax on these
amounts so deducted by the respondents is liable to be
refunded to the petitioner. It is ordered accordingly. The
writ petition stands allowed in these terms and the
respondents are directed to refund the amount so
deducted as tax to the petitioner within one month from
the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. …”
27 IT Appeal No.495/2009 dt.30.03.2011
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36. The Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Smt. Kuni
28
Sahoo & Ors. VS . Union of India & Ors. , after considering
Susamma Thomas (supra), Sarla Verma (supra), Reshma
29
Kumari v. Madan Mohan & Anr. , Abati Bezbaruah ,
Dharampal (supra) and Rupesh Rashmikant Shah (supra), held
as under:
“8.7 … The multiplier theory proceeds on the basis that
with interest that may be earned on the compensation
and a portion drawn from the capital should be
equivalent to what the deceased would have contributed
to his family. At the end of the period, the capital should
be completely utilised. While awarding compensation,
though the Claims Tribunal awards future loss in
praesenti, interest is awarded for the period between
filing of the application for claim till passing of the award
for compensation.”
“10.2 Therefore, the interest awarded in the motor
accident claim cases from the date of the application for
claim till the passing of the award or in case of Appeal,
till the Judgment of the High Court in such Appeal, would
not be exigible to tax, and such interest not being an
income as such interest payable on account of delay in
deposit of amount awarded shall not attract TDS under
section 194A. The nature of such interest paid/credited
to the petitioners does not fall within the ambit of
definition of “interest” contained in Section 2(28A).”
F. An accretion takes the character of the principal
37. It is a settled principle that the character of a receipt received
on account of delay is determined by the character of the principal
transaction with which it is integrally connected. In Commissioner
30
of Income Tax, Gujarat v. Saurashtra Cement Ltd. , liquidated
damages received on account of delay in supply of plant and
machinery were held to be a capital receipt, being directly and
intrinsically connected with the procurement of a capital asset. By
28 (2023) 457 ITR 777 (Orissa)
29 (2013) 9 SCC 65
30 (2010) 11 SCC 84
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the same reasoning, interest awarded on account of the time taken
to determine compensation for death or bodily injury
partakes/assumes the character of that compensation only and is
equally a non-income capital receipt.
38. The interest awarded under Section 171 of the MV Act for the
period of adjudication is thus – (i) integral to the compensation,
being part of the exercise of determining just compensation under
Section 168; (ii) inseparable from it, being computed upon it,
calibrated by the heads of loss, and existing only by reason of the
award of compensation; and (iii) inalienable from it, in so much as
it cannot be severed, neither can be independently claimed or
enforced, and is recovered only as part of the amount due under
the award. Thus, the interest awarded by MACT being an accretion
to a sum (compensation) which is not exigible to income tax, being
a capital receipt, as a corollary thereof, it is also not ‘income’.
PART- V I : Such interest is merely compensatory and is not
‘interest’ in common parlance or within section 2(28A) of the
Income Tax Act, 1961.
A. The meaning of ‘interest’ in common parlance
39. In its ordinary and commercial sense, “interest” is the return
for the use of money lent or deposited, or the charge for
forbearance in demanding money already due. The definition
contained in Black’s Law Dictionary, as noticed by the Supreme
Court in Kerala State Coastal Zone Management Authority
31
Member Secretary Vs . Maradu Municipality & Ors. , defines
interest as under:
“12. “Interest” as defined in Black's Law Dictionary is the
compensation fixed by agreement or allowed by law for
the use or detention of money, or for the loss of money
31 (2022) 8 SCC 240
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by one who is entitled to its use; especially, the amount
owed to a lender in return for the use of the borrowed
money. A person deprived of the use of money to which
he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated
for the deprivation, call it by any name [Irrigation Deptt.,
State of Orissa v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508].”
40. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Central Bank
32
of India v. Ravindra & Ors. , (Para 37) explained thus:
“37.Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edn.) defines “interest”
inter alia as the compensation fixed by agreement or
allowed by law for the use or detention of money, or for
the loss of money by one who is entitled to its use;
especially, the amount owed to a lender in return for the
use of the borrowed money . According to Stroud's Judicial
Dictionary of Words And Phrases (5th Edn.) interest
means, inter alia, compensation paid by the borrower to
the lender for deprivation of the use of his money. In
Secy., Irrigation Deptt., Govt. of Orissa v. G.C. Roy
[(1992) 1 SCC 508] the Constitution Bench opined that a
person deprived of the use of money to which he is
legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for
the deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called
interest, compensation or damages … this is the principle
of Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. In Sham Lal
Narula (Dr) v. CIT [AIR 1964 SC 1878 : (1964) 7 SCR
668] this Court held that interest is paid for the
deprivation of the use of the money. The essence of
interest in the opinion of Lord Wright, in Riches v.
Westminster Bank Ltd. [(1947) 1 All ER 469 : 1947 AC
390 (HL)] All ER at p. 472 is that it is a payment which
becomes due because the creditor has not had his money
at the due date. It may be regarded either as
representing the profit he might have made if he had had
the use of the money, or, conversely, the loss he suffered
because he had not that use. The general idea is that he
is entitled to compensation for the deprivation; the
money due to the creditor was not paid, or, in other
words, was withheld from him by the debtor after the
time when payment should have been made, in breach
of his legal rights, and interest was a compensation
whether the compensation was liquidated under an
agreement or statute. A Division Bench of the High Court
of Punjab speaking through Tek Chand, J. in CIT v. Dr
Sham Lal Narula [AIR 1963 Punj 411 : (1963) 50 ITR
513] thus articulated the concept of interest: (AIR p.
414, para
8)
“8. The words ‘interest’ and ‘compensation’ are sometimes
used interchangeably and on other occasions they have
distinct connotation. ‘Interest’ in general terms is the
return or compensation for the use or retention by one
person of a sum of money belonging to or owed to
another. In its narrow sense, ‘interest’ is understood to
32 (2002) 1 SCC 367
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mean the amount which one has contracted to pay for use
of borrowed money. … In whatever category ‘interest’ in a
particular case may be put, it is a consideration paid
either for the use of money or for forbearance in
demanding it, after it has fallen due , and thus, it is a
charge for the use or forbearance of money. In this sense,
it is a compensation allowed by law or fixed by parties, or
permitted by custom or usage, for use of money,
belonging to another, or for the delay in paying money
after it has become payable.””
41. The “interest” in its ordinary sense or as understood in
common parlance thus presupposes two things: (i) money
belonging to one person which is used or retained by another, and
(ii) a sum which has fallen due or become payable. Neither is
present in the case of interest awarded under Section 171 for the
period of adjudication. The insurer has never had the use of any
money belonging to the claimant, rather it never owed any money
to the claimant; the claimant has neither lent nor deposited
anything. And until the award, there is no sum due or payable at
all: the claim is one for unliquidated damages. The Supreme Court
33
in Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry , held as under:
“Now the law is well settled that a claim for unliquidated
damages does not give rise to a debt until the liability is
adjudicated and damages assessed by a decree or order
of a Court or other adjudicatory authority. When there is
a breach of contract, the party who commits the breach
does not eo instanti incur any pecuniary obligation, nor
does the party complaining of the breach becomes
entitled to a debt due from the other party. … A claim for
damages for breach of contract is, therefore, not a claim
for a sum presently due and payable …”
42. The principle applies a fortiori to a claim in tort for damages
for death or bodily injury. Until the Tribunal adjudicates the claim
and assesses the compensation, no debt exists in respect of which
interest in its ordinary sense could run. The amount described as
“interest” for that period is not interest on a debt; it is a
33 (1974) 2 SCC 231
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component of the damages itself, intrinsically & inherently
attached to or impregnated with damages themselves, quantified by
applying a rate to the principal over the period of adjudication.
43. The nomenclature is not decisive. The Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court in the matter of Secretary, Irrigation
34
Department, Government of Orissa & Ors. Vs. G.C. Roy (Para
43) expounded as under:–
“(i) A person deprived of the use of money to which
he is legitimately entitled has a right to be
compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name.
It may be called interest, compensation or damages.
…”
44. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of
Shamlal Narula Dr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab,
35
Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Patiala , itself
confirms the distinction. The Supreme Court propounded that
statutory interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 is taxable only because, title having passed to the State on
possession, the interest was paid for the State’s use of money
which already belonged to the owner; the Court expressly
distinguished such interest from damages or compensation as
under:–
“9….This amount is not, therefore, compensation for the
land acquired or for depriving the claimant of his right to
possession, but is that paid to the claimant for the use of
his money by the State. … But in case where title passes
to the State, the statutory interest provided thereafter
can only be regarded either as representing the profit
which the owner of the land might have made if he had
the use of the money or the loss suffered because he had
not that use. In no sense of the term can it be described
damages as or compensation for the owner’s right to
retain possession …”
34 (1992) 1 SCC 508
35 (1964) 53 ITR 151 (SC)
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45. The interest under Section 171 of the MV Act for the period of
adjudication is the converse case: it is not paid for the use by the
insurer of any money of the claimant, but is, in every sense of the
term, part of the damages or compensation for death or bodily
injury. On the reasoning of Shamlal Narula (supra) itself, it is not
interest in its ordinary connotation or as understood in common
parlance.
B. The statutory definition in Section 2(28A) of the Income
Tax Act, 1961
46. The 1961 Act does not leave the meaning of “interest” to
common parlance alone. Section 2(28A) provides as under:
“(28A) “interest” means interest payable in any manner
in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred
(including a deposit, claim or other similar right or
obligation) and includes any service fee or other charge
in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in
respect of any credit facility which has not been utilised;”
47. The definition is anchored in two expressions, “moneys
borrowed” and “debt incurred”. The words in the parenthesis are
illustrative of those expressions and do not enlarge them beyond
relationships of a debtor-creditor character; the service fee or other
charge is likewise “in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt
incurred” or a credit facility. The Division Bench of the Kerala High
Court in Beacon Projects (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income
36
Tax , after surveying the authorities, held as under:
“8. … If this is the principle to be borne in mind, the term
‘interest’ as defined in section 2(28A) of the Act has to be
construed strictly. On such literal construction, it can be
seen that before any amount paid is construed as interest,
what is required to be established is that the sum paid is in
respect of any money borrowed or debt incurred and that
there is debtor-creditor relationship between the parties.
These are the necessary ingredients of section 2(28A).”
36 (2015) 377 ITR 237
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“11. From the principles laid down in the decisions referred
to above, it is obvious that section 2(28A) is not attracted to
every payment made and that the provision can be
attracted only in cases where there is debtor-creditor
relationship and that payments are made in discharge of a
pre-existing obligation.”
48. The same view has been taken by different High Courts, while
interpreting the extant provisions of Section 2(28A) of the Act,
1961, in the cases of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sahib
37
Chits (Delhi) (P) Ltd. (payments to chit subscribers not interest,
there being no money borrowed or debt incurred); Commissioner
38
of Income Tax v. Cargill Global Trading (P) Ltd. (discounting
charges not interest unless payable in respect of money borrowed
or debt incurred); Commissioner of Income Tax v. H.P. Housing
39
Board (amount paid to allottees on account of delayed allotment
not interest under Section 2(28A)); and Commissioner of Income
40
Tax v. M.K.J. Enterprises Ltd. (interest relates to a pre-existing
debt implying a debtor-creditor relationship).
49. Applying the said definition of ‘interest’ contained in Section
2(28A) of the Act, 1961 specifically to motor accident, the Allahabad
High Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) held as under:
“36. The word "interest" as defined under Section 2(28A)
has to be construed strictly. We may refer to Polestar
Electronic (P.) Ltd. v . Addl. CST [1978] 41 STC 409 in
which hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under:-
"if there is one principle of interpretation more well
settled than any other, it is that statutory enactment
must ordinarily be construed according to the plain
natural meaning of its language and that no words should
be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary
to do so in order to prevent a provision from being
unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally
irreconcilable with the rest of the statute."”
37 (2010) 328 ITR 342 (Del)
38 (2011) 335 ITR 94 (Del)
39 (2012) 340 ITR 388 (HP)
40 (2014) 50 Taxmann.com 441 (Cal)
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“37. The necessary ingredients of such interest are that it
should be in respect of any money borrowed or debt
incurred. The award under the Motor Vehicle Act is
neither the money borrowed by the insurance company
nor the debt incurred upon the insurance company. As far
as the word “claim” is concerned, it should also be
regarding a deposit or other similar right or obligation.
The definition of Section 2(28A) of the Income Tax Act
again repeats the words “monies borrowed or debt
incurred” which clearly shows the intention of the
legislature …”
“38. The word “claim” used in the definition may relates
claims to under contractual liability but certainly do not
cover the claims under the statutory liability. The claim
under the Motor Vehicle Act regarding c ompensation for
death or injury is a statutory liability.”
“44. In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chiranji Lal
Multani Mal Rai Bahadur (P.) Ltd. (supra), Commissioner of
Income-tax Vs. H.P. Housing Board (supra), Commissioner
of Income-tax Vs. Sahib Chits (Delhi) (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra), it
has been clearly held that if interest is awarded by the court
for loss suffered on account of deprivation of property or
paid for breach of contract by means of damages or were
not paid in respect of any debt incurred or money borrowed,
shall not attract the provisions of Section 2(28A) read with
Section 194A(1) of the Income Tax Act.”
50. The Orissa High Court in Kuni Sahoo (supra), applying the
definition in Section 2(28A) specifically to interest awarded on MACT
compensation, held as under:
“10.3 In the instant case, it is not denied that interest was
paid for delay in depositing the awarded amount. Reading
of clause (28A) of section 2 of the IT Act would show that
in order to fall within the connotation of the term
“interest”, the money must be: i. Borrowed or debt
incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right
or obligation) and includes ii. Any service fee or other
charge in respect of money borrowed or debt incurred or
in respect of any credit facility which has not been utilized.
10.4 The marginal heading of section 194A suggests
that said provision deals with TDS in respect of
“interest” definition of which term is given in Section
2(28A), but not “interest on securities” which
expression is defined in section 2(28B). The amount
of “interest” deposited by the opposite party No. 4
with the MACT is on account of delay in deposit of
compensation, which can neither be understood as
borrowed or debt incurred nor does it fall within
meaning of the term “service fee” or the expression
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“other charge in respect of money borrowed or debt
incurred or in respect of any credit facility which has
not been utilized”. The interest so deposited by the
National Insurance Co. Ltd.-opposite party No. 4
would not, therefore, be treated as income of the
petitioners. Hence, the TDS deducted by the
opposite party No. 4 is liable to be refunded to the
petitioners.”
51. These principles apply with greater force to interest awarded
under Section 171 of the MV Act, for the reason that :
(a) there is no money borrowed by the insurer from the
claimant;
(b) there is no debt incurred prior to the award, the claim being
for unliquidated damages Raman Iron Foundry’s case
( supra);
(c) there is no ‘debtor–creditor’ relationship and no pre–existing
obligation of the insurer towards the claimant, the liability
arising from tort and statute and being quantified only by the
award;
(d) the word “claim”, applying the well–established canon of
statutory interpretation of noscitur a sociis, with “deposit” and
“other similar right or obligation” and in the context of “moneys
borrowed or debt incurred”, purposively refers to debt–like
contractual claims and not to a statutory claim for damages for
death or bodily injury; and
(e) the rate of interest is merely the measure by which the
Tribunal quantifies the compensation for the period of
adjudication.
52. A definition in a taxing statute is to be construed strictly, and
any ambiguity in a charging provision must be resolved in favour of
the assessee ( Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v.
41
Dilip Kumar & Co mpany & Ors. . Even if the word “claim” were
thought to admit of two readings or a possible case of two plausible
41 (2018) 9 SCC 1
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views, then also the interpretation which keeps compensation for
death and injury outside the ambit and purport of charge must be
preferred and resolved in favour of the assessee taxpayer.
C. Such interest is merely compensatory
53. The interest awarded under Section 171 is, accordingly,
merely compensatory. It does not represent any profit, gain or yield
earned by the claimant; it represents the restoration of the value of
the compensation which the claimant would have received had the
claim been decided on the day it was filed. As the Gujarat High
Court observed in Oriental Insurance case (supra) (Para 56),
income refers to “something earned”, whereas “what is received as
compensation for loss in one or the other form may not be income”.
The Supreme Court too has recognised, in the context of awards by
consumer fora, that the interest so awarded is in substance
compensation and that the principles governing the grant of interest
on debts do not govern the grant of compensation ( Ghaziabad
42
Development Authority v. Balbir Singh .
54. By way of comparative illustration, the Parliament of the
United Kingdom has by statute provided that no liability to income
tax arises in respect of interest on damages for personal injuries or
death included in a sum for which judgment is given (Section 751,
Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act, 2005, carrying forward
Section 329 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988) — a
recognition, in a comparable common law system, that interest
forming part of personal injury damages shares the character of
those damages.
42 (2004) 5 SCC 65
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PART-VII: Sections 56(2)(viii), 145B(1) and 194A do not
create a charge on a receipt which is not income
55. Section 56(1) charges “income of every kind”; Section 56(2)
(viii) talks about “income by way of interest received on
compensation or on enhanced compensation”; Section 57(iv)
operates in respect of “income of the nature referred to in clause
(viii)”; and Section 145B(1) of the Act, 1961 merely fastens the year
in which interest on compensation is deemed to be income. Each
provision presupposes that the receipt is of the nature of ‘income’
thereof. The Bombay High Court in Rupesh Rashmikant Shah
(supra) has elucidated as under:
“50. … section 56 of the Act per se does not make a
particular receipt chargeable to tax if it otherwise does
not happen to be income. This section merely provides
for taxing an income not falling under the other heads as
income from other sources. … Therefore, clause (viii) of
sub-section (2) of section 56 by itself would not make
the receipt of interest on compensation chargeable to tax
as income from other sources, if such receipt is not
income.”
“52. … Once again, as observed in the context of section
56(2)(viii), clause (b) of section 145A of the Act does not
make interest on compensation or enhanced
compensation taxable if it is otherwise not exigible to
tax. It merely provides for the point of time when it
would be subjected to tax if otherwise taxable.”
“57. We, therefore, hold that the interest awarded in the
motor accident claim cases from the date of the Claim
Petition till the passing of the award or in case of Appeal,
till the judgment of the High Court in such Appeal, would
not be exigible to tax, not being an income. This position
would not change on account of clause (b) of section 145A
of the Act ... which provision now finds place in sub-
section (1) of section 145B of the Act. … Section 194A of
the Act is only a provision for deduction of tax at source.
Any provision for deduction of tax at source in the said
section would not govern the taxability of the receipt. The
question of deduction of tax at source would arise only if
the payment is in the nature of income of the payee.”
56. T
he Gujarat High Court in Oriental Insurance’s case (supra)
also examined in extenso the scheme of the Act, 1961, particularly
with reference to Sections 2(24), 56(2)(viii), 145A(b), 145B,
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194A(3) etc. and after extensively delving into the propositions laid
down in various authorities of the Supreme Court & High Courts,
propounded as under:
“45. Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
empowers the Tribunal to award interest on the claim
made under the Motor Vehicles Act from the date of
making the claim. Sections 28 and 34 resply of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 relate to the interest on
compensation for the land compulsorily acquired and the
compensation received for.
46. It is very essential to bear the fine distinction
between the interest awarded under the two enactments
viz. the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 and the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 resply. There are few amendments brought
under the Income-tax Act keeping a specific law (Land
Acquisition Act, 1894) in mind. Various High Courts have
taken the view that the treatment of all the three
sections 28, & 34 resply of the Land Acquisition Act and
section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act interest is not the
same so far as taxability under the Income-tax Act is
concerned.
47. The amendment in section 145A(b) only creates
a deeming fiction as to the year of taxability of the
interest on compensation. It does not create a
deeming fiction as to the taxability of the interest on
compensation. Even after the insertion of section
145A(b), the interest on compensation under the
Motor Vehicles Act which is exempt does not become
taxable by operation of section 145A(b).
48. The compensation received under the
compulsory acquisition of land is in any case taxable
under section 45 as the Capital Gains and therefore,
the issue under the Land Acquisition with regard to
interest under sections 28 and 34 i.e limited to the
extent that the same would be taxable under section
56(2)(viii) (Section 34 interest) or section 45 the
Capital Gains (Section 28 interest that is part of the
compensation) and therefore, only the year of its
taxability is decided by section 145A(b) and not the
taxability of interest on the compulsory acquisition of
land. Whereas under the Motor Vehicles Act, the
compensation itself is exempt. The nature of
interest, therefore, would assume significance and
cannot be given the same treatment as interest on
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compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and be
taxed by operation of section 145A(b).
49. It is crucial to note that in Rama Bai (supra), the
Supreme Court drew no distinction between the
interest under section 28 and interest under section
34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Later in CIT v.
Ghanshyam (HUF) [2009] 182 Taxman 368/315 ITR
1 (SC), the Supreme Court drew this distinction and
held that the interest under section 28 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 would form part of the
compensation itself and is taxable under the capital
gain only. The amendment of section 145A(b),
sections 56(2) (viii) and 194A resply would therefore
not apply to the interest under section 28 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, but would apply only to
Section 34 interest as is held in the case of Movaliya
Bhikhubhai Balabhai v. ITO-TDS [2016] 70
taxmann.com 45/388 ITR 343. Therefore, the
implication of Sections 145A(b) is not absolute even
with respect to the interest awarded under section 28
of the Land Acquisition Act and cannot apply to the
interest awarded by the MACT as well.
50. The term "income" is inclusively defined in
section 2(24). Such definition does not include the
"interest" referred to in the section 56(2) (viii) or
interest received in the MACT award.
51. The words of section 194A(3) are crucial i.e
"income by way of interest" and not simply "interest".
Therefore, even when interest is paid, if the same is
received not in the name of "income", then Section
194A(3) would not operate.
52. Therefore, the interest on compensation not being
taxable at all there is no question of deducting tax on
the same under section 194(A).”
57. T
he Punjab & Haryana High Court in Nirmal Devi (supra), with
specific reference to Section 145B(1), held as under:
“8. … A bare reading of Section 145-B (1) reveals that it
says that the interest received by an assessee on any
compensation or enhanced compensation, as the case may
be, shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year
in which it is received. However, in our opinion, this
provision does not make the interest chargeable to tax
without considering that whether such interest is income of
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the recipient or not? This section deals with the method of
accounting and is not a charging provision. The only
impact that Section 145-B has on the taxability of an
income, is its timing of taxability. What is not taxable is not
made taxable under this Section and it is only what is
taxable under the mercantile method of accounting which
is made taxable on cash basis of accounting by this
provision. Meaning thereby that only when the receipt is in
the nature of an income and receipt of interest is in nature
of income at the hands of assessee, that such interest can
be taxed as has been made out from the provisions of
Section 56 (2) (viii) also. … In view of this discussion, it
emerges that the interest granted on compensation or
enhanced compensation awarded by MACT or this Court
from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of
passing of the award or judgment by High Court will not
fall in the bracket of income and would not be exigible to
tax. …”
58. The legislative history confirms that the 2009 amendments
were mitigating provisions addressed to timing. The Memorandum
explaining the Finance (No.2) Bill, 2009 (extracted by the Gujarat
High Court, para 54) states that the decision in Rama Bai (supra)
“has caused undue hardship to the taxpayers. With a view to
mitigating the hardships, it is proposed to amend Section 145A to
provide that the interest received by an assessee on compensation
or enhanced compensation shall be deemed to be his income for
the year in which it is received, irrespective of the method of
accounting followed by the assessee.” Similarly, the Memorandum
to the Finance Bill, 2015 (para 55) records that deduction of tax on
interest on MACT compensation on accrual basis “results into
undue hardship and mismatch and that deduction would therefore
be made only at the time of payment. An amendment brought
about to mitigate the hardships cannot be elevated to the status of
a charging provision.
59. Section 194A of the 1961 Act is not in the nature of a charging
provision and is merely a machinery provision outlining procedural
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requirements relating to deduction & deposit of tax at source as per
Chapter XVII-B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Further, the obligation
to deduct tax at source arises only in the event where the payment
is income chargeable to tax in the hands of the payee ( GE India
Technology Centre Private Limited v. Commissioner of Income
43
Tax & Anr. , the Bombay High Court held as under (para 59):–
“59. … However, the fundamental question is does
section 194A make the interest income chargeable to
tax if it otherwise is not. The answer has to be in the
negative. The provision for deduction of tax at source
not is a charging provision. It only makes deduction
tax of at source on payment of same, which, in the
hands of payee, is income. If the payee has no
liability to pay such income, the liability to deduct tax
source at in the hands of payer cannot be fastened.
In other words, the provision of deducting tax at
source cannot govern the taxability of the amount
which is being paid.”
60. The Orissa High Court in Kuni Sahoo (supra) likewise held as
under
“10. Turning to IT Act, Section 194A, being not a charging
provision, deals with deduction of tax at source in respect
of “interest other than interest on securities”. Said
provision is attracted only when the payment of interest is
the in nature of income in the hands of the recipient. …”
61. Further, an award of the Tribunal is in the nature of a decree,
and in the absence of any direction in the award for deduction of
tax, the insurer cannot deduct tax from the amount payable to the
claimants ( Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (Allahabad) (supra),
para 43).
PART-VIII: The decisions of this Court and other decisions
on the TDS machinery
Decisions of this Court
43 (2010) 10 SCC 29
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44
62. In Kailash Narain Gupta v. Commissioner of Income Tax ,
interest on compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was
held to be income, drawing upon decisions in the land acquisition
and arbitration contexts; the decision predates Ghanshyam (HUF)
(2009) (supra) and the statutory amendments of 2009 and 2015.
In Smt. Sharda Pareek (supra), it was held, as extracted by the
Gujarat High Court in Oriental Insurance’s case (supra) (para
23), that “originally compensation was received by the claimant was
not income but once amount received, it has become capital and
interest on capital is liable to be taxable”. That this reasoning treats
the interest as a yield on capital in the hands of the claimant,
whereas for the period of adjudication, the claimant never received
or held the capital and there was no debt due to him until the
award; and that it does not address the governing words “moneys
borrowed or debt incurred” in Section 2(28A), nor the distinction
drawn in Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra) has been taken note of.
Further, the Interest earned by a claimant on investment of
compensation after its receipt (for instance, on a fixed deposit) is a
distinct receipt which is not the subject of this reference.
Decisions on the TDS machinery
63. Certain decisions, for instance, of the Karnataka High Court in
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chennabasavaiah, W.P. No. 49878
of 2012 (18/02/2015) and of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaroopi Bai, M.P. No. 5090 of
2018 (24/06/2019) and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kala Bai,
MANU/MP/0755/2020 , referred to & distinguished in the judgment of
the Gujarat High Court in Oriental Insurance (supra), required
44 (1997) 225 ITR 921 (Raj)
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insurers to deduct TDS where the interest exceeded Rs.50,000/-, leaving
the claimant to seek a refund. These decisions proceeded on the
language of Section 194A(3) and did not examine the anterior question
whether the interest is income at all, which is the question now referred.
Significantly, both these High Courts have since examined that anterior
question and answered it in favour of the claimants — the Karnataka
High Court by its order dated 09/08/2018 in MFA No. 103954 of
2017 , followed in B.L. Chudamani (supra), and the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Atar Singh Bhadouria (supra).
64. The following observation of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
45
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Savitri Devi are worth noticing –
“Considering the object of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, regarding grant of compensation to the victim,
it will not only be unjust but cruel to ask the hapless
victim to first pay the interest received along with
compensation on account of delayed payment, for
which he is not responsible, and then to file the income
tax return and claim the refund. As a result of the
foregoing discussion, it is held that the interest paid
along with the compensation as a result of the order of
the Tribunal or of the superior Court is not liable for
TDS.”
PART-IX: The Income Tax Act, 2025 and the exemption
inserted by the Finance Act, 2026
65. The 2025 Act came into force on 01.04.2026, replacing the
1961 Act, which continues to govern income of earlier periods. The
scheme on the subject has been carried forward: Section 92(2)(i)
(“any income by way of interest received on compensation or on
enhanced compensation referred to in section 278(1)”); Section
278(1) contemplates a deeming fiction to tax the interest received
on any compensation or enhanced compensation on receipt basis;
and Section 393 deals with provisions relating to TDS. Further, the
45 CR NO.6784/2016, dt. 04.04.2018
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provisions of Section 11 exempts the incomes of the nature
enumerated in Schedules II, III, IV, V and VI.
66. That the Finance Act, 2026 has amended Schedule III
[TABLE : Sl. No. 38B] to unconditionally exempt an individual or his
legal heir on any income in the nature of interest under the MV Act.
The Memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2026 (Clause 108)
states as under:
“2. The provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 inter alia
provides for compensation and interest on such
compensation to be awarded by the tribunal under said
Act, to an individual or his legal heir, on account of death
or on account of permanent disability or any bodily injury
under the said Act.”
“3. In order to alleviate sufferings of victims of such
accident and their family which may cause extreme
hardship to the aggrieved person and family, it is
proposed to amend the said Schedule to provide
exemption to an individual or his legal heir, on any
income in the nature of interest under the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988.”
“4. These amendments will take effect from the 1st day
of April, 2026 and shall accordingly, apply i n relation to
the tax year 2026-27 and subsequent tax years.”
67. Correspondingly, item (iv) in Section 393(4) [TABLE FOR NO
DEDUCTION AT SOURCE : Sl. No. 7, Column C – Condition (c)(iv)]
has been substituted so that no tax is to be deducted at source on
interest on the compensation amount awarded by a Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal “(A) to an individual; or (B) to a person other than
an individual, where the aggregate interest on such compensation
does not exceed ₹ 50000 during the tax year” .
68. The amendments assume significance to the present reference
in four respects:
(a) Legislative recognition of the nature of the
interest. The Memorandum describes the interest as
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awarded together with compensation “on account of death
or on account of permanent disability or any bodily injury”
and grants the exemption to “alleviate sufferings of victims”,
a recognition, in terms, that the interest is part and parcel of
the restitution for death or injury.
(b) Breadth. The exemption extends to “any income in the
nature of interest under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988”, and
not merely to interest for the period of adjudication.
(c) Receipt-basis consequence. Since Section 278(1) of
the 2025 Act (like Section 145B(1) of the 1961 Act) deems
interest on compensation to be income of the year of
receipt, interest awarded under the MV Act which is received
by an individual or legal heir on or after 01/04/2026 falls
within Tax Year 2026-27 or a later year and is exempt,
irrespective of the period to which it relates; and no tax is
deductible on its payment to an individual. Amounts
awarded to individual claimants which are paid or released
on or after 01/04/2026, including amounts withheld pending
this reference, must therefore reach them in full.
(d) Not the source of the Petitioners’ case for the
earlier period. For the period prior to 01/04/2026 the
Petitioners’ case rests on the proposition that the interest is
not an ‘income’ at all. The amendment, made by way of
abundant caution and to resolve the uncertainty created by
conflicting decisions, confirms that proposition; A
subsequent legislation may be looked at as a parliamentary
exposition where the earlier provision is ambiguous, and the
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Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Commissioner
of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi Vs. Vatika
46
Township Private Limited, recognised that legislation
conferring a benefit or removing a hardship, without a
corresponding detriment, warrants a purposive construction.
The Supreme Court expounded as under:
“30. … If a legislation confers a benefit on some
persons but without inflicting a corresponding
detriment on some other person or on the public
generally, and where to confer such benefit
appears to have been the legislators' object, then
the presumption would be that such a legislation,
giving it a purposive construction, would warrant
it to be given a retrospective effect.”
PART-X:Summary of propositions and answer to the referred
questions
69. The summary of propositions is as under:
(i) Compensation under the MV Act is restitution for death
or bodily injury, is not income, and is so accepted by the
Revenue; the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court has so held in
respect of the interest as well (B.L. Chudamani) (Part III).
(ii) Interest under Section 171 arises only upon the
allowance of a claim for compensation, is computed upon it, is
calibrated by the heads of loss, is awarded even without a plea
as being consequential in law, and is recovered only as part of
the amount due under the award. It is an integral,
inseparable and inalienable part of the compensation and an
accretion to it ( Abati Bezbaruah (supra); Dharampal
(supra); Keshav Bahadur (supra); Rupesh Rashmikant
Shah (supra); Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) ;
46 (2015) 1 SCC 1
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Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra) ; Nirmal Devi (supra) ; Kuni
Sahoo (supra) ( Part IV ) .
(iii) Being an accretion to a principal sum which is not
income, it takes the character of that principal sum
( Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra) Saurashtra Cement ; ) (supra)
(Part IV-F).
(iv) Such interest is merely compensatory. It is not interest in
common parlance, which presupposes the use of another’s
money or a sum already due ( Central Bank of India v.
Ravindra ) (supra); until the award there is no debt ( Raman
Iron Foundry ) (supra); and nomenclature is not decisive ( G.C.
Roy ) (supra) (Part V-A).
(v) It is not “interest” within Section 2(28A), which requires
moneys borrowed or a debt incurred and a debtor-creditor
relationship in discharge of a pre-existing obligation ( Beacon
Projects (supra); Sahib Chits (supra); H.P. Housing Board
(supra); CIT v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd . (supra); Kuni
Sahoo) (supra)(Part V-B).
(vi) Sections 56(2)(viii), 57(iv) and 145B(1) are
classification, computation and timing provisions which
presuppose ‘income’; Section 194A is a machinery provision
which follows chargeability ( Rupesh Rashmikant Shah
(supra) ; Nirmal Devi (supra) ; Kuni Sahoo )(supra) (Part VI).
(vii) The land acquisition decisions are distinguishable (Parts
IV-D and IV-E), and Kailash Narain Gupta (supra) and
Sharda Pareek (supra), to the extent contrary, do not lay
down the correct law (Part VII).
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(viii) Parliament has, by the Finance Act, 2026, recognised the
compensatory nature of such interest and exempted it, with no
TDS, from 01.04.2026 (Part VIII).
70. Thus, the question referred is answered as under:
(a) Interest awarded under Section 171 of the MV Act on
compensation for the period from the date of the claim
petition till the date of the award, or, in the case of an
appeal, till the judgment of the Appellate Court, forms
an integral and inseparable part of the compensation, is
merely compensatory, is not “interest” within Section
2(28A) of the 1961 Act, and is not income chargeable to
tax under Section 56(1) or Section 56(2)(viii) read with
Section 145B(1) [previously Section 145A(b)] of that
Act. Consequently, the insurance company is not
required to deduct tax at source thereon under Section
194A.
(b) The decisions of this Court in Kailash Narain Gupta
(supra) and Smt. Sharda Pareek (supra), to the extent
contrary, do not lay down the correct law.
(c) As regards interest for any period after the award
received before 01.04.2026, tax is not deductible on its
credit, and is deductible on payment only where the
aggregate of such interest paid to a claimant in the
financial year exceeds Rs.50,000/-, without prejudice to
the claimant’s right to establish non-taxability and claim
a refund.
(d) With effect from 01.04.2026, any interest awarded under
the MV Act and received by an individual or his legal heir
is exempt under Section 11 read with Schedule III of the
2025 Act, irrespective of the period to which it relates,
and no tax is deductible at source thereon under Section
393 of that Act.
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[2026:RJ-JP:40985-DB] [CREF-1/2022]
71. The reference is accordingly disposed off in the aforestated
terms.
72. Let the matter be placed before the appropriate Bench having
roster for disposal of writ petitions in light of the question of law, so
answered.
73. We place on record our appreciation for the assistance rendered
by Mr. Rahul Joshi, Mr. Ashish Saxena, Mr. Harshit Mittal, Mr.
Sandeep Mathur, Mr. Vinay Mathur, Mr. Daksh Pareek, Ms. Manasvita
Sharma, Mr. Naman Maheshwari, Mr. Vishwas Fatehpuria learned
counsels for the petitioners and Mr. Virendra Agrawal, Mr. Prakhar
Agrawal, Mr. Shantanu Sharma, Mr. Parth Vashistha, Mr. Sandeep
Pathak & Mr. Nitin Jain, learned counsels for the respondents, who
appeared and made submissions in arriving at the aforesaid
conclusion.
(BHUWAN GOYAL),J (SAMEER JAIN),J (SANJAY K. AGRAWAL),CJ
Kamlesh Kumar (Reserved)
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