Shahbaj @ Saji & Anr. vs State Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr.0

$~98
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
% Date of Decision: 27 October, 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010511902026
+ CRL.M.C. 8004/2026 & CRL.M.A. 33391/2026
SHAHBAJ @ SAJI & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Nazim Husain Qureshi with
Ms. Meena Rani and Mr. Ashok
Kumar, Advocates with petitioners in
person.
(M): 8447535224
Email: [email protected]

versus

STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sunil Kumar Gautam, APP for
the State.
(M): 9871349009
Email: [email protected]
SI Mittahn Lal, PS Sarita Vihar.
(M): 8800868695
Respondent no. 2 in person.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
MINI PUSHKARNA, J. (Oral) :


1. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), corresponding to Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), seeking quashing of the First
th
Information Report (“FIR”) being FIR No. 419/2019 dated 06 November,
2019, registered at Police Station (“PS”) Sarita Vihar, South East District,
Delhi, under Sections 393/398/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”),
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:31.10.2026
13:20:22
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and Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act, 1959 (“Arms Act”), on the ground of
settlement.
2. The aforesaid FIR was initially registered under Sections 392/511/34
of the IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act. Subsequently, a Chargesheet was
filed by the concerned Investigating Officer (“IO”), charging the petitioners
under Sections 393/398/34 of the IPC. Petitioner no. 1 was also charged under
Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act.
3. Charges were framed against both the petitioners under Sections
393/398/34 of the IPC and Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act vide order dated
th
08 October, 2025, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-02, South East
District, Saket Courts, Delhi, in SC 5096/2024 .
4. Issue notice. Notice is accepted by learned Additional Public
Prosecutor (“APP”) appearing for the State, i.e., respondent no. 1, as well as
by respondent no. 2.
5. The petitioners and respondent no. 2 are present before this Court, and
are duly identified by their respective counsels as well as the IO, who is also
present before this Court.
6. The relevant facts for adjudication of the captioned petition, as culled
out from the material on record, are as under:
6.1. The complainant, i.e., respondent no. 2, has stated that at about 12:30
th
AM on 06 November, 2019, he was standing near his car at Shaheen Bagh
Pulia, Jasola .
6.2. Two boys, i.e., the petitioners, arrived at the scene on a motorcycle and
informed respondent no. 2 that a woman was very ill and needed to be taken
to AIIMS Hospital. At their request, respondent no. 2 agreed to assist them.
6.3. Subsequently, one of the petitioners, who was riding pillion on the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:31.10.2026
13:20:22
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motorcycle, sat with respondent no. 2 inside his car, while the other petitioner
rode ahead on the motorcycle.
6.4. Once the parties arrived near Mother Dairy, Jasola , the petitioner, who
was sitting next to respondent no. 2, told him to drive towards the jhuggis near
the metro line. However, he refused to comply with the request as the area
was dark.
6.5. After the said petitioner repeated the request, respondent no. 2 drove a
short distance towards the area but stopped, refusing to proceed further despite
subsequent requests to enter.
6.6. Thereafter, the other petitioner, who was riding on the motorcycle,
approached the car and showed respondent no. 2 a desi katta , i.e., a country-
made pistol. Both the petitioners told respondent no. 2 to hand over all his
belongings and leave the car, threatening to shoot him with the country-made
pistol if he refused.
6.7. Suddenly, respondent no. 2 caught hold of the country-made pistol and
drove the car away from the area. The petitioner, sitting next to respondent
no. 2, opened the car door and jumped out.
6.8. Meanwhile, a Central Industrial Security Force (“CISF”) jawan
patrolling the area arrived. Upon seeing him, the other petitioner, riding the
motorcycle, left the motorcycle and ran away.
6.9. Respondent no. 2 then called the police on his mobile phone and handed
over the country-made pistol to the police official who arrived at the scene.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the
petitioners and respondent no. 2 have compromised the matter by executing a
th
Deed of Compromise dated 24 February, 2026.
8. In support of his contention that the present FIR can be quashed on the
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:31.10.2026
13:20:22
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basis of the settlement between the parties, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Narinder Singh and Others Versus State of Punjab and Another, (2014) 6
SCC 466 .
9. However, learned APP appearing for the State vehemently opposes the
present petition and submits that the present case involves a heinous crime,
wherein, the petitioners attempted to rob respondent no. 2. They were also in
possession of a country-made pistol, and consequently, the FIR includes
charges under Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act.
10. Having heard learned counsels appearing for the parties, this Court
notes the contents of the present FIR. A reading of the FIR clearly brings to
the fore that the petitioners had attempted to rob respondent no. 2 by showing
him a country-made pistol in a threatening manner. The robbery attempt was
not successful only on account of the fact that a CISF jawan was patrolling
the area where the alleged incident occurred.
11. Reliance on Narinder Singh (supra) is of no assistance to the
petitioners in this case, given that the Supreme Court makes a clear distinction
in relation to quashing of proceedings in relation to offences having a
predominantly civil character and those that are heinous and serious in nature.
The relevant portions of the judgment are as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down
the following principles by which the High Court would be guided
in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties
and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while
accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing
to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the

criminal proceedings:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:31.10.2026
13:20:22
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29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to
quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not
compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between
themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and

with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that
basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the
guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion
on either of the aforesaid two objectives .
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society . Similarly,
for the offences alleged to have been committed under special
statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that capacity are
not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between
the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed
when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among
themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as
to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused
to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:31.10.2026
13:20:22
Page 5 of 7

12. Further, in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Versus Laxmi
Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 , the Supreme Court categorically
held that certain offences, such as those under the Arms Act, are to be treated
as crimes against society, and set out the factors for determining whether
proceedings involving such offences may be quashed. The relevant
observations of the Supreme Court are as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of
this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and
held as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable
offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and
when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst
themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences
under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc.
would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the
Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot
be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code,
on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute
amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its
decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:31.10.2026
13:20:22
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in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would
be open to the High Court to examine as to whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the
prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved,
would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For
this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on
the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc.
However, such an exercise by the High Court would be
permissible only after the evidence is collected after
investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed
and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when
the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate
conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court
in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6
SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously
and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated
hereinabove;

xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
13. In view of the aforementioned judgments and the submissions made
before this Court, the present petition cannot be allowed as the allegations
against the petitioners are very serious. Attempting to rob a person at gunpoint
is a crime against society, and such crimes cannot be condoned merely
because the concerned parties have allegedly settled.
14. Accordingly, considering the facts and circumstances of the present
case, this Court does not find this to be a fit case for quashing.
15. The present petition, along with the pending application, is dismissed
and disposed of.

MINI PUSHKARNA, J
OCTOBER 27, 2026
c
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:31.10.2026
13:20:22
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