Ali Ahmed Khan vs Council For Leather Exports And Ors.

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Reserved on: 07 April, 2026.
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Pronounced on: 29 May, 2026.
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Uploaded on: 31 May, 2026.

+ W.P.(C) 5425/2019, CM APPL. 23802/2019, CM APPL.
31394/2021, CM APPL. 44857/2021, CM APPL. 35652/2023, CM
APPL. 78384/2025, CM APPL. 8020/2026

ALI AHMAD KHAN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Biswajit Das, Mr. Deepak Kumar
and Ms. Neha Yadav, Advocates.

versus

COUNCIL FOR LEATHER EXPORTS AND ORS.
....Respondents
Through: Mr. Nalin Kohli, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Anshul Malik and Mr.
Ayuushman Arora, Advocates for R-
3.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT

SANJEEV NARULA, J.:
1. The present writ petition assails disciplinary proceedings initiated by
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the Council for Leather Exports against one of its senior officers. The
dispute arises from a chain of public deputations, repatriation from National
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Book Trust, refusal of physical joining by the parent organisation, salary
directions passed by this Court, and thereafter a charge-sheet and suspension

1
“CLE”
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 5425/2019 Page 1 of 49

Digitally Signed
By:ANITA BAITAL
Signing Date:31.05.2026
00:33:14

order founded substantially on alleged acts during the Petitioner’s tenure as
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Secretary, Central Waqf Council.
2. The Petitioner seeks quashing of the charge-sheet/memorandum dated
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1 March, 2019, the disciplinary proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, and
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the suspension order dated 15 April, 2019. He also seeks consequential
service benefits and directions for being permitted to discharge duties in the
appropriate post. CLE, arrayed as Respondent no. 1, contests the petition at
the threshold. It claims that it is not “State” under Article 12 of the
Constitution, is not otherwise amenable to writ jurisdiction in service
matters, and that the Petitioner’s remedy, if any, lies elsewhere.
3. The connected writ petition [ W.P.(C) 6602/2018 ] arises from the
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relieving order dated 29 May, 2018 issued by NBT, by which the Petitioner
was prematurely repatriated to his parent organisation. That petition also
contains a prayer for consideration of the Petitioner’s representation dated
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3 May, 2018 for release of outstanding dues. The two matters have
overlapping facts. They have therefore been heard together on the
preliminary objection of maintainability. They are, however, not identical in
cause, relief or legal enquiry. The present judgment deals with the challenge
to CLE’s disciplinary action. The connected writ petition concerning NBT’s
relieving order is being dealt with separately.
Factual background
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4. The Petitioner joined CLE as Regional Director on 21 July, 2005.
His appointment was on the regular cadre of CLE and his service was
governed by the Standing Orders of CLE. The charge-sheet itself relies upon

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“NBT”
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“CWC”
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Digitally Signed
By:ANITA BAITAL
Signing Date:31.05.2026
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the Petitioner’s appointment order dated 20 June, 2005 and condition no. 5
thereof, which required him to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to
duty.
5. CLE is an Export Promotion Council in the leather sector. Its
governing documents describe it as an organisation functioning under the
administrative aegis of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government
of India, while also operating with a measure of institutional autonomy. The
2016 amended Memorandum and Articles of Association, read with the
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Office Memorandum dated 10 November, 1997, indicate autonomy in day-
to-day administrative matters, including staffing and internal management.
At the same time, the governing framework retains a continuing nexus with
the Central Government through provisions concerning Government
nominees, appointment of the Election Authority, concurrence in
appointment of auditors, restrictions on alteration of the constitutional
documents without prior approval, and the binding power of Government
directions under Article 76. CLE also functions as the recognised Export
Promotion Council for the leather sector under the foreign trade regime,
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including in relation to Registration-cum-Membership Certificates. These
features are relevant to the first issue in this case, namely whether CLE can
resist writ jurisdiction on the ground that it is merely a private company.
6. The Petitioner’s service history thereafter moved through two
deputations. The first was to the CWC. The Petitioner was appointed as
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Secretary, CWC, under an Office Memorandum dated 17 July, 2012. CWC
is a statutory body under the Waqf Act, 1995. The Petitioner asserts that, for
the post of Secretary, CWC, the competent authority was the Union Minister
Signature Not Verified
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By:ANITA BAITAL
Signing Date:31.05.2026
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for Minority Affairs as ex-officio Chairperson of the Council. The
Petitioner’s tenure as Secretary, CWC, was extended from time to time by
orders issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Minority Affairs. One
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such order dated 9 July, 2014 records extension of his term as Secretary,
CWC, and also records that the post of Secretary, CWC, was upgraded to
the level of Joint Secretary to the Government of India.
7. The second deputation was to NBT. The Petitioner was selected as
Joint Director in NBT and joined there on deputation. The NBT appointment
was for a tenure of three years, subject to the terms of deputation. By order
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dated 29 May, 2018, NBT relieved the Petitioner and repatriated him to his
parent organisation. The Petitioner challenged that order in W.P.(C)
6602/2018. In that petition, CLE was not initially arrayed as a Respondent.
It was impleaded later because, after repatriation, the Petitioner complained
that CLE was not permitting him to join.
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8. The order dated 20 November, 2018 passed in W.P.(C) 6602/2018
records that the Petitioner’s grievance in that petition was against the NBT
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relieving order dated 29 May, 2018. The Court noted that CLE had earlier
been considered not to be a necessary party, but on the Petitioner’s statement
that after the relieving order he tried to join the parent department and CLE
did not allow him to do so, CLE was impleaded as Respondent no. 3 in that
petition.
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9. On 18 December, 2018, CLE appeared in W.P.(C) 6602/2018. It
stated before the Court that it was not ready to give joining to the Petitioner,
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but would pay salary from 9 July, 2018 and continue to pay salary till
further orders. The Court recorded the statement and made it clear that CLE

4
“RCMC”
Signature Not Verified
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shall continue to pay salary. The issue of salary for the period from 29
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May, 2018 to 9 July, 2018 was left to final disposal.
10. The subsequent correspondence shows that the Petitioner repeatedly
sought clarity on his posting, salary slips, admissible allowances and other
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service incidents. In an email dated 9 January, 2019, he acknowledged
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receipt of salary for the period from 9 July, 2018 till 31 December, 2018
and requested that salary slips be issued to him as issued to other employees
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of CLE. In another representation dated 3 April, 2019, he complained that
although he had reported back after repatriation from NBT, CLE had not
allowed joining or posting, and that salary had been released only after the
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order dated 18 December, 2018.
11. The record also contains a later instruction sent by CLE to counsel on
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9 April, 2026, in response to a query whether the Petitioner had joined CLE
after repatriation. It states that CLE had released salary in adherence to the
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order dated 18 December, 2018 and that this was considered as the
Petitioner’s joining in the Council. It further states that the Petitioner was
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thereafter placed under suspension with effect from 15 April, 2019 and
paid 50% wages as subsistence allowance.
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Charge-sheet dated 1 March, 2019
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12. CLE issued memorandum dated 1 March, 2019 proposing to hold an
inquiry against the Petitioner under the Standing Orders of CLE. The
memorandum enclosed the statement of articles of charge, the statement of
imputations, the list of documents and the list of witnesses. The Petitioner
was required to submit his written statement of defence within seven days of
receipt and to state whether he desired to be heard in person. The
memorandum also warned that, if he did not submit his defence or failed to
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 5425/2019 Page 5 of 49

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Signing Date:31.05.2026
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appear before the Inquiry Authority, the inquiry could proceed ex parte .
13. The charge-sheet contains seven articles. Articles I to V relate to the
Petitioner’s tenure as Secretary, CWC. Article I alleges irregular payment of
Rs. 20,000/- in cash as brokerage for identifying residential accommodation
while the Petitioner was serving as Secretary, CWC. CLE alleges that the
Petitioner treated himself as the competent authority in his own personal
case.
14. Article II alleges irregular payment by CWC to CLE towards
employer’s provident fund contribution of Rs. 6,00,294/- and pension
contribution of Rs. 8,32,845/-. CLE alleges that these amounts were not
admissible under the terms of appointment as Secretary, CWC and that there
was no CPF or pension scheme in CLE.
15. Article III concerns alleged short deduction/payment of TDS of Rs.
52,223/- in relation to rent-free accommodation during the Petitioner’s
tenure as Secretary, CWC. CLE alleges that the value of perquisites was not
included while calculating salary income and that the Petitioner failed to
deposit the alleged short payment despite show-cause notice.
16. Article IV concerns medical reimbursement of Rs. 1,34,975/- in
respect of treatment of the Petitioner’s wife at a private IVF centre. CLE
alleges that the clinic was not empanelled under CGHS and that the
reimbursement was contrary to the relevant guidelines. The Petitioner’s
reply to the show-cause notice, as noticed in the charge-sheet itself, was that
the reimbursement had the approval of the Minister for Minority Affairs and
Chairperson, CWC, and that the applicable OM did not require the clinic to
be CGHS-empanelled, provided it was registered with the State or Central
Government.
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 5425/2019 Page 6 of 49

Digitally Signed
By:ANITA BAITAL
Signing Date:31.05.2026
00:33:14

17. Article V relates to payment of Rs. 15,000/- towards counsel fee in
W.P.(C) 4690/2012 , in which the appointment of the Petitioner as Secretary,
CWC had been challenged. CLE alleges that the payment from CWC funds
to the advocate representing the Petitioner personally was irregular and
ought to have been borne by the Petitioner.
18. Articles VI and VII arise from the Petitioner’s repatriation from NBT
and his communications thereafter. Article VI alleges that, instead of joining
CLE after premature repatriation from NBT, the Petitioner agitated against
his repatriation, caused embarrassment to CLE and lowered its image in the
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general public. Article VII alleges that through letters/emails dated 7
September, 2018, addressed to the Chairman, CLE, and in a meeting dated
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11 September, 2018, the Petitioner was impolite, discourteous and wilfully
insubordinate.
19. The list of documents annexed to the charge-sheet shows that CLE
proposed to rely on, among others, audit reports concerning CWC,
correspondence from CWC, the Petitioner’s appointment order in CLE, the
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CWC OM dated 17 July, 2012, the Ministry of Commerce communication
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dated 23 July, 2018, the show-cause notice dated 19 September, 2018,
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and the Petitioner’s reply dated 1 October, 2018.
Petitioner’s reply and subsequent events
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20. The Petitioner first sought further time by communication dated 11
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March, 2019. He stated that he had received the memorandum dated 1
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March, 2019 on 8 March, 2019 and that the reply was sought within seven
days. He requested fifteen more days, stating that he was unwell, had
domestic issues, and that the matter required mobilisation of records relating
to issues which were several years old.
Signature Not Verified
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Digitally Signed
By:ANITA BAITAL
Signing Date:31.05.2026
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21. The Petitioner thereafter submitted a detailed reply dated 20 March,
2019, seeking withdrawal of the charge-sheet. He asserted that he had joined
CLE in 2005, later held additional charge and then regular charge of
Executive Director, and thereafter proceeded on deputation as Secretary,
CWC, a statutory body under the Ministry of Minority Affairs. He asserted
that the CWC was headed by the Union Minister for Minority Affairs as ex-
officio Chairperson, and that the appointing and disciplinary authority for
the post of Secretary, CWC, was the Union Minister/Chairperson under the
Waqf Act, 1995 and the CWC Rules, 1998.
22. The Petitioner’s reply raised a foundational objection. He said that the
communications from CWC which formed the basis of the charge-sheet
were not issued by the competent authority, namely the Minister for
Minority Affairs and Chairperson, CWC. He further alleged that the inquiry
had been initiated on unauthorised communications and that proceedings
were being pushed while related matters were sub-judice before this Court.
He also complained that CLE had misled the Court in its counter affidavit
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dated 15 January, 2019 by stating that an inquiry was pending, although the
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memorandum itself was issued only on 1 March, 2019.
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23. On 22 March, 2019, CLE appointed the Inquiry Officer and
Presenting Officer. The Petitioner says that the appointment was made
without meaningful consideration of his reply and without first deciding
whether the foundational objections were correct. The Petitioner also sought
documents before the Inquiry Officer, including approvals from the
competent authority in CWC, records of CLE’s authority to proceed, and
documents relating to the Petitioner’s deputation, repatriation and payment
position.
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 5425/2019 Page 8 of 49

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Signing Date:31.05.2026
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Suspension order dated 15 April, 2019
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24. By order dated 15 April, 2019, CLE placed the Petitioner under
suspension with immediate effect. The order records that disciplinary
proceedings were pending and that the charges being inquired into were
serious and grave and warranted suspension. It invokes Clause 12(b)(i) of
the Standing Orders of CLE. It fixes the Petitioner’s headquarters at CLE’s
Regional Office at New Delhi and prohibits him from leaving headquarters
without prior permission. It also grants subsistence allowance under Clause
12(b)(iii) of the Standing Orders, initially at one-half of basic wages,
dearness allowance and other compensatory allowances, with provision for
enhancement after ninety days if the inquiry was prolonged for reasons not
attributable to the Petitioner.
25. The Petitioner challenges the suspension as arbitrary, punitive in
effect, and unsupported by any reason showing that his presence would
prejudice the inquiry or enable tampering with records. He submits that most
records were with CWC, NBT or the Ministries, and that CLE had itself
refused to allow him to work physically. The Petitioner further submits that
the suspension, following the charge-sheet and the hurried appointment of
Inquiry Officer, formed part of a predetermined course of action.
Interim directions and procedural history
26. The procedural course of the matter is important because the
maintainability objection has surfaced repeatedly and because interim
directions shaped the parties’ conduct.
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27. In W.P.(C) 6602/2018, by order dated 20 November, 2018, CLE was
impleaded after the Petitioner complained that, after being repatriated by
NBT, he tried to join CLE but was not allowed to do so.
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Digitally Signed
By:ANITA BAITAL
Signing Date:31.05.2026
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28. By order dated 18 December, 2018, CLE stated that it was not ready
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to give joining to the Petitioner, but would pay salary from 9 July, 2018
and continue to pay till further orders. The Court recorded that statement and
made it clear that CLE shall continue to pay salary. The question of salary
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from 29 May, 2018 to 9 July, 2018 was left open for final disposal.
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29. On 5 October, 2020, a coordinate Bench, after perusing both writ
petitions, recorded a prima facie view that the writ petitions were not
maintainable and directed the Petitioner to satisfy the Court on
maintainability on the next date.
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30. On 20 January, 2026, both writ petitions were taken up together. The
Court recorded the distinct subject matter of each petition. W.P.(C)
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6602/2018 was recorded as concerning NBT’s relieving order dated 29
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May, 2018 and the representation dated 3 May, 2018 for release of
outstanding dues. W.P.(C) 5425/2019 was recorded as concerning the
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charge-sheet dated 1 March, 2019, proceedings emanating therefrom, the
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suspension order dated 15 April, 2019, and consequential benefits.
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31. The order dated 20 January, 2026 further records CLE’s objection
that it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction, principally because it does not fall
within Article 12. The Petitioner contended that the issue of maintainability
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was “done and dusted” by earlier orders dated 23 February, 2024 and 10
May, 2024. The Court rejected that contention, holding that earlier orders
had not determined maintainability in favour of the Petitioner and that the
issue remained open. Since maintainability went to the root of the matter,
the Court directed that it be decided at the outset.
The Petitioner’s case
32. The Petitioner submits that CLE’s objection to maintainability is
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Signing Date:31.05.2026
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misconceived. He contends that CLE is not a private association of traders in
the ordinary sense. It is sponsored by the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, performs functions under the foreign trade regime, acts as the
recognised and, in certain respects, compulsory registering authority for
leather exports, and discharges functions which would otherwise be
performed by the Central Government. The Petitioner places reliance on the
public notice and export-policy framework, and on the judgment of the
Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Council for Leather Exports v.
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All India Small Scale Tanners and Exporters Association , where CLE
itself was held to be acting as an instrumentality of the Central Government
while discharging compulsory export-registration functions.
33. The Petitioner further relies on CLE’s governing documents to
contend that the Central Government retains a continuing role in the
functioning of the Council. Reliance is placed on provisions concerning
Government nominees, appointment of the Election Authority, concurrence
in appointment of auditors, restrictions on alteration of the constitutional
documents without prior approval, and the binding power of Government
directions under Article 76.
34. On this basis, the Petitioner submits that CLE is “State” or an
authority within Article 12. In the alternative, he submits that CLE is clearly
amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 because it performs public
functions and public duties. He contends that incorporation under Section 25
of the Companies Act, 1956 cannot operate as a constitutional shield where
the entity performs governmental or public functions.
35. On merits, the Petitioner contends that the charge-sheet is without

5
1996 SCC OnLine Mad 1237
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jurisdiction, founded on unauthorised communications, actuated by mala
fides and issued without application of mind. He submits that Articles I to V
relate to his tenure as Secretary, CWC, where he functioned under a
statutory regime and under the authority of the Chairperson, CWC.
According to him, CLE could not initiate disciplinary action on the basis of
communications from subordinate CWC officials without ascertaining the
position of the competent authority, namely the Union Minister for Minority
Affairs and Chairperson, CWC.
36. The Petitioner submits that the alleged financial irregularities were
either approved, ratified or processed within CWC. He contends that CLE’s
charge-sheet selectively relies on audit objections without considering the
full record, subsequent audit settlement, approvals of the competent
authority, or the statutory position of the Secretary, CWC. He asserts that
several documents necessary for his defence were either not supplied or
were dismissed as irrelevant.
37. As regards Articles VI and VII, the Petitioner says that the charges are
contrary to CLE’s own conduct. He reported to CLE after repatriation from
NBT. CLE did not accept his joining and instead asked him to await NBT’s
response because CLE itself had sought reasons from NBT for premature
repatriation and had asked for compliance with the three-month notice
contemplated by the DoPT OM. Thereafter, CLE appeared before this Court
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and stated that it was not ready to give joining but would pay salary from 9
July, 2018.
38. The Petitioner therefore submits that CLE cannot refuse physical
joining, pay salary pursuant to a Court-recorded arrangement, later treat that
payment as deemed joining, and still charge him for not joining or for
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agitating his service grievance. He says that his communications were not
acts of insubordination but attempts to secure posting, salary and allowances
for himself and his family after repatriation.
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39. The Petitioner also challenges the suspension order dated 15 April,
2019. He says that the order contains no reason except a mechanical recital
that the charges are serious and grave. The alleged incidents were old. The
Petitioner was not permitted to work physically. The relevant records were
with CWC, NBT or Ministries. There was therefore no basis to conclude
that suspension was necessary for the inquiry. He submits that the
suspension has operated punitively and has caused serious prejudice.
The stand of CLE
40. CLE submits that the writ petition is not maintainable. CLE is a
company limited by guarantee, incorporated under Section 25 of the
Companies Act, 1956, and not a department or instrumentality of the
Government. It emphasises that it is an autonomous industry body and one
among several Export Promotion Councils recognised by the Ministry of
Commerce. Its internal affairs, according to CLE, are managed by its
Committee of Administration.
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41. CLE relies heavily on the Office Memorandum dated 10 November,
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1997 and the Ministry letter dated 21 July, 2017. According to CLE, these
documents show that Government granted autonomy to Export Promotion
Councils in creation of posts, recruitment and administrative matters, and
that CLE is not a Government organisation. CLE also says that Government
funds, if any, are scheme-specific and do not meet its establishment costs. It
further submits that its employees are paid from its own resources and not
from the Consolidated Fund of India.
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42. CLE also relies on the 2016 amended Memorandum and Articles and
submits that Government nominees do not exercise controlling power over
CLE. It says that the Government’s role, if any, is supervisory or regulatory
and not pervasive. It argues that regulatory oversight, recognition under the
foreign trade regime, and some financial support for specific schemes do not
make a body “State” under Article 12.
43. CLE relies on judgments concerning other Export Promotion
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Councils, including Darshan Singh v. Union of India relating to the Sports
Goods Export Promotion Council, Raj Rajeshwar Dadhich v. Gem &
7
Jewellery Export Promotion Council , and Dr. Jitarani Udgata v. Union of
8 9
India relating to the Gems and Jewellery Export Promotion Council. CLE
submits that these authorities show that Export Promotion Councils are not
State instrumentalities merely because they are sponsored, recognised or
regulated by Government.
44. On the Article 226 enquiry, CLE submits that even if certain public-
facing functions are performed by it, the present dispute is a pure service
matter. The Petitioner’s appointment was contractual and governed by CLE
Standing Orders. No statutory service rule is invoked. A writ, according to
CLE, cannot be maintained to enforce a private contract of service or to
interdict a disciplinary inquiry under non-statutory Standing Orders. It relies
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on Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya, K.K. Saksena v. International
11
Commission on Irrigation and Drainage , and allied authorities to contend

6 th
WP(C) 4125 of 2000 decided on 18 December, 2009
7
1992 SCC OnLine Raj 202
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2022 SCC OnLine Del 3449
9
“GJEPC”
10
(2019) 16 SCC 303
11
(2015) 4 SCC 670
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that a body may perform some public functions, but not every internal
employment decision becomes amenable to judicial review.
45. On merits, CLE submits that the Petitioner remained its employee
throughout. His deputations to CWC and NBT did not sever the relationship
of employment with CLE. As parent employer, CLE retained disciplinary
control. CLE says that it received communications and material from CWC
and the Department of Commerce concerning serious financial irregularities
committed by the Petitioner while serving as Secretary, CWC. It therefore
issued a show-cause notice and, thereafter, the charge-sheet.
46. CLE submits that the charges involve serious financial and
administrative misconduct including handling of public finances, regulatory
lapses in TDS and statutory contributions, improper medical claims, and the
misuse of CWC funds for legal fees, reflecting poorly on the standards
expected of a senior employee. CLE submits that these matters require
inquiry and the Petitioner cannot seek quashing of a charge-sheet at the
threshold. It submits that disputed questions of fact cannot be decided in writ
proceedings and the Petitioner must participate in the inquiry.
47. As regards suspension, CLE submits that the charges are grave and
that suspension was ordered in exercise of power under Clause 12(b)(i) of
the Standing Orders and subsistence allowance has been paid in accordance
with the Standing Orders. CLE further submits that the Petitioner’s conduct
after repatriation, including agitation and discourteous correspondence,
justified disciplinary scrutiny.
Stand of the Union and other Respondents
48. The Union of India has appeared in both petitions. In substance, its
role in the present petition is tied to the Petitioner’s contention that CLE
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functions under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and that
communications from Government/CWC formed the basis of the
disciplinary process. The Union’s position, as emerging from the record, is
that CLE is an Export Promotion Council and that its administrative
autonomy and legal status have to be assessed in the light of the relevant
Ministry communications and governing documents.
49. The Central Waqf Council and National Book Trust enter the factual
narrative because Articles I to V arise from the Petitioner’s CWC tenure and
Articles VI and VII arise from the aftermath of NBT repatriation. The
validity of NBT’s relieving order is the subject matter of the W.P.(C)
6602/2018 and is not being finally determined in the present judgment.
Issues for determination
50. Having regard to the pleadings, documents, interim orders and
submissions, the following issues arise for consideration:
i. Whether CLE is an authority or instrumentality of the State within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.
ii. Even if CLE is not held to be “State” for every purpose, whether it is
amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 having regard to its
constitution, functions, Government control and role under the foreign
trade/export regime.
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iii. Whether the present challenge to the charge-sheet dated 1 March,
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2019 and suspension order dated 15 April, 2019 is maintainable, or
whether it is barred as a private service dispute under non-statutory Standing
Orders.
iv. Whether CLE could initiate disciplinary proceedings on allegations
substantially arising from the Petitioner’s tenure as Secretary, Central Waqf
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Council, without first satisfying itself as to the authority and validity of the
CWC/Ministry communications forming the basis of such proceedings.
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v. Whether the charge-sheet dated 1 March, 2019 suffers from non-
application of mind, pre-determination, mala fides, denial of relevant
documents, or any other foundational infirmity warranting interference at
the threshold.
vi. Whether Articles VI and VII of the charge-sheet, concerning alleged
failure to join after repatriation from NBT, agitation and discourteous
conduct, can stand in the face of CLE’s own refusal to permit physical
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joining and the Court-recorded salary arrangement dated 18 December,
2018.
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vii. Whether the suspension order dated 15 April, 2019 is legally
sustainable, having regard to the nature of the charges, the passage of time,
CLE’s own conduct, and the requirement that suspension should not be used
punitively.
viii. What relief, if any, should be granted.
51. Since maintainability has been pressed as a preliminary objection and
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has been expressly kept open by order dated 20 January, 2026, it must be
decided first.
Maintainability
52. The Court will therefore turn first to the constitutional status of CLE,
under Article 12 of the Constitution, its amenability to writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 and whether the present challenge, though arising from a
disciplinary proceeding, has sufficient public law content to sustain the writ
petition. The first three issues are thus taken up together.
53. CLE objects to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground
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that it is a company limited by guarantee, incorporated under Section 25 of
the Companies Act, 1956. It claims that it is neither a department of the
Government nor a statutory corporation. Its affairs are managed by its
Committee of Administration and its employees are governed by CLE’s own
Standing Orders. On that basis, it is argued that the present lis is an
employer-employee dispute arising under non-statutory service conditions.
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CLE also places reliance on the Ministry’s letter dated 21 July, 2017 and
th
the Office Memorandum dated 10 November, 1997. It contends that Export
Promotion Councils were granted autonomy in administrative matters,
including creation of posts and recruitment of staff, and that CLE has been
specifically described as not being a Government organisation.
54. The Petitioner contests that characterisation. He submits that CLE
cannot be judged merely by its corporate form. The substance of its
constitution, control and functions must be examined. CLE is sponsored by
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, performs duties under the foreign
trade and export regime, and has been notified as the registering authority
for exporters in the leather sector. He also relies upon CLE’s constitutional
documents, which, according to him, reserve substantial authority in favour
of the Central Government. The Petitioner further submits that the public
character of CLE is no longer a matter of first impression. A Division Bench
of the Madras High Court, while examining CLE’s compulsory registration
function in relation to leather exports, recognised it as acting as an
instrumentality of the Central Government. On this foundation, the
Petitioner contends that CLE answers the description of “State” or “other
authority” within Article 12 of the Constitution. In any event, he submits
that CLE performs public duties and is amenable to writ jurisdiction under
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Article 226.
55. The objection raises a question of constitutional status and its
amenability to writ jurisdiction. The enquiry, therefore, has two layers. The
first is institutional: what is CLE? The second is functional and contextual:
what is the character of the action challenged? A body may be “State” under
Article 12 for all purposes. Even where it is not, it may be amenable to
Article 226 in respect of public duties. Conversely, a body may perform
public functions in one field, yet not be subject to writ jurisdiction for a
purely private employment claim. The constitutional task is to avoid both
over-inclusion and artificial exclusion.
56. Judicial decisions have not treated all Export Promotion Councils
alike. Their status has turned on the governing documents of the particular
Council, the nature of the function under examination, the degree and
quality of Government control, and the character of the action impugned. It
would therefore be unsafe to proceed on the assumption that every Export
Promotion Council must fall on the same side of the constitutional line. The
enquiry must remain institution-specific and, where Article 226 is invoked,
function-sensitive. This Court must accordingly examine CLE on its own
constitution, functions and history, and must also test the present dispute by
reference to the setting in which the impugned action was taken.
12
57. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi , the Supreme Court held
that the enquiry is not controlled by the form or manner in which a juristic
entity is brought into existence. A society or company may, in a given case,
constitute an instrumentality or agency of the Government. The indicia
identified in Ajay Hasia are not rigid formulae, but relevant factors to
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determine whether the body, in substance, answers the constitutional
description of “State” under Article 12.
13
58. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology ,
restated the principle with greater precision. The question in each case is
whether, on a cumulative assessment, the body is financially, functionally
and administratively dominated by, or under the control of, Government.
The control must be particular to the body and pervasive; mere regulatory
control, whether statutory or otherwise, is not sufficient. The focus,
therefore, is on real and deep governmental control in substance, and not
merely on the juristic form of the entity, governmental patronage, or
supervisory oversight.
59. Article 226 stands on a wider footing. A writ may issue not only
against the State and statutory bodies, but also against “any person or
authority” performing a public duty or owing a positive obligation of a
14
public nature. In Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya , the Supreme
Court reiterated that a writ under Article 226 can lie against a statutory
body, an instrumentality of State, a company financed and owned by the
State, a body substantially run on State funding, a private body discharging
public duty, or a person/body under a statutory obligation.
60. The same judgment, relying on K.K. Saksena v. International
15
Commission on Irrigation and Drainage , draws another distinction which
is material here. Even where a body performs some public function and is
amenable to writ jurisdiction, all its decisions are not thereby subject to

12
(1981) 1 SCC 722
13
(2002) 5 SCC 111
14
(2019) 16 SCC 303
15
(2015) 4 SCC 670
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judicial review. A writ does not lie to enforce purely private law rights. If
the action challenged lies wholly in the domain of a private contract of
service, the High Court would ordinarily decline interference. But where the
action bears a public law character, the width of Article 226 remains
available.
61. In this backdrop, CLE’s reliance on S.K. Mukherjee v. Chemical &
16
Allied Products Export Promotion Council , does not carry the matter far.
That decision concerned termination of a stenographer employed by an
Export Promotion Council and proceeded on an older understanding of
Article 12 and prerogative writs. It treated the Council as a company and
held that appointment or dismissal of its employees did not involve statutory
duties. The later constitutional development from Rajasthan State
17 18 19
Electricity Board, Sukhdev Singh, Ramana Dayaram Shetty, Ajay
20
Hasia, Pradeep Kumar Biswas, Zee Telefilms and Ramakrishna Mission
has substantially widened and refined the enquiry. S.K. Mukherjee may still
be relevant to the proposition that every employment dispute of every
Export Promotion Council is not automatically a writ matter. It cannot
decide the present case, where the record contains later Governmental
instruments, foreign trade policy functions, and direct judicial consideration
of CLE’s role.
62. CLE also relies on Darshan Singh , decided by this Court in relation
to the Sports Goods Export Promotion Council. There, the Petitioners
challenged reduction of the age of superannuation from 60 to 58 years. The

16
(1961) 31 Comp Cas 733
17
Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 18
18
Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr., (1975) 1 SCC 421
19
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and Ors., (1979) 3 SCC 489
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Council was a company registered under the Companies Act, its main object
was to promote exports of sports goods, and the Court noticed the objection
that it was a body of private individuals. The reasoning turned substantially
on the internal management of that Council, its funding pattern, and the
nature of the service dispute placed before the Court.
63. Darshan Singh cannot, however, be read as laying down an absolute
proposition that no Export Promotion Council can ever answer the
description of “State” under Article 12 or otherwise be amenable to writ
jurisdiction. The decision turned on the institutional character of the Sports
Goods Export Promotion Council and the nature of the dispute before the
Court. The present case concerns a different body, a different constitutional
record, and disciplinary action founded substantially upon acts allegedly
committed by the Petitioner while serving, on deputation, in the Central
Waqf Council, a statutory body. The question therefore requires independent
examination on the material relating to CLE and the public law character, if
any, of the impugned action.
64. Raj Rajeshwar Dadhich v. Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion
21
Council, also does not carry CLE’s objection to its desired conclusion. In
that case, the Rajasthan High Court found that the affairs of the Gem &
Jewellery Export Promotion Council were managed by its Working
Committee. Government control was viewed as limited, principally directed
at ensuring proper utilisation of grants. The Court also noticed that
Government nominees formed only a small part of a larger committee and
did not control day-to-day management. The dispute, there too, arose from

20
Zee Telefilms Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 649
21
1992 SCC OnLine Raj 202
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an employment claim. The decision is useful to the limited extent that
Government nomination, grant-in-aid or export-promotion activity, taken
separately, may not be enough to attract Article 12. But it does not decide
the question presented here. CLE must be tested on its own governing
documents, its compulsory registration role in the leather export sector, the
degree of Government control reflected in its constitution, and the public
law setting in which the impugned disciplinary action arose.
65. CLE places its principal reliance on the Division Bench decision of
22
this Court in Dr. Jitarani Udgata v. Union of India . The Division Bench
cautioned that Article 12 cannot be expanded so widely as to bring every
autonomous body with some Government nexus within the fold of “State”.
It reiterated that powers, functions, finances and Government control are
relevant indicators, but none of them is conclusive by itself. The control
must be real and pervasive. A merely regulatory relationship with
Government does not convert an otherwise autonomous body into an
authority of the State.
66. On the facts before it, the Division Bench found that the Gem &
Jewellery Export Promotion Council was essentially a collective body of
exporters. Its role was to place the concerns of the export trade before
Government. The Court found that it did not carry out Government policy,
did not participate in governmental decision-making, and was managed by a
Committee of Administration consisting predominantly of exporters. The
three Government nominees on that Committee did not exercise controlling
voting power. On that factual foundation, the Division Bench held that
GJEPC was not “State” within Article 12, and that the service dispute before
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it was not maintainable in writ jurisdiction.
67. Jitarani is binding on this Court for the principles it lays down. It
does not, however, conclude the status of every Export Promotion Council
irrespective of its own constitution, functions and entrusted role under the
export regime. The Division Bench did not proceed on a class-wide
assumption. It examined the particular Council before it and reached its
conclusion on the material relating to GJEPC. Jitarani therefore supplies the
governing caution, but not the factual answer to the present case.
68. The Petitioner relies on All India Garment Exporters Common
23
Cause Guild v. Union of India . In that case, AEPC was examined in the
context of the Exim Policy. The Court noticed that AEPC was incorporated
under Section 25 of the Companies Act, was sponsored by the Ministry of
Textiles, received Government grants, was listed as an Export Promotion
Council under the Exim Policy, and issued Registration-cum-Membership
Certificates. The Court held that even if AEPC were not State under Article
12, it exercised public functions in ensuring implementation of the Exim
Policy and was amenable to Article 226.
69. All India Garment Exporters recognises that the status of an Export
Promotion Council cannot be determined only by its incorporation under the
Companies Act. Its role under the foreign trade regime, the consequences of
its decisions on exporters, and the source of its functions are material. The
later appellate history of that case and its treatment in Jitarani must be kept
in mind. Yet the underlying principle remains sound: where a body performs
a function under a statutory or policy regime affecting legal rights in trade,

22
(2022) 6 HCC (Del) 1
23
2011 SCC OnLine Del 265
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the nature of that function may attract Article 226.
24
70. Robin Sharma v. Apparel Training and Design Centre , strongly
underscores this exact method of judicial enquiry. In that case, the Court
refused to rest the matter on nomenclature, opting instead to microscopically
examine the Memorandum of Association, the composition of the governing
body, the presence of Government nominees, the funding patterns, assets,
underlying public schemes, and the structural relationship between the
training center and its parent Export Promotion Council. Guided by that
precedent, this Court must look beyond the corporate label of a Section 25
company limited by guarantee and inspect the actual governing instruments
and regulatory functions.
25
71. Sunirmal Kumar Roy v. Union of India , stands closer to the present
controversy. The Calcutta Division Bench was concerned with CAPEXIL,
earlier known as the Chemical and Allied Products Export Promotion
Council, and examined whether it was amenable to writ jurisdiction. The
Court noticed that the Department of Commerce had encouraged the
formation of Export Promotion Councils under its administrative control. It
also noticed that such Councils functioned as registering authorities for
exporters under the foreign trade framework, that CAPEXIL’s
Memorandum could not be altered without prior Central Government
approval, that Government nominees formed part of its committee, and that
the Government supervised export promotion activities through it. The
decision may not directly bind this Court. Its reasoning, however, is
instructive. It recognises that an Export Promotion Council cannot be

24
2021 SCC OnLine Del 5886
25
2006 SCC OnLine Cal 868
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assessed by nomenclature alone. Where its governing instruments, entrusted
functions and Government control reveal a public character, such a Council
may be amenable to writ jurisdiction.
72. The direct and most significant authority concerning CLE itself is
Council for Leather Exports v. All India Small Scale Tanners and
26
Exporters Association . That case arose from a challenge to a circular
issued by CLE demanding 5% development fee on finished leather exports
and to the related public notice issued by the Director General of Foreign
Trade. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court first noticed that the
public notice inserted the condition “Registration of exports with Council
for Leather Exports”.
73. The Division Bench then examined the Export and Import Policy for
st st
the period 1 April, 1992 to 31 March, 1997. It noted that the DGFT could
specify, through public notice, terms and conditions according to which
goods not in the Negative List may be exported, including registration with
specified authorities. It further noted that Export Promotion Councils were
enumerated as specified authorities and that CLE appeared as one such
authority. The public notice then made registration of finished leather
exports with CLE compulsory.
74. The finding of the Madras Division Bench bears directly on the
present issue. It held that although CLE was a registered company under the
Companies Act, it was recognised, for the purpose of exporting finished
leather goods, as an Export Promotion Council regulating exports; that the
function which the Central Government was required to perform had been
entrusted to CLE; and that while discharging such functions, CLE acted as
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an instrumentality of the Central Government and not merely as a company.
The Court expressly rejected the contention that CLE’s corporate form
excluded relief under Article 226.
75. The Division Bench went further. It held that in view of the function
entrusted to CLE, which formed part and parcel of the functioning of the
Central Government, CLE could not escape judicial review in respect of its
decision relating to the demand of development fee against registration of
exports. It also observed that CLE was exercising powers which the Central
Government was to exercise and, to that extent, became an instrumentality
of the State.
76. CLE submits that the Madras decision arose in the context of levy of
development fee and export registration rather than an employment dispute.
That distinction is noted. The significance of the judgment, however, lies in
its examination of CLE’s institutional character and the nature of the
functions discharged by it under the foreign trade regime. To that extent, the
decision bears upon the enquiry into CLE’s constitutional status and
amenability to writ jurisdiction.
77. The governing documents of CLE nevertheless disclose that
Government is not a distant external regulator standing wholly outside the
Council’s institutional framework. The material placed on record indicates
Government-nominated members, Government involvement in aspects of
internal governance including appointment of the Election Authority,
concurrence in appointment of auditors, restrictions against alteration of the
Memorandum and Articles without prior approval of the Central
Government, provisions contemplating deputation of Government servants

26
1996 SCC OnLine Mad 1237
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to the Council, and a binding power of Government directions under Article
76. These features assume significance when read alongside CLE’s role
within the foreign trade regime.
78. At the same time, following Jitarani , the Court does not proceed on
the basis that Government nominees, approval clauses or audit concurrence,
taken in isolation, would by themselves satisfy Article 12. The significance
of these features lies in their cumulative effect and in the setting in which
they operate. CLE performs functions carrying consequences under the
foreign trade framework and, at the same time, remains institutionally linked
with Government through binding directives under Article 76,
Governmental involvement in electoral and audit processes and approval
requirements for alteration of its governing instruments. The enquiry,
therefore, does not stop at incorporation under the Companies Act.
79. The Court must therefore examine whether CLE’s relationship with
Government is merely regulatory, as was found in Jitarani in relation to
GJEPC, or whether the present record reveals a deeper and more direct
connection with governmental functions and control. In Jitarani , the
Division Bench found that GJEPC was essentially a collective body of
exporters. It placed trade concerns before Government. It did not carry out
Government policy or participate in governmental decision-making. Its
Committee of Administration was dominated by exporters, and the
Government nominees did not exercise controlling voting power. The record
before this Court, however, stands on a different footing.
80. CLE itself has been considered by a Division Bench of the Madras
High Court. In proceedings concerning CLE, the Madras High Court held
that, while discharging the compulsory registration function in relation to
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leather exports, CLE acts as an instrumentality of the Central Government
and not merely as a company. That finding is of direct relevance because it
concerns the same body and the same export-sector function which gives
CLE its public character.
81. Under the Foreign Trade Policy and the Handbook of Procedures,
exporters in the leather sector are required to obtain a Registration-cum-
Membership Certificate through the concerned Export Promotion Council.
CLE is recognised as the Council for the leather sector. The regulatory
framework accords institutional consequences to such recognition, including
for compliance and availing benefits under the foreign trade framework.
CLE’s role is therefore not confined to representing industry concerns
before Government, but forms part of the operational structure through
which the foreign trade regime is administered in the leather sector. The
Court is conscious that, in Jitarani , the Division Bench did not regard the
functions of an Export Promotion Council under the foreign trade
framework as sufficient, by themselves, to satisfy Article 12. The present
case, however, concerns CLE functioning within a different institutional
setting.
82. The significance of that role lies in the wider institutional setting in
which CLE functions. Unlike the position noticed in Jitarani , where GJEPC
was found to function essentially as a collective body of exporters and
Governmental oversight was treated as regulatory, the material concerning
CLE discloses a closer institutional nexus with Government. CLE performs
functions carrying regulatory consequences under the foreign trade
framework, including issuance of Registration-cum-Membership
Certificates in the leather sector, and operates within a structure in which the
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Central Government retains a continuing role in matters such as
constitutional amendments, appointment of the Election Authority,
concurrence in appointment of auditors, and deputation-related
arrangements. These features, when read cumulatively with CLE’s role
under the foreign trade regime, place it on a materially different footing
from the body considered in Jitarani .
83. There is another material distinction from the position considered in
Jitarani . In that case, the Government’s power to issue directions to GJEPC
was confined to matters such as national security, national economy or
public interest, which the Division Bench treated as supervisory or
regulatory in character. CLE’s governing framework stands on a different
footing. Article 76 of the AoA contains a non obstante clause empowering
the Union Government to issue directives “in respect of promotion and
development of international trade” and requiring the Council to “give due
effect” to such directions. The power, unlike in Jitarani , is neither confined
to exceptional contingencies nor external regulation. It extends to the very
field for which CLE exists and functions. This constitutes a material
distinction in the cumulative assessment of Government control.
84. The historical record also reflects instances of direct Government
involvement in executive appointments within CLE. The record contains the
th
Government of India order dated 16 June, 2009, issued by the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, appointing the Petitioner, who was then Regional
Director of CLE and holding additional charge of Executive Director, to the
post of Executive Director, CLE. While this appointment arose under an
earlier constitutional framework of the Council, it nevertheless illustrates the
historically close governmental association with the highest executive office
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in CLE. More importantly for the present enquiry, the Petitioner’s own
service relationship with CLE bears traces of direct Government
involvement, lending additional public law colour to the present lis .
85. There is also another feature of CLE’s institutional functioning which
merits notice. The record indicates that part of CLE’s revenue is derived
from membership and registration mechanisms connected with the RCMC
framework under the Foreign Trade Policy. The significance of this
circumstance lies in the fact that a part of CLE’s financial structure is linked
to the discharge of functions recognised under the foreign trade regime.
Though not independently determinative of Article 12, this is a relevant
circumstance in the cumulative assessment of CLE’s institutional character
and public nexus.
86. On the other hand, CLE relies on the 2016 amended Memorandum
th
and Articles of Association, the OM dated 10 November, 1997 and the
st
Ministry’s letter dated 21 July, 2017. Its submission is that these documents
describe CLE as an autonomous industry body and not as a Government
organisation. The Court has considered that submission. The 1997 Office
Memorandum and the Ministry correspondence do indicate administrative
autonomy in certain internal matters, especially in relation to creation of
posts and recruitment within budgetary discipline. But autonomy in day-to-
day administration does not, by itself, negate public character. Many public
bodies function with operational autonomy. The real question is not whether
CLE enjoys any autonomy, but whether the cumulative record discloses
financial, functional and administrative control of the kind relevant under
Article 12, and in any event, whether CLE performs public duties sufficient
to attract Article 226.
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87. The later statement that CLE is “not a Government organisation” is
therefore not conclusive. Constitutional status is a matter of legal
characterisation. It does not turn on a departmental description. If the origin,
functions, governing instruments, entrusted role and actual working of a
body satisfy the constitutional tests, a Ministry letter cannot place it beyond
scrutiny. Nor does CLE become an ordinary private body merely because its
entire establishment expenditure is not met from Government funds, or
because elected industry representatives participate in its day-to-day
management. Those factors must be weighed, but they do not displace the
cumulative effect of CLE’s public functions and the Government-control
features reflected in the record.
88. At the same time, CLE’s autonomy argument cannot be brushed
aside. The material does show that CLE is incorporated under the
Companies Act, that a substantial part of its membership is drawn from
industry, that its daily affairs are handled through the Committee of
Administration, and that its employees are stated to be governed by CLE’s
Standing Orders rather than DoPT rules. These are relevant considerations.
They are the reason why the Court cannot adopt a broad, undifferentiated
proposition that every Export Promotion Council is “State”. They do not,
however, answer the present case. The question remains whether, despite
these features, the cumulative record concerning CLE discloses a public
character and Government control sufficient to satisfy Article 12, or at least
amenability under Article 226.
89. Even apart from the institutional position of CLE, the present case
does not arise from a routine internal service dispute confined to CLE’s
office. The impugned disciplinary action is founded substantially on alleged
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acts performed by the Petitioner while serving as a Secretary at Central
Waqf Council, a statutory body. It also rests on communications from public
authorities, deputation and repatriation through public bodies, and earlier
proceedings recorded by this Court in the connected writ petition. Even
apart from CLE’s institutional status, these facts supply a distinct public law
element to the controversy.
90. CLE’s objection that the dispute is, in substance, a service matter
must therefore be examined with precision. The general rule is well settled.
Writ jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked to enforce a private contract of
service. Where the employer is not “State” and the service conditions have
no statutory force, Article 226 does not become a substitute for a civil suit,
industrial remedy, or any other remedy available in private law.
Ramakrishna Mission and K.K. Saksena preserve this important boundary
between public law and private law.
91. The present case, however, does not fit that description. Once CLE is
held, on the cumulative record, to be an authority or instrumentality of the
State, its employment decisions cannot be placed beyond Article 14 merely
because the service conditions are found in Standing Orders. A State
instrumentality cannot act arbitrarily in matters of employment. The source
of the service rule may bear upon the nature and extent of relief, but it does
not exclude constitutional scrutiny where the action is alleged to be
arbitrary, mala fide , jurisdictionally defective or procedurally unfair.
92. Even if the matter were tested on the narrower footing of Article 226,
the petition would still be maintainable. The impugned charge-sheet and
suspension do not arise from a closed private employment arrangement.
Articles I to V relate to the Petitioner’s tenure as Secretary, Central Waqf
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Council, a statutory body under the Waqf Act. The charge-sheet proceeds on
material and communications emanating from public authorities. Articles VI
and VII arise from the Petitioner’s repatriation from NBT, the subsequent
refusal by CLE to permit physical joining, and the salary arrangement
recorded by this Court. These features take the impugned action beyond an
ordinary master-servant dispute and give it a clear public law setting.
93. This conclusion is consistent with Ramakrishna Mission . In that case,
the Supreme Court found that the hospital run by the Mission was a
voluntary service institution. No monopoly status had been conferred upon it
by law. Medical services were being provided both by State institutions and
private bodies. The employee there sought, in substance, enforcement of
service rules in a private employment setting. CLE stands on a different
footing. At least in the field of leather export registration, it performs an
entrusted function within the foreign trade regime. The present controversy
is also not confined to an internal service grievance. It is interwoven with
public deputations, a statutory office, communications from
Government/public authorities, and service arrangements recorded by this
Court.
94. Nor does this conclusion declare all Export Promotion Councils to be
“State”. Each Council must be tested on its own documents, functions and
record. Darshan Singh, Raj Rajeshwar Dadhich and Jitarani show that
export-promotion activity, limited Government oversight, grant-in-aid, or
the presence of Government nominees may not, by themselves, suffice. The
present finding rests on the cumulative record concerning CLE. That record
includes its entrusted compulsory registration role in the leather export
sector, the Madras Division Bench judgment concerning CLE itself, the
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Government-control clauses in its governing documents, the appointment of
the Petitioner as Executive Director by the Central Government, and the
public law setting in which the impugned disciplinary action arose.
95. The Court therefore rejects the submission that incorporation under
Section 25 of the Companies Act is conclusive. Corporate form is relevant,
but it is not decisive. A public function does not lose its character merely
because it is entrusted to a company limited by guarantee. Equally, a
company does not become “State” merely because it is recognised or
regulated by Government. The constitutional enquiry looks past form to
substance. It asks where effective authority lies, what function the body
performs, how that function is controlled, and what consequences flow from
its decisions.
96. On a cumulative assessment of the material, this Court holds that CLE
answers the description of an authority or instrumentality of the State within
Article 12 of the Constitution.
97. In any event, and independently of the Article 12 finding, CLE is
amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 where the action impugned
bears a public law character. The present action does. The Petitioner is not
merely seeking enforcement of an ordinary private contract of service. He
challenges a charge-sheet and suspension founded upon his tenure in a
statutory body, communications from public authorities, deputation and
repatriation through Government-linked institutions, and orders passed by
this Court concerning his joining and salary position. The dispute therefore
carries a public law character sufficient to sustain the writ petition.
98. The objection that the petition is not maintainable because the
Petitioner is governed by CLE Standing Orders is also rejected. The
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Standing Orders may be relevant when the Court examines the validity of
the charge-sheet and suspension. They do not bar the maintainability of the
writ once CLE is found to be an authority under Article 12 and, in any event,
once the impugned action is found to carry a public law element.
99. Issues (i), (ii) and (iii) are accordingly answered in favour of the
Petitioner. CLE is amenable to writ jurisdiction. On the material placed
before the Court, CLE is an authority/instrumentality of the State within
Article 12. Even otherwise, the present petition is maintainable under Article
226 because the impugned disciplinary action bears sufficient public law
character. The Court shall therefore proceed to examine the legality of the
charge-sheet and the suspension order on merits.
Merits
100. Having held that the writ petition is maintainable, the Court now turns
st
to the validity of the charge-sheet dated 1 March, 2019, the disciplinary
th
proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, and the suspension order dated 15
April, 2019.
101. Before examining the record, it is necessary to state the limits of
judicial review at the stage of a charge-sheet. Ordinarily, a writ court does
not interdict disciplinary proceedings at their inception. A charge-sheet is
not quashed merely because the employee disputes the facts, offers an
explanation, or contends that the allegations are ultimately unsustainable.
The truth of the charge, the credibility of the material and the weight of the
defence are matters ordinarily left to the disciplinary authority and the
inquiry officer. This principle has been reiterated in Union of India v.
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27 28
Kunisetty Satyanarayana , Union of India v. Upendra Singh, and
29
Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha .
102. However, the rule is not absolute. A writ court may interfere at the
threshold where the charge-sheet is issued by an authority lacking
jurisdiction, where the proceeding is mala fide , where the allegations even if
taken at face value do not amount to misconduct, where the action rests on
no material, or where the authority proceeds under dictation or without
independent application of mind. Interference is also warranted where the
process is so fundamentally unfair that allowing it to continue would itself
become oppressive. Restraint at the charge-sheet stage is a rule of prudence.
It is not a command to overlook jurisdictional error, manifest unfairness or
abuse of process.
103. The present case must be tested against that standard. The Petitioner
questions the foundation and fairness of the process itself. His case is that
CLE acted on communications relating to his tenure in a statutory body
without first verifying whether those communications emanated from, or
had the approval of, the competent authority in CWC. He submits that CLE
had already decided to proceed with an inquiry before meaningfully
considering his reply. He also complains of denial of material documents
necessary for his defence.
104. The Petitioner’s challenge to Articles VI and VII stands on a separate
footing. According to him, those charges are contradicted by CLE’s own
stand before this Court, particularly its refusal to permit physical joining and
its later treatment of salary payment as joining or deemed joining. The

27
(2006) 12 SCC 28
28
(1994) 3 SCC 357
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suspension order is assailed on the further ground that it records no
independent assessment of necessity and proceeds only on a mechanical
recital that the charges are serious and grave.
105. The charges fall into two distinct groups. Articles I to V relate to the
Petitioner’s tenure as Secretary, Central Waqf Council. Articles VI and VII
relate to the events after his repatriation from National Book Trust and his
communications with CLE. The first group raises questions of authority,
source material and fairness. The second group is tested directly against
CLE’s own conduct before this Court.
Articles I-V concerning tenure as Secretary, CWC
106. The challenge to Articles I to V turns, in the first instance, on the
settled legal character of deputation. Deputation does not result in the
transfer of an employee’s substantive appointment to the borrowing
organisation; it only places his services, for a specified period and purpose,
at the disposal of another authority. The employee continues to retain his
lien and substantive relationship with the parent organisation, a principle
30
authoritatively recognised in State of Punjab v. Inder Singh. It follows
that CLE did not divest itself of disciplinary control over the Petitioner
merely by reason of his serving on deputation as Secretary, Central Waqf
Council.
107. This conclusion answers only the question of power. It does not
resolve how that power was exercised in the facts of the present case.
Articles I to V do not concern CLE’s internal functioning; they arise from
acts attributed to the Petitioner during his tenure as Secretary, Central Waqf

29
(2012) 11 SCC 565
30
(1997) 8 SCC 372
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Council, a statutory body constituted under the Waqf Act. Any inquiry into
those charges must therefore be informed by the institutional and statutory
framework within which the acts were performed. CLE was entitled to
examine whether the Petitioner’s conduct during deputation attracted
consequences under its Standing Orders, but it could not do so divorced
from the context in which that conduct occurred. The source of the
complaint, the authority from which the material emanated, the statutory
position held by the Petitioner, any approval or ratification within CWC, and
the particular Standing Orders said to be breached, all bear directly on the
legitimacy of the inquiry.
108. This aspect assumes particular significance in light of the nature of
the Petitioner’s appointment. He was not serving in a casual or informal
capacity, but held the statutory office of Secretary, Central Waqf Council,
under the Waqf Act and the applicable Rules. His appointment, and the
extensions that followed, were processed through the Ministry of Minority
Affairs and the Chairperson of the Council.
109. From the outset, the Petitioner has maintained that the
communications from CWC, on which CLE founded its action, did not
emanate from the competent authority. According to him, that authority was
the Union Minister for Minority Affairs in his capacity as ex-officio
Chairperson of the Council. He further contends that several acts later
characterised as irregular had, in fact, been approved, processed, or
otherwise dealt with within the institutional framework of CWC. On that
basis, he asserts that CLE framed the charges without first obtaining or
examining the relevant approval notes, decisions of the competent authority,
and the complete audit record.
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110. These objections cannot be dismissed as extraneous or irrelevant.
Although they do not, at this stage, justify quashing Articles I to V, they are
directly material to the fairness and legality of the inquiry. If the acts in
question were approved, ratified, or otherwise dealt with within CWC, that
circumstance may bear significantly on whether misconduct is made out
under the Standing Orders of CLE. Likewise, if the communications relied
upon do not reflect the position of the competent authority within CWC, that
issue must be examined before any adverse conclusion is reached.
111. The Petitioner’s request for documents must be viewed in this
context. He sought, inter alia , records reflecting approval by the Union
Minister/Chairperson, documents bearing on CLE’s authority to initiate the
proceedings, records concerning repatriation and assumption of charge, and
th
material relevant to the alleged financial irregularities. By order dated 24
April, 2019, the Inquiry Officer rejected several of these requests on the
ground that they were either irrelevant or in the nature of a fishing inquiry.
112. Ordinarily, in disciplinary proceedings, an employee cannot demand
production of documents on a speculative basis, nor is the Inquiry Officer
required to permit a roving inquiry. The present case, however, stands on a
different footing. Articles I to V are substantially founded on records of a
separate statutory body. Where CLE seeks to rely on audit material,
correspondence, or complaints emanating from CWC, the Petitioner must be
given access to such material as is reasonably necessary to test its authority,
completeness, and context. Documents bearing on approval, ratification,
resolution of audit objections, the competence of the originating authority,
or otherwise relevant to the defence cannot be withheld merely because they
form part of CWC records or because their production may render the
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inquiry more elaborate.
113. The Court is not persuaded that the mere receipt of material from
CWC or the Department of Commerce is, by itself, insufficient to justify
initiation of disciplinary proceedings. To hold otherwise would set the
threshold unduly high at this stage. Whether the material relied upon is
complete and accurate, whether relevant approvals or explanations exist, and
whether the acts alleged amount to misconduct under the Standing Orders,
are matters that must be examined in the course of the inquiry.
114. The Court refrains, at this stage, from expressing any conclusive view
on the merits of Articles I to V. The record shows that the inquiry had
already advanced to the stage of defence evidence before it was stayed. In
these circumstances, it would be inappropriate to interdict the proceedings
solely because the Petitioner disputes the authority, completeness, or
correctness of the material received from CWC. The proper course is to
allow the inquiry to continue, while ensuring that the Petitioner’s objections
are duly examined.
115. The plea of pre-determination and non-application of mind has also
been considered. The sequence of events does raise some concern as to
whether the Petitioner’s objections were adequately examined before the
proceedings were initiated. That concern, however, is not sufficient, on the
material presently available, to sustain a definitive finding of mala fides or
pre-determination so as to justify quashing the charges at this stage. The
more appropriate course is to permit the inquiry to continue, subject to the
safeguards indicated below.
116. Accordingly, the inquiry shall continue in respect of Articles I to V
from the stage at which it stood stayed. If any relied-upon document, or any
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document reasonably necessary for an effective defence, has not been
furnished, or has earlier been declined, the Petitioner may submit a fresh
request within two weeks from the date of this judgment. The Inquiry
Officer shall consider such request in accordance with law and the
applicable service rules, and shall not reject it merely because the document
pertains to CWC, provided it bears a demonstrable nexus to the charge or to
the Petitioner’s defence. The Petitioner shall be afforded adequate
opportunity to respond to any additional documents furnished and to take all
consequential steps in accordance with law for the purposes of his defence.
117. If any such request is declined in whole or in part, the Inquiry Officer
shall record brief reasons indicating why the document is considered
irrelevant, privileged, or otherwise not liable to be produced, so that the
disciplinary authority may, at the appropriate stage, assess whether any
prejudice has been caused to the Petitioner. It is clarified that non-supply of
a particular document shall not, by itself, vitiate the proceedings unless the
Petitioner is able to demonstrate that such non-supply has resulted in denial
of a reasonable opportunity of defence or has caused grave prejudice, in
which event it will be open to him to take all permissible pleas before the
disciplinary authority and, if necessary, in further challenge to the final
order.
118. Before passing any final order, the disciplinary authority shall
independently consider and record specific findings on the Petitioner’s
objections concerning the competence of the source of the CWC material,
the existence or absence of approval or ratification by the competent
authority within CWC, the completeness of the audit record, and whether the
acts alleged, even if established, constitute misconduct under the Standing
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Orders of CLE. Any order adverse to the Petitioner shall contain reasoned
findings on each of these aspects.
Articles VI and VII concerning non-joining, agitation and alleged
discourtesy
119. Articles VI and VII stand on a different footing. Article VI alleges
that, instead of joining CLE after repatriation from NBT, the Petitioner
agitated against the repatriation and caused embarrassment to CLE. Article
VII alleges impolite, discourteous and insubordinate conduct through
th th
letters/emails dated 7 September, 2018 and during the meeting dated 11
September, 2018.
120. These charges cannot be examined apart from CLE’s own conduct.
th
The Petitioner was repatriated by NBT on 29 May, 2018. He approached
th
CLE for joining. CLE did not permit physical joining. By order dated 20
November, 2018 in W.P.(C) 6602/2018, CLE was impleaded precisely
because the Petitioner complained that, after repatriation, he had tried to join
his parent organisation but was not allowed to do so.
th
121. On 18 December, 2018, CLE appeared before this Court and stated,
on instructions, that it was not ready to give joining to the Petitioner, but
th
would pay salary from 9 July, 2018 till further orders. The Court recorded
that statement. A later instruction given by CLE to its counsel in April, 2026
also records CLE’s understanding that salary released pursuant to the
Court’s order was considered as the Petitioner’s joining in the Council and
th
that he was thereafter placed under suspension with effect from 15 April,
2019.
122. This sequence is decisive. CLE could not refuse physical joining, pay
salary pursuant to a Court-recorded arrangement, later treat that payment as
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joining or deemed joining, and yet maintain a charge on the premise that the
Petitioner had failed to join after repatriation. The position is internally
inconsistent. The Petitioner cannot be charged for not doing what CLE itself
did not permit him to do. Nor can an employer first create the uncertainty
and then treat the employee’s response to it as misconduct.
123. The same reasoning bears directly on Article VII. The communication
th
dated 7 September, 2018 was written in the setting of non-posting, non-
release of salary, and continuing uncertainty after repatriation. CLE may
well have found its tone unpleasant or inappropriate. It may be argued that
senior officers are expected to maintain discipline and restraint even when
aggrieved. However, disciplinary law does not treat every sharp, anxious, or
distressed representation as misconduct. Context matters. A communication
written by an employee seeking posting and salary, after being kept out of
work despite reporting back, cannot be assessed as though it were an
unprovoked act of insubordination.
124. The Petitioner’s protest arose from CLE’s refusal to permit joining,
the non-release of salary, and the absence of a posting after repatriation.
Before converting that protest into a charge of grave misconduct, CLE was
required to confront its own role in creating the situation from which the
protest emerged. It did not do so.
125. Articles VI and VII rest on a factual and legal premise that cannot be
reconciled either with CLE’s recorded stand before this Court or with the
basic logic of service law. Permitting the inquiry to proceed on these articles
would serve no legitimate disciplinary purpose. It would instead allow CLE
to convert the consequence of its own refusal to accept joining into an
allegation of misconduct against the Petitioner.
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126. For these reasons, Articles VI and VII of the charge-sheet are held to
be unsustainable and are quashed.
th
Suspension order dated 15 April, 2019
th
127. The suspension order dated 15 April, 2019 records only that
disciplinary proceedings were pending and that the charges were serious and
grave. It then places the Petitioner under suspension with immediate effect
under Clause 12(b)(i) of the Standing Orders and grants subsistence
allowance under Clause 12(b)(iii).
128. The Court is conscious that suspension pending inquiry is ordinarily
an administrative measure. Courts do not interfere with such orders merely
because another view is possible, or because the employee disputes the
charges. The employer must have a fair degree of latitude in deciding
whether the presence of the employee may prejudice the inquiry, affect
discipline, or interfere with records or witnesses. That restraint, however,
does not mean that an order of suspension is immune from scrutiny. The
Court may interfere where the order is mechanical, where it bears no relation
to the purpose of suspension, where relevant circumstances have not been
considered, or where the suspension becomes punitive in substance.
129. Suspension is not a punishment in form, but it carries serious civil
consequences. It removes an employee from work, reduces pay, affects
reputation, and may, by passage of time, operate with a severity close to
penalty. The power must therefore be exercised for a legitimate purpose.
Such purpose may include protecting the inquiry, preventing interference
with records or witnesses, maintaining discipline in a sensitive post, or
preserving institutional interest. The mere issuance of a charge-sheet does
not, by itself, justify suspension.
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31
130. In State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty , the Supreme Court
held that suspension should not be resorted to as an administrative routine.
The authority must consider the gravity of the alleged misconduct, the
nature of evidence, the circumstances of the case, and whether suspension is
necessary in public interest or to facilitate inquiry. In Ajay Kumar
32
Choudhary v. Union of India , the Supreme Court expressed concern over
prolonged suspensions and emphasised that suspension cannot be allowed to
33
become punitive through delay. O.P. Gupta v. Union of India , also
recognises the oppressive effect of continued suspension without timely
conclusion.
131. Tested on these principles, the suspension order is unsustainable. It
contains no reason beyond the recital that charges are serious and grave. The
order does not explain how the Petitioner’s continuance would prejudice the
inquiry, whether he retained control over relevant records, whether he was in
a position to influence witnesses from CWC or NBT, or whether he
occupied any post from which the proceedings could be obstructed.
132. These circumstances go to the root of the justification for suspension.
CLE had not permitted the Petitioner to physically join, and he was not
functioning from its office. The records relevant to Articles I to V were
substantially with CWC, the Ministry, or other public authorities. Articles
VI and VII likewise arose from correspondence and events already forming
part of the record. In this factual setting, the suspension order discloses no
reason why suspension was necessary, as opposed to allowing the inquiry to
proceed while regulating the Petitioner’s position through an appropriate

31
(1994) 4 SCC 126
32
(2015) 7 SCC 291
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posting arrangement or other lawful administrative control.
133. The chronology of events reinforces the conclusion. The Petitioner
was repatriated by NBT in May, 2018. CLE did not permit physical joining.
In December, 2018, this Court recorded CLE’s statement that it would pay
th
salary from 9 July, 2018 till further orders. The charge-sheet was issued on
st th
1 March, 2019. The suspension followed on 15 April, 2019. By then, the
events forming the basis of the charges were already matters of record. CLE
did not identify any live operational risk which required the Petitioner to be
kept out of service.
134. The subsequent passage of time is also material. The Petitioner has
remained under suspension for years while the proceedings have not reached
finality. Even allowing for the pendency of the present writ petition and
interim orders passed therein, the continuation of suspension cannot be
justified by a bare reference to the pendency of disciplinary proceedings.
Suspension must remain connected to necessity. Once that link is absent, the
order becomes punitive in effect.
135. Articles VI and VII have already been found unsustainable. As
regards Articles I to V, the inquiry has been permitted to continue subject to
safeguards concerning documents, source material, approvals within CWC
and procedural fairness. The mere continuance of inquiry on those articles
does not justify sustaining a suspension order which discloses no assessment
of necessity. The order is not being set aside because the Court has returned
any finding on the truth of the allegations in Articles I to V, but because
CLE failed to demonstrate why suspension was necessary in the
circumstances of the case, particularly when the Petitioner had not been

33
(1987) 4 SCC 328
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permitted to physically join and the relevant records substantially lay with
public authorities.
th
136. The Court therefore holds that the suspension order dated 15 April,
2019 cannot be sustained. The Petitioner shall be entitled to consequential
benefits flowing from this finding, subject to the final outcome of the
inquiry on Articles I to V. Nothing in this judgment shall preclude CLE
from proceeding with the inquiry on Articles I to V in accordance with law
and the directions issued herein.
137. CLE shall, within four weeks, pass an appropriate order regulating the
Petitioner’s service position consequent upon revocation of suspension,
including posting, assignment of duties, or any other lawful administrative
arrangement consistent with this judgment and the pendency of inquiry.
Relief
st
138. For the foregoing reasons, the charge-sheet dated 1 March, 2019 is
not quashed in its entirety. However, Articles VI and VII are set aside, being
inconsistent with CLE’s own position before this Court and with its
subsequent treatment of salary payment as joining, or as deemed joining.
139. The disciplinary proceedings shall continue only in respect of Articles
I to V, and from the stage at which they stood stayed, subject to the
safeguards and directions contained in paragraphs 116 to 118 above. The
proceedings shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible, and preferably
within six months from the date of this judgment. If the Petitioner
superannuates before conclusion of the proceedings, CLE may continue
them if permissible under the applicable service rules and law.
th
140. The suspension order dated 15 April, 2019 is set aside.
Consequently, CLE shall compute and release the differential salary and
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admissible allowances for the period during which the Petitioner was paid
only subsistence allowance, after due adjustment of the allowance already
paid. The computation and release shall be effected, in accordance with law
and CLE’s applicable service conditions, within six weeks from the date of
this judgment.
141. The release of the aforesaid amount shall not be construed as any
expression on the merits of Articles I to V. If, upon conclusion of the
disciplinary proceedings, the Petitioner is found guilty of any of the
surviving charges, it shall remain open to CLE to pass such consequential
order as may be permissible under the applicable service conditions and law,
including for adjustment or recovery, after affording the Petitioner an
opportunity of hearing.
142. The Petitioner shall be treated as having joined, or as deemed to have
th
joined, the services of CLE with effect from 9 July, 2018. For all service
purposes, including continuity of service, there shall be no break attributable
to CLE’s refusal to permit physical joining.
th th
143. The question of salary for the period from 29 May, 2018 to 9 July,
2018 is linked to the Petitioner’s repatriation from NBT and to the interim
order passed in W.P.(C) 6602/2018. That issue is being dealt with in the
judgment pronounced today in the said writ petition and is not decided here.
144. The writ petition is partly allowed in the above terms. Pending
applications, if any, stand disposed of.


SANJEEV NARULA, J
MAY 29, 2026/ab
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