YES BANK LTD. vs WARDHA NAGARI SAHAKARI ADHIKOSH (BANK) AND ORS.
- Court
- Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal
TELECOM DISPUTES SETTLEMENT & APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 23.03.2026
Pronounced on: __.05.2026
CYBER APPEAL NO. 03 OF 2025
YES BANK Limited …APPELLANT
Versus
Wardha Nagari Sahakari Adhikosh (Bank) & Ors …RESPONDENTS
BEFORE:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DHIRUBHAI NARANBHAI PATEL (CHAIRPERSON)
HON’BLE MR. SANJEEV BANZAL (MEMBER)
FOR APPELLANT FOR RESPONDENT
Mr Kunal Tandon, Sr. Adv
Ms Swikriti Singhania
Mr Ranjeet Singh Sidhu
Mr Gyanendra Rathor
Ms Natasha Singh
Mr. Kanishk Sachdeva
Mr Mahendra B Limaye For R-1
Ms Aditi Dixit for R 2-7
Mr Mohit Raj For R11 And R12;
Ms Aprajita Kumar For Dr. Nityanand
Singh For R13 And R14;
Mr. Vijay Kumar for R-15
Mr. Ashish K Singh, Ms. Muskan Malhotra,
Mr. Sidhant Malik for R-18
Mr. G K Mishra, Ms. Navika Malik,
Mr. Manas Rai for R-21
Page 1 of 75
JUDGEMENT
Per Justice D.N. PATEL, Chairperson
1. The present Appeal is preferred under Section 57(1) of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 (hereinafter, "the IT Act")
read with Rule 3(1) of the Cyber Appellate (Procedure)
Rules, 2000. The Appellant assails the Impugned Order dated
11.02.2025 (hereinafter, the "Impugned Order") passed by
the Learned Adjudicating Officer, Mumbai, in Complaint
Case No. 01 of 2024.
2. By the Impugned Order, the Adjudicating Officer allowed the
Complaint filed by the Respondent No. 1, herein, and
directed the Appellant, YES Bank Limited, to refund a sum
of ₹1,21,16,004/- (Rupees One Crore Twenty-One Lakhs
Sixteen Thousand and Four only) together with compound
interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of alleged
contravention until full payment, and further directed
payment of compensation amounting to ₹29,83,996/-
(Rupees Twenty-Nine Lakhs Eighty-Three Thousand Nine
Hundred and Ninety-Six only) towards loss of reputation,
public trust, mental distress, and litigation expenses.
3. The Appellant challenges the Impugned Order primarily on the
ground that it was passed in gross violation of the Principles of
Natural Justice, specifically the doctrine of audi alteram
partem . The Appellant contends that it was condemned
unheard; that no notice of the final hearing was served upon it
or its counsel at the correct email addresses duly communicated
to the office of the Learned Adjudicating Officer.
Page 2 of 75
4. Further, that the Appellant’s applications seeking to summon
material witnesses remained undisposed of; and that,
consequently, it was deprived of any reasonable opportunity
to present its case, lead evidence, or advance oral submissions
before the adverse order came to be passed.
5. The factual matrix germane to the procedural challenge is
culled out from the pleadings and the documentary evidence
on record and is as follows:
A. The Respondent No. 1, Wardha Nagari Sahakari Adhikosh
(Bank) Maryadit (hereinafter, "the Complainant Bank"), is
an urban cooperative bank operating in Wardha district,
Maharashtra. The Appellant, YES Bank Limited, is a full-
service commercial bank with a pan-India presence.
Pursuant to an agreement executed in the year 2013, the
Complainant Bank availed sub-membership arrangements
with the Appellant for RTGS and NEFT services and
maintained a Current Account bearing No.
xxxxxxxxxxxx0581 at the Appellant's Nagpur branch.
B. The account was linked to the mobile number of an
authorized officer of the Complainant Bank for the
purpose of receiving transaction alerts.
C. It is from this banking relationship that the present
controversy arises as on 24.05.2023 , twenty-four
electronic transactions aggregating to Rs. 1,21,16,004/-
came to be processed from the aforesaid current account
of Respondent No. 1 and were transferred to twenty-four
separate beneficiary accounts maintained with various
banks, who now stand arrayed as Respondent Nos. 2 to 24
in the present appeal.
Page 3 of 75
D. The Complainant Bank alleged that these transactions
were unauthorized and fraudulent. Upon being informed,
the Appellant initiated recall requests with the beneficiary
banks on the same day. The Complainant Bank lodged a
First Information Report with the Wardha Cyber Crime
Cell on 25.05.2023, and an investigation ensued.
E. The Appellant also engaged M/s Ernst & Young LLP, an
independent forensic audit firm, to conduct an analysis of
the incident, and two reports being an Interim Report was
submitted in June 2023, followed by a Final Forensic
Report in September 2023.
F. Thereafter, on 01.11.2023, Respondent No. 1 instituted
Complaint Case No. 01 of 2024 before the Ld.
Adjudicating Officer, Maharashtra, under Sections 43(a),
43(g), and 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000,
seeking refund of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1,21,16,004/-,
together with compensation quantified at Rs. 29,83,996/-
under various heads including loss of reputation, public
confidence, mental harassment, and litigation expenses.
G. The record discloses that the complaint remained pending
for some time, subsequently, a writ petition was moved
before the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay,
Nagpur Bench, and by order dated 01.08.2024, the
Adjudicating Officer was directed to decide the complaint
expeditiously and, in any event, within a period of four
months from production of the order.
H. Consequent to the Hon’ble High Court's directive, on
22.10.2024, the Ld. Adjudicating Officer issued a
notice, by email as well as speed post, fixing the matter
for hearing on 29.10.2024. The Appellant states that the
speed post notice was received by it on 24.10.2024 and
Page 4 of 75
that, upon verification, it was found that the email
addresses reflected in the notice did not correctly
mention the Appellant’s service coordinates. On
29.10.2024, the Appellant appeared before the
Adjudicating Officer and time was granted for filing
reply.
I. As indicated from the record that on the same date, the
Appellant addressed a formal email communication to the
official email ID of the Adjudicating Officer's office
(Annexure A-10), specifically furnishing the correct email
addresses of the Appellant and its legal representatives for
all future service and communication, the aforesaid
communication contained following Email addresses:
•
[email protected]
• [email protected]
• [email protected]
• [email protected]
J. The Appellant on 12.11.2024, sought a short extension of
time to file its reply, and on 14.11.2024, it filed its
reply/written statement to the complaint. Thereafter, on
18.11.2024, Respondent No. 1 filed its rejoinder, and on
27.11.2024, the Appellant filed its sur-rejoinder.
K. The record further shows that on 05.02.2025, the
Appellant filed two applications before the Adjudicating
Officer, one seeking summoning of the Investigating
Officer concerned with the FIR and investigation; and the
other seeking summoning of the concerned officials of
Ernst & Young, the forensic auditors.
L. The grievance of the Appellant is that these applications
were neither meaningfully taken up nor disposed of by any
Page 5 of 75
reasoned order prior to pronouncement of the impugned
order.
M. A further notice dated 06.02.2025 came to be issued by the
office of the Adjudicating Officer for the final hearing
fixed on 11.02.2025. The Appellant asserts that this notice
was not served at the corrected email addresses furnished
by the authorized individual of the Appellant on
29.10.2024, with the consequence that neither the
Appellant nor its legal representatives had any knowledge
of the final hearing.
N. It is further the Appellant’s case that, on account of such
defective service, neither it nor its counsel was present on
11.02.2025 when the complaint was taken up and decided.
O. The Ld. Adjudicating Officer proceeded to take up the
matter on 11.02.2025 in the absence of the Appellant and
its counsel and passed the impugned order, allowing the
complaint in favour of Respondent No. 1 and directing the
Appellant to refund Rs. 1,21,16,004/- together with
compound interest @ 18% from the date of contravention
till payment, and additionally to pay Rs. 29,83,996/-
towards compensation.
P. The Appellant’s further grievance is that a copy of the
impugned order was not supplied to it by the office of the
Adjudicating Officer in the ordinary course, but was
received only on 20.02.2025 through the counsel for
Respondent No. 1.
Q. Thereafter, on 21.02.2025, the Appellant’s counsel
addressed an email to the Adjudicating Officer
specifically pointing out that no notice of the final hearing
had been received and asserting that the hearing notice had
Page 6 of 75
not been sent to the correct addresses earlier furnished by
the Appellant.
R. The Appellant thereafter preferred a review/recall
application before the Ld. Adjudicating Officer on
20.03.2025, seeking the recall of the impugned order on
the grounds of procedural infirmity and denial of natural
justice.
S. According to the Appellant, the said review application
has remained unattended and has not been listed for
consideration till the date of the present appeal. In the
interregnum, the Complainant Bank filed an execution
application on 21.03.2025, seeking enforcement of the
impugned order.
6. That being aggrieved thereby, the Appellant instituted the
present appeal before this Tribunal on 02.04.2025 and vide
Order Dated 08.04.2025, this Tribunal admitted the appeal,
directed issuance of notice by dasti and email and in view of the
peculiar facts of the present case, stayed the operation,
implementation and execution of the impugned order till the
next date of hearing.
7. Thereafter, on 25.07.2025, this Tribunal heard learned counsel
for the parties at some length and recorded the submissions of
the appellant that, before the Adjudicating Officer, reply,
rejoinder and sur-rejoinder had been filed; that the two
applications dated 05.02.2025 for summoning the Investigating
Officer and the forensic auditor were not acted upon; that the
matter was taken up for final hearing on 11.02.2025 without
notice to the appellant; and that even the recall application filed
after the impugned order had not been decided.
Page 7 of 75
8. That vide order dated 25.07.2025, this Tribunal also recorded
the submission of Respondent No. 1 that the procedure
followed by Adjudicating Officers under Section 46 of the
Information Technology Act varied from State to State and
required uniformity.
9. ISSUES INVOLVED
The following issues are involved in the present Cyber Appeal,
which need due consideration of this Hon’ble Tribunal are as
follows:
I. Whether the procedure adopted by the Learned Adjudicating
Officer in passing the Impugned Order dated 11.02.2025 satisfies
the mandatory requirement of a reasonable and effective
opportunity of hearing under Section 46 (2) of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 read with Rules 4 (c), 4 (d), 4 (h), 4 (j) and
7 of the Information Technology (Qualification and Experience of
Adjudicating Officers and Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules,
2003?
II. Whether the said order is liable to be set aside on the ground of
violation of the Principles of Natural Justice, particularly the
doctrine of audi alteram partem ?
ARGUMENTS CANVASSED BY THE APPELLANT
10. It is submitted by Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that
the impugned order dated 11.02.2025 stands vitiated by a
fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice and the
mandatory statutory requirement of a reasonable opportunity of
hearing under Section 46(2) of the Information Technology Act,
2000 read with Rules 4 and 7 of the Information Technology
(Qualification and Experience of Adjudicating Officers and
Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003.
Page 8 of 75
11. Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, submitted that if the
Impugned Order is found to have been passed in violation of
the Principles of Natural Justice, it must be set aside irrespective
of the merits, and the matter must be remanded for a fresh
adjudication in accordance with law.
12. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the Adjudicating Officer
proceeded to pass the Impugned Order without ensuring that the
Appellant had been served with a valid notice of the final
hearing date. He draws our attention to a clear and
uncontroverted documentary trail:
A. The initial notice dated 22.10.2024, fixing the hearing on
29.10. 2024. On the face of this notice, it is recorded that
the email addresses used were "provided by
complainant." The Appellant, upon receiving the speed
post notice on 24.10.2024, discovered that its correct
email address was not reflected. The aforesaid notice is
contained at Annexure A-9 of the memo of this appeal.
B. A formal email communication sent by the Appellant's
Counsel to the official email ID of the Adjudicating
Officer's office on 29.10.2024 at 4:26 PM. This
communication expressly stated that the Appellant's
email address was not mentioned in the previous notice
and provided four specific email addresses for all future
correspondence. The aforesaid communication is
contained at Annexure A-10 of the memo of this appeal.
C. The notice for the final hearing, purportedly dated 06.02.
2025, fixing the hearing on 11.02.2025, this notice did
not contain any of the four email addresses provided in
Annexure A-10. Consequently, neither the Appellant nor
its Counsel received any intimation whatsoever of the
final hearing date.
Page 9 of 75
13. Learned Senior Counsel contends that an email dated
21.02.2025, sent by the Appellant's Counsel to the Adjudicating
Officer's office after physically inspecting the case papers. The
email confirms that the Notice dated 06.02.2025, was not sent
to the correct email addresses and draws attention to the factual
inaccuracy in the Impugned Order regarding service of notice.
14. Learned Senior Counsel contends that this documentary
evidence stands unrebutted. Respondent No. 1, in its Reply
Affidavit, has neither denied the existence of Annexure A-10
nor produced the Notice dated 06.02.2025 to demonstrate that
it was, in fact, sent to the correct addresses. In the face of this
silence, the Appellant's version must be accepted.
15. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the finding
recorded by the Adjudicating Officer in paragraph IV.1 of the
Impugned Order that "despite due notice, the learned counsel
for Respondent No. 1 failed to appear" is factually incorrect and
legally unsustainable. The Appellant did not "fail to appear"; it
was never informed of the hearing. The right to a fair hearing,
which is the very essence of the audi alteram partem rule, was
thus completely denied.
16. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the Appellant had, from
the very inception of the proceedings, consistently requested an
opportunity for oral hearing. The Impugned Order itself
acknowledges, at paragraph IV.1, that the Appellant's
Counsel "appeared only once and duly submitted the Written
Statement... wherein a request for a hearing was made."
Page 10 of 75
17. Having acknowledged the request, and having scheduled a final
hearing in response to it, the Adjudicating Officer was duty-
bound to ensure that the Appellant was actually informed of that
hearing date. The failure to serve the notice at the correct
address rendered the scheduling of the hearing an empty
formality and deprived the Appellant of the very opportunity it
had sought.
18. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the matter involved
complex questions of fact and law cyber forensic evidence,
competing expert reports, regulatory compliance, and multi-
party liability and such a matter could not be justly determined
merely on the basis of written pleadings, without affording the
parties an opportunity to address arguments, clarify
submissions, and respond to queries from the adjudicator. The
denial of an oral hearing has caused grave and irreparable
prejudice to the Appellant.
19. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the two applications
were filed by the Appellant on 05.02.2025 (Annexures A-14
and A-15). These applications were filed under Section 46 (5)
of the IT Act, which confers on the Adjudicating Officer the
powers of a civil court, including the power to summon
witnesses, and sought to summon:
A. The Investigating Officer of the Wardha Cyber
Crime Cell, who had investigated the FIR and filed a
charge-sheet; and
B. The officials of M/s Ernst & Young LLP, the
independent forensic auditor, to provide testimony
on their findings.
Page 11 of 75
20. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Impugned Order
is entirely silent on these applications. They were neither
listed for hearing, nor were they allowed or rejected by a
reasoned order. The Adjudicating Officer proceeded to
pronounce a final judgment without even acknowledging, let
alone disposing of, pending interlocutory applications that
went to the very heart of the Appellant's defense.
21. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that, this is a fundamental
procedural lapse that further vitiates the proceedings. A party
has a right to have its applications for leading evidence
considered and decided before the main matter is adjudicated
upon.
22. Learned Senior Counsel also drew our attention to the
observations made by this Tribunal in its order dated
25.07.2025, wherein it was noted that the procedure before
Adjudicating Officers lacks consistency and that the practice
of issuing fresh notices for every hearing, without assigning
a fixed next date in the presence of the parties, is prone to
failure and leads to precisely the kind of denial of natural
justice witnessed in the present case.
23.
The Appellant, in its Written Submissions, has offered
constructive suggestions for streamlining the procedure,
including the mandatory assignment of next hearing dates in
the presence of parties and the maintenance of a cause list.
These suggestions, it is submitted, may be considered by this
Tribunal for issuance of general guidelines.
Page 12 of 75
ARGUMENTS CANVASSED BY RESPONDENTS
24. Mr. Mahendra Limaye, Learned Counsel appearing for
Respondent No. 1, has mounted a vigorous opposition to the
present Appeal and has endeavoured to sustain the validity of
the Impugned Order dated 11.02.2025.
25. The principal contention advanced on behalf of Respondent No.
1 is that the Appellant was afforded ample and adequate
opportunity to present its case before the Learned Adjudicating
Officer.
26. Learned Counsel points to the fact that the Appellant filed a
comprehensive Reply (Written Statement) on 14.11.2024,
followed by a Sur-Rejoinder on 27.11.2024, and further moved
two substantive interlocutory applications on 05.02.2025
seeking the summoning of witnesses.
27. It is submitted that these pleadings and applications were duly
received, placed on record, and considered by the Adjudicating
Officer prior to the pronouncement of the Impugned Order. In
this factual setting, it is argued that the Appellant cannot
legitimately complain of a denial of opportunity to be heard.
28. Learned Counsel has placed reliance upon the statutory
provisions contained in Section 46(2) of the Information
Technology Act, 2000, read with Rule 4 of the Information
Technology (Qualification and Experience of Adjudicating
Officers and Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003.
Page 13 of 75
29. It is submitted that these provisions envisage a summary
adjudicatory procedure founded upon the complaint, any
attendant investigation reports, and the written submissions
exchanged between the parties. The Adjudicating Officer,
having arrived at a considered opinion on the basis of the
material available on the record, was fully competent to
pronounce the Impugned Order.
30. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1 made specific
reference to Rule 4 (h), which empowers the Adjudicating
Officer to proceed ex parte in the event of non-appearance by a
party after due notice, and it is contended that this power was
legitimately exercised in the facts of the present case.
31. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 has placed on record
the order dated 01.08.2024 rendered by the Hon'ble High Court
of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, in Writ Petition No.
4474 of 2024 (Annexure P-3). Wherein the Hon’ble High Court
directed the Ld. Adjudicating Officer to decide the matter with
expedition and, in any event, within a period of four calendar
months from the date of production of the said order.
32. Learned Counsel submits that the Adjudicating Officer acted in
strict compliance with this judicial mandate and concluded the
proceedings within the timeframe stipulated by the High Court.
It is urged that the Appellant's grievance regarding the alleged
want of adequate time or opportunity must be evaluated against
this backdrop; the Adjudicating Officer was duty-bound to
adhere to the timeline prescribed by the superior court. In
summation, Respondent No. 1 prays that the present Cyber
Page 14 of 75
Appeal be dismissed with exemplary costs and that the
Impugned Order dated 11.02.2025 be upheld in its entirety.
33. At the later stage of hearing before this Tribunal, Respondent
No. 1 also placed on record a suggestion note concerning the
procedure to be followed by Adjudicating Officers under
Section 46 of the Information Technology Act.
34. In the said note, Respondent No. 1 proposed a structured and
time-bound adjudicatory schedule beginning from filing of the
complaint and extending up to pronouncement, with provision
for hybrid hearings, an additional hearing in the event of non-
appearance, specific communication of the next date of hearing
on the hearing date itself, and recording of virtual proceedings.
35. In so far as Respondent Nos. 13 and 14 , namely the concerned
branches of Federal Bank , being the Kolkata (C.R. Avenue)
and Bangalore (Gandhi Nagar) branches of Federal Bank,
respectively, have filed a Short Reply before this Tribunal.
36. It is submitted that the facts of their case are that upon receipt
of the recall communication from the Appellant on 24.05.2023,
they acted promptly by placing a debit freeze and marking lien
on the concerned beneficiary accounts.
37. It is submitted by learned Counsel appearing for Respondent
No. 13 & 14, that two accounts that had received the disputed
credits, one is in the name of Arabindu Barman at the Kolkata
branch and the other in the name of Sharath J at the Bengaluru
branch. However, by the time action could be taken, the funds
Page 15 of 75
had already been withdrawn or transferred onward, leaving
insufficient balance for reversal and that no actionable
deficiency lies on their part and that the appeal, in so far as it
concerns them, deserves to be dismissed.
38. Further, Respondent No. 15 has filed a short reply stating that
two disputed credits, amounting to Rs. 4,90,800/- and Rs.
4,79,080/- , were received on 24.05.2023 in the account of one
Jagadish Reang maintained at its Malleshwaram Branch, but
that the said amounts had already been withdrawn by the
customer on the same day.
39. It further stated that, upon receipt of the Appellant’s recall email
dated 24.05.2023, it marked lien on the account and informed
the Appellant that reversal was not possible because the funds
had already been withdrawn. On that foundation, Respondent
No. 15 contends, that it had no role in the fraud, that there was
no deficiency on its part, that no cause of action arises against
it, and that the appeal, as against it, is liable to be dismissed with
costs.
40. Thus, broadly stated, Respondent No. 1 has sought to sustain
the impugned order by asserting that adequate opportunity was
granted to the appellant, that the Appellant was substantively
liable under the Information Technology Act, and that no
equitable relief should be granted to a party which, according
to it, has not approached the Tribunal with clean hands and
Respondent Nos. 13, 14, and 15 have confine themselves to
their respective transactional roles as beneficiary-bank
respondents.
Page 16 of 75
REASONS AND ANALYSIS
-ISSUE No. I -
41. Whether the procedure adopted by the Ld. Adjudicating
Officer in passing the Impugned Order dated 11.02.2025
satisfied the mandatory requirement of a reasonable and
effective opportunity of hearing under Section 46 (2) of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 read with Rules 4 (c), 4
(d), 4 (h), 4 (j) and 7 of the Information Technology
(Qualification and Experience of Adjudicating Officers and
Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003 ?
42. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid factual and procedural
developments and argument canvassed by the counsel for both
the parties that the present appeal falls for consideration. Since
the appeal, as pressed, principally raises a challenge to the
legality and fairness of the adjudicatory process culminating in
the impugned order dated 11.02.2025.
43. That it has become necessary to first examine whether the
Adjudicating Officer proceeded in accordance with the mandate
of Section 46 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, read
with the applicable Rules governing notice, inquiry, hearing,
and exercise of procedural powers, before considering the
consequence that ought to follow.
44. The contours of the Adjudicating Officer's jurisdiction, powers,
and most significantly procedural obligations are defined by
Section 46 of the Act, read with the Information Technology
(Qualification and Experience of Adjudicating Officers and
Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003 (hereinafter, "the
2003 Rules").
Page 17 of 75
45. It is pertinent to denote that Section 46 of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 provides the foundational statutory
mandate, which lies at the heart of the present controversy and
reads as follows:
“ 46. Power to adjudicate.—
(1) For the purpose of adjudging under this Chapter
whether any person has committed a contravention
of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule,
regulation, direction or order made thereunder
which renders him liable to pay penalty or
compensation, the Central Government shall,
subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), appoint
any officer not below the rank of a Director to the
Government of India or an equivalent officer of a
State Government to be an adjudicating officer for
holding an inquiry in the manner prescribed by the
Central Government.
(1A) The adjudicating officer appointed under sub-
section (1) shall exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate
matters in which the claim for injury or damage
does not exceed rupees five crore:
Provided that the jurisdiction in respect of the claim for
injury or damage exceeding rupees five crores shall vest
with the competent court.
(2) The adjudicating officer shall, after giving the person
referred to in sub-section (1) a reasonable
opportunity for making representation in the matter
and if, on such inquiry, he is satisfied that the person
has committed the contravention, he may impose
such penalty or award such compensation as he
thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of that
section.
(3) No person shall be appointed as an adjudicating
officer unless he possesses such experience in the
field of Information Technology and legal or judicial
experience as may be prescribed by the Central
Government.
Page 18 of 75
(4) Where more than one adjudicating officers are
appointed, the Central Government shall specify by
order the matters and places with respect to which
such officers shall exercise their jurisdiction.
(5) Every adjudicating officer shall have the powers of a
civil court which are conferred on the Appellate
Tribunal under sub-section (2) of section 58, and
(a) all proceedings before it shall be deemed to
be judicial proceedings within the meaning
of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860);
(b) shall be deemed to be a civil court for the
purposes of sections 345 and 346 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974);
(c) shall be deemed to be a civil court for
purposes of Order XXI of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 (5 of 1908). ”
46. The bare reading of Section 46 of the IT Act, 2000 would
indicate that the statutory requirements enshrined under
Section 46 is threefold. First , sub-section (2) is couched in
mandatory language and requires the Adjudicating Officer to
give the person proceeded against a “reasonable opportunity
for making representation in the matter.” Second , the inquiry
contemplated by the provision is not an empty ritual or
formality; it is the very jurisdictional foundation upon which
satisfaction as to contravention and consequential award of
compensation must rest. Third , sub-section (5) recognises
that the Adjudicating Officer is not a mere administrative
functionary but a quasi-judicial authority vested with powers
analogous, to the extent specified, to those of a civil court.
Page 19 of 75
47. Having regard to the above, it would be expedient and prudent
to visit Rule 3 of the Information Technology (Qualification
and Experience of Adjudicating Officers and Manner of
Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003 , which reads as follows:
“ 3. Eligibility for Adjudicating Officer:—
Whereas the purpose and intent of Section 46(3) of
IT Act is that the Adjudicating Officer should be a
person so qualified and experienced to take
decisions with a view in relation to Information
Technology aspects as well as in a position to
determine the complaints keeping in view the legal
or judicial mannerism on the principle of
compensation of damages of IT Act .
A person shall not be qualified for appointment as
Adjudicating Officer unless the person—
(a) Possesses a University graduate Bachelor
degree or equivalent, recognized by Central
Government / State Government for the purpose
of recruitment to grade I Service in a
Government Department through Union / State
Public Service Commission;
(b) Possesses Information Technology experience
in the areas of relevance to public interface with
Central / State Government functioning and
experience obtained through the in-service
training imparting competence to operate
computer system to send and receive e-mails or
other information through the computer
network, exposure and awareness about the
method of carrying information, data, sound,
images or other electronic records through the
medium of network including Internet;
(c) Possesses legal or judicial experience to
discharge responsibilities connected with the role
of Central / State Government in respect of
making decisions or orders in relation to
administration of laws as a District Magistrate, or
Additional District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional
Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate or in other
administrative or quasi-judicial capacity for a
cumulative period of 5 years ;
Page 20 of 75
(d) Is working and holding a post in Grade I in
Government Department either in State
Government/Union Territories to perform
functional duty and discharge job responsibility
in the field of Information Technology;
(e) Is an in-service officer not below the rank of
Director to the Government of India or an
equivalent officer of State Government. ”
48. The perusal of Rule 3 leaves no manner of doubt that the
Adjudicating Officer is expected to possess a dual competence
one in Information Technology and the other in legal or quasi-
judicial decision-making. This statutory design is of some
importance to the present issue, for it militates against any
suggestion that proceedings before the Adjudicating Officer
may be conducted in an informal or unstructured fashion which
is unconstrained by the discipline of fair procedure.
49. The manner in which the inquiry is to be held is then prescribed
by Rule 4 . Since the present issue directly turns on the content
of that rule, it is appropriate to reproduce the relevant rule in
extenso and therefore, Rule 4 of the 2003 Rules reads as under:
“ 4. Scope and Manner of holding inquiry: -
(a) The Adjudicating Officers shall exercise
jurisdiction in respect of the contraventions in
relation to Chapter IX of IT Act 2000 and the matter
or matters or places or area or areas in a State or
Union Territory of the posting of the person.
(b) The complaint shall be made to the Adjudicating
Officer of the State or Union Territory on the basis
of location of Computer System, Computer
Network as defined in sub-Section 2 of Section 75
of IT Act on a plain paper on the Proforma
attached to these Rules together with the fee
payable calculated on the basis of damages
claimed by way of compensation.
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(c)
The Adjudicating Officer, shall issue a notice
together with all the documents to all the
necessary parties to the proceedings, fixing a
date and time for further proceedings . The notice
shall contain such particulars as far as may be as
to the time and place of the alleged contravention,
and the person (if any) against whom, or the thing
(if any) in respect of which, it was committed.
(d)
On the date so fixed, the Adjudicating Officer shall
explain to such person or persons to whom notice
is issued about the contravention alleged to have
been committed in relation to any of the provisions
of the Act or of any rule, regulation, direction or
order made there under.
(e) If the person in respect of whom notice is issued
pleads guilty, the Adjudicating Officer shall record
the plea, and may impose penalty or award such
compensation as he thinks fit in accordance with
the provisions of the Act, rules, regulations, order
or directions made there under.
(f) Alternatively on the date fixed the person or
persons against whom a matter is filed may show
cause why an enquiry should not be held in the
alleged contravention or that why the report
alleging the contravention should be dismissed.
(g) The Adjudicating Officer on the basis of the report
of the matter, investigation report (if any), other
documents and on the basis of submissions shall
form an opinion that there is sufficient cause for
holding an enquiry or that the report into the
matter should be dismissed and on that basis
shall either by order dismiss the report of the
matter, or shall determine to hear the matter.
(h) If any person or persons fails, neglects or refuses
to appear, or present himself as required by sub-
rule (d), before the Adjudicating Officer, the
Adjudicating Officer shall proceed with the inquiry
in the absence of such person or persons after
recording the reasons for doing so.
(i) At any time or on receipt of a report of
contravention from an aggrieved person, or by a
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Government agency or suo-moto, the Adjudicating
Officer, may get the matter or the report
investigated from an officer in the Office of
Controller or CERT-IND or from the concerned
Deputy Superintendent of Police, to ascertain
more facts and whether prima facie there is a case
for adjudicating on the matter or not.
(j) The Adjudicating Officer, shall fix a date and time
for production of documents or evidence and for
this purpose may also rely on electronic records or
communications and as far as may be, shall use
or make available the infrastructure for promoting
on-line settlement of enquiry or disputes or for
taking evidence including the services of an
adjudicating officer and infrastructure in another
State.
(k) As far as possible, every application shall be heard
and decided in four months and the whole matter
in six months.
(l) Adjudicating Officer, when convinced that the
scope of the case extends to the Offence(s) (under
Chapter Xl of IT Act) instead of Contravention,
needing appropriate punishment instead of mere
financial penalty, should transfer the case to the
Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case,
through Presiding Officer. ”
50. Having perused the above, it appears that Rule 4 makes the
procedural sequence abundantly clear. A notice with all
documents must first be issued, fixing the date and time of
further proceedings. On the date so fixed, the Adjudicating
Officer must explain the allegation. If the party does not
admit guilt, the Officer must consider whether inquiry should
proceed.
51. It is apparent that only thereafter may the matter be heard and
adjudicated. Crucially, the ex parte route provided under Rule
4 (h) is not an independent power existing in the abstract; it
is expressly conditional upon the person failing, neglecting,
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or refusing to appear “as required by sub-rule (d)”. In other
words, due notice of the date fixed is a condition precedent to
lawful exercise of the ex parte power.
52. The office of Adjudicating Officer under section 46 of the IT
Act, 2000 was formalized by appointment framework issued by
the Central Government’s order dated 25.03.2003 , issued and
notified in Gazette Notification as Order No. G.S.R. 240 (E) .
The said order states as follows:
“ G.S.R. 240(E).— In exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section (1) of section 46 of the Information
Technology Act, 2000, the Central Government
hereby makes the following order/appointments,
viz.—
1. Whereas Sub-section (1) of the Section 46 makes
provision for appointment of one or more
Adjudicating Officers not below the rank of Director
to the Central Government and Sub-section (3)
requires that such an officer should possess
experience in the field of Information Technology
and legal or judicial experience as may be
prescribed by the Central Government and whereas
such experience necessary for appointment as
Adjudicating Officer has been notified by the Central
Government as per the Gazette Notification for
Information Technology Rules, 2003 under the short
title Qualification and Experience of Adjudicating
Officer and Manner of Holding Enquiry vide Gazette
th
Notification G.S.R. 220(E) dated 17 March, 2003.
2. Further, whereas the Secretary of the Department of
Information Technology of each of the States or
Union Territories are normally not below the rank of
Director and possess the requisite experience in
the field of Information Technology and also
possess legal/judicial experience as required ,
therefore the Secretary of Department of
Information Technology of each of the States or of
Union Territories is hereby appointed as
Adjudicating Officer for the purpose of the
Information Technology Act, 2000.
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3. The Department of Information Technology of each
of the States or of Union Territories shall provide the
infrastructure and maintain the records of the
matters handled by Adjudicating Officer functioning
in the States/Union Territories. ”
53. Since service of notice is itself the central dispute in the peculiar
facts of the present case, it is incumbent upon us that Rule 7
must also be reproduced in full and it reads as under:
“ 7. Service of notices and orders: -A notice or an order
issued under these rules shall be served on the person
in any of the following manners, that is to say: -
(a) by delivering or tendering it to that person or the
person’s authorized agent in an electronic form
provided that there is sufficient evidence of
actual delivery of the electronic record to the
concerned person; or
(b) by sending it to the person by registered post with
acknowledgement due to the address of his place
of residence or the last known place of residence
or business place;
(c)
if it cannot be served under clause (a) or (b) above
then by affixing it, in the presence of two
witnesses, on the outer door or some other
conspicuous part of the premises in which that
person resides or is known to have last resided, or
carried on business or personally works or last
worked for gain. ”
54. Upon careful examination, two facets of Rule 7 are
immediately apparent. First , where electronic service is
relied upon, the rule requires not merely dispatch but
“sufficient evidence of actual delivery.” Second , the rule
sets out a hierarchy in manner service ought to be effectuated
the said being electronic service; failing that, service by
registered post with acknowledgment due; and only if both
fail, service by affixation in the presence of witnesses.
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55.
The rule, therefore, does not treat service as a matter of
convenience; rather the language employed in Rule 7, treats
it as a matter of procedural legitimacy as quasi-judicial
proceeding are being undertaken by adjudicating officer.
56. Thus, the legal position is clear. The statutory and delegated
framework contemplates that adjudication under Section 46
is to be carried out by a properly qualified quasi-judicial
authority, equipped with both technological and legal
competence, and operating under a defined procedure of
notice, inquiry, hearing, and service. The existence of such a
carefully structured framework itself militates against any
attempt to reduce the requirement of hearing to a mere
formality.
57. The first issue goes to the root of the adjudicatory process.
At this stage, this Tribunal is not adjudicating the correctness
or otherwise of the rival contentions on the merits of the
alleged cyber fraud. The anterior and determinative question
is whether the Impugned Order dated 11.02.2025 came to be
consistent with the minimum statutory
passed in a manner
safeguards that the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the
2003 Rules insist upon before civil liability by way of
compensation is imposed upon any person.
58. If the procedural foundation is found to be infirm, the merits
cannot be permitted to cure the defect; for the right to be heard
is anterior to, and independent of, the question whether the
person proceeded against has a meritorious defence . The
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record, as it has unfolded before this Tribunal, discloses the
following sequence of procedural events which are either
admitted or uncontroverted.
59. The Complaint was filed by the Respondent Bank on
01.11.2023 . For a period of nearly one year thereafter, no
effective steps appear to have been taken by the office of the
Learned Adjudicating Officer to advance the proceedings. It
was only upon the Respondent Bank approaching the
Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench,
in Writ Petition Number 4474 of 2024 , that the Hon’ble
High Court, by an Order dated 01.08.2024, directed the
Learned Adjudicating Officer to decide the complaint
expeditiously and in any event within four months.
60. The first notice was issued on 22.10.2024, fixing the hearing
on 29.10.2024. The record shows and indeed the face of the
notice itself (Annexure A-9) discloses that the email
addresses contained therein were “provided by
complainant,” that is to say, furnished by the Respondent
Bank and not independently verified by the office of the
Learned Adjudicating Officer. The Appellant received this
notice at its Nagpur Branch by speed post on 24.10.2024,
giving it effectively five days’ notice of the first hearing.
61. On 29.10.2024, the Counsel for the Appellant appeared
before the Learned Adjudicating Officer for the first time. On
the same date, at 4:26 PM, the Counsel addressed a formal
email to the office of the Learned Adjudicating Officer
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(Annexure A-10), expressly drawing attention to the fact that
the Appellant’s correct email address was not mentioned in
the notice dated 22.10.2024, and furnishing four correct email
addresses for all future communications, being:
(i) [email protected];
(ii) [email protected];
(iii) [email protected];
(iv)
[email protected].
62. Thereafter, the Appellant actively and continuously
participated in the proceedings before the Learned
Adjudicating Officer. On 14.11.2024, the Appellant filed its
Reply to the Complaint. On 18.11.2024, the Respondent
Bank filed its Rejoinder.
63. Furthermore, on 27.11.2024, the Appellant filed its Sur-
Rejoinder, annexing therewith SMS delivery logs and on
05.02.2025, the Appellant filed two substantive Applications
one seeking the summoning of the Investigating Officer of
the Wardha Cyber Crime Cell, and the other seeking the
summoning of officials of Ernst and Young LLP, the forensic
auditor both invoking the powers of the Learned
Adjudicating Officer under Section 46(5) of the IT Act. The
decisive question for our consideration as formulated in Issue
No.1, then, is whether the notice dated 06.02.2025 fixing the
final hearing on 11.02.2025 was effectively served upon the
Appellant in the manner required by Rule 7 of the 2003
Rules.
Page 28 of 75
64. It is the case of the Appellant that the Notice dated
06.02.2025 did not contain any of the four email addresses
furnished by the Appellant’s Counsel on 29.10.2024. This
assertion is supported by the email dated 21.02.2025
(Annexure A-16) wherein the Appellant’s Counsel records
that upon visiting the office of the Learned Adjudicating
Officer on 21.02.2025 and physically inspecting the case
papers, it was confirmed that the Notice dated 06.02.2025 did
not mention the email addresses communicated on
29.10.2024.
65. The relevant wording of the said email dated 21.02.2025
reads as “ it is clear that Yes Bank and/or Saikrishna &
Associates did not receive any prior intimation of the date of
Final Arguments, which if intimated, we would have been
present to justify Yes Bank’s positions and to press our
pending Applications .”
66. The Respondent No.1, in its Reply Affidavit filed before this
Tribunal, has not produced any material to demonstrate that
the Notice dated 06.02.2025 was in fact transmitted to the
corrected email addresses, or that there existed, within the
meaning of Rule 7 (a) of the 2003 Rules, “sufficient
evidence of actual delivery of the electronic record” to the
Appellant or its authorised representatives.
67. The Respondent Bank has not produced a copy of the Notice
dated 06.02.2025 to show, on the face of the document, that
it bore the correct addresses. The Respondent Bank has not
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placed on record any email dispatch log, read receipt,
delivery confirmation, or any other form of proof establishing
that the notice reached the intended recipients.
68. Once the position as that has been reached as in the facts of
the present case, the resort to Rule 4 (h) of the 2003 Rules
becomes legally untenable. The power to proceed in the
absence of a party, as conferred by Rule 4(h), is not a free-
standing or self-executing power. It is expressly conditional
upon the person having failed, neglected, or refused to appear
“as required by sub-rule (d).”
69. In other words, the rule contemplates a sequence, being,
first , a valid notice under Rule 4(c) fixing a date and time;
second , the person so notified is required, on the date so
fixed, to appear as contemplated by Rule 4(d); and only
thereafter , if the person fails, neglects, or refuses to appear
despite such valid notice, may the Adjudicating Officer
proceed in the person’s absence, and that too only “after
recording the reasons for doing so.” Each of these
conditions is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the valid
exercise of the ex parte power.
70. Needless to state that a party that deliberately stays away
after effective service stands on a wholly different footing
from a party that had no knowledge of the hearing because
the notice itself was not effectively served at the correct
address.
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71. In the present case, since the notice of the final hearing has
not been shown to have been served at the corrected
addresses furnished by the Appellant, the very premise upon
which the Learned Adjudicating Officer proceeded to pass
the Impugned Order in the absence of the Appellant namely,
that the Appellant had failed to appear “despite due notice”
cannot be accepted as established.
72. The above infirmity is compounded by the treatment, or more
accurately, the complete non-treatment, of the two
Applications dated 05.02.2025. Those Applications sought
the summoning of the Investigating Officer and the officials
of Ernst and Young LLP to provide testimony regarding the
forensic reports and the findings of the police investigation.
73. Whether those Applications were liable to be allowed or
rejected is not the point presently in issue; what is material is
that they were pending before the Learned Adjudicating
Officer when the matter was taken up for final disposal, and
the Impugned Order does not disclose any consideration of
them indeed no reference of any kind.
74.
The text of Section 46 (5) of the IT Act recognises that the
Adjudicating Officer carries certain powers akin to those of a
civil court, including the power to summon and examine
witnesses and Rule 4 (j) of the 2003 Rules, specifically
contemplates the fixation of a date and time for production of
documents or evidence.
Page 31 of 75
75. In a technically contested matter such as the present one,
where the dispute involved rival contentions regarding the
origin and cause of a cyber fraud, the adequacy of security
measures, the interpretation of forensic reports, and the
significance of investigative findings, applications seeking
expert and investigative testimony are not trivial procedural
incidents.
76. The complete disregard of such substantive application
before final adjudication constitutes a material procedural
omission on the part of Adjudicating Officer. Having
conspectus of the above sequence of event this Tribunal is
unable to treat such omission as merely inconsequential in
nature, particularly, when the final hearing itself is shown to
have been held in the absence of the Appellant and without
effective notice.
77. The Ld. Counsel for Respondent No.1, has vigorously argued
that the filing and consideration of written pleadings, being,
the Reply, the Rejoinder, the Sur-Rejoinder, and the
Applications constituted sufficient compliance with the
requirement of reasonable opportunity under Section 46(2) of
the IT Act. This Tribunal is unable to accept this submission.
78. Mere act of the filing of a written statement, rejoinder, or sur-
rejoinder represents a component of participation in the
proceedings; it is not the equivalent of a “reasonable
opportunity for making representation” when the statute
requires such representation to be made after notice and upon
inquiry, and when the party has specifically requested an oral
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hearing and has further sought the summoning of expert
witnesses to adduce testimony.
79. To hold that the exchange of written pleadings alone satisfied
the statutory requirement would be to collapse the distinction
between filing a defence on the one hand and being heard upon
it on the other and perusal of the text of Section 46 (2) of the IT
Act read with the 2003 Rules, does not permit such a reduction.
The statute contemplates inquiry and representation; it does not
contemplate unilateral disposal upon the record without
affording the party sufficient and reasonable opportunity to
present his case.
80. Whether the Appellant’s defence on the merits is strong or
weak, or whether it has suppressed anything germane to the
substantive banking dispute, are questions which fall for
determination on an appropriate record after a fair hearing. The
right to notice and hearing under Section 46 (2) of the IT Act
and Rules 4 and 7 of the 2003 Rules is a statutory entitlement
anterior to the merits controversy.
81. Much has been argued by learned counsel for Respondent No.
1, relying on the order dated 01.08.2024 of the Hon’ble High
Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, directing
expeditious disposal of the complaint within four months. We
are sanguine of the order dated 01.08.2024 of the Hon’ble
Bombay High Court.
82. However, a direction for speedy disposal cannot be construed
as dispensing with notice, hearing, or service requirements
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expressly embedded in the Act and Rules. Speed may shorten
time; it cannot abrogate fairness and due process . Expedition
and fairness are not competing or opposing values; the former
must operate within the discipline imposed by the latter.
83. The Hon’ble High Court's directive presupposed, and indeed
mandated, that the adjudicatory process would be conducted
in strict conformity with the principles of natural justice,
albeit within an accelerated timeline. It did not and in our
respectful consideration could not authorise the Learned
Adjudicating Officer to truncate the principle of audi alteram
partem or to pronounce a final order without first ensuring
that valid and effective notice of the final hearing had been
served upon all concerned parties at their designated and duly
communicated addresses.
84. Indeed, to read the High Court’s direction as permitting
curtailment of notice or effective hearing would be to
attribute to that order a consequence wholly inconsistent with
settled principles governing quasi-judicial process. It ought
to be noted that when a court directs expeditious disposal
does not sanction procedural abbreviation at the cost of
fairness; it merely requires that fairness be administered
without avoidable delay.
85. If the statutory requirement under Section 46 (2) is that the
person proceeded against must be given a reasonable
opportunity for making representation, and if the Rules insist
upon proper service and hearing before ex parte progression
can lawfully occur, those safeguards cannot be neutralised by
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invoking administrative urgency or by misconstruing the
order of the Hon’ble High Court. Any contrarian construction
of the aforesaid would not only erode the statutory command
and legislative intent, but would also render the entire process
vulnerable to arbitrariness and non-application of mind.
86. Further Section 47 of the Act, which requires the adjudicating
officer, while adjudging the quantum of compensation, to
have due regard to (a) the amount of gain of unfair advantage,
wherever quantifiable, made as a result of the default; (b) the
amount of loss caused to any person as a result of the default;
and (c) the repetitive nature of the default. These parameters
indicate that the statute itself contemplates a reasoned and
calibrated adjudicatory exercise founded on proper
appreciation of material and circumstances.
87. For all the aforesaid reasons, considered cumulatively and in
their proper perspective, this Tribunal holds that the
procedure adopted by the Learned Adjudicating Officer in
passing the Impugned Order dated 11.02.2025 did not satisfy
the mandatory requirement of a reasonable and effective
opportunity of hearing under Section 46 (2) of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 read with Rules 4 (c), 4
(d), 4 (h), 4 (j) and 7 of the Information Technology
(Qualification and Experience of Adjudicating Officers and
Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003. Hence, Issue No. I
is, accordingly, answered in the negative , and in favour of
the Appellant.
Page 35 of 75
-ISSUE No. II -
88. Whether the said order is liable to be set aside on the
ground of violation of the Principles of Natural Justice,
particularly the doctrine of audi alteram partem ?
89. We believe that the second issue is closely allied to the first,
yet it operates at a broader and deeper plane. In our analysis
and examination of Issue No. I, we limited our examination
to compliance with the specific statutory and procedural
requirements contained in Section 46 of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 and the 2003 Rules.
90. However, Issue No. II requires this Tribunal to determine
whether the manner in which the impugned order came to be
passed offends the more fundamental requirement of natural
justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram partem , which is
now firmly embedded in Indian public law as an incident of
fairness, non-arbitrariness, and lawful decision-making in
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings.
91. The principles of natural justice represent one of the most
ancient, enduring, and humanising doctrines known to the
civilised legal order. They are not the creation of any one
statute or any one legal system; they are the universal
minimum that every system of law, which claims to be just,
fair and reasonable must observe.
92. The expression ‘natural justice’ conveys the notion of a duty to
act fairly. In the words of Byles, J. in Cooper v. Wandsworth
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Board of Works [(1863) 14 CB (NS) 180], ‘ even God himself
did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to
make his defence .’ This is one of the most fundamental
principles of law and of justice.
93. The principles of natural justice comprise two foundational
pillars, first , nemo judex in causa sua that no man shall be a
judge in his own cause; and second , audi alteram partem that
no man shall be condemned unheard. These twin principles,
which predate the modern State and find expression in every
mature legal system, constitute the procedural minimum below
which the exercise of adjudicatory power becomes
constitutionally impermissible.
94. The doctrine of audi alteram partem, which is the principle
directly engaged in the present case, expresses the elementary
requirement that before an adverse order is passed against any
person, that person must be afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to present his case, to know the allegations against
him, and to meet those allegations. It encompasses the right to
notice, the right to be heard, and the right to have one’s
submissions considered by the decision-maker.
95. The legal maxim Qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita altera
aequum licet dixerit, haud aequum fecerit, which translate to "he
who shall decide anything without the other side having been
heard, although he may have said what is right will not have done
what is right" or as is now expressed "justice should not only be
done but should manifestly be seen to be done". This principle
applies not only to courts of law but equally, and with full force,
Page 37 of 75
to all bodies and authorities exercising adjudicatory, quasi-
judicial, or administrative functions that entail civil consequences.
Before we proceed to examine the specific facts of the present case
96.
in the light of the principles of natural justice, it would be apposite
and prudent on our part to first collate and examine the rich and
well-established jurisprudence prevailing in India on the
requirements of complying with the principles of natural justice in
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings.
97. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘ Mahipal Singh Tomar
v. State of U.P., (2013) 16 SCC 771 ’ , while deliberating upon the
content and significance of the principles of natural justice in
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, under paras 15, 16,
31 and 32 held as follows:
“15. In administrative law, the “rules of natural justice” have
traditionally been regarded as comprising audi alteram
partem and nemo judex in sua causa . The first of these
rules requires the maker of a decision to give prior
notice of the proposed decision to the persons
affected by it and an opportunity to them to make
representation. The second rule disqualifies a person
from judging a cause if he has direct pecuniary or
proprietary interest or might otherwise be biased.
The first principle is of great importance because it
embraces the rule of fair procedure or due process.
Generally speaking, the notion of a fair hearing
extends to the right to have notice of the other side's
case, the right to bring evidence and the right to
argue . This has been used by the courts for nullifying
administrative actions. The premise on which the
courts extended their jurisdiction against the
administrative action was that the duty to give every
victim a fair hearing was as much a principle of good
administration as of good legal procedure.
16. Under the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, it is provided that:
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“ 6. Right to a fair trial .—(1) In the determination of his
civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law.”
31. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR
1970 SC 150] , this Court declared that the dividing line
between administrative power and quasi-judicial
power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated.
Speaking for the Bench, K.S. Hegde, J., observed: (SCC
pp. 268-69, para 13)
“ 13 . The dividing line between an administrative power
and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is
being gradually obliterated. For determining
whether a power is an administrative power or a
quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature
of the power conferred, the person or persons on
whom it is conferred, the framework of the law
conferring that power, the consequences
ensuing from the exercise of that power and the
manner in which that power is expected to be
exercised. Under our Constitution the rule of law
pervades over the entire field of administration.
Every organ of the State under our Constitution is
regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a
welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the
jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is
increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of
law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities
of the State are not charged with the duty of
discharging their functions in a fair and just
manner. The requirement of acting judicially in
essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly
and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The
procedures which are considered inherent in the
exercise of a judicial power are merely those which
facilitate, if not ensure a just and fair decision. In
recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power
has been undergoing a radical change. What was
considered as an administrative power some years
back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial
power.”
32. In State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei [ AIR 1967 SC 1269 ] ,
this Court observed: (AIR p. 1272, para 12)
“ 12 . … We think that such an enquiry and decision were
contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot
have any value. It is true that the order is
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administrative in character, but even an
administrative order which involves civil
consequences as already stated, must be made
consistently with the rules of natural justice after
informing the first respondent of the case of the
State….”
98. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘ Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India, (1978) 1 SCC 248’ , the seven-Judge Bench, in what is
now universally recognised as the decision that transformed
the landscape of fundamental rights jurisprudence in India,
established three propositions of enduring constitutional
significance. First , that Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the
Constitution are not mutually exclusive compartments but are
interconnected facets of a single constitutional vision of the
“golden triangle” of fundamental rights.
99. Second , that the “procedure established by law” under
Article 21 must be “right and just and fair and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive.” Third , and most pertinently for the
present case, that the principles of natural justice are an
essential ingredient of every procedure by which a person is
deprived of any right, and that any procedure that fails to
satisfy the requirements of natural justice offends Article 14
and the relevant paras of the aforesaid judgement reads as
under:
“ 7. Now, the question immediately arises as to what is the
requirement of Article 14 : what is the content and reach
of the great equalising principle enunciated in this
article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith
of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests
securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And,
therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic
or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made
to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to
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do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality
is a dynamic concept with many aspects and
dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within
traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate here
what was pointed out by the majority in E.P.
Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974
SCC (L&S) 165 : (1974) 2 SCR 348] namely, that “from a
positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to
arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are
sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a
republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an
absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is
implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political
logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of
Article 14 ”. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State
action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment.
The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as
philosophically, is an essential element of equality or
non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding
omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by
Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in
order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be
“right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful or
oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all
and the requirement of Article 21 would not be
satisfied .
How far natural justice is an essential element of
“procedure established by law”
8. The question immediately arises : does the procedure
prescribed by the Passports Act, 1967 for impounding a
passport meet the test of this requirement? Is it “right or
fair or just”? The argument of the petitioner was that it
is not, because it provides for impounding of a passport
without affording reasonable opportunity to the holder
of the passport to be heard in defence. To impound the
passport of a person, said the petitioner, is a serious
matter, since it prevents him from exercising his
constitutional right to go abroad and such a drastic
consequence cannot in fairness be visited without
observing the principle of audi alteram partem. Any
procedure which permits impairment of the
constitutional right to go abroad without giving
reasonable opportunity to show cause cannot but be
condemned as unfair and unjust and hence, there is in
the present case clear infringement of the requirement
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of Article 21. Now, it is true that there is no express
provision in the Passports Act, 1967 which requires that
the audi alteram partem rule should be followed before
impounding a passport, but that is not conclusive of the
question . If the statute makes itself clear on this point,
then no more question arises. But even when the
statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an
implication and apply the principle stated by Byles, J.,
in Cooper v. Wandswort Board of Works [(1863) 14
CBNS 180 : (1861-73) All ER Rep Ext 1554] :
“A long course of decisions, beginning with Dr
Bentley case and ending with some very recent
cases, establish that, although there are no
positive works in the statute requiring that the
party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common
law will supply the omission of the legislature .”
The principle of audi alteram partem, which mandates
that no one shall be condemned unheard, is part of the
rules of natural justice. In fact, there are two main
principles in which the rules of natural justice are
manifested, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi
alteram partem. We are not concerned here with the
former, since there is no case of bias urged here. The
question is only in regard to the right of hearing which
involves the audi alteram partem rule. Can it be
imported in the procedure for impounding a passport?
10. Now, if this be the test of applicability of the doctrine
of natural justice, there can be no distinction between
a quasi-judicial function and an administrative
function for this purpose. The aim of both
administrative inquiry as well as quasi-judicial inquiry
is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural
justice is calculated to secure justice, or to put it
negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is
difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-
judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It
must logically apply to both . On what principle can
distinction be made between one and the other? Can
it be said that the requirement of “fair-play in action” is
any the less in an administrative inquiry than in a
quasi-judicial one? Sometimes an unjust decision in an
administrative inquiry may have far more serious
consequences than a decision in a quasi-judicial
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inquiry and hence the rules of natural justice must
apply equally in an administrative inquiry which entails
civil consequences. There was, however, a time in the
early stages of the development of the doctrine of
natural justice when the view prevailed that the rules
of natural justice have application only to a quasi-
judicial proceeding as distinguished from an
administrative proceeding and the distinguishing
feature of a quasi-judicial proceeding is that the
authority concerned is required by the law under which
it is functioning to act judicially. This requirement of a
duty to act judicially in order to invest the function with
a quasi-judicial character was spelt out from the
following observation of Atkin, L.J. in Rex v. Electricity
Commissioners [(1924) 1 KB 171 : (1923) All ER Rep
150] , “ wherever any body of persons having legal
authority to determine questions affecting the rights
of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act
in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to
the controlling jurisdiction of the King Bench Division
. . .”. Lord Hewart, C.J., in Rex v. Legislative Committee
of the Church Assembly [(1928) 1 KB 411] read this
observation to mean that the duty to act judicially
should be an additional requirement existing
independently of the “authority to determine questions
affecting the rights of subjects”— something super-
added to it. This gloss placed by Lord Hewart, C.J., on
the dictum of Lord Atkin, LJ., bedevilled the law for a
considerable time and stultified the growth of the
doctrine of natural justice. The Court was constrained
in every case that came before it, to make a search for
the duty to act judicially sometimes from tenuous
material and sometimes in the services of the statute
and this led to oversubtlety and over-refinement
resulting in confusion and uncertainty in the law. But
this was plainly contrary to the earlier authorities and
in the epoch-making decision of the House of Lords
in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66]
which marks a turning point in the history of the
development of the doctrine of natural justice, Lord
Reid pointed out how the gloss of Lord Hewart, C.J.,
was based on a misunderstanding of the observations
of Atkin, L.J., and it went counter to the law laid down
in the earlier decisions of the Court. Lord Reid
observed: “If Lord Hewart meant that it is never
enough that a body has a duty to determine what the
rights of an individual should be, but that there must
always be something more to impose on it a duty to
act judicially, then that appears to me impossible to
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reconcile with the earlier authorities”. The learned Law
Lord held that the duty to act judicially may arise from
the very nature of the function intended to be
performed and it need not be shown to be super-
added. This decision broadened the area of
application of the rules of natural justice and to borrow
the words of Prof. clark in his article on “ Natural
Justice, Substance and Shadow ” in Public Law Journal,
1975, restored light to an area “benighted by the
narrow conceptualism of the previous decade”. This
development in the law had its parallel in India in
the Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N.
Sharma [AIR 1965 SC 1595 : (1965) 2 SCR 366 : (1965)
1 LLJ 433 : 27 FJR 204] where this Court approvingly
referred to the decision in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC
40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66] and, later in State of Orissa v. Dr
Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269 : (1967) 2 SCR 625 :
(1967) 2 LLJ 266] observed that: “ If there is power to
decide and determine to the prejudice of a person,
duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such
power ”. This Court also pointed out in A.K.
Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : (1970) 1
SCR 457] another historic decision in this branch of the
law, that in recent years the concept of quasi-judicial
power has been undergoing radical change and said:
“The dividing line between an administrative
power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and
is being gradually obliterated. For determining
whether a power is an administrative power or a
quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature
of the power conferred, the person or persons on
whom it is conferred, the framework of the law
conferring that power, the consequences
ensuing from the exercise of that power and the
manner in which that power is expected to be
exercised.”
The net effect of these and other decisions was that the
duty to act judicially need not be super-added, but it
may be spelt out from the nature of the power conferred,
the manner of exercising it and its impact on the rights
of the person affected and where it is found to exist, the
rules of natural justice would be attracted .”
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100. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sahara India (Firm)
v. Commissioner of Income Tax , (2008) 14 SCC 151 : (2008)
300 ITR 403 , while deliberating on the scope, content and
applicability of the principles of natural justice in statutory
proceedings entailing adverse civil consequences, under
paragraphs 15, 18, 19 and 29 , held as follows:
“15. Rules of ‘natural justice’ are not embodied rules. The
phrase ‘natural justice’ is also not capable of a precise
definition. The underlying principle of natural justice,
evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary
exercise of power by the State or its functionaries.
Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly i.e.
fair play in action. As observed by this Court in A.K.
Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] the aim of
rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it
negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules
can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly
made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it.
(Also see ITO v. Madnani Engg. Works Ltd. [(1979) 2
SCC 455 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 140].)
18. Recently, in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy [(2005) 6 SCC
321 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 833] the concept, scope, history
of development and significance of principles of natural
justice have been discussed in extenso, with reference
to earlier cases on the subject. Inter alia, observing that
the principles of natural justice are those rules which
have been laid down by the courts as being the
minimum protection of the rights of the individual
against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by
a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority
while making an order affecting those rights, the Court
said: (SCC pp. 331-32, para 14)
‘14. Concept of natural justice has undergone a
great deal of change in recent years. Rules of
natural justice are not rules embodied always
expressly in a statute or in rules framed
thereunder. They may be implied from the
nature of the duty to be performed under a
statute. What particular rule of natural justice
should be implied and what its content should
be in a given case must depend to a great extent
on the fact and circumstances of that case, the
framework of the statute under which the
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enquiry is held. The old distinction between a
judicial act and an administrative act has
withered away. Even an administrative order
which involves civil consequences must be
consistent with the rules of natural justice. The
expression “civil consequences” encompasses
infraction of not merely property or personal
rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations
and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide
umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen
in his civil life’
19. Thus, it is trite that unless a statutory provision either
specifically or by necessary implication excludes the
application of principles of natural justice, because in
that event the court would not ignore the legislative
mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable
opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is
generally read into the provisions of a statute,
particularly when the order has adverse civil
consequences for the party affected. The principle will
hold good irrespective of whether the power conferred
on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative or
quasi-judicial .
“29. … it is the civil consequence which obliterates the
distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative
function. Moreover, with the growth of the
administrative law, the old distinction between a
judicial act and an administrative act has withered
away. Therefore, it hardly needs reiteration that even a
purely administrative order which entails civil
consequences, must be consistent with the rules of
natural justice. (Also see Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597] and S.L.
Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379].)”
101. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘ State Bank of
India and Others v. Rajesh Agarwal and Others, (2023) 6
SCC 1’ , after an exhaustive survey of the entire body of
natural justice jurisprudence, has held as follows:
Page 46 of 75
“ 36. We need to bear in mind that the principles of natural
justice are not mere legal formalities. They constitute
substantive obligations that need to be followed by
decision-making and adjudicating authorities. The
principles of natural justice act as a guarantee against
arbitrary action, both in terms of procedure and
substance, by judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative
authorities . Two fundamental principles of natural justice
are entrenched in Indian jurisprudence : (i) nemo judex in
causa sua, which means that no person should be a Judge
in their own cause; and (ii) audi alteram partem, which
means that a person affected by administrative, judicial or
quasi-judicial action must be heard before a decision is
taken. The courts generally favour interpretation of a
statutory provision consistent with the principles of
natural justice because it is presumed that the statutory
authorities do not intend to contravene fundamental
rights. Application of the said principles depends on the
facts and circumstances of the case, express language
and basic scheme of the statute under which the
administrative power is exercised, the nature and
purpose for which the power is conferred, and the final
effect of the exercise of that power . [Union of India v. J.N.
Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458]
80. Audi alteram partem has several facets, including the
service of a notice to any person against whom a
prejudicial order may be passed and providing an
opportunity to explain the evidence collected .
In Tulsiram Patel [Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel,
(1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672] , this Court
explained the wide amplitude of audi alteram partem :
(SCC p. 476, para 96)
“96. The rule of natural justice with which we are
concerned in these appeals and writ petitions,
namely, the audi alteram partem rule, in its
fullest amplitude means that a person against
whom an order to his prejudice may be passed
should be informed of the allegations and
charges against him, be given an opportunity
of submitting his explanation thereto, have
the right to know the evidence, both oral or
documentary, by which the matter is proposed
to be decided against him, and to inspect the
documents which are relied upon for the
purpose of being used against him, to have
the witnesses who are to give evidence
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against him examined in his presence and
have the right to cross-examine them, and to
lead his own evidence, both oral and
documentary, in his defence. The process of a
fair hearing need not, however, conform to the
judicial process in a court of law, because
judicial adjudication of causes involves a
number of technical rules of procedure and
evidence which are unnecessary and not
required for the purpose of a fair hearing within
the meaning of audi alteram partem rule in a
quasi-judicial or administrative inquiry.”
(emphasis supplied)
81 . Audi alteram partem, therefore, entails that an entity
against whom evidence is collected must : (i) be provided
an opportunity to explain the evidence against it; (ii) be
informed of the proposed action, and (iii) be allowed to
represent why the proposed action should not be taken.
Hence, the mere participation of the borrower during the
course of the preparation of a forensic audit report would
not fulfil the requirements of natural justice. The decision
to classify an account as fraud involves due application of
mind to the facts and law by the lender banks. The lender
banks, either individually or through a JLF, have to decide
whether a borrower has breached the terms and
conditions of a loan agreement, and based upon such
determination the lender banks can seek appropriate
remedies. Therefore, principles of natural justice demand
that the borrowers must be served a notice, given an
opportunity to explain the findings in the forensic audit
report, and to represent before the account is classified as
fraud under the Master Directions on Frauds.
84. In E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [E.P. Royappa v. State of
T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165] , this Court held
that an arbitrary State action is violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Again, in Maneka Gandhi [Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] this Court
reiterated that the principle of non-arbitrariness pervades
Article 14. An administrative action can be tested for
constitutional infirmities under Article 14 on four grounds
: (i) unreasonableness or irrationality; (ii) illegality; (iii)
procedural impropriety ; [State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co.,
(1996) 3 SCC 709; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2
SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039] and (iv) proportionality.
However, the scope of such judicial review is limited to
ascertaining the deficiency in the decision-making
process, and not the correctness of the choice made by
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the administrator. [United Commercial Bank v. P.C.
Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 468]
89. In Union of India v. J.N. Sinha [ Union of India v. J.N. Sinha ,
(1970) 2 SCC 458] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court held
that an endeavour must be made to interpret a statutory
provision consistent with the principles of natural justice
: (SCC p. 461, para 8)
8 . … It is true that if a statutory provision can be read
consistently with the principles of natural justice,
the courts should do so because it must be
presumed that the Legislatures and the statutory
authorities intend to act in accordance with the
principles of natural justice . But if on the other
hand a statutory provision either specifically or by
necessary implication excludes the application of
any or all the principles of natural justice then the
court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature
or the statutory authority and read into the
provision concerned the principles of natural
justice. Whether the exercise of a power
conferred should be made in accordance with
any of the principles of natural justice or not
depends upon the express words of the provision
conferring the power, the nature of the power
conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred
and the effect of the exercise of that power .
(emphasis supplied) ”
102. The cumulative effect of this line of authority is that natural
justice in India is no longer confined to traditional
adjudication in the narrow sense. It is now inseparably linked
to Article 14 and the constitutional insistence that State
action, whether administrative or quasi-judicial, must not be
arbitrary. Where a statutory authority determines rights,
imposes financial liability, or visits a party with serious civil
consequences, the authority must act fairly, transparently,
and in a manner that demonstrates real not ritualistic
consideration of the affected party’s defence.
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103. A quasi-judicial body cannot proceed in a manner that
reeks of arbitrariness and then seek shelter behind the form
of the proceeding. Arbitrariness is the antithesis of
equality; and absence of fair hearing, where hearing is due,
is one of the clearest manifestations of arbitrary exercise of
power.
104.
When these principles are applied to the facts of the present
case, the breach becomes manifest. The record shows that
the appellant had entered appearance, corrected its service
particulars by communication dated 29.10.2024 , filed its
reply, filed its sur-rejoinder, and thereafter filed two
applications dated 05.02.2025 seeking summoning of the
Investigating Officer and the E&Y officials.
105. Yet the final hearing dated 11.02.2025 proceeded in the
absence of the appellant, and the material before this
Tribunal does not establish that the final-hearing notice
dated 06.02.2025 was actually delivered to the corrected
email addresses in the manner required by the Rules. Nor
does the impugned order disclose any reasoned treatment
of the pending applications. Indeed, the order proceeds on
the footing that all parties were afforded reasonable
opportunity and that the matter was heard at length, even
though the appellant’s case is that it was neither aware of
the final hearing nor heard on that date.
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106. In the considered view of this Tribunal, this is not a case of
a mere technical irregularity. It is a case where the final
adjudicatory act was performed without demonstrable
compliance with the hearing and while material
interlocutory application remained unattended. The right of
hearing does not mean only the filing of papers. It includes
effective knowledge of the hearing that will culminate in
decision, reasonable opportunity to appear and address, and
fair consideration of procedural requests which bear upon
the defence. To hold otherwise would be to reduce audi
alteram partem to an empty incantation, which is not
permissible in law.
107. These requirements are not mere procedural niceties; they
are the essential constituents of a fair hearing. A failure to
comply with any of these core requirements, where such
compliance is mandated by the governing statute or by the
principles of natural justice, renders the resultant order
vulnerable to being quashed on the ground of procedural
impropriety.
108. The most glaring and inexcusable infraction of natural
justice in the present case is the complete failure to serve a
valid and effective notice of the final hearing upon the
Appellant. The documentary record, which we have
analysed in considerable detail in the preceding section of
this judgment, establishes beyond any shadow of doubt that
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the Notice dated 06.02.2025, which fixed the final hearing
for 11.02.2025, was not dispatched to any of the four
corrected electronic mail addresses that the Appellant's
Counsel had specifically and formally furnished to the
secretariat of the Learned Adjudicating Officer in the
communication dated 29.10.2024 (Annexure A-10).
109. The Learned Adjudicating Officer's office was thus placed
on clear and unequivocal notice of the correct addresses,
yet, the consequence of this defective service was both
direct and devastating as neither the Appellant nor its legal
representatives acquired any knowledge whatsoever of the
scheduled final hearing. The absence of the Appellant on
11.02.2025 was not a voluntary act of "failure to appear"
stemming from negligence or indifference.
110. For all these reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that
the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the ground
of violation of the principles of natural justice, particularly
the doctrine of audi alteram partem . The manner in which
the final hearing was held, especially in the absence of
proven effective notice to the corrected addresses furnished
by the appellant and the non-consideration of the
applications dated 05.02.2025, the same cannot be
countenanced in a constitutional order governed by Article
14 and the rule of law. Thus, Issue No. II is answered in
affirmative and accordingly in favour of the appellant.
Page 52 of 75
THE ROLE OF THE ADJUDICATING OFFICER
UNDER INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000
111. Before proceeding to the operative directions, this Tribunal
considers it both necessary and appropriate to place on record
certain observations regarding the role, institutional position,
and consequential obligations of the Adjudicating Officer
under the Information Technology Act, 2000. These
observations arise organically from the systemic concerns
that both parties have candidly acknowledged before this
Tribunal.
112. Section 46 of the Information Technology Act, 2000
establishes the office of the Adjudicating Officer and clothes
the incumbent with significant adjudicatory powers. Sub-
section (1A) of Section 46, confers upon the Adjudicating
Officer the jurisdiction to adjudicate matters in which the
claim for injury or damage does not exceed rupees five crore.
113. This pecuniary jurisdiction is quite significant; it demarcates
the Adjudicating Officer as the primary, and indeed the
exclusive, quasi-judicial forum for a substantial class of civil
claims arising under Chapter IX of the Act. The adjudicatory
powers vested in the Adjudicating Officer are not merely
administrative or recommendatory in character. Sub-section
(5) of Section 46 provides, in unmistakable terms, that every
Adjudicating Officer "shall have the powers of a civil
court" which are conferred on the Appellate Tribunal under
sub-section (2) of Section 58.
Page 53 of 75
114. These powers include, inter alia , the power to summon and
enforce the attendance of any person and examine him on
oath, to require the discovery and production of documents
or other electronic records, to receive evidence on affidavits,
to issue commissions for the examination of witnesses or
documents, to review decisions, and to dismiss an application
for default or decide it ex parte . Furthermore, clause (a) of
sub-section (5) expressly declares that "all proceedings
before it shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within
the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860"
115. The Adjudicating Officer is, therefore, in every meaningful
sense, a court of first instance. The proceedings before him
are not a mere prelude to litigation elsewhere; they constitute
the primary, and statutorily ordained, forum for the
adjudication of civil disputes arising from contraventions of
the provisions of the IT Act. It is therefore, Adjudicating
Officer who must afford the parties a full and fair opportunity
to present their respective cases, to adduce evidence, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to make oral
submissions.
116. The record compiled before the Adjudicating Officer
comprising of the pleadings, the documentary evidence, the
oral testimony, and the exhibits forms the foundational
substratum upon which all subsequent appellate scrutiny
must rest. It is before the Adjudicating Officer that the factual
matrix of the case is established, the evidence is collected and
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exhibited, and the pure questions of fact are determined. The
integrity, completeness, and reliability of this foundational
record are, therefore, matters of paramount importance. The
original opportunity to establish facts, test evidence, and
present one’s case is an irreplaceable procedural right.
117. An infirm hearing, laced as in the present case with a wilful
disregard of the mandatory procedural requirements of the
Act and the 2003 Rules, does not merely occasion prejudice
to the immediate party who is condemned unheard. Its
deleterious effects ripple outward, increasing the hardship
and exacerbating the prejudice suffered by both sides to
the lis . The party who is denied a fair hearing is, of course,
compelled to undertake the onerous and expensive exercise
of pursuing appellate remedies to vindicate its procedural
rights.
118. The party who succeeded before the Adjudicating Officer, on
the other hand, finds the fruits of its success suspended, its
legitimate expectation of finality frustrated, and its resources
depleted in defending an appeal that could have been avoided
had the proceedings been conducted with due procedural
rectitude at the first instance.
119. The present appeal is a testament to this very phenomenon.
The Appellant has been driven to invoke the appellate
jurisdiction of this Tribunal, expending considerable time,
effort, and resources. The Respondent No. 1, having secured
a favourable order, has seen its enforcement stayed and has
been compelled to defend the appeal. The beneficiary banks,
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though largely disinterested in the procedural dispute, have
been arrayed as respondents and have incurred costs in filing
their replies.
120. The public exchequer, which sustains this Tribunal, has borne
the cost of adjudicating a matter that ought to have been
concluded, at least at the first instance, with due adherence to
the principles of natural justice. All of this could have been
avoided had the Learned Adjudicating Officer simply
ensured that the notice of the final hearing was dispatched to
the correct electronic mail addresses that were specifically
furnished to his office.
121. The Information Technology Act, 2000 is a special
legislation, enacted to provide legal recognition for
transactions carried out by means of electronic data
interchange and other means of electronic communication.
The adjudicatory and appellate structure erected under the
Act is, correspondingly, unique and merits careful
consideration. A proper appreciation of this structure is
essential to understanding the critical importance of the role
played by the Adjudicating Officer as the foundational tier of
this edifice.
122. As we have already observed, the adjudicatory process
commences with the Adjudicating Officer, who functions as
the court of first instance. It is before the Adjudicating Officer
that the complaint is lodged, the parties are summoned, the
pleadings are exchanged, the evidence is adduced, and the
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factual findings are rendered. The Adjudicating Officer is
tasked with the crucial responsibility of collecting,
exhibiting, and analysing the pure factual substratum of the
case. His order represents the first, and often the most
determinative, application of the law to the facts as found by
him.
123. Under Section 57 of the Information Technology Act, 2000
confers upon any person aggrieved by an order made by an
Adjudicating Officer the right to prefer an appeal to this
Tribunal. The Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate
Tribunal, established under Section 14 of the Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, functions as the
Appellate Tribunal for the purposes of the IT Act. This
Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to hear and dispose of
appeals from the orders of Adjudicating Officers and is
empowered, under Section 57 (4), to confirm, modify, or set
aside the order appealed against.
124.
Thereafter Section 62 of the IT Act, 2000, confers upon any
person aggrieved by a decision or order of this Tribunal the
right to file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days of
the communication of the order. The language of Section 62
is noteworthy and merits careful attention. The section
provides that such appeal may be filed “on any question of
fact or law arising out of such order.”
125. In the ordinary course, a second appeal, that is to say, an
appeal from the order of an appellate court or tribunal is
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entertainable only on a substantial question of law. This is the
well-settled principle that governs second appeals under
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where the
scope of the second appellate court is confined to substantial
questions of law and does not extend to reappreciation of
evidence or redetermination of facts.
126. The legislature, however, has made a conscious and
deliberate departure from this norm in Section 62 of the IT
Act by permitting an appeal to the High Court “ on any
question of fact or law .” The consequence of this departure is
that the High Court, in an appeal under Section 62, is vested
with jurisdiction that is wider than that of an ordinary second
appellate court; it may examine questions of fact with the
same amplitude as questions of law. This statutory design
reflects the legislative recognition that disputes under the IT
Act may involve technically complex questions of fact
relating to cybersecurity, forensic evidence, digital forensics,
IP address analysis, and system vulnerabilities, which may
require independent judicial examination even at the second
appellate stage.
127. It is needless to state, but we state it for completeness, that
even after an order is passed by the Hon'ble High Court under
Section 62, a further challenge may be mounted before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India by way of a Special Leave
Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. While
the grant of special leave is discretionary, the availability of
this remedy ensures that the adjudicatory process under the
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IT Act is ultimately subject to the superintendence and
corrective jurisdiction of the highest constitutional court of
the land, exercising its special leave jurisdiction.
128. This statutory architecture has an important jurisprudential
consequence. Since the original order of the Adjudicating
Officer is expected to sustain appellate scrutiny before this
Tribunal, and thereafter before the High Court under Section
62 on questions of fact and law, the initial adjudication cannot
be casual, impulsive, or procedurally attenuated. The greater
the depth of appellate supervision contemplated by the
statute, the greater is the obligation of discipline, fairness, and
completeness at the first instance.
129. For all these reasons, it is both advisable and incumbent upon
every Adjudicating Officer exercising power under Section
46 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 to proceed in a
manner that is fair, impartial, non-arbitrary, and measured.
The authority must ensure effective service, clear scheduling,
meaningful opportunity to respond, due consideration of
interlocutory applications, and reasoned determination
founded upon the record.
130. For avoidance of doubt, we firmly reiterate that it is not merely
a matter of adjudicatory prudence; it is a statutory obligation
flowing from the Act and Rules and a constitutional obligation
flowing from the guarantee against arbitrariness. The office of
the Adjudicating Officer occupies too central a place in the
statutory design to permit its process to be reduced to hurried
formality ungoverned by cardinal principles of law.
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SUGGESSTIONS MADE BY PARTIES AND
COUNSELS AT BAR
131. Before proceeding to frame general directions, it is necessary
to notice that the question of procedural reform did not arise
in the abstract. By order dated 25.07.2025 , this Tribunal
recorded the submission of learned counsel appearing for the
appellant that, before Adjudicating Officers functioning
under Section 46 of the Information Technology Act, 2000,
next dates are often not assigned in the ordinary course and
that final hearings may commence upon fresh notice alone.
132. Significantly, learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 also
submitted that the procedure followed by Adjudicating
Officers varies from State to State and requires
standardisation, so that there may be consistency in
adjudication under Section 46 across the country. It is in that
backdrop that this Tribunal invited suggestions from the
parties.
133. The Appellant has filed its Written Submissions, wherein it
has approached this exercise in two tiers, first, by identifying
the practical concerns faced by litigants before the A.O.'s
office; and second, by tendering specific, actionable
suggestions addressed to each concern. We thus record their
concerns and suggestion as under:
Practical Concerns Identified by the Appellant
A. Absence of Scheduled Hearing Dates being that the
Adjudicating Officer does not assign the next date of
hearing at the conclusion of each session. Instead, fresh
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notices are issued before each hearing, often resulting
in incomplete or failed service. As per the Appellant
this practice leads to repeated adjournments and non-
appearances, as parties remain unaware of scheduled
hearings.
B. Adjudication Without Proper Notice, as result of the
above, in the absence of effective service, matters are
being decided solely on the record, without the benefit
of oral submissions or clarifications from the parties.
Parties, having been unaware of the hearing, are then
constrained to file recall applications, introducing
further delay into proceedings that are already required
to be disposed of within six months.
C. Violation of Statutory Timelines, although Rule 4(k) of
the Information Technology (Qualification and
Experience of Adjudicating Officers and Manner of
Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003 mandates disposal of
every application within four months and the entire
matter within six months, recurring procedural lapses
comprehensively defeat this statutory objective.
D. Non-listing of Applications as in the present case as
Application filed by parties are not placed before the
Adjudicating Officer with any regularity.
Specific Suggestions Tendered by the Appellant
A. Comprehensive Memo of Parties being that every
Complaint filed before the Adjudicating Officer must
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contain, in the memo of parties, the full name,
complete address, email ID and telephone number
(preferably WhatsApp-enabled mobile number) of
each Complainant and each Respondent. This
requirement must be mandatory, and deficiency in
compliance must be a ground for return of the
Complaint at the scrutiny stage.
B. Multi-Modal Service i.e. Service of notice upon
receipt of the Complaint shall be effected
simultaneously through all available modes postal
(registered post A.D.), email and WhatsApp. Dasti
service may additionally be resorted to. The
Complainant must file an affidavit of service along
with proof of service at each stage. The summons
issued by the AO must specifically mention (i) the next
date of hearing; (ii) the time within which the Reply is
to be filed; and (iii) the email address and contact
details of the Secretariat of the Adjudicating Officer.
C. Authority to Appear, where a party appears through an
Advocate, Pleader or any authorised representative, a
formal Authority to Appear (or Vakalatnama) must be
filed, containing the full contact particulars of the party
being represented and the address and mode for future
service.
D. Mandatory Assignment of Next Date in Open Court
wherein the Adjudicating Officer must assign the next
date of hearing to the person appearing, in the presence
of all appearing parties, on the day of each hearing
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itself. The practice of subsequently issuing fresh
notices in lieu of assigning dates must be discontinued.
E. Recording of Next Date in Orders, ideally in every
order passed by the Adjudicating Officer must
specifically record the following (i) the names of
counsel and parties present; and (ii) confirmation that
communicated to the
the next date of hearing has been
appearing parties in open proceedings. This recording
must be a mandatory part of the body of every order.
F. Listing of Interlocutory Applications i.e. any application
filed before the Adjudicating Officer must be placed
before the Officer within a reasonable time, and notice
must be issued to the non-applicant party, normally for
the next fixed date, except in cases requiring urgent
attention.
G. Cause List on Website and Premises, wherein, a cause
list for the day must be prepared by the office of the
Adjudicating Officer, published on the website of the
concerned Ministry/State Government, and
simultaneously displayed at a conspicuous place on the
premises of the AO's office.
H. Dedicated Days and Advertised Timings, ideally, the
Adjudicating Officer must designate specific days of the
week exclusively for hearings under the IT Act, and this
schedule must be widely advertised for the benefit of the
general public and litigants. Inquiry timings must also be
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notified so that any person may inquire about a pending
matter
134. The Respondent No. 1 has tendered its suggestions through Mr.
Mahendra B. Limaye, who has proposed a structured, day-
based timeline for every proceeding before the Adjudicating
Officer, calculated from the date of filing of the Complaint ("D-
1"), and his valuable suggestion is tabulated below:
Stage Day Activity Mode
1 D-1 Complaint filed before the Adjudicating Officer —
2 D-7 Scrutiny complete; if admitted, hearing date
—
intimated to parties with complaint copies
3 D-15 Admission hearing (if in doubt); hearing date
—
intimated if admitted
4 D-30 First hearing Hybrid
5 D-45 Additional hearing for non-appearing parties Hybrid
6 D-75 Replies, written submissions, and evidence of all
Virtual
respondents
7 D-120 Rejoinders, sur-rejoinders, and evidence to be
Virtual
exchanged
8 D-150 Final hearing and last opportunity for submissions Hybrid
9 D-165 Final hearing concluded; order reserved Hybrid
10 D-180 Pronouncement of judgment or order Virtual
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135. In addition to the timeline, the Respondent Bank’s Counsel
proposed four supplementary measures:
A. No adjournments to be granted. If an adjournment is
granted, parties must be directed to comply with the
stage then current before the next timeline decided by the
Adjudicating Officer.
B. In case of failure to serve the notice or insufficient
address, the complainant must take all efforts to serve all
the respondents before the first hearing or additional
hearing date.
C. The next date of hearing to be specifically communicated
on the hearing date itself.
D. The office of the Adjudicating Officer must record all the
video-conferencing proceedings, and the official video-
conferencing link must be made available to all parties
and complainants in person.
136. This Tribunal records, with a measure of satisfaction, that the
suggestions filed by the Appellant and the Respondent Bank
converge on several fundamental points such as the necessity
of assigning the next date of hearing at the conclusion of each
session, rather than relying on fresh notices; the need for
multi-mode service of notices, including electronic and
telephonic modes; the desirability of a structured timeline for
adjudicatory proceedings; the recording of proceedings; and
the publication of cause lists. What is of considerable
importance is that, despite the adversarial position of the
parties on the merits of the appeal, a substantial area of
convergence emerges from these suggestions. In the
considered view of this Tribunal, these suggestions are of real
and valuable assistance.
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GENERAL DIRECTIONS TO THE ADJUDICATING
OFFICERS FOR STREAMLINING THE A.O. OFFICE
UNDER SECTION 46 OF THE IT ACT, 2000.
137. In the light of the analysis undertaken in this judgment, the
systemic deficiencies acknowledged by both parties, the
suggestions placed before this Tribunal, and the powers vested in
this Tribunal under Section 57 (4) read with Section 58 (1) of the
IT Act, 2000, this Tribunal considers it appropriate to issue the
following general directions to the Adjudicating Officers
functioning under Section 46 of the Information Technology Act,
2000, across all States and Union Territories to unify and
streamline the procedure to ensure Access to Justice in light of
mandatory requirements of Article 14, 21 and 39A of the
Constitution of India,1950.
138. These directions are issued to bring uniformity, consistency, and
procedural fairness to the adjudicatory process, and to prevent the
recurrence of the kind of procedural infirmity that has necessitated
the setting aside of the Impugned Order in the present case and are
as follows:
I. Filing, Registration, and Acknowledgment of
Complaints:-
(i) Every complaint filed under Section 46 of the IT Act
shall be registered and acknowledged by the office of
the Adjudicating Officer with a diary number on the
date of receipt. Where the complaint is filed
electronically, an automated acknowledgment with the
diary number shall be sent to the complainant.
(ii) If any defect is found in the complaint, including
deficiency in documents or court fees, the complainant
shall be informed of such defect within seven days of
receipt and shall be granted reasonable time to rectify
the same.
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(iii) Every complaint filed either on plain paper using a
specific proforma or electronically accompanied by a
fee calculated as per the specified rules under the
Section 46 of the IT Act.
(iv) The complaint shall mandatorily contain, in the memo
of parties, the full name, postal address, email address,
and mobile telephone number (preferably WhatsApp-
enabled) of each party. Where a party is represented by
an advocate or authorised representative, the
vakalatnama or authority to appear shall also contain the
email address and mobile number of the advocate or
representative.
II. Service of Notices
(i) Upon admission of the complaint, the Adjudicating
Officer shall issue notice to all necessary parties,
simultaneously by all available modes electronic mail,
registered post with acknowledgment due, and SMS or
WhatsApp message to the mobile number on record.
(ii) The complainant shall be required to file an affidavit of
service, annexing proof of service by each mode, within
a reasonable time as directed by the Adjudicating
Officer.
Where service cannot be effected despite diligent
(iii)
efforts, the Adjudicating Officer shall record this fact
and may direct alternative modes of service, including
substituted service in accordance with Rule 7 (c) of the
2003 Rules.
(iv) Where a party or its Counsel furnishes updated or
corrected contact details at any stage of the proceedings,
the office of the Adjudicating Officer shall immediately
update its records and ensure that all future
communications are addressed to the corrected details.
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III. Initial Hearing and Recording the Plea
(i) On the date so fixed, the Adjudicating Officer shall
explain to such person or persons to whom notice is
issued about the contravention alleged to have been
committed in relation to any of the provisions of the
Actor of any rule, regulation, direction or order
made thereunder.
(ii) If the person in respect of whom notice is issued
pleads accepts the contravention, the Adjudicating
Officer shall record the plea, and may impose
penalty or award such compensation as he thinks fit
in accordance with the provisions of the Act, rules,
regulations, order or directions made thereunder.
(iii) Alternatively on the date fixed the person or
persons against whom a matter is filed may show
cause why an enquiry should not be held in the
alleged contravention or that why the report
alleging the contravention should be dismissed.
(iv) The Adjudicating Officer on the basis of the report
of the matter, investigation report (if any), other
documents and on the basis of submissions shall
form an opinion that there is sufficient cause for
holding an enquiry or that the report into the matter
should be dismissed and, on that basis, shall either
by order dismiss the report of the matter, or shall
determine to hear the matter.
IV. Assignment of Hearing Dates and Communication
(i) At the conclusion of each hearing, the Adjudicating
Officer shall assign the next date of hearing in the
presence of the parties or their Counsel and shall
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ensure that the next date is recorded in the order of
the day. The practice of relying exclusively on fresh
notices for subsequent hearings, without assigning
the next date in the course of the proceedings, shall
be discontinued.
(ii) Where a party or its Counsel is not present at the
hearing, the next date shall be communicated to
such party by electronic mail and SMS or
WhatsApp within two working days.
(iii) Notwithstanding the assignment of the next date, a
reminder notice shall be sent to all parties by
electronic mail and SMS or WhatsApp at least five
days before the date of hearing.
(iv) The Adjudicating Officer shall himself only will
hear the complaint on the designated days in a week
or month without delegating this work to any other
officer.
V. Cause List and Transparency
(i) A cause list for each hearing day shall be prepared
and published on the official website of the
Department of Information Technology of the State
or Union Territory concerned, at least three days prior
to the date of hearing.
(ii) A physical copy of the cause list shall also be
displayed at a conspicuous place on the premises of
the office of the Adjudicating Officer.
(iii) The Adjudicating Officer shall designate specific
days in a week or month for hearing complaints under
the IT Act, and this information shall be published on
the aforesaid website and at the office premises.
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VI. Conduct of Hearings
(i) The Adjudicating Officer shall adopt hybrid hearing
modes, combining physical and virtual presence
through video-conferencing. The Adjudicating
Officer shall retain discretion to direct physical
attendance where necessary.
(ii) All proceedings conducted by video-conferencing
shall be officially recorded, and the recording shall
form part of the record of the case.
(iii) At each hearing, the Adjudicating Officer shall record
the appearances of the parties and their Counsel, and
shall ensure that the order of the day reflects the
business transacted and the next date assigned.
(iv) The final hearing will be in presence of all the parties
involved in the matter. The Adjudicating Officer
only will hear the matter without delegating his
work to any other officer.
VII. Disposal of Applications
(i) Every application filed by a party shall be placed
before the Adjudicating Officer within seven days
of its receipt and shall be listed for hearing at the
earliest available date.
(ii) The Adjudicating Officer shall not proceed to final
hearing or disposal of the complaint while
substantive applications remain pending and
undisposed of, unless specific reasons are recorded
in writing.
(iii) Every application as far as practicable shall be
disposed of by a reasoned order.
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VIII. Timelines
(i) While the statutory rule as per Rule 4 (k) is that
every application should, as far as possible, be
heard and decided within four months and the
whole matter within six months must be kept in
view, timeline discipline must operate consistently
with valid service, fair opportunity, and proper
disposal of interlocutory matters.
(ii) The broad stage-wise timeline suggested at the Bar
contained at Para 134 of this judgement may serve
as a model for case management, but it shall remain
indicative and subject to the facts and complexity
of individual matters.
(iii) Adjournments shall be granted sparingly and only
for sufficient cause recorded in writing.
(iv) Before proceeding ex parte on account of non-
appearance, the Adjudicating Officer shall satisfy
himself that service has been duly and effectively
completed in accordance with Rule 7 of the 2003
Rules and that the record reflects such satisfaction.
The reasons for proceeding in the absence of the
party shall be expressly recorded, in conformity
with Rule 4(h).
(v) Where a party has not appeared despite service, and
the stage of the matter so permits, the Adjudicating
Officer may, in appropriate cases, afford one
additional or final opportunity before reserving the
matter, especially where the consequences are
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serious and the record indicates some prior
participation or attempted appearance.
IX. Reasoned Orders and Communication
(i) Every order passed by the Adjudicating Officer,
whether final or interlocutory, shall be a reasoned
order. Final orders shall reflect the date of decision
consideration of the record, evidence, submissions,
and statutory factors relevant to the determination.
(ii) Certified copies of final orders, and where
appropriate important interlocutory orders, shall be
supplied or communicated to the parties or their
authorised representatives without avoidable delay,
consistent with Rule 6 of the 2003 Rules. The mode
of such communication shall be noted on the file.
X. Infrastructure and Record-Keeping
(i) The Department of Information Technology of each
State and Union Territory shall, in compliance with
G.S.R. 240(E) dated 25.03.2003, provide the
necessary infrastructure including video-
conferencing facility, dedicated email, and
adequate staffing.
(ii) A register of all complaints, notices, hearings,
applications, and orders shall be maintained and
shall be open to inspection by parties upon request.
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(iii) All electronic records shall be preserved in digital
form as part of the record of the case.
XI. Compliance
(i) These directions are issued in the exercise of this
Tribunal’s appellate jurisdiction under Section 57
of the IT Act, 2000 and are intended to supplement,
not supplant , the provisions of the IT Act and the
2003 Rules. The Adjudicating Officers shall
implement these directions with immediate effect
and shall report compliance to this Tribunal,
through the Department of Information Technology
of the respective State or Union Territory, within
ninety days of the date of this order.
139. The Registrar of this Tribunal is directed to forward a certified
copy of this Judgment, thereof, to:
I. The Secretary, Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology (MeitY), Government of
India, New Delhi;
II. The Chief Secretaries of all States and Lieutenant
Governor &/or Administrator of Union Territories,
III. The IT Secretary of all States and Union Territories
who are the respective Adjudicating Officers
appointed under Section 46 of the IT Act;
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140. Having thus answered Issue No. I & II, the natural and inevitable
consequence is that the Impugned Order cannot be sustained on
its present procedural foundation. Since the matter is capable of
being disposed of on these ground alone, and since the parties
have canvassed substantial and elaborate contentions on the merits
including contested questions regarding the applicability of
Sections 43(a), 43(g), and 43A of the IT Act, the adequacy of
security measures, the interpretation of forensic reports, the
significance of IP address logs, the delivery of SMS alerts, and the
respective obligations of the Appellant and the Respondent Bank
all of which are questions that ought not to be prejudged after an
infirm hearing.
141. Hence it is neither necessary nor proper, at this stage, to record
any conclusive view on the merits. All contentions on the
substantive aspects of the dispute are expressly left open for
consideration afresh in appropriately conducted proceedings.
142. In view of the foregoing discussion, and having regard to the
findings recorded on Issue Nos. I and II, we are of the considered
opinion that the impugned order dated 11.02.2025 cannot be
sustained in law. The same is, accordingly, quashed and set aside.
143. The matter is remitted to the Learned Adjudicating Officer for
de novo adjudication on merits. While undertaking the said
exercise, the Learned Adjudicating Officer shall have due regard
to the mandate of Section 46 of the Information Technology Act,
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2000, as well as Rules 4 (c), 4 (d), 4 (h), 4 (j) and 7 of the
Information Technology (Qualification and Experience of
Adjudicating Officers and Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules,
2003, and shall proceed strictly in accordance with law without
being influenced by the observation in the present Cyber Appeal.
144. Keeping in view the order dated 01.08.2024 passed by the Hon’ble
High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, as also the
mandate of Rule 4 (k) of the aforesaid Rules, the Learned
Adjudicating Officer shall endeavour to conclude the proceedings,
in accordance with law, preferably within a period of four months
from the date of the receipt pf the copy of this Order . The
parties are directed to extend full cooperation in the inquiry and
shall not seek unnecessary adjournments. With the aforesaid
observations and directions, the present appeal stands allowed.
The impugned order dated 11.02.2025 is set aside. No orders as to
cost. Any pending interlocutory applications shall stand disposed
of accordingly.
____________________
(JUSTICE D. N. PATEL)
CHAIRPERSON
____________________
(SANJEEV BANZAL)
MEMBER
N/S
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