BISHNU PRIYA MOHANTY vs STATE OF ODISHA
- Court
- Odisha High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
FAO No.161 of 2024
Bishnu Priya Mohanty & Ors. . Petitioner
Mr. B. Routray, Sr. Adv.
-versus-
State of Orissa and Ors. . Opp. Parties
Mr.D.K.Sahoo, A.G.A.
FAO No.219 of 2024
Sushanta Kumar Lenka . Petitioner
Mr. D.N.Rath, Adv.
-versus-
State of Orissa and Ors. . Opp. Parties
Mr.D.K.Sahoo, A.G.A.
CORAM:
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. MOHAPATRA
_____________________________________________________
Date of hearing: 30.07.2026 | Date of Judgment: 31.08.2026
_____________________________________________________
A.K. Mohapatra, J. :
1. The FAO No.161 of 2024 has been filed by the
Appellants, who are lecturers and retired lecturers at the Indravati
Higher Secondary School, Jaipatna, with a prayer to set-aside the
Page 1 of 34
impugned judgement dated 22.01.2024 passed in GIA Case
No.66 of 2023, by the State Education Tribunal, at Annexure-3,
along with a further prayer to allow the GIA application bearing
GIA Case No.66 of 2023.
2. Similarly, the FAO No.219 of 2024 has been filed by
the Appellant, who is a retired lecturer at the Indravati Higher
Secondary School, Jaipatna, with a prayer to set-aside the
impugned judgement dated 22.01.2024 passed in GIA Case
No.103 of 2023, by the State Education Tribunal, annexed at
Annexure-3, along with a further prayer to allow the GIA
application bearing GIA Case No.103 of 2023.
3. These two connected First Appeals, preferred under
Section 24-C of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 (“ the Act ”), arise
out of two separate but virtually identical orders, both dated
22.01.2024, passed by the learned State Educational Tribunal,
Bhubaneswar, concerning the very same educational institution,
namely, Indravati Higher Secondary School, Jaipatna, District
Kalahandi (“ the College ”). Since the two appeals emanate from a
common factual matrix and raise identical questions of fact and
law, they were heard together and are disposed of by this
common judgment. In the interest of expediency, FAO No.161 of
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2024 is treated as the leading matter and, the facts narrated
hereinafter are, save where otherwise indicated, common to both
appeals.
FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE
4. The central facts of the case, in short, are that the
College, which is a private institution managed by its Governing
Body, was established in the year 1984 with both +2 Science and
Arts streams, as the second Science junior college of Kalahandi
district, to cater to the educational needs of the largely Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities of the region. The
College obtained government recognition and CHSE affiliation
from the academic session 1985. Initially the College was
operated on the donations from local residents and funding
received from the Upper Indravati Hydro Electric Project
(“UIHEP”). Later, the College was granted permanent
recognition and CHSE affiliation w.e.f the academic session
2003-04 (formal permanent recognition having been accorded on
29.10.2003). The Governing Body of the College was first
constituted and registered under the Societies Registration Act,
1860 from the academic session 1987-88, and was approved by
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the Director, Higher Education under Rule 4(3) of the ‘Orissa
Education (Management of Private Colleges) (Amendment)
Rules, 1988’ on 25.03.1989. Subsequently, the Governing Body
was reconstituted and re-approved on 19.09.1992 and 26.12.1995
under the ‘Orissa Education (Establishment, Recognition and
Management of Private Junior Colleges/Higher Secondary
Schools) Rules, 1991’.
5. On account of the College’s limited financial capacity,
the matter of financial assistance was taken up with the
UIHEP/Energy Department, resulting in a series of directions viz.
letter No.2738 dated 08.02.1993, directing that the salary of
Lecturers and staff be borne by the Project; letter No.8991 dated
25.04.1994, directing that the establishment cost be borne by
UIHEP/Government until completion of UIHEP; and letter
No.17752 dated 28.07.1994, directing that the establishment cost
be borne by UIHEP/OHPC till its completion only and that the
College to be treated as a private college for all purposes until
taken over by the Education Department in accordance with the
Act. The scale of pay of teaching and non-teaching staff was, in
the meanwhile, revised at par with aided non-Government
th
colleges first under the 4 Pay Revision at Rs.2000-3500/-
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(ORSP Rules, 1989) with effect from 01.06.1992, and thereafter
th
under the 5 Pay Revision (ORSP Rules, 1998) with effect from
01.01.1996.
6. Consequently, the GIA Order, 1994 was enacted with
retrospective effect from 01.06.1994. The College submitted its
first Form-A application vide letter No.2997, dated 25.02.1995,
to the Directorate of Higher Education, which was received on
28.02.1995. Since the GIA order was in force, the Government
prepared a district-wise list of unaided colleges maturing for
grant-in-aid under the GIA Order, 1994, wherein the College was
placed at Serial No.105, being the first college of Kalahandi
district in the said list. Despite repeated reminders from the
Secretary of the Governing Body and the Principal of the
College, the Opposite Party No.1 neither took any decision
thereon nor communicated any order of rejection. It is relevant to
note that the Degree wing of the composite institution, separated
in 1991 as ‘Indravati Mahavidyalaya (Degree wing), Jaipatna’
though initially notified under the GIA Order, 2004, was
subsequently notified as an aided institution under the GIA Order,
1994 itself vide Government Order No.26204 dated 26.10.2012, a
circumstance to which reference shall be made later.
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rd th
7. It is also material to note that, at the 3 and 4 Control
Board meetings of the UIHEP, held on 04.09.1997 and
24.06.1998 respectively, a considered decision was taken to
handing over the institution to the control of the Department of
Higher Education so as to lend it permanent institutional stability.
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Energy addressed the Higher
Education Department vide letter No.164, dated 05.01.1998, for
taking over of the institution. The Higher Education Department
responded vide letter No.24901, dated 19.05.1999, stating that
while it was not administratively feasible to take over the
institution as a Government college, its eligibility for Grant-in-
Aid could be examined under the GIA Order, 1994. The
institution, accordingly, resubmitted its Form-A proposal for a
second time on 18.01.2002.
8. Faced with continued inaction despite the repeated
applications by the institution, the teaching and non-teaching staff
of the institution were constrained to approach this Court, initially
in W.P.(C) No.20628 of 2009, which was disposed of on
22.03.2010 with a direction to the Secretary, Higher Education
Department to consider the grievance, and later in W.P.(C)
No.18488 of 2010 and a batch of connected writ petitions filed on
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27.10.2010. During the pendency of the said writ petitions, a
series of significant developments occurred:- at a High Power
Committee (“HPC”) meeting held on 14.12.2012, the question of
taking over such institutions into the Grant-in-Aid fold was
considered. Pursuant thereto, a Committee was constituted and
notified vide Odisha Gazette Notification No. 905 dated
04.02.2013. The said Committee, in its meeting held on
01.05.2013, took a decision to extend Grant-in-Aid to such
institutions under the GIA Order, 1994. The Director, Higher
Education, in compliance therewith, submitted a report to the
Government on 23.05.2013 recommending that approval be
accorded for inclusion of such institutions, including the
Appellants’ institution, in the Grant-in-Aid fold in accordance
with the provisions made for left-out colleges. The Principal
Secretary, Higher Education Department, by a decision recorded
on the file on 13.08.2013, approved the said recommendation,
noting in terms that the Higher Education Department had no
objection to taking over such institutions under the Grant-in-Aid
fold of the Government.
9. It was in this backdrop that a learned Single Judge of
this Court, by order dated 16.04.2015, at Annexure-1, disposed of
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W.P.(C) No.18488 of 2010, W.P.(C) No.9236 of 2010 and the
connected batch of writ petitions, directing that the Government
take a decision to include the institutions in question (including
the Appellants’ institution) under the GIA Order, 1994 and
authorising the Director, Higher Education to undertake
verification of the records of the institutions for approval of the
posts and sanction of Grant-in-Aid in accordance with the
provisions made for left-out colleges and directing that Grant-in-
rd
Aid, equivalent to 1/3 the salary cost, be paid to persons duly
appointed against admissible posts with effect from 01.06.1994.
The order further specified a time-frame of four months within
which the entire exercise was to be completed.
10. In purported compliance with the said order, the
Director, Higher Education, vide letters No.24580 dated
06.07.2015 and No.25995 dated 09.07.2015, called upon the
President/Secretary of the Governing Body to submit a fresh
Form-A application, which was accordingly submitted, for the
third time, by the Sub-Collector, Dharmagarh-cum-President of
the Governing Body, on 15.07.2015. Upon physical verification
of the original records of the institution carried out on 30.08.2015
and 01.09.2015, the Director, Higher Education submitted his
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considered recommendation to the Government on 28.10.2015, at
Annexure-7, recommending notification of the Appellants’
institution under the GIA Order, 1994, together with the tentative
financial implication thereof.
11. Notwithstanding the aforesaid recommendation for
notification under the GIA Order, 1994, the Government, in the
School and Mass Education Department (“S&ME Department”),
by notification dated 24.10.2017, notified the institution under the
GIA Order, 2004 instead, ostensibly relying upon the fact of the
interregnum repeal of the 1994 Order. Subsequently, however, in
further compliance with the order dated 16.04.2015 of this Court,
as well as pursuant to proceedings in Contempt Case No. 481 of
2019 (CONTC No. 481 of 2019), the S&ME Department issued a
fresh notification dated 27.04.2021, re-notifying, inter alia, the
Appellants’ institution to receive Grant-in-Aid in terms of the
GIA Order, 1994, with effect from 01.06.1994.
12. It was at this stage that Respondent No.1-State,
preferred Writ Appeal No.474 of 2021 (and a connected Writ
Appeal No.401 of 2021), which came to be allowed by a Division
Bench of this Court, thereby setting aside the order passed in the
contempt proceeding. Thereafter, the Principal Secretary, Higher
Page 9 of 34
Education Department, by an order dated 01.11.2021, at
Annexure-10, unilaterally disentitled the appellants and similarly
situated employees from the benefit of the GIA Order, 1994,
notwithstanding the extant notification dated 27.04.2021, on the
ostensible ground that, consequent upon the repeal of the GIA
Order, 1994, no such benefit was any longer admissible.
13. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellants and certain similarly
situated persons approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way
of Special Leave Petitions registered as S.L.P.(C) Nos. 20178-
20179 of 2021, which came to be disposed of vide order dated
04.10.2022. While declining to interfere with the order of this
Court in the Writ Appeals (confined, as it was, to the contempt
proceeding), the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted liberty to the
Appellants to pursue any other remedy available in law. It was in
pursuance of the said liberty that the Appellants approached the
learned Tribunal by way of GIA Case No.66 of 2023 and GIA
Case No. 103 of 2023 (FAO No.219 of 2024), invoking Section
24-B of the Act, seeking approval of their posts in terms of the
GIA Order, 1994 and consequential release of salary and other
service benefits, with a specific prayer for quashing of the order
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dated 01.11.2021 passed by the Principal Secretary, Higher
Education Department.
14. The learned Tribunal took up both the GIA
applications on 22.01.2024, ostensibly for admission and issuance
of notice to the Opposite Parties, and proceeded to dismiss both
applications at the very threshold, holding, in essence, that in
view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State
of Odisha and Another v. Anup Kumar Senapati and Another ,
reported in (2019) 19 SCC 626 , the GIA Order, 1994 was “no
more in existence” and the applications were, accordingly, not
maintainable. In GIA Case No.103 of 2023, the learned Tribunal
additionally observed that the sole Appellant therein had no locus
standi to maintain the application in his individual capacity under
Section 24-B of the Act, with a prayer to notify the institution
under the GIA Order, 1994, in alleged violation of Clause 7 read
with Section 7-C of the Orissa Education Act, 1969. It is against
these orders dated 22.01.2024 that the Appellants have preferred
the present appeals under Section 24-C of the Orissa Education
Act, 1969.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS
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15. Heard Mr. B. Routray, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellants in FAO No. 161 of 2024, and Mr.
D.N. Rath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in FAO
No. 219 of 2024. Since the submissions made/grounds taken on
behalf of the Appellants in both the FAOs are broadly identical,
they may be summarised as follows;
a. That the learned Tribunal has wholly failed to
appreciate that the Appellants’ institution was, since its
inception, funded and financed by UIHEP/OHPC under the
Energy Department only as a stop-gap arrangement pending
its formal absorption into the Grant-in-Aid fold, and that a
considered decision to hand over the institution to the
Department of Higher Education had already been taken as
rd th
far back as at the 3 and 4 Control Board meetings of
UIHEP held on 04.09.1997 and 24.06.1998, attended by the
highest functionaries of the State.
b. That the learned Tribunal also failed to notice that the
Principal Secretary, Energy Department, vide letter dated
04.08.2015, had specifically called upon the Higher
Education Department to comply with the direction of this
Court dated 16.04.2015 within the time-frame of four months
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prescribed by this Court. In fact, the Higher Education
Department had already, vide letter No.14530 dated
04.07.2015, requested the Director, Higher Education to take
appropriate action. Thereafter, the Principal Secretary, Energy
Department, vide letter No.6764 dated 04.08.2015, called
upon the Higher Education Department to ensure compliance.
Resultantly, the Director gave his unequivocal
recommendation dated 28.10.2015, after physical verification
of records, for notification of the institution under the GIA
Order, 1994.
c. Additionally, the impugned orders travel wholly
beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal inasmuch as a
statutory application under Section 24-B of the Act (as
amended in 1998) was summarily dismissed at the threshold
of admission without issuance of any notice to the Opposite
Parties and without affording them an opportunity of filing
counter-affidavits, which was incumbent upon the Tribunal to
allow. It was contended that on the aforesaid ground of
procedural infirmity alone, the impugned order at Annexure-3
is liable to be set-aside.
Page 13 of 34
d. Specifically with regard to the finding of the learned
Tribunal that the Appellant in FAO No.219 of 2024 had no
locus standi to maintain the application in his individual
capacity, it was contended that such a proposition is factually
and legally unsustainable, since the institution already stood
notified under the GIA Order, 1994 vide notification dated
27.04.2021, and the prayer in the GIA application was
confined to seeking quashment of the subsequent order dated
01.11.2021 which had, without notice and without
justification, disentitled the Appellant from the benefit
flowing from the extant notification, i.e. a relief squarely
within the competence of the Tribunal to grant.
e. That the appellants fall squarely within the exception
carved out by the decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court
in State of Odisha and Another v. Ratnakar Mohapatra and
Another , bearing F.A.O. No.509 of 2014 and connected
matters, decided on 19.03.2025, since the claim of the
Institution to which the Appellants belonged to was already
solidified in light of the 28.10.2015 recommendation of the
Director, Higher Education after verifying original records of
the institution on 30.08.2015 and 01.09.2015. It was
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contended that such benefit under the GIA Order, 1994 had
already accrued in favour of the Appellants, but, pending its
disbursement, the Principal Secretary, Higher Education
Department, vide its order dated 01.11.2021, at Annexure-10,
unilaterally, arbitrarily and without any justification,
disentitled the Appellants from availing such benefits that had
rightfully accrued unto them.
f. That the order dated 16.04.2015, by a Coordinate
Bench of this Court, in W.P.(C) No.18488 of 2010 and the
connected batch has attained finality since it has neither been
set aside nor interfered with by any higher forum (including
in Writ Appeal No. 474 of 2021, which was confined to the
contempt proceeding), and continues to bind the Opposite
Parties. As such, the entitlement of the appellants under the
GIA Order, 1994, crystallised by that order, could not have
been unsettled by the unilateral executive order dated
01.11.2021.
g. To further consolidate the Appellants’ claim to the
benefits of the GIA Order, 1994, the learned senior counsel
has demonstrated the following instances of teaching and
non-teaching staff of other similarly placed institutions,
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which are on an identical footing to the present Appellants,
and have already availed the benefits of the GIA Order, 1994;
Firstly , Vindhya Vasini Junior College, Paikmal (in GIA
Case No.338 of 2012, allowed on 28.02.2014, the State’s
appeal being FAO No. 195 of 2016 dismissed on 07.02.2018
and the consequent S.L.P.(C) Diary No.21291 of 2018
dismissed on 17.09.2018); secondly , Panchayat Samiti Degree
College (in GIA No.218 of 2012, allowed on 12.08.2013, the
State’s appeal being FAO No.658 of 2014 dismissed on
31.07.2015, S.L.P.(C) No.25421 of 2017 filed against such
dismissal was itself dismissed on 08.12.2017, and Review
Petition (C) No.2134 of 2018 dismissed on 17.07.2018);
thirdly , another batch of employees of Vindhya Vasini Junior
College (in GIA Case No. 245 of 2012 allowed on
03.10.2013, upheld by this Court, the State’s S.L.P. Civil
Diary No.26091 of 2018 dismissed on 17.09.2018, and the
subsequent Review Petition (Civil) Diary No.2367 of 2020
dismissed on 02.06.2020, the latter after the pronouncement
in Anup Kumar Senapati ( supra ), following which the State
itself accorded approval under the GIA Order, 1994 to the
teaching and non-teaching staff of that institution on
Page 16 of 34
24.11.2020). It was submitted that these instances
demonstrate that Anup Kumar Senapati ( supra ) was never
treated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as an absolute and
universal bar to all claims under the GIA Order, 1994,
irrespective of when the underlying recommendation was
made.
16. It is in light of the aforesaid contentions that the
learned senior counsel and the learned counsel for the Appellants
in both the FAOs urged before this Court that the impugned
judgement dated 22.01.2024 of the Tribunal, passed in GIA
No.66 of 2023 and GIA No.103 of 2023, be quashed and, the
prayer of the Appellants made in such GIA petitions be allowed.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
17. Heard Mr. D. K. Sahoo, learned AGA appearing on
behalf of the Respondents. Since the learned Tribunal dismissed
the GIA applications at the threshold itself without issuing notice,
the State did not avail of any occasion to file a counter-affidavit
or otherwise controvert the factual averments of the Appellants
either before the Tribunal or, in the first instance, before this
Court. That said, the sole plank on which the impugned orders
Page 17 of 34
rested and, have been defended before this Court, is that in view
of the law declared in Anup Kumar Senapati ( supra ) no claim
for Grant-in-Aid under the GIA Order, 1994, the order having
been repealed with effect from 05.02.2004 by the GIA Order,
2004, could be entertained after the date of such repeal, and that
the Appellants’ applications before the Tribunal, having been
instituted long after 2004, were rightly, for this reason alone, not
maintainable.
18. On a previous occasion, this Court, by order dated
21.07.2026, drew the attention of learned counsel for the State to
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026 in
Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026 , arising out of and affirming the
judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Ratnakar
Mohapatra ( supra ), as well as to the order dated 06.04.2026
passed in the Appellants’ own S.L.P.(C) Diary No.13489 of 2026.
The learned counsel for the State sought time to verify the
position. On the matter being taken up thereafter, learned counsel
for the State has once again taken the stand that there is no fault
with the impugned orders of the Tribunal since the Appellants
agitated their claim before the Tribunal well after the GIA Order,
Page 18 of 34
1994 was repealed, and, as such, they cannot lay stake to the
benefits flowing from the repealed GIA Order, 1994
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
19. Heard learned senior counsel and the learned counsel
for the Appellants, along with the learned AGA for the
Respondents. Perused the impugned judgement of the Tribunal
along with other materials on record. The controversy involved in
the present appeals lies within a fairly narrow compass, inasmuch
as the Appellants’ institution, which was admittedly eligible in
terms of the criteria prescribed under the GIA Order, 1994, and
admittedly the subject of a favourable recommendation of the
Director, Higher Education long before the GIA Order, 1994 was
repealed in the year 2004, has been denied the fruits of that
recommendation on account of misappreciation of the facts and
an erroneous application of the dictum in Anup Kumar Senapati
( Supra ). Therefore, the primary question before this Court, in
essence, is whether the fact of repeal of the GIA order, 1994
extinguishes the Appellants’ claim that had already matured
administratively.
Page 19 of 34
20. At the outset, it is clear that Section 7-C of the Act,
inserted by the Odisha Education (Amendment) Act, 1994,
empowers the State Government to set apart, within the limits of
its economic capacity, monies to be disbursed annually as Grant-
in-Aid to private educational institutions, subject to the fulfilment
of certain conditions prescribed in the orders made thereunder. In
exercise of this power, the GIA Order, 1994 was notified on
21.11.1994 (with retrospective effect from 01.06.1994), and later
repealed with effect from 05.02.2004 by the GIA Order, 2004,
save for the purposes specified in Section 3(1) thereof. Section
4(2) of the GIA Order, 2004 further provides that institutions in
receipt of Grant-in-Aid under the repealed GIA Order, 1994 shall
continue to receive the same as if the GIA Order, 1994 had not
been repealed.
21. The question of the survivability of claims for Grant-
in-Aid under the GIA Order, 1994, after its repeal, fell for the
consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anup Kumar
Senapati ( supra ). The Hon’ble Supreme Court effectively laid
down therein that the right to grant-in-aid must have accrued,
vested and crystallised under the machinery of the 1994 Order
before its repeal, and mere satisfaction of individual eligibility
Page 20 of 34
conditions or submission of an application is insufficient. In
paragraph 18, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even
completion of the prescribed qualifying period does not result in
an “automatic accrual of right for receiving grant-in-aid”, grant-
in-aid being dependent upon the Director’s assessment and
selection of the institution. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held
that the Grant-in-Aid under the GIA Order, 1994 could never be
claimed as a matter of right, being contingent upon fulfilment of
numerous conditions and subject to the discretion of the Director
and the economic capacity of the State. The Court also held that
after repeal of a statute, what survives, in terms of Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897, is a right “acquired or accrued”,
and not a mere “hope or expectation of, or liberty to apply for,
acquiring a right”. The Hon’ble Apex Court also observed that
the saving clause in Paragraph 4(2) of the GIA Order, 2004
preserves only the continuance of Grant-in-Aid already being
received, and does not save either pending applications or the
right to apply after the repeal. As such, there is “no vested,
accrued or absolute right to claim grant-in-aid under the Act or
the Order of 1994” merely upon fulfilment of educational and
appointment criteria.
Page 21 of 34
22. That said, a specific perusal of para 19 of the aforesaid
decision discloses that the case before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court turned upon the specific fact that “there is no material on
record that the institutions have duly applied in the particular
academic year and within the time fixed for making application
as per the Order of 1994 and there is nothing on the record
indicating that the requisite information was furnished”. Such an
observation, which would subsequently be clarified in principle
in State of Odisha and Anr. v. Ratnakar Mohapatra and Anr. ,
bearing FAO No.509 of 2014 , decided on 19.03.2025 and the
order of the Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026 in Civil Appeal
No.3904 of 2026 , assumes particular significance since it
confines the ratio of Anup Kumar Senapati ( supra ) to instances
where, prior to the repeal, the institution had made no application
for grant-in-aid and no consequent recommendation had been
made in favour of the concerned institution.
23. It was this qualification that formed the foundation of
the subsequent decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court
in Ratnakar Mohapatra ( supra ), rendered in a batch of appeals
arising from orders of the Tribunal both allowing and rejecting
claims for GIA order, 1994. Relying, inter alia, upon the
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information furnished by the Directorate of Secondary Education
under the Right to Information Act, 2005, vide letter dated
21.01.2013 which disclosed that prior to repeal of the GIA Order,
1994 the Directorate had already recommended extension of
Grant-in-Aid in favour of several unaided institutions, the learned
Single Judge held, at paragraphs 6.1 to 6.3, that Anup Kumar
Senapati ( supra ) could not be treated as an absolute bar in cases
where the concerned employees/institutions were otherwise
eligible under the GIA Order, 1994 and the requisite
recommendation had been made by the competent Directorate
before its repeal. The learned Single Judge also took note of
similar orders affirmed by this Court, which had not been
interfered with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Consequently, the
State authorities were directed to verify, within six months,
whether the claims in the individual cases had been
recommended by the concerned Directorate prior to 05.02.2004,
and, upon such verification, to pass appropriate orders regarding
extension of the benefit of Grant-in-Aid under the GIA Order,
1994 in favour of the Appellants therein.
The aforesaid directions were thereafter carried to the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3904 of 2026 and
Page 23 of 34
connected appeals. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, by judgment
dated 25.03.2026, after examining the reasoning of the learned
Single Judge, held in para 7 that the directions issued by the High
Court were “completely in consonance with the reasoning
therein” and declined to interfere. Further, taking note of the
dismissal of numerous connected SLPs raising the same
controversy, the Apex Court dismissed the appeals preferred by
the State, directed that the cases of the private Appellants be dealt
with in accordance with the directions of the High Court, and
required the exercise contemplated therein to be completed within
six months.
24. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid three decisions
in Anup Kumar Senapati ( supra ), Ratnakar Mohapatra ( supra )
and the order of the Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026 in Civil
Appeal No.3904 of 2026 ., therefore, is that Anup Kumar
Senapati ( supra ) continues to govern the fundamental
proposition that repeal of the GIA Order, 1994 precludes the
institution of a fresh or uncrystallised claim thereunder and mere
eligibility, expectation or a claim requiring further determination
does not constitute an accrued or vested right surviving such
repeal. Ratnakar Mohapatra ( supra ), however, recognised that
Page 24 of 34
the said principle could not be mechanically applied to cases in
which the claim had already progressed to a material stage prior
to repeal, particularly where the competent Directorate had made
the requisite recommendation before the GIA order, 2004 came
into force. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, by its order dated
25.03.2026 in Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026 and connected
matters, declined to interfere with that approach, that is to say, the
appeals filed by the State were dismissed, and it was expressly
directed that the claims of the private persons be dealt with in
accordance with the verification exercise contemplated by the
High Court. Thus, the repeal of the GIA Order, 1994 remains a
bar to fresh and uncrystallised claims, but does not, by itself,
constitute an absolute bar in respect of claims which had
sufficiently crystallised prior to the repeal of the GIA Order, 1994
and fall within the factual and legal parameters recognised in
Ratnakar Mohapatra ( supra ). The ultimate entitlement in such
cases consequently turns upon verification of the pre-repeal status
of the claim, rather than upon an automatic rejection by reference
to Anup Kumar Senapati ( supra ) alone.
25. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that Appellants’
own Special Leave Petition bearing S.L.P.(C) Diary No.13489
Page 25 of 34
of 2026 (@ S.L.P.(C) No.12532 of 2026) in Bishnu Priya
Mohanty and others v. State of Odisha , preferred against an
earlier order of the Principal Secretary, Higher Education
Department dated 01.11.2021 disentitling them from the benefit
of the GIA Order, 1994, came to be disposed of by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, on 06.04.2026, on the express concession of
learned counsel for both the parties that “the issue as involved is
covered by order dated 25.03.2026 passed by this court whereby
the said batch of cases concerning Grant-in-Aid has already been
disposed of” disposed of the said SLP “on the same terms” as the
order dated 25.03.2026 of the Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026 .
26. Turning to the impugned order of the Tribunal dated
22.01.2024, it is pertinent to note that in Paragraph 1 of the
impugned order itself, the Tribunal records that the matter was
listed for admission “after hearing the issue at length from
learned Counsels appearing for the parties”. As such, there is no
factual foundation on the face of the record for any contention
that the Respondents were denied a hearing before the Tribunal.
In any event, even assuming such denial, a plea of denial of
natural justice inheres in, and can be invoked only by, the party
to whom the hearing was denied. It is not a ground available to
Page 26 of 34
the Appellants, who suffered no such denial, to assail an order
passed against them.
27. On merits, upon a further scrutiny of the impugned
order, this Court finds that the impugned order of the Tribunal
itself proceeds upon a legal standard considerably stricter than
the one primarily engaged within the submissions advanced on
behalf of the Appellants. Paragraph 8 of the impugned order
relies upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in
State of Orissa and Another v. Lokanath Behera and Anr. ,
bearing F.A.O. Nos.194 of 2016 and 58 of 2017 , reported in
2018(II) ILR-CUT-535 , decided on 11.09.2018, holding that no
benefit under the GIA Order, 1994 can be granted, to any
institution or its staff, after its repeal, save to institutions that had
“already received such grant-in-aid” before the repeal. Similarly,
paragraph 9 of the impugned order relies upon the decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Ratikanta
Tripathy , S.L.P.(C) No.33245 of 2018 , where it has been held,
at paragraph 31, that the only saving under Paragraph 4 of the
GIA Order, 2004 is of the right to receive the grant where the
grant-in-aid had actually been received on or before the repeal,
and no other rights are saved. This is, in substance, a receipt-
Page 27 of 34
before-repeal test, which is materially stricter than the test in
Anup Kumar Senapati ( supra ), or even the recommendation-
based test as seen in Ratnakar Mohapatra ( supra ).
28. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is
undisputed that the first Form-A application was filed by the
Appellants’ institution on 25.02.1995, followed by the second
application on 18.01.2002. Thereafter, the institution became the
subject matter of various proceedings and recommendations,
including the HPC decision dated 01.05.2013, the
recommendation of the Director, Higher Education dated
23.05.2013, the approval recorded by the Principal Secretary on
13.08.2013, the subsequent recommendation of the Director,
Higher Education dated 28.10.2015 following physical
verification of the original records, and the notification dated
27.04.2021. The GIA Order, 1994 had, in the meantime, been
repealed with effect from 05.02.2004. The Principal Secretary,
Higher Education Department thereafter passed the order dated
01.11.2021 disentitling the Appellants’ institution from the
benefit of the GIA Order, 1994. The significance and legal effect
of the aforesaid sequence of events, particularly in the light of
Ratnakar Mohapatra ( supra ), are matters which, in the
Page 28 of 34
considered view of this Court, are appropriately left for
examination by the competent authority in the first instance.
29. In view of the aforesaid factual position, this Court is
of the considered view that it would not be appropriate, in the
present proceedings, to finally determine whether the claim of
the Appellants’ institution had, prior to repeal of the GIA Order,
1994, acquired the character of an accrued, vested or crystallised
right, or whether the various recommendations and decisions
made in favour of the institution, including those subsequent to
the repeal, have any legal consequence in the light of the
principles enunciated in Anup Kumar Senapati ( supra ) and
subsequently considered in Ratnakar Mohapatra ( supra ). Such
determination would necessarily require an examination of the
entire record relating to the institution, the nature and status of
the recommendations made from time to time, the authority by
whom such recommendations were made, the stage at which the
claim of the institution stood on the date of repeal, and the effect,
if any, of the subsequent proceedings and recommendations.
30. Significantly, the decision in Ratnakar Mohapatra
( supra ), as affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by order
dated 25.03.2026 in Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026 and
Page 29 of 34
connected matters, itself contemplates an exercise of verification
by the competent authorities before the claims of the individual
institutions are ultimately dealt with. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court, while declining to interfere with the directions issued by
this Court, directed that the cases of the private appellants be
dealt with in accordance with the directions of the High Court.
The subsequent order dated 06.04.2026 passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in S.L.P.(C) Diary No.13489 of 2026, arising
from the case of the present Appellants, also assumes
significance inasmuch as the said proceedings were disposed of
on the same terms as the order dated 25.03.2026.
31. In the aforesaid circumstances, the question that arises
for consideration in the present appeals is not one which ought to
be conclusively answered by this Court on the basis of the
material presently placed before it. The appropriate course, in the
considered view of this Court, would be to require the competent
authority to examine the case of the Appellants’ institution in its
proper factual and legal perspective, particularly in the light of
Ratnakar Mohapatra ( supra ) and the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026, and to ascertain the relevance
and legal effect of the various recommendations and decisions
Page 30 of 34
which, according to the Appellants, were made in their favour at
different points of time.
32. Such examination shall not be confined merely to the
recommendation dated 23.05.2013. The competent authority
shall examine the entire relevant record of the institution,
including the applications submitted during the currency of the
GIA Order, 1994, the recommendations made by the competent
authorities, the decision of the High Power Committee, the
recommendation dated 23.05.2013, the subsequent
recommendation dated 28.10.2015 following physical
verification of the original records, the notification dated
27.04.2021, and the order dated 01.11.2021, together with such
other material as may be relevant to the determination of the
Appellants’ claim. The competent authority shall also examine
the case in the light of the principles governing the survivability
of claims under the repealed GIA Order, 1994, as explained in
Anup Kumar Senapati ( supra ), Ratnakar Mohapatra ( supra ),
and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated
25.03.2026.
33. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any
final opinion, on the substantive entitlement of the Appellants to
Page 31 of 34
the benefit of the GIA Order, 1994. In particular, this Court does
not record any concluded finding as to whether the claim of the
Appellants’ institution had crystallised prior to repeal of the GIA
Order, 1994, whether any particular recommendation made
before or after the repeal is sufficient in law to sustain such
claim, or whether the Appellants are ultimately entitled to the
benefit claimed by them. All such questions are left open for
consideration by the competent authority in accordance with law
and in the light of the aforesaid decisions.
34. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgments
dated 22.01.2024 passed by the learned State Education
Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in GIA Case No.66 of 2023 and GIA
Case No.103 of 2023 cannot be sustained. The Tribunal, having
proceeded to reject the applications at the threshold on the
premise that the repeal of the GIA Order, 1994 constituted an
absolute bar, did not undertake the factual and legal examination
which is now required to be undertaken in the light of the
subsequent pronouncement in Ratnakar Mohapatra ( supra ) and
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026.
The impugned judgments, at Annexure-3 to both the FAOs are,
accordingly, set aside.
Page 32 of 34
35. Consequently, the matter is remitted to Respondent
No.1-State, through the competent authority, more particularly
the Director, Higher Education, for examination of the case of
the Appellants’ institution and the individual Appellants in
accordance with law. The competent authority shall undertake a
comprehensive verification of the relevant records and
recommendations concerning the institution and shall determine,
upon such examination, whether the case of the Appellants’ falls
within the principles recognised in Ratnakar Mohapatra
( supra ), as affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its order
dated 25.03.2026, and whether they are consequently entitled to
the benefit claimed under the GIA Order, 1994. Such exercise
shall be undertaken independently and uninfluenced by any
observations made herein which may be construed as expressing
a final opinion on the merits of the claim.
36. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed by the
competent authority within a period of three months from the
date of production of a certified copy of this judgment, after
affording the Appellants an opportunity to place all relevant
materials and documents in support of their claim. A reasoned
and speaking order shall thereafter be passed and communicated
Page 33 of 34
to the Appellants. Needless to say, the competent authority shall
consider the claim in the light of the law declared by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and this Court in the decisions referred to herein
and shall not reject the claim solely on the ground that the
proceedings before the Tribunal were instituted after repeal of
the GIA Order, 1994, without examining whether the case
otherwise falls within the principles recognised in Ratnakar
Mohapatra ( supra ).
37. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed to the aforesaid
extent and disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
(A.K. Mohapatra)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
st
The 31 August, 2026/ Rubi/ Sr.Stenographer
Signature Not Verified
Page 34 of 34
Digitally Signed
Signed by: RUBI BEHERA
Reason: Authentication
Location: OHC
Date: 01-Sep-2026 12:19:52