Balbir Singh vs Ram Kishore Bagga

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 24.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27.10.2026

# CNR No. DLHC011395582016

+ RC.REV. 367/2016

BALBIR SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Naved Ahmed, Ms. Anam
Siddiqui and Ms. Diksha Hira,
Advocates.
versus

RAM KISHORE BAGGA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Jugal Bagga, Advocate
along with Respondent in
person.


CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Rent Control Revision Petition has been preferred
by the Petitioner under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi
1 2
Rent Control Act, 1958 , assailing the Order dated 30.01.2016
passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller (South), Saket
3
Courts, New Delhi , whereby the Eviction Petition instituted by the
Petitioner (Landlord) under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act came to

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
Learned ARC
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BHATIA
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be dismissed in respect of the shop situated on the ground floor of
4
Property No. 21, Masigarh, Sukhdev Vihar, New Delhi .

BRIEF FACTS:

2. The Petitioner instituted eviction proceedings, vide Eviction
5
Petition dated 10.10.2012 , against the Respondent in respect of the
subject premises, pleading a bona fide requirement thereof for running
his own business dealing in electronic equipment. The Petitioner
asserted that the subject premises had been let out to the Respondent
vide Rent Agreement dated 06.02.1989 and that, in view of his
pleaded requirement, he was entitled to recover possession of the same
under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
3. The Respondent contested the Eviction Petition and, upon being
served with notice, filed an Application seeking leave to defend dated
17.12.2012. While the relationship of landlord and tenant between the
parties was admitted, the Respondent disputed the bona fides of the
requirement pleaded by the Petitioner. The controversy, inter alia ,
concerned the Respondent‟s assertion that the Petitioner continued to
carry on business under the name and style of M/s Ashish Electronics
from Shop No. 166/7, Sarai Julena, Okhla Road, New Delhi, and the
Petitioner‟s case that the said shop had closed, necessitating his
requirement of the tenanted shop situated at Property No. 21,
Masigarh.
4. The learned ARC allowed the Application seeking leave to
defend, whereafter the matter proceeded to trial and both parties led
evidence in support of their respective stands. In the course of the

4
Subject Premises
5
Eviction Petition
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BHATIA
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proceedings, the Petitioner relied upon documentary material and the
testimony of the parties in support of his plea that the subject premises
was required for his own commercial use. The Respondent, on the
other hand, maintained his challenge to the bona fide requirement
pleaded in the Eviction Petition, including on the basis of the
controversy concerning the business premises at Sarai Julena.
5. Upon conclusion of the evidence and consideration of the
material placed on record, the learned ARC, vide the Impugned Order
dated 30.01.2016, dismissed the Eviction Petition. Aggrieved by the
Impugned Order, the Petitioner has preferred the present Revision
Petition, assailing the findings returned by the learned ARC with
respect to the bona fide requirement of the subject premises,
particularly in the context of the Respondent‟s alleged continuation of
business from Shop No. 166/7, Sarai Julena, Okhla Road, New Delhi.
The controversy arising for consideration before this Court is confined
to the aforesaid aspect.


SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits
that the learned ARC failed to properly appreciate the evidence on
record concerning the closure of the shop being run under the name
and style of M/s Ashish Electronics at Shop No. 166/7, Sarai Julena,
6
Okhla Road, New Delhi . It is contended that the said shop had been
closed pursuant to the proceedings initiated by the Delhi Development
Authority vide Show Cause Notice dated 30.05.2002 and that,
following the closure thereof, the Petitioner has no other shop in his
possession to carry on his business operations. It is, therefore,

6
Shop No. 166/7
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BHATIA
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submitted that the learned ARC erred in dismissing the Eviction
Petition on the ground that the Petitioner had failed to establish the
closure of the Shop No. 166/7.
7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the
Respondent had taken contradictory stands with respect to the location
from which M/s Ashish Electronics was being operated. It is
submitted that, while the Respondent asserted that the Petitioner
continued to operate M/s Ashish Electronics from Shop No. 166/7,
Sarai Julena, he had also averred that, in 2007, the Petitioner shifted
the said business to the ground floor of Property No. 21, Masigarh,
where he allegedly had ample space available and continued to
operate the business. According to the Petitioner, these assertions are
inconsistent and undermine the Respondent‟s contention that the
business continued to operate from Sarai Julena and had not been
closed as claimed by the Petitioner.

8. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent supports the Impugned Order and submits that the
Petitioner‟s assertion regarding the closure of the Shop No. 166/7 is
contrary to the material on record. It is contended that M/s Ashish
Electronics continued to be run by the Petitioner from the said
premises and that the material pertaining to the business, including the
VAT returns relied upon by the Respondent, supports this position. It
is, accordingly, submitted that the learned ARC rightly dismissed the
Eviction Petition upon finding that the Petitioner had failed to
establish the closure of the Shop No. 166/7.
9. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contends that the
Petitioner had failed to establish that M/s Ashish Electronics had
closed its operations at Sarai Julena pursuant to the DDA notice.
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BHATIA
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Reliance is placed upon the VAT returns, Ex. PW1/R12 to Ex.
PW1/R17, reflecting the name of M/s Ashish Electronics and its
address at Sarai Julena, as well as other material on record, to contend
that the business continued to operate from the said premises. It is
further submitted that the learned ARC had duly considered the
material placed on record and rightly rejected the Petitioner‟s claim
for eviction in the absence of cogent evidence establishing the alleged
closure.
10. Learned counsel lastly submits that the present proceedings are
governed by the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act and that interference with
the Impugned Order would not be warranted in the absence of any
perversity, material irregularity or error of law in the findings returned
by the learned ARC.
11. No other submissions were advanced on behalf of the parties.

ANALYSIS:

12. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and, with their able assistance, perused the relevant documents as also
the Impugned Order.
13. Before adverting to the controversy arising in the present
Revision Petition, it is apposite to delineate the scope of the
jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act. The jurisdiction conferred thereunder is
supervisory in nature and does not partake of the character of an
appellate jurisdiction. This Court is, therefore, not called upon to
undertake a fresh appraisal of the evidence or to substitute its own
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conclusions for those arrived at by the learned ARC, merely because
another view may be possible on the material available on record.

14. The scope of the aforesaid jurisdiction stands elucidated by the
7
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua ,
wherein it was reiterated that the High Court, while exercising
revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC
Act, is required to examine the legality of the decision-making process
and cannot convert such jurisdiction into a regular appellate
proceeding. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

15. Accordingly, interference in exercise of the aforesaid
jurisdiction is warranted where the order under challenge discloses a
material illegality, perversity, or an infirmity in the decision-making
process that renders the conclusion legally unsustainable. The
jurisdiction does not, however, extend to re-weighing the evidence
merely to arrive at a conclusion different from that of the learned
ARC. The inquiry in the present case must, therefore, remain confined
to examining whether the learned ARC‟s finding that the Petitioner

7
(2022) 6 SCC 30
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BHATIA
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had failed to establish the alleged closure of M/s Ashish Electronics at
Shop No. 166/7, and consequently the statutory requirement pleaded
under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, suffers from any infirmity
warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the
DRC Act.
16. The relevant findings and reasoning recorded by the learned
ARC in the Impugned Order, forming the basis for dismissal of the
eviction petition, are reproduced hereinbelow to facilitate a proper
consideration of the issues arising in the present Revision Petition:
“24. Now, coming to the most important point of this litigation,
i.e., whether the requirement of the petitioner qua the tenanted
premises is bona fide or not. It is settled proposition of law that
landlords desire for possession, however, honest has subjective
element in it and that desire to become a „requirement‟ in law must
have the objective element of ‘need’ .
25. Qua Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act the learned counsel for the
petitioner has knitted his web of arguments and stated that pursuant
to issuance of Show Cause Notice dated 30.05.2012 by DDA
(Ex.PW1/E) to M/s Ashish Electronics, i.e. the electronics shop
which was being run by PW-1/petitioner from Sarai Julena, the
petitioner was fined U/s 29(2) of DDA Act by the Court and
ultimately he had to close the said shop and shift its entire stock in
the house of his elder brother at 21 Masihgarh and the tenanted suit
premises being situated on the ground floor of premises in question
and facing the main road is more than suitable for him to run his
business of electronics therefrom.
26. Per Contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/RW-1 has
very vehemently refuted the aforesaid contention of petitioner and
has argued that PW-1 has not at all closed the shop, i.e. M/s Ashish
Electronics and is still running the same from Sarai Julena. He has
further argued that the requirement of petitioner is not genuine and
same is driven by greed as he wants to have exorbitant rent for the
same.
27. Now, let us see the documents which have been brought on
record by the parties to prove their aforesaid contentions. It is not
clear from the perusal of Ex.PW1/E, i.e. the Show Cause Notice
dated 30.05.2002 issued by DDA that whether the petitioner/PW-1
has closed his aforesaid shop pursuant to issuance of the same. It is
further not clear from the perusal of Ex.PW1/I, i.e. the fine receipt
No.24183, issued by the Court U/s 29(2) of DDA Act whether the
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BHATIA
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petitioner/PW-1 has closed his aforesaid shop or not, as the
concerned Court has merely imposed fine upon the petitioner/PW-
1, but there is no specific order of the said Court thereby directing
the petitioner to close his aforesaid shop. PW-1 even duly admitted
in his cross-examination that he has not filed any order passed by
the Court in this regard . Throughout the course of proceedings of
instant case, the petitioner has not filed any reply/status report
before this Court thereby showing that he had ever written any
letter to the DDA or any statutory authority thereby informing
them he had closed his aforesaid shop pursuant to issuance of
Ex.PW1/E. The petitioner has further failed to examine his brother
in the matter, who could have supported the story of petitioner with
regard to the fact that after closure of his aforesaid shop, he/PW-1
had shifted his stock/material to the house of his brother.
28. On the other hand, in support of his contention that PW-
1/petitioner is still running his shop, i.e. M/s Ashish Electronics
from Sarai Julena, he/RW-1 has proved on record the copies of
Forms DVAT 16, i.e. Delhi Value Added Tax Return (pertaining to
M/s Ashish Electronics) as Ex.PW1/R12 to Ex.PW1/R17, which
are of different time periods. It seems that the motive of RW-1 to
prove on record the said documents was to controvert the stand of
PW-1/petitioner qua the fact that he had vacated the shop in
question during April/May 2004. However, a perusal of
Ex.PW1/R12 to Ex.PW1/R17 shows that the same pertains to the
period given hereunder:
(i) Ex.PW1/R12 pertains to the period from 01.10.2008 to
31.03.2009 ( tax period second half yearly 2008 );
(ii) Ex.PW1/R13 pertains to the period from 01.04.2009 to
30.09.2009 ( tax period first half yearly 2009 );
(iii) Ex.PW1/R14 pertains to the period from 01.10.2009
to 31.03.2010 ( tax period second half yearly 2009 );
(iv) Ex.PW1/R15 pertains to the period from 01.04.2010 to
30.09.2010 ( tax period first half yearly 2010 );
(v) Ex.PW1/R16 pertains to the period from 01.10.2010 to
31.03.2011 ( tax period second half yearly 2010 ); and
(vi) Ex.PW1/R17 pertains to the period from 01.07.2006 to
30.09.2006 ( tax period second quarter 2006 ).
29. The aforesaid Form(s) DVAT 16 mentions the name of dealer
as “M/s Ashish Electronics” and its address as “166/7, Hanuman
Mandir Market, Sarai Julena, New Delhi-110025” , meaning
thereby that as late as on 31.03.2011 (Ex.PW1/R16), the PW-1
paid VAT Tax for the second half year of 2010 qua M/s Ashish
Electronics from the address of “Sarai Julena” itself. PW-1 in his
cross-examination has duly admitted the correctness of
documents exhibited as Ex.PW1/R12 to Ex.PW1/R17. The
aforesaid documents goes on to show that PW-1/petitioner did not
close/move out of said shop in May/April 2010 and he still has
been paying tax qua the said shop from “Sarai Julena”. However,
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his defence has been that after closure of M/s Ashish Electronics at
Sarai Julena, he continued to pay VAT from the premises in
question in order to avoid certain technical glitches with regard to
tax matters. I am afraid the aforesaid contention of petitioner does
not hold much water, especially in view of him duly admitting the
correctness of Ex.PW1/R12 to Ex.PW1/R17.
30. For the sake of argument, if the version of PW-1 is believed to
be correct that pursuant to issuance of Show Cause Notice
Ex.PW1/E, he had to shut down/close his shop, i.e. M/s Ashish
Electronics at Sarai Julena around April/May' 2004, then it is
noticed that PW-1 has also admitted Ex.PW1/R11, i.e. the Rent
Agreement executed between him and M/s Money Creeper qua a
shop situated on the ground floor of premises in question.
Admittedly, Ex.PW1/R11 is dated 03.05.2010 and commencing
w.e.f. 01.05.2010. PW-1 further admitted in his cross-examination
that after vacation of said shop by M/s Money Creepers, he let out
the same on rent to M/s Subhiksha Stores and subsequently
thereafter to one M/s K.B Fairprice Shop, that too as late as in the
year 2011. This goes on to show that from the mid of year 2010 till
the end of year 2014, petitioner/PW-1 let out the aforesaid shop to
three different tenants, but did not occupy the same himself for
opening a shop of electronics therein, despite the fact that the said
shop is also situated on the ground floor of premises in question
and facing the main road. No cogent explanation in this regard has
come from the side of petitioner as to what were the circumstances
which prohibited him from occupying the shop being vacated by
M/s K.B's Fairprice and as such, an adverse inference in this regard
is likely to be drawn against him.
31. Thus, in view of the evidence and material brought on record
by the parties, I am of the considered opinion that petitioner has
failed to prove the ingredient(s) of Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958, especially the factum that he had closed his
shop, i.e. M/s Ashish Electronics situated at Sarai Julena pursuant
to issuance of Show Cause Notice by DDA (Ex.PW1/E). The
petition is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their
own costs.
32. File be consigned to Record Room after completion of
necessary formalities.”

17. At the outset, it is necessary bear in mind that the claim for
eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act rests upon the
fulfilment of the statutory ingredients prescribed therein, including the
bona fide requirement of the landlord. The existence of such
requirement must be examined in the context of the pleadings and the
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evidence led by the parties. Where the landlord relies upon the closure
of an existing business establishment as the factual foundation for
asserting the need for the tenanted premises, the Court must examine
whether the material on record substantiates that assertion. The mere
issuance of a show-cause notice by the DDA cannot, without evidence
of the consequential action taken or of the actual cessation of business,
be treated as conclusive proof that the business had closed.
18. The principles governing the assessment of bona fide
requirement, as elucidated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shiv
8
Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta , require the Court to
distinguish a genuine and honest requirement from a mere desire or
pretext for seeking eviction. The requirement must be assessed
objectively, having regard to the facts and circumstances established
on record. Applying the aforesaid principle, the Petitioner‟s claim in
the present case must be examined not merely on the basis of the
requirement asserted, but also in the light of the evidence adduced in
support thereof, particularly the alleged closure of M/s Ashish
Electronics at Shop No. 166/7 and the circumstances bearing upon that
assertion. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“12. A perusal of Section 14 of the Act shows that the law has
imposed restrictions on the recovery of possession of any premises
by a landlord from a tenant notwithstanding any law or contract to
the contrary. However, an order for recovery of possession is
permissible on one or more of the specified grounds. One such
ground is the premises let for residential purposes being required
bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or
for any member of his family dependent on him. What is a bona
fide requirement is not defined in the Act. The words “need” and
“require” both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within

8
(1999) 6 SCC 222
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demanding fulfilment. “Need” or “requirement” qualified by the
word “bona fide” or “genuine” preceding as an adjective — is an
expression often used in rent control laws. “Bona fide or genuine
need” of the landlord or that the landlord “genuinely requires” or
“requires bona fide” an accommodation for occupation by or use
for himself is an accepted ground for eviction and such expression
is often employed by rent control legislation draftsman. The two
expressions are interchangeable in practice and carry the same
meaning.
13. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean
“in good faith : genuine”. The word “genuine” means “natural : not
spurious : real : pure : sincere”. In Law Dictionary , Mozley and
Whitley define bona fide to mean “good faith, without fraud or
deceit”. Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of
mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity
contemplated by “requires” is much more higher than in mere
desire. The phrase “required bona fide” is suggestive of legislative
intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is
not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in
the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest
desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict
a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the
premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle
him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any
setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the
landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully
withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. The
judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord
and then ask the question to himself — whether in the given facts
substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can
be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the
positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the
landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case,
positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court
drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the
landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext
for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the court
certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the
court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for
the premises or additional premises by applying objective
standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one
accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall
be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to
satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the
landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court
would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of
the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation
must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short,
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the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a
practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach
either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded
against.”

19. In the present case, the Petitioner relies upon the DDA show-
cause notice dated 30.05.2002 to contend that M/s Ashish Electronics,
situated at Shop No. 166/7, had been closed. However, the issuance of
such notice, by itself, does not establish that the business had actually
ceased to operate. As noticed by the learned ARC, no order directing
closure was placed on record, and the fine receipt relied upon by the
Petitioner did not establish that the Shop No. 166/7 had, in fact, been
closed pursuant to the notice. The distinction between initiation of
proceedings by a statutory authority and the actual cessation of
business is material and cannot be overlooked.
20. The aforesaid position assumes significance when considered
alongside the VAT returns, Ex. PW1/R12 to Ex. PW1/R17, relied
upon by the Respondent. These returns reflected the name of M/s
Ashish Electronics and its address as Shop No. 166/7, Sarai Julena.
While the returns may not, in isolation, conclusively establish the
actual conduct of business on every relevant date, they constitute
material evidence bearing upon the assertion of closure. The
Petitioner‟s explanation that the articles of the business had been
shifted following closure also remained uncorroborated, as the elder
brother, at whose house the articles were stated to have been shifted,
was not examined. In these circumstances, the material relied upon by
the Petitioner does not sufficiently establish that the business had
ceased to operate as asserted.
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BHATIA
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21. The Petitioner‟s further assertion that, following the alleged
closure, he had no other shop in his possession to carry on his business
cannot, by itself, cure the deficiency in establishing the factual
premise on which his claim rests. The question is not merely whether
the Petitioner expressed a desire to carry on business from the subject
premises, but whether the circumstances relied upon to support the
requirement pleaded by him were borne out by the evidence. Where
the alleged closure of the existing business remains unsubstantiated,
the assertion founded upon that closure cannot be accepted merely on
the strength of the Petitioner‟s own claim.
22. Another circumstance emerging from the record is that other
portions of Property No. 21, Masigarh, were let out to commercial
occupants, including M/s Money Creepers, M/s Subhiksha Store and
M/s K.B. Fairprice. The learned ARC took note of these successive
lettings and observed that, during the relevant period, portions of the
said property had been let out to different occupants rather than being
utilised by the Petitioner for commencing his electronics business.
This circumstance was relevant to the assessment of the Petitioner‟s
explanation and the requirement asserted by him. Though the act of
letting out portions of the said property would not, in itself, be
conclusive of the absence of bona fide requirement, it was a relevant
circumstance to be considered alongside the failure to establish the
alleged closure of M/s Ashish Electronics at Shop No. 166/7.
9
23. In Ved Prakash v. Gay Dry Cleaners and Another , the
Hon‟ble Delhi High Court examined the genuineness of the landlord‟s
pleaded requirement in the light of the evidence elicited in cross-

9
2026 SCC OnLine Del 1528
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BHATIA
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examination and the conduct of the landlord in relation to other
commercial premises. The Court held that where the factual basis of
the asserted requirement remained doubtful and the landlord failed to
offer a satisfactory explanation for his conduct concerning other
available premises, the bona fides of the claim stood seriously
undermined. The relevance of the aforesaid decision to the present
case lies in the principle that the requirement pleaded by a landlord
must be tested against the evidence and the surrounding
circumstances, and cannot be accepted merely on the strength of the
assertion itself. In the present case, the Petitioner‟s assertion that M/s
Ashish Electronics had closed pursuant to the DDA notice remains
unsubstantiated by cogent evidence. This circumstance, when
considered alongside the material concerning the letting out of other
portions of Property No. 21, Masigarh to other commercial occupants,
assumes significance in assessing the bona fides of the pleaded
requirement. The learned ARC, therefore, rightly drew an adverse
inference against the Petitioner, as the asserted closure remained
unsubstantiated and the surrounding circumstances did not lend
support to the requirement set up by him. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 39. Supreme Court in Rahabhar Productions (P) Ltd. v.
10
Rajendra K. Tandon , had observed and held as under:
“ 18. The phrase “bona fide need” or “bona fide
requirement” occurs not only in the Delhi Rent Control
Act but in the Rent Control legislation of other States also.
What is the meaning of this phrase has been considered
innumerable times by various High Courts as also by this
Court and requires no citations to explain its legal
implications. Even then reference may be made to the
decision of this Court in Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander
[(1988) 3 SCC 131 : AIR 1988 SC 1422], in which it was

10
(1998) 4 SCC 49
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indicated that “bona fide need” should be genuine, honest
and conceived in good faith. It was also indicated that
landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might
otherwise be, has, inevitably, a subjective element in it.
The “desire” to become “requirement” must have the
objective element of a “need” which can be decided only
by taking all relevant circumstances into consideration so
that the protection afforded to a tenant is not rendered
illusory or whittled down. These observations were made
in respect of the provisions contained in E.P. Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949.”
40. In the present case, the observations of the learned ARC with
respect to the fact that in his cross-examination the Petitioner had
feigned ignorance with regard to the income of his son, as well as
other evasive answers, clearly points out that the ground taken in
the eviction petition was not genuine. The petitioner could not
explain the circumstances which were put to him during cross-
examination, and therefore, the bona fide requirement is doubtful.
Coupled with the fact that despite Property No. 435 being available
with the Petitioner, 4 months before filing of the eviction petition,
the Petitioner could not give any satisfactory Explanation as to why
the said shop was not utilised by his son Mr Jatinder Atri for
running his office. It has also come on record that the lease of the
said shop was to expire on 31-7-2016, and therefore, the same
would have been available to the Petitioner within 3 months of
filing of the eviction petition, but again, no reasonable Explanation
could be given by the Petitioner as to why the same was not
suitable for the Petitioner's son's office.
41. Similarly, with respect to Property No. 436, it was stated by the
Petitioner that the same had been let out in the year 2015 and was
vacated in or around October - November, 2016, and subsequently
the Petitioner regained possession of the said property. However,
the Respondent specifically averred that the Petitioner thereafter,
had re-let the said property to successive tenants, i.e. , M/s. Riyaz
Chicken Corner and subsequently to M/s. Akib Chicken Point. The
Petitioner, instead of disputing the said position, took an
inconsistent stand that tenancy qua the said property was in the
name of his son, who had further sub-let the same with his consent.
In absence of any documentary proof of such alleged tenancy,
coupled with the admission that no rent had been paid by his son
for several years, the said plea was rightly rejected by the learned
ARC. It was correctly concluded that despite availability of
alternate premises, the Petitioner permitted further sub-letting,
which undermined the plea of bona fide requirement.
42. With respect to Property No. 439, the Respondent asserted that
the said property had been let out to a tenant running a dry-
cleaning business under the name of “Wardrobe”. The Petitioner,
on the other hand, had claimed that the said property was leased
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BHATIA
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out to “Jyoti Fabricare Services Limited” vide lease agreement
dated 3-8-2015. However, the Petitioner failed to place on record
the original lease agreement before the learned ARC. Even
otherwise, the said property was let out by the Petitioner nine
months prior to the filing of the eviction petition, and there was no
averment as to when the alleged need for the subject premises
arose. In these circumstances, the learned ARC rightly observed
that letting out of the said property, shortly before filing of the
eviction petition, casted a serious doubt on the bona fide
requirement of the Petitioner.
43. With respect to Property No. 440, the Respondent had argued
that the same was sold by the Petitioner to Sh. Amit Kumar Sethi
and the vacant possession of the said property was handed over at
the time of execution of the sale deed. It was further contended that
despite the said property being available with the Petitioner, the
same was not utilised for his son, Mr Jatinder Atri's requirement. In
these circumstances, the time frame for the alleged need becomes
crucial. Per contra , it was argued by the Petitioner that he was
constrained to sell the said property for raising funds for
construction of Property No. 279-A. It is pertinent to note that no
evidence, either documentary or oral, was placed on record before
the learned ARC to demonstrate that any construction was carried
out by the Petitioner, after execution of the said sale deed. In these
circumstances, the learned ARC had rightly concluded that the
Petitioner had failed to lead any evidence in support of the said
contentions, thereby again casting serious doubts on the bona fide
requirement.
44. The finding of the learned ARC with respect to not specifying
the time period during which the need for a separate office arose,
has to be examined in the aforesaid background, particularly in
light of the premises being available to the Petitioner shortly before
the filing of the petition and thereafter.”


24. The Petitioner has further contended that the Respondent has
adopted contradictory stands regarding the location from which M/s
Ashish Electronics was being operated. While the Respondent asserted
that the business continued to operate from Sarai Julena, he had also
averred that the Petitioner shifted M/s Ashish Electronics to 21,
Ground Floor, Masihgarh, in the year 2007, and continued to operate
the same from there. According to the Petitioner, these assertions are
mutually inconsistent and undermine the Respondent‟s contention that
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BHATIA
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the business continued to operate from Sarai Julena till 2011. This
contention merits consideration, as the parties‟ pleadings along with
the material placed on record must be examined as a whole and not by
placing reliance upon isolated averments or documents.
25. As discussed hereinabove, the learned ARC assessed the
Petitioner‟s assertion of closure against the entire evidentiary record,
including the documentary material relied upon by the parties, the
absence of independent corroboration of the alleged closure and
shifting of the business, and the Petitioner‟s subsequent conduct in
relation to the subject property. Thus, upon a holistic consideration of
the competing submissions and the material on record, the
inconsistency pointed out by the Petitioner, though relevant to the
assessment of the Respondent‟s stand, does not by itself establish that
M/s Ashish Electronics had ceased to operate from Sarai Julena
pursuant to the DDA notice. This Court, therefore, finds no sufficient
ground to displace the conclusion reached by the learned ARC on the
basis of the cumulative circumstances emerging from the record or to
hold that the Impugned Order warrants interference on this count in
exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
26. Viewed in the totality of the circumstances as well as the
material placed on record, this Court finds no basis to conclude that
the learned ARC‟s finding suffers from perversity, material
misreading of evidence or any other infirmity warranting interference
in revisional jurisdiction. The Petitioner has not demonstrated that the
conclusion reached by the learned ARC rests upon an erroneous
premise or that any material evidence bearing upon the controversy
was disregarded. The challenge, in substance, seeks a reassessment of
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BHATIA
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the evidence without establishing any jurisdictional infirmity in the
Impugned Order. The same, therefore, does not warrant interference
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
CONCLUSION:
27. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in
the challenge laid by the Petitioner to the Impugned Order and the
present Revision Petition is dismissed accordingly.
28. The present Petition, along with pending application(s), if any,
stand disposed of in the above terms.


HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/ma
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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