Smt.Ram Rati And 2 Others vs State Of U.P.

AFR
Reserved on 09.03.2026
Delivered on 22.05.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 2275 of 2019
Smt.Ram Rati and 2 others
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Nand Lal Sharma, Dilip Kumar Singh,
Jyoti Rajpoot, K.k.sharma, Kaustubh
Singh, Manoj Kumar Yadav, Prem
Shankar, Rajendra Prasad, Rakesh Kumar
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Govt. Advocate,
Court No. - 9
HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.
HON'BLE INDRAJEET SHUKLA, J.
Per: Indrajeet Shukla, J.
For the sake of convenience, instant judgment is divided into following parts:
Index
Serial No. Heading Page Nos.
1 Introductory facts 2
2 Case of prosecution 2-6
3 Scope of criminal appeal (Being first appeal against
7-17
conviction)
4 Relevant statutory provisions and authoritative
18-29
pronouncements
5 Analysis of evidence 30-31
6 Contentions raised on behalf of appellants 32-34
7 Submissions on behalf of the State 34-49
8 Conclusion 49
9. Proportionality of sentence 49-55

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
Introductory Facts
1. Embittered with the impugned judgment and order of
conviction and sentence dated 05.08.2019 passed by the learned
Additional District & Sessions Judge/Special Sessions Judge
(Prevention of Corruption Act), Court No. 6, Lucknow, in Session
Trial No. 440 of 2013 (State Vs. Sunil Kumar & others), arising out
of Crime No. 119 of 2012, under Sections 498-A, 304-B of IPC
and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Mall,
District Lucknow, instant appeal has been preferred before this
Court.
2. Conviction and sentence awarded against the appellants
under different penal provisions are tabulated as under:
Section 304-B
IPC
Ramrati (mother in law)-
Punishment for life,
Sunil Kumar (husband)
Babulal (father in law) -20
years rigorous imprisonment
Section 498-A
IPC
03 years rigorous
imprisonment
Fine of Rs.2000/-
each, in default one
month’s additional
imprisonment
Section 4 D.P. Act 02 years rigorous
imprisonment
Fine of Rs.2000/-
each, in default one
month’s additional
imprisonment
All the sentences, were directed to run concurrently
Case of Prosecution
3. The prosecution story in nutshell as disclosed by first
informant Santosh Kumar is, his daughter Sujata was married to
one Sunil Kumar son of Babulal, native of village Kandhar Tala,
Police Station Mall, District Lucknow as per Hindu rites and rituals
about one and a half years prior to the occurrence. After the

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
customary farewell for the first time, his daughter went to her in-
laws house. When she came to her paternal home (maika) she told
her parents that her mother-in-law Ramrati, father-in-law Babulal
and her husband Sunil Kumar were asking for additional dowry in
the shape of motorcycle and a fan. Owing to his poor financial
condition, first informant could not fulfill the said demand. Due to
social pressure, first informant’s daughter was again sent to her
matrimonial home (sasural). A few days later, his daughter sent
word to her parents with respect to harassment and demand of
dowry. The first informant counselled her to stay at her in-laws
home. On 13.05.2012, at approximately 10:00 AM, first
informant’s brother-in-law (Shivdin), called him and informed that
his daughter had caught fire. Her in-laws were taking first
informant’s daughter to Civil Hospital, Lucknow. Upon receiving
the information, the first informant rushed to the Civil Hospital.
First informant’s daughter was admitted to the Civil Hospital for
treatment. After admission, the in-laws fled from the hospital. The
first informant and his family members were involved in treatment
of their daughter. Based on information received from the Medical
Superintendent, Civil Hospital, the Deputy District
Magistrate/SDM, Malihabad, recorded the statement of first
informant’s daughter (Sujata) in which, she said that on the
previous day, her husband had beaten her and on the next day, her
mother-in-law, father-in-law and husband poured kerosene oil upon
her and set her ablaze.
4. The aforesaid information given in the shape of written
complaint dated 20.05.2012 was translated into First Information
Report dated 22.05.2012.
5. The injured Sujata succumbed to her injuries on 04.06.2012
at the Civil Hospital and the Inquest proceedings of the deceased
were conducted on the next day i.e. on 05.06.2012. The inquest
report (exhibit Ka-2) and other related documents were prepared.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
The dead body of the deceased was sealed and sent for the post-
mortem examination.
6. The post-mortem examination on the person of deceased was
conducted on 05.06.2012 at 04.30 PM by PW-4 Dr. A.K. Srivastava
at Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow, exhibited as Ka-3. As per the
post mortem report, the following ante mortem injuries were
noticed/found on the person of deceased Sujata:-
(i) Antemortem Injury-superficial to deep septic burn
present on all over the body except antsolateral aspect of
R side abdomen, forehead, upper part of the face, top of
the head and both soles, pus, slough, debris dead skin
present in wounds. On opening and section cutting of
both lungs, liver, spleen and kidney multiple pus foci
seen.
7. The cause of death of the deceased as exhibited in the
postmortem report has been opined as ‘septicemia as a result of
ante-mortem burn injuries’.
8. The prosecution primarily relied upon the testimony of three
witnesses of fact viz PW-1 Santosh Kumar (father of deceased)
who is also the first informant, PW-2 Rakesh Kumar (uncle of
deceased), PW-3 Sushila (mother of deceased) and also relied upon
the dying declaration (exhibit Ka-12) which has been proved by
PW-9 Suryanarayan Yadav (Executive Magistrate/SDM).
9. The investigation of the case was initially conducted by
PW-7 Pradeep Kumar Maurya, who recorded the statements of
witnesses and thereafter, the further investigation was conducted by
PW-8 Rajesh Kumar Saxena, who has filed Charge-Sheet under
Sections 498-A, 304-B of IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act
against appellants-convicts vide exhibit Ka-6.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
10. Learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 498-A,
304-B of IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the
appellants and alternatively charge under Section 302 IPC was also
framed. The accused persons pleaded ‘not guilty’ and claimed trial.
11. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the
prosecution has examined following witnesses:
PW-1 Santosh Kumar (first informant
and father of the deceased)
PW-2 Rakesh Kumar (uncle of the
deceased)
PW-3 Sushila (mother of the deceased)
PW-4 Dr. A.K. Srivastava has conducted
post-mortem of the deceased
PW-5 Rajesh Kumar Shukla (Nayab
Tehsildar Mall Tehsil Malihabad-
in whose presence inquest
proceedings were conducted).
PW-6 Head Constable Rajdev who is the
scribe of chik FIR
PW-7 Pradeep Kumar Maurya, first
Investigating Officer
PW-8 Rajesh Kumar Saxena-
Investigating Officer, who
submitted the chargesheet.
PW-9 Suryanarayan Yadav, the then
SDM Malihabad, Lucknow
(Executive Magistrate, who
recorded dying declaration)

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
12. Apart from aforesaid witnesses, prosecution produced
following documentary evidences, which were exhibited and
proved by leading evidence as follows:
Exhibit Ka-1 Written report
Exhibit Ka-2 Inquest report
Exhibit Ka-3 Post mortem report no.1933/2012
Exhibit Ka-4 Police form-challan-dead body
Exhibit Ka-5 Photo of dead body
Exhibit Ka-6 Letter to C.M.O.
Exhibit Ka-7 Chik no.-98
Exhibit Ka-8 G.D. report no.33
Exhibit Ka-9 Site plan of the place of occurrence
Exhibit Ka-10 Arrest memo
Exhibit Ka-11 Chargesheet
Exhibit Ka-12 Statement of deceased/dying
declaration
13. After closure of prosecution evidence, the accused persons
were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein they outrightly
denied all the charges and incriminating evidence against them and
claimed themselves to be innocent. Dying Declaration exhibited as
Ka-12, was put as incriminating material against appellants at the
stage of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and upon the
confrontation of the same, they again discarded it stating it to be
incorrect. Appellants-convicts had filed a written statement wherein
they denied any demand of dowry harassment. They stated that the
deceased herself set to fire. They tried to extinguish the fire during
which Babulal sustained injuries on his hand. They further stated
that the FIR has been lodged against them only because they could
not fulfill illegal demand of first informant.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
Scope of Criminal Appeal (Being First Appeal against Conviction)
14. Before we thrash out the evidence adduced before trial
Court, we would like to recollect and remind ourselves of the
manner in which an appeal against conviction is required to be
heard by this Court, considering the scope of jurisdiction conferred
by Sections 374 and 386 Cr.P.C.
15. Further, we would like to refresh our memory by going
through the observations made by the Apex Court in the case
of Ishvarbhai Fuljibhai Patni v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supreme
Court Cases (Crl) 222]. Para-4 of the judgment reads as under:
……….On a plain requirement of justice, the High Court while
dealing with a first appeal against conviction and sentence is
expected to, howsoever briefly depending upon the facts of the case,
consider and discuss the evidence and deal with the submissions
raised at the bar. If it fails to do so, it apparently fails in the
discharge of one of its essential jurisdiction under its appellate
powers. In view of the infirmities pointed out by us, the judgment
under appeal cannot be sustained.”
16. It would also be beneficial to have a glance of judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for understanding the
scope and ambit of criminal appeal in the case of Lal Mandi, v.
State of West Bengal, [1995 CRI.L.J. 2659 (Supreme Court),
2659], the Apex Court in para-5 of the report has given the caution
to the High Court reminding its duty in the matter of hearing of
appeal against conviction. It would be gainful to reproduce the
observation made in para-5 of the report, extracted below:
“5. To say the least, the approach of the High Court is totally
fallacious. In an appeal against conviction, the Appellate Court has
the duty to itself appreciate the evidence on the record and if two
views are possible on the appraisal of the evidence, the benefit of
reasonable doubt has to be given to an accused. It is not correct to
suggest that the “Appellate Court cannot legally interfere with”
the order of conviction where the trial court has found the
evidence as reliable and that it cannot substitute the findings of the

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
Sessions Judge by its own, if it arrives at a different conclusion on
reassessment of the evidence. The observation made in Tota
Singh's case, which was an appeal against acquittal, have been
misunderstood and mechanically applied. Though, the powers of
an appellate court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal
and an appeal against conviction are equally wide but the
considerations which weigh with it while dealing with an appeal
against an order of acquittal and in an appeal against conviction
are distinct and separate. The presumption of innocence of
accused which gets strengthened on his acquittal is not available
on his conviction. An appellate court may give every reasonable
weight to the conclusions arrived at by the trial court but it must
be remembered that an appellate court is duty bound, in the same
way as the trial court, to test the evidence extrinsically as well as
intrinsically and to consider as thoroughly as the trial court, all the
circumstances available on the record so as to arrive at an
independent finding regarding guilt or innocence of the convict.
An Appellate Court fails in the discharge of one of its essential
duties, if it fails to itself appreciate the evidence on the record and
arrive at an independent finding based on the appraisal of such
evidence.”
17. The law mandates and casts a duty upon the appellate court
for reassessment of entire evidence, so as to arrive at an
independent finding regarding the guilt or innocence of a convict,
thus, the testimony of witnesses of facts is reappreciated as under:
(emphasis added)
18. PW-1 Santosh Kumar happens to be first informant and
father of deceased appeared in the witness box and deposed as
under:
“I, Santosh Kumar, aged about 40 years, occupation labourer, son
of Late Fakir, resident of Kushmaura, P.S. Kakori, Lucknow, do
hereby state on oath as follows: My daughter’s name was Sujata,
also known as Khushboo. I married her on 22.11.2010 to Sunil
Kumar, son of Babulal, resident of Kandhar Tala, P.S. Mall,
according to Hindu rites and customs. I gave dowry according to
my financial capacity. After about four days of marriage, my
daughter came to our house and told me, my wife, and my sons that
her husband Sunil Kumar, father-in-law Babulal, and mother-in-
law Ramrati were demanding a motorcycle and a fan as additional
dowry. Thereafter, whenever she visited our house on different
occasions such as Holi, Raksha Bandhan, and other family
functions, she repeatedly informed us that her husband and in-laws
were beating, abusing, and harassing her for not fulfilling the
demand of a motorcycle and fan. On 18.04.2012, my daughter and
her husband came to our house. On that night, my son-in-law again

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
demanded a motorcycle and a fan from me and my wife. We told
him that we had not yet repaid the loan taken for the marriage and
were not in a position to fulfil the demand at that time. Thereafter,
he forcibly took my daughter back with him. Later, my daughter
sent information that her husband and in-laws were beating and
torturing her. On 05.05.2012, I went to her matrimonial home and
tried to counsel her husband and in-laws. On 13.05.2012, my
brother-in-law Shivdin informed me that my daughter had been
burnt and taken to the Civil Hospital. I immediately went there
with my family and found her admitted in the hospital. Her in-laws
had fled from the hospital. When we asked her, she told us that one
day earlier her husband had beaten her, and on the next day her
husband Sunil Kumar, mother-in-law Ramrati, and father-in-law
Babulal poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. I got a report
lodged through the village Pradhan on 20.05.2012. Later, the police
also came to the hospital and recorded statements. My daughter
succumbed to her burn injuries on 04.06.2012 at the Civil Hospital.
The inquest proceedings were conducted there, and the post-
mortem was conducted on 05.06.2012 at the Medical College. I
performed her last rites. No one from her in-laws’ side attended.
The written report shown to me was dictated by me to the Pradhan
and bears my signature after being read over to me. This statement
is true and correct.”
19. The testimony of PW-1 was subjected to lengthy cross
examination and in his cross examination he stated as under:
“I have studied up to Class VIII. I can write Hindi and have limited
knowledge of English. I work as a labourer and have no other
source of income. I have two sons and one daughter, Sujata alias
Khushboo, who is now deceased. I married my daughter to Sunil
Kumar, son of Babu Lal, resident of Village Kandhartala, Police
Station Mal, Lucknow. Before the marriage, I visited the house of
Sunil Kumar and Babu Lal and found their family to be of similar
financial status to mine. Accordingly, the marriage was arranged.
All marriage ceremonies were completed peacefully and there was
no dispute at the time of marriage or farewell. After marriage, my
daughter went to her matrimonial home and stayed there for four
days. Thereafter, she came to my house and stayed for about fifteen
days. Later, her father-in-law Babu Lal came to take her back to her
matrimonial home. At the time of marriage, Sunil Kumar and Babu
Lal both worked as labourers. Sunil used to work in Lucknow and
sometimes lived there with my daughter. Initially, Sunil Kumar and
my daughter lived normally, though occasional quarrels took
place.”

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
20. The second witness of fact adduced by prosecution is Rakesh
Kumar examined as PW-2 who stated in his examination in chief
that:
“My name is Rakesh Kumar, son of Late Fakire, resident of Village
Kusmaur, Police Station Kakori, District Lucknow. The deceased
Sujata was my niece. She was married to Sunil Kumar, son of Babu
Lal, resident of Kandhar Kala, Police Station Mal. For a few days
after the marriage, everything was normal. Thereafter, her husband
Sunil Kumar, mother-in-law, and father-in-law started harassing her
for dowry. Whenever Sujata came to her parental home, she
informed us that they were demanding dowry and troubling her. We
used to console her and send her back. On 13.05.2012, Sujata
sustained burn injuries and was admitted to the Civil Hospital. We
received information through Shivdin and immediately reached the
hospital. Her in-laws were present there initially but fled shortly
thereafter. On 04.06.2012, Sujata died at the Civil Hospital. The
inquest proceedings (Panchayatnama) were conducted in my
presence, and the document bears my signature. I identify and
confirm the same.”
21. PW-2 was cross examined by the defence which reads as
under:
“Rakesh Kumar, son of Fakire, aged about 40 years, resident of
Village Kushmaura, Police Station Kakori, District Lucknow,
stated on oath as follows: The deceased Sujata was my niece. After
the incident, I first saw Sujata at the Civil Hospital. My brother
Santosh Kumar and my sister-in-law were already present there.
Sujata was lying on a hospital bed and was conscious at that time.
The information regarding the incident of burning was given to us
over mobile phone by Shivdin. I spoke with Sunil Kumar during
Sujata’s treatment. A Magistrate also came to the hospital on the
day of her admission. Sujata told me that her husband was
demanding a car. No complaint had been filed by us earlier
regarding this demand. I was not present at the time of lodging of
the FIR. There was no dispute between Sunil Kumar and Sujata for
about six months after the marriage. Thereafter, I came to know
that disputes had arisen between them. Sujata had informed me
over the phone that Sunil Kumar had assaulted her. It is incorrect to
say that Sujata consumed kerosene or committed suicide. It is also
incorrect to say that this case was falsely lodged due to any
conspiracy or that I am deposing for money.”

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
22. Third witness of fact adduced by prosecution is mother of
deceased namely Sushila examined as PW-3 who stated before trial
Court:
“Sushila Devi, wife of Santosh Kumar, aged about 35 years,
resident of Village Kusmaura, Police Station Kakori, Lucknow,
stated on oath as follows: My deceased daughter’s name was
Sujata. About five years ago, I married her to Sunil Kumar, son of
Babulal, according to Hindu rites and customs. Dowry was given
according to our financial capacity. After the marriage, Sujata went
to her matrimonial home. Thereafter, when she returned to our
house, she told me that her husband Sunil Kumar, mother-in-law
Ramrati, and father-in-law Babulal were demanding a motorcycle
and a fan as dowry. She further told me that they used to abuse,
harass, and torture her for the said demand. Whenever Sujata came
to her parental home, she repeated the same complaints regarding
cruelty and dowry demand. About 10–15 days later, her father-in-
law Babulal came to take her back. I told him about Sujata’s
complaints and informed him that we were not financially capable
of giving a motorcycle and fan. Thereafter, after persuasion, Sujata
was sent back with him. Later, in the month of Jyeshtha, at about
11:00 a.m., my brother-in-law informed me over phone that Sujata
had been burnt. This incident took place about one and a half years
after her marriage. My husband and I immediately proceeded there.
On the way, we found that her in-laws were taking Sujata to the
hospital. After getting her admitted, they fled. When I met my
daughter in the hospital, she was in a serious condition.”
23. The defence did not prefer to cross examine PW-3 despite
opportunity was afforded, thus her statement in chief is to be read
and is admissible as such.
24. In order to ascertain whether the deceased died otherwise
than under normal circumstances, the consideration of testimony of
PW-4 Dr. A.K. Srivastava who conducted the postmortem
examination is expedient, who stated that after the post-mortem
examination of the deceased Sujata Devi, by him, the police papers
and post-mortem report were handed over to Police Constable
Ramakant Pathak, Police Station Hazratganj, Lucknow. The
postmortem report number of the deceased Sujata Devi is 1933/12.
The deceased was approximately 20 years old. The deceased died

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
on 4/6/2012 at 8:30 pm at Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee Hospital.
This is established by Exhibit Ka-3.
External Examination-
25. The body of the deceased was of normal nature, rigor mortis
was present all over the body. It was difficult to ascertain the
staining after death due to burns. The deceased was identified by
CP 1710 Ramakant of Hazratganj police station. The eyes of the
deceased were closed and the mouth was half open in the natural
opening of the body. The rest was normal. The body had burn
injuries. The wounds on the body were noted.
Internal Examination
26. The scalp, skull, head, neck, and breasts were normal. Body
membranes including the brain coverings, pleura, pericardium, and
abdominal cavity were congested. The base of skull, spine, and
meninges were not opened. The esophagus and stomach were
normal. The left side of the heart was empty and the right side
contained blood. The teeth, tongue, and throat were intact. The
Antemortem injuries included the deceased had approximately
90% burn injuries over the body. Areas spared from burns were the
right lower anterior abdomen, forehead, crown of the head, and
soles of both feet. Burn wounds showed peeling skin, sloughing
tissue, pus formation, and septic changes extending deep into the
skin. On internal dissection, the lungs, liver, spleen, and kidneys
were congested, and pus was found at several places indicating
infection. The stomach contained about 90 ml fluid. The small
intestine contained digested food and gas, and the large intestine
contained fecal matter and gas. The urinary bladder was empty. The
uterus was empty and genital organs were normal.In my opinion,
the cause of death was septicemia resulting from ante-mortem burn
injuries. Despite the burn injuries, the deceased could have
remained capable of speech before death. If the deceased had
sustained kicks, fists, or stick blows, separate external injuries may

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
not be visible due to the extensive 90% burn area. The post-mortem
report of deceased Sujata Devi was prepared by me on 05.06.2012,
jointly with Dr. Raghubir Srivastava, and bears our signatures.
27. PW-5 Rajesh Kumar Shukla, Naib Tehsildar Mal Tehsil,
Malihabad, Lucknow was examined by the prosecution who
proved inquest proceedings and after detailed cross examination
nothing could elicit, which could doubt the veracity/genuineness of
inquest proceedings. The said witness had stated before trial Court
that Panchs were appointed and their opinion were taken, who
stated that the deceased died due to burn injuries. Therefore, he
concurred with the opinion of the inquest witnesses. For
determination of real cause of death, the inquest witnesses
including PW-5 were in favour of post mortem and for that purpose
the body was sent. With respect to inquest proceedings, the said
witness has stated that he and other witnesses signed the inquest
report and they also signed police form, challan, photo of dead
body, letter written to CMO. The said witness admitted his
signatures on all forms/papers. Defence has not questioned either
veracity of inquest proceedings or any police papers which were
formally proved.
28. PW-6, Head Constable Rajdev, was examined by the
prosecution. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that on
22.5.2012, he was posted as a Constable Clerk at the Police Station
Mall, Lucknow. On that date, based on the complaint filed by the
first informant-Santosh Kumar, the FIR registered vide Case Crime
No. 119/2012 under Sections 498-A, 323, 307 of the Indian Penal
Code, and sections 3/4 of the DP Act. As per his statement, he
acknowledged and authenticated his signature on the FIR. He
acknowledged the GD entry no.33 pertaining to the registration of
FIR.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
29. The defence cross examined the PW-6 but nothing material
could come out impeaching the veracity of police papers.
30. On behalf of the prosecution, PW-7 Pradeep Kumar Maurya,
the first Investigating Officer, was examined. The said witness after
statement in his examination in chief, he stated that he has recorded
the statement of the then injured Sujata (who later succumbed to
her injuries), first informant and other witnesses. He also proved
the preparation of site plan and other police papers. In detailed
cross examination, nothing could come out which may discredit the
prosecution case.
31. PW-8 Rajesh Kumar Saxena, Investigating Officer, was
examined on behalf of the prosecution. He stated in his
examination-in-chief that on 14.7.2012, he was posted as Circle
Officer, Malihabad. On that day, he received the investigation
report of FIR No. 119/2012, under sections 498A, 304B of the
Indian Penal Code, and sections 3/4 of the DP Act, at Malihabad
police station. He proved the filing of charge sheet and the police
papers filed therein. The said witness also faced lengthy cross
examination but the defence utterly failed to impeach the
authenticity police papers. Even before this Court nothing could be
pointed out by appellant which may discredit the authenticity of
police paper filed along with charge sheet.
32. On behalf of the prosecution, PW-9 Suryanarayan Yadav,
Secretary, State Backward Classes Commission, Lucknow, was
examined. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that on
13/05/2012, he was working as SDM, Malihabad, Lucknow. On
that day, information was received from the Civil Hospital,
Lucknow, through the police station, that Mrs. Sujata, wife of Sunil
Kumar, was admitted to the hospital with serious burn injuries and
her statement needed to be recorded. Following this information,

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
he went to the Civil Hospital, Lucknow, and recorded the victim’s
statement. As per testimony of said witness, the statement of victim
was recorded in verbatim in her own words. His testimony further
states that the victim stated that she had quarrelled with her mother-
in-law and father-in-law, verbally abusing her, and that when her
husband returned home, he also assaulted her and attempted to
drive her out of the house. She also stated that my mother-in-law,
Ramrati, poured kerosene upon her and set her ablaze, and they
were demanding dowry. The victim had given this statement
without any pressure. Upon looking at paper number A-7/4 in the
file, the witness stated, I recorded the victim’s statement myself. It
is in my own handwriting and bears my signature. Thus, he proved
the Exhibit Ka-12 available as dying declaration.
33. The main thrust of prosecution to bring home the guilt of
accused, is upon the dying declaration recorded by PW-9
Suryanarayan Yadav (Executive Magistrate/the then SDM,
Malihabad). The said dying declaration has been exhibited as
Exhibit Ka-12, which contains due certification by the Doctor
Manoj Chaurasia, Emergency Medical Officer, Dr. S.P.M. (Civil
Hospital, Lucknow).
34. The exhibit Ka-12 dying declaration of Smt. Sujata is
extracted as under:
-12
प्रदर्शक
Sujata 20/F W/o Sunil Kumar is Fully conscious & oriented to time
place & person
Sd/-Dr. Manoj Chaurasiya
4.00 PM
13.5.12
W/o
श्रीमती सुजाता सुनीलकुमारनिवासीग्रामकन्धारतालाथानामाताजनपद

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
20
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वेभीमारेपीटेतथाघरसेनिकलनेलगे।मुझेमेरीसासुरामरतीनेमुझेमिट्टीकातेल

डालकरजलायाहैयेलोगदहेजमेगाड़ीमांगरहेथेतथाआयेदिनपैसेकीमांग

करतेरहतेथे।बयानमैंसत्यसत्यबिनाकिसीजोरदबावकेदेरहीहूँ।

बयानमेरेद्वारालिखाया।
Sd/-Illegible
13.5.12
ह०अपठनीय
. . .
एस डी एम
मलिहाबाद
Pt. was conscious & oriented during her dying declaration
Sd/-Illegible
ManojChaurasiya
13.5.12
EMO Dr. S.P.M. (Civil) Hospital, Lko.
35. In the present case, the defence adduced as many as three
witnesses, namely Mrs. Rooprani as DW-1, Mr. Rajendra Kumar as
DW-2 and Mrs. Kalawati as DW-3.
36 . DW-1, Mrs. Rooprani, stated that shortly before the incident,
Sunil had come to her shop. Thereafter, a child informed her that
Sunil’s wife had set herself on fire. She rushed with Sunil to his
house and saw Babulal and Ramrati trying to save Sujata. Sunil
covered her with a blanket, while Babulal used a quilt to extinguish
the flames, during which Babulal sustained burn injuries on his
hands. She further stated that when Sujata was asked as to why she
had done so, Sujata replied that she had set herself on fire and that
neither her husband nor her in-laws were at fault. She also stated
that Sunil, Babulal, Ramrati and other villagers took Sujata to the

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
hospital. According to her, she had never heard of any quarrel or
demand of dowry by Sunil, Ramrati or Babulal.
37. The defence examined DW-2, Rajendra Kumar, stated that
Sunil was sitting at a grocery shop when a boy came and informed
him that his wife had set herself on fire. Thereupon, he
accompanied Sunil to the house, where they found Sujata in flames
and all present persons attempted to extinguish the fire. He stated
that Babulal sustained burns on his hand while saving her.
Thereafter, Sujata was taken in a cart to Civil Hospital, Hazratganj,
by Sunil along with his parents. He further deposed that Sujata was
saying that she had set herself on fire and that none of them were at
fault.
38. The defence examined the third witness, DW-3, Mrs.
Kalawati, stated that Sunil and Sujata had been married about one
and a half years prior to the incident. According to her, Sunil used
to reside and work in Lucknow and kept Sujata with him there. She
stated that she had never heard of any dowry demand or quarrel
between them. She further deposed that Sujata told her that she had
set herself on fire and that no one else was responsible.
39. The undisputed factual position which emerges is, the
unfortunate occurrence of ablaze took place on 13.05.2012, and the
injured Sujata was hospitalized and on the same day, her dying
declaration was recorded by Executive Magistrate/PW-9. The
injured succumbed to her injuries on 04.06.2012 in the Hospital i.e.
after about 22 days. The postmortem examination was conducted
on 05.06.2012, in the meantime, FIR was registered on 22.05.2012
on the written report submitted by the first informant on
20.05.2012. The Investigating Officer filed charge sheet on
25.08.2012 under Sections 498-A, 304-B of IPC and Section 3/4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act. The case was committed to the Court of
Session on 27.05.2013 and thereafter, the charges were framed on
31.07.2013.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
Relevant Statutory Provisions and Authoritative Pronouncements
40. The dowry death is grave social menace, Hon’ble Supreme
Court in introductory part of the judgment in the case of Rajinder
Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 2015 SC 1359, has
referred what made the parliament to amend the penal provisions to
tackle the dowry death. Relevant introductory paragraphs reads as
under:
“1. The facts of this case raises questions relating to one of
the two great social evils practiced against the women of this
country for centuries. In the facts presented before us, a young
woman consumes pesticide having been driven to do so by
repeated demands being made on her for money by the family
into which she is supposed to merge her identity. Sati and
dowry deaths have plagued this nation for centuries. Sati – the
practice of sending a widow to her husband’s funeral pyre to
burn in it -was first outlawed under British Rule in 1829 and
1830 under the Governor Generalship of Lord William Bentinck
in the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Presidencies. General
SirCharles Napier, the Commander-in-Chief of the British
Forcesin India between 1859 and 1861, is supposed to have said
tothe Hindu Priests who complained to him about the prohibition
of Sati that “the burning of widows is your custom but in
mycountry, when a man burns a woman alive, we hang them
andconfiscate all their property. Let us both, therefore, act in
accordance with our national customs.
(emphasis supplied by us)
2. It took free India many years before the Commission of Sati
(Prevention) Act, 1987 was passed by Parliament setting down
various offences relating to the commission of Sati and the trial
of such offences by special courts. In this appeal, however, we
are confronted with the other major problem, namely, dowry
deaths. Parliament responded much earlier so far as the
prohibition of dowry is concerned by enacting the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 under which minimum sentences were
prescribed as penalty for the giving or taking of dowry.
The specific menace of dowry deaths, however, was tackled by
the introduction of a new provision in 1986 - Section 304B in he
Penal Code together with another new provision Section 113B of
the Evidence Act.”
41. Before we test the evidence led by rival parties, it would be
apposite to have brief glimpse of certain provision of substantive as
well as procedural law, which would necessarily lead us to reach an
appropriate conclusion.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
42. In order to curb and tackle the social menace of dowry death,
the legislature in its collective wisdom introduced a new provision
under viz 304 B IPC and 113-B of Indian Evidence Act. These two
provisions read as follows:
“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is
caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than
under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage
and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such
death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative
shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall
have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years
but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”
“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is
whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and
it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been
subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume
that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “dowry death”
shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860).”
43. The primary ingredient to attract the offence under Section
304-B is that the death of a woman must amount to a “dowry
death”. “Dowry” has been defined under Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961, which reads as follows:
“2. Definition of “dowry”.—In this Act, “dowry” means any
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly—
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage;
or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other
person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at
or before [or any time after the marriage] [in connection with the
marriage of the said parties, but does not include] dower or mahr
in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat) applies.
Explanation I.— [*]

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
Explanation II.—The expression “valuable security” has the
same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860).”
44. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that the definition
can be broken into six distinct parts.
1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable security- the
word “any” is a word of width and would, therefore, include within it
property and valuable security of any kind whatsoever.
2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to be given.
The actual giving of such property or security is, therefore, not
necessary.
3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly.
4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party
to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by
any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person.
It will be noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the Act
insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving
dowry is concerned.
5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at,
before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can be many years
after a marriage is solemnised.
6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of
the parties. Obviously, the expression “in connection with” would in
the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry
Prohibition Act mean “in relation with” or “relating to”.
45. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B have
been elaborately stated and restated in many judgments of Hon’ble
Supreme Court. There are four such ingredients and they are said to
be:
(a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily
injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal
circumstances;
(b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage;
(c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and
(d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand
for dowry.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
46. In order to arrive at the true construction of the definition
of dowry and consequently the ingredients of the offence under
Section 304-B, we first need to determine how a statute of this
kind needs to be interpreted. It is obvious that Section 304B is a
stringent provision, enacted to combat a social evil of alarming
proportions.
47. One of the essential ingredients for constitution of an offence
under Section 304-B IPC is that soon before her death the victim
must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or any relative of her husband. This phrase ‘soon before her death’
remained a matter of debate before by jurist but has been
considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Surinder
Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 129 had this
to say:
“17. Thus, the words “soon before” appear in Section 113-B of
the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304-B IPC. For the
presumptions contemplated under these sections to spring into
action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or harassment was
caused soon before the death. The interpretation of the words
“soon before” is, therefore, important. The question is how “soon
before”? This would obviously depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The cruelty or harassment differs
from case to case. It relates to the mindset of people which varies
from person to person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be
physical. Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It can be
verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a
woman. It can be giving threats of injury to her or her near and
dear ones. It can be depriving her of economic resources or
essential amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on her
movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the outside
world. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Physical cruelty
could be actual beating or causing pain and harm to the person of
a woman. Every such instance of cruelty and related harassment
has a different impact on the mind of a woman. Some instances
may be so grave as to have a lasting impact on a woman. Some
instances which degrade her dignity may remain etched in her
memory for a long time. Therefore, “soon before” is a relative
term. In matters of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. The
time-lag may differ from case to case. This must be kept in mind
while examining each case of dowry death.
18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of this Court
in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207: 2000 SCC
(Cri) 935] where this Court considered the term “soon before”.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
The relevant observations are as under: (SCC pp. 222-23, para
15)
“15. … ‘Soon before’ is a relative term which is required
to be considered under specific circumstances of each
case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by
fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the
idea of proximity test. The term ‘soon before’ is not
synonymous with the term ‘immediately before’ and is
opposite of the expression ‘soon after’ as used and
understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence
Act. These words would imply that the interval should not
be too long between the time of making the statement and
the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as
earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under
the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to
dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of
cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to
a Page 22 particular instance but normally refer to a course
of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of
time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is
shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be ‘soon
before death’ if any other intervening circumstance
showing the non-existence of such treatment is not
brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the
date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time
can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link
between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and
the consequential death is required to be proved by the
prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment
based upon such demand and the date of death should not
be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be
treated as having become stale enough.”
Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry,
cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and the date of
death. The test of proximity will have to be applied. But, it is not
a rigid test. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court
within the confines of law.”
48. In another judgment in the case of Sher Singh v. State of
Haryana, 2015 (1) SCALE 250, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
as under:
“We are aware that the word ‘soon’ finds place in Section 304B;
but we would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or
months or years, but as necessarily indicating that the demand for
dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should
be the continuing cause for the death under Section 304B or the
suicide under Section 306 of the IPC. Once the presence of these
concomitants are established or shown or proved by the
prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility, the initial
presumption of innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt
of the accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of proof

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
upon him and requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his
guilt, beyond reasonable doubt.” (at page 262).
49. We respectfully endorse what has been laid down in the
aforesaid decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen.
What is required to be borne in mind is that the word “soon” does
not mean “immediate” before. A fair and pragmatic construction,
keeping in mind the grave social evil that has led to the enactment
of Section 304-B IPC would make it clear that the expression is a
relative in nature. Time lag may differ from case to case. What is
necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale, but
should be the continuing cause linked with the death of the married
woman under Section 304-B IPC.
50. At this stage, it is important to notice the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh v. State of Haryana,
2014 (5) SCALE 641 in which the law was stated thus:
“The expression “soon before” is a relative term as held by this
Court, which is required to be considered under the specific
circumstances of each case and no straight jacket formula can be
laid down by fixing any time of allotment. It can be said that the
term “soon before” is synonyms with the term “immediately
before”. The determination of the period which can come within
term “soon before” is left to be determined by courts depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” (at page 646)
51. Thus, position of law which emerges from a plain reading of
judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court is that the expression “soon
before” is not synonymous with “immediately before”. This Court
is conscious that the use of the word “soon” in Section 304-B I.P.C.
ought not to be interpreted in terms of rigid periods such as days,
months or years, but as necessarily should indicate that the demand
of dowry should not be stale, but rather should be a continuing
cause for the death. Once the presence of these concomitants is
established or shown or proved by the prosecution even to their
foundational effect by preponderance of possibility, the initial
presumption of innocence is faded and replaced by an assumption

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
of guilt by the deeming provision of law, thereby shifting the
burden of proof upon the accused to dislodge his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt as per Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.
52. The learned trial court has also convicted the appellants
under Section 498-A IPC, thus, before testing the veracity of
evidence led before the learned trial Court, it would be germane to
examine the ingredients referable to Section 498-A IPC, which
deals with cruelty. The said provision reads as under:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting
her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "cruelty” means
—
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a
view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on
account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such
demand.”
53 . The ingredients of an offence to be made out under Section
498-A of IPC require that there must be cruelty inflicted upon the
woman which either drives her to commit suicide or causes grave
injury to herself or lead to such conduct that would cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical). The second part of this provision refers to harassment
with a view to satisfy an unlawful demand for property or valuable
security raised by the husband or his relatives.
54. The prosecution has heavily relied upon dying declaration
for “bringing home the guilt of accused”, thus, it is apt to extract
Section 32(1) of Indian Evidence Act as under:

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
“(1) When it relates to cause of death. -- When the statement is
made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in
cases in which the cause of that persons death comes into
question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who
made them was or was not, at the time when they were made,
under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the
proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.”
55. The ‘Dying Declaration’ Exhibited as Ka-12, has heavily
been relied upon in the instant case, thus, this Court would like to
be enlightened from certain authoritative pronouncements of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court governing the field of appreciation of
dying declaration as an evidence.
56. We have had privilege of combing through various
authorities on the subject i.e. ‘Dying Declaration’ since pre
independence era (time of privy council whose decision guided
Indian Law pre 1950) and post independence era (after
enforcement of constitution and the law declared by the Hon’ble
Apex Court) such as Queen Empress v. Abdullah (1885 ILR 7 All
385), Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor (1939 PC 47), Dalip
Singh & Others v. State of Punjab (AIR 1953 SC 364), Kushal Rao
v. State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 22), K. Ramachandra Reddy &
Another v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1976 SC 1994), Munnu
Raja & Another v. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104 (AIR 1976 SC
2199), Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (AIR
1984 SC 1622), Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474
(AIR 1992 SC 1817), Kamla v. State of Punjab (AIR 1993 SC
374), Paparambaka Rosamma & Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh
(1999) 7 SCC 695, Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC
710 (AIR 2002 SC 2973), Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi
(2010) 9 SCC 1, Bhajju alias Karan Singh v. State of M.P. ((2012)
4 SCC 327), Jayamma & Another v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2021
SC 2399), Irfan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023 SCC OnLine SC
1060), Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024 SCC OnLine SC

26
CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
237), Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav Vs. Stateo f U.P. and others,
2025 SCC Online SC 2639, State of Himanchal Pradesh Vs.
Chaman Lal, 2026 SCC Online SC 85.
57. Thus, we are taking it an opportunity to comprehensively sum
up the law on dying declarations taking into account aforesaid
authoritative pronouncement as under:
(i) ‘Dying Declaration’ having passed the muster of law are
admissible by virtue of legal sanctity envisaged u/s 32 (1)
Indian Evidence Act, such declarations being exception to
the hearsay rule carry immense weight in criminal trials.
Over the decades, the Supreme Court of India has shaped the
law on dying declarations, clarifying their admissibility, the
need or absence of corroboration, and the safeguards
required to ensure reliability. 
(ii) The root of ‘Dying Declaration’ lies in the latin maxim
“nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” (no one at the point
of death is presumed to lie). Sanctity of a dying declaration
comes from the grave position of the declarant.
Essentially, unless there is some concrete reason to suspect
the dying declaration, the court can safely rely on it alone.
The declaration must be scrutinized to ensure it was not the
result of tutoring, prompting or imagination, and that the
victim had a clear opportunity to identify the perpetrator and
was in a fit condition to speak. If a dying declaration
appears suspicious or suffers from any infirmity, the court
should look for corroboration and not rely on it exclusively.
For example, if evidence suggests the deceased was
unconscious or physically incapable of making the
statement, that declaration must be discarded.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
(iii) There cannot be an absolute rule of law that the dying
declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it
is corroborated. The requirement of corroboration is merely
a rule of prudence, not a mandatory legal rule. Insisting on
corroboration in every case would defeat the very purpose of
the statutory exception, further, lack of detail in the dying
declaration is not a reason to discard it.
(iv) If a dying declaration has been recorded in a proper
manner by a competent authority and the court is satisfied of
its truthfulness, it is a “substantive piece of
evidence” sufficient to sustain a conviction on its own and
cannot be regarded as a weak piece of evidence.
(v) The dying declaration must pass the test of it being
voluntary, coherent, and made with the declarant’s faculties
intact. A dying declaration should be accepted if it inspires
confidence after examining all the surrounding
circumstances (who recorded it, when and how it was
recorded, and the condition of the victim).
(vi) The omissions of detail do not invalidate a dying
declaration, a statement cannot be rejected merely because it
is brief or lacks particulars. In fact, brevity by itself is not a
ground to doubt a statement; sometimes “the shortness of the
statement itself guarantees truth”.
(vii) The requirement of medical fitness/certificate is pitted
against eye witness testimony, the consistent law is, if an
eyewitness testifies that the deceased was in a fit and
conscious state to make a declaration, that can override a
doctor’s contrary opinion. The logic is that a person present

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
at the scene may better observe the victim’s condition in real
time than a belated medical inference.
(viii) In case of multiple dying declaration i.e. more than one
dying declaration with material inconsistencies, those
declarations cannot be accepted at face value without
corroborative support. Specifically, if the declarations differ
on essential facts or implicate different individuals, the court
must examine them in light of other evidence. Further the
declarations should corroborate each other; if they do not,
they must at least be consistent with the overall
circumstantial and medical evidence of the case. In
essence, where multiple dying declarations conflict, the
benefit of doubt generally goes to the accused unless one of
the versions is clearly proven true by independent evidence.
This principle ensures that the prosecution cannot cherry-
pick one dying statement out of several contradictory ones to
secure a conviction without addressing the discrepancies.
(ix) The absence of a doctor’s certificate is not by itself a
ground to discard a dying declaration if the circumstances
otherwise indicate the victim was fit. The guiding principles
emerges from Constitution Bench judgement rendered by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxman (supra) which
overruled the earlier dictum of Hon’ble Supreme Court
rendered in the case of Paparambaka Rosamma (supra).
Thus, merely not having a doctor’s signature or certificate at
the foot of the statement will not render it inadmissible or
untrustworthy.
(x) The impact of judgment rendered by five judges bench of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxman (supra) on
Indian jurisprudence was to settle the law on recording

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
procedure for dying declarations. It resolved the confusion
by clarifying that a doctor’s certification of mental fitness is
though ideal but is not a sine qua non for the acceptance of a
dying declaration. What matters is that the person who
recorded the statement or others present can verify the
victim’s consciousness and clarity.
(xi) The law does not require the declarant to be under the
“shadow of death” or expect imminent death at the time of
making the statement. A statement is a valid dying
declaration as long as it relates to the cause of death or
circumstances leading to it regardless of whether a
substantial period passed between the statement and the
death.
(xii) There is no rule barring police from recording of dying
declaration, however, note of caution must be observed while
relying such declarations but they are not outright
inadmissible.
58. Heard Ms. Jyoti Rajpoot, learned counsel for the appellants
and Sri Bipul Kumar Singh, learned State Law Officer representing
State.
Analysis of Evidence
59. The statement of PW-1, Santosh Kumar (father of the
deceased Sujata), reflects that he stated in his examination-in-chief
he stated that "I got Sujata married on 22.11.2010 to Sunil Kumar,
son of Babu Lal, as per Hindu customs." His testimony is
consistent with the First Information Report (Exhibit KA-1). On
13.5.2012, he received a call from his brother-in-law informing
him that his daughter had suffered burn injuries and that her in-
laws were taking her to Civil Hospital, Lucknow. After her
admission, the appellants fled the hospital, and it was PW-1 who
stayed throughout her treatment. The deceased was subjected to a

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
post-mortem examination, which recorded that "The deceased was
about 20 years of age. She died on 04.06.2012 at 8.30 p.m. in Dr.
Shyama Prasad Hospital." The death occurred within two years of
marriage otherwise then under normal circumstances. PW-1
Santosh Kumar made it unequivocal that his daughter had told him
that her husband Sunil Kumar used to beat her and that her mother-
in-law and father-in-law abused her with respect to the demand for
a motorcycle and a fan.
60. The testimony of PW-1 further states that his daughter was
subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of her in-laws. He then went
to his daughter in-laws' house on 5.5.2012, where, he counselled
his daughter Sujata's husband Sunil, and her mother-in-law and
father-in-law, and advised Sujata to stay at her in-laws' house. He
then returned home. On 13.5.2012, his brother-in-law Shivdin
called and informed him that his daughter had caught fire and was
being taken to the Civil Hospital, he stated that the deceased had
stated that the three accused poured kerosene on her and set her on
fire. Upon receiving this information, he arrived at the Civil
Hospital with family and friends at 2:30 p.m. When he arrived at
the hospital, he met the appellants at the hospital gate, after which
they fled. The cross-examination further records that the deceased
was lying on a stretcher at the hospital gate and that no treatment
had been administered until he reached the hospital.
61. PW-2, Rakesh Kumar, stated before the trial court that "The
deceased Sujata is my niece. Whenever Sujata returned home from
her in-laws' house, she used to complain that the in-laws were
demanding a motorcycle as dowry. They consoled Sujata and send
her back, saying that everything would be fine after a few days. On
13.5.2012, all three accused together burnt Sujata." This witness is
essentially a witness to the Panchnama, which has also been proved
as Exhibit KA-2.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
62. PW-3, Sushila, mother of the deceased Sujata, stated before
the trial court that "My daughter's name is Sujata. When I met my
daughter Sujata, she told me that her mother-in-law Ramrati,
father-in-law Babulal, and husband Sunil were demanding a
motorcycle as dowry. I counselled my daughter. My daughter also
told me that her husband, father-in-law, and mother-in-law abused
and harassed her with respect to the demand for a motorcycle and a
fan. Whenever my daughter visited us she would tell us about the
beatings and torture. Due to this very demand, my daughter's
mother-in-law and father-in-law doused her with kerosene and set
her on fire with the intention of killing her."
The defence did not cross-examine PW-3 Sushila, mother of the
deceased Sujata on material particulars.
63. A close scrutiny of statements of all the witnesses of fact
reveals that nothing material has been elicited in their cross
examinationthat may impeach the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses' statements. At the very least, the statements of the
witnesses of fact are of corroborative value when read conjointly
with the dying declaration exhibited as KA-12.
64. The post-mortem report was proved by PW-4, Dr. A.K.
Srivastava, as Exhibit KA-3, who stated that "In my opinion, the
cause of death was septicemia due to ante-mortem burn injuries.
The extent of burn injuries in the post-mortem examination was
approximately 90% burns." Despite lengthy cross-examination, his
testimony cannot be impeached. He further affirmed the fitness
certification appended to the dying declaration.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
Contentions Raised on Behalf of Appellants
65. Learned counsel for the appellants assailed the finding of
conviction returned by learned trial court raising following
grounds:
66. The first and foremost submission advanced by learned
counsel for appellants is that the FIR which is the foundation of
prosecution case has been lodged at a belated stage as the first
informant was engaged in bargaining by putting the appellant
convicts to terms of paying money and since bargaining failed as
such an occurrence of 13.05.2012 has been reported by means of
first information report dated 22.05.2012 i.e. nearly after 9 days of
delay without satisfactory explanation.

67. The contention raised by Ms. Rajpoot that the defence
evidence has wrongly been discarded by learned trial court is
perfunctory as on close scrutiny of all defence evidence it comes
out that none of them claimed themselves to be an eye witness
account and no primacy can be attached to their testimony if pitted
against dying declaration.
68. Ms. Rajpoot further submitted by impeaching the testimony
of PW1 - Santosh kumar contradicting it from dying declaration
that when he first visited the hospital, his daughter was
unconscious and she re-gained her conscious at about 5:00 PM.
However, prosecution claims that dying declaration of deceased
was recorded between 4:40 PM to 4:55 PM. The record does not
support the timing as alleged by Ms. Rajpoot. However, PW-1
being only literate who was under trauma having seen his daughter
in injured condition cannot be expected to record the timing
through his watch and any such contradiction is insignificant. Thus,
the argument so raised by Ms. Rajpoot does not inspire confidence
impeaching the entire prosecution story.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
69. The further contention raised by learned counsel for the
appellants is there are multiple dying declarations thus, no credence
can be attached to exhibit Ka-12 relied as dying declaration by
learned trial Court. Further, the error committed by learned trial
Court is relying upon dying declaration despite the deceased was
brought to the hospital with 90% burn injuries. The deceased was
in state of shock and severe pain arising out of burn injuries. The
deceased was administered with several sedatives and painkillers
which could have compromised her state of mind by impairing her
cognitive capacity.
70. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that
there was no fitness certificate which could be proved by the
examining Doctor and in addition to this, the deceased was
unconscious until 5:00 PM as per the testimony of father of the
deceased (PW-1). Thus, the dying declaration of the deceased
cannot be relied upon and is highly doubtful reason being in
absence of medical certificate.
71. Counsel for the appellants-accused pointed out that on dying
declaration thumb impression has been affixed which is not
possible as entire body was burnt except right side abdomen,
forehead upper part of the face, top of the head and both soles,
thus, the alleged dying declaration is concocted.
72. The counsel for the appellant further submitted that no
material object incriminating the deceased was recovered from the
crime scene.
73. The submission so raised by learned counsel for the
appellants that septicemia is the cause of death which could only be
said to be remote cause but there is no denial that plethora of
evidence is available that septicemia has direct nexus with the burn
injuries suffered by deceased as such the appellants are the author

34
CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
of the crime in question. It was the direct and immediate result of
the death of the deceased which is not the consequence of alleged
act of the accused. The deceased died after 21 days does not
establish a clear plausible link between the alleged act and death
being caused by the septicemia. In this respect, reliance has been
placed in Keshvalal Vs State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in
(2002) 3 SCC 254, it was held that where death occurs due to
septicemia after days of treatment, prosecution must establish clear
link.
74. The last submission raised by counsel for the appellant is
with respect to quantum of sentence inter alia stating that the
punishment for life awarded to mother-in-law and 20 years
rigorous imprisonment to husband and father in law of the
deceased by the trial Court is disproportionate and unsustainable in
the eyes of law taking into the consideration that mother-in-law has
already undergone more than 14 years of incarceration, while the
husband and father-in-law have undergone 10 years of
incarceration. Therefore, the Court must consider the mitigating
factors and proportionality of the sentence awarded to the
appellants.
75. No other points/grounds assailing the impugned judgment of
conviction and sentence has been pressed by the counsel for the
appellants.
Submissions Advanced on Behalf of the State
76. Refuting the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants, Mr. Bipul Kumar Singh, learned State Counsel
submitted that the learned trial court has rightly convicted the
appellants-accused in the present case after analysing evidence in
detail particularly dying declaration.
77. It is submitted that PW-1 Santosh Kumar, PW-2 Rakesh
Kumar and PW-3 Sushila have made clear and coherent statements
that the deceased was being harassed by the appellants for dowry.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
The conviction of the appellants is based on evidence and the
present appeal has no merit and is liable to be dismissed.
78. Learned Counsel for the State- Respondent further contends
that all statutory ingredients for " Dowry Death" are fully satisfied
in this case. The deceased died within seven years of her marriage
other than normal circumstances. The testimonies of PW-1
(Santosh Kumar), PW-2 (Rakesh Kumar) and PW-3 (Sushila)
establishes that she was subjected to cruelty and harassment in
respect to the dowry demand for motorcycle and fan "soon before
her death".
79. It is further contended that the deceased specifically
attributed the role of pouring kerosene oil and setting her ablaze
against her mother in law/appellant-Ram Rati and she was
subjected to assault and cruelty accompanying demand of dowry
by her husband (Sunil Kumar) and father in law (Babulal).
80. Counsel for the State further placed reliance on the dying
declaration recorded on 13.05.2012. It is submitted that the
statement was recorded by Executive Magistrate, it was
emphasized that deceased was certified as "fully conscious and
oriented" by Doctor both before and after recording of her
statement. Thus, requirement of certification by medical jurist is
duly satisfied.
81. Relying upon the judgment of Naeem vs State of UP
reported in (2024) 3 SCR 36, wherein the Apex Court laid down
the factors to be taken into consideration while relying on dying
declaration and in the present case all statutory conditions with
respect to dying declaration are fully satisfied.
82. The further submission advanced by learned counsel for the
State is that the death of the deceased resulting from septicemia has
direct nexus with the burn injuries which was 90% and what
matters is that whether the injuries were sufficient in ordinary

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
course of nature to cause death and if the original injury is of fatal
nature it makes no difference that death is caused by the
complications flowing from that injury since, casual connection is
proximate as reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the
judgment of Maniklal sahu vs state of Chhattisgarh reported in
2025 livelaw (SC) 905.
83. Having heard learned counsel for rival parties and perused
the record, it comes out that the contention raised by learned
counsel for the appellants that there is no explanation offered by
prosecution qua delay in lodging FIR is examined in the face value
of the statement of first informant, who unequivocally stated that
he was involved in the treatment of his injured daughter in the
Hospital, who later on succumbed to burn injuries. He has further
stated that he submitted a written report on 20.05.2012 but same
was not lodged by police taking sham shelter of absence of in-
charge of police station and for aforesaid reasons, the police
handed over the FIR to brother in law of first informant on
22.05.2012. The delay of seven days in submitting written report if
examined and pitted against the mental trauma of father who was
engaged in treatment of his daughter having suffered the burn
injuries, the explanation of alleged delay owing to involvement in
treatment appears to be plausible. The reliance placed by defence
on the judgment of Thulia Kali Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in
(1972) 3 SCC 393 the Hon’ble Apex Court wherein it was held that
unexplained delay in lodging FIR is fatal and creates suspicion and
fabrication is completely misplaced as Thulia Kali’s dictum has
been considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Hariprasad @ Kishan Sahu Vs. State of Chhatisgarh reported in
2024 SCC Online SC 1764 and it has been held that delay in
lodging FIR is not always fatal if cogent explanation is furnished
by prosecution and the said authority is in the same line of Hon’ble
Supreme Court’s judgment rendered in the case of Ravinder Kumar
Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2001) 7 SCC 690. Having

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
considered the judgments of Supreme Court qua delay in lodging
FIR in the facts of present case, it comes out that there is sufficient
explanation offered by none other than first informant stating that
the delay was caused on first hand due to engagement in treatment
and on the other hand the FIR was not lodged by police station
assigning the reason of absence of In-charge Station House Officer,
thus, the argument of defence that there is delay in registration of
FIR cannot be applied in vacuum and the argument so raised is
hereby rejected for aforementioned reasons.
84. The argument of Ms. Rajpoot that there were multiple dying
declarations is an unfounded fact as prosecution has relied upon
only one dying declaration i.e. exhibit Ka-12. Thus, there is neither
multiple dying declaration nor any inconsistency from any other
piece of evidence could successfully be pointed out by learned
counsel for appellants at the same time, the certification appended
on dying declaration by medical jurist which has been duly proved
before learned trial Court by virtue of testimony of PW-4 cannot be
doubted, thus, the fitness as certified by the Doctor for making
dying declaration is to be believed by this Court and this Court
cannot supplant its own wisdom by substituting the certificate of
the Doctor in some other way.
85. Furthermore, for appreciation of dying declaration the
statement of PW-9 the Executive Magistrate who recorded dying
declaration is material evidence in which he has stated that the
deceased was in fit condition and he examined the voice whether
patient was able to put thumb impression. There is no cross
examination on the point with Doctor or with Magistrate that
whether deceased was at the time recording of dying declaration
was in condition to put a thumb impression or not and in absence
of such cross examination the defence cannot derive any benefit.

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
The counsel for the appellant submitted that no incriminating
material pointing out deceased was set to ablaze was recovered.
86. The stress laid by appellants’counsel that nothing
incriminating was recovered, this contention is if examined on its
face value then even if it is assumed recovery of any incriminating
material was not effect then such lapse can be attributed to
Investigating Officer and defective investigation cannot be
foundation for tendering any short of benefit leading acquittal to
the appellants.
87. The counsel for the appellant has stressed and laid much
emphasis that the victim was admitted to the hospital by in laws
which rules out any possibility of culpability in the mind of
accused rather their conduct is bona fide and same may be taken
into account and their conduct of admission to hospital entitles
them to have favour i.e. at least the benefit of doubt but such
contention is tested on the overall evidence available on record
which clearly suggest that if it is assumed that it was in laws they
got the victim admitted for treatment even then they did not remain
with the victim throughout her injured condition and there is no
evidence that they have contributed towards expenses of treatment
rather there is evidence in regard to their fleeing away from the
hospital which belies the contention of appellant treating the
accused appellants to be bona fide in their conduct. The attempt of
admission of victim to hospital might be due to social pressure as
the neighbours reached on the spot when victim was burning. The
clear role assigned in the dying declaration waters down any
attempt of admission to hospital in the backdrop when the
appellants were impugned to have fled away from the hospital.
Thus, the arguments so raised by appellants qua admission to
hospital does not find favour of this Court.

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88. The further contention raised by counsel for the appellant
that the deceased died due to septicemia as a result of burn injuries
thus, the cause of death could not directly be attributed to burn
injuries rather the cause happened to be remote one. It is commonly
noticed that death in case of burn injuries invariably is found due to
septicemia thus, this contention is being examined in the light of
judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of
Maniklal Sahu Vs. State of Chhatisgarh reported in 2025 SCC
Online SC 1960, wherein the death was due to septicemia and
Hon’ble Supreme court tested ‘Theory of Causation’ where death
ensues after some delay.
89. The relevant paragraphs of aforementioned authority are
extracted as under:
“58. Septicemia is described by the medical experts as the
condition which results where the circulation becomes flooded with
bacteria, either due to the failure of local defensive reactions at the
site of infection or to delayed or inadequate treatment. According to
the learned author, every penetrating wound except those inflicted
by the surgeon is potentially infected, though a certain period
elapsed before invading organisms actually establish themselves
become embedded in the tissues to multiply and form toxins. [See:
The Essentials of Modern Surgery by Handfield Jones and Pokitt,
V Edn]
59. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court in Prasad
Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2023) 11 SCC 320, this Court
stated in paragraphs 30 and 31 respectively as under:—
31. There can be no stereotypical assumption or formula that where
death occurs after a lapse of some time, the injuries (which might
have caused the death), the offence is one of culpable homicide.
Every case has its unique fact situation. However, what is mportant
is the nature of injury, and whether it is sufficient in the ordinary
course to lead to death. The adequacy or otherwise of medical
attention is not a relevant factor in this case, because the doctor
who conducted the post-mortem clearly deposed that death was
caused due to cardiorespiratory failures, as a result of the injuries
inflicted upon the deceased. Thus, the injuries and the death were
closely and directly linked.”
(Emphasis supplied)
61. In Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 1 SCC 22,
the interval between the date of the incident when the deceased
sustained burns and the date of her death was a fortnight. It was
argued on behalf of the appellant therein that the death of the
deceased had no direct nexus with the burn injuries as during the
interregnum period some other complications cropped up as a

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
result of which the victim succumbed. While negativizing such
contention, this Court observed as under:—
“16. Harping on an answer given by PW 12 in cross-examination
that death of the deceased had occurred due to “septic” learned
Senior Counsel made out an argument that such septic condition
could have developed on account of other causes. Mere possibility
of other causes supervening during her hospitalisation is not a safe
premise for deciding whether she would not have died due to the
burns sustained on 21-10-1988. The cause of death can be
determined on broad probabilities. In this context we may refer to a
passage from Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,
dealing with death by burns:
“As already mentioned, death may occur within 24 to 48 hours, but
usually the first week is the most fatal. In suppurative cases, death
may occur after five or six weeks or even longer.”
17. In Om Parkash v. State of Punjab [(1992) 4 SCC 212] the
victim was set ablaze on 17-03-1979 and she sustained burns with
which she died only 13 days thereafter. The assailant was convicted
of murder and the conviction was confirmed by this Court.
18. It is preposterous to say that the deceased in this case would
have been healed of the burn injuries and that she would have
contracted infection through some other causes and developed
septicemia and died of that on 15-11-1988. Court of law need not
countenance mere academic possibilities when the prosecution case
regarding death of the deceased was established on broad
probabilities as a sequel to the burns sustained by her. Hence we
repel the contention of the learned counsel on that score.”
(Emphasis supplied)
90. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants with
respect to burn injuries not being direct cause of death rather
remote one, is examined by taking cue/light from judgment
rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Maniklal Sahu
(supra) and is tested on the anvil of statement of doctor it comes
out the medical jurist/doctor himself stated that the nexus between
septicemia and the burn injuries cannot be ruled out. Furthermore
the burn injuries of 90% were found to be sufficient for death in
ordinary course of nature. Thus, the defence ought not to expect
any leniency from this Court on the count of death being due to
septicemia.
91. The deceased Sujata died at the age of about 20 years, within
one and half years of her marriage, due to burn injuries at her in-
laws' house, occurred “otherwise than under normal

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
circumstances”. Thus, her statement before the Magistrate is a
significant piece of evidence in connection with her death. A
perusal of Exhibit KA-12 clearly shows that before recording the
statement, the then Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Malihabad, Mr.
Suryanarayan Yadav, had a doctor record a fitness report with
respect to the victim's condition, and only after obtaining the
certification of the medical jurist, he proceeded to record the victim
Sujata's statement. The said dying declaration has been proved by
its author, PW-9. The incident occurred on 13.05.2012, the
statement was recorded on the same day, and the victim succumbed
to her injuries on 04.06.2012. As such, the statement is relevant
under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. In this statement,
the deceased Sujata stated that she was 20 years old and had a
quarrel with her in-laws, who abused and assaulted her. When her
husband returned home, he also beat her and tried to drive her out
of the house. Regarding how she caught fire, she clearly stated in
Exhibit KA-12: "My mother-in-law, Ramrati, poured kerosene
upon me and set me ablaze. They were demanding a vehicle as
dowry and were demanding money every day.
92. In the case at hand, the prosecution proved the dying
declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate having been
examined as PW-9, Suryanarayan Yadav. He stated on oath before
the trial court that "On that day, I received information from Civil
Hospital, Lucknow, through the police station, that Mrs. Sujata,
wife of Sunil Kumar, was admitted to the hospital with serious
burns and her statement needed to be recorded. Following this
information, I went to Civil Hospital, Lucknow, and recorded Mrs.
Sujata's statement verbatim as she had narrated it. The victim stated
that she had quarrelled with her mother-in-law and father-in-law,
who abused her. Later, when her husband returned home, he also
beat her and they tried to drive her out of the house. She further
stated that her mother-in-law, Ramrati, had poured kerosene on her

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
and set her ablaze, and that they were demanding a vehicle as
dowry. The victim gave this statement without any pressure." Upon
being shown Paper No. A-7/4 in the file, the witness confirmed that
he had written the victim's statement in his own handwriting, which
bore his signature. In this manner, Exhibit KA-12 was proved.
93. In nutshell we gathered since the foundational judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court qua dying declaration to be tested on the
touchstone of statutory mandate contained under Section 32 (1) of
Indian Evidence Act is Kushal Rao Vs. State of Bombay reported
in AIR 1958 SC 22, wherein the contention so raised that an
uncorroborated dying declaration would not be safe for conviction
was repelled and it was observed that there is neither rule of law
nor a prudence that dying declaration must be corroborated before
it can found a conviction. The only caution is required that dying
declaration should have been recorded in a proper manner by a
competent authority and the court is satisfied of its truthfulness, it
is a substantive piece of evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction
on its own. In short, a truthful and voluntary dying declaration can
suffice without independent confirmation, so long as the court is
convinced of its veracity. The jurisprudence qua dying declaration
since time of Kushal Rao’s judgment rendered in 1957 remained
consistent and there is no deviation on the said legal principle.
94. We have an advantage to go through the judgment of Privy
Council rendered in the case of Pakala Narayana Swami Vs.
Emperor reported in AIR 1939 PC 47 in which, the principles qua
reliability of dying declaration was summerized stating therein the
statement must relates to chain of evidence having a direct
connection to the actual cause of death and it has further held it is
not a weak piece of evidence. If the Court is satisfied that the
statement is true and voluntarily it can be the sole basis for
conviction without any further corroboration, there is no absolute
rule that it must be recorded by a Magistrate or in a specific format

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
but going by the facts of case in hand the dying declaration in
question exhibited as Ka-12 has been recorded by Executive
Magistrate who proved its authenticity before the Court.
95. The great emphasis has been laid by defence that if there are
multiple dying declarations then, it is not safe to record conviction
founded on dying declarations but Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
in the case of Puran Chand Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2010)
6 SCC 566 that if there are multiple dying declarations they must
be consistent, major contradiction may lead the Court to reject
them. In the case in hand prosecution has not relied upon multiple
dying declaration as incriminating material but it is the brain child
of defence that the statement given to the parents, to the
Investigating Officer and to the Executive Magistrate are termed as
multiple dying declarations but so far as any contradiction is
concerned, nothing could be projected as such the argument of
multiple dying declaration is absolutely of no consequence.
96. The Deceased survived for almost 22 days after the incident.
Her dying declaration was recorded by PW-9 Suryanarayan yadav,
the then SDM, Malihabad Lucknow, after obtaining the certificate
of medical fitness from the doctor concerned. This dying
declaration was proved by him. This witness is absolutely an
independent witness and has no grudge or enmity against
appellants to get them convicted. In the wake of aforesaid
judgment of Laxman (supra), dying declaration cannot be
disbelieved, if it inspires confidence.
97. On reliability of dying declaration and acting on it, without
corroboration, Hon'ble Apex Court held in Krishan vs. State of
Haryana [(2013) 3 Supreme Court Cases 280] that it is not an
absolute principle of law that a dying declaration cannot form the
sole basis of conviction of an accused. Where the dying declaration
is true and correct, the attending circumstances show it to be
reliable and it has been recorded in accordance with law, the

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
deceased made the dying declaration of her own accord and upon
due certification by the doctor with regard to the state of mind and
body, then it may not be necessary for the court to look for
corroboration. In such cases, the dying declaration alone can form
the basis for the conviction of the accused. Hence, in order to pass
the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a
very close judicial scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the
statement has been made in the absence of the accused, who had no
opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-
examination. But once, the court comes to the conclusion that the
dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstance of
the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of
further corroboration.
98. In Ramilaben Hasmukhbhai Khristi vs. State of Gujarat,
[(2002) 7 SCC 56], the Hon'ble Apex Court held that under the law,
dying declaration can form the sole basis of conviction, if it is free
from any kind of doubt and it has been recorded in the manner as
provided under the law. It may not be necessary to look for
corroboration of the dying declaration. As envisaged, a dying
declaration is generally to be recorded by an Executive Magistrate
with the certificate of a medical doctor about the mental fitness of
the declarant to make the statement. It may be in the form of
question and answer and the answers be written in the words of the
person making the declaration. But the court cannot be too
technical and in substance if it feels convinced about the
trustworthiness of the statement which may inspire confidence such
a dying declaration can be acted upon without any corroboration.
99. Thus, we find ourselves in complete agreement that dying
declaration can be the sole piece of evidence if it is trustworthy for
bringing home the guilt of accused and following principles can
culled out for appreciation of dying declaration as an evidence. The
corroboration of dying declaration often sought as a matter of
prudence is not an absolute legal requirement. While examining the

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
dying declaration the courts must ensure that dying declaration so
relied upon must pass the following tests:
(i) It must be free from tutoring, prompting or imagination;
(ii)It must have been given voluntarily, coherent and made
with declarant’s faculties intact
(iii) The declarant should have had a clear opportunity to
observe and identify the assailants
(iv) It must have been given in fit mental state and,
(v) It ought to have been recorded properly meeting the
touchstone of section 32(1) of Indian Evidence Act.
100. The rigorous judicial scrutiny of dying declaration in
question, satisfactory passes the muster of all the aforementioned
tests.
101. The dying declaration in the instant case is briefly but clearly
worded and describes the quarrels, abuse, and assault by her in-
laws. It further records that when her husband arrived, he also
assaulted her, and that her mother-in-law, Ramrati, poured kerosene
on her and set her ablaze. Thus, the dying declaration clearly
details how the incident occurred. PW-1 Santosh Kumar, (the
deceased Sujata's father), and PW-3 Sushila (the deceased Sujata's
mother), also stated that Sujata had told them about the cruelty,
harassment and maltreatment meted out to her in connection with
demand of dowry at the hospital. Thus, the dying declaration
having medical certification stands corroborated by the testimonies
of witnesses of fact.
102. It is now well-settled law, since the time of foundational
judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Kushal Rao (supra) and ever since the judgment rendered by privy
council in the case of Pakala Narayana Swami (supra) till today,
that where a dying declaration inspires confidence, no further

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CRLA No. - 2275 of 2019
corroboration is needed. In the case at hand, there is a certification
by the medical jurist regarding the condition of the injured Sujata,
who later succumbed to her injuries. The credibility of the
Executive Magistrate, i.e., PW-9, could not be doubted by the
defence. Thus, the dying declaration in this case has been
sufficiently proved to bring home the guilt of the accused.
103. In the present case, the deceased died in a hospital due to
burn injuries within one and a half year of her marriage. In her
dying declaration, she unequivocally mentioned the cruelty and
torture she had suffered in connection with a demand for dowry.
The dying declaration further shows that the abuse and torture took
place shortly before her death. Corroborating evidence of all these
facts is available in the testimony of PW-1 and PW-3.
104. It is needless to mention that Section 113-B of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 mandates the court to presume dowry death in
cases where there is evidence of dowry demand and harassment,
attracting Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The
presumption envisaged under Section 113B of Indian Evidence Act
is rebuttable one but appellants utterly failed to discharge the
reverse burden cast upon them by aforesaid statutory prescription
as in the present case statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. , accused
Ramrati stated, "We were not in the house when Sujata set herself
to fire. We came in after hearing the noise. I was outside applying
mud to the wall." Accused Babulal stated, "Sujata set the fire
herself. We saved her. In the process, my left hand was burned. The
case arose only because her family's inability to pay the money."
Accused Sunil, in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC,
said, "Ramavatar's house is near my house. On the day of the
incident, there was an argument between Ramavatar's wife and
Sujata, and in a fit of rage, Sujata set herself on fire. My in-laws
were demanding Rs. 1.5 lakh for not filing a case. I did not pay,

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hence the case was filed." In the present case, the evidence
presented by the defence does not appear natural or sufficient to
rebut the statutory presumption beyond reasonable doubt.
105. The legislative intent behind the enactment of Section 113-B
of the Indian Evidence Act represents a profound shift in our
criminal jurisprudence. Generally, this departure from the
traditional maxim of the burden of proof rests upon him who
affirms is deeply rooted in the doctrine of special knowledge and
the compelling socio-legal necessity to pierce the veil of domestic
privacy.
106. It is a grim reality that dowry deaths typically occur within
the "four corners of the house," a domain characterized as a private
sanctuary where the husband and his relatives exercise near-total
dominion. In such a setting, the State recognizes a systemic
evidentiary vacuum. In these private,hidden crimes, the victim is
often dead, leaving behind no external witnesses other than the
perpetrators themselves.
107. Consequently, the law justifies the imposition of a reverse
burden of proof on the premise that the circumstances surrounding
the death are uniquely within the exclusive knowledge of the
accused. It is, therefore, both logically sound and morally
imperative that the onus shifts to the occupants of the household to
offer a cogent explanation.
108. Another important aspect of the defence case is that the
statements of the defence witnesses do not match the statements of
the accused recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. Accused
Sunil alleged that there was dispute between his neighbour
Ramavatar's wife and Sujata, and stated that it was for this reason
that Sujata set herself on fire. However, this fact is not mentioned
in the statements of the other two accused or in the defence
evidence at all. Thus, the defence's attempt to explain the
circumstances of Sujata's death is entirely contradictory to the
deceased's dying declaration.

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109. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also expressed its view in
Ramakant Mishra alias Lalu & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2015) 3 SCC (Crl.) 503, that under Section 113-B of the Indian
Evidence Act, in such cases, the burden of proof falls on the
accused to prove their innocence.
110. The accused persons have examined three witnesses in their
defence. DW-1 Smt. Roop Rani is neighbour of the appellants who
in her statement has stated that at the time of incident accused-
appellants were trying to extinguish the fire and accused appellant
Babulal's hands got burnt while extinguishing the fire. DW-2
Rajendra Kumar is also neighbour of the appellants and has
reiterated the version of DW-1. He further stated that appellants
with the help of his 'Dala'(cart) have admitted the deceased at Civil
Hospital, Hazaratganj, Lucknow and also stated that wife of Sunil
was saying that she set herself on fire. It is not their (appellants)
fault. DW-3-Smt. Kalawati is also the resident of same village. She
stated that she never heard about the demand of dowry or any
harassment by the deceased. She further stated that Sujata herself
said that she set herself on fire and there is no fault of anyone else.
111. The defence version that appellant convict Babulal
endeavoured to save the deceased by extinguishing the fire does
not inspire confidence in absence of any medical examination as he
had ample opportunity to get himself medically examined as
appellant no.3 Babulal accompanied the deceased while reaching to
Civil Hospital, thus, absence of medical examination of Babulal
establishing burning of his hand in the incident goes against the
defence version.
112. When the dying declaration is weighed against the
tetsimonies of the three defence witnesses, it emerges that none of
them witnessed the manner and mode in which the deceased

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sustained the burn injuries. They are not eyewitnesses to the
incident, though they have attempted to establish an alibi in favour
of Sunil Kumar (the husband) by showing his presence at the
grocery shop of one Sitaram. The statements of these defence
witnesses are not of unimpeachable character, and when pitted
against the dying declaration proved by the concerned Magistrate,
their testimonies cannot be given any primacy, particularly in the
backdrop of this case, where none of the defence witnesses claims
to be an eyewitness. It is noteworthy that DW-2 himself stated that
the deceased was in a condition to speak, which finds corroboration
to the fitness certificate appended on the dying declaration by the
medical jurist giving all the reason for the Court to believe upon
the dying declaration and the learned trial Court has considered the
dying declaration in correct perspective.
Conclusion
113. Having marshalled the evidence led by the parties before
learned trial Court and having taken an overall view of the matter,
including statutory prescriptions envisaged in the penal provisions
and the legal requirements necessary to establish offences falling
under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the I.P.C. with the aid of
Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act to be conclusively proved
against the appellants, Accordingly the conviction as recorded by
learned trial Court do not call for any interference and same is
maintained. Thus, is hereby affirmed.
Proportionality of Sentence
114. The custody certificates of appellants dated 02.02.2026
having been produced before this Court reflect that appellant no.1-
Ramrati has served total incarceration of 15 years 03 months and
18 days, appellant no.2 Sunil Kumar has served total incarceration
of 10 years 5 months and 10 days whereas appellant no.3 Babulal
has suffered incarceration of 09 years 03 months and 14 days.

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115. This Court now proceeds to consider and examine the
proportionality of sentence awarded to the appellants
commensurate to the offence, in view of evidence led by parties
and the prayer of leniency qua sentence is again examined in the
light of certain authorities of Hon’ble Supreme Court which
governs the field, with respect to sentence particularly life
imprisonment in relation to Section 304-B IPC (major penal
provision). The penal provision under Section 304-B provides,
Courts could award sentence in exercise of its discretion between
seven years to life imprisonment, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case, thus, the minimum sentence provided
is ‘not less than 7 years’ and the extreme punishment is ‘life
imprisonment’. The extreme penalty of life imprisonment in cases
of section 304-B is not imposed as a matter of course, but only in
‘rarest of rare cases’.
116. The question of sentence in penal provision such as under
Section 304-B IPC came for consideration of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Hem Chand Vs State of Haryana, reported in
(1994) 6 SCC 727, wherein the Trial Court had awarded life
imprisonment to the accused under Sections 304-B read with 498A
I.P.C., however, the Hon’ble Supreme court reduced the sentence to
10 years and held as under:
“7. Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be seen that
Section 304-B IPC lays down that:
“Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years
but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”
117. This Court is faced with the question “whether the extreme
punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the
circumstances of instant case.”
118. The culpability/guilt under Section 304-B IPC is primarily
dependent upon presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence

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Act. Unlike section 302 IPC, the convection under Section 304-B
IPC do not require direct or circumstantial evidence but almost in
every case the presumption as casts by virtue of 113-B of Indian
Evidence Act is the foundation, though such presumption remains
rebuttable one, but again the million dollar question is ‘can a
person be convicted for throughout life based on presumption cast
by law and for this reason the sentence of life imprisonment as
envisaged under Section 304-B IPC is for rarest of rare cases and
not in every case.’ The phrase rarest of rare case used for section
302 IPC, cannot be compared to be or given same meaning when
offence under Section 304-B IPC is tried with. It is profitable to
have glimpse of ratio laid down in the case of Hariom Vs. State of
Haryana reported in (2014) 10 SCC 577, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court examined the possibility of alteration of sentence in
proportion to the gravity of crime. The relevant paragraphs of
aforementioned judgment with respect to award of sentence are
extracted as under:
“16. Now, the question arises as to whether we should reduce the
appellant's sentence and if so, to what extent, as urged by the
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant.
17. This issue has been the subject-matter of debate before this
Court in several cases, which arose out of Section 304-B read
with Section 498-A and wherein this Court while interpreting the
expression “may” occurring in Section 304-B IPC held that it is
not mandatory for the Court in every case to award life
imprisonment to the accused once he is found guilty of the
offence under Section 304-B. It was held that the Court could
award sentence in exercise of its discretion between seven years
to life imprisonment depending upon the facts of each case. It
was held that in no case it could be less than seven years and that
extreme punishment of life term should be awarded in “rare
cases” but not in every case.
18. In Hem Chand v. State of Haryana [(1994) 6 SCC 727 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1995 SC 120] , the courts below had awarded
life term to the accused under Section 304-B read with Section
498-A but this Court reduced it to 10 years. This was also a case
where the accused was a police officer who had suffered life
imprisonment. This Court held as under: (SCC p. 731, paras 7-8)
“7. … the appellant-accused was a police employee and
instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein
and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the
increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As

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mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises
presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should
be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life.
Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment
for life should be in rare cases and not in every case.
8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' RI
would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while
confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section
304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to
10 years' RI.”
19. Similarly, this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.V.
Manjunathegowda [(2003) 2 SCC 188 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 467] ,
while convicting the accused under Section 304-B awarded 10
years' imprisonment in somewhat similar facts.
20. Recently, in G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka [(2010) 3
SCC 152 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] , this Court while allowing the
appeal filed by the accused only on the question of sentence altered
the sentence from life term to 10 years on more or less similar
facts. Hon'ble H.L. Dattu, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking
for the Bench held as under: (SCC p. 160, para 31)
“31. In conclusion, we are satisfied that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the appellant was rightly
convicted under Section 304-B IPC. However, his
sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the courts
below appears to us to be excessive. The appellant is a
young man and has already undergone 6 years of
imprisonment after being convicted by the Additional
Sessions Judge and the High Court. We are of the view, in
the facts and circumstances of the case, that a sentence of
10 years' rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of
justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction
of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, reduce the
sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' rigorous
imprisonment. The other conviction and sentence passed
against the appellant are confirmed.”
21. Applying the principle of law laid down in the aforementioned
cases and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of
this case, we are of the considered opinion that the ends of justice
would meet, if we reduce the sentence of the appellant from life
imprisonment to that of 10 years. In our view, this case does not
fall in the category of a “rare case” as envisaged by this Court so as
to award to the appellant the life imprisonment. That apart, we also
notice that while awarding life imprisonment, the courts below did
not assign any reasons.
22. The learned counsel for the State and the complainant were not
able to cite any authority in support of their submission except to
oppose the prayer made by the appellant. Therefore, we are not
impressed by their submission.
23. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and
is allowed in part. The conviction of the appellant Hari Om (A-1)
under Section 304-B read with Section 498-A IPC is upheld.
However, the sentence (life imprisonment) awarded to the appellant

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is altered and accordingly, is reduced to 10 years' rigorous
imprisonment. To this extent, the impugned judgment [Hari Om v.
State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2004, decided on 14-
5-2010 (P&H)] stands modified.
119. The proposition of law qua awarding life sentence under
Section 304-B IPC was also examined by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in case of State of Karnataka Vs M.V Manjunathe gowda &
Anr. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 183; and G.V. Siddaramesh vs State
of Karnataka, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 152; wherein in both the
cases the life term was reduced to 10 years.

120. The question whether the sentence of imprisonment for life
can be converted into a fixed term sentence and in this regard we
would like to go through the ratio of law laid down by
Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, rendered in
the case of Union of India v. V. Sriharan, reported in (2016) 7 SCC
1 where Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with issue as to whether
imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45
of the I.P.C. means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the
convict or the same can be reduced. The Constitutional Bench after
referring to the various precedents, including Swamy
Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2008) 13 SCC
767; has answered the same in paragraph nos. 104 and 105 of the
said judgment i.e. V. Sriharan (Supra), in the following words:
"104. That apart, in most of such cases where death penalty or
life imprisonment is the punishment imposed by the trial court
and confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court, the
convict concerned will get an opportunity to get such verdict
tested by filing further appeal by way of special leave to this
Court. By way of abundant caution and as per the prescribed law
of the Code and the criminal jurisprudence, we can assert that
after the initial finding of guilt of such specified grave offences
and the imposition of penalty either death or life imprisonment,
when comes under the scrutiny of the Division Bench of the High
Court, it is only the High Court which derives the power under
the Penal Code, which prescribes the capital and alternate
punishment, to alter the said punishment with one either for the
entirety of the convict's life or for any specific period of more
than 14 years, say 20, 30 or so on depending upon the gravity of

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the crime committed and the exercise of judicial conscience
befitting such offence found proved to have been committed."
"105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the
Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment
provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can
only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further
appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other court in
this country. To put it differently, the power to impose a modified
punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till
the end of the convict's life as an alternate to death penalty, can be
exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not
by any other inferior court."
121. The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the said principle in
the case of Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2023) 9
SCC 817; after considering both of the aforementioned judgments
of V. Sriharan (Supra) and Swamy Shraddananda (Supra); wherein
it has held that Constitutional Courts may, even under capital
punishments is not in issue, impose a fixed term sentence of more
than fourteen years in place of an ordinary life sentence, subject to
the mandate of Section 433-A CrPC.
122. In the present case, this Court does not find any plausible
reasons recorded by the learned Trial Court as to why the
maximum punishment of life imprisonment had been awarded to
the appellants. There can be no dispute that the crime committed is
one of the most heinous and grave crime and does not call for any
leniency. At the same time, sentencing must remain guided by
judicial principles of proportionality and individual culpability.
123. Sentence awarded under Section 498-A of IPC and Section 4
of Dowry Prohibition Act having been suffered by appellants calls
for no interference.
124. Thus, taking cue from Constitutional Bench judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of V. Sriharan
(Supra), as later clarified in the case of Shiva Kumar (Supra), this
Court being a Constitutional Court derives authority to commute
the sentence of life imprisonment to a fixed term sentence.

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125. In view of ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of M.V. Manjunathe Gowda (supra) and Hariom (supra) and
keeping the complicity of Ramrati into account, the sentence of
imprisonment for life is commuted to the sentence she had already
undergone. Similarly, the sentence awarded to other two appellants
namely Sunil Kumar and Babu lal are also modified from 20 years
rigorous imprisonment to the period they have already undergone.
126. The appellant no.1 shall be released forthwith if not wanted
in any other case. The appellant no.2 and 3, who are on bail, need
not to surrender and their bail bonds are discharged.
127. However, entire amount of fine awarded by trial Court shall
be deposited by appellants within two months from today.
Otherwise default sentence shall remain intact and be served by
appellants-convicts.
128. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed to the aforesaid
extent only.
129. The appellants shall comply with provisions enshrined under
Section 437A Cr.P.C.
130. Record and proceedings along with copy of this judgment be
sent back to the trial Court forthwith for compliance.
(Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Rajesh Singh Chauhan,J.)
May 22, 2026
Mohit
Digitally signed by :-
MOHIT KUMAR KUSHWAHA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench