THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
ND
DATED THIS THE 2 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA
WRIT PETITION NO. 10743 OF 2023 (S-KSAT)
BETWEEN:
THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA
M S BUILDING,
DR. B R AMBEDKAR ROAD,
BENGALURU-560001,
REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. VENKATESH S ARBATTI, ADV.)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
PUBLIC WORKS, PORTS AND
INLAND WATER TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT,
VIKASA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU-560001.
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT,
M S BUILDING,
BENGALURU-560001.
Digitally signed by
NANJUNDACHARI
Location: High
Court of Karnataka
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3. SRI K P SHANTHEGOWDA
S/O LATE K C NITTEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
WORKING AS
ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
MAHALAKSHMIPURAM SUB DIVISION,
BRUHATH BENGALURU
MAHANAGARA PALIKE,
BENGALURU,
ND RD
R/AT NO.99, 2 CROSS, 3 MAIN,
MAHALAKSHMIPURAM,
BENGALURU-560086.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. MANJUNATH B., AGA FOR R1 & 2
SRI B KESHAVA MURTHY, ADV. FOR R3)
THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION IN
THE NATURE OF A WRIT THEREBY QUASHING THE ORDER
DATED 09.07.2019 PASSED BY THE KSAT BENGALURU IN
A.NO-5508/2018 AS PER ANNEXURE-A AND B) AWARD THE
COST OF THIS WRIT PETITION.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
AND
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA
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ORAL ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT)
The petitioner-Lokayukta Institution is before this
Court questioning order dated 09.07.2019 in Application
No.5508/2018 passed by the Karnataka State
Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru (for short, ‘the
Tribunal’), quashing the order of penalty of withholding
two increments with cumulative effect imposed on
respondent No.3 dated 02.03.2017 (Annexure-A19).
2. Heard learned counsel Sri.Venkatesh S. Arabatti
for petitioner, learned Additional Government Advocate
Sri.Manjunath.B., for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and learned
counsel Sri.B.Keshava Murthy for respondent No.3.
Perused the entire writ petition papers.
3. Respondent No.3 was imposed with punishment
of withholding two increments with community effect in
exercise of power under Rule 8(iii) of Karnataka Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1957
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(for short, ‘CCA Rules’) under order dated 02.03.2017 on
conducting departmental proceedings. That was the
subject matter of above stated Application and the
Tribunal under impugned order dated 09.07.2019 set
aside the impugned order of penalty, against which, the
petitioner-Lokayukta Institution is before this Court in this
writ petition.
4. However, it is noticed that the State
Government has not preferred any writ petition against
the impugned order passed by the Tribunal quashing the
order of penalty imposed on respondent No.3 herein.
5. Learned counsel Sri.Venkatesh S. Arabatti for
petitioner would submit that the Tribunal on a wrong
appreciation of the facts has come to the conclusion that
respondent No.3 could not have taken any action. Further,
he submits that there was no suit insofar as unauthorized
construction of the property in respect of which action
under Section 321 of Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act,
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1976 was initiated. Further, learned counsel would submit
that the suit related to eviction from the property. Further,
he would submit that in the cross-examination, the DGO
has deposed that he has not seen the suit papers. Further,
learned counsel would submit that the Tribunal has not
appreciated the facts properly and has come to the wrong
conclusion that the complainant had a remedy as
contemplated under Section 8 of Karnataka Lokayukta Act
(for short, ‘the Act’) and has wrongly allowed the
Application.
6. However, learned counsel for respondent No.3
would support the order passed by the Tribunal and would
further submit that there is inordinate delay in
approaching this Court. Further, learned counsel would
submit that in an identical fact situation, this Court
dismissed the writ petition solely on the ground of delay in
approaching this Court. Thus, he would pray for dismissal
of the writ petition.
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7. However, learned counsel Sri.Venkatesh S.
Arabatti for petitioner would submit that the impugned
order was passed in July-2019 and soon thereafter there
was COVID Pandemic. As such, the petitioner-Institution
could not approach this Court in time.
8. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for
the parties and on perusal of the entire writ petition
papers we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned
order passed by the Tribunal.
9. Admittedly, the impugned order was passed on
09.07.2019 by the Tribunal. The present writ petition was
filed before this Court on 24.05.2023, nearly after four
years from the date of impugned order passed by the
Tribunal. However, it is true that COVID pandemic was
prevailing during 2019 to 2021. However, even thereafter
there is two years delay in approaching this Court. The
fact that respondent No.3 when he approached the
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Tribunal in the year 2018 was aged 58 years and by the
time the writ petition is filed, respondent No.3 had
superannuated and retired from service. As on this day,
respondent No.3 is nearly 70 years of age.
10. When respondent No.3 is in the evening of his
life, it would not be appropriate for this Court to entertain
the present writ petition. The grounds raised by the
petitioner with regard to Section 8 of the Act is kept open
to be considered in an appropriate proceedings.
MRINMOY
11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
MAITY V. CHHANDA KOLEY AND OTHERS 2024 SCC
, reported in
OnLine SC 551
was considering the question of delay in
approaching the Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and held that when the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen
as to whether within a reasonable time same has been
invoked. Relevant paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 read as
follows:
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9.
“ Having heard rival contentions raised and
on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case,
we are of the considered view that writ petitioner
ought to have been non-suited or in other words
writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the
ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who
approaches the court belatedly or in other words
sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of
time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to
be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ
courts. This Court time and again has held that
delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the
factors which should be born in mind by the High
Court while exercising discretionary powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given
case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the
applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause
of action to drift away and attempts are made
subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10.
The discretion to be exercised would be
with care and caution. If the delay which has
occasioned in approaching the writ court is
explained which would appeal to the conscience of
the court, in such circumstances it cannot be
gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to
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come the delay is not to be condoned. There may
be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the
invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all
depends on facts and circumstances of each case,
same cannot be described in a straight jacket
formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate
discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends
upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in
which the facts have travelled.
11.
For filing of a writ petition, there is no
doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed.
However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the
writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether
within a reasonable time same has been invoked
and even submitting of memorials would not revive
the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of
action which has had a natural death. In such
circumstances on the ground of delay and latches
alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the
applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that
the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the
High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole
ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not
to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take
advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there
cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while
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exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article
226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into
consideration the delay and latches on the part of
the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court
in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.,
(2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is
no doubt true that there can be no waiver of
fundamental right. But while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226,
227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes
into account certain factors and one of such
considerations is delay and laches on the part of
the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is
well settled that power to issue a writ is
discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing
reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution
is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction
of a writ court, he should come to the Court at
the earliest reasonably possible opportunity.
Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ
will indeed be a good ground for refusing to
exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The
underlying object of this principle is not to
encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume
matters which have already been disposed of or
settled or where the rights of third parties have
accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v.
Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR
261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR
1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of
India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 :
(1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even
in case of an infringement of fundamental right
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(vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi,
[(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC
185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
[(1970) 1 SCC 84]).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower
limit as to when a person can approach a court.
The question is one of discretion and has to be
decided on the basis of facts before the court
depending on and varying from case to case. It
will depend upon what the breach of
fundamental right and the remedy claimed are
and when and how the delay arose.”
12.
It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid
down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corporation
Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322
whereunder it has been held that the High Court may
refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is
negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant
to assert his right. It has been further held
thereunder:
“6.
Delay or laches is one of the factors which is
to be borne in mind by the High Court when they
exercise their discretionary powers under Article
226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case
the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such negligence
or omission on the part of the applicant to assert
his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse
of time and other circumstances, causes
prejudice to the opposite party. Even where
fundamental right is involved the matter is still
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within the discretion of the Court as pointed out
in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports
and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC
769]. Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
7.
What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR
492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court
in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC
1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant
Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR
1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust
to give a remedy either because the party
has, by his conduct done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of
it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has
though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay
are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of
that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances
always important in such cases are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
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injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as it relates to the remedy.”
8.
It would be appropriate to note certain
decisions of this Court in which this aspect has
been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the
Constitution. It is apparent that what has been
stated as regards that article would apply, a
fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in
Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1
SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be
given to the petitioner who without any
reasonable explanation approaches this Court
under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was
stated that though Article 32 is itself a
guaranteed right, it does not follow from this
that it was the intention of the Constitution-
makers that this Court should disregard all
principles and grant relief in petitions filed after
inordinate delay.
9.
It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal
Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251]
that the High Court in exercise of its discretion
does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If
there is inordinate delay on the part of the
petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily
explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is
premised on a number of factors. The High Court
does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause
confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in
its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have
the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
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inconvenience but also injustice on third parties.
It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is
invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of third-party rights in the meantime is
an important factor which also weighs with the
High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise
such jurisdiction.”
12. For the reasons recorded above, the writ
dismissed
petition stands .
Sd/-
(S.G.PANDIT)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(DR.CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA)
JUDGE
NC
CT:bms
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