M/S C.B. Global Scientific Group & Anr. vs M/S Synergic Trailer And Auto Solutions Private Limited

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on : 07.10.2026
Pronounced on: 16.10.2026
Uploaded on : 16.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010436362026
+ FAO (COMM) 268/2026, CM APPL. 62621/2026, CM APPL.
62622/2026, CM APPL. 62623/2026

M/S C.B. GLOBAL SCIENTIFIC GROUP & ANR.
....Appellants
Through: Mr. Shivam Sharma, Adv.

versus

M/S SYNERGIC TRAILER AND AUTO SOLUTIONS
PRIVATE LIMITED .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Shahil Rao, Adv.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BHARAT PARASHAR
JUDGMENT

BHARAT PARASHAR, J.

1. The present appeal filed under Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLIII Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 („CPC‟) by the Appellants, who were the Defendants
in the suit, assails the order dated 09.07.2026 („Impugned Order‟)
passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial Court)-01,
South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, in Misc. DJ No.
666/2026, whereby the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC read
with Section 151 CPC along with application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, filed by the Appellants herein was dismissed.
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2. For ease of reference, the parties shall hereafter be referred to as
the Appellants and the Respondent, the latter being the Plaintiff in the
Suit.
3. Appellant No. 1 is a proprietorship firm, which is involved in
manufacture and supply of medical equipment including Nitrile
Gloves, personal protective equipment kits (PPE) and other allied
products, based in Sonipat, Haryana, with Appellant No. 2 as its
proprietor and authorized signatory. The Respondent is a private
limited company originally engaged in the business of import and
supply of trailer parts, and it was only during the COVID-19 pandemic
that the Respondent ventured into the business of supplying personal
protective equipment (PPE) and other allied medical equipment.
4. The Respondent came into contact with the Appellants through
online platforms and in the second week of July, 2020, the Respondent
placed a purchase order dated 27.07.2020 for supply of 6000 boxes of
Nitrile Gloves worth Rs. 23,99,040/- and between 27.07.2020 and
01.08.2020, the Respondent transferred a total sum of Rs. 23,78,500/-
to the Appellants as advance payment through multiple transactions.
However, the delivery could not be made by the Appellants as promised
allegedly due to market disruption on account of Covid-19 pandemic.
5. It has been further averred that subsequently upon the
Respondent‟s instructions the advance consideration was transferred to
an alternate vendor M/s Akira Traders and Exporter Pvt. Ltd. but it too
ultimately failed to supply the required items.

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6. On the other hand, the Respondent has averred that the
Appellants simply defaulted on their contractual obligations, failing to
supply the ordered items despite receiving advance payments and
extending repeated assurances.
7. According to the respondent, on 11.08.2021, in order to settle the
dispute, Appellant No. 2 offered to make a lump sum payment of Rs.
23,00,000/- and issued a cheque bearing no. 000039 dated 12.08.2021
drawn on HDFC Bank, Kath Mandi, Old Rohtak Road, Sonipat,
Haryana, for a sum of Rs.23,00,000/- in favour of the Respondent.
However, upon presentation through the Respondent‟s banker, Union
Bank of India, Sarita Vihar, New Delhi, the cheque was returned
dishonoured with the remark “Funds Insufficient” vide memo dated
17.08.2021.
8. When payment was not made despite repeated requests, the
Respondent issued a legal notice dated 13.09.2021, which, according to
it, remained unanswered. The Respondent thereafter invoked
pre-institution mediation proceedings under Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 which concluded with a Non-Starter
Report on 06.12.2021.
9. For recovery of the amount, the Respondent instituted CS
(Comm.) No. 01/2022 on 03.01.2022 for recovery of Rs. 23,00,000/-
along with pendente lite and future interest @ 12% per annum.
10. In the suit, the Appellants were duly served on 18.08.2023. On
14.09.2023, one counsel, Mr. Ajay Tyagi appeared through video
conferencing and submitted that he would file Vakalatnama on behalf
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of the Appellants within a week. However, the Appellants, thereafter,
neither appeared nor filed written statement despite service.
Accordingly, vide order dated 20.12.2023, the right of the Appellants to
file the written statement was closed. As none appeared for the
Appellants thereafter, vide order dated 22.02.2024, both the Appellants
were proceeded ex parte .
11. The Respondent thereafter led ex parte evidence and examined
its Authorized Representative, Sh. Ranjan Sabu (PW-1) and exhibited
documents Ex. PW1/A to Ex. PW1/K, including the copy of the police
complaint dated 31.08.2021. After the arguments and examination of
the evidence, the learned Commercial Court passed an ex parte
judgment dated 09.08.2024, decreeing the suit against the Appellants
for Rs.23,00,000/- along with interest @7% per annum from the date of
institution till realization, together with costs of Rs. 30,000/-.
12. Subsequently, the Respondent instituted Execution Petition No.
EXE/129/2025 before the Learned Commercial Court-01, South-East
District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, which was thereafter transferred to
the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sonipat, Haryana.
The Appellants state that they came to know of the ex parte judgment
and decree on 21.09.2025 when a process server visited the residence of
Appellant No. 2 in Sonipat in connection with the execution
proceedings.
13. On 05.02.2026, the Appellants, through their erstwhile counsel,
preferred an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC before the
learned Commercial Court. However, the said application was
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subsequently withdrawn on 29.04.2026, with liberty to file afresh, on
account of formal defects, vague particulars, and an omission to place
the complete factual position on record.
14. Consequently, on 18.05.2026, the Appellants filed a fresh
application under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 CPC,
accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963, seeking condonation of a delay of 203 days, computed by them
from the alleged date of knowledge, i.e., 21.09.2025.
15. The Appellants have contended that, upon service of summons in
the suit, they promptly engaged counsel, who appeared before the Court
through video conferencing on 14.09.2023. However, the counsel
thereafter failed to file the vakalatnama or written statement or to
follow up the proceedings. It has also been averred that the Appellants
remained under the bona fide belief, on the assurances of their counsel,
that he was duly attending to and following up the proceedings.
According to the Appellants, even after they were proceeded ex parte
and the ex parte decree was passed, the erstwhile counsel collected
professional fees and court fees amounting to Rs.24,800/- for filing a
Regular First Appeal (Comm.) before this Court, but failed to pursue
the same. The said appeal is stated to be still lying under objections
before the Registry.
16. In addition, Appellant No. 2 has relied upon severe personal
distress as an explanation for his inability to effectively monitor the
proceedings. On 11.09.2023, three days before the first appearance of
the counsel engaged by the Appellants, his elder brother passed away in
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a train accident. It is submitted that the sudden tragedy, coupled with
the winding up of the business of Appellant No. 1, adversely affected
the financial condition of the family and impaired the ability of
Appellant No. 2 to monitor the ongoing proceedings.
17. The learned Commercial Court, however, dismissed the fresh
application dated 12.05.2026, filed on 18.05.2026, under Order IX Rule
13 read with Section 151 CPC, along with the application under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, vide the Impugned Order dated
09.07.2026. It was held that the application was barred by limitation
and that, since summons had been duly served in the suit, the period of
30 days was required to be reckoned from the date of the judgment
dated 09.08.2024. The application was first listed on 22.05.2026. It was
further held that both the conditions contained in the second proviso to
Order IX Rule 13 CPC stood satisfied, as the Appellants had notice of
the date of hearing and sufficient time to appear, and had failed to
establish any “sufficient cause” which prevented them from appearing
in the suit.
18. Thereafter, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sonipat, in
the execution proceedings, vide order dated 31.08.2026, issued a
conditional warrant of arrest against Appellant No. 2 through the
concerned SHO, returnable on 10.09.2026. Upon filing of the present
appeal, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 16.09.2026,
directed the learned Executing Court not to proceed with the arrest of
Appellant No. 2 in execution of the subject money decree.
19. Learned counsel representing the Appellants submits that the
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learned Commercial Court erred in dismissing the application under
Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 CPC without properly
appreciating the circumstances which prevented the Appellants from
appearing in the suit proceedings.
20. According to the Appellants, the counsel engaged by them
failed to take the requisite steps, adequately represent their interests or
apprise them of the progress of the suit. It is further submitted that, even
after passing of the decree, despite receiving professional fees as well
as court fees for preferring an appeal against the ex parte decree, the
said counsel failed to prosecute the appeal beyond the stage of Registry
objections. The Appellants state that a complaint was subsequently
lodged against the erstwhile counsel before the Bar Council of Delhi on
29.08.2026. It is, therefore, contended that the Appellants had bona fide
relied upon their counsel and ought not to be prejudiced on account of
his alleged professional negligence, and that their non-appearance was
neither deliberate nor intentional.
21. It is further contended that the aforesaid circumstances were
compounded by a personal tragedy. During the period when the suit
was pending before the learned Commercial Court, Appellant No. 2
suffered severe personal trauma on account of the untimely death of his
elder brother. Learned counsel submits that the incident caused
profound mental distress to the family and affected the ability of
Appellant No. 2 to monitor the proceedings.
22. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel placed
reliance upon the decision in Rafiq v. Munshilal, 1981 SCC OnLine SC
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222, to contend that an innocent litigant ought not to be made to suffer
for the negligence or inaction of the counsel engaged to represent him.
Reliance is also placed upon Dwarika Prasad (D) Through LRs v.
Prithvi Raj Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3828 as well as Sambhaji v.
Gangabai , ( 2008) 17 SCC 117, in support of the proposition that
procedural rules are intended to advance the cause of justice and should
not be applied so as to defeat substantive rights.
23. On the question of limitation, learned counsel for the Appellants
submits that the Appellants acquired knowledge of the ex parte
judgment and decree only on 21.09.2025 and appeared before the
Executing Court on the very next day, i.e., 22.09.2025, whereafter they
pursued their remedies. It is submitted that their conduct demonstrates
that they had not deliberately avoided the proceedings.
24. We have heard the arguments and perused the record.
25. Before an ex parte decree passed against the Defendant could be
set aside by a Court under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, it must be shown that
either the summons were not duly served upon the Defendant or that he
was prevented by a sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was
called on for hearing. The second proviso to Order IX Rule 13 CPC
further provides that no Court shall set aside an ex parte decree merely
on the ground of any irregularity in the service of summons, if it is
satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and
sufficient time to appear and answer the Plaintiff‟s claim.
26. In this regard it would be pertinent to refer to the observations
made in Hira Sweets & Confectionary Private Ltd. Vs. Hira
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Confectioners , 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1823, wherein while
considering the expression „sufficient cause‟, the following
observations were made in Paragraphs 14 and 15 as under:-
“14. In Sudarshan Sareen (Supra), a Division Bench of this
Court while holding that the appellant therein, was wilfully
negligent in not appearing and thus rejecting his prayer for
setting aside of an ex-parte decree, relied on the following
passage in the case of Parimal v. Veena reported as (2011) 3
SCC 545 , where the expression “sufficient cause” was
interpreted as under:
“13. “Sufficient cause” is an expression which has
been used in a large number of statutes. The meaning of
the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”,
inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose
intended. Therefore, word “sufficient” embraces no more
than that which provides a platitude which when the act
done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the
facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly
examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of
a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means
that the party had not acted in a negligent manner or there
was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to
have been “not acting diligently” or “remaining
inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each
case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court
concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that
whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be
exercised judiciously. (Vide Ramial v. Rewa Coalfields
Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361], Lonand Grampanchayat v.
Ramgiri Gosavi [AIR 1968 SC 222], Surinder Singh Sibia
v. Vijay Kumar Sood [(1992) 1 SCC 70] and Oriental
Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial
Development Corpn. [(2010) 5 SCC 459].)
xxx xxx xxx
15. While deciding whether there is sufficient cause or
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not, the court must bear in mind the object of doing
substantial justice to all the parties concerned and that the
technicalities of the law should not prevent the court from
doing substantial justice and doing away the illegality
perpetuated on the basis of the judgment impugned before
it. (Vide State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh
[(2000) 9 SCC 94], Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC
535], Davinder Pal Sehgal v. Partap Steel Rolling Mills
(P) Ltd. [(2002) 3 SCC 156], Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195], Kaushalya Devi v. Prem Chand
[(2005) 10 SCC 127], Srei International Finance Ltd.v.
Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. [(2005) 13 SCC 95]
and Reena Sadh v. Aniana Enterprises [(2008) 12 SCC
589].)
16. In order to determine the application under Order
9 Rule 13 CPC, the test that has to be applied is whether
the defendant honestly and sincerely intended to remain
present when the suit was called on for hearing and did
his best to do so. Sufficient cause is thus the cause for
which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence.
Therefore, the applicant must approach the court with a
reasonable defence. Sufficient cause is a question of fact
and the court has to exercise its discretion in the varied
and special circumstances in the case at hand. There
cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application.”
15. Recently, the Supreme Court in A. Murugesan v. Jamuna
Rani reported as (2019) 20 SCC 803 affirmed its earlier view in
G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada and Others reported as (2000)
3 SCC 54 , which is reproduced as under:
“7. Under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC an ex-parte decree
passed against a defendant can be set aside upon
satisfaction of the Court that either the summons were not
duly served upon the defendant or he was prevented by
any “sufficient cause” from appearing when the suit was
called on for hearing. Unless “sufficient cause” is shown
for non-appearance of the defendant in the case on the
date of hearing, the court has no power to set aside an
ex-parte decree. The words “was prevented by any
sufficient cause from appearing” must be liberally
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construed to enable the court to do complete justice
between the parties particularly when no negligence or
inaction is imputable to the erring party. Sufficient cause
for the purpose of Order 9 Rule 13has to be construed as
an elastic expression for which no hardand-fast guidelines
can be prescribed. The courts have a wide discretion in
deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the peculiar
facts and circumstances of each case. The “sufficient
cause” for non-appearance refers to the date on which the
absence was made a ground for proceeding ex-parte and
cannot be stretched to rely upon other circumstances
anterior in time. If “sufficient cause” is made out for
non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for
hearing when ex pate proceedings were initiated against
him, he cannot be penalised for his previous negligence
which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier.
In a case where the defendant approaches the court
immediately and within the statutory time specified, the
discretion is normally exercised in his favour, provided
the absence was not mala fide or intentional. For the
absence of a party in the case the other side can be
compensated by adequate costs and the lis decided on
merits.”
27. Coming now to the facts of the present case, the Appellants have
principally relied upon two circumstances to explain their
non-appearance, namely, the conduct of their erstwhile counsel and the
personal distress suffered by Appellant No. 2 on account of the
untimely demise of his elder brother. The record indicates that although
the brother of Appellant No. 2 passed away on 11.09.2023, the family
came to know of his death only subsequently. While this Court is
mindful of the grave personal tragedy suffered by Appellant No. 2 and
its emotional impact upon the family, nothing has been placed on
record to establish that the bereavement prevented the Appellants from
attending to the proceedings over the succeeding months. There was no
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appearance on their behalf on 20.12.2023 or thereafter, and they were
ultimately proceeded ex parte on 22.02.2024. The personal
circumstances pleaded, though undoubtedly distressing, do not
sufficiently explain their continued non-appearance on the relevant
dates.
28. As regards the alleged default of the erstwhile counsel, while a
litigant acting bona fide ought not ordinarily to suffer for the negligence
of his counsel, the mere engagement of counsel does not absolve a party
of the duty to pursue the proceedings with reasonable diligence.
Although the Appellants assert that they remained in contact with their
erstwhile counsel and were repeatedly assured that the matter was being
attended to, this assertion is unsupported by particulars. Neither the
dates on which such enquiries were made nor the dates on which such
assurances were given have been disclosed, nor has any relevant
material been placed on record to evidence them. Moreover, the filing
of a complaint against the erstwhile counsel only after the passing of the
Impugned Order does not establish sufficient cause for the earlier
non-appearance. In these circumstances, a bare plea of continued
reliance upon counsel fails to demonstrate the diligence required of the
Appellants.
29. The conduct of the Appellants after acquiring knowledge of the
decree also requires consideration. According to them, they became
aware of the ex parte judgment and decree on 21.09.2025 and appeared
before the Executing Court on the very next day. The record shows that
they thereafter filed objections in the execution proceedings on
15.11.2025, which came to be dismissed on 20.01.2026. The first
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application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was filed on 05.02.2026.
Thus, although the Appellants cannot be said to have remained wholly
inactive after acquiring knowledge of the decree, the steps taken in the
execution proceedings do not explain why the statutory remedy for
setting aside the ex parte decree was not invoked earlier. More
importantly, since summons in the suit had admittedly been duly served
upon the Appellants, the learned Commercial Court was justified in
reckoning limitation from the date of the decree and not from the
asserted date of knowledge. Even if the Appellants were given the
benefit of the latter date for examining their subsequent conduct, the
explanation offered does not satisfactorily account for the delay in
invoking the remedy under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.
30. The decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the Appellants
do not lead us to a different conclusion. The principle that a litigant
should not suffer solely for the fault of counsel applies where the
litigant has himself acted bona fide and with reasonable diligence.
None of the cited authorities lays down that every default attributed to
counsel would, irrespective of the facts and the litigant‟s own conduct,
constitute sufficient cause under Order IX Rule 13 CPC. Equally, the
principle that procedural rules must advance substantial justice does not
require the Court to accept a general plea of counsel default without
examining whether sufficient cause has been established on the facts of
the particular case. For the reasons recorded above, we are unable to
hold that such cause has been established here.
31. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are unable to
find any sufficient cause which prevented the Appellants from
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appearing when they were proceeded ex parte or which satisfactorily
explains their subsequent delay in seeking to have the ex parte decree
set aside. The learned District Judge (Commercial Court), therefore,
committed no error in declining to exercise discretion under Order IX
Rule 13 CPC and in dismissing the accompanying application seeking
condonation of delay.
32. Accordingly, we find no ground to interfere with the Impugned
Order. The present appeal is dismissed. Pending applications also stand
disposed of.
33. There shall be no order as to costs.

BHARAT PARASHAR, J.





ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
th
DH/MN
OCTOBER 16 , 2026/
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