THE STATE BANK OF INDIA REPRESENTED THROUGH THE CHIEF MANAGER vs KAMAL KISHORE SINGH

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.293 of 2024
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The State Bank of India, having its registered office at Bombay, one
of its local head office at Patna and one of its branches, Kathara
Branch, P.S.-Bokaro Thermal, District-Bokaro (Jharkhand),
represented through the Chief Manager, Kathara Branch, Kathara
… … Appellant
Versus

1. Kamal Kishore Singh, S/o Rajendra Prasad Singh, R/o Morabadi
New Area, Anand Parivesh, P.O.-Morabadi, P.S.-Lalpur, District-
Ranchi
2. Arbin Kumar Mishra, S/o Jagadish Mishra, R/o At & P.O.-Dumran
Chowk Bazar, P.S.-Dumran, District-Bhojpur (Bihar)
3. C.K. Mishra, S/o Jagdish Mishra, R/o At & P.O.-Dumran Chowk
Bazar, P.S.-Dumran, District-Bhojpur (Bihar)
4. Tarun Kumar Singh, S/o Sri R.P. Singh, R/o At & P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-
Bokaro Thermal, District-Bokaro
5. Shashi Bhusan Singh, S/o Late Rama Ballah Singh, R/o At & P.O.-
Baranappa, P.S.-Muffasi, District-Hazaribag, Area Sales Officer,
Office of the General Manager, C.C.L., R/o Dhori Area, P.O. & P.S.-
Bermo, District-Bokaro
6. Lalit Narayan Dubey, Assistant District Supply Officer, Tenughat,
Bokaro
7. Chandra Deo Ram, S/o Ram Swaroop Ram, R/o At & P.O.-New Road
Barhiya, P.S. & District-Munger, the then Accountant, State Bank of
India, Kathara Branch
8. M/s Shakti Traders, a Partnership Firm consisting Defendant Nos. 1,
3 & 4 as partners At & P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-Bokaro Thermal, District-
Bokaro
9. M/s Shiv Shati Coal Agency consisting defendant Nos. 1, 3 & 4 as
partners, situated at & P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-Bokaro Thermal, District-
Bokaro
10. Uma Nath Singh, R/o At & P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-Bokaro Thermal,
District-Bokaro
11. Shailendra Kumar Choudhary, R/o At & P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-Bokaro
Thermal, District-Bokaro
12. Central Coalfields Ltd, a subsidiary to Coal India Ltd, Government of
India undertaking having its registered office at Darbhanga House,
Ranchi and one of its office at the office of General Manager, Central
Coalfields Ltd., Kathara Area, P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-Bokaro Thermal,
District-Bokaro …. … Respondents
-----
CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
-----
For the Appellant : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Manindra Kumar Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Manoj Prasad, Advocate
Mr. Lalan Kumar Singh
Mr. Shivam Utkarsh Sahay, Advocate
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Reserved on 11.02.2026 Pronounced on 25.02.2026
Per : Rajesh Shankar, J. :

1. The present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order dated
15.03.2024 passed by learned Single Bench of this Court in C.M.P No.
65 of 2021 whereby the said C.M.P. has been dismissed by rejecting
the prayer of the petitioner/appellant for restoration of First Appeal No.
121 of 2018 to its original file.
2. The office has raised objection with respect to the maintainability of the
present appeal by referring to the order dated 23.11.2010 passed in
L.P.A No. 57 of 2009 wherein a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, by
referring to Section 100-A of CPC, has held that Letters Patent Appeal
cannot be entertained if the Single Judge of this court has already
exercised his jurisdiction by passing an order.
3. The notices were earlier issued to the respondents in pursuance of
which few of them have appeared in this case also raising the issue of
maintainability of the present appeal.
4. The factual background of the case is as under: -
(i) The appellant had filed Money Suit No. 02/1993 for
recovery of Rs. 1,79,47,752.81 with interest thereon
@ 21.75%, however the claim of the appellant was
rejected vide judgment dated 05.01.2018 and decree
dated 17.01.2018 passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.)
st
1 , Bermo at Tenughat.
(ii) Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed first appeal
being F.A. No. 121 of 2018 and vide order dated
24.06.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of this
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court, the appellant was directed to file requisites for
service of notices upon the respondent nos. 2 to 11
by registered post with A/D as well as under ordinary
process within four weeks, failing which, the First
Appeal was to be dismissed without further reference
to the Bench.
(iii) The Appellant failed to comply the said direction of
the learned Single Judge and consequently, the first
appeal was dismissed on 22.07.2020 for non-
compliance of the Court’s order dated 24.06.2020.
(iv) The appellant subsequently filed Civil Miscellaneous
Petition No. 65 of 2021 for restoration of F.A No. 121
of 2018 to its original file claiming that due to poor
network during virtual hearing, the counsel for the
petitioner/appellant could not clearly hear that a
peremptory order was passed by the Single Judge as
a result of which the requisites etc. could not be filed.
(v) The said Civil Miscellaneous Petition was also
dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this court
vide order dated 15.03.2024 observing inter-alia that
even if the learned counsel for the petitioner could
not clearly hear the Court’s order, it was always
expected that he would obtain a copy of the order
and take necessary steps in the matter.
(vi) Hence, the present appeal.
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5. The learned counsel for the appellant has given much emphasis to the
argument that the first appeal filed by the appellant was never heard
by the learned Single Judge of this court, rather the same was
dismissed for default. As such, the statutory bar imposed by Section
100-A CPC against filing of appeal before the Division Bench
challenging the order passed by the Single Judge, would not be
applicable in the case in hand.
6. It is further argued that though Section 100-A CPC bars filing of Letters
Patent Appeal before the Division Bench against the judgment and
decree passed by the Single Judge, it does not bar filing of Letters
Patent Appeal against the order of the Single Judge rejecting a petition
filed for restoration of first appeal. As such the present appeal is
maintainable before this court.
7. Under the aforesaid factual matrix, the following issues fall for
consideration of this Court:-
(i) Whether section 100-A CPC imposes bar on filing of
Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of
the High Court against the order passed by the Single
Judge dismissing the first appeal for default?
(ii) Whether Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable before
the Division Bench of the High Court against the
order passed in Civil Miscellaneous Petition filed for
restoration of first appeal which was dismissed for
default by the Single Judge?
8. Originally, the CPC did not expressly bar a second appeal or an appeal
to the Division Bench in the nature of Letters Patent Appeal against the
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judgment passed by the Single Judge.
9. Section 100-A was introduced for the first time by the Code of Civil
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (104 of 1976). The said section
initially reads as follows: -
“100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.
Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent
for any High Court or in any other instrument having the
force of law or in any other law for the time being in
force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or
order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High
Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment,
decision or order of such Single Judge in such appeal or
from any decree passed in such appeal.”
10. Subsequently, Section 100-A of CPC was introduced in the present form
by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 (effective from
July 1, 2002) by substituting the earlier Section 100-A of CPC. The
amended Section reads as follows: -
“100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.
Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent
for any High Court or in any instrument having the force
of law or in any other law for the time being in force,
where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or
order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High
Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and
decree of such Single Judge.”
11. Thus, Section 100-A CPC amended w.e.f. 01.07.2002 provides that
where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard
and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, the further appeal i.e.,
the Letters Patent Appeal is barred against the judgment and decree of
the Single Judge. The said Section starts with non-obstante clause i.e.,
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent" and thus
section 100-A overrides the power of High Courts to hear Letters Patent
Appeals in such eventuality.
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12. In the case of D.N. Taneja Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in (1988) 3
SCC 26, it has been held that the right of appeal is a creature of the
statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not, will
have to be considered on an interpretation of the provision of the
statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration.
13. We have perused the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered
in the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Vs.
Union of India reported in (2003) 1 SCC 49 wherein the legal
validity of Section 100-A CPC has been upheld by holding inter-alia that
the said Section has been introduced to minimize unnecessary
workload on a Division Bench of the High Court and the said provision
does not cause any prejudice to the litigants.
14. In the case of Mohd. Saud & Another Vs. Dr. (Maj.) Sk. Mahfooz
& Others reported in (2010) 13 SCC 517, an interim order passed
by the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No. III,
Bhubaneshwar in Civil Suit No. 498 of 2004 was challenged in first
appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC which was decided by the Single
Judge of Orissa High Court vide judgement dated 06.08.2008 and
thereafter Letters Patent Appeal was filed before the Division Bench
challenging the said judgment. The Full Bench of Orissa High Court
dismissed the said Letters Patent Appeal being not maintainable.
In the appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the claim of the
appellant was that Section 100-A CPC as substituted in the year 2002,
only bars an LPA against a judgment of the learned Single Judge which
contains a decree and since the judgment of the Single Judge passed in
first appeal did not accompany a decree, the LPA was not barred
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against the said judgment. Their Lordships rejected the said contention
of the appellant by observing that there seems to be some apparent
contradiction in Section 100-A as amended in the year 2002. While in
the first part of the said section it is stated “where any appeal from an
original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single
Judge of a High Court”, in the following part it is stated “no further
appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge”.
Thus, while the first part of section 100-A refers to an order which
would include even an interlocutory order, the latter part of the section
mentions judgment and decree.
It has been further held that a purposive interpretation is needed
to resolve the said conflict. The entire purpose of introducing Section
100-A was to reduce the number of appeals as the litigants at large
were being harassed by the numerous appeals provided in the statute.
If a purposive construction is not made, the resultant will be that
against an interlocutory order of the District Judge, there may be two
appeals, first to the learned Single Judge and then to the Division
Bench of the High Court, but against a final judgment of the District
Judge, there can be only one appeal. This situation would be strange
and against the very object of Section 100-A, i.e., to curtail the number
of appeals. It has further been held that the apparent contradiction in
Section 100-A as amended in the year 2002, is only due to improper
drafting and for clarity, the very purpose of Section 100-A is to be
understood.
15. It is trite law that literal interpretation is given to a statute where the
words mentioned in it are clear, unambiguous and lead no absurdity.
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Previously, the literal interpretation was treated as golden rule of
interpreting a statute. Nowadays, the rule of purposive construction is
predominant and the courts are frequently using it where literal
interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity to
achieve the purpose of enactment of a statute. Purposive interpretation
is a pragmatic legal approach adopted by the Courts to interpret any
statute by focusing on the underlying purpose, object, and intent
behind the legislation, rather than just its strict literal wording. It seeks
to actually fulfill the legislature's intent.
16. In the case of Hameedia Hardware Stores represented by its
partner S. Peer Mohammed Vs. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar reported in
(1988) 2 SCC 513, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the
court while construing a provision should not easily read into its words
which have not been expressly enacted, but should construe it in a
harmonious way to make it meaningful having regard to the context in
which a provision is introduced in the statute.
17. In the case of Anwar Hasan Khan Vs. Mohd. Shafi & Others
reported in (2001) 8 SCC 540, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
as under: -
“8. It is settled that for interpreting a particular
provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning
of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be
gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter
and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a
cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort
should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a
conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The
statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a
whole and one provision should be construed with
reference to the other provision to make the provision
consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The
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well-known principle of harmonious construction is that
effect should be given to all the provisions and a
construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “dead
letter” is not harmonious construction. With respect to
law relating to interpretation of statutes this Court
in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco
De Gama [(1990) 1 SCC 277] held: (SCC p. 284, para 16)
16. The paramount object in statutory
interpretation is to discover what the legislature
intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained
from the text of enactment in question. That does not
mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of
prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A
statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation.
‘Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and
unchanged’ as Mr Justice Holmes has wisely and properly
warned. (Towne v. Eisner [245 US 418, 425 (1918)] )
Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said:
‘Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid,
but with some imagination of the purposes which lie
behind them.’ (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage [218
FR 547, 553])”
18. In the case of Shailesh Dhairyawan Vs. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla
reported in (2016) 3 SCC 619, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
as under: -
31. The aforesaid two reasons given by me, in
addition to the reasons already indicated in the judgment
of my learned Brother, would clearly demonstrate that
the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act require
purposive interpretation so that the aforesaid
objective/purpose of such a provision is achieved
thereby. The principle of“purposive interpretation” or
“purposive construction” is based on the understanding
that the court is supposed to attach that meaning to the
provisions which serve the “purpose” behind such a
provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it
designed to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by
interpretative process the court is supposed to realise the
goal that the legal text is designed to realise. As Aharon
Barak puts it:
Purposive interpretation is based on three
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components: language, purpose, and discretion.
Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities
within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the
interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal
meaning of the text from among the (express or implied)
semantic possibilities. The semantic component thus sets
the limits of interpretation by restricting the interpreter
to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its (public or
private) language.” [Aharon Barak, Purposive
Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005).]
32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely,
language, purpose and discretion “of the court”, insofar
as purposive component is concerned, this is the ratio
juris, the purpose at the core of the text. This purpose is
the values, goals, interests, policies and aims that the
text is designed to actualise. It is the function that the
text is designed to fulfil.
33. We may also emphasise that the statutory
interpretation of a provision is never static but is always
dynamic. Though the literal rule of interpretation, till
some time ago, was treated as the “golden rule”, it is now
the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is
predominant, particularly in those cases where literal
interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to
absurdity. If it brings about an end which is at variance
with the purpose of statute, that cannot be
countenanced. Not only legal process thinkers such as
Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a grand
strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they
offered purposivism, this principle is now widely applied
by the courts not only in this country but in many other
legal systems as well.”
19. In the case of Newtech Promoters & Developers Private Limited
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others reported in (2021) 18 SCC 1
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: -
139. It is settled principle of law that if the plain
interpretation does not fulfil the mandate and object of
the Act, this Court has to interpret the law in consonance
with the spirit and purpose of the statute. There is indeed
a visible inconsistency in the powers of the Authority
regarding refund of the amount received by the promoter
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and the provision of law in Section 18 and the text of the
provision by which such refund can be referred under
Section 40(1). While harmonising the construction of the
scheme of the Act with the right of recovery as mandated
in Section 40(1) of the Act keeping in mind the intention
of the legislature to provide for a speedy recovery of the
amount invested by the allottee along with the interest
incurred thereon is self-explanatory. However, if Section
40(1) is strictly construed and it is understood to mean
that only penalty and interest on the principal amount are
recoverable as arrears of land revenue, it would defeat
the basic purpose of the Act.
20. Section 100-A of CPC has been introduced to streamline the appellate
remedy making it more efficient and less burdensome on the higher
adjudicatory forums. The intention of the legislature in introducing the
said section is to limit the number of appeals so as to avoid prolonged
litigations as well as to reduce judicial backlogs. The principle of finality
in judicial proceedings is a cornerstone of procedural law, aiming to
prevent indefinite litigation and to ensure certainty in legal outcomes.
21. If the words “heard and decided” as appear in section 100-A of CPC is
given a literal interpretation as has been contended by the learned
counsel of the appellant, an LPA can be said to be maintainable against
the orders passed by a Single Judge of a High Court where an appeal
has been dismissed for any reason other than on merit and only in
those cases of first appeal where a judgment has been passed after
hearing the parties, the LPA would be barred before the Division Bench.
This will give rise to the same anomalous situation as discussed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Saud (supra).
22. Thus, the literal interpretation of the words “heard and decided” will
not serve the object sought to be achieved by the introducing
legislature in Section 100-A of CPC vide 2002 amendment. Therefore,
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the said provision has to be given harmonious/purposive construction.
23. We are of the considered view that the words “heard and decided” as
appear in section 100-A of CPC should not to be construed in isolation,
rather Section 100-A should be construed in its entirety to achieve the
real and meaningful purpose of the said section.
24. In the case of Metro Tyres Ltd. & Others Vs. Satpal Singh
Bhandari & Others reported in 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3681, the
Division Bench of Delhi High Court had an occasion to deal with a
similar matter. In the said case, the Additional District Judge had
rejected the application for restoration of suit on the ground that the
same had abated due to not bringing on record the legal representative
of some of the defendants. The First appeal filed by the appellant of
that case before the Single Bench of the High Court was dismissed for
default as well as the application filed for restoration of the first appeal
was also dismissed. Thereafter, the appeal under Clause 10 of the
Letters Patent was filed before the Division Bench, which was held not
maintainable observing that the words ‘heard and decided’ as appear in
Section 100A of CPC had to be interpreted keeping in view the context
itself as well as that the said Section was amended with effect from
st
1 July, 2002 to take away the further appeal from a decree or an order
and the fundamental purpose of introducing the same was to minimize
the sphere of appeals.
25. The Delhi High Court went on to observe that if the appellants’
contention is accepted, it may give rise to a situation where a litigant
prefers an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 and allows it to dismiss for
default or shows total callousness in getting it dismissed for want of
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prosecution and thereafter files an application for restoration at his own
leisure and being unsuccessful prefers a Letters Patent Appeal
contending that it is maintainable. Thus, this interpretation will amount
to giving a premium to an unscrupulous or negligent litigant. The
courts are required to interprete a provision which would subserve the
purpose of the legislative intent unless the same brings in a situation of
an irreconcilability or absurdity.
26. A Full Bench of this Court also in the case of Satya Narayan Agiwal
and Bishwanath Agiwal Vs. State Bank of India & Others
reported in 2005 SCC OnLine Jhar. 228 has held that on plain
reading of the provisions of Section 100-A of the CPC, it is evident that
the legislative intent in introducing the said provision was to minimize
the delay in the finality of a decision by excluding the right to prefer a
Second Appeal in the High Court from an order of the Single Judge
passed in an appeal from an original or appellate decree.
27. In the case of Mrs. Indira Vishwa Mohini Mishra Vs. Smt. Kiran
Devi & Others reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Jhar 229, a
Division Bench of this court has held that the words ‘no further appeal
shall lie’ appearing in Section 100-A of C.P.C. is of great significance
and the same clearly indicate that no further appeal shall be
entertained, if an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order
is heard and decided by a learned Single Judge of the High Court.
28. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Delhi
High Court particularly considering the observations made by the Full
Bench and the Co-ordinate Bench of this court as cited hereinabove.
29. Furthermore, on perusal of the record, it would be evident that the
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appellant was accorded ample opportunity to file requisites for issuance
of notices upon some of the respondents, however it failed to comply
the said order. If a party who given a proper, fair and sufficient
opportunity, chooses not to respond, cannot subsequently contend that
he was not appropriately heard. It may thus be construed that an
"opportunity of hearing provided" is to be treated in consonance with
the word "heard" mentioned in Section 100-A of 2002 amendment.
Thus, the appellant cannot claim that it was not heard before deciding
the first appeal leading to its dismissal for any reason whatsoever.
30. Thus, we are of the considered view that Section 100-A of CPC also
imposes a bar in filing of Letters Patent Appeal before the Division
Bench of the High Court against the order passed by the learned Single
Judge dismissing the first appeal for default.
31. The first issue is decided accordingly.
32. So far as the second issue is concerned, we are of the view that since
LPA is not maintainable against the judgment and order of the Single
Judge of the High Court passed in first appeal, the same will also not
be maintainable against the order passed by the Single Judge rejecting
an application seeking restoration of the first appeal to its original file.
33. We also wish to observe here that if the present LPA is held
maintainable, it may lead to a situation where an unscrupulous litigant
will deliberately try to linger the first appeal by letting it dismissed for
default, then will file restoration and on its rejection, will file LPA. Any
other interpretation of section 100-A would frustrate the intent of the
legislature in introducing it resulting in multiplicity of the proceedings
before the courts, whereas the purposive interpretation will be in
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conformity with the legislative mandate aimed at achieving finality in
litigation and avoiding multiple tiers of intra-court scrutiny.
34. Since Section 100-A of CPC bars filing of the Letters Patent Appeal
before the Division Bench of this Court challenging any judgment or
order passed by the Single Judge, the present appeal filed in the form
of LPA or even against the order passed by the Single Judge rejecting
the application seeking restoration of first appeal dismissed for default,
is held to be not maintainable.
35. The second issue is also decided in above terms.
36. The present appeal is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable.
37. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of.

(M.S. Sonak, C.J.)

(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
th
25 February, 2026
Vikas/A.F.R.
Uploaded on 25.02.2026
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