Pr. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central, Gurugram vs M/S Experion Developers Pvt. Ltd.

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Date of decision: 18 NOVEMBER, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
# CNR No. DLHC011103732025
+ ITA 319/2026
PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRAL,
GURUGRAM .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Vipul Agrawal, SSC along with
Mr. Gaoraang Ranjan & Ms. Harshita
Kotru, Advocates.
versus

M/S EXPERION DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rohit Jain & Mr. Vaibhav
Kulkarni, Advocates.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
1. The present Appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as „ IT Act ‟) for the Assessment Year 2012-13 has
been filed by the Appellant/Department against the order dated 31.07.2025
passed by the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to
as „ ITAT ‟) in ITA No. 1367/Del/2017, whereby the learned ITAT deleted an
ad-hoc disallowance of Rs.8,73,10,314, being 90% of revenue expenditure
of Rs. 9,70,11,460/- made by the learned Assessing Officer (hereinafter
referred to as „ AO ‟), which were claimed as business expenditure by the
Respondent/Assessee.
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2. The facts, in brief, leading upto the filing of the present Appeal are
that the Respondent/Assessee is engaged in the business of construction and
development of real estate projects, including developing townships,
housing, commercial premises and other related activities.
3. For the Assessment Year 2012-13, the Respondent/Assessee filed its
return on 29.09.2012 declaring loss of Rs. 7,82,95,075/-, which was
processed under the provisions of Section 143(1) of the IT Act. It is stated
that the case of the Assessee was selected for scrutiny, and a notice under
Section 143(2) of the IT Act was issued and served upon him by the
Assessing Officer. The assessment under Section 143(3) of the IT Act was
completed, and an Assessment Order was framed by the Assessing Officer
on 19.03.2015, in which the total income of the Respondent/Assessee was
determined at Rs. 90,15,239/-.
4. During the assessment proceedings, the learned Assessing Officer,
vide the order dated 19.03.2015,disallowedthe expenditure to the tune of Rs.
8,73,10,314, being 90% of revenue expenditure amounting to Rs.
9,70,11,460/-, claimed as business expenditure by the Respondent/Assessee.
According to the learned Assessing Officer, the expenditure was directly or
indirectly connected with projects under development and ought to have
been capitalised as „project cost or work-in-progress‟, particularly when no
project revenue had been recognised during the year.
5. Aggrieved by the Assessment Order dated 19.03.2015, the
Respondent/Assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income
Tax (Appeals)(hereinafter referred to as „ CIT(A) ‟). The appeal was,
however, rejected, and the additions made by the learned Assessing Officer
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were confirmed vide the order dated 02.01.2017. The said Order was further
challenged by the Assessee before the learned ITAT.
6. The learned ITAT, vide the Impugned Order dated 31.07.2025,
reversed the decision of the learned CIT(A) and the learned Assessing
Officer, finding that the Assessee had allocated project-related expenditure
to inventory in accordance with the applicable accounting framework and
had claimed the balance as revenue expenditure. The relevant portion of the
Impugned Order reads thus:-
“6. The assessee had allocated the cost of various
expenditure strictly in accordance with the AS-7 and
Guidance Note on Accounting of Real Estate
transactions issued by ICAI by transferring the
requisite portion to the project and claiming the
remaining sums as revenue expenditure. The books of
accounts and the book results submitted by the
assessee are not sought to be rejected by the Learned
AO in terms of section 145(3) of the Act. The
application of Accounting Standard and Guidance
Notes issued by ICAI and utilization of the same for the
purpose of recognition of income under the Income Tax
Act has been subject matter of due consideration by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Virtual Soft
Systems Limited vs ACIT reported in 404 ITR 409 (SC)
wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court had duly given due
credence to the Accounting Standards and Guidance
Notes issued by ICAI. It is well settled that earning of
revenue is not a condition precedent for deduction of
expenditure under section 37 of the Act. What is
required to be seen is whether the business is set up
and whether the expenditure incurred thereon are
meant for the purpose of business. The issue in dispute
was also subject matter of consideration by the
Coordinate Bench of Delhi Tribunal in the case of AB
Multiplex Private Limited vs ACIT in ITA No. 739/ Del
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/ 2014 wherein that assessee was engaged in the
business of builders and developers; that the
commercial projects of that assessee was under
construction; that the expenses directly related to the
project were added to the inventories (project under
construction) as per its accounting policies. Certain
expenses being administrative expenses and not
directly related to the project were however debited in
the profit and loss account and claimed as deduction.
That assessing officer concluded that assessee did not
have any business income and that since no business
was carried out by that assessee during the year, the
question of allowability of business expenditure does
not arise which stood upheld by that Learned CITA.
The Tribunal appreciating the existence of business
activities held that the expenditure not linked /
attributable to the project is allowable 'as . deduction
while computing the business income of that assessee.
The facts of that case before the Delhi tribunal are
squarely applicable to the facts before us.

7.Further in any event, we find that the Learned AO
himself had allowed 10°/0 of the total revenue
expenditure as a deduction which goes to prove that he
was convinced that the expenditure incurred by the
assessee in the total sum of Rs 9,70,11,460/- are indeed
meant wholly and exclusively for the purpose of
business of the assessee. Having held so, the Learned
AO erred in making an adhoc disallowance of 90% of
the expenditure in the sum of Rs 8,73,10, 314/ - which
in our opinion is totally arbitrary in nature. A query
was posed by the Bench to the Learned AR as to when
the income has been ultimately offered to tax from the
project. In response thereto, the Learned AR sought
time to furnish the said details of income being offered
in subsequent assessment years under POCM up to
Assessment years 2022-23. We find from the perusal of
the said details that certain assessments were even
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completed under section 143(3) of the Act by the
Learned AO accepting the claim of the assessee.

8. In view of the aforesaid observations, we hold that
assessee has followed the consistent practice of
claiming deduction of revenue expenditure not related
to the '.project since beginning i.e. from Assessment
year 2011-12 onwards. We also find that the assessee's
method of accounting of claiming deduction has been
accepted by the revenue in Assessment year 2011-12
except the finance cost and thereafter from Assessment
year 2016-17 onwards. As far as Assessment years
2012-13 to 2015-16 are concerned, the revenue has
only disputed the allowability of deduction of revenue
expenditure not related to the project cost which has
already been addressed by us in the present appeal.
The fact of the business of the assessee being set up
and expenditures being incurred wholly and exclusively
for the purpose of business are not being doubted by
the revenue. Considering the consistent method
adopted by the assessee in the past and also in
subsequent assessment years, we hold that a sum of Rs
8,73,10,314 would be squarely eligible for allowability
of deduction in the year under appeal. Accordingly, the
grounds raised by the assessee are hereby allowed .”

7. It is this Order dated 31.07.2025 passed by the learned ITAT, which is
under challenge in the present Appeal.
8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Revenue has submitted that the
principal issue concerns the allowability of expenditure of Rs. 8,73,10,314/-
as revenue expenditure in a year in which no revenue was recognised from
the real estate projects under the Percentage of Completion Method
(hereinafter referred to as „ POCM ‟), and the minimum threshold under
Accounting Standard 7(hereinafter referred to as „ AS-7 ‟) and the Guidance
Note on Real Estate Transactions issued by the Institute of Chartered
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Accountants of India (hereinafter referred to as „ Guidance Note ‟) had not
been crossed.
9. Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Revenue has further submitted that
the nature of expenses actually incurred by the Assessee and the method of
accounting of expenditure in POCM with the real estate projects must have
been examined before allowing the deduction. He contended that AS-7 and
the Guidance Note distinguish project construction and development costs
from general administrative, selling and other expenses that are not to be
included in project costs. It is submitted that the expenses directly or
indirectly attributable to ongoing projects and Work In Progress require
consideration for capitalisation and cannot be allowed as revenue
expenditure merely by describing them as such.
10. He further submitted that the Respondent/Assessee had disclosed
„NIL‟ receipts under “Revenue from Operations” during the concerned
Assessment Year, i.e., 2012-13, and that the expenses incurred during the
year were connected with activities in relation to the work in progress.
Further, there was no activity carried out by the Assessee during the
Assessment Year in question, which yielded or could yield any receipt or
accrue any receipt and therefore, the expenses related to the project should
be capitalised under Work In Progress. Besides, a lot of factual findings of
the learned AO were not considered while giving findings by the learned
ITAT.
11. He further submitted that the Respondent/Assessee had not furnished
sufficient evidence to establish that the expenses claimed in the Profit and
Loss Account were revenue in nature or that the allocation between revenue
and project-related expenditure was properly substantiated. He submitted
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that, since the Respondent‟s principal business was real estate development
and no other business activity was identified to which the expenditure could
be allocated, the classification of expenses as unrelated to projects could not
be accepted without supporting material.
12. He further submitted that the Assessing Officer‟s allowance of 10% of
the expenses as revenue expenditure was made because of the difficulty in
verifying the Respondent‟s bifurcation and to account for statutory expenses
necessary for the existence of the entity. He submitted that this allowance
did not establish that the remaining 90% was unrelated to the projects or
allowable as revenue expenditure. He also submitted that the genuineness of
expenditure and its allowability as a revenue deduction are distinct issues,
and that the mere recording of expenses in the books does not establish their
deductibility in the year incurred. Reliance was placed on the dictum in
Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd. v. CIT , (1997) 6 SCC 117 in
support of his contention that the project-related expenditure required
consideration for capitalisation rather than automatic allowance as revenue
expenditure.
13. Per Contra , the learned Counsel for the Respondent has submitted
that the Impugned Order is based on findings of fact and no substantial
question of law arises under Section 260A of the IT Act, particularly as the
Appellant/Revenue has neither alleged nor demonstrated any perversity in
the findings of the learned ITAT.
14. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Respondent
had allocated expenses strictly in accordance with AS-7 and the ICAI
Guidance Note, which excludes general administrative and selling expenses
from project costs, and that no provision of law mandates the inclusion of
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such expenses in WIP. Moreover, since the Appellant/Revenue had not
rejected the books of account under Section 145(3) of the IT Act, the
regularly followed method of accounting ought to be accepted.
15. Learned Counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the
expenditure was allowable under Section 37(1), as the Respondent‟s
business was already set up and running, and actual earning of revenue in
the same year was not a condition for deduction. The Respondent had
consistently followed the same method of accounting from Assessment Year
2011–12 onwards. He further submitted that the Assessing Officer‟s
disallowance of 90% of the expenditure was arbitrary, as the Respondent
had furnished a head-wise classification of all 27 expense categories and
neither the Assessing Officer nor the CIT(A) identified any specific expense
as incorrectly claimed.
16. He further submitted that the CIT(A) had incorrectly treated WIP as
property, plant and equipment instead of inventory, referred to the project
completion method instead of the Percentage of Completion Method
(POCM), and stated that the entire expenditure had been capitalised despite
the AO allowing 10% as revenue expenditure. Further, the dispute was
revenue neutral, as the AO had merely deferred the deduction by directing
that the disallowed amount be treated as WIP, rather than holding the
expenditure to be inadmissible.
17. He submitted that the project income had already been offered to tax
under POCM, but the disallowed expenditure had not been allowed in any
subsequent year, and restoring the disallowance would result in the
permanent denial of genuine business expenditure.
18. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.
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19. Six substantial questions of law were framed by the
Appellant/Department at the time of filing the Appeal, which read under:
A) Whether Ld. ITAT erred in law in allowing
deduction of Rs.9,70,11,460/- as revenue expenditure in
a year when the assessee, following POCM, recognised
no revenue from its real estate projects and the projects
had not crossed the minimum threshold prescribed
under AS-7 and ICAI Guidance Note on Real Estate
Transactions?

B) Whether Ld. ITAT misapplied the law by holding
that expenditure not directly capitalized by the assessee
is automatically allowable as revenue expenditure,
ignoring the mandatory matching principle under the
Incometax Act and the binding judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals
(227 ITR 172), Madras Auto Service (233 ITR 468) and
Taparia Tools Ltd. (372 ITR 605)?

C) Whether Ld. ITAT erred in law in treating partial
allowance of 10% by the AO as an admission that the
entire expenditure is allowable in the current year, and
directing 100% allowance on this misconceived basis?

D) Whether Ld. ITAT was justified in permitting the
assessee to follow only the revenue-recognition part of
POCM (deferring income) while selectively claiming
immediate deduction of indirect/overhead expenditure
attributable to the same unfinished projects, thereby
distorting true income and violating Section 145 and
the scheme of the Act?


E) Whether Ld. ITAT's reliance on its co-ordinate
bench decision in AB Multiplex Pvt. Ltd. (ITA
739/Del/2014) and the rule of consistency is legally
sustainable when the same is contrary to binding
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Supreme Court precedents on matching of revenue and
expenditure in project-based accounting?

F) Whether the impugned order passed by Ld. ITAT
is perverse on law and facts?

20. It is apposite to consider the scope of jurisdiction exercisable by this
Court under Section 260A of the IT Act. An appeal under the said provision
is maintainable only where the Court is satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law. The learned ITAT is the final fact-finding
authority under the Act, and its findings cannot be reopened merely because
another view of the evidence may be possible. A Co-ordinate Bench of this
in CIT v. Hamdard National Foundation, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 513 has
discussed the meaning of the term “substantial question of law” as under:
“26. The Supreme Court, in Ram Kumar Agarwal v.
Thawar Das [Ram Kumar Agarwal v. Thawar Das,
(1999) 7 SCC 303] , has reiterated that under Section
100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the jurisdiction
of the High Court to interfere with the orders passed by
the courts below is confined to hearing on the
substantial question of law and interference with the
finding of the fact is not warranted if it involves
reappreciation of evidence. Further, the Supreme
Court, in State of Haryana v. Khalsa Motors Ltd. [State
of Haryana v. Khalsa Motors Ltd., (1990) 4 SCC 659] ,
has held that the High Court was not justified in law in
reversing, in the second appeal, the concurrent finding
of the fact recorded by both the courts below. The
Supreme Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal [Hero
Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545] , has also
held that “in a case where from a given set of
circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the
one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be
interfered by the High Court in the second appeal.
Adopting any other approach is not permissible”. It
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has also been held that there is a difference between a
question of law and a “substantial question of law”.
Recently, while considering a similar provision in the
Electricity Act, 2003, the Supreme Court in
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v.
Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission
[Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v.
Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission,
(2022) 4 SCC 657 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 913] ,
observed that the word “substantial question of law”
means not only a substantial question of law of general
importance, but also any substantial question of law
arising in a case between the parties on which the
decision in the lis depends. A question of law that
arises accidentally or collaterally and has no bearing
on the final outcome will not be a substantial question
of law. Whether the question raised is a question of law
and, if so, whether the question is a substantial
question of law is also not determined by the enormity
of the stakes involved in the same. To be “substantial”,
a question of law must be debatable, not previously
settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent,
and must have a material bearing on the decision of
the case and/or rights of the parties before it, if
answered either way. Findings of fact recorded by the
courts below, which would imply the CIT(A) and the
learned ITAT in these appeals, cannot be reopened.
Sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence to support a
finding is a matter for the decision of the court of facts.

(Emphasis Supplied)


21. Similarly, the Karnataka High Court in the dictum in Commissioner
of Income Tax v. Bahubali Neminath Muttin , 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 8048
has observed the following :
“16. It is evident from a reading of Section 260A of the
I.T. Act that an appeal would lie to this Court from an
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order of the ITAT, only if there is a substantial question
of law that arises for consideration. In Vijay Kumar
Talwar‟s case (supra), the Supreme Court has held that
it is mandatory for the High Court to formulate the
substantial question of law on which the appeal would
be considered. But that the expression “a substantial
question of law”, is not defined in the I.T. Act.
However, it has acquired a definite connotation
through various judicial pronouncements. In Shri
Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning
and Manufacturing Company Limited [AIR 1962 SC
1314] , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has
held as follows:

“18. The proper test for determining whether a
question of law raised in the case is substantial
would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general
public importance or whether it directly and
substantially affects the rights of the parties and if
so whether it is either an open question in the
sense that it is not finally settled by this court or
by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is
not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of
alternative views. If the question is settled by the
highest court or the general principles to be
applied in determining the question are well
settled and there is a mere question of applying
those principles or that the plea raised is palpably
absurd the question would not be a substantial
question of law.”

17. Similarly, in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari
[(2001) 3 SCC 179] , a three-judge Bench of the Apex
Court has observed that: “A point of law which admits
of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but
cannot be a substantial question of law. To be
„substantial‟ a question of law must be debatable, not
previously settled by law of the land or a binding
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precedent, and must have a material bearing on the
decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as
the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a
question of law „involving in the case‟ there must be
first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the
question should emerge from the sustainable findings
of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be
necessary to decide that question of law for a just and
proper decision of the case. An entirely new point
raised for the first time before the High Court is not a
question involved in the case unless it goes to the root
of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and
circumstance of each case whether a question of law is
a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the
paramount overall consideration being the need for
striking a judicious balance between the indispensable
obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling
necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any
lis.”

18. In Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal [(2006) 5
SCC 545, 556] , the Apex Court has observed that:
“The general rule is that High Court will not interfere
with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it
is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised
exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored
material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the
courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts
by applying the law erroneously; or (Hi) the courts
have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer
to „decision based on no evidence it not only refers to
cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also
refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a
whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the
finding.”

19. In Vijay Kumar Talwar's case (supra), the Supreme
Court has observed thus:
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“21. A finding of fact may give rise to a
substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event
the findings are based on no evidence and/or
while arriving at the said finding, relevant
admissible evidence has not been taken into
consideration or inadmissible evidence has been
taken into consideration or legal principles have
not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or
when the evidence has been misread. (See: Madan
Lal v. Mst. Gopi [(1980) 4 SCC 255; Narendra
Gopal Vidyarthi v. Rajat Vidyarthi (2009) 3 SCC
287; Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) v.
Vijay Dasharath Patel (2007) 4 SCC 118;
Metroark Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise,
Calcutta (2004) 12 SCC 505; West Bengal
Electricity Regulatory Commission v. CESC Ltd.
(2002) 8 SCC 715).”

20. Further, in Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works case
(supra), the Supreme Court has held as follows:

“19. xxx There is a clear finding of fact by the
Tribunal that the legal expenses incurred by the
assessee were for protecting its business and that
the expenses were incurred after November 18,
1994. There is no reason to reverse this finding of
fact particularly since nothing has been shown to
us to conclude that the finding of fact was
perverse in any manner whatsoever. That apart, if
the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal were
to be set aside, a specific question regarding a
perverse finding of fact ought to have been framed
by the High Court. The Revenue did not seek the
framing of any such question. In this regard,
reference may be made to K. Ravindranathan
Nair v. Commissioner of Income Tax [2001] 247
ITR 178, 181 (SC) wherein it was observed: “The
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High Court overlooked the cardinal principle that
it is the Tribunal which is the final fact-finding
authority. A decision on fact of the Tribunal can
be gone into by the High Court only if a question
has been referred to it which says that the finding
of the Tribunal on facts is perverse, in the sense
that it is such as could not reasonably have been
arrived at on the material placed before the
Tribunal. In this case, there was no such question
before the High Court. Unless and until a finding
of act reached by the Tribunal is canvassed before
the High Court in the manner set out above, the
High Court is obliged to proceed upon the
findings of fact reached by the Tribunal and to
give an answer in law to the question of law that

is before it.”

22. Applying the law laid down by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
Hamdard National Foundation (supra), only the proposed questions are
primary questions of facts and there is no accounting principle.
23. The Appellant/Department, by proposed Questions A and B, contends
that the learned ITAT erred in allowing the deduction of Rs.9,70,11,460/- as
revenue expenditure in a year in which no project revenue had been
recognised. The allowability of expenditure has to be determined in
accordance with the nature of the expenditure and whether it is attributable
to the project or is otherwise incurred wholly and exclusively for the
business. In the case on hand, the learned ITAT considered the accounting
method followed by the Assessee, the allocation of expenditure to work-in-
progress, the business purpose of the expenditure and the applicable
accounting guidance. It also took note of the fact that the Assessing Officer
had disallowed 90% of the expenditure on an ad hoc basis and that the
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Assessing Officer‟s action in making the disallowance of Rs.8,73,10,314/-
was “totally arbitrary in nature”. The learned ITAT‟s conclusion was based
on its assessment of the material on record which cannot be said to be
perverse and does not warrant any interference.
24. Questions C and E concern the significance attributed by the learned
ITAT to the partial allowance allowed by the Assessing Officer and the rule
of consistency. It is indeed true that the partial allowance by the Assessing
Officer cannot constitute a conclusive admission that the entire expenditure
is deductible. The rule of consistency in the method of accounting cannot
override the provisions of the IT Act. However, the learned ITAT also relied
upon its factual findings concerning the nature and allocation of expenditure.
25. Question D, which challenges the allowance of indirect and overhead
expenditure while project revenue remained unrecognised, raises the same
underlying issue regarding the distinction between expenditure attributable
to projects and expenditure otherwise deductible under Section 37. The
applicable accounting guidance, which is the Guidance Note, distinguishes
between costs directly related to specific projects and costs attributable to
project activity generally. On the findings recorded by the learned ITAT, the
Department has not demonstrated that the learned ITAT‟s conclusion rests
upon an erroneous interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions or
accounting principles.
26. As regards Question F, no specific material has been identified to
demonstrate that a substantial question of law arises from the present
Appeal.
27. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered
opinion that the proposed substantial questions of law do not give rise to a
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substantial question of law warranting interference by this Court under
Section 260A of the IT Act.
28. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Application(s), if any, pending,
shall stand closed.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J


RENU BHATNAGAR, J
NOVEMBER 18, 2026
EK
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