Adarsh Dinkar Sontakke vs Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti

Court
Supreme Court

2026 INSC 865
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No(s).24310-24311 of 2026)


ADARSH DINKAR SONTAKKE
(MINOR) & ORS. ETC. ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

NAVODAYA VIDYALAYA
SAMITI & ORS. ETC. ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. These appeals with special leave are preferred
by the appellants herein seeking to assail the
th
judgment dated 10 July, 2026 rendered by Division
Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,
1
Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Writ Petition No.4157 of
2026 titled as Arpita Santosh More (Minor) v.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2026.08.17
09:58:38 IST
Reason:

1
Hereinafter, referred to as “the High Court”
1

Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti & Ors. , following
which, identical order was passed in Writ Petition
No.3796 of 2026 titled as Gargi Nitesh Rasse
(Minor) thr. her natural guardian father Nitesh
Hemkant Rasse & Ors. v. Navodaya Vidyalaya
Samiti & Ors .
4. The short question that falls for determination
in these appeals as to whether appellants whose
schools are situated within the limits of a Nagar
Panchayat, an area constituted under Article 243-
Q(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and described as
a “transitional area” under Section 341-A of the
Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats
2
and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 , can be treated
as candidates from an “urban area” and thereby be
denied the benefit of the Rural Category reservation
i.e., 75% of seats under the Jawahar Navodaya
3
Vidyalaya Selection Test Scheme 2026
notwithstanding that they had otherwise qualified on
merit and had been provisionally selected.

2
In short, “the 1965 Act”
3
Hereinafter, referred to as “JNVST-2026”
2

5. For ready reference, Article 243-Q of the
Constitution of India has been reproduced
hereunder:
“243Q. Constitution of Municipalities –

(1) There shall be constituted in every State, -

(a) a Nagar Panchayat (by whatever name called)
for a transitional area, that is to say, an area in
transition from a rural area to an urban area.
(b) a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area;
and
(c) a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban
area,

in accordance with the provisions of this Part:

Provided that a Municipality under this clause may
not be constituted in such urban area or part thereof
as the Governor may, having regard to the size of the
area and the municipal services being provided or
proposed to be provided by an industrial
establishment in that area and such other factors as
he may deem fit, by public notification, specify to be
an industrial township.

(2) In this article, 'a transitional area', 'a smaller
urban area' or 'a larger urban area' means such area
as the Governor may, having regard to the population
of the area, the density of the population therein, the
revenue generated for local administration, the
percentage of employment in non-agricultural
activities, the economic importance or such other
factors as he may deem fit, specify by public
notification for the purposes of this Part.”

3

6. The Division Bench of the High Court whilst
deciding the lead matter of Arpita Santosh More
(supra) held as below:
“30. Thus, a 'Transitional Area' is neither a smaller urban
area nor a larger urban area. At the same time, it cannot
be treated as a rural area. Once a notification declaring
an area as a 'Transitional Area' is issued, the area no
longer remains a rural area because the process of its
transition from a rural area to an urban area has begun
and is in progress.
xx xx xx
32. Thus, there is no element of doubt that the
specification of areas, as transitional areas, smaller
urban areas or larger urban areas is indicative of the fact
that by their very nature, these areas have ceased to be,
rural in nature and characteristics. Clause (2) of Article
243-Q requires the Governor; to have due regard to the
population of the area, the density, of population, the
revenue generated. For local administration, the
percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities,
the economic importance or such other factors as he may
deem fit. These are all indicia of urbanization as distinct
from a predominantly rural area.
xx xx xx
37. After considering the object of establishment of
Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya where for the upliftment of
rural students 75% seats are reserved for rural students,
we cannot accept the definition of a 'rural area' which the
petitioner has relied upon, i.e., an 'urban area' is that
which is notified by the Government and all other areas
are 'rural areas'.

38. Whereas, the definition of a 'rural area' which says
that the area nor notified as a 'rural area' by the
Government will be an urban area, is the correct
definition which will help to achieve the manifest purpose
of the scheme of Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas.

4

39. Thus, we hold that for the admission in rural quota
in Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas, the areas which are not
notified by the Government as rural areas will be
considered as urban areas.”

7. Thus, primarily the High Court was of the view
that once the areas in which the schools from which
the appellants studied in previous classes were
declared to be transitional areas, they lost the
character of students of rural areas and as such,
could not be admitted against the 75% seats reserved
for the said category.
8. The High Court further held that for admission
in rural quota in Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya, the
areas which are not notified by the government as
rural areas would be considered as urban areas.
9. Learned Counsel Shri Chapalgaonkar
Siddharth Sarang representing the appellants
vehemently urged that the judgment rendered by the
High Court in Arpita Santosh More (supra) case is
per incuriam as the Division Bench has taken a totally
converse view from the earlier prevailing view of the
Division Bench of the very same Court in the case of
Jiya Jitendra Nagrale v. State of Maharashtra
rd
being Writ Petition No.5598 of 2023 decided on 23
5

April, 2024. The learned counsel referred to Article
243-Q of the Constitution of India and urged that the
same deals with the constitution of municipalities
and provides for three steps set out in clause (a), (b)
and (c).
10. He submitted that the areas in which the
schools attended by the appellants were situated had
been notified as Nagar Panchayats in 2015; but
thereafter no further steps were taken to declare the
said areas to be a municipal council for a smaller
urban area or a municipal corporation for a larger
urban area. Hence, as per Shri Sarang, the areas in
question continued to remain transitional areas and
could not be treated as urban areas. He urged that
for a rural area to be converted to an urban area, a
specific notification to that effect is required to be
issued. Until and unless such notification is made,
the area would continue to retain its rural character.
11. It was submitted that the very concept of a
transitional area indicates that till the transition is
completed, the original character of the area in
question would be retained. Shri Sarang referred to
the Division Bench Judgment in the case of Jiya
Jitendra Nagrale (supra) wherein, after a detailed
6

discussion of Article 243-Q(1)(a), it was held that
merely because a Nagar Panchayat is constituted
that by itself would not mean that the rural area
automatically becomes an urban area. Reference
was also made to the observations made in Para No.8
of the said judgment to point out that in the said
case, there was a draft notification issued under
Section 341A of the 1965 Act but no final notification
had been issued and yet the High Court treated the
students hailing from the transitional areas as
entitled to the seats reserved for rural students.
12. It was further submitted that the concerned
Government officers have continued to issue rural
area certificates to the appellants, which have been
placed on record along with a rejoinder. These
certificates were issued in April, 2026 and
conclusively establish that the appellants are
residents of rural areas even as on date and are thus
entitled to be admitted against the seats reserved for
the rural category students based on their merit
position.
13. It was further submitted that provisional
admission certificates had been issued to the
appellants but subsequently, the respondents, taking
7

note of the notification of the area being declared as
a Nagar Palika (transitional area), refracted their
stance and denied the benefit of reservation to the
appellants on the ground that they no longer retained
the status of rural area students.
14. It was contended that indisputably, the
appellants were provisionally selected from rural

quota for admission in standard VI of Jawahar
Navodaya Vidyalaya, Chandrapur District,
Maharashtra for the academic session 2026-2027
but were denied final admission on the ground that
rd
for a few months in 3 Standard, they had taken
admission and studied in schools situated at
Pombhurna, Sindewahi, Gondpipri and Sawali which
were located in Nagar Panchayat (transitional areas)
and hence, they did not retain the character of rural
area students.
15. Shri Sarang submitted that the Division bench
while deciding the lead matter of Arpita Santosh
More took note of judgment in Jiya Jitendra
(supra)
Nagrale (supra) . However, by placing reliance on a
judgment of Allahabad High Court, the view taken by
a co-ordinate Bench of the same High Court was
brushed aside and hence, it was the contention of
8

learned counsel for the appellants that the Division
Bench judgment deserves to be annulled on the
ground of it being per incuriam . It was urged that if
at all the Division Bench was of a view that Jiya
Jitendra Nagrale (supra) did not lay down the
correct exposition of law then the proper and only
permissible course would be to refer the same to a
full Bench of the High Court. However, by relying on
a judgment of another High Court, the existing view
of a Division Bench of the same High Court could not
have been bypassed.
16. It was submitted that the Unified District
4
Information System for Education Guidelines dated
th
27 March, 2026, which dispensed with the
requirement of the Rural area certificate, could not
be applied to the appellants, as the same were issued
after the selection process had concluded. The last
th
date for applications was 29 July, 2025, the
th
examination was held on 13 December, 2025 and
the results, along with provisional selection, were
th
declared on 10 March, 2026. The Prospectus
governing the entire process contains no reference to

4
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘UDISE’
9

UDISE, and the candidates were not informed that
their eligibility would be determined on the basis of
the classification reflected in the UDISE portal.
Reliance was placed on K. Manjusree v. State of
5
A.P. , to contend that the criteria governing a
selection cannot be altered after the process has
commenced, particularly to the prejudice of
candidates who have already been selected.
17. It was further submitted that the UDISE
Guidelines have been relied upon by the respondents
to dispute the appellant’s eligibility while
disregarding the valid Rural Area Certificates issued
to them by the Tahsildars.
18. Clause 3.7 of the Prospectus expressly
recognises the District Magistrate, Tahsildar and
Block Development Officer as competent authorities
for certifying the rural status of a school. It was
therefore contended that an entry in the UDISE
portal, which is not referred to in the Prospectus,
could not impinge upon the validity and legal force of
the certificates issued by the authorities recognised
under the Prospectus, nor could the subsequent

5
(2008) 3 SCC 512
10

Guidelines alter the eligibility criteria already
notified.
19. Per contra , Shri S. Rajappa, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents vehemently and
fervently opposed the submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the appellants. It was urged that
the very purport of Article 243-Q is to constitute
municipal areas by upgrading the rural areas. For
this purpose, the initial step is the constitution of the
Nagar Panchayat, thereafter, a municipal council and
finally a municipal corporation depending upon the
density of population, the land area and the revenue
generated for local administration, etc.
20. It was submitted that once the declaration of an
area as a Nagar Panchayat is made under Article 243-
Q(1)(a), the rural character of the area is permanently
lost and thus, the students who hail from such areas
would not be entitled to claim admission against the
seats reserved for the rural area students in the
Navodaya Vidyalaya. He thus urged that the view
taken by the High Court in Arpita Santosh More
(supra) following the judgment of Allahabad High
11

6
Court in Rakam Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh
is the correct interpretation of law and thus, no
interference is called for in the impugned judgment.
21. It was further submitted on behalf of the
th
respondents that the circular dated 27 March, 2026
did not introduce any new eligibility condition. The
requirement that a candidate must have studied in a
school situated in a rural area during Classes III, IV
and V was already prescribed in the Prospectus.
According to the respondents, the UDISE portal was
introduced only as a mechanism for verification of the
rural or urban status of schools, with a view to
ensuring uniformity in verification and preventing
ineligible candidates from claiming the benefit of the
Rural Category. It was further submitted that
candidates whose schools were reflected as rural on
the UDISE portal were not required to furnish a
separate Rural Area Certificate, which was only a
measure intended to simplify the verification process.
It was, therefore, contended that the Guidelines
neither altered the eligibility criteria nor operated
retrospectively. They merely prescribed the manner

6
2015 SCC OnLine All 7509
12

in which compliance within an existing eligibility
criterion was to be ensured.
22. We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced at bar and have gone
through the impugned judgment. We have also
carefully perused the judgment in Jiya Jitendra
Nagrale (supra) .
23. We feel that the Division Bench, while rendering
the judgment in Arpita Santosh More (supra) has
taken a diagonally opposite view to that taken by the
earlier Division Bench in Jiya Jitendra Nagrale
(supra) . For the sake of ready reference, the relevant
conclusions from Jiya Jitendra Nagrale (supra) are
quoted hereinbelow:
“7. A perusal of Article 243-Q (l)(a) of the Constitution of
India, would indicate that a Nagar Panchayat is to be
constituted for a transitional area, that is to say, an area
in transition from a rural area to an urban area. Merely,
because a Nagar Panchayat is constituted that by itself
does not mean that the rural area automatically becomes
an urban area, this is more so for the reason, that Article
243-Q (2) defines what is meant by a "transitional area",
"a smaller urban area" or "a larger urban area",
depending upon the density of the population, the
revenue generated for local administration, the
percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities,
the economic importance or such other factors as may be
prescribed in that regard. The action of defining an area
as "a transitional area", "a smaller urban area" or "a larger
13

urban area", under Article 243-Q (2) of the Constitution
of India, has to be done by the Governor.

8. In the instant case, though there is a draft Notification
pointed out to us issued in pursuance to Section 341-A
of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar
Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965, which
is dated 01.03.2014, there is no final notification in that
regard, which has been placed on record or brought to
our notice. Even if we presume, that there is a final
notification in existence, that would only indicate that the
area of Nagar Panchayat Maregaon, is a Transitional area
in terms of Article 243-Q-(1) (a) and (2) of the Constitution
of India. That-by itself, does not turn it into an urban area
so as to deprive the petitioner No. 2 of the benefit of the
same.

9. The certificate issued dated 17.08.2023 issued by the
Panchayat Samiti Maregaon, is merely based upon the
language of Article 243-Q of the Constitution of India and
does not indicate that it is issued after any compliance,
with the provisions of Article 243-Q (2) of the Constitution
of India, which could only be indicated by the Notification
by the Governor in that regard, which is absent.

10. It would therefore be appropriate, to grant the benefit
of Nagar Panchayat Maregaon being a transitional area to
the petitioner No.2, in view of which, the impugned
communications as indicated above are hereby quashed
and set aside and the respondent No.2 is directed to
continue the admission of the petitioner No.2.”


24. Having gone through the conclusions in the two
conflicting views of the Benches of co-equal strength
of the High Court, we find that the Division Bench in
Arpita Santosh More (supra) has virtually overruled
the ratio of the judgment in Jiya Jitendra Nagrale
14

(supra) which ex facie runs contrary to the principle
of per incurium .
25. This Court in a series of judgments has laid
down that when there exists an exposition of law by
a Bench of the High Court, a Bench of co-equal
strength cannot take a different view unless, of
course, in its opinion, the earlier judgment has been
rendered in ignorance of a provision of law or the law
as laid down by a larger Bench of the same Court or
a judgment rendered by this Court which is binding
under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. This
Court, in U.P. Gram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh v.
7
Daya Ram Saroj , observed that:
“26. Judicial discipline is self-discipline. It is an inbuilt
mechanism in the system itself. Judicial discipline
demands that when the decision of a coordinate Bench of
the same High Court is brought to the notice of the
Bench, it is to be respected and is binding, subject of
course, to the right to take a different view or to doubt the
correctness of the decision and the permissible course
then open is to refer the question or the case to a larger
Bench. This is the minimum discipline and decorum to
be maintained by judicial fraternity.”

26. Similarly, a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v.

7
(2007) 2 SCC 138
15

8
State of Maharashtra has summarised the law
governing the binding effect of decisions rendered by
Benches of different strengths in the following terms:
“ 12. Having carefully considered the submissions made
by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties and having
examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches
in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the
legal position in the following terms:
(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered
by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any
subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength.
(2) [Ed.: Para 12(2) corrected vide Official Corrigendum
No. F.3/Ed.B.J./21/2005 dated 3-3-2005.] A Bench of
lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view
of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of
doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to
invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for
the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of
larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come
up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of
coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the
correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of
coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed
for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger
than the one which pronounced the decision laying down
the law the correctness of which is doubted.”
(Emphasis supplied)

27. In the present case, none of the circumstances
which could justify a departure from the earlier view
is shown to exist. More importantly, in para 40 of
Arpita Santosh More (supra) , the Division Bench

8
( 2005) 2 SCC 673
16

has explicitly declared the law as laid down in Jiya
Jitendra Nagrale (supra) to be incorrect without
assigning any logical or rational reason behind such
finding. On this ground alone, quite apart from the
merits, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
28. Coming to the merits, in our considered view,
the text of Article 243-Q(1) itself provides a clear
indication of the constitutional scheme, which does
not appear to have received due consideration by the
High Court while deciding Arpita Santosh
More
(supra) . Clause (a) refers to “a transitional area,
that is to say, an area in transition from a rural area
to an urban area”, whereas clauses (b) and (c) employ
the expressions “a smaller urban area” and “a larger
urban area”, respectively. The Constitution has,
therefore, specifically used different expressions in
the three clauses. It is a well-settled principle of
interpretation that where different words are
employed in the same provision, they are ordinarily
intended to bear different meanings. Equally, effect
must be given to every expression used in the
Constitutional provision, and no part of the provision
should be rendered redundant. If “transitional area”
were to be understood as synonymous with an
17

“urban area”, the distinction maintained in clause (a)
would serve no independent purpose, as clauses (b)
and (c) would sufficiently cover the field.
29. The scheme of the 1965 Act also supports this
distinction. Under Section 3(2), the State
Government may specify an area as a “smaller urban
area” or a “larger urban area”, upon which a
Municipal Council or a Municipal Corporation, as the
case may be, is to be constituted. Section 341-A, on
the other hand, empowers the State Government to
declare an area to be “in transition from a rural area
to an urban area”, leading to the constitution of a
Nagar Panchayat. The Legislature has, thus, treated
a transitional area as a category distinct from a
smaller urban area.
30. This distinction is further amplified by virtue of
Section 341-D, which contemplates a subsequent
stage when a transitional area attains the status of a
smaller urban area. It is only upon the issuance of a
notification under that provision that the Nagar
Panchayat stands abolished and the area is declared
to be a smaller urban area. Section 341-C also
proceeds on the same premise by manifesting that
the provisions applicable to a Municipal Council do
18

not apply to a Nagar Panchayat unless specifically
extended by notification. The statutory scheme,
therefore, does not place a Nagar Panchayat on the
same footing as a Municipal Council.
31.
Indisputably, no notification under Section 341-
D has been issued in respect of Pombhurna,
Sindewahi, Gondpipri or Sawali where the schools in
question were located. Consequently, these areas
continue to be governed by the notification of
transitional areas under the statutory framework.
Read as a whole, the provisions of the 1965 Act
maintain a clear distinction between a transitional
area and a smaller urban area, and that distinction
cannot be ignored while construing Article 243-Q of
the Constitution of India or the provisions of the 1965
Act.
32. Since considerable reliance was placed by the
High Court, as well as by the learned counsel for the
respondents, on the decision of the Allahabad High
Court in Rakam Singh , it would be
(supra)
appropriate to examine the scope of that decision.
33. The issue before the Allahabad High Court arose
in an entirely different statutory and constitutional
context. The petitioner, who intended to contest
19

elections to the Zila Panchayat, challenged the
constitutional validity of Section 12-A of the Uttar
9
Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 and
th
the notification dated 14 January, 2015 concerning
the reconstitution and delimitation of Gram
Panchayats within the jurisdiction of NOIDA and
Greater NOIDA.
34. Section 12-A of the 1976 Act provides that
where an industrial development area is specified as
an “industrial township” under the proviso to Article
243-Q(1) of the Constitution of India, the area ceases
to form part of a Panchayat area and the Panchayat
constituted for such area stands dissolved. The
question before the Allahabad High Court was
whether this statutory consequence was consistent
with Part IX of the Constitution and it was in that
context that Rakam Singh was decided.
(supra)
35. However, the present case stands on an entirely
different footing. It does not concern an industrial
township constituted under the proviso to Article
243-Q(1), but a Nagar Panchayat constituted under
clause (a) of Article 243-Q(1) during a transitional

9
For short, “the 1976 Act”
20

phase. The constitutional basis, purpose and
statutory consequences of both scenarios are entirely
distinct. As noticed in paragraph 16 of Rakam Singh
(supra) , an industrial township is treated as a subset
of an urban area for the purposes of the proviso to
Article 243-Q(1). The decision, therefore, proceeded
on the premise that the area in question possessed
an urban flavour before its specification as an
industrial township.
36. That is not the position in the present case. It is
undisputed that no notification declaring
Pombhurna, Sindewahi, Gondpipri or Sawali to be a
smaller urban area has been issued. The High Court
has principally relied upon the observations
contained in paragraph 15 of Rakam Singh (supra) ,
wherein the constitutional scheme under Parts IX
and IX-A was discussed whereas the same was in
entirely different geographical and factual context.
37. Those observations thus have to be understood
in the context of the issue that arose for
consideration in that case. The question before the
Allahabad High Court was the constitutional validity
of a statutory provision governing industrial
townships under the proviso to Article 243-Q(1). The
21

present case raises an entirely different question,
namely, the legal status of a transitional area
constituted under clause (a) of Article 243-Q(1) and
its relevance for determining eligibility of the students
residing in such area against the seats reserved for
rural students under the Jawahar Navodaya
Vidyalaya Scheme. It is well settled that a judgment
is an authority for the question that it decides and
not for every observation contained therein. The
observations in Rakam Singh (supra) must therefore
be read in the context of the factual matrix before that
Court and cannot be treated as laying down a general
proposition governing every issue arising under
Article 243-Q.
38. It is also relevant to note that Rakam Singh
(supra) was not concerned with the interpretation of
Clause 4.7 of the Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya
Prospectus, the object of the JNV Scheme, or the
question whether a transitional area should be
treated as rural or urban for the purpose of
determining eligibility under that Scheme. Those
issues were totally alien to the controversy prevailing
in Rakam Singh (supra) . In these circumstances, we
are of the view that the decision in Rakam Singh
22

(supra) had no application to the facts of the present
case, and the reliance placed upon it by the High
Court was clearly erroneous.
39. Coming to JNVST-2026 Prospectus, Clause 4.7
in material part, provides:
“A candidate who has studied in a school located
in an urban area even for a single day of session in
Class-III, IV and V will be considered as an urban
candidate. Urban areas are those which are so
defined by any Government notifications on the last
date of submission of application for JNVST
registration. All other areas will be considered as
rural.”

40. The language used is clear. For the purposes of
the Prospectus, an area is to be treated as urban only
where it has been so notified by the Government. In
the absence of such a notification, it falls within the
category of rural area be it transitional or residual.
The clause does not envisage any further sub-
classification. The interpretation accepted by the
High Court proceeds on the premise that a
transitional area, though not notified as an urban
area, should nevertheless be treated as urban. Such
an interpretation does not accord with the language
of Clause 4.7. The Prospectus itself makes the
existence of a Government notification the
23

determinative criterion for treating an area as urban.
It would neither be appropriate nor justified to read
into the Prospectus a category that it does not
expressly provide for. This is particularly so where
the interpretation adopted determines eligibility
under a beneficial educational scheme. It is well
settled that where an authority frames the norms
governing its own selection process, it is bound to act
in accordance with those norms. The respondent-
Samiti must, therefore, apply the Prospectus as
framed and cannot introduce an additional criterion
not found therein.
41. Upon noticing the chronology of the events in
the case at hand, it is not disputed that the last date
th
for submission of applications was 29 July, 2025;
th
the selection test was conducted on 13 December,
2025; and the results, along with the provisional
th
selection letters, were issued on 10 March, 2026.
th
The UDISE Guidelines were issued only on 27
March, 2026, after the selection process had
concluded. It is also not in dispute that the
Prospectus governing JNVST-2026 does not contain
any reference to the UDISE portal or to the
classification recorded therein. Candidates who
24

applied pursuant to the Prospectus were, therefore,
not put to notice that their eligibility under the Rural
Category would be determined with reference to
entries in the UDISE database.
42.
It is well settled that a selection process must
ordinarily be governed by the criterion that was in
force when the process commenced. While the scope
of the principle popularly described as the “rules of
the game” doctrine has been considered by the
Constitution Bench in K. Manjushree (supra) , there
is little doubt that eligibility conditions governing an
ongoing selection cannot ordinarily be altered to the
prejudice of candidates who have participated on the
basis of the notified norms.
43. In the present case, the appellants submitted
their applications, appeared in the examination and
were provisionally selected in accordance with the
Prospectus as it stood. The subsequent issuance of
the UDISE Guidelines cannot, therefore, furnish a
basis to revisit their eligibility for JNVST-2026.
44. This is not to suggest that the respondents are
precluded from adopting a uniform mechanism for
verification in future admissions. If the respondent-
Samiti considers it appropriate to rely upon the
25

UDISE classification for determining the rural or
urban status of schools, it is at liberty to incorporate
such a criterion in the Prospectus or other governing
documents applicable to future admission cycles.
Once such a requirement is notified in advance, all
candidates would have clear notice of the basis on
which their eligibility is to be assessed.
45. However, a criterion introduced in the midst of
or after the completion of the selection process
cannot be applied retrospectively to govern
admissions already under process.
46. There is another aspect of the matter. Following
the declaration of the results, the appellants were
issued provisional selection letters. Acting upon
those communications, they obtained Transfer
Certificates from their respective schools and altered
their position on the assumption that their
admissions would be processed in accordance with
the Prospectus. In these circumstances, the
respondents could not, after the conclusion of the
selection process, rely upon subsequently issued
guidelines to deny admission to the appellants. Such
a course would be inconsistent with the manner in
which the selection process was notified and
26

conducted and thus would have to be struck down as
being arbitrary and unjust.
47. Hence, we are of the firm view that the
exposition as made by the learned Division Bench of
the High Court in Arpita Santosh More (supra) and
subsequently followed in Gargi Nitesh Rasse (supra)
is not the correct proposition in law. The conclusions
drawn in the said judgment that the mere declaration
of the area in question to be a transitional area under
Article 243-Q (2) of the Constitution of India would
bring the same within the category of urban areas
and in turn imply that the area no longer remains a
rural area because the process of transition has
begun, is neither the pragmatic view nor one that
stands to reason.
48. The presumption, in our opinion, would operate
in favour of treating the area in question to be rural
till the final transition takes place. It is our firm
opinion that until and unless the final notification
declaring the area under question to be a
municipality as per the header of Article 243-Q of the
Constitution of India is issued, the transitional area
would definitely retain its character as a rural area.
27

49. Hence, the impugned judgments do not stand
the scrutiny and are hereby set aside.
50. The appellants who have qualified and
succeeded on merit in the written examination for
being admitted in the class VI of the Jawahar
Navodaya Vidyalaya, shall be duly and forthwith
admitted into the said school.
51. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to
grant admission to the appellants who have qualified
and succeeded in the written examination to Class VI
of the Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya against the seats
reserved for the Rural Category forthwith. If the
academic session has already commenced, the
respondents shall take appropriate steps, including
by providing bridge classes or such other academic
support as may be necessary, to ensure that the
appellants are able to cover the missed academic
exercises and continue their studies without any
disadvantage.
52. We make it clear that this judgment is confined
to the admission process for JNVST-2026. Nothing
contained in this judgment shall preclude the
respondent-Samiti from reviewing or revising the
criteria or the verification mechanism, including the
28

use of the UDISE guidelines, for future admission
cycles. However, any such revision shall be notified
before the commencement of the relevant admission
process and shall operate prospectively. It shall not
be applied to candidates who have participated in, or
been selected through, an admission process already
governed by a previously notified Prospectus.
53. The appeals are allowed in these terms. No order
as to costs.
54. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.

….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)



...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 30, 2026.


29