Manisha Tyagi vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others

A.F.R.
Reserved On: 22.09.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - A No. - 1685 of 2025
Manisha Tyagi
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. And 2 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Vijayendra Pratap Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Jay Prakash Singh
Court No. - 52
HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI CHAUHAN, J.
1. Heard Mr. Awadh Narayan Rai, learned Advocate holding brief of Mr.
Vijayendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned
Standing Counsel for the State as well as Mr. Jay Prakash Singh, learned
counsel for respondent nos.2 and 3.
2. The present petition has been instituted challenging the order dated
14.11.2024 passed by the District Basic Education Officer, District-
Saharanpur whereby the claim of the petitioner for appointment on
compassionate grounds has been rejected.
3. Placing the brief facts of the case, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the petitioner’s father, namely, late Dharamveer Singh, was
serving as an Assistant Teacher in a Primary Vidyalaya and died in
harness on 14.05.2015. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted an
application, along with all the relevant documents, before the concerned
respondent on 17.05.2016, seeking appointment on compassionate
grounds.
4. It is further submitted that, vide order dated 05.09.2016, the petitioner’s
claim for compassionate appointment was rejected by the respondents
solely on the ground that she was a married daughter. Aggrieved by the
said order, the petitioner instituted Writ Petition No.11255 of 2019
(Manisha Tyagi vs. State of U.P. And 2 Others) before this Court,

WRIA No. 1685 of 2025
2
assailing the rejection of her claim for compassionate appointment.
5. The aforesaid writ petition was decided by this Court on 10.05.2024,
whereby the order rejecting the petitioner’s claim was quashed and the
matter was remitted to the concerned respondent with a direction to
consider the petitioner’s claim afresh and to pass an appropriate order in
accordance with law within a period of one month from the date of receipt
of a certified copy of the order.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that, in the aforesaid
writ petition, the petitioner had specifically relied upon the judgment
rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal
Defective No. 863 of 2015 (Neha Srivastava v. State of U.P. And A
nother) , wherein the exclusion of a married daughter from the ambit of
the expression “family” occurring in Rule 2(c) of the Uttar Pradesh
Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servants Dying in Harness
Rules was assailed as being arbitrary, discriminatory and in violation of
Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India.
7. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Division
Bench of this Court, in Writ-C No. 60881 of 2015 (Vimla Srivastava v.
, examined the validity of the
State of U.P.), decided on 04.12.2015
exclusion of a married daughter from the ambit of the expression “family”
occurring in Rule 2(c) of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of
Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974. The Division Bench
held that the exclusion of married daughters merely on the ground of their
marital status was arbitrary and unconstitutional, being violative of
Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the word
“unmarried” occurring in Rule 2(c)(iii) of the said Rules was struck down.
8. The aforesaid judgment, therefore, makes it clear that marital status, by
itself, cannot constitute a valid ground for excluding an otherwise eligible
daughter from consideration for compassionate appointment. The claim of
the petitioner is accordingly required to be examined in the light of the
law so declared, while keeping in view the other statutory requirements
governing compassionate appointment.
9. Consequent upon the aforesaid declaration of law by the Division

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3
Bench, the State Government issued the requisite notification dated
12.11.2021, whereby the word “unmarried” was omitted from Rule
2(c)(iii) of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government
Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974. The statutory position, therefore,
came to be aligned with the constitutional mandate and the law declared
by this Court, rendering marital status no longer a disqualification for
consideration of an otherwise eligible daughter for compassionate
appointment.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance upon the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Government of India And A
, reported in
nother vs. Sri Devaraj URS Medical College 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 1479 , submits that the petitioner is entitled to consideration
of her claim in the light of the law declared by this Court in
Vimla
Srivastava (supra) . It is contended that a declaration of law by a
competent constitutional court ordinarily operates retrospectively unless
the court, in express terms or by necessary implication, limits the
operation of its declaration prospectively.
11. Placing particular reliance upon the aforesaid decision, learned
counsel submits that where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not expressly
directed that its declaration of law shall operate prospectively, the settled
position is that the law so declared is retrospective in its application.
Accordingly, it is urged that the benefit of the law declared in Vimla
cannot be denied to the petitioner merely on the
Srivastava (supra)
ground that her claim arose or was considered prior to the subsequent
statutory amendment dated 12.11.2021.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance upon the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in
Sayara Khatoon @ Shayara
Khatoon and another v. State of Bihar and others , reported in 2026
, submits that, in view of the law declared in
SCC OnLine SC 1466
Vimla Srivastava (supra) and the subsequent statutory notification dated
12.11.2021, the petitioner cannot be denied consideration for
compassionate appointment merely on account of her being a married
daughter. The decision in had already declared
Vimla Srivastava (supra)
the exclusion of married daughters from the expression “family” under

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4
Rule 2(c) of the Dying-in-Harness Rules to be unconstitutional and had
struck down the word “unmarried” occurring in Rule 2(c)(iii).
13. It is, therefore, submitted that the petitioner is entitled, at the very
least, to have her claim considered in accordance with the law declared in
, read with the notification dated 12.11.2021
Vimla Srivastava (supra)
and the principles reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
. The consideration of her claim cannot be
Sayara Khatoon (supra)
foreclosed solely by reference to her marital status; the competent
authority is required to examine her eligibility, dependency and the other
requirements prescribed under the applicable rules.
14. The second ground assigned in the impugned order for rejecting the
petitioner’s claim is that the application for compassionate appointment
was made after a lapse of six years from the date of death of the deceased
employee and was, therefore, barred by limitation. The said reasoning,
however, cannot be sustained on the facts of the present case.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that from the record it is
clear that the petitioner had submitted her application for compassionate
appointment on 17.05.2016, well within the period prescribed under the
applicable rules. The petitioner’s claim was not rejected on the ground of
delay or limitation at the relevant stage; rather, the claim was declined on
the premise that, being a married daughter, she did not fall within the
ambit of the expression “family” under the Dying-in-Harness Rules.
Thus, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the lapse attributable to
the respondents in considering or deciding her claim.
16. Once the petitioner had approached the competent authority within the
prescribed period, the subsequent passage of time occasioned by the
respondents’ consideration and rejection of her claim cannot be treated as
a delay attributable to the petitioner. The objection of limitation,
therefore, proceeds on an erroneous factual premise and cannot furnish a
valid ground for rejection of the petitioner’s claim.
17. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is contended that the
impugned order, insofar as it declines to consider the petitioner’s claim
for compassionate appointment merely on the ground of her marital

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5
status, is unsustainable in law. The order, having been passed in disregard
of the law declared by this Court in Vimla Srivastava (supra) and the
subsequent statutory notification dated 12.11.2021, suffers from
arbitrariness and unreasonableness and is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
18. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that, following the death
of the petitioner's father on 14.05.2015, the petitioner applied for
compassionate appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher at the
primary level on 17.05.2016.
19. Thereafter, by letter dated 05.09.2016, the then District Basic
Education Officer informed the petitioner that, although she was a
graduate, passing the Teacher Eligibility Test was a mandatory
qualification for appointment to the post of teacher. It was further
observed that, according to the family member certificate dated
11.06.2015, the deceased employee had left behind five dependents,
including a married daughter. Accordingly, in view of the applicable
Government Orders and relevant rules, the petitioner was held ineligible
for compassionate appointment on the grounds that she was a married
daughter and did not possess the requisite educational qualifications.
20. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the petitioner filed Writ Petition
No.11255 of 2019 (Manisha Tyagi vs. State of U.P. And 2 Others), which
was disposed of by order dated 10.05.2024, whereby the matter was
remitted to the District Basic Education Officer for fresh consideration in
the light of the law laid down in . In compliance
Neha Srivastava (supra)
with the aforesaid order, the District Basic Education Officer passed an
order dated 29.07.2024, deciding the petitioner's claim afresh.
21. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that, under
Clause 8 of the Government Order dated 04.09.2000, an application for
compassionate appointment is required to be considered within five years
from the date of death of the deceased employee. It is, therefore,
contended that the petitioner's claim is barred by the prescribed period
and is not liable to be considered.
22. It is further submitted that the petitioner's claim had already been
rejected on the grounds of her being a married daughter and her failure to

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6
possess the requisite educational qualifications, whereas the subsequent
notification relied upon by her came into existence thereafter.
Accordingly, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the
petitioner is not entitled to be considered for compassionate appointment.
23. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival submissions, the
material brought on record and the legal position governing the
controversy, this Court finds that the impugned order cannot be sustained
either on the ground on which the petitioner’s claim for compassionate
appointment has been rejected or on the purported ground of delay.
24. The principal foundation of the impugned order is that, being a
married daughter, the petitioner did not fall within the ambit of the
expression “family” contemplated under Rule 2(c) of the Uttar Pradesh
Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servants Dying in Harness
Rules, 1974. Such an approach, however, is rendered wholly untenable in
view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Division Bench of this
Court in Writ-C No. 60881 of 2015 (Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P.),
. The Division Bench, upon examining the
decided on 04.12.2015
constitutional validity of the exclusion of married daughters from the
expression “family”, held such exclusion to be impermissible, being
violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, and
consequently struck down the word “unmarried” occurring in Rule
2(c)(iii) of the Rules.
25. The declaration in was not an isolated
Vimla Srivastava (supra)
judicial pronouncement divorced from the statutory scheme; rather, the
State Government itself, in recognition of the legal position so declared,
issued the notification dated 12.11.2021, whereby the word “unmarried”
was omitted from the aforesaid statutory provision. The legislative and
executive response thus brought the text of the Rules into consonance
with the constitutional principle that marital status, by itself, cannot
furnish a disqualification to an otherwise eligible daughter seeking
consideration for compassionate appointment.
26. The subsequent judicial pronouncements relied upon by learned
counsel for the petitioner reinforce the aforesaid legal position. In the case

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7
of , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
Sri Devaraj Urs Medical College(supra)
reiterated the settled principle concerning the temporal operation of a
declaration of law, namely, that unless the Court expressly confines its
pronouncement to prospective operation, a declaration of law ordinarily
governs the legal position from its inception. Likewise, reliance has been
placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
, in support of the proposition that the claim of a
Sayara Khatoon (supra)
married daughter cannot be non-suited merely by invoking her marital
status when such exclusion stands contrary to the law declared by a
constitutional court and the statutory position subsequently brought into
conformity therewith.
27. Consequently, the petitioner’s claim could not have been rejected by
treating her marital status as an insurmountable disqualification. The fact
that the statutory amendment/notification came subsequently cannot, by
itself, efface the legal consequence flowing from the earlier declaration of
law in Vimla Srivastava (supra) . A subsequent formal amendment
bringing the statutory text into conformity with the constitutional position
cannot be construed as conferring, for the first time, a right which had
otherwise been legally unavailable; rather, it evidences the consequential
alignment of the statutory framework with the law already declared by
this Court.
28. The second reason assigned in the impugned order, namely, that the
petitioner’s application was barred by limitation as it was allegedly
submitted after six years from the death of the deceased employee, is
equally bereft of factual and legal foundation. The record demonstrates
that the petitioner had submitted her application for compassionate
appointment on 17.05.2016. Thus, it cannot legitimately be said that the
petitioner slept over her claim or approached the competent authority after
an unexplained or inordinate delay. On the contrary, she had invoked the
compassionate appointment mechanism within the relevant period. Her
claim came to be rejected on the substantive ground that, being a married
daughter, she did not fall within the definition of “family”. The
intervening passage of time, therefore, cannot be converted into a
disability against the petitioner when such passage was occasioned by the
consideration and eventual rejection of her claim by the respondents.

WRIA No. 1685 of 2025
8
29. It is equally well settled that, while considering a claim for
compassionate appointment, the relevant circumstances are to be assessed
with reference to the time when the right to seek such consideration arose
and when the dependent approached the competent authority in
accordance with the applicable rules. The date of subsequent rejection
cannot be retrospectively employed as the determinative point for
assessing whether the claimant had approached the authority within time.
To permit the respondents to take advantage of the time consumed in their
own administrative process would amount to converting an administrative
delay into a disqualification against the claimant. Such an approach would
be manifestly inequitable and legally unsustainable.
30. In the present case, therefore, there is neither any demonstrable delay
attributable to the petitioner nor any basis for treating her application
dated 17.05.2016 as belated. The petitioner had already asserted her claim
within the prescribed framework. The subsequent rejection of that claim
on the ground of marital status, which was itself contrary to the
constitutional principle enunciated in the case of
Vimla Srivastava
(supra) , cannot be employed to defeat her claim by subsequently
characterizing the matter as one of delay.
31. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the impugned
order suffers from a fundamental legal infirmity. It proceeds upon a
criterion which had been judicially declared constitutionally
impermissible and, in addition, proceeds upon an erroneous attribution of
delay to the petitioner notwithstanding her application dated 17.05.2016.
The order, thus, fails to withstand the test of legality, reasonableness and
constitutional fairness and is liable to be interdicted.
32. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 14.11.2024, to the extent it
rejects the petitioner's claim solely on the ground of her being a married
daughter, is hereby .
quashed
33. The matter is remitted back to respondent no.3-District Basic
Education Officer, for fresh consideration of the petitioner’s claim of
appointment on compassionate ground, in accordance with the 1974 Rules
and the law declared in , as subsequently
Vimla Srivastava (supra)

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9
reinforced by this Court in
Writ-A No.8368 of 2022 (Chetna Devi vs.
State of U.P. and 5 others), decide on 11.08.2022 and the constitutional
principle enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sayara Khatoon
(supra) . Such reconsideration shall be undertaken uninfluenced by the
petitioner's marital status and after examining all other relevant statutory
requirements, including dependency, financial condition of the family,
qualification as she possessed at the time of moving the initial application
dated 17.05.2016, availability of a suitable post and any other condition
legitimately applicable to the claim.
34. It is, however, made clear that the petitioner shall not be treated as
having acquired an automatic right to appointment merely by virtue of
this judgment. The present determination is confined to the legality of the
exclusion of her claim on the sole ground of marital status. The competent
authority shall undertake the remaining exercise in accordance with law
and pass a reasoned and speaking order within eight weeks from the date
of production of a certified copy of this judgment.
The writ petition is, accordingly, to the aforesaid extent.
allowed
35. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.)
October 16, 2026
K.N.
Digitally signed by :-
KALP NATH SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad