Aaa vs Linda Sema

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 675

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP Criminal No. 4772 of 2024)

AAA …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

LINDA SEMA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T

MANOJ MISRA, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is by a minor victim’s mother
1
impugning an order of the High Court dated 08.03.2022
in Criminal Revision Petition No.6 of 2021, whereby the
2
discharge order passed by the Trial Court dated
19.02.2021 has been affirmed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
KAVITA PAHUJA
Date: 2026.07.09
16:49:35 IST
Reason:

1
Gauhati High Court, Itanagar Bench
2
Court of Session Bomdila, West Kameng District, State of Arunachal Pradesh
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Background Facts
3
3. A first information report was lodged by the
appellant on 17.04.2020, inter alia , alleging that on
4
07.04.2020, her daughter , aged 8 years, complained of
pain in her private part. Upon enquiry, the victim told
the appellant that in the month of November 2019, while
the victim was in SRS school (a pseudonym), her senior,
a Juvenile boy, had sexually assaulted her in the
classroom; the incident was reported by her to her elder
sister, a student of the same school, who, in turn,
informed the Head Girl; thereafter, the Head Girl scolded
the boy and reported the matter to the school authority.
It was alleged that the school authority did not take
action and did not even inform the informant, rather the
boarders of that school were told not to disclose about
the incident to anyone. It was also alleged that when the
informant came to know about the incident, to ascertain
the truth, she took the victim to the District Hospital
where the Doctor, after check-up, confirmed that
informant’s daughter is a victim of rape. On the aforesaid

3
FIR No.01 of 2020 at Women Police Station, Seppa, East Kameng District, State of Arunachal Pradesh
4
Hereinafter referred to as Ms. XXX or the victim
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Criminal Appeal No.@SLP(Crl.) No(s). 4772/2024

allegations, the informant (i.e., the appellant herein)
prayed for action against the offender(s) including the
school authorities/ staff.

4. The matter was investigated. During
investigation, statements of the victim; her sister; the
Head Girl of the School; and few witnesses were
recorded. Thereafter, the police report, dated
29.05.2020, was submitted under Section 173(2) of the
5
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 enlisting eight
witnesses, namely, (i) the informant; (ii) the victim; (iii)
6
(iii) Elder sister of the victim ; (iv) Y S, the Head Girl of
7
the School ; (v) RT, Chairperson of the management of
the School; (vi) Medical Officer; (vii) another Medical
Officer; and (viii) Smt. S. Nabam, the Investigating
Officer. Relevant portion of the police report, containing
the narration of the facts and the nature of evidence
8
collected during investigation is extracted below :
“ 16. Brief facts of the case:
The brief fact of the case is that a written FIR was
received on 17/04/20 at 1900 hrs from Smt. AAA (27
yrs) w/o shri. CCC of Type III police colony, Seppa to

5
CrPC
6
Referred to as Ms. BBB
7
Hereinafter referred to as HG
8
Pseudonyms of the School, Victim etc., as far as possible is being used.
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the effect that her daughter Ms. XXX (8 yrs) studying
in class I at SRS School was allegedly raped by one
KB, a student of Class VIII of SRS School, in their
classroom in the month of November 2019. The said
incident was narrated to the complainant by the
victim’s elder sister Ms. BBB who studies in the same
school. The school students had reported about the
incident to the school authority however, despite
knowing the incident, they did not inform the same to
the family members of the victim. Instead they had
warned all the students from revealing the matter to
anyone. On receipt of the FIR a case vide
SPA/WPS/Case No.01/20 u/s 376 (AB)
201/107/506 IPC r/w Sec 6 of POCSO Act was
registered and was taken up by L/S.I.S. Nabam for
investigation.
During the course of investigation, the complainant
was examined and her statement was recorded u/s
161 of CrPC. The victim was examined at her
residence and her statement was recorded in the
presence of her mother. The victim was forwarded to
the court of CJM Seppa for her statement to be
recorded u/s 164 of CrPC, a copy of which is enclosed
herewith. In her statement, she stated that sometime
in the month of November 2019 the juvenile in conflict
with law (JCWL), a student of class 8, took her to a
classroom of her School in the evening hours and
made her to sit on his lap and then kissed her on her
lips. Thereafter, she was made to hold and caress his
private part. Then he removed her innerwear and
started having sexual intercourse. Since the act was
hurting her she began crying, it was then that the
JCWL had stopped his act and had asked her not to
disclose anything to anybody. Thereafter she wore her
undergarment, went back to hostel and informed
about this to her elder sister Ms. BBB, her friend CT
and her senior Miss Y S (HG). Miss Y S then took her
to JCWL and questioned him as to why he committed
such act with her, then JCWL got furious and tried
assaulting Miss Y S. Thereafter Miss YS informed the
matter to the Head Mistress Smt. Linda Sema. Smt.
Sema took her to Miss L S’s room and removed her
undergarment for verification. There she found some
sticky substance in her undergarment and her private
part sustained bruise injury and was reddish in
colour. Thereafter, she was sent back to her dormitory
with an instruction not to disclose anything to
anybody by the Head Mistress. The child welfare
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committee was informed regarding the matter. The
place of occurrence (for short, PO) was visited and
examined, which is a classroom at SRS School. Rough
sketch map of the PO was prepared and photograph
taken. However, no physical evidence could be
collected from the crime scene as the alleged offence
had occurred five (5) months ago. I verified the CCTV
installed in the school and found that the camera of
the CCTV did not cover the PO as such it yielded no
clue to the case. The available witnesses to the case
were examined and their statements were recorded.
One of the named witnesses Miss CT was examined
in-front of her parents who also confirmed the
occurrence of the incident however her parents have
denied making her a witness to the case. The victim
was subjected to medical treatment at District
Hospital Seppa by her mother prior to the registration
of the case i.e., on 07/04/20. A requisition was
submitted and the medical report has been obtained.
In the report the medical officer has opined that at
present the victim shows no sign and symptoms of
being sexually assaulted, however there is swelling
around the labia. Watery vaginal discharge is present.
Redness present and rash is present around the labia
of the victim. As stated by the victim and the
witnesses, the victim had gone through the same
medical condition as this at the time of the occurrence
of offence but was not subjected to medical treatment
in the hospital by the school officials.
During further investigation effort was made to
apprehend the JCWL from his residence located at
Type III Colony Seppa, but he fled away from the spot
and despite a thorough search in and around Seppa
town he could not be located anywhere. A total of four
(4) officials of SRS School were arrested, namely, Shri.
ABL (School Principal), Miss L S (School Teacher),
Miss J A (Girls Hostel warden), Miss P D (school
teacher). They were taken into police custody and
were thoroughly interrogated. All of them admitted
that the victim had complained of the occurrence of
nd
offence on 22 November 2019 but since there was
no eye-witness to the act, they did not think it was
appropriate to inform the matter to anybody. As
stated by them a team of four female faculties were
directed by the school principal to keep the victim and
the juvenile in conflict with law (JCWL) under
observation to verify whether the said crime had
occurred. According to their investigation the victim
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behaved absolutely fine with the JCWL as such they
concluded that nothing had happened and so they did
not think it was necessary to inform the matter to her
parents/Police and also did not think it was
necessary to subject the victim for medical treatment.
After the expiry of police remand they were remanded
into judicial custody and were later released on bail
by the Special Court Bomdila. The alleged co-accused
Smt. Linda Sema wife of the Principal could not be
arrested as she was referred to Margarita, Assam for
medical treatment prior to the registration of case and
owing to the state-wide lockdown due to COVID-19 it
is difficult to travel to Assam to cause the arrest.
The prime witness to the case Miss Y S (HG) was
examined and her statement was recorded by the
Hon’ble Court of CJM Seppa u/s 164 of CrPC. The
statement she gave corroborates the statement of the
victim. During her examination she also deposed that
in the month of April 2020 the mother of the victim
enquired her about the exact date of the incident, as
such she had to call one of her teachers to ask for the
exact date. The very next day, her teachers, namely,
Shri. R J K, Shri C B, Smt. Linda Sema and Miss P D,
had come to meet her. They took her to Government
Higher Secondary School, and there she was
instructed by Smt. Linda Sema not to disclose the
name of the culprit. Subsequently, Shri. C B and Shri.
R J K were arrested and were examined thoroughly
and their statements were recorded u/s 161 of CrPC.
After thorough interrogation they admitted that they
nd
did not inform about the incident of 22 November
2019 to anybody as they were instructed to do so by
the school Principal Shri. A B L and his wife Smt.
th
Linda Sema. On April 8 2020, they took Y S to
Government Higher Secondary School to enquire as
to what she has told to the mother of the victim about
the said incident. Thereafter the age proof documents
of both the victim and the alleged accused were
obtained from the school after serving notice u/s 91
CrPC. The school principal furnished the TC and
Admission form of the JCWL which was duly seized
and examined. The birth certificate of the victim was
furnished and seized. According to the documents
furnished, the victim was seven years old and JCWL
was sixteen (16) yrs and two (2) months old at the time
of commission of crime. To further verify JCWL’s age,
a copy of his birth certificate was seized from the
Principal of his previous school. This certificate also
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confirmed the age of the JCWL as 16 years and 2
months old at the time of commission of crime.
Despite various efforts made to apprehend the
juvenile in conflict with law he was evading
apprehension all these time. His parents gave false
assurance to cooperate and to surrender him before
the police. Instead they had switched off their phones
and had left their home. Raids were conducted from
time to time in almost all the houses of the relatives
of JCWL, but his whereabouts was not known. The
relative of JCWL had applied for anticipatory bail in
the Guwahati High Court, Itanagar Bench thrice. Up
to date case diary and status report was submitted to
the said court and for three consecutive time the bail
was rejected. A team was sent to N G model village,
Papumpare district and raid was conducted in the
house of one of the suspected relatives of the juvenile,
but he was not found there. CDR of his number and
the IMEI of his handset was also requisitioned but
still the juvenile could not be found. Reliable sources
were engaged in the villages Namchar, Wada Bangang
and Chayangtajo area to look for the absconding
juvenile in conflict with law, but his whereabouts was
still not known. The BW Society Seppa was taken into
confidence who later assured to cooperate and to
make the juvenile surrender before the Police. On
17/05/20 the JCWL (17 yrs) was handed over to
police by his father Shri. SB and the members of BW
Society Seppa, thereafter he was apprehended at WPS
Seppa and was thoroughly interrogated in the
presence of his family member. During the
interrogation, he admitted that one evening in the
month of November 2019 he tried to have sexual
intercourse with the victim in one of the classroom at
SRS School Seppa. But stopped his act when the
victim started crying. After the act he ejaculated
semen which spilt on the undergarment of the victim.
He also admitted that right after the incident Miss YS
came to him to enquire about the incident and both
of them ended up arguing with each other. So he was
called by the female teachers inside Miss L S’s room
where he was asked about the incident to which he
denied flatly. The parents of JCWL informed that a
new birth certificate was obtained from the District
Statistics office and as per that certificate JCWL was
aged about 14 years. As such to further verify the age
of JCWL the surrendered original copy of birth
certificate was seized from the District Statistics office
which confirms that the JCWL is seventeen (17) years
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old and not fourteen (14) years (seized original birth
certificate is enclosed herewith).
After thorough investigation of the case it has come to
nd
light that one evening on 22 November 2019 the
juvenile in conflict with law (JCWL) had taken the
victim to one of the classrooms at SRS School and
tried having sexual intercourse with her. When the
victim complained of pain and started crying he
stopped his act and ejaculated semen on the
undergarment of the victim. The victim had
complained about the incident to her elder Sister Miss
BBB who in-turn complained the same to their hostel
monitor Miss Y S. Miss Y S took this matter before the
wife of the Principal i.e., Smt. Linda Sema. The victim
was then taken to the room of Miss L S for verification
and this was done in the presence of Miss P D, Miss
LS and Miss YS. During this verification (as stated by
the victim and the prime witness to the case) the
private part of the victim had turned reddish and was
swollen and the victim complained of pain too.
However, the same has been denied by the female
faculties, namely, Smt. Linda Sema, Miss P D and
Miss L S. When the matter was brought to the
knowledge of the school principal Shri. ABL, a
meeting was held amongst the teachers which was
attended by Smt. Linda Sema, Miss JA (girls hostel
warden), Miss LS, Miss PD, Shri CB (vice-principal)
and Shri. RJK and instead of reporting the said
matter before the competent authority they all
conspired not to disclose anything to anybody. They
even instructed the students not to talk about the
incident further. The victim was not subjected to
medical treatment by the school officials even after
she had complained of pain in her private part which
led to the destruction of all the biological evidence.
Owing to delay in reporting of the case, no physical
evidence could be gathered from the PO and also no
biological evidence is seen in the medical report
furnished by the Medical officer. Had the mother of
the victim didn’t overhear the conversation of the
victim and her elder sister BBB, the said incident
would have never come up to anyone’s knowledge. I
could not find any reason as to why a minor girl of 7
years would lie about the occurrence of such incident.
Further, the juvenile in conflict with law was evading
his apprehension as he was very well aware of the
consequences of what he did. The MLC of the juvenile
in conflict with law is not submitted by the medical
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officer. Dr. Arun Kumar Nabam of District Hospital
Seppa despite sending reminder as such he may be
summoned to appear in person along with the MLC.
In the light of the above facts and circumstances a
prima-facie case is found well established against the
alleged accused, namely Shri. A B L, Smt. Linda
Sema, Shri C B, Shri R J K, Miss P D, Miss J A, Miss
L S u/s 176/201/120(B) IPC R/W Sec. 21 (2) of
POCSO Act for omitting to furnish information
regarding the commission of an offence, for causing
disappearance of evidence of offence, for conspiring
not to disclose the incident to anyone and for failing
to report the commission of a cognizable offence.
Whereas a prima-facie case is found well established
against the juvenile in conflict with law u/s 376 AB
R/W Sec. 6 of POCSO Act. A supplementary Charge-
sheet will be submitted as soon as the co-accused
Smt. Linda Sema is arrested and examined. Therefore
I am submitting the case into charge sheet against the
aforesaid accused and Juvenile in conflict with law
under sections noted above vide SPA/WPS/CS
No.01/20 dated 29/05/20. A date for the trial may be
fixed at the earliest and the witnesses mentioned
under column no.13 may please be summoned to
prove the case. The MLC of the juvenile in conflict
with law is not submitted by the medical officer Dr.
Arun Kumar Nabam of District Hospital Seppa
despite sending reminder as such he may be
summoned to appear in person along with the MLC. ”

5. The aforesaid extract of the police report, makes
it clear that besides the main offender, who was a
juvenile in conflict with law (JCWL) qua offences
punishable under Section 376 AB of the Indian Penal
9
Code, 1860 read with Section 6 of the Prevention of
10
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 , the other

9
IPC
10
POCSO Act
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accused persons were indicted for offences punishable
under Sections 176/ 201/ 120B read with Section 21 (2)
of POCSO Act for omission to furnish information
regarding commission of the offence, causing
disappearance of evidence of the offence, conspiring not
to disclose the incident to anyone and for failing to report
the commission of a cognizable offence.
6. All those accused who were indicted in the final
report for offences under Sections 176/201/120B and
Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act applied for discharge
before the Trial Court.
7. The Trial Court discharged the aforesaid accused
vide order dated 19.02.2021. Relevant portion of the
order dated 19.02.2021 is extracted below:
“The initial information was received from the victim by
elder sister of the victim who passed the information to
the monitor Miss Y S who reported the matter to Smt
Linda Sema. The accused Linda Sema took the victim
to Miss L S’s room and removed the under garments of
the victim for verification. As per the prosecution,
“accused Miss Linda Sema and Miss L S found some
sticky substances on her under garment and private
part sustained bruise injury and was reddish in color.
Thereafter, the matter was discussed by the school
authority, participated by all the accused, and a
decision was taken not to reveal to any person, and the
victim and the student were directed to remain silent
on the issue.” This part of statement is the basic or
initial point drawing incriminating statement against
all the accused.
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On the other hand, it is also noted in the prosecution
story that all the accused admitted about the
complaint of the victim regarding misbehaviour of the
delinquent juvenile on 22.11.2019 but there was no
eye witnesses to the act. They did not think it
appropriate to inform the matter to parent and police.
As stated by accused, a team of four female faculties
were directed by the principal to keep the victim and
the juvenile under observation to ascertain whether
the incident occurred or not. According to their
investigation team, the victim was found absolutely
fine with the juvenile; as such, they concluded that
nothing had happened. Hence, they did not think it
necessary to inform the matter to parents and police.
The vital point as to the incriminating statement
against the accused is that the accused Linda Sema,
Miss L S found sticky substance on private part of the
victim and, along with other accused, concealed the
incident. As per the statement of YS, Miss P D was also
present at the time of checking the victim’s private
part. But as per the statement of P D recorded u/s: 161
CrPC she did not participate in the process of checking
of private part of victim. The statement of YS recorded
U/s 161 CrPC does not reveal that she had
participated and checked the private part of victim. Her
statement is that Miss Linda took the victim to Miss
LS’s room and checked the private part of victim. The
statement of victim does not reveal the presence of P D
& Y S at the time of checking her private part for
verification in the room of L S by the accused L S and
Linda Sema.
On the other hand, the statement of the accused Linda
Sema & L S revealed that they checked the private part
of victim and found no mark in the private part of
victim and they also inquired from the delinquent
juvenile to which the delinquent juvenile denied. Later
on, the matter was reported to the Principal and
accordingly a meeting was called for. During the
meeting, a decision was taken to constitute a team to
make observation of behaviour of the victim with
delinquent juvenile. As per the report of the team, the
victim was found absolutely fine with the delinquent
juvenile without any sign of fear or hesitation. As per
the records, the incident was not directly reported by
the victim to Y S & accused but it was heard from
victim’s elder sister by Miss Y S and then to Linda
Sema and L S. Therefore, it was not reported to the
parents and police.
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Considering the above facts & circumstances, I find
that the claim of prosecution to have found about the
redness of the private part and finding of sticky
substance on under garments of the victim are not
narrated by the PWs as the PW P D & Y S did not
participate in checking of private part of the victim.
Hence, the vital incriminating evidence at the very
initial stage of the case is silent against the accused.
Accordingly, I am of the opinion that there is no prima
facie case incriminating the accused to substantiate at
the time of trial. In absence of any witness who
witnessed the sticky substance or redness of the
private part of victim, I cannot hold the opinion that all
the accused had conspired to conceal the incident and
also cause disappearance of the evidences with
intention of screening the offender from legal
punishment. As such, all the accused were not duty
bound to report the incident to police and parents. On
the other hand, they had constituted a committee to
observe the behaviour of victim with the delinquent
juvenile. As per the team, the victim was found
absolutely fine with delinquent juvenile and played
without fear and hesitation. So they concluded that
nothing had happened with the victim.
As regards to the submission of ld. Special PP that the
court is duty bound to presume that the commission
of offence had happened, I am of the humble opinion
that the law of presumption is to be based on the
evidences on records after completion of trial and the
provision is applied after completion of the trial and not
at the stage of consideration of charges. However, at
present, this case is at the stage of consideration of
charges as to whether there is prima facie case against
the accused or not and to see the scope of trial to
convict the accused under charged section. Therefore,
if the case does not show any scope of trial to prove
against the accused, the provision of discharge of the
accused at the time of consideration of charges would
be defeated. Hence, the right of the accused to get
discharge at the time of CC cannot be flatly denied. It
is also observed that the statement of Miss Y S U/s 161
& 164 CrPC is contradictory.
In view of the above, I do not find any prima facie case
or scope of trial to prove the involvement of all the
accused namely, Miss L S, Linda Sema, Miss P D, Shri
A B L, Miss J A, Shri C B, Shri R J K in the case and
accordingly, all the accused are/ stand discharged. In
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the result, all the accused are set at liberty with a
11
direction to execute a bond U/s: 437 (A) of CrPC.”
8. Aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court, the
appellant preferred revision before the High Court.
Revision before the High Court
9. Before the High Court, on behalf of the appellant,
it was argued that a prima facie case is made out against
the discharged accused who were teachers and staff
members of the School where the victim and the main
accused were studying. Besides, the victim, her elder
sister and her mother had supported the allegations
made in the FIR. Their statements are consistent and
find support from the statement of the victim recorded
under Section 164 CrPC, therefore there was no
justification for the Trial Court to discharge the aforesaid
accused.

10. Whereas, on behalf of the discharged accused,
it was argued that in so far as the Principal and Teachers
of the School are concerned, they had no personal
knowledge of the incident and though the matter might

11
The aforesaid extract is copied from Annexure P-11 which carries apparent mistakes, therefore, wherever
mistake was apparent, corrections have been made while ensuring that the true meaning of the text is not
disturbed.
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have been reported to them, they did not find any
evidence to infer that an offence of the nature reported
has been committed; besides, they could not notice
anything abnormal in the behaviour of the victim and
the alleged offender. As such, they had no reason to
believe that any offence was committed. As far as the
remaining accused are concerned, there is no specific
allegation against them. Even if it is assumed that they
had examined the victim, in absence of visible signs of
sexual assault, knowledge that an offence has been
committed cannot be imputed to them. Besides, there is
no positive act of causing disappearance of evidence of
commission of offence alleged to have been committed
by them. Thus, the necessary ingredients of offences
punishable under Sections 176/201/120B of the IPC
read with Section 21 (2) of the POCSO Act are not made
out against them.
11. The High Court dismissed the revision reasoning
thus:
“14. Sub-Section (1) to Section 19 of the POCSO
Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained
in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 any person
(including the child), who has apprehension that an
offence under this Act is likely to be committed or has
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knowledge that such an offence has been committed,
he shall provide such information to, (a) the Special
Juvenile Police Unit; or (b) the local police. It is a fact
that here in this case no information has been
provided either to special juvenile police unit or the
local police. But, criminal culpability of non-reporting
is totally dependent on “knowledge” that the alleged
offence took place. In the case in hand, though the
respondent Nos.1 and 4, in presence of respondent
No.3, Ms. P D, has checked the private part of the
victim yet they have found nothing and the medical
report also reveals no sign and symptom of being
sexually assaulted and her hymen was intact though
rash, swelling of labia was present. They have also
called the juvenile offender and questioned him about
the offence and then he flatly denied the same. They
have also reported the matter to the school authority
and school authority constituted a team of teachers
to keep vigil upon the victim and the juvenile offender
and they also found nothing. The place where the
alleged occurrence took place is not covered under the
CCTV also and as such, nothing was found by the I.O.
while checking the CCTV footage and as such, the
“knowledge” or “reason to believe’ which are the
ingredients of the offence under Section 19 of the
POCSO Act cannot be said to be made out here in this
case.
15. The learned counsel for the respondent
Nos.2,3,5,6 &7 has rightly pointed this out during
argument and the ratio laid down in the case of A.S.
Krishnan and Ors. (supra), referred by her also fully
supported her submission. In the aforesaid case,
Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“9. Under IPC, guilt in respect of almost all the
offences is fastened either on the ground of
“intention” or “knowledge” or “reason to believe”.
We are now concerned with the expressions
“knowledge” and “reason to believe”. “Knowledge”
is an awareness on the part of the person
concerned indicating his state of mind. “Reason to
believe” is not the same thing as “suspicion” or
“doubt” and mere seeing also cannot be equated to
believing. “Reason to believe” is a higher level of
state of mind. Likewise “knowledge” will be slightly
on higher plane than “reason to believe”. A person
can be supposed to know where there is a direct
appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to
have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause
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to believe the same. Section 26 IPC explains the
meaning of the words “reason to believe” thus:
“26 – “ Reason to believe ”: A person is said
to have ‘reason to believe’ a thing, if he has
sufficient cause to believe that thing but
not otherwise.”
10. In substance what it means is that a person
must have reason to believe if the circumstances
are such that a reasonable man would, by probable
reasoning, conclude or infer regarding the nature
of the thing concerned. Such circumstances need
not necessarily be capable of absolute conviction
or inference; but it is sufficient if the
circumstances are such creating a cause to believe
by chain of probable reasoning leading to the
conclusion or inference about the nature of the
thing. These two requirements i.e. “knowledge”
and “reason to believe” have to be deduced from
various circumstances in the case.”
16. Since, the ‘knowledge’ or ‘reason to believe’
cannot be attributed to the respondent Nos.1,3 & 4,
criminal liability under Section 19, in the considered
opinion of this Court, cannot be attributed to them.
17. Also having gone through the record, I find
absence of ingredients of the offence under Sections
176/120(B)/201 IPC as the ‘intention’ and
‘knowledge’ which are the basic requirement of the
Section 176/201 IPC have not been found out from
the materials collected by the I.O. during
investigation.
18. It is a fact that the complainant-mother of the
victim and the victim and her elder sister and witness
Y S has corroborated each other in respect of the
alleged offence. But, the same may be sufficient for
putting the juvenile offender into trial, but not
sufficient for the rest of the respondents to put them
into trial and as such, it cannot be said that the
impugned order of the learned Court below suffers
from any illegality or impropriety, requiring
interference of this Court. It is a settled proposition of
law that when two views are possible and the learned
Court below has taken one of the views, the Revisional
Court cannot substitute its own view with that of the
Trial Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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12. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the
victim's mother is in appeal before us.
13. We have heard Shri Jitendra Mohan Sharma,
learned senior counsel for the appellant; Shri Satya Kam
Sharma for respondent No.1; and Ms. Jagriti S. Jadeja
for respondent Nos.3, 5, 6 and 7. None appeared for
respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 8 despite service of notice
being complete on them.
Submissions on behalf of Appellant
14. On behalf of Appellant, it was submitted:
(i) The police report makes it clear that
the teachers and the school
administration had knowledge of the
incident, therefore they were under a
legal obligation to report the matter as
per the provisions of the POCSO Act.
(ii) School Authorities are not only under
an obligation to prevent sexual
assault or exploitation of a minor
under their supervision, but also to
report to the concerned authority any
Page 17 of 66
Criminal Appeal No.@SLP(Crl.) No(s). 4772/2024

such act in respect of a subordinate
under their control.
(iii) When a School Authority receives
complaint of molestation or abuse of a
child under their supervision, it has
no option but to report the matter to
the concerned authority. It cannot, on
its own analysis, discard the
complaint as incorrect or false.
(iv) The expression “knowledge that such
an offence has been committed” as
used in Section 19 of the POCSO Act
does not mean direct knowledge.
Knowledge can be based on
information received from the victim.
(v) There were enough incriminating
materials in the police report to frame
charges against the respondents as all
of them in one way or the other
suppressed the information and were
apparently in conspiracy with each
Page 18 of 66
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other to conceal and suppress the
incident. The Trial Court as well as the
High Court erred in accepting their
plea for discharge, particularly when
prompt and proper reporting of
offences under the POCSO Act is of
utmost importance, otherwise the very
purpose of the Act would be
frustrated.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No.1
15. On behalf of Respondent No.1 (Linda Sema) it
was submitted:
(i) Respondent No.1 is just an
accountant in the school and has no
command or authority over the
school.
(ii) No incident occurred in the presence
of Respondent No.1.
(iii) Admittedly, the victim first reported to
her elder sister. Elder sister reported
to Head Girl. Thereafter, it is alleged,
Page 19 of 66
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Head Girl reported to Respondent
no.1. When such report was made, is
not disclosed. Though, according to
the allegations, victim’s private part
was examined under supervision of
Respondent No. 1, it is not disclosed
as to when it was examined. Medical
reports do not support prosecution’s
case. In such circumstances, if to the
knowledge of the respondents no
reportable incident occurred, there
was no occasion to lodge a report.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No.3
16. On behalf of respondent No. 3 (P D) it is
submitted that she was employed as a primary teacher
in the School; the only allegation against her is of being
present in the room where the main culprit (i.e., the
juvenile in conflict with law) was called to confront him
with the complaint against him. As, admittedly, the
juvenile refuted the allegations, how could respondent
No.3 be held responsible when she had no authority to
Page 20 of 66
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lodge the report. The allegation that she was present in
the room when the victim was examined to ascertain
whether there is any truth in her allegation, is of no
consequence once the medical expert could not find
signs of any previous sexual assault. If a medical expert
cannot find traces of sexual assault, how could
respondent No.3, a person having no medical expertise,
notice signs of sexual molestation. Further, she was not
the person in-charge of the school, therefore, she was
not under any legal obligation to report, particularly
when to her knowledge no incident occurred. Hence,
her discharge warrants no interference.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No.5
17. On behalf of Respondent no.5 (JA), it is
submitted that she was employed as Girls’ Hostel
warden at SRS School. Allegation against her is of being
part of the team which was monitoring the behaviour of
the victim to ascertain whether any untoward incident
occurred or not. Monitoring the conduct of the alleged
victim and the offender by itself does not make out
commission of any offence by the answering respondent,
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particularly when there is no allegation that the victim
complained to the answering respondent. Hence,
discharge of the answering respondent calls for no
interference.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No.6
18. On behalf of Respondent No.6 (CB), it is
submitted that he was employed as Vice Principal at SRS
School. The only allegation against him is that he was
present in the meeting in which a Committee comprising
of lady teachers was appointed to observe the two
students, namely, the victim and the offender, to
ascertain whether any untoward incident had happened
or not. It is contended that since to the knowledge of the
answering respondent no incident occurred, and no
complaint was made to the answering respondent, no
offence could be said to be committed by the answering
respondent. Hence, the order discharging the answering
respondent calls for no interference.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No.7
19. On behalf of Respondent No.7 (RJK), it is
submitted that she was employed as teacher at SRS
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School where the alleged offence took place. The only
allegation against her is that she was present in the
meeting in which a Committee of lady teachers was
appointed to observe the two students to ascertain
whether any untoward incident had occurred or not. It
is contended that since to the knowledge of the
answering respondent no untoward incident occurred,
and no complaint was made to the answering
respondent, no offence could be said to be committed by
the answering respondent. Hence, the order discharging
the answering respondent calls for no interference.
Discussion/ Analysis
20. As the present appeal arises out of an order of
discharge, before we proceed to test the correctness of
the discharge order in the context of rival submissions,
we must remind ourselves of the settled legal position
that in a case instituted on a police report, at the stage
of considering a prayer for discharge made by an
accused, the Court must only consider the materials
collected during investigation and which form part of the
police report. A plea of defence raised by the accused on
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some material not part of the police report is not liable
to be considered. At this stage, the court is concerned
not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the
accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial,
could prove him guilty. The final test of guilt is not to be
12
applied at this stage . Further, the court must proceed
on an assumption that the material which has been
13
brought on record by the prosecution is true . On the
scope of the proceedings at the stage of framing of charge
under Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), in State of Tamil Nadu v. N.
14
Suresh Rajan and Ors. , this Court observed:

“29. … True it is that at the time of consideration of the
application for discharge, the court cannot act as a
mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may
sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations
made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is
trite that at this stage of consideration of an application for
discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that
the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true
and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to
find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their
face value disclose the existence of all ingredients constituting
the alleged offense. At this stage, probative value of the
materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to
go deep into the matter and hold the materials would not
warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be
considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the
offence has been committed and not whether a ground for

12
Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and Anr., (2012) 9 SCC 460
13
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsingh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688
14
(2014) 11 SCC 709; See also: Tarun Jit Tejpal v. State of Goa & Anr., (2020) 17 SCC 556.
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convicting the accused has been made out. To put it
differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have
committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record
on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for
conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the
accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a
mini trial at this stage.”

(Emphasis supplied)


21. The test, therefore, is whether the materials
forming part of the police report if taken at their face
value have sufficient probative value to create a grave
suspicion that the accused to be charged has committed
that offence. For the purpose of satisfying itself whether
the material put forth in the police report creates grave
suspicion about commission of the offence by the
accused, the Court has the power to sift and weigh the
15
evidence . However, at this stage, the Court is not
required to be satisfied that the material is sufficient to
record conviction.


15
Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368, paragraph 21 (i)
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22. In that light, we propose to consider the final
police report to find out whether it contains material
sufficient to create grave suspicion against the accused-
respondents of committing the offence(s) alleged to have
been committed by them in the police report.
Final Police Report
23. The police report indicts JCWL for offences
punishable under Section 376 AB IPC read with Section
6 of the POCSO Act and the respondents, namely, ABL
(Principal of the School), Smt. Linda Sema (Respondent
No.1 i.e., wife of the Principal/ alleged Head Mistress of
the School), Shri CB (Vice Principal cum teacher in the
School), Shri RJK (teacher in the School), Miss PD
(teacher in the School), Miss JA (teacher in the School
cum Girls’ School Warden) and Miss L S (teacher in the
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16 17 18
School), under Sections 176 , 201 , 120-B of IPC and
19
Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act.
24. The relevant materials placed with the police
report are:
(i) Birth certificate of the victim showing
her date of birth as 7.8.2014.
(ii) Medical report dated 27.4.2020 of
District Hospital, Seppa, Arunachal

16
Section 176 IPC. — Omission to give notice or information to public servant by person legally bound to give it.- - Whoever,
being legally bound to give any notice or to furnish information on any subject to any public servant, as such, intentionally
omits to give such notice or to furnish such information in the manner and at the time required by law, shall be punished
with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to ₹500, or with both:
or, if the notice or information required to be given respects the commission of an offense, or is required for the purpose of
preventing the commission of an offense, or in order to the apprehension of an offender, with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to ₹1000, or with both;
Or, if the notice or information required to be given is required by an order passed under sub-section (1) of Section 565 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
six months, or with fine which may extend to ₹1000, or with both.
17
Section 201 IPC.—Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender.--
Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission
of that offense to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives
any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false;
if a capital offense . -- shall, if the offense which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable with death, be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to
fine;
if punishable with imprisonment for life. -- and if the offense is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment
which may extend to 10 years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
three years, and shall also be liable to fine;
if punishable with less than 10 years’ imprisonment. -- and if the offense is punishable with imprisonment for any term not
extending to 10 years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which
may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both.
18
Section 120-B IPC. – Punishment of criminal conspiracy.—(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an
offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall,
where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner
as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offense punishable as aforesaid
shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.
19
Section 21 of POCSO Act. – Punishment for failure to report or record a case. – (1) Any person, who fails to report the
commission of an offence under sub-section (1) of Section 19 or Section 20 or who fails to record such offense under sub-
section (2) of Section 19 shall be punished with imprisonment of either description which may extend to six months or with
fine or with both.
(2) Any person, being in-charge of any company or an institution (by whatever name called) who fails to report the
commission of an offence under sub-section (1) of Section 19 in respect of a subordinate under his control, shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and with fine.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to a child under this Act.
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Pradesh. The relevant portion of the
report is as under:
“Examination proper: (1). Clothes:
She changed her clothes and took
bath too as incident occurred on 22
November 2019. (2). External
examination: No sign of struggle
found, no abrasion, no contusion or
any cut mark present at the time of
examination.

Local examination: No pubic hair.
Watery vaginal discharge present
around the labia. Swelling around
labia, redness present, rash
present, intact hymen, vaginal
permits entry of tip of ear bid. No
foreign material or hair recovered
from vulva. No sign of struggle,
abrasion, bruise or any cut injury
present at the time of examination.
Victim is not pregnant.

Vaginal swab was not taken.

All the system is within normal
limit.

Conclusion: From the above finding
Miss XXX (pseudonym) 8 years
shows no sign and symptoms of
being sexually assaulted at present.
All the required test has been
attached.”
(Emphasis supplied)

(iii) Statement of victim u/s 164 CrPC: In
her statement, the victim confirmed
that JCWL, a student of class VIII, had
sexually assaulted her in the month of
November 2019. She stated that her
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undergarment was wet after the
incident and she had rushed to the
hostel to inform her sister. She also
told her friend C T and her senior (i.e.,
the Head Girl). The Head Girl took her
to JCWL to confront him. JCWL got
furious and tried to assault the Head
Girl. Then the Head Girl informed
Yangda Madam (to be understood as
Linda Sema -Respondent No.1) , Head
Mistress of the School. To verify, Linda
got the victim to remove her inner
garment(s) in Miss LS’s room. She had
noticed sticky substance on the inner
garment, and also noticed bruise as
well as redness on her private part.
Thereafter, the victim was told by the
Head Mistress not to disclose it to
anyone. Since that day the victim had
been having trouble in urination. Her
elder sister had applied powder to
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keep it dry, but it did not work. In the
month of March 2020, when the
victim was discussing about her
problem with her sister, victim’s
mother overheard, then victim
disclosed everything to her mother.
(iv) Statement of Y S (the Head Girl) u/s
164CrPC: In the month of November
2019, she was informed by the victim
that JCWL had sexually assaulted
her. Therefore, she confronted JCWL,
who became aggressive and tried to
assault her. She clarified that she did
not ask JCWL whether he had
sexually assaulted the victim. She had
only asked whether he did anything
wrong to the victim. Thereafter, she
informed Linda Sema, upon which,
the victim was taken to L S’s and N’s
room where, along with her, N, Linda
Sema, LS and P D were present. There
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JCWL was called and asked whether
he did anything wrong. However, he
flatly denied. After JCWL left the
room, Linda Sema and others present
in the room checked the victim’s
private part. It was noticed that it had
turned reddish and was slightly
swollen and the victim was
complaining of pain. A little later,
when the Principal ABL came back
from market, they had a meeting.
After that she was told by PD that it
was decided that the matter should
not be disclosed to anybody till it is
resolved. In the month of April, 2020,
victim’s mother contacted her over the
phone to verify about the exact date of
the incident. Since she was not aware,
she contacted Miss MB, a teacher.
Later, the same evening, Mr. RJK
called her over the phone and asked
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her if he and other school authorities
could meet her. Next morning, RJK,
Linda Sema, PD, MB and CB came to
her residence. Initially, they were
denied entry. However, later, she went
with them in a car to hostel of a Govt.
School, where Linda Sema instructed
her to say that if anybody asks her,
she must say that the incident
certainly happened but it was not
clear as to who is the culprit, to which
she responded by saying that she has
already disclosed about the incident.
(v) Statement of victim’s mother (i.e.,
AAA, the informant): She reiterated
the allegations made in the FIR.
(vi) Statement of victim’s elder sister: She
stated that one evening in the month
of November 2019, the victim, her
younger sister, complained to her
about the incident. Consequently, she
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informed the Head Girl, YS. YS had
confronted JCWL, who started
arguing. Thereafter, YS informed
Linda Sema. Linda, accompanied by
PD, took the victim to LS’s room for
verification. After a while, all teachers
were called by the Principal and they
had a meeting. Later, Y S came and
told that all teachers have instructed
all boarders not to disclose about the
incident to anyone. It was learnt that
the teachers verified from the CCTV
but nothing was found. Since then she
kept quiet. But, during vacation, the
victim complained of rash to her,
when their mother overheard, and
asked about the incident, so she had
to tell her.
25. What is clear from the police report is that,- (a)
the victim was a minor, a child within the meaning of
section 2(d) of the POCSO Act; (b) the victim had
Page 33 of 66
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20
complained about JCWL , a student of Class VIII,
sexually assaulting her; (c) the said complaint was first
made to her elder sister, thereafter she and her elder
sister contacted the Head Girl (Y S); (d) the Head Girl
thereafter informed Smt. Linda Sema (Respondent No.1),
who is alleged to be the Headmistress of the School; (e)
Smt. Linda Sema thereafter took the victim to L S’s room
where N, Linda Sema, LS and P D were present; (f) Linda
Sema and others, who were present in that room,
physically checked the private part of the victim and
noticed that private part had turned reddish and was
slightly swollen; (g) later, when the Principal arrived, the
accused persons had a meeting and it was decided that
the matter should not be disclosed to anybody till it is
resolved; (h) in the month of April 2020, the victim’s
mother came to know about the incident and sought to
verify the details of it from Y S; (i) the School
management including teachers had instructed Y S that
if anybody asks her about the incident, she must say

20
Juvenile in Conflict with Law
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that the incident may have occurred, but it is not clear
as to who the culprit is.
Relevant Provisions of the POCSO Act
21

26. Section 19 of the POCSO Act , inter alia ,
provides that any person, who has ‘knowledge’ that an
offence under this Act has been committed, he shall
provide such information to (a) the Special Juvenile
Police Unit; or (b) the local police. Sub-section (6) of
Section 19 provides that the Special Juvenile Police Unit
or the local police shall, without unnecessary delay but
within a period of twenty-four hours, report the matter

21
Section 19. Reporting of offences .—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of1974) any person (including the child), who has apprehension that an offence under this
Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence has been committed, he shall provide such
information to,—
(a) the Special Juvenile Police Unit; or
(b) the local police.
(2) Every report given under sub-section (1) shall be—
(a) ascribed an entry number and recorded in writing;
(b) be read over to the informant;
(c) shall be entered in a book to be kept by the Police Unit.
(3) Where the report under sub-section (1) is given by a child, the same shall be recorded under sub-section (2)
in a simple language so that the child understands contents being recorded.
(4) In case contents are being recorded in the language not understood by the child or wherever it is deemed
necessary, a translator or an interpreter, having such qualifications, experience and on payment of such fees as
may be prescribed, shall be provided to the child if he fails to understand the same.
(5) Where the Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police is satisfied that the child against whom an offence has
been committed is in need of care and protection, then, it shall, after recording the reasons in writing, make
immediate arrangement to give him such care and protection including admitting the child into shelter home or
to the nearest hospital within twenty-four hours of the report, as may be prescribed.
(6) The Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police shall, without unnecessary delay but within a period of twenty-
four hours, report the matter to the Child Welfare Committee and the Special Court or where no Special Court
has been designated, to the Court of Session, including need of the child for care and protection and steps taken
in this regard.
(7) No person shall incur any liability, whether civil or criminal, for giving the information in good faith for the
purpose of sub-section (1)
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to the Child Welfare Committee and the Special Court or
where no Special Court has been designated, to the
Court of Session, including need of the child for care and
protection and steps taken in that regard. Sub-section
(7) of Section 19 gives protection to the person who gives
the information in good faith by providing that no person
shall incur any liability, whether civil or criminal, for
giving the information in good faith for the purpose of
sub-section (1).
22
27. Section 21 of the POCSO Act provides for
punishment in case of failure to report or record the
case. Sub-section (1) of Section 21 provides that any
person, who fails to report the commission of an offence
under sub-section (1) of Section 19 or Section 20, or who
fails to record such offence under sub-section (2) of
Section 19, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description which may extend to six months or
with fine or with both. Sub-section (2) of Section 21
provides that if any person, being in-charge of any
company or an institution, who fails to report the

22
See: Footnote 19
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commission of an offence under sub-section (1) of
Section 19 in respect of a subordinate under his control,
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to one year and with fine. Sub-section (3) of
Section 21 clarifies that the provisions of sub-section (1)
shall not apply to a child under this Act.

Construction of phrase ‘Knowledge that such an
offence has been committed’ used in Section 19(1) of
POCSO Act

28. The word ‘knowledge’ used in Section 19 is not
defined in the POCSO Act. Section 2 (2) of the POCSO
Act states: “ The words and expressions used herein and
not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860), the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2015 (2 of 2016) and the Information Technology Act,
2000 (21 of 2000) shall have the meanings respectively
assigned to them in the said Codes or the Acts ”. However,
knowledge is not defined in either of the two Codes or
the Acts mentioned in Section 2(2).
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29. A conjoint reading of Section 19 and Section 21
of the POCSO Act, inter alia , indicates that if any person
has knowledge that an offence has been committed
under the Act, it is the mandate of law to provide such
information to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the
local police. If such person, other than a child, fails to
report, he is liable to punishment under Section 21.
30. Therefore, the crucial question is, as to when can
it be said that a person has knowledge that an offence
under the POCSO Act has been committed.
23
31. In A.S. Krishnan and Ors. v. State of Kerala ,
24 25
this Court with reference to Sections 471 and 26 of
IPC had an occasion to expound the expressions
“ knowledge ” and “ reason to believe ”. It was observed that
“ knowledge ” is an awareness on the part of the person
concerned indicating his state of mind. “ Reason to
believe ” is another facet of the state of mind. “ Reason to
believe ” is not the same thing as “ suspicion ” or “ doubt ”

23
(2004) 11 SCC 576
24
Section 471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record.— Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly
uses as genuine any document or electronic record which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged
document or electronic record, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or
electronic record.
25
Section 26; “Reason to believe”.— A person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing, if he has sufficient
cause to believe that thing but not otherwise
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and mere seeing also cannot be equated with believing.
“ Reason to believe ” is a higher level of state of mind than
suspicion or doubt and “ knowledge ” is on a higher plane
than “ reason to believe ”. It was also observed that a
person can be supposed to know where there is a direct
appeal to his senses, and a person is presumed to have
a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to believe
the same. It was observed:
“10. In substance, what it means is that a person must
have reason to believe if the circumstances are such that
a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning,
conclude or infer regarding the nature of the thing
concerned. Such circumstances need not necessarily be
capable of absolute conviction or inference; but it is
sufficient if the circumstances are such as creating a
cause to believe by chain of probable reasoning leading
to the conclusion or inference about the nature of the
thing. These two requirements i.e., ‘knowledge’ and
‘reason to believe’ have to be deduced from various
circumstances in the case.”

32. In SR. Tessy Jose and Others v. State of
26
Kerala , this court, had the occasion to deal with the
word “ knowledge ” as used in Section 19 of the POCSO
Act. In that case, according to the allegations, A-1 had
raped the victim in 2016 when she was a minor. As a
result, she became pregnant. As per the victim’s mother,

26
(2018) 18 SCC 292
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when the victim started complaining about pain in her
stomach, she brought her to the hospital where the
appellants before this Court were working. The victim
being found at an advanced stage of pregnancy was
taken to the labour room, where she delivered a child.
The role of appellants who were before this Court was
that one of them had conducted the delivery, as a
Gynaecologist, and the other had attended to the child
of the victim after the delivery, as a Paediatrician. The
third accused was in the administrative block of the
hospital. The prosecution case against the said
appellants was that they had knowledge about the rape
of the victim, yet they did not report the matter. In that
context, this Court considered the provisions of Section
19 of the POCSO Act and held that there is no evidence
to implicate the appellants. It was also observed that to
frame charge, evidence should be such which should at
least create grave suspicion regarding commission of the
offence by the accused. Consequently, this Court
allowed the appeal and quashed the proceedings of the
case. While deciding the aforesaid case, this Court
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observed that the provisions of Section 19(1) of the
POCSO Act uses the expression ‘ knowledge ’, “which
means that some information received by such a person
gives him/her knowledge about the commission of the
crime”. The court observed that there is no obligation on
such a person to investigate and gather knowledge. The
court thereafter relied on the decision of this Court in
A.S. Krishnan (supra) expounding the expression
‘knowledge’ as to mean an awareness on the part of the
person concerned, indicating his state of mind. It was
observed that a person can be supposed to know only
where there is a direct appeal to his senses. The Court
went on to observe:
“13. The knowledge requirement foisted on the
appellants cannot be that they ought to have deduced
from circumstances that an offense has been
committed.”

33. In State of Maharashtra and another v. Dr.
27
Maroti minor tribal girls who were students of an
educational institution, residing in girls’ hostel, were
sexually assaulted by unknown persons. They were
taken to hospital and attended by a medical practitioner,

27
(2023) 4 SCC 298
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who was informed about the sexual assault on them.
Sexual assault on them was also clear from their medical
examination conducted by the said medical practitioner,
yet no report, as per the mandate of Section 19(1), was
made by the medical practitioner. During investigation,
the said medical practitioner was found prima facie
guilty of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the
POCSO Act. However, the High Court quashed the
proceedings qua the said medical practitioner. Aggrieved
therewith, the State came before this Court. This Court
allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order
holding that whether one has ‘knowledge’ or not is a
question of fact. In that context, this Court observed that
conclusion in that regard must not ordinarily be drawn
by perusing statements collected during investigation.
Importantly, this Court had noticed that the victim(s)
had disclosed to the medical practitioner of them being
subjected to sexual assault, and the medical
examination had disclosed ruptured hymen.
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34. In Just Rights for Children Alliance and
28
another v. S. Harish and others , this Court, after
surveying the legislative history and the statutory
scheme of the POCSO Act, observed that to achieve the
avowed purpose of the Act, a legal obligation to report an
offence under the POCSO Act has been put on any
person who has knowledge that an offence under the Act
has been committed. This obligation also extends to
individuals who have reason to believe that an offence
under the Act is likely to be committed. Besides, in
addition to imposing this legal duty under Section 19,
the legislature being in seisin of the paramount
importance in collectively addressing the problems of
child abuse and exploitation, deemed it expedient to
make the failure to discharge this obligation punishable
under Section 21 of the Act. It was observed that such
provisions have been inserted with a view to ensure that
children of tender age are not abused and their
childhood and youth is protected against exploitation.

28
2024 SCC Online SC 2611
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The Court also underscored the importance of prompt
and proper reporting of offences under the POCSO Act.
35. Notably, the expression ‘ knowledge ’ is not
defined in either the POCSO Act or any of the Codes/
Acts specified in Section 2(2) thereof. Even the General
Clauses Act, 1897 does not define it. Therefore, a
contextual meaning of the word ‘knowledge’, which
serves the avowed purpose of the Act, would have to be
ascertained.
36. Before we consider the avowed purpose of the Act
and discuss as to what meaning to the phrase “ has
knowledge that such an offence has been committed ”
must be ascribed to achieve the object of the Act, it
would be useful to notice how the expression ‘knowledge’
has been expounded in legal dictionaries.
29
37. In Black’s Law Dictionary , knowledge is
defined as an awareness or understanding of a fact or
circumstance.
38. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law
30
Lexicon , different meanings of the word ‘knowledge’ as

29
Seventh Edition, published by West Group, page 876
30
Fourth Edition, published by LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, pages 2665 -2666
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found in various judicial pronouncements have been
compiled. Relevant amongst them are extracted below:
(a) The certain perception of truth; belief which amounts
to or results in moral certainty indubitable
apprehension; information, intelligence, implying
truth, proof and conviction; the act or state of
knowing; clear perception of fact; that which is or may
be known; acquaintance with things ascertainable;
specific information; settled belief; reasonable
conviction; anything which may be the subject of
human instruction.
(b) Knowledge signifies a state of mental realization with
bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in
which human mind remains supine or inactive.
(c) Knowledge is an awareness on the part of the person
concerned indicating his state of mind. Reason to
believe is another facet of the state of mind.
Knowledge will be slightly on a higher plane than
‘reason to believe’.

(d) The word knowledge is sometimes used also in the
sense of information. It describes the state of mind.
Knowledge is not satisfaction. Information not
believed to be false is knowledge.
(e) Knowledge is nothing more than men's firm belief and
is distinguished from ‘belief’ in that the latter includes
things which do not make a very deep impression on
the memory. The difference is ordinarily merely in
degree.
(f) The meaning of the words ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’, as
defined by lexicographers, will show that there is a
distinct and well-defined difference between them.
‘Believe’ is defined by Webster to mean to exercise
trust or confidence; and by the Century dictionary, to
exercise belief in; to be persuaded upon evidence,
arguments, and deductions, or by other
circumstances other than personal knowledge.
‘Knowledge’ according to Webster, is the act or state
of knowing; clear perception of fact; that which is or
may be known. According to the Century Dictionary it
means acquaintance with things ascertained or
ascertainable; specific information.
(Emphasis supplied)

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39. Those extracts from Advanced Law Lexicon
(supra) make it clear that the word ‘knowledge’ has
been variously expounded in judicial
pronouncements. Importantly, ‘knowledge’ has also
been understood as an information not believed to be
false. In such circumstances, and in absence of any
specific definition of the word ‘knowledge’ in the
POCSO Act or in any of the Codes/ Acts specified in
Section 2(2) thereof, and also the General Clauses Act,
1897, the meaning that would best serve the purpose
of the Act must be adopted.
40. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for
enacting the POCSO Act are stated as under:
“ STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS -
Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia , confers upon
the State powers to make special provision for children.
Further, Article 39, inter alia , provides that the State
shall in particular direct its policy towards securing that
the tender age of children are not abused and their
childhood and youth are protected against exploitation,
and they are given facilities to develop in a healthy
manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity.
2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
th
Children, ratified by India on 11 December 1992,
requires the State Parties to undertake all appropriate
national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent
(a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in
any unlawful sexual activity; (b) the exploitative use of
children in prosecution or other unlawful sexual
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practices; and (c) the exploitative use of children in
pornographic performances and materials.
3. The data collected by the National Crime Records
Bureau shows that there has been increase in cases of
sexual offences against children. This is corroborated by
the ‘Study on Child Abuse; India 2007’ conducted by the
Ministry of Women and Child Development. Moreover,
sexual offences against children are not adequately
addressed by the existing laws. A large number of such
offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they
adequately penalised. The interests of the child, both as
a victim as well as a witness, need to be protected. It is
felt that offences against children need to be defined
explicitly and countered through commensurate
penalties as an effective deterrence.
4. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a self-contained
comprehensive legislation inter alia to provide for
protection of children from the offences of sexual
assault, sexual harassment and pornography with due
regard for safeguarding the interest and well-being of
the child at every stage of the judicial process,
incorporating child-friendly procedures for reporting,
recording of evidence, investigation and trial of offences
and provision for establishment of Special Courts for
speedy trial of such offences.
5. The Bill would contribute to enforcement of the right
of all children to safety, security and protection from
sexual abuse and exploitation.
6. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various
provisions contained in the Bill.
7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.”
(Emphasis supplied)

41. It is clear from above that the legislative intent
was to enact a self-contained comprehensive legislation,
inter-alia , to provide for protection of children from the
offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and
pornography, with due regard for safeguarding the
interest and well-being of the child at every stage of the
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judicial process, incorporating child-friendly procedures
for reporting, recording of evidence, investigation and
trial of offences and provision for establishment of
Special Court for speedy trial of such offences. To ensure
that the provisions of the POCSO Act have overriding
effect, to the extent of inconsistency with the provisions
of any other law, Section 42A was inserted in the Act
with effect from 03.02.2013. Further, to ensure that
there is public awareness about the Act, Section 43 of
the Act provides that the Central Government and every
State Government, shall take all measures to ensure
that –
(a) the provisions of this Act are given wide
publicity through media including the television,
radio and the print media at regular intervals to
make the general public, children as well as their
parents and guardians aware of the provisions of
this Act;
(b) the officers of the Central Government and the
State Governments and other concerned persons
(including the police officers) are imparted periodic
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training on the matters relating to the
implementation of the provisions of the Act.
42. Besides, Section 44 of the Act provides for monitoring
the implementation of the provisions of the Act. According
to Section 44, the National Commission for Protection of
Child Rights constituted under Section 3, or as the case
may be, the State Commission for Protection of Child Rights
constituted under Section 17, in addition to the functions
assigned to them under that Act, were required to monitor
the implementation of the provisions of the Act in such
manner as may be prescribed.
43. Section 45 of the Act empowers the Central
Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of
this Act. Sub-rule (2) of Section 45, inter alia , provides that
without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers,
such rules may provide for all or any of the matters
enumerated therein including “care and protection and
emergency medical treatment of the child under sub-
section (5) of Section 19” (see clause (b) of sub-section (2) of
Section 45) .
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44. In exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (1),
read with clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 45
of the POCSO Act, the Central Government notified “The
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules,
31
2012 ”. Rule 4 thereof details the procedure to be followed
by the Special Juvenile Police Unit (for short, SJPU) or the
local police on receipt of information under sub-section (1)
of Section 19 of the POCSO Act. Sub-rules (2), (3) and (4)
of Rule 4 of 2012 Rules are relevant. The same are extracted
below:
“ Rule 4. Care and Protection .—(1) …

(2) Where an SGPU or the local police, as the case may be,
receives information in accordance with the provisions
contained in the sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act in
respect of an offence that has been committed or attempted or
is likely to be committed, the authority concerned shall, where
applicable.—
(a) proceed to record and register a First Information
Report as per the provisions of section 154 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, and furnish a copy thereof
free of cost to the person making such report, as per sub-
section (2) of section 154 of the Code;
(b) where the child needs emergency medical care as
described under sub-section (5) of section 19 of the Act
or under these rules, arrange for the child to access such
care, in accordance with rule 5;
(c) take the child to the hospital for the medical
examination in accordance with section 27 of the Act;
(d) ensure that the samples collected for the purpose of
the forensic tests are sent to the forensic laboratory at
the earliest;

31
2012 Rules
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(e) inform the child and his parents or guardian or other
person in whom the child has trust and confidence of the
availability of support services including counseling, and
assist them in contacting the persons who are
responsible for providing these services and relief;
(f) inform the child and his parents or guardian or other
person in whom the child has trust and confidence as to
the right of the child to legal advice and counsel and the
right to be represented by a lawyer, in accordance with
section 40 of the Act.
(3) Where the SJPU or the local police receives information
under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act, and has a
reasonable apprehension that the offence has been committed
or attempted or is likely to be committed by a person living in
the same or shared household with the child, or the child is
living in a child care institution and is without parental
support, or the child is found to be without any home and
parental support, the concerned SJPU, or the local police shall
produce the child before the concerned Child Welfare
Committee (hereinafter referred to as CWC) within 24 hours of
receipt of such report, together with reasons in writing as to
whether the child is in need of care and protection under sub-
section (5) of section 19 of the Act, and with a request for a
detailed assessment by the CWC.
(4) Upon receipt of a report under sub-rule (3), the concerned
CWC must proceed, in accordance with its powers under sub-
section (1) of section 31 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, to
make a determination within three days, either on its own or
with the assistance of a social worker, as to whether the child
needs to be taken out of the custody of his family or shared
household placed in the children's home or a shelter home.”
(Emphasis supplied)

45. A conjoint reading of the provisions of Section 19 of
the POCSO Act and the 2012 Rules makes it clear that the
information contemplated under sub-section (1) of Section
19 may be in respect of an offence committed, or attempted,
or likely to be committed. Such information may be
provided by any person (including the child) who has
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apprehension that an offence under the Act is likely to be
committed or has knowledge that such an offence has been
committed. If the child could make a report, could it be
said that the person under whose care and protection the
child is placed would not lodge report, despite receiving
complaint from that child, only because the offence has not
been committed in his or her presence or to his
understanding? In our view, if such an interpretation is
accorded to the phrase ‘has knowledge that such an offence
has been committed’ the provisions of sub-sections (5) and
(6) of Section 19 and of Rule 4 of the 2012 Rules would be
rendered non-functional because the person in whose
custody and care the child is placed, and to whom report is
made, would waste time in seeking the truth when it is not
his or her task to investigate. To save time and to ensure
prompt reporting with a view to secure the child, the person
who reports under sub-section (1) of Section 19 is protected
under sub-section (7) of Section 19 from any liability,
whether civil or criminal, for giving the information in good
faith. Thus, in our view, if we construe the expression
“ knowledge ”, as used in sub-section (1), as something
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which a person knows on the basis of his own senses, and
exclude knowledge based on receipt of credible information,
the purpose of the POCSO Act would stand defeated. This
we say so because the purpose of the Act is not only to
punish the offender but also to protect a child from sexual
offences. Besides, it is a matter of common understanding
that sexual offences are rarely committed in public gaze.
These offences usually occur in the confines of secrecy.
Therefore, for the purposes of this Act, when a child victim
reports to a person that he or she has been subjected to an
offence, or is likely to be subjected to an offence, punishable
under the Act, it could safely be concluded that the person
to whom such information is provided by the child victim
has knowledge that such an offence has been committed or
is likely to be committed.
46. There may be instances where a child may report
without understanding the nature of the act to which the
child has been subjected to. In such cases, and also where
the information provided by the child is either not clear or
confusing, a brief questioning of the child may be justified
to derive a lucid picture of the nature of the information
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which the child wishes to convey. However, such
questioning should not be with a view to rubbish the
complaint made by the child, rather it must be to
understand the true and correct nature of the complaint.
47. In light of the discussion above, in our considered
view, to serve the avowed purpose of the POCSO Act, the
phrase “ has knowledge that such an offence has been
committed ”, as used in sub-section (1) of Section 19, would
have to be construed as to include awareness based on the
receipt of credible information with regard to commission of
an offence punishable under the Act. And where such
information is received directly from the victim, who is
capable of communicating/ reporting/ informing, it will be
deemed credible.
Whether accused respondents had knowledge and were
under legal obligation to report

48. Based on the aforesaid exposition of law, we shall
consider whether the accused-respondents herein, based
on the information received from the victim, had knowledge
that such an offence has been committed and, therefore,
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were under an obligation to make a report in terms of
Section 19(1) of the Act.
49. In the statement of the victim recorded under Section
164 CrPC, she stated that she was subjected to sexual
assault in the month of November 2019 and her
undergarments had got wet after the incident. According to
her, she first informed her sister and her friend (C T), not a
witness listed in the police report, and the Head Girl. The
Head Girl took her to JCWL and confronted him with the
information. JCWL got infuriated and attempted to assault
the Head Girl. Thereafter, the Head Girl informed Linda
Sema, the Headmistress of the School. Miss. Linda Sema
did a verification exercise in LS’s room. According to the
victim, when that exercise was carried out, some sticky
substance was found on her undergarments, and her
private part was bruised and was reddish in colour. But
Linda Sema told the victim not to make disclosure about it
to anyone. Thus, from the statement of the victim, it is clear
that she informed as many as four persons about the
incident, namely, her own elder sister; her friend (C T); her
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senior i.e. the Head Girl; and Miss. Linda Sema i.e. the
Headmistress.
50. The statement of the Head Girl recorded under Section
164 CrPC corroborates the statement of the victim that she
was informed about the incident by the victim and that she
confronted JCWL who became aggressive and, thereafter,
she informed Linda Sema. The statement of the Head Girl
discloses that Linda Sema took the victim to LS’s room
where, in all, there were four persons, namely, N; Linda
Sema; LS; and PD. There, JCWL was called and asked
whether he did anything wrong. In response, JCWL flatly
denied, and left the room. Linda Sema and others present
in the room physically checked the victim’s private part.
Upon inspection, it was noticed that there was some
swelling and redness and the victim was complaining of
pain. A little later, the Principal ABL came back from
market and called a meeting. The Head Girl was informed
by PD that it was decided not to disclose the incident to
anyone till the matter is resolved. Remainder of her
statement is against the other accused persons regarding
their efforts to downplay the incident.
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51. The statement of the victim’s elder sister is in line with
the statement of the Head Girl. She also makes a statement
that she received information that the school management
tried to confirm the incident from the CCTV footage but
nothing was found.
52. What is clear from above is that the information about
sexual assault was provided by the victim directly to four
persons, namely, her own elder sister, who is a minor; her
own friend (CT), who is also a minor; the Head Girl (YS) of
the institution, who is also a minor; and Miss. Linda Sema
(Respondent No.1), who is alleged to be the Headmistress of
the School. The material collected in the police report does
not indicate that the victim imparted information of the
incident to any other teacher or office bearer of the
institution. Though it appears from the material collected
during the course of investigation that other teachers and
office bearers of the institution were aware that such an
incident was reported by the victim to Miss. Linda Sema.
53. The above analysis would indicate that as per the
materials collected during investigation, Miss. Linda Sema
was informed by the victim, of having been subjected to
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sexual assault by JCWL. However, Miss. Linda Sema, in
her own wisdom, instead of reporting the matter as per the
provisions of Section 19(1), or getting it reported, undertook
an exercise to verify the correctness of the allegations. In
that exercise, to her own understanding, she did not find
any sign of sexual assault. Therefore, based on her own
understanding of the situation, she took a decision not to
report the matter.
54. The case taken by the accused during investigation is
that there were no signs of sexual assault and therefore,
instead of immediately reporting the matter, they thought it
appropriate to watch the conduct of the victim and JCWL
and since those two behaved normally, it was concluded
that nothing had happened of the nature complained of.
55. The defence case further is that if the prosecution
story about sexual assault is correct, then the medical
report would have indicated some signs of sexual assault.
However, the medical report discloses no sign of past sexual
assault, and therefore, the decision taken not to report the
matter is a bona fide decision. Hence, on this ground alone,
they are not liable to be prosecuted, particularly when there
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was no commission of any offence to their knowledge.
Defence case also is that knowledge of a fact would only
arise if there is any reason to believe in its existence. As the
verification exercise did not reveal any sign of sexual
assault, there was no reason to believe that such an offence
has been committed. Thus, the act of not reporting the
incident must not beget punishment as contemplated
under Section 21 of the POCSO Act.
56. As we have held that the phrase “ has knowledge that
such an offence has been committed ” is not limited to direct
knowledge of the commission of the offence, but would
include awareness of its commission based on direct
information received from the victim, in our view, the
person who received information about its commission from
the victim could be said to have knowledge that such an
offence has been committed. The defence that an effort was
made to ascertain the truth and in absence of signs of
sexual assault, report was not made is not acceptable, at
this stage, to stifle a prosecution under Section 21 of the
POCSO Act. More so, when the Act does not contemplate
any such exercise. Besides, in our view, an investigation to
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ascertain whether such an incident has actually occurred
or not must take place after reporting of the incident and
not before, as such an exercise would defeat the very
purpose for which the POCSO Act has been enacted.
Otherwise also, if investigative exercise is carried out by a
person before reporting the incident, the signs of such an
offence may disappear, resulting in the accused going scot-
free. Prompt reporting of the incident is a sine qua non for
effective implementation of the Act. This position is clear
from the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 19 and
Section 27 of the POCSO Act.
57. Section 27 reads thus:
“ 27. Medical examination of a child .—(1) The
medical examination of a child in respect of whom any
offence has been committed under this Act, shall,
notwithstanding that a First Information Report or
complaint has not been registered for the offences
under this Act, be conducted in accordance with
section 164A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1973).

(2) In case the victim is a girl child, the medical
examination shall be conducted by a woman doctor.

(3) The medical examination shall be conducted in the
presence of the parent of the child or any other person
in whom the child reposes trust or confidence.

(4) Where, in case the parent of the child or other
person referred to in sub-section (3) cannot be present,
for any reason, during the medical examination of the
child, the medical examination shall be conducted in
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the presence of a woman nominated by the head of the
medical institution.”

58. What is significant in Section 27 is that a medical
examination of the child in respect of whom any offence has
been committed under this Act is required notwithstanding
that the first information report or complaint is not
registered for the offences under the POCSO Act. This would
imply that the information regarding commission of an
offence punishable under the Act has to be provided at the
earliest so that necessary steps could be taken for medical
examination, and for protective measures, if required.
59. In our view, the High Court and the Trial Court fell in
error in holding that as there were no noticeable signs of
sexual assault, there was no reason to believe that such an
offence has been committed; therefore, the accused were not
under a legal obligation to report.
60. However, not all teachers or office bearers of the
institution need to be prosecuted for the offence punishable
under Section 21 of the Act. Only those who received
information directly from the victim, of her being subjected
to sexual assault, could be prosecuted for failure to report.
Others, who are not the ones before whom offence was
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committed or to whom complaint was made, are not liable to
be prosecuted merely because of their alleged presence in the
room where verification was carried out. This we say so,
because in absence of a direct complaint to them, and there
being no signs of sexual assault according to their
understanding as also the medical report, they cannot be
considered liable for not reporting.
61. As noticed above, the victim had imparted information
about the incident to as many as four persons, namely, her
elder sister; her friend (C T); the Head Girl (YS); and Miss
Linda Sema. Admittedly, the victim’s sister; the victim’s
friend and the Head Girl were minors and therefore, a child
within the meaning of section 2(b) of the POCSO Act. Sub-
section (3) of Section 21 provides that provisions of sub-
section (1) of Section 21 shall not apply to a child under the
Act. In such circumstances, the victim’s sister; victim’s
friend; and the Head Girl of the institution are not liable to
be prosecuted for an offence punishable under Section 21
read with Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act.
62. In so far as Linda Sema (Respondent No.1) is
concerned, the allegations are that she was given
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information about the incident but, instead of reporting the
incident, she conducted her own verification exercise and
suppressed the information. Although, it is stated on behalf
of Respondent No.1 that she is not the Headmistress of the
institution, but the prosecution case is that she was the
Headmistress of the institution. Even otherwise, she falls in
the category of ‘any person’ who has knowledge that such an
offence has been committed. In such circumstances, we are
of the view that qua Linda Sema the police report had
sufficient material to create grave suspicion against her for
the purposes of framing charge of an offence punishable
under Section 21 of the POCSO Act / Section 176 of IPC, and
therefore, she was not entitled to be discharged.
Whether other teachers and office bearers liable
63. In so far as other teachers and office bearers of the
institution are concerned, it is not the prosecution case that
they were given information about the sexual assault by the
victim. No doubt, the prosecution case is that they tried to
suppress the information from spreading. But this allegation
would be sustainable only when it is demonstrated that they
had credible information about the incident. In absence of
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credible information, it is natural that anyone who is part of
the institution would advise not to act in a manner that
tarnishes the image of the institution, particularly when the
Head Mistress who received the information directly took a
decision not to report based on her own understanding of the
situation. Therefore, this allegation, in our view, is not
sustainable qua those other teachers and office bearers who
had no direct credible information from the victim about the
incident and, admittedly, the incident had not occurred to
their knowledge.
64. Besides, there is no worthwhile material on record to
indicate a conspiracy to suppress the information. The
material only indicates that after considering all materials
including CCTV footage, a decision was taken not to report.
Such a decision may be incorrect, but, prima facie , it was on
the own understanding of the situation; therefore, those who
had no direct knowledge of the incident and had not received
information about it directly from the victim, cannot be
considered part of the criminal conspiracy. At this stage, we
may also notice that making false accusation against a child
is also an offence punishable under sub-section (3) of Section
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22 of the POCSO Act. Notably, JCWL is a child. Therefore, in
absence of direct information from the victim, if they had
erred in favour of caution, it would be travesty of justice to
prosecute them for criminal conspiracy to suppress
information of the commission of an offence under the
POCSO Act. Besides, we do not find cogent material in the
police report regarding accused persons causing evidence of
the offence to disappear. Because, firstly, to their
understanding and knowledge as required under Section
201 of IPC no offence was committed, and, secondly, it is not
the prosecution case that they destroyed the clothes, etc to
cause disappearance of the evidence. Consequently, we do
not find a good reason to interfere with the order of the High
Court and the Trial Court to the extent it discharges the
accused persons of that accusation.
65. For all the reasons above, this appeal is partly allowed.
The judgment of the High Court and the Trial Court to the
extent it discharges Miss. Linda Sema (Respondent No.1)
from prosecution, under Section 21 read with Section 19 (1)
of the POCSO Act and Section 176 of IPC, is set aside. The
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Trial Court shall now proceed against the Respondent No.1
in accordance with the law for the above offences.
66. We make it clear that any observation made by us
shall not be taken as an opinion expressed on the merits of
the allegations. The Trial Court shall deal with the merits of
the allegations strictly in accordance with law.
67. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.



…......................................J.
(MANOJ MISRA)


…......................................J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)


New Delhi;
July 9, 2026

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