Rajendra Kumar And Another vs State Of U.P. Thru Secy.Tacation And Registration Lko. And Ors.

A.F.R.
Neutral Citation No. -
2026:AHC-LKO:75352
Reserved on: 29.09.2026
Delivered on: 16.10.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - C No. - 11162 of 2017
Rajendra Kumar and another
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. Thru Secy.Tacation and Registration Lko. and Ors.
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Anurag Srivastava, Jyotindra
Prakash Pathak, Laxmi Kant Pathak,
Mohammad Danish, Mohd.
Mansoor
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Anit Vishal Srivastav,
Mohammad Ehtesham Khan, Pooja
Pandey, Pradeep Kumar Singh
Court No. - 4
HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.
1. Heard Sri Mohd. Mansoor, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri
Shiv Ganesh Singh, learned Additional CSC for the respondent Nos.1 to
3 – State, Sri M.E. Khan, learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 & 5 and
Sri Amit Prasad Srivastava, learned counsel for the intervenor.
2. The present writ petition has been filed on following prayer:
“i) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of
certiorari thereby quashing the impugned order dated 30.3.2017
passed by the opposite party no.2 as contained in Annexure-13 to
the writ petition:
ii) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of
mandamus thereby commanding the opposite parties not to
interfere over the land having no.392/0-5-0, 395 Ka/0-1-0, 356/0-
14-0, 357/0-2-5, 359/0-7-0, 354/1-10-5, 364/0-8-0, 366/0-8-10,
367/0-9-0, 355/0-3-5, 397/0-1-0, 471/0-5-10, 477/0-13-11, half of

2
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
41/0-6-2 i.e.0-3-1 total 14 plots having consolidated area 5-11-07
situated at Gram Pura Husain Khan, Pargana Haveli Avadh,
Tehsil & District Faizabad which is in the peaceful possession of
the petitioners;
iii) To issue any other writ order or direction which this
Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the nature and
circumstances of the case;
iv) To award the cost of this writ petition.”
3. Factual matrix of the case is that opposite party no.4 is a business
trust which is being run, managed and supervised by the opposite party
no.5. The land in question is situated on the eastern side of Faizabad
National Highway/Faizabad-Allahabad Road at Gram Husain Khan,
Pargana Haveli Avadh, Tehsil and District Faizabad. The said land was
the valuable land of Sankramaniya Bhumidari belonging to the father of
the petitioners, namely, Late Chotey Lal.
4. Father of the petitioners, namely, late Chotey Lal had sold some
portion of his land to the opposite parties no.4 and 5 in the year 1985
after obtaining the requisite permission from the District Magistrate,
Faizabad. Consequently, cordial relations had developed between the
father of the petitioners and the opposite parties no.4 and 5.
5. Petitioner no.1 had also been working as a Turner in the Sugar
Mill of the opposite party no.5 and on account of the aforesaid
relationship, the relations between the petitioners' father and the opposite
parties no.4 and 5 remained cordial for some time.
6. Father of the petitioners belonged to the Scheduled Caste category.
The land in question being situated near the main Faizabad-Allahabad
Road, was valuable property. Taking advantage of its valuable location,
opposite party no.5 repeatedly expressed his desire and eagerness to
purchase the remaining land of the petitioners' father. However, the
father of the petitioners categorically declined to sell the said land.
7. Subsequently, when father of the petitioners was in dire need of
money and keeping in view the fact that the opposite parties no.4 and 5

3
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
had earlier purchased some land from him in the year 1985, he
approached opposite party no.5 for a temporary loan of Rs.40,000/-.
Opposite party no.5 advanced a sum of Rs.40,000/- to the father of the
petitioners but taking advantage of the circumstances and without
disclosing the true nature and purpose of the documents, obtained his
signatures on certain stamp papers.
8. After the aforesaid amount was repaid by the father of the
petitioners, opposite party no.5 did not return the stamp
papers/documents bearing his signatures despite repeated demands. The
said documents were, thereafter, allegedly misused by opposite party
no.5 for creating a document purporting to be an agreement to sell in
respect of the valuable land of the petitioners' father.
9. In connivance with the opposite party no.5, the blank/stamp papers
upon which the signatures of the father of the petitioners had earlier been
obtained were fraudulently converted into an alleged instrument dated
30.04.1989 described as an agreement to sell, purportedly executed by
the father of the petitioners in favour of opposite parties no.4 and 5.
10. Under the alleged agreement to sell dated 30.04.1989, fourteen
plots bearing Plot Nos. 392 area 0-5-0, 395-Ka area 0-1-0, 356 area 0-
14-0, 357 area 0-2-5, 359 area 0-7-0, 354 area 1-10-5, 364 area 0-8-0,
366 area 0-8-10, 367 area 0-9-0, 355 area 0-3-5, 397 area 0-1-0, 471 area
0-5-10, 477 area 0-13-11 and half share of Plot No.41 area 0-6-2,
together with Plot No.100 area 0-3-1 having a consolidated area of 5-11-
07 situated at Gram Pure Husain Khan, Pargana Haveli Avadh, Tehsil
and District Faizabad, were allegedly shown to have been agreed to be
sold in favour of opposite parties no.4 and 5. The aforesaid property is
hereinafter referred to as the "land in question".
11. On the basis of the aforesaid alleged agreement to sell dated
30.04.1989, the opposite parties no.4 and 5 attempted to get the said

4
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
instrument registered before the Sub-Registrar, Faizabad under the
provisions of the Registration Act, 1908.
12. After following the procedure prescribed under law, the Sub-
Registrar, Faizabad passed an order dated 24.01.1990 refusing to register
the alleged agreement to sell dated 30.04.1989 in favour of the opposite
parties no.4 and 5. Being aggrieved by the order dated 24.01.1990,
opposite party no.4 preferred an appeal/case before opposite party no.2
under Section 72 of the Registration Act, 1908 on 24.02.1990. The said
proceedings were registered as Case No.1 of 1990, titled "Laxmi Public
Charitable Trust Versus Chotey Lal".
13. The permission to sell the land in question had allegedly been
obtained by opposite party no.4 by practising fraud and permission dated
14.04.1989 had been obtained in circumstances which were subsequently
disputed by father of the petitioners. Accordingly, father of the
petitioners submitted an application dated 22.09.1990 before the District
Magistrate, Faizabad placing the true facts on record and requesting
cancellation of the permission dated 14.04.1989.
14. Upon consideration of the application dated 22.09.1990 submitted
by the father of the petitioners, the District Magistrate, Faizabad
cancelled the aforesaid permission vide order dated 06.10.1990. Pursuant
thereto, an order dated 09.10.1990 was issued by the District Land
Management Officer, Faizabad.
15. Father of the petitioners, thereafter, filed his objections/written
statement dated 17.10.1990 in Case No.1 of 1990 before opposite party
no.2. In the said objections, father of the petitioners specifically raised a
preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal filed by
opposite party no.4 under Section 72 of the Registration Act, 1908. It
was specifically pleaded that Section 71 of the Act deals with refusal of
registration on grounds other than denial of execution, whereas in the

5
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
present case the Sub-Registrar had refused registration because father of
the petitioners had denied execution of the alleged instrument.
16. In the aforesaid objections, father of the petitioners categorically
stated that he had never entered into any agreement to sell the land in
question with opposite party no.4 or opposite party no.5. It was
specifically asserted that the alleged instrument had been fraudulently
prepared by opposite party no.5 with the intention of grabbing the
valuable property of the petitioners.
17. During pendency of Case No.1 of 1990, father of the petitioners,
namely, late Chotey Lal, expired on 20.09.1995. Despite having
knowledge of his death, opposite party no.4 did not take steps within the
prescribed period for substitution of the petitioners in place of their
deceased father.
18. After an inordinate delay, opposite party no.4 moved an
application for substitution before opposite party no.2. The petitioners
opposed the said application on the ground of delay and absence of any
provision under the relevant statute for condoning such delay. Despite
the objections raised by the petitioners, opposite party no.2 allowed the
application for substitution vide order dated 12.01.1998.
19. Being aggrieved by the circumstances arising out of the alleged
agreement to sell and in order to seek adjudication of their substantive
rights over the property, the petitioners instituted Regular Suit No.436 of
1998, titled "Rajendra Kumar and Others Versus Laxmi Public and
Others", before the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Faizabad,
under Order VII Rule 1 read with Section 151 CPC seeking a declaration
that the alleged agreement to sell was null and void and was not binding
upon the petitioners.
20. In the aforesaid Regular Suit No.436 of 1998, opposite parties
no.4 and 5 filed their written statement on 24.11.2003 denying the
assertions and allegations made by the petitioners in the plaint.

6
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
21. It is alleged that, in the meanwhile taking advantage of his
position and influence, opposite party no.5 exercised political pressure
upon opposite party no.2, who, thereafter, passed an order dated
24.01.2002 in favour of the opposite parties, whereby the earlier order
dated 24.01.1990 passed by the Sub-Registrar, Faizabad was
cancelled/set aside. By the said order dated 24.01.2002, the Sub-
Registrar was directed to reconsider the matter by exercising the powers
contemplated under Section 36 of the Registration Act and to call the
witnesses in relation to the disputed instrument.
22. In pursuance of the order dated 24.01.2002, the matter was
referred to the Sub-Registrar, Sadar, Faizabad on 09.07.2003 for taking
steps regarding registration of the disputed instrument. Thereafter, the
Sub-Registrar, Sadar, Faizabad submitted/issued a communication dated
31.07.2003 to the District/Sub-Registrar, Faizabad clarifying the relevant
legal position concerning registration of the disputed instrument in the
light of the order dated 24.01.2002.
23. Thereafter, on behalf of opposite party no.4 another application for
disposal of the pending appeal/case was filed before opposite party no.2
on 05.01.2004. Despite aforesaid proceedings, the matter remained
pending before opposite party no.2 for a considerable period. Ultimately,
the petitioners submitted detailed objections dated 17.01.2017,
specifically reiterating that their father had never executed any
agreement to sell in favour of opposite party no.4 or opposite party no.5.
24. In the objections dated 17.01.2017, the petitioners specifically
pointed out that the alleged instrument did not bear the photograph of
their deceased father and that the signatures thereon were also seriously
disputed. It was further stated that no consideration whatsoever had ever
been received by their father towards the alleged sale transaction. The
petitioners also specifically pointed out that the witnesses to the alleged
document sought to be registered were servants of opposite party no.4

7
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
and its counsel, thereby raising serious questions regarding the
genuineness and credibility of the alleged instrument.
25. Against the detailed objections filed by the petitioners, opposite
party no.4 filed a counter before opposite party no.2 on 21.01.2017,
wherein incorrect and false facts were stated in an attempt to support the
alleged agreement to sell. Thereafter, without properly considering the
factual and legal position of the case and without properly appreciating
the material documents available on record, opposite party no.2
proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 30.03.2017 in a wholly
illegal, arbitrary and unjustified manner.
26. By means of the impugned order dated 30.03.2017, opposite party
no.2 held that execution of the disputed instrument by the father of the
petitioners in favour of opposite party no.4 stood proved. Opposite party
no.2 further admitted/entertained Appeal/Case No.1 of 1990, titled
"Laxmi Public Charitable Trust Versus Chotey Lal and Others", arising
out of the order dated 24.01.1990 passed by the Sub-Registrar, Faizabad.
27. Opposite party no.2, vide impugned order dated 30.03.2017,
further directed that upon presentation of the disputed instrument before
the Sub-Registrar, Sadar, Faizabad, the same be registered in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Registration Act, 1908.
28. The impugned order dated 30.03.2017 has been passed without
properly considering the specific case of the petitioners that their father
had never executed the alleged agreement to sell, that the disputed
document had been fraudulently prepared by misusing his signatures,
that no consideration had been received by him and that the genuineness
and execution of the disputed instrument were specifically denied from
the very inception.
29. The impugned order dated 30.03.2017 is further vitiated by non-
consideration of the material facts and documents placed before opposite
party no.2 including the earlier order dated 24.01.1990 passed by the

8
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
Sub-Registrar refusing registration, the objections filed by the father of
the petitioners, the cancellation of the permission to sell by the District
Magistrate, Faizabad and the objections filed by the petitioners in the
proceedings.
30. The impugned order dated 30.03.2017, whereby opposite party
no.2 has not only upheld the alleged execution of the disputed instrument
but has also directed its registration, is wholly illegal, arbitrary, contrary
to the material available on record and contrary to the provisions of the
Registration Act, 1908. The impugned order has caused serious prejudice
to the valuable property rights of the petitioners and, therefore, is liable
to be quashed by this Hon'ble Court in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
31. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the
impugned order dated 30.03.2017 passed by the opposite party no.2 in
Case/Appeal No.1 of 1990 is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction,
inasmuch as the proceedings before the registering authorities were
governed by the specific statutory scheme contained in Sections 35, 71,
72 and 73 of the Registration Act, 1908 and the opposite party no.2 has
failed to exercise jurisdiction strictly within the parameters prescribed by
the said provisions.
32. He next submitted that the very maintainability of the proceedings
before the opposite party no.2 was required to be examined at the
threshold. Section 72 of the Registration Act applies only where a Sub-
Registrar refuses registration on a ground other than denial of execution.
In the present case, the refusal to register the disputed instrument was
founded upon denial of its execution by the person purported to be the
executant. Consequently, the statutory remedy, if any, was governed by
Section 73 of the Act and not Section 72. The assumption of jurisdiction
by the opposite party no.2 under Section 72 was, therefore, legally
misconceived.

9
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
33. He further submitted that the distinction between Sections 72 and
73 of the Registration Act is substantive and jurisdictional and cannot be
ignored by merely describing a proceeding under one provision as a
proceeding under another. Where the executant denies execution, the
Registrar is required to proceed in accordance with Section 73 and
thereafter, determine the right of the person claiming under the document
to have the same registered. The impugned order, having proceeded on
an erroneous statutory foundation, is liable to be set aside on this ground
alone.
34. He submitted that opposite party no.2 further committed an error
of law in treating the proceedings under Section 72 as capable of being
converted into proceedings under Section 73 of the Registration Act. The
statutory conditions, procedure and consequences contemplated by
Sections 72 and 73 are materially different. A proceeding instituted
under an inapplicable statutory provision cannot acquire jurisdiction
merely by subsequently giving it a different nomenclature, particularly
when such conversion materially affects the substantive and procedural
rights of the affected parties.
35. He submitted that Section 35 of the Registration Act casts a
specific obligation upon the registering officer to satisfy himself
regarding the identity of the persons appearing before him and where
necessary, regarding admission of execution. In a case where the person
by whom the document purports to have been executed denies execution,
Section 35(3)(a) expressly contemplates refusal of registration. The
statutory scheme does not confer upon the registering authority an
unrestricted jurisdiction to conclusively adjudicate complicated
questions of title, fraud, fabrication or disputed execution as though it
were a civil court.
36. The submission is that the impugned order suffers from a
fundamental jurisdictional error inasmuch as the opposite party no.2 has
effectively undertaken to adjudicate upon the disputed execution of the

10
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
alleged agreement to sell as a court of plenary civil jurisdiction without
appreciating the limited scope of proceedings under the Registration Act.
The finding that the disputed instrument was executed by father of the
petitioners could not have been recorded mechanically or without
adherence to the procedure prescribed by law.
37. He submitted that the finding regarding execution is particularly
unsustainable because the alleged executant had denied execution and
the dispute concerning the genuineness and execution of the document
was specifically raised before the authorities. Once execution was
specifically denied, the burden lay upon the party seeking registration to
establish its statutory entitlement in accordance with law. The impugned
order, instead of applying the statutory test, has proceeded as though the
disputed instrument carried a presumption of valid execution.
38. His submission is that opposite party no.2 has acted beyond the
permissible limits of its statutory jurisdiction by directing that, merely
upon presentation of the disputed instrument, the Sub-Registrar shall
register the same. Such a direction could not legally be issued without
first satisfying all statutory requirements governing registration,
particularly where execution itself remained seriously disputed.
39. He submitted that the impugned order is also vitiated on account
of violation of the principles of natural justice. The proceedings were
admittedly at the stage of evidence, yet the opposite party no.2
proceeded to pronounce the final order without affording the petitioners
a reasonable and effective opportunity to complete their evidence.
Closure of adjudication without permitting a party to place material
evidence in support of its defence amounts to denial of a meaningful
opportunity of hearing.
40. He next submitted that the right of hearing guaranteed by the
principles of natural justice is not an empty formality. Where disputed
execution of an instrument is the foundational issue, the affected party

11
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence, challenge
the evidence relied upon by the opposite side and place relevant material
before the adjudicating authority. The impugned order, having been
passed without completing such process, is liable to be quashed for
breach of natural justice.
41. He further submitted that the impugned order further suffers from
non-application of mind, as the material objections specifically raised by
the petitioners have not been considered in their proper legal perspective.
The petitioners had specifically raised objections regarding the
maintainability of the proceedings, denial of execution, absence of
consideration, genuineness of the disputed document and the
competence of the witnesses relied upon by the opposite party. These
material issues went to the root of the proceedings and required specific
consideration and determination.
42. HE submitted that an administrative or quasi-judicial authority
exercising statutory powers is under a legal obligation to consider the
material submissions raised before it and to record reasons dealing with
the issues which have a direct bearing upon the determination of the lis.
Failure to consider material objections amounts to non-application of
mind and renders the resulting order vulnerable to judicial review.
43. His submission is that the impugned order is further vitiated
because the opposite party no.2 has recorded a positive finding regarding
execution of the disputed instrument without undertaking a legally
sustainable evaluation of the evidence. A finding affecting valuable
proprietary rights cannot be founded upon conjectures, assumptions or
untested material, particularly when execution of the document has been
specifically denied.
44. He submitted that the opposite party no.2 failed to appreciate the
legal effect of the earlier order dated 24.01.1990 passed by the Sub-
Registrar refusing registration. The said refusal was founded upon the

12
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
statutory consequences flowing from denial of execution. Unless the
subsequent proceedings were validly instituted and conducted under the
appropriate statutory provision, the earlier order could not have been
displaced merely by directing the Sub-Registrar to register the disputed
instrument.
45. His submission is that the subsequent proceedings also could not
lawfully be continued against the deceased executant after his death
without due and lawful substitution of the persons legally representing
his estate within the prescribed period and in accordance with the
applicable statutory procedure. The question of limitation and the
legality of the belated substitution application was a material
jurisdictional issue which required determination before proceeding
further in the matter.
46. He submitted that opposite party no.2 committed an error of law in
allowing the belated substitution application without recording a legally
sustainable finding regarding the source of its power to condone the
delay. Where a statutory proceeding is governed by a prescribed
limitation period, the authority cannot assume an inherent power to
condone delay unless such power is conferred expressly or is otherwise
legally available under the governing statutory framework.
47. He further submitted that the impugned order is therefore liable to
be interfered with on the settled principle that an authority exercising
statutory jurisdiction cannot travel beyond the four corners of the statute.
Any order passed in excess of statutory jurisdiction or in disregard of
mandatory statutory procedure is rendered legally unsustainable.
48. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 & 5
submitted that the present writ petition is directed against the order dated
30.03.2017 passed by the learned District Registrar/Additional District
Magistrate (Finance & Revenue), Faizabad in Appeal No. 1 of 1990,
whereby the statutory appeal preferred against the order dated

13
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
24.01.1990 passed by the Sub-Registrar, Sadar, Faizabad was allowed
and a direction was issued for registration of the Agreement to Sell dated
30.04.1989 in accordance with Section 75(1) of the Registration Act,
1908. The impugned order is, thus, an order passed in exercise of
statutory appellate jurisdiction and cannot be assailed merely on the
basis of disputed factual assertions which do not demonstrate any
jurisdictional infirmity.
49. He further submitted hat the material available before the appellate
authority included the original Agreement to Sell dated 30.04.1989, the
evidence concerning its execution, the material relating to payment of
consideration, the proceedings undertaken before the registering
authority and the subsequent conduct of the parties. The appellate
authority, after examining the material placed before it, arrived at a
conclusion regarding the registrability of the document. The petitioners
have not been able to identify any material circumstance demonstrating
that the conclusion reached by the appellate authority was based upon no
evidence whatsoever.
50. He submitted that the allegation that the Agreement to Sell was a
subsequently fabricated document is wholly inconsistent with the
contemporaneous conduct attributable to Late Chhotey Lal. After
execution of the Agreement, Late Chhotey Lal himself approached the
competent authority for obtaining permission for sale of the land in
question and permission was granted on 08.06.1989. The said
circumstance is of considerable evidentiary significance, as it constitutes
contemporaneous conduct consistent with the existence and intended
implementation of the transaction.
51. He next submitted that the subsequent cancellation of the
permission, stated to have taken place upon the complaint of Late
Chhotey Lal himself, does not retrospectively obliterate the Agreement
to Sell which had already been executed on 30.04.1989. The subsequent
change of stand, if any, could not by itself constitute proof that the

14
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
document was forged at its inception. The legal consequences flowing
from the Agreement and the question whether the transaction was
ultimately enforceable are matters which have to be determined in
accordance with law by the competent forum.
52. His submission is that the consideration aspect also cannot be
examined in isolation from the contemporaneous documentary material.
Respondent Nos.4 & 5 had placed before the competent authority
documents evidencing payment of substantial amounts towards the
agreed consideration, including the payment of Rs.40,000/- through
cheque and the remaining payments through vouchers. The petitioners
have not produced any contemporaneous document of equal evidentiary
value establishing that the entire consideration was never received by
Late Chhotey Lal.
53. His submission is that the allegation regarding subsequent refund
of the amount of Rs.40,000/- is likewise unsupported by any reliable
documentary material. No receipt, acknowledgment, bank record or
other contemporaneous document evidencing such alleged repayment
has been brought on record by the petitioners. The assertion, therefore,
remains a disputed factual plea and cannot furnish a foundation for
declaring the statutory appellate order illegal in writ jurisdiction.
54. He submitted that the conduct of Late Chhotey Lal subsequent to
execution of the Agreement is also relevant for appreciating the
controversy. The document was presented for registration and notice was
issued to the concerned executant. Despite having knowledge of the
registration proceedings, Late Chhotey Lal did not appear before the
registering authority to admit or deny execution. The consequence of
such non-appearance was dealt with in the statutory proceedings and the
remedy contemplated under the Registration Act was thereafter pursued.
55. He submitted that the statutory appellate authority was
consequently required to examine the effect of the material relating to

15
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
execution and registration of the document. The direction issued for
registration under Section 75(1) of the Registration Act cannot be
equated with a decree declaring title in favour of Respondent No.4.
Registration of the document and adjudication of substantive proprietary
rights operate in distinct legal fields.
56. His submission is that it is of particular significance that the
evidence concerning execution was not confined merely to the document
itself. The marginal witnesses, namely Sri Jagdamba Prasad Pandey and
Sri Ram Jas, were examined during the proceedings and supported the
execution of the Agreement to Sell. Their testimony constituted
substantive evidence before the authority and was liable to be considered
along with the other material available on record.
57. He submitted that the opinion of the handwriting expert dated
05.02.2004 also materially supports the case of respondent Nos. 4 & 5.
The disputed signature appearing upon the Agreement to Sell was
compared with the admitted signatures of Late Chhotey Lal and was
opined to be his signature. The said opinion was not standing alone but
was required to be considered cumulatively with the testimony of the
attesting witnesses and the contemporaneous conduct of Late Chhotey
Lal.
58. He submitted that the subsequent conduct of Suresh Kumar, one of
the sons of Late Chhotey Lal, is also a relevant circumstance which
cannot be completely ignored. Suresh Kumar, who was impleaded as
defendant No.3 in Regular Suit No.646 of 2017, has filed a written
statement acknowledging execution of the Agreement to Sell by his
father. He had also executed a registered declaration dated 30.08.2016
acknowledging the execution of the Agreement to Sell dated 30.04.1989
in favour of respondent No.4 - LPCT. Such material, at the very least,
demonstrates that the petitioners' allegation of complete fabrication is
itself a seriously disputed proposition and cannot be treated as an
admitted or established fact.

16
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
59. He submitted that the fact that the original executant subsequently
did not proceed with registration or disputed the transaction cannot,
without a proper adjudication of the surrounding circumstances,
automatically lead to the conclusion that the document itself was forged.
A subsequent dispute regarding a transaction is legally distinct from the
question whether the document evidencing such transaction was
genuinely executed.
60. He submitted that the substitution of the legal heirs of Late
Chhotey Lal after his death on 20.09.1995 was duly undertaken in the
proceedings before the competent authority. The substitution application
was allowed vide order dated 12.01.1998. The petitioners cannot,
therefore, seek to unsettle the consequences of the said proceedings
indirectly in the present writ petition without demonstrating any
independent and legally sustainable challenge to the order by which
substitution was permitted.
61. He submitted that the petitioners' reliance upon Regular Suit
No.436 of 1998 does not advance their case. The said suit was dismissed
for want of prosecution and, to the knowledge of the answering
respondents, has not been restored. Consequently, no subsisting
adjudication arising from the said suit can be relied upon as establishing
the petitioners' assertions regarding the invalidity or forgery of the
Agreement to Sell.
62. He submitted that the very nature of the relief sought in the writ
petition demonstrates that the petitioners seek, in substance, to have the
Agreement to Sell declared invalid and to nullify the consequences
flowing from the statutory registration proceedings. Such relief cannot
be granted merely by re-assessing factual material which had already
been considered by the statutory authority, particularly when the
determination of the parties' substantive rights is already the subject
matter of civil litigation.

17
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
63. He submitted that the impugned order dated 30.03.2017 does not
by itself adjudicate or confer any independent title upon respondent
No.4. The order operates within the limited statutory framework
governing registration and directs registration of the document under
Section 75(1) of the Registration Act. Questions relating to title,
possession, enforceability of the Agreement to Sell, entitlement to
specific performance and execution of a consequential sale deed
necessarily remain governed by the orders which may ultimately be
passed by the competent Civil Court.
64. He submitted that the petitioners cannot, therefore, treat the
direction for registration as if the appellate authority had decreed specific
performance or adjudicated the ultimate proprietary rights of the parties.
The legal effect of registration, the enforceability of the Agreement and
the consequential rights of the parties are separate questions and remain
subject to adjudication in accordance with law.
65. He submitted that the statutory appellate authority cannot be said
to have acted mechanically merely because its conclusion is adverse to
the petitioners. The authority considered the material relating to the
Agreement, the evidence concerning its execution and the circumstances
attending the registration proceedings. A judicial review proceeding
cannot be converted into an appeal for substituting another possible view
of the evidence unless the conclusion is shown to suffer from a legally
recognized infirmity.
66. His next submission is that the petitioners have also failed to
demonstrate that the impugned order has resulted in any irreversible
prejudice to their substantive rights. The registration directed by the
impugned order does not foreclose their right to establish, before the
competent Civil Court, any legally sustainable claim concerning title,
validity, enforceability or other consequences arising from the
Agreement to Sell.

18
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
67. He further submitted that the pendency of the substantive civil
proceedings is particularly material because the Civil Court is competent
to examine the entire controversy on the basis of pleadings, oral and
documentary evidence, examination and cross-examination of witnesses
and such other evidence as may be lawfully adduced by the parties. The
writ proceedings are not intended to replace such adjudicatory process
where the controversy essentially concerns private rights in immovable
property.
68. He submitted that respondent Nos.4 & 5 have themselves invoked
the jurisdiction of the competent Civil Court by instituting Regular Suit
No.646 of 2017 for specific performance of the Agreement to Sell dated
30.04.1989, whereas the petitioners have also instituted proceedings
seeking cancellation of the said Agreement. The existence of such
proceedings provides an appropriate forum for determination of the
substantive rights claimed by the rival parties.
69. His submission is that the institution and pendency of Regular Suit
No.8 of 2021, seeking permanent injunction in respect of the property in
dispute, further demonstrates that the controversy has ramifications
extending beyond the limited question dealt with by the registering
authorities. Such questions are appropriately capable of determination in
the pending civil proceedings and ought not to be conclusively decided
in the present writ petition.
70. His submission is that the petitioners cannot simultaneously invite
adjudication of the validity and enforceability of the Agreement before
the Civil Court and seek, in the present proceedings, a finding on the
same disputed factual issues by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction
of this Hon'ble Court. Such a course would result in overlapping
adjudication and may lead to inconsistent findings on issues which are
already pending before the competent Civil Court.

19
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
71. His submission is that the challenge founded upon alleged
violation of natural justice is also untenable in the facts of the present
case. The record indicates that the parties were afforded opportunity in
the statutory proceedings and that evidence was brought on record. The
petitioners had the opportunity to contest the evidence and place their
own material before the authority. The mere fact that the authority
ultimately accepted the case of respondent No.4 cannot be treated as
denial of hearing.
72. It is also argued that the petitioners' failure to effectively cross-
examine the witnesses or otherwise challenge the evidentiary material at
the appropriate stage cannot subsequently be converted into a plea that
the statutory authority acted in violation of natural justice. The right of
hearing does not imply a right to insist upon a conclusion favourable to
the party claiming such right.
73. It is also submitted that the objection based upon an alleged
erroneous reference to a statutory provision, if any, is equally insufficient
to invalidate the impugned proceedings in the absence of a demonstrated
lack of jurisdiction or substantial prejudice. The legality of an order is to
be examined with reference to the jurisdiction actually exercised, the
statutory scheme and the substance of the decision and not merely by
isolating an incorrect or imperfect citation of a provision.
74. He submitted that the petitioners have not established that
respondent No.2 lacked statutory authority to entertain and decide the
appeal arising out of the order passed by the Sub-Registrar. Once the
appellate jurisdiction was validly invoked, the authority was entitled to
examine the material relevant to the registration proceedings and pass an
appropriate order in accordance with the Registration Act.
75. His submission is that the cumulative circumstances on record,
including the contemporaneous Agreement to Sell, the evidence
regarding payment, the conduct of Late Chhotey Lal in obtaining

20
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
permission for sale, the evidence of the marginal witnesses, the
handwriting expert's opinion and the subsequent conduct of one of the
legal heirs, provide sufficient factual foundation for the conclusion
reached by the statutory authority. The petitioners' contrary assertions
raise, at best, competing factual claims which require adjudication in the
appropriate forum.
76. He submitted that the writ petition, therefore, does not disclose
any case of patent lack of jurisdiction, failure to exercise jurisdiction,
breach of mandatory statutory procedure or such perversity as would
justify interference with the impugned appellate order. The petitioners
are essentially seeking reconsideration of the factual material and a
different conclusion therefrom, which is impermissible within the
limited parameters of judicial review in the facts of the present case.
76. His submission is that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Hon'ble Court is discretionary and equitable in nature. The petitioners,
having available to them the remedy of adjudication before the
competent Civil Court and having already instituted civil proceedings
concerning the very transaction and property, cannot seek to use the writ
jurisdiction as a substitute for the ordinary civil adjudicatory process.
77. It is submitted that the petitioners have failed to establish any
legally sustainable ground for interference with the order dated
30.03.2017 passed by the learned District Registrar/Additional District
Magistrate (Finance & Revenue), Faizabad in Appeal No.1 of 1990. The
said order was passed in exercise of statutory appellate jurisdiction on
the basis of material available before the authority and does not warrant
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
78. Learned Additional CSC for respondent Nos.1 to 3 – State also
followed the same arguments, as has been advanced by learned counsel
for respondent Nos.4 & 5 and submitted that there is no illegality or
infirmity in the impugned order and the same is just and valid.

21
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
79. The application for intervention has been filed by the intervenor
on the ground that the subject matter of the writ petition directly affects
his rights and interest in the land in question.
80. Submission of learned counsel for the intervenor is that the
intervening applicant is the registered owner and is in possession of land
comprised in Gata No.367 Minjumla, measuring 9 Biswa, situated at
Village Pure Husain Khan, Pargana Haveli, Tehsil Sadar, District
Ayodhya (formerly Faizabad). The said land was purchased by the
applicant from Smt. Nisha Devi through a registered sale deed dated
17.08.1992. Thus, the applicant's title and interest in respect of the
aforesaid 9 Biswa land arise from a registered instrument executed much
prior to the proceedings which have culminated in the filing of the
present writ petition.
81. He submitted that after execution of the aforesaid registered sale
deed, the applicant has remained in peaceful and continuous possession
over the land purchased by him. The revenue records have also
recognized the applicant's rights over the said land. It is further
submitted that the land in question was declared in favour of the
applicant under Section 80 of the U.P. Revenue Code on 03.10.2020. The
relevant old and new Khataunis/revenue records have been brought on
record by the applicant. The aforesaid documents demonstrate that the
applicant has an independent and subsisting right, title and interest in
respect of the 9 Biswa land comprised in Gata No. 367 Minjumla.
82. He further submitted that the applicant, being under the bona fide
belief that his title and possession over the aforesaid land were
undisputed, commenced construction over the land on 15.01.2022.
However, the opposite parties in the aforesaid writ petition obstructed
the applicant from carrying out the construction and informed him that a
dispute concerning the land was pending before this Hon'ble Court and
that an order of status quo had been passed in the matter. It was only
thereafter that the applicant approached his counsel and for the first time,

22
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
came to know about the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition and the
proceedings from which the same had arisen.
83. He submitted that the applicant was admittedly not impleaded as a
party in the proceedings initiated by opposite party Nos.3 to 5 under the
Registration Act in the year 1990 before the Sub-Registrar, Sadar,
Faizabad. Even in the subsequent Appeal No.01 of 1990 preferred under
Sections 72 and 73 of the Registration Act against the order passed by
the Sub-Registrar, the applicant was not arrayed as a party. The appellate
proceedings ultimately culminated in the order dated 30.03.2017, which
has been challenged before this Hon'ble Court in the present writ
petition. The applicant was, thus, not afforded any opportunity to place
his independent claim and title before the authorities or before this
Hon'ble Court, despite the fact that his land forms part of the same Gata
number.
84. He submitted that the registered sale deed dated 17.08.1992, under
which the applicant acquired his rights in respect of 9 Biswa land, has
never been challenged, cancelled or declared void by any competent
court of law. Consequently, so long as the said registered sale deed
continues to remain valid and operative, the applicant's title and interest
flowing therefrom cannot be adversely affected behind his back in
proceedings to which he was never made a party.
85. His submission is that the dispute involved in the writ petition,
therefore, cannot be effectively adjudicated without considering the
applicant's independent right, title and interest over the aforesaid 9
Biswa land. Any order passed in the writ petition concerning the entirety
of Gata No. 367 Minjumla, without hearing the applicant, is likely to
directly prejudice and adversely affect his valuable rights arising out of
the registered sale deed dated 17.08.1992 and the subsequent revenue
entries in his favour.

23
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
86. He submitted that the applicant is not seeking to reopen or enlarge
the controversy unnecessarily, but seeks protection of his independent
rights over the specific portion of land measuring 9 Biswa which was
purchased by him through the registered sale deed dated 17.08.1992. The
applicant's limited and specific grievance is that his land ought not to be
subjected to the effect of any order passed in the present writ petition
without first determining and protecting his independent interest therein.
87. He, therefore, submitted that the applicant is a necessary and
proper party to the present proceedings, since any adjudication relating
to the land comprised in Gata No.367 Minjumla may have a direct
bearing upon his proprietary and possessory rights. The principles of
natural justice require that no person should be adversely affected by an
order passed in proceedings to which he was not a party and in which he
was not afforded an opportunity of hearing.
88. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and perused the material on record.
89. While entertaining the writ petition, following interim order was
granted on 22.05.2017:
“………………………….
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going
through the records, as an interim measure, it is provided
that till the next date of listing, parties are directed to
maintain status quo, as it exits today, in respect of land in
dispute. ”
90. On perusal of the pleadings, material brought on record and the
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties, this
Court finds that the controversy essentially revolves around the validity
of the order dated 30.03.2017 passed by the learned District
Registrar/Additional District Magistrate (Finance & Revenue), Faizabad
in Appeal/Case No.1 of 1990, whereby the appeal preferred against the
order dated 24.01.1990 passed by the Sub-Registrar, Sadar, Faizabad was
allowed and a direction was issued for registration of the Agreement to

24
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
Sell dated 30.04.1989 in accordance with law. The petitioners seek to
challenge the said order primarily on the ground that the document was
never executed by their father, late Chotey Lal and that the proceedings
before the registering authorities suffered from jurisdictional errors,
violation of natural justice and improper appreciation of the material
available on record.
91. The first submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that
the proceedings before the learned District Registrar were not
maintainable under Section 72 of the Registration Act, 1908, since the
refusal of registration by the Sub-Registrar was allegedly founded upon
denial of execution and, consequently, the procedure contemplated under
Section 73 of the Act alone could have been invoked. This Court is
unable to accept the said submission in the absolute manner in which it
has been advanced. The statutory scheme contained in Sections 71 to 75
of the Registration Act has to be examined as a whole and the substance
of the proceedings, the order passed by the registering authority and the
jurisdiction exercised by the appellate authority have to be considered
together.
92. It is not in dispute that the document in question was presented for
registration and that the Sub-Registrar passed an order dated 24.01.1990
refusing registration. Against the said order, Appeal/Case No.1 of 1990
came to be instituted before the competent authority. The appellate
proceedings remained pending for a considerable period and, during
their pendency, the parties placed documentary as well as oral material
concerning the execution and genuineness of the document before the
authority. The appellate authority, after considering the material
available before it, ultimately recorded a finding in favour of the
respondent in respect of the execution of the document and directed
registration in accordance with law.
93. Even assuming that there was some defect in the description or
reference to the statutory provision under which the proceedings were

25
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
initially instituted, such defect by itself would not render the ultimate
order void unless the petitioners establish that the authority lacked
substantive jurisdiction to entertain the dispute arising from the refusal
of registration or that the petitioners suffered substantial prejudice on
account of the alleged procedural error. The petitioners have not been
able to demonstrate either that the appellate authority was a stranger to
the statutory scheme governing refusal of registration or that the
proceedings were conducted by an authority wholly lacking jurisdiction.
94. The substance of the proceedings is also required to be noticed.
The dispute was not merely with regard to an abstract question of title
but arose directly out of the refusal of the Sub-Registrar to register a
document presented before him. The appellate authority was, therefore,
required to examine whether the refusal to register the document was
legally sustainable and whether the person claiming under the document
was entitled to have the same registered in accordance with the statutory
scheme. The mere fact that, in undertaking such examination, the
authority was required to consider the circumstances relating to
execution of the document would not, by itself, establish that the
authority assumed the jurisdiction of a Civil Court.
95. The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that
the appellate authority could not have recorded any finding regarding
execution of the Agreement to Sell dated 30.04.1989, particularly when
the petitioners' father had denied execution. There can be no quarrel with
the proposition that registration proceedings cannot be converted into a
plenary adjudication of complicated questions of title, ownership or
ultimate enforceability of an agreement. However, in the facts of the
present case, the question of execution of the document was directly
relevant to the statutory issue of registration and the authority could not
have decided the appeal without examining the material bearing upon
such execution.

26
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
96. The record, as placed before this Court, indicates that the finding
of execution recorded by the appellate authority was not based upon the
disputed document alone. The material considered by the authority
included the testimony of the marginal witnesses, the handwriting
expert's opinion and other circumstances relied upon by the contesting
respondents. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 and 5 has
specifically pointed out that the marginal witnesses, namely Sri
Jagdamba Prasad Pandey and Sri Ram Jas, supported the execution of
the Agreement to Sell and that the handwriting expert, by opinion dated
05.02.2004, also supported the genuineness of the signature attributed to
late Chotey Lal.
97. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, is not ordinarily required to undertake a fresh appreciation
or re-weighing of evidence as if sitting in appeal over every factual
conclusion recorded by a statutory authority. Where a finding is founded
upon some relevant material and the conclusion cannot be characterised
as one which no reasonable authority could have reached, interference
merely because another view may also be possible is not warranted.
98. In the present case, the petitioners have not demonstrated that the
opinion of the handwriting expert or the evidence of the marginal
witnesses was wholly irrelevant or that the appellate authority relied
upon material which was legally inadmissible. The petitioners may have
a different interpretation of the said evidence and may dispute its
probative value, but such disagreement, by itself, does not establish
perversity or patent illegality warranting interference under Article 226
of the Constitution.
99. Equally significant is the circumstance relied upon by respondent
Nos.4 and 5 that there was contemporaneous conduct relating to
obtaining permission for sale of the land in question. According to the
material placed before the Court, permission for sale was obtained after
execution of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent cancellation of

27
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
such permission was relied upon by the petitioners in support of their
case. However, cancellation of the permission at a subsequent stage
cannot, by itself, conclusively establish that the Agreement to Sell was
fabricated from its inception. The evidentiary effect of the said
circumstance is a matter to be assessed in conjunction with the other
material available on record.
100. Likewise, the rival submissions concerning payment of
consideration constitute essentially disputed questions of fact.
Respondent Nos.4 and 5 have relied upon documentary material relating
to payment, including the alleged payment of Rs.40,000/- through
cheque and other payments through vouchers, whereas the petitioners
dispute receipt of consideration and assert that the amount of Rs.40,000/-
had subsequently been returned. This Court cannot, in exercise of writ
jurisdiction, conduct a full-fledged trial for determining the truth of these
rival factual assertions, particularly when the parties have already
invoked the jurisdiction of the competent Civil Court.
101. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that the
absence of a photograph of late Chotey Lal on the document itself
establishes that the document was fabricated also cannot be accepted as a
conclusive proposition. The evidentiary significance of such
circumstance has to be assessed along with the entire evidence and
cannot, in isolation, displace the testimony of the witnesses and the
expert material considered by the statutory authority.
102. The submission concerning the alleged incompetence or interested
nature of the witnesses also does not justify interference. The credibility,
reliability and evidentiary weight to be attached to a witness are matters
ordinarily requiring appreciation of testimony in the context of the entire
evidence. The mere fact that a witness was associated with one of the
parties does not render his testimony non-existent in law. Its reliability is
to be assessed on the basis of the material circumstances and the other
evidence available on record.

28
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
103. The petitioners have further contended that their father had
specifically denied execution and that the burden was upon respondent
No.4 to establish its entitlement. The said submission, considered in its
proper perspective, does not assist the petitioners in the present writ
proceedings. The appellate authority did not proceed merely on the basis
of a presumption arising from the existence of the document; rather, it
considered the evidence which, according to the authority, supported
execution. Whether such evidence ultimately proves execution to the
standard required in a civil action is a matter which can appropriately be
determined by the competent Civil Court in the pending proceedings.
104. The plea of violation of natural justice also does not appear to
have substance. The record indicates that the parties participated in the
statutory proceedings over a prolonged period, objections were filed,
evidence was brought on record and the rival claims were considered.
The petitioners have not demonstrated with sufficient specificity what
material evidence, which could not otherwise be placed before the
authority, was illegally excluded or what particular opportunity essential
to the determination of the statutory appeal was denied to them.
105. It is settled that principles of natural justice are intended to secure
a fair opportunity and not to create an endless procedural process. The
right of hearing does not include a right to insist that the authority must
accept the version of the party heard. In the present case, the petitioners
were admittedly aware of the proceedings and had filed objections,
including their detailed objections dated 17.01.2017. The mere fact that
the authority ultimately did not accept those objections cannot, by itself,
amount to denial of hearing.
106. The submission that the appellate authority failed to consider the
objections raised by the petitioners also cannot be accepted merely on
the basis of the fact that the objections were rejected. An order is not
rendered non-speaking merely because every contention raised by a
party is not reproduced verbatim. What is required is that the authority

29
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
should apply its mind to the material issues arising for determination and
arrive at a conclusion on the basis of relevant considerations. On
examination of the impugned order in the backdrop of the material
referred to by the parties, no such fundamental non-application of mind
is established as would warrant exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction
of this Court.
107. The argument founded upon the earlier order dated 24.01.1990
passed by the Sub-Registrar also does not advance the case of the
petitioners. The said order was precisely the subject matter of
Appeal/Case No.1 of 1990. Once a statutory appellate remedy was
invoked, the correctness of the order of the Sub-Registrar was open to
examination by the competent appellate authority in accordance with the
Registration Act. The petitioners cannot treat the order under challenge
before the appellate authority as if it had attained an immutable finality
independently of the statutory appellate proceedings.
108. The challenge to the substitution order dated 12.01.1998 is also of
no assistance to the petitioners at this stage. The legal heirs of late
Chotey Lal were brought on record by an order passed during the
pendency of the statutory proceedings. The petitioners participated
thereafter in the proceedings and have not demonstrated that the said
order was independently challenged and set aside by any competent
forum. A concluded interlocutory order cannot be permitted to be
reopened indirectly in a writ petition filed years thereafter against the
ultimate appellate order, particularly in the absence of any demonstrated
jurisdictional nullity.
109. The contention regarding delay in substitution, including the
alleged absence of power to condone delay, may perhaps have been
available to the petitioners at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
However, the petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the order dated
12.01.1998 was passed by an authority having no jurisdiction
whatsoever or that its effect is so fundamentally void that every

30
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
subsequent proceeding necessarily stood rendered a nullity. The long
participation of the parties thereafter and the subsequent conduct of the
proceedings are also relevant circumstances which cannot be ignored.
110. Another circumstance which cannot be lost sight of is that the
dispute between the parties is not confined to the registration of the
document. The rival parties have asserted competing rights concerning
the Agreement to Sell and the property covered thereby. Respondent
Nos.4 and 5 have instituted Regular Suit No.646 of 2017 for specific
performance, while the petitioners have also asserted their rights in civil
proceedings. Thus, the questions relating to ultimate validity,
enforceability, specific performance, title and consequential rights
arising out of the Agreement to Sell remain matters for determination by
the competent Civil Court on the basis of the pleadings and evidence led
before it.
111. In this context, the submission of learned counsel for respondent
Nos.4 and 5 that registration of the Agreement to Sell does not by itself
amount to adjudication of title or grant of specific performance deserves
acceptance. The impugned order is confined to the statutory consequence
arising from the registration proceedings. It does not operate as a decree
declaring title in favour of respondent No.4, nor does it by itself compel
execution of a sale deed or conclusively determine the parties'
substantive proprietary rights.
112. The existence of civil proceedings is also relevant while
examining the scope of interference under Article 226. This Court is not
called upon in the present proceedings to decide whether the Agreement
to Sell is ultimately enforceable, whether the entire consideration was
paid, whether the document was obtained by fraud, whether the alleged
repayment took place, whether the petitioners' father voluntarily
executed the document or whether the respondents are ultimately entitled
to specific performance. These are matters which require appreciation of
evidence in accordance with the ordinary civil adjudicatory process.

31
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
113. The Court is conscious that the petitioners have made serious
allegations of fraud, fabrication and misuse of signatures. Such
allegations are undoubtedly serious. However, the seriousness of an
allegation does not, by itself, convert the writ court into a court of first
instance for recording oral evidence, testing the credibility of witnesses
and deciding disputed questions of fact. Where the statutory authority
has recorded its conclusion on the basis of material placed before it and
the substantive rights of the parties are also pending consideration before
the Civil Court, interference under Article 226 must be exercised with
restraint.
114. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that the
impugned order causes prejudice to their proprietary rights also cannot
be accepted as a ground for quashing the order in its entirety. The fact
that an administrative or statutory order may have civil consequences
does not mean that it is automatically liable to be quashed. The question
is whether the order suffers from such jurisdictional error, perversity,
violation of mandatory procedure or breach of natural justice as would
justify interference. For the reasons noticed hereinabove, no such
infirmity has been established.
115. So far as the intervenor is concerned, the Court finds substance in
the submission that a person claiming an independent title under a
registered sale deed dated 17.08.1992 in respect of a portion of Gata
No.367 cannot be deprived of his independent rights merely by reason of
the present proceedings. The intervenor claims to have acquired 9 Biswa
of land from Smt. Nisha Devi through the aforesaid registered sale deed
and further relies upon subsequent revenue records and declaration under
Section 80 of the U.P. Revenue Code. His claim is independent in
character and has not been shown to have been finally annulled by any
competent court.
116. Consequently, while no finding is required to be recorded in the
present writ petition regarding the ultimate validity of the intervenor's

32
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
title, it is appropriate to clarify that the dismissal of the writ petition shall
not be construed as adjudicating upon or extinguishing any independent
right, title or interest of the intervenor in respect of the land claimed by
him. Likewise, any question concerning identity, boundaries, area or
overlapping of the land comprised in Gata No.367 shall remain open for
determination by the competent forum in accordance with law.
117. The interim order dated 22.05.2017 directing the parties to
maintain status quo was an interim arrangement during the pendency of
the writ petition and does not create any independent right in favour of
either party. With the dismissal of the writ petition, the said interim order
shall stand vacated, subject, however, to any order which may have been
passed by the competent Civil Court in the pending civil proceedings or
any other competent proceeding concerning the same property.
118. On an overall consideration of the matter, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the petitioners have essentially sought re-
appreciation of the factual material and substitution of the view taken by
the statutory appellate authority by another possible view. Such exercise
is beyond the normal parameters of judicial review under Article 226 of
the Constitution, particularly when the finding of the statutory authority
is supported by relevant material and the rival parties have an efficacious
forum before the competent Civil Court for determination of their
substantive rights.
119. It is, therefore, held that the petitioners have failed to establish that
the impugned order dated 30.03.2017 suffers from patent lack of
jurisdiction, perversity, violation of mandatory statutory procedure or
denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing. The objections regarding the
statutory provision invoked, execution of the Agreement to Sell,
consideration, credibility of witnesses, handwriting and the effect of the
subsequent conduct of the parties are matters which, insofar as they
concern the ultimate civil rights of the parties, shall remain open for
consideration by the competent Civil Court. The impugned order, viewed

33
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
within the limited scope of the present writ proceedings, does not call for
interference.
120. In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons recorded
hereinabove, the present writ petition is found to be devoid of merit and
is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is hereby
dismissed. The order dated 30.03.2017 passed by the learned District
Registrar/Additional District Magistrate (Finance & Revenue), Faizabad,
in Appeal/Case No.1 of 1990, is hereby affirmed.
121. It is, however, clarified that the affirmation of the impugned order
in the present writ proceedings shall not be construed as a final
adjudication by this Court upon the ultimate validity, enforceability or
specific performance of the Agreement to Sell dated 30.04.1989, nor
upon the final title or proprietary rights of the parties in respect of the
land in question. All such questions, to the extent they arise for
consideration before the competent Civil Court, shall be decided
independently in accordance with law and on the basis of the evidence
led before it, uninfluenced by any observation contained in the present
judgment.
122. Since Regular Suit No.646 of 2017 concerning the Agreement to
Sell dated 30.04.1989 is stated to be pending before the competent Civil
Court, it is expected that the learned Court concerned shall make all
endeavour to conclude the said proceedings expeditiously, preferably
within a period of eight months from the date of appearance of the
parties and certified copy of this order, subject to cooperation of the
parties and the applicable procedural requirements. It is made clear that
the said proceedings shall be decided strictly on their own merits and in
accordance with law.
123. Insofar as the claim of the intervenor relating to Gata No.367
Minjumla, measuring 9 Biswa, is concerned, it is clarified that nothing
contained in this judgment shall be construed as adjudicating upon,

34
WRIC No. - 11162 of 2017
extinguishing or adversely affecting any independent right, title or
interest claimed by the intervenor under the registered sale deed dated
17.08.1992 or the subsequent revenue records, except to the extent
necessarily flowing from the statutory order under challenge. The
intervenor shall remain at liberty to establish his independent claim
before the competent forum in accordance with law.
124. The interim order dated 22.05.2017 shall stand vacated. It is
further clarified that this vacation shall not prejudice or override any
subsequent order, interim or final, passed by the competent Civil Court
or any other competent forum in respect of the property in question.
125. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Irshad Ali,J.)
October 16, 2026
Adarsh K Singh
Digitally signed by :-
ADARSH KUMAR SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench