SYAMA PRASAD MOOKERJEE PORT, KOLKATA (FORMERLY KNOWN AS BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATA vs INDIAN JUTE INDUSTRIES RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (IJIRA)

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE


BEFORE :-

THE HON’BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA SARKAR



C.O 1020 of 2024

Syama Prasad Mookerjee Port, Kolkata

vs.

Indian Jute Industries’ Research Association (IJIRA)


For the Petitioner : Mr. Subhankar Nag, Adv.
Mr. Sandip Das Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Debayan Sen, Adv.
Mr. Niket Ojha, Adv.


For the Opposite Party : Mr. Mainak Bose, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Niraj Kr. Pandey, Adv.
Mr. Shakeel Md. Akhter, Adv.


Judgment reserved on : 17.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on : 15.05.2026
Judgment uploaded on : 15.05.2026.

Shampa Sarkar, J.

1. This civil revisional application arises out of a judgment and order dated
January 6, 2024, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 7th
Court at Alipore in P.P. Appeal No. 4 of 2013. The appeal was directed
against an order dated March 18, 2013, passed by the Estate Officer
Kolkata Port Trust under sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Public Premises

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(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1971 (hereinafter referred to as
the said Act), in Proceeding No. 1051 of 2010, under sub-section (1) and
(2A) of section 7 of the said act, in Proceeding No. 1051/R of 2010 and
under sub-section (2) and (2A) of section 7 of the said Act in Proceeding No.
1051/D of 2010. The Estate Officer directed eviction of the opposite party.
2. The learned judge allowed the appeal, thereby setting aside the order of the

Estate Officer on various grounds, namely:-
a) The lease deed was executed between the parties on December 18,
1947 with effect from July 1, 1947 and the said Act could not be
resorted to, for eviction of the opposite party, who had come in
possession of the public premises prior to September 16, 1958.
b) The said Act did not have retrospective application, i.e. prior to the
date of its enforcement. Thus, the date of entry of the opposite party
would be a relevant factor to test the applicability of the said Act in the
instant case.
c) Renewal of the lease deed by the deed of indenture dated April 23,
1981 with effect from July 1,1977 for a further term of 30 years, would
not ipso facto make the said Act applicable, as the occupation of the
opposite party dated back to 1947.

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d) In view of the position of law laid down in Suhas H. Pophale Vs.
Oriental Insurance Company Limited & its Estate Officer reported
in (2014) 4 SCC 657 , the opposite party did not fall within the
definition of “unauthorized occupant”.
e) The opposite party being ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution
of India, could not be evicted from the premises by taking recourse to
the said Act. The said Act could be applied only for eviction of a private
party.
(f) The office memorandum dated May 22, 2018 clarified the position
that, in the event of any dispute or difference relating to interpretation
and application of commercial contracts between Central Public Sector
Enterprises/Port Trust, inter se , and also between Central Public
Sector Enterprises and Government Departments/Organizations, such
disputes or differences shall be taken up by either party for its
resolution through AMRCD. Accordingly, the opposite party had
approached the Assistant Land Manager-II, Calcutta Port Trust Estate
Department for revision of rent at the end of the second tenure with a
request to consider the first alternative, i.e., enhancement of rent by
25%. A reminder was also sent, but the Port Trust expressed its

inability to entertain the matter and no settlement could take place.

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3. Aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment and order, the petitioner has
approached this court, seeking interference with the order impugned, with
a prayer that the order of the Estate Officer be upheld.
4. Mr. Subhankar Nag, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the
petitioner was the owner of approximately 15 bighas of land situated at 17
Taratala Road, Kolkata – 700088, (hereinafter referred to as the said

premises).
5. By a lease deed dated December 18, 1947, the opposite party was granted
lease of the said premises for a period of 30 years. The lease expired due to
efflux of time. Thereafter, a fresh lease deed was executed on April 23,
1981, for a further period of 30 years, which did not contain a renewal
clause. The lease expired due to efflux of time on June 30, 2007. A notice
to quit and vacate was issued on May 28, 2008 on the failure of the
opposite party to pay rent, taxes, and compensation amounting to Rs.
2,56,02,040. It was alleged that the opposite party violated the conditions
of the lease deed by not paying rent to the tune of Rs. 2,15,03,065 for the
period between July 1997 to June 30, 2007 and also continued to illegally
occupy the premises after expiry of the lease. The petitioner initiated
proceedings under the said Act against the opposite party. Notices under
Sections 4 and 7, dated March 9, 2010, were issued to the opposite party.

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Upon contested hearing, by an order dated March 18, 2013, the Estate
Officer passed the order of eviction. Such order of eviction was passed on
account of default in payment of lease rent and for other reasons. The
proceeding under Section 7 of the said Act was also disposed of, directing
payment of a sum of Rs. 9,41,09,706.14/- with interest. The opposite party
preferred the appeal vide PP Appeal No. 4 of 2013.
6. The first contention of Mr. Nag was that, the opposite party did not fall
within the definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
The communication of the Under-Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, indicated that the Ministry of
Textiles vide a letter dated November 23, 2021, had informed that the
opposite party was not an affiliated body of the government. The finding of
the learned appeal court that the said Act would not be applicable in case
of the opposite party which was State under Article 12 of the Constitution

of India, was thus misconceived.
7. According to Mr. Nag, the Act did not make any differentiation between
government approved bodies like the opposite party and any other class of
unauthorized occupants. The opposite party was in occupation from 1947
for a period of 30 years. Another lease deed was entered into, which
ultimately expired on June 30, 2007. The opposite party continued to

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possess and utilize the said premises and defaulted in making payment of
the lease rent for a long period of time. This was not only a case of breach
of the lease agreement, but also a case of continuous occupation of the
public premises by the opposite party, even after the authorization to
possess and occupy the same had expired. Although, the lease deed by
which the opposite party was allowed to occupy the premises had expired
due to efflux of time and a notice to quit and vacate had been issued by the
petitioner, the opposite party refused to vacate the premises. Thus, the
opposite party was covered by the definition of unauthorized occupant.
8. It was next contended that, the initial lease was granted in December 1947.
The said lease expired. A fresh lease deed was executed on April 23, 1981
i.e. after the promulgation of the said Act and the relationship between the
parties was governed by the fresh lease dated April 23, 1981. The said Act
was applicable on the date when the cause of action arose to evict the
opposite party. The ratio of the judgment in Suhas H. Pophale (supra), on
the basis of which the judgment and order impugned was passed, had
since been overruled in the decision of Life Insurance Corporation of
India & Anr. Vs. Vita reported in (2026) 3 SCC 427 .
9. It was further urged that, the learned Judge failed to take into
consideration the ratio laid down in Ashoka Marketing Limited Vs.

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Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported in (1990) 4 SCC 406 and M/s.
Jain Ink Manufacturing Company Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of
India reported in (1980) 4 SCC 435 . Further reliance was placed on the
decisions of Gyan Mahendra Swarup Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of
India reported in 2018 SCC Online Calcutta 5803, M/s. B.C. Shaw &
Sons Vs. The Union of India & Ors. reported in 2014 SCC Online
Calcutta 17606 and Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata Vs.
Metal Box India Limited & Anr. reported in 2021 SCC Online Calcutta
2405 . Relying on the decision of Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji Vs.
Union of India & Anr. reported in (2019) 20 SCC 705 , it was submitted
that the Hon’ble Apex Court had clearly held that, the said Act did not
create any new right of eviction, but it only created a remedy for a right
which already existed under the general law. In other words, the said Act
provided a remedy which was speedier than the remedy of filing a suit
under the general law, for eviction of unauthorized occupants from public
premises. The only consideration in this case would be whether the
premises in question was public premise as defined under Section 2(e) of
the said Act at the time of initiation of the proceeding for eviction.
10. It was urged that, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997
would not apply in this case, inasmuch as, by virtue of Section 3 (a) (iii)

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and (iv), properties owned by government undertakings or enterprises or
statutory bodies were excluded from the purview of the 1997 Act. The
opposite party was not entitled to any benefit under the local rent law.
11. Mr. Nag further refuted the contention of the opposite party that,
being an authority affiliated to the government, it was entitled to special
protection. According to Mr. Nag, the observations of a learned Single
Judge in a writ petition involving the opposite party, to the effect that two
government authorities should resolve their disputes, could not confer any
special status to the opposite party, and would not exclude it from the
purview of the said Act. The law did not prohibit initiation of eviction
proceedings against a society. Secondly, the Ministry of Textiles had also
indicated that there was no embargo under the law, in proceeding for
eviction of the opposite party, which was not an affiliated body of the
Ministry of Textiles. It was further contended that the Circular Resolution
No. 21013/1/2000-Pol.1 dated May 30, 2002, which was published in the
Gazette of India, Part I, Section 1, dated June 8, 2002 which was relied
upon by the opposite party, did not prohibit an eviction proceeding against
the opposite party. Moreover, such question was not raised before the
Estate Officer. The circular was directory and not mandatory. Moreover, the
circular had been substantially complied with, to the extent that,

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recourse was taken to the appropriate provision of law under the said Act,
in order to evict the opposite party.
12. Thus, it was urged that the order of the appeal court should be set
aside on the ground of patent illegality, as it suffered from
misinterpretation of law and incorrect appreciation of the legal position
with regard to applicability of the said Act.
13. Mr. Mainak Bose, learned Senior Advocate for the opposite party
submitted that the opposite party fell within the definition of State under
Article 12 of the Constitution of India and functioned under the Ministry of
Textiles. Eviction proceeding against the said body was contrary to the
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) . In
paragraph 56 of the said decision, the Apex Court mentioned the guidelines
issued by the Central Government, to prevent arbitrary use of powers
under the said Act. Those guidelines were in the nature of a resolution No.
21013/ 1/2000- Pol 1, dated May 30, 2002, which was published in the
Gazette of India, Part I, Section 1, dated June 8, 2002. Learned Senior
Advocate emphasized that the Act was meant to evict totally unauthorized
occupants from public premises or sub-lessees or employees who had
ceased to be in service and were ineligible to occupy the premises. The said
Act should not be resorted to, either with a commercial motive or to secure

10

vacant possession of the premises, in order to accommodate the employees
of the petitioner, specially in cases where the premises were in occupation
of genuine tenants who were lawfully inducted either by the public
authority or by such person from whom the public authority acquired the
property.
14. According to Mr. Bose, the Apex Court further observed that the
guidelines dated May 30, 2002, on the one hand kept it open for the public
authority to secure periodic revision of rent in terms of the local rent
control Act in each state and also to move the Court on genuine grounds,
under the Rent Control Act, for resumption of possession. The opposite
party was entitled to the benefit of such provision and had accordingly
requested for revision of rent. Further, the guidelines went on to instruct
all public undertakings to review all pending cases before the Estate Officer
or Courts, with reference to the guidelines and withdraw such proceedings
which were pending against genuine tenants. According to the Hon’ble
Apex Court, the intention behind the issuance of the guidelines could not
be ignored by the public undertakings and they were expected to follow the
same.
15. It was urged by Mr. Bose that, the guidelines were issued to prevent
arbitrary use of powers under the said Act. Powers conferred upon the

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owners of public premises as defined under the said Act, could not be
pressed into service to evict the opposite party, who was a genuine tenant
and could not be treated to be an unauthorized occupant merely because a
notice to quit and vacate the premises had been issued. The opposite party
had approached the authority of the petitioner for revision of rent, but the
said request, although made on two occasions, were not paid any heed to.
The opposite party could not be treated as a private tenant. The eviction
proceeding was initiated in abuse of discretionary powers. The said
proceeding was not maintainable in view of the guidelines prescribed and
also the ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Suhas H.
Pophale (supra) . Although the guidelines were advisory in nature, the
intention behind the guidelines could not be ignored by the petitioner, as
public authority. The said premises had attained the status of public
premises from September 16, 1958, that is, the date from which the said
Act was brought into force. All persons inducted as tenants in respect of
the premises prior thereto, would not come within the ambit of the said Act
and could not, therefore, be evicted by proceedings initiated under the said
Act. Such occupants could only be evicted under the general law or the
local rent control laws. The occupants had vested right to be treated as
tenants under the general laws or local rent control law at the time of entry

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into the said premises. Had the opposite party entered the said premises
after September 16, 1958, the provisions of the said Act would be
applicable. As the opposite party was leased out the premises at an earlier
date, the said Act was not applicable. The said act provided for eviction of
unauthorized occupants and recovery of arrears of rent or damages from
such authorized occupants. It was also urged that the provision of the
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 would override the provisions of
the said Act, being a special statute. When the opposite party had come in
possession of the said premises under the lease deed with effect from 1947,
The Public Premises (unauthorized occupants) Act, 1958 had not been
enacted.
16. Thus, applying the ratio of Suhas H. Pophale (supra) , it was
submitted by Mr. Bose, that the proceeding initiated by the Estate Officer
was contrary to law. The initial date of entry into the said premises should
have been taken into consideration by the Estate Officer.
17. The occupants who had come into possession of the premises owned
or acquired by public authorities on and from September 16, 1958 or
thereafter, could be evicted under the said Act. The date from which the
said Act had overriding effect over other laws of eviction, ought to have
been determined with reference to the date on which the opposite party had

13

come into occupation of the premises. Secondly, whether on such date of
occupation, the concerned premises was public premises under the 1971
Act should have also been an important test to determine the applicability
of the said Act. The concerned premises did not fall within the definition of
public premises at the time of entry of the opposite party and not until
September 16, 1958.

18. Considered the rival contentions of the parties. Admittedly, the
guidelines issued vide resolution No. 21013/1/2000-Pol 1, dated May 30,
2002, do not confer any special right on the tenants/occupants, being
bodies approved by various government departments to continue to remain
in public premises, even after the authority under which the
tenants/occupants had come in possession had expired or had been
terminated. In this case, the lease was created for the first time on
December 18, 1947, for a period of 30 years. Thereafter, a fresh lease deed
was executed on April 23, 1981, for a period of another 30 years, without
any renewal clause.
19. The lease expired due to efflux of time on June 30, 2007 and a notice
to quit was issued on May 28, 2008. The opposite party continued in
possession of the property even thereafter. The petitioner alleged violation
of the conditions of the lease and non-payment of lease rent from July

14

1997 to June 2007. Further case was for non-payment of taxes and
compensation. The petitioner initiated proceedings under the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 and accordingly,
the notices under Sections 4 and 7, were issued by the Estate Officer. The
relevant portions of the notices are quoted below:-
“ To,
The Indian Jute Industries,
Research Association,
17, Taratala Road,
Kolkata-700 088.

AND ANY PERSON/S INTERESTED ON
THE PROPERTY UNDER SCHEDULE

Whereas I, the undersigned, am of opinion on the
grounds specified below that you are in unauthorised
occupation of the public premises mentioned in the schedule
below and that you should be evicted form said premises.

G R OU N D S

THAT YOU HAVE VIOLATED THE FUNDAMENTAL
CONDITION OF TENANCY AS GRANTED BY KOLKATA PORT
TRUST (KOPT) UNDER LEASE. THAT THE CONTRACTUAL
PERIOD OF LEASE IN RESPECT OF THE PUBLIC PREMISES
IN QUESTION WAS FOR 30 YEARS WITHOUT ANY OPTION
FOR RENEWAL AND HAS ALREADY EXPIRED ON
30.06.2007. THAT YOU ARE OCCUPYING THE PROPERTY
WRONGFULLY AFTER EXPIRY OF THE PERIOD OF LEASE IN
QUESTION. THAT YOU ARE IN WRONGFUL OCCUPATION OF
THE PUBLIC PREMISES AND LIABLE TO PAY DAMAGES FOR
UNAUTHORIZED USE AND OCCUPATION OF THE PORT
PROPERTY UPTO THE DATE OF DELIVERING VACANT AND
PEACEFUL POSSESSION TO PORT AUTHORITY. AN
APPLICATION FROM KOLKATA PORT TRUST DATED
13.1.2010 IS ATTACHED HERETO WHICH ALSO FORMS A
PART OF THE GROUND.

Now, therefore, in pursuance of Sub-Section (i) of Section
4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)
Act, 1971. I hereby call upon you to show cause on or before

15

19.04.2010 why such an order of eviction should not be
made.

And in pursuance of Clause (b)(ii) of Sub-Section 2 of
Section 4, I also call upon you to appear before me in person
or through the duly authorised representative capable to
answer all material questions connected with the matter along
with the evidence which you intend to produce in support of
the cause shown on 19.04.2010 at 3 P.M. for personal
hearing. In case you fail to appear on the said date and time,
the case would be decided exparte.

SCHEDULE OF THE PUBLIC PREMISES
REFERRED TO ABOVE

st
The said piece or parcel of land msg. 8752.707 sq. m. in 1
nd
belt and 11325.338 sq. m. in 2 belt altogether msg.
20067.045 sq. m. or thereabouts in situate at Taratala Road,
Thana- Taratala Police, Calcutta, District-24 Parganas
(South), Registration District-Alipore. It is bounded on the
North by the Trustees’ Taratala Road, on the East by the
Trustees’ land occupied by M/s. Alstom Ltd. now known as
M/s. Marathon Electric Motors (India) Ltd. on the South party
by the Trustees’ open land and partly by the Trustees’ land
occupied by the Principal Seamens Welfare Office, and on the
West Bengal Trustees’ land occupied by I.P.B. Ltd.
The Trustees’ means the Board of Trustees of the Port of
Kolkata.

Sd/-
Date: 22.03.2010
Estate Officer”



“OrderNo.2 Dated 09.03.2010
To,
Shri/Shrimati/M/s.
The Indian Jute Industries
Research Association,
17, Taratala Road,
Kolkata-700 088

Whereas I, the undersigned, am satisfied that you are/were in
occupation of the Public Premises described in the Schedule
below:

And Whereas in exercise of the powers conferred on me by
sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of

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Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, 1 consider that a sum of
Rs 2,15,03,065.00 (Rupees Two crores fifteen lakhs three
thousand sixty five only) being arrears of rent from the --- day
th
of July 1997 up to the 30 day of June 2007 (both day
inclusive) in respect of the said promises is due and payable
by you to the Statutory Authority (Kolkata Port Trust);

And whereas in exercise of the powers conferred on me by
sub-section (2A) of section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction
of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1971, I consider that you are
also liable to pay simple interest to the Statutory Authority
(Kolkata Port Trust) on the said arrears at the rate determined
by the undersigned till its final payment;

Now, therefore, in pursuance of sub-section (3) of section 7 of
the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971, I hereby call upon you to show-cause on or before the
19.4.2010 at 3 P.M. why an order requiring you to pay the
said arrears of rent together with simple interest should not
be made.

S C H E D U LE

st
The said piece or parcel of land msg. 8741.707 sq. m. in 1
nd
belt and 11325.338 sq. m. in 2 belt altogether
msg.20067.045 sq. m. or thereabouts is situate at Taratala
Road, Thana-Taratala Police, Calcutta, District-24 Parganas
(South), Registration District-Alipore. It is bounded on the
North by the Trustees’ Taratala Road, on the East by the
Trustees’ land occupied by M/s. Alstom Ltd. now known as
M/s. Marathon Electric Motors (India) Ltd. on the South party
by the Trustees’ open land and partly by the Trustees’ land
occupied by the Principal Seamens Welfare Office, and on the
West by the Trustees' land occupied by LF.B. Ltd.

The Trustees means the Board of Trustees of the Port of
Kolkata.

Sd/-
Dated 22.3.2010 Signature & Seal of
the Estate Officer”


20. The notices outlined the nature of breach of the provisions of the
lease deed and those of the said Act and why the opposite party should be
treated as an unauthorised occupant. Upon contested hearing, the order of

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eviction was passed on March 18, 2013. Relevant portions of the said order
are quoted below:-
“NOW THEREFORE, I am consciously of the view that this is a
fit case for issuing order of eviction u/s5 of the Act against O.P.
for the following grounds/ reasons:-
1: That the proceedings against O.P. are very much
maintainable within the four corners of the P.P. Act.
2. That O.P's contention with regard to applicability of lease
period from a future date or from the registration of the lease
deed in view of Sec, 5 of the T.P. Act has got no merit in
determining/calculating the terminal date of the contractual
period of lease.
3. That all the documents produced before this Forum of Law
in course of hearing are forming a part of the record and strict
compliance of the Indian Evidence Act is not mandatory or
necessary for conducting adjudication process before this
Forum of Law, which is a Quasi-Judicial Authority under the
P.P. Act.
4. That O.P. has failed and neglected to pay the rental dues in
terms of the provision of the lease deed in question and the
rental demands made by KoPT in terms of the KoPT's notified
schedule of rent charges are correctly payable by O.P.
5. That O.P's contentions regarding "Tenant Holding Over" is
not supported by fact and law as well.
6. That O.P's contention regarding time barred claim of KoPT
has got no merit in facts and circumstances of the case as O.P.
prefers to continue in occupation of the Public Premises,
acknowledging the jural relationship as debtor.
7. That O.P. has failed to bear any witness or adduce any
evidence in support of their contention regarding authorized
occupation.
8. That the demand for possession vide KolT's letter/notice
dated 27.05.2008 is valid, lawful and binding upon the parties.
9. That O.Ps occupation, has become unauthorized in view of
Sec 2(g) of P.P. Act right from the date of expiry of the
contractual period of lease in question and O.P. is liable to pay
damages for wrongful use and enjoyment of the Port Property
in question upto the date of handing over of clear, vacant and
unencumbered possession to KoPT.

ACCORDINGLY, Department is directed to draw up formal
order of eviction u/s.5 of the Act as per Rule made there
under, giving 15 days time to O.P. and any person/s whoever
may be in occupation to vacate the premises. I make it clear
that all person/s whoever may be in occupation are liable to be
evicted by this order and the Port Authority is entitled to claim

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damages for unauthorized use and occupation of the property
against O.P. in accordance with Law up to the date of recovery
of possession of the same.
It is my considered view that a sum of Rs.2,13,80,872/- for the
period 30.06.2000 to 30.06.2007 is due and recoverable from
O.P. by the Port authority on account of rental dues and O.P.
must have to pay the rental dues to KoPT on or before
31.05.2013. Such dues attracts interest at the rate of 15% per
annum upto 18.09.1996 and thereafter at the rate of 18% per
annum upto 06.04.2011 and thereafter at the rate of 14.25%
per annum till its liquidation of the same from the date of
incurrence of liability in accordance with the notification of
KoPT issued under Authority of Law as per adjustment of
payments made so far by O.P as per KoPT's books of accounts.
Department is directed to draw up formal order as per Rule
u/s 7 of the Act.
Department is directed to draw formal order for damages
u1/s.7 of the Act for Rs. 1,10,67,450/-for the period
01.07.2007 to 30.11.2009, directing O.P. to pay the amount on
or before $1.05.2013. 5uch amount attracts interest from the
date of incurrence of liability @ 15% per annum upto
18.09.1996 and thereafter 13% per annum upto 06.04.2011
and thereafter @ 14.25% till its final payment as per
notification published under authority of law by the Port
Authority as per adjustment of payments made so far as per
books of accounts of KoPT.
In my opinion KoPT's claim for damages upto August,2012 for
Rs. 3,60,13,817.13 (excluding interest for delayed payment) for
wrongful occupation may be payable by O.P. as it is gathered
in course of hearing that the charges so claimed by KoPT is on
the basis of the Schedule of Rent Charges published under the
Authority of Taw as per provisions of the Major Port Trusts Act
1963. To course of hearing, 1 find that KoPT has made out an
arguable claim against O.P., founded with sound reasoning. I
make it clear that Kolkata Port Trust is entitled to claim
damages against O.P. for unauthorized use and occupation of
the public premises up to the date of recovery of clear, vacant
and unencumbered possession of the same in accordance with
Law and KoPt ie entitled to claim interest upon dues/charges
right from the date of incurrence of liability by O.P. as per
KoPT's Rule. KoPT is accordingly directed to submit a
statement comprising details of its calculation of damages
indicating there in the details of the rate of such charges
together with the basis on which such charges are claimed
against O.P. for my consideration for the purpose of
assessment of damages as per Rule made under the Act.
I must reiterate that KoPT's total claim against O.P, on account
of rental dues and charges for compensation for wrongful use
and enjoyment of the property for Rs.9,41,09,706.13 upto July,

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2012 which includes interest for delayed payment of Rs.
3,07,15,017.00 has received my due attention and I am
satisfied that Port Authority has made out an arguable claim
based on sound reasoning for such claim against O.P.
All concerned are directed to act accordingly.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL
Sd/-
(P.BHATTACHARYA)
ESTATE OFFICER”


21. The relevant provisions of law on the basis of which the order was
passed are quoted below:-
“ 4. Issue of notice to show cause against order of eviction. (1) If
the estate officer has information that any person is in unauthorised
occupation of any public premises and that he should be evicted, the
estate officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in
writing within seven working days from the date of receipt of the
information regarding the unauthorised occupation calling upon the
person concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not
be made.
(1A) If the estate officer knows or has reasons to believe that any
person is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises, then,
without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), he shall forthwith
issue a notice in writing calling upon the person concerned to show
cause why an order of eviction should not be made.
(IB) Any delay in issuing a notice referred to hi sub-sections (1) and
(1A) shall not vitiate the proceedings under this Act.
(2) The notice shall-
(a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be
made; and
(b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are, or
may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the public premises,-
(i) to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before such
date as is specified in the notice, being a date not later than seven
days from the date of issue thereof; and
(ii) to appear before the estate officer on the date specified in the notice
along with the evidence which they intend to produce in support of the
cause shown, and also for personal hearing, if such hearing is desired.
(3) The estate officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it
affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public
premises, and in such other manner as may be prescribed, whereupon
the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons
concerned.

20

5. Eviction of unauthorised occupants. (1) If, after considering the
cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under
section 4 and any evidence produced by him in support of the same
and after personal hearing, if any, given under sub-clause (ii) of clause
(b) of sub-section (2) of section 4, the estate officer is satisfied that the
public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the estate officer shall
make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing
that the public premises shall be vacated, on such date as may be
specified in the order but not later than fifteen days from the date of
the order, by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part
thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or
some other conspicuous part of the public premises:
Provided that every order under this sub-section shall be made by the
estate officer as expeditiously as possible and all endeavour shall be
made by him to issue the order within fifteen days of the date
specified in the notice under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A), as the
case may be, of section 4.
(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction [on
or before the date specified in the said order or within fifteen days of
the date of its publication under sub-section (1), whichever is later, the
estate officer or any other officer duly authorised by the estate officer
in this behalf may, after the date so specified or after the expiry of the
period aforesaid, whichever is later, evict that person] from, and take
possession of, the public premises and may, for that purpose, use such
force as may be necessary:
Provided that if the estate officer is satisfied, for reasons to be
recorded in writing, that there exists any compelling reason which
prevents the person from vacating the premises within fifteen days,
the estate officer may grant another fifteen days from the date of
expiry of the order under sub-section (1) to the person to vacate the
premises.
7. Power to require payment of rent or damages in respect of
public premises. (1) Where any person is in arrears of rent payable in
respect of any public premises, the estate officer may, by order, require
that person to pay the same within such time and in such instalments
as may be specified in the order.
(2) Where any person is, or has at any time been, in unauthorised
occupation of any public premises, the estate officer may, having
regard to such principles of assessment of damages as may be
prescribed, assess the damages on account of the use and occupation
of such premises and may, by order, require that person to pay the
damages within such time and in such instalments as may be
specified in the order.
(2A) While making an order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the
estate officer may direct that the arrears of rent or, as the case may
be, damages shall be payable together with compound interest at such
rate as may be prescribed, not being a rate exceeding the current rate
of interest within the meaning of the Interest Act, 1978 (14 of 1978).]

21

(3) No order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be made
against any person until after the issue of a notice in writing to the
person calling upon him to show cause [within seven days from the
date of issue thereof), why such order should not be made, and until
his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of
the same, have been considered by the estate officer.
(3A) If the person in unauthorised occupation of residential
accommodation challenges the eviction order passed by the estate
officer under sub-section (2) of section 3B in any court, he shall pay
damages for every month for the residential accommodation held by
him.
(4) Every order under this section shall be made by the estate officer
as expeditiously as possible and all endeavour shall be made by him
to issue the order within fifteen days of the date specified in the
notice.”

22. The factual findings of the Estate Officer were not controverted by
Mr. Bose. The learned appeal court also did not express any opinion on the
same. The appeal court allowed the appeal, by holding that the eviction
proceeding before the Estate Officer against the opposite party was
erroneous and not maintainable. The ratio laid down in Suhas H. Pophale
(supra) , was applied, inter alia, to hold that the opposite party was not an
unauthorised occupant. The learned Judge was of the view that, as the
said Act was given effect only from September 16, 1958, and the opposite
party had come into possession of the property by virtue of a lease deed of
1947, the opposite party would be governed by the general law of eviction
or by the local rent control law. A right had vested upon the said occupant,
to be treated as a tenant under the law prevailing at the relevant point of
time. The subsequent renewal of the lease deed, would not alter the fact
that the occupant was in possession since 1947, when the said premises

22

were not public premises. The other factor which prevailed upon the appeal
court was that, the opposite party was an affiliated body of the Ministry of
Textiles and as such the guidelines of 2002 would prevail and protect the
opposite party from such eviction proceedings.
23. In my opinion, the guidelines were only advisory in nature. They
made no special provision for protection of an unauthorized occupant like
the opposite party, who continued to remain in the premises without
paying rent and even after the lease had expired. The opposite party is a
registered society, approved by the Ministry of Textiles and amenable to the
provisions of the said Act.
24. The communication of the Ministry of Textiles, which was relied upon
by the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways in the letter dated
November 26, 2021, clarified the position that, the opposite party’s status
as an affiliated body to the Ministry of Textiles had ceased and it was
merely a body approved by the Ministry of Textiles, who could be evicted in
terms of the said Act.
25. Moreover, the decision of Suhas H. Pophale (supra) has been
overruled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision of Life Insurance
Corporation of India (supra) , Suhas H. Pophale (supra) laid down the
law that, any occupant who had come into possession of the premises prior

23

to September 16, 1958 would not be subject to eviction under the said Act,
but would be treated to be a tenant under the local Rent Control Act, and
could be evicted only under the local law. In Life Insurance Corporation
of India (supra) , a contrary view was taken by a larger bench comprising
of three Hon’ble Judges of the Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court held
that, the decision in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) was bad law, being in
direct conflict with the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ashoka
Marketing Limited (supra) . In rendering the decision in Suhas H.
Pophale (supra), the Hon’ble two Judges bench had not only contradicted,
but also disregarded the decision of a bench of larger strength.
26. Thus, the contention of Mr. Bose that, the opposite party having
come into possession in December 1947, could not be evicted under the
said Act as the premises was not public premises as on the date of entry
into possession, is contrary to the decision of the Hon’ble three Judges
bench in Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) . Further
contention that the opposite party would fall within the definition of tenant
under the West Bengal Public Premises Tenancy Act 1997 is misconceived.
In Ashoka Marketing Limited (supra), it was laid down that the said Act,
would have an overriding effect over the Rent Control Act. The provisions of
the said Act would have to be applied even to such public premises, which

24

were within the bounds of the Rent Control Act and no exceptions could be

created on the basis of the date of coming into force of the said Act.
27. Section 2(e) of the said Act defines public premises and Section 2(g)
of the said Act defines unauthorised occupation, which are as follows:-
“2(e) “ public premises” means — (1) any premises belonging
to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of the
Central Government, and includes any such premises which
have been placed by that Government, whether before or after
the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980 (61 of 1980)
under the control of the Secretariat of either House of
Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any
member of the staff of that Secretariat;”
(2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on
behalf of,—
(i) any company as defined in section 3 of the 3 [the Companies
Act, 2013 (18 of 2013)], in which not less than fifty-one per
cent. of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central
Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the
meaning of that Act) of the first-mentioned company;
(ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in section
3 of the 3 [the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013)], or a local
authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned or
controlled by the Central Government; 4
(iii) any company as defined in clause (20) of section 2 of the
Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) in which not less than fifty-
one per cent. of the paid up capital is held partly by the
Central Government and partly by one or more State
Governments and includes a company which is a subsidiary
(within the meaning of that Act) of the first-mentioned
company and which carries on the business of public transport
including metro railway.
(iiia) any University established or incorporated by any Central
Act,];
(iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology
Act, 1961 (59 of 1961); 1
(v) any Board of Trustees or any successor company
constituted under or referred to in the Major Port Trusts Act,
1963 (38 of 1963);]
(vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted under section
79 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), and
that Board as and when re-named as the Bhakra-Beas
Management Board under sub-section (6) of section 80 of that
Act, 2 *.

25

(vii) any State Government or the Government of any Union
territory situated in the National Capital Territory of Delhi or in
any other Union territory,
(viii) any Cantonment Board constituted under the
Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924); and]
(3) in relation to the 4 [National Capital Territory of Delhi],—
(i) any premises belonging to the 5 [Council as defined in
clause (9) of section 2 of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act,
1994 (44 of 1994) or Corporation or Corporations notified
under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957),] of Delhi, or any Municipal
Committee or notified area committee, 2 *
(ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority,
whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out
by, the said Authority;] 6 [and], 7
(iii) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or
requisitioned by, or on behalf of any State Government or the
Government of any Union Territory,] 8
(iv) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on
behalf of any Government company as defined in clause (45) of
section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013).
(4) any premises of the enemy property as defined in clause (c)
of section 2 of the Enemy Property Act, 1968 (34 of 1968).

2(g) “unauthorised occupation”, in relation to any public
premises, means the occupation by any person of the public
premises without authority for such occupation, and includes
the continuance in occupation by any person of the public
premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any
other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy
the premises has expired or has been determined for any
reason whatsoever.”

28. Admittedly, the petitioner being a public authority was the owner of
the property when the opposite party had entered into the premises as the
lessee of the petitioner. Continuation of the occupation of the opposite
party in the said premises, after expiry of the lease, makes the opposite
party an unauthorised occupant. Such occupation was without any legal
authority, as the lease had expired. Moreover, the opposite party also
defaulted in payment of the lease rent. This was in breach of the terms and

26

conditions of the lease deed. Sections 4 and 5 of the said Act outlines the
procedure for eviction. There is no challenge to the procedure followed by
the Estate Officer, in passing the order of eviction. There are no challenges
to the factual findings arrived at by the Estate Officer and to the calculation
of arrear rent damages and compensation. The said Act, envisages a special
procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises.
The special procedure seeks to facilitate speedy recovery of possession of
public premises by avoiding technicalities and possibility of delay. The
constitutional validity of the said Act and the summary procedure for
eviction has been upheld by an Hon’ble five Judges Bench of the Apex
Court in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. & Ors vs National Textile Corporation
Ltd. & Ors reported in (2002) 8 SCC 182. It was also held that the said
Act would prevail over the state law. The relevant portions are quoted
below:-
“ 40. Once the PP Eviction Act is enacted then the Bombay Rent
Act would not prevail qua the repugnancy between it and the PP
Eviction Act. To the extent of repugnancy, the State law would be
void under Article 254(1) and the law made by Parliament would
prevail. Admittedly, the duration of the Bombay Rent Act was
extended up to 31-3-1973 by Maharashtra Act 12 of 1970. The
result would be from the date of the coming into force of the PP
Eviction Act, the Bombay Rent Act qua the properties of the
Government and government companies would be inoperative.
For this purpose, language of Article 254(1) is unambiguous and
specifically provides that if any provision of law made by the
legislature of the State is repugnant to the provision of law made
by Parliament, then the law made by Parliament whether passed
before or after the law made by the legislature of the State, would

27

prevail. It also makes it clear that the law made by the legislature
of the State, to the extent of repugnancy, would be void.
41. Hence, once the PP Eviction Act came into force w.e.f. 23-8-
1971, the existing Bombay Rent Act would be void so far as it is
repugnant to the law made by Parliament as in view of Article
254(1), the law made by Parliament would prevail.
*
*
60. From the aforesaid observations, it is clear that when the
President gave assent to the Kerala Act in 1962, there was no
repugnancy to the Act made by Parliament or some existing law
in concurrent field. However, before grant of subsequent assent in
1967 to the Act extending the life of the Kerala Act by another two
years, the declaration of electricity as an essential article had
been made and was part of the Act. Thereafter, the Court
observed that the assent of the President should be deemed not
merely to the substitution of the words “five years” by the words
“seven years” in the Kerala Act but to the Act as a whole, that is
the Act as amended by the 1967 Act and any repugnancy
between the Kerala Act and the Electricity Act, 1910 and the
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 should be deemed to have been
cured by such assent.
61. From the aforesaid discussion, it would appear that ( a ) if
there is extension of the duration of the temporary Act, it cannot
be said that the new Act is enacted, the old Act continues and its
life is extended; ( b ) however, while extending the duration if there
is any substantial amendment in the statutory provisions as
found in Basantlal Banarsilal case [AIR 1955 Bom 35 : 55 Bom
LR 614] it cannot be said that it was mere extension of the
existing law.
Additional contention
62. On behalf of the appellant, the following additional ground is
raised in the written submission.
“Article 254(1) incorporates the principle of supremacy of
parliamentary law — it applies to any provision of ‘a law made by
the legislature of a State’ which is repugnant to any
parliamentary law or (which is repugnant) to any existing law.
Article 254(1) opening part, does not expressly give supremacy to
parliamentary law over existing State/provincial law — i.e. law
made in the Provinces before the Constitution: hence Constitution
( sic ), the Bombay Amending Act 43 of 1951 (the first law enacted
by the State Legislature after the Constitution) — even though a
mere extension law — must constitutionally be regarded as a law
made by the legislature of a State, for purposes of applicability of
Article 254(1), which it could only be if it was a substantive law
re-enacting or incorporating the provisions of the 1947 Act, post-
Constitution. That it was reserved for the consideration of the
President and received his assent lends support to the fact that it

28

was not a mere extension but treated as a substantive
enactment.”
63. The aforesaid submission requires to be rejected mainly
because Article 254(1) as quoted above clearly inter alia provides
that if any provision of a law made by the legislature of a State is
repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament then the
law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law
made by the legislature of such State, shall prevail . It also provides
that the law made by the legislature of the State shall, to the
extent of repugnancy, be void.
64. Further, in the present case, there is no question of
considering that the Bombay Rent Act was an existing law as
defined under Article 366(10). Explanation III to Article 372
specifically provides that nothing in the said article shall be
construed as continuing any temporary law in force beyond the
date fixed for its expiration or the date on which it would have
expired if the Constitution had not come into force. Therefore,
there is no question of applying the concept of “existing law” as
defined under Article 366 to a law of which duration is extended
from time to time. Article 254(1), inter alia , also provides that if
any provision of a law made by the legislature of a State is
repugnant to any provision of an existing law, the existing law
shall prevail and law made by the legislature of the State shall to
the extent of repugnancy be void but in the present case there is
no question of applying the said part of Article 254(1).
65. The result of the foregoing discussion is:
1. It cannot be held that summary speedier procedure prescribed
under the PP Eviction Act for evicting the tenants, sub-tenants or
unauthorised occupants, if it is reasonable and in conformity
with the principles of natural justice, would abridge the rights
conferred under the Constitution.
2. ( a ) Article 254(2) contemplates “reservation for consideration of
the President” and also “assent”. Reservation for consideration is
not an empty formality. Pointed attention of the President is
required to be drawn to the repugnancy between the earlier law
made by Parliament and the contemplated State legislation and
the reasons for having such law despite the enactment by
Parliament.
( b ) The word “assent” used in clause (2) of Article 254 would in
context mean express agreement of mind to what is proposed by
the State.
( c ) In case where it is not indicated that “assent” is qua a
particular law made by Parliament, then it is open to the Court to
call for the proposals made by the State for the consideration of
the President before obtaining assent.
3. Extending the duration of a temporary enactment does not
amount to enactment of a new law. However such extension may
require assent of the President in case of repugnancy.

29

WPs (Civil) Nos. 1056, 1081 of 1991 and 162 of 1992
*
*
68. These writ petitions are filed challenging the vires of certain
provisions of the PP Eviction Act. In view of the order passed
above, these writ petitions are dismissed.”

29. The Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing Limited (supra)
addressed the question as to whether a person who was inducted as a
tenant of such premises which became public premises for the purpose of
the said Act and whose tenancy had expired or had been terminated, could
be evicted from the premises as being person in unauthorized occupation of
the premises under the provisions of the said Act, or whether such person
could invoke the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1951. The issue
in a nutshell was, whether the provisions of the 1971 Act would override
the provisions of the State Rent Control Act in respect of premises which
would come within the purview of both the enactments. An interpretation
of the decision in Ashoka Marketing Limited (supra) was rendered in

Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) as follows:-
“I nterpretation in Ashoka Marketing Ltd.
43. In dealing with the above issue, the five-Judge Bench of
this Court observed that the Rent Control legislations fall
within the ambit of Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. The Rent Control Act has been
enacted by Parliament in exercise of its legislative power under
Article 246(4) of the Constitution. On the other hand, the PP
Act, 1971 which deal with the eviction of unauthorised
occupants from the premises belonging to or taken on lease or
requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government would

30

fall within Entry 32 of List I, being law with respect to a
property of the Union. At the same time, it was stated that in
relation to the properties belonging to the various legal entities
mentioned in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 2( e ) of the PP
Act, 1971 would stand covered by Entries 6, 7 and 46 of List
III.
44. Thus, both the statutes, namely, the Rent Control Act
and the PP Act, 1971 were enacted by the same legislature in
exercise of the legislative powers in respect of the matters
enumerated in the Concurrent List and the Union List,
respectively. The Court stated that in its opinion, the question
whether the provisions of the PP Act, 1971 override the
provisions of the Rent Control Act had to be considered in light
of the principles of statutory interpretation applicable to the
laws made by same legislature.
45. The Court proceeded to highlight such principle of
statutory interpretation observing: ( Ashoka Mktg. case [ Ashoka
Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank , (1990) 4 SCC 406 : (1992)
74 Comp Cas 482] , SCC p. 438, para 50)
“ 50 . One such principle of statutory interpretation which is
applied is contained in the Latin maxim: leges posteriores
priores conterarias abrogant (later laws abrogate earlier
contrary laws). This principle is subject to the exception
embodied in the maxim: generalia specialibus non derogant (a
general provision does not derogate from a special one.) This
means that where the literal meaning of the general enactment
covers a situation for which specific provision is made by
another enactment contained in the earlier Act, it is presumed
that the situation was intended to continue to be dealt with by
the specific provision rather than the later general one
(Bennion, Statutory Interpretation , pp. 433-34).”
Domain of two statutes
46. It was observed that the Delhi Rent Control Act is an
earlier enactment, whereas the PP Act, 1971 is subsequently
enacted law and thus, it being the enactment later in point of
time, represents the last will of Parliament. The Court observed
that the PP Act, 1971 should, therefore, prevail over the Delhi
Rent Control Act unless it can be said that the PP Act, 1971 is
a general enactment, whereas the Rent Control Act is a special
enactment.
47. Explaining the operational status of the rent control
legislation and the PP Act, 1971, it was observed: ( Ashoka
Mktg. case [ Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank , (1990) 4
SCC 406 : (1992) 74 Comp Cas 482] , SCC pp. 439-40, para
55)
“ 55 . The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the
general law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant
contained in the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes

31

provision for determination of standard rent, it specifies the
grounds on which a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant,
it prescribes the forum for adjudication of disputes between
landlords and tenants and the procedure which has to be
followed in such proceedings. The Rent Control Act can,
therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the
relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union Territory of
Delhi.”
48. The PP Act, 1971 intends for speedy eviction, stated the
Constitution Bench: ( Ashoka Mktg. case [ Ashoka Mktg.
Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank , (1990) 4 SCC 406 : (1992) 74
Comp Cas 482] , SCC p. 440, para 55)
“ 55 . … The Public Premises Act, 1971 makes provision for a
speedy machinery to secure eviction of unauthorised occupants
from public premises. As opposed to the general law which
provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery of possession of
property in a competent court and for trial of such a suit in
accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil
Procedure, the Public Premises Act, 1971 confers the power to
pass an order of eviction of an unauthorised occupant in a
public premises on a designated officer and prescribes the
procedure to be followed by the said officer before passing such
an order.”
49. It was thus clearly expressed that the PP Act, 1971 is a
special statute and that it will override the Rent Control Act:
( Ashoka Mktg. case [ Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank ,
(1990) 4 SCC 406 : (1992) 74 Comp Cas 482] , SCC p. 440,
para 55)
“ 55 . … Therefore, the Public Premises Act, 1971 is also a
special statute relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants
from public premises. In other words, both the enactments,
namely, the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act,
1971, are special statutes in relation to the matters dealt with
therein. Since, the Public Premises Act, 1971 is a special
statute and not a general enactment the exception contained in
the principle that a subsequent general law cannot derogate
from an earlier special law cannot be invoked and in
accordance with the principle that the later laws abrogate
earlier contrary laws, the Public Premises Act, 1971 must
prevail over the Rent Control Act.”

30. The Hon’ble Apex Court discussed the policy and purpose behind the
special enactments and held that both the enactments would operate in
their respective realms. Relevant paragraphs are quoted below:-

32

“50. As both the enactments are “special enactments” in their
respective realms, the five-Judge Bench observed on the basis
of the principle stated in Ram Narain v. Simla Banking &
Industrial Co. Ltd. [ Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & Industrial
Co. Ltd. , (1956) 2 SCC 75 : (1956) 26 Comp Cas 280 : AIR 1956
SC 614] that when each enactment is a special Act, the
ordinary principle that a special law overrides a general law
does not afford any clear solution. In such circumstances, it
was stated, it would be desirable to determine the overriding
effect of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two
Acts, in a given scenario, on much broader considerations of
the purpose and policy underlying the two statutes and the
clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant
provisions therein.
51. After referring to several other decisions, the proposition
was stated thus: ( Ashoka Mktg. case [ Ashoka Mktg.
Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank , (1990) 4 SCC 406 : (1992) 74
Comp Cas 482] , SCC p. 442, para 61)
“ 61 . The principle which emerges from these decisions is that
in the case of inconsistency between the provisions of two
enactments, both of which can be regarded as special in
nature, the conflict has to be resolved by reference to the
purpose and policy underlying the two enactments and the
clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant
provisions therein.”
52. It was stated that the consequence of giving overriding
effect to the provisions of the PP Act, 1971 over the Rent
Control Act would be that the buildings belonging to
companies, corporations and autonomous bodies referred to in
Section 2( e ) of the PP Act, 1971 would be excluded from the
ambit of the Rent Control Act in the same manner as properties
belonging to the Central Government. It was further stated that
the Government while dealing with the citizens in respect of
property belonging to it would not act for its own purpose as a
private landlord but would act in public interest.
Legislative intent recognised
53. Ashoka Mktg. [ Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank ,
(1990) 4 SCC 406 : (1992) 74 Comp Cas 482] considered the
object and purpose of the PP Act, 1971 and the overall
legislative intendment behind the enactment. It was held that
the object and purpose of the PP Act, 1971 would give it an
overriding effect over the provisions of the Rent Control Act,
even though, the relevant sections of both the PP Act, 1971 and
the Delhi Rent Control Act contained a non obstante clause.
The Court provided that the scope of the provisions of the
Public Premises Act cannot be whittled down on the basis of
the apprehension that the Corporations like nationalised banks
or the Life Insurance Corporation are trading Corporations

33

interested in earning profit. They cannot be precluded from
buying the properties in possession of the tenants at low price
and then vacating the tenants after terminating the tenancy
and thereafter selling the property at higher price.
54. Negating the contention that the provisions of the PP Act,
1971 if given overriding effect would be exploited by such
corporations to expand the business with a view to earn profit,
it was observed: ( Ashoka Mktg. case [ Ashoka Mktg.
Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank , (1990) 4 SCC 406 : (1992) 74
Comp Cas 482] , SCC p. 446, para 69)
“ . … The consequence of giving overriding effect to the
69
provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1971 is that premises
belonging to companies and statutory bodies referred to in
clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2( e ) of the Public Premises Act,
1971 would be exempted from the provisions of the Rent
Control Act. The actions of the companies and statutory bodies
mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2( e ) of the Public
Premises Act, 1971 while dealing with their properties under
the Public Premises Act, 1971 will, therefore, have to be judged
by the same standard.”
55. The Constitution Bench with above interpretational
philosophy and cogent reasons stated further: ( Ashoka Mktg.
case [ Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank , (1990) 4 SCC
406 : (1992) 74 Comp Cas 482] , SCC p. 446, para 70)
“ 70 . … we are unable to accept the contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioners that the provisions contained in the
Public Premises Act, 1971 cannot be applied to premises which
fall within the ambit of the Rent Control Act. In our opinion,
the provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1971, to the extent
they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control
Act, override the provisions of the Rent Control Act and a
person in unauthorised occupation of public premises under
Section 2( e ) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent
Control Act.”

31. Moreover, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 as also 1997,
excludes government undertakings or enterprises or statutory bodies from
the purview of the said Act. Thus, had the 1971 Act not been promulgated,
upon expiry of the lease granted to the opposite party, the remedy for the

34

petitioner would have been to proceed under the general law, i.e., under the

Transfer of Property Act, seeking eviction.
32. The reasons underlying the exclusion of property belonging to the
government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act were discussed in
Ashoka Marketing (supra) . The said Act sub-served public interest by
making available for public use, those premises belonging to the
government or public authority. The said premises was owned by the
petitioner, which was always a public authority. Paragraph 62 to 70 of
Ashoka Marketing are quoted below:-
“ 62. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the enactment
of the Rent Control Act, indicates that it has been enacted with
a view:
( a ) to devise a suitable machinery for expeditious adjudication
of proceedings between landlords and tenants;
( b ) to provide for the determination of the standard rent
payable by tenants of the various categories of premises which
should be fair to the tenants, and at the same time, provide
incentive for keeping the existing houses in good repairs, and
for further investments in house construction; and
( c ) to give tenants a larger measure of protection against
eviction.
This indicates that the object underlying the Rent Control Act
is to make provision for expeditious adjudication of disputes
between landlords and tenants, determination of standard rent
payable by tenants and giving protection against eviction to
tenants. The premises belonging to the government are
excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act which means
that the Act has been enacted primarily to regulate the private
relationship between landlords and tenants with a view to
confer certain benefits on the tenants and at the same time to
balance the interest of the landlords by providing for
expeditious adjudication of proceedings between landlords and
tenant.
63. As mentioned earlier, the Public Premises Act has been
enacted with a view to provide for eviction of unauthorised

35

occupants from public premises. In the Statement of Objects
and Reasons for this enactment reference has been made to the
judicial decisions whereby the 1958 Act was declared as
unconstitutional and it has been mentioned:
“The court decisions, referred to above, have created serious
difficulties for the government inasmuch as the proceedings
taken by the various Estate Officers appointed under the Act
either for the eviction of persons who are in unauthorised
occupation of public premises or for the recovery of rent or
damages from such persons stand null and void.... It has
become impossible for government to take expeditious action
even in flagrant cases of unauthorised occupation of public
premises and recovery of rent or damages for such
unauthorised occupation. It is, therefore, considered imperative
to restore a speedy machinery for the eviction of persons who
are in unauthorised occupation of public premises keeping in
view at the same time the necessity of complying with the
provisions of the Constitution and the judicial
pronouncements, referred to above.”
This shows that the Public Premises Act has been enacted to
deal with the mischief of rampant unauthorised occupation of
public premises by providing a speedy machinery for the
eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. In order to
secure this object the said Act prescribes the time period for
the various steps which are required to be taken for securing
eviction of the persons in unauthorised occupation. The object
underlying the enactment is to safeguard public interest by
making available for public use premises belonging to Central
Government, companies in which the Central Government has
substantial interest, corporations owned or controlled by the
Central Government and certain autonomous bodies and to
prevent misuse of such premises.
64. It would thus appear that, while the Rent Control Act is
intended to deal with the general relationship of landlords and
tenants in respect of premises other than government
premises, the Public Premises Act is intended to deal with
speedy recovery of possession of premises of public nature, i.e.
property belonging to the Central Government, or companies in
which the Central Government has substantial interest or
corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government
and certain corporations, institutions, autonomous bodies and
local authorities. The effect of giving overriding effect to the
provisions of the Public Premises Act over the Rent Control Act,
would be that buildings belonging to companies, corporations
and autonomous bodies referred to in Section 2( e ) of the Public
Premises Act would be excluded from the ambit of the Rent
Control Act in the same manner as properties belonging to the
Central Government. The reason underlying the exclusion of
property belonging to the Government from the ambit of the

36

Rent Control Act, is that the Government while dealing with the
citizens in respect of property belonging to it would not act for
its own purpose as a private landlord but would act in public
interest. What can be said with regard to government in
relation to property belonging to it can also be said with regard
to companies, corporations and other statutory bodies
mentioned in Section 2( e ) of the Public Premises Act. In our
opinion, therefore, keeping in view the object and purpose
underlying both the enactments viz. the Rent Control Act and
the Public Premises Act, the provisions of the Public Premises
Act have to be construed as overriding the provisions contained
in the Rent Control Act.
65. As regards the non-obstante clauses contained in Sections
14 and 22 and the provisions contained in Sections 50 and 54
of the Rent Control Act, it may be stated that Parliament was
aware of these provisions when it enacted the Public Premises
Act containing a specific provision in Section 15 barring
jurisdiction of all courts (which would include the Rent
Controller under the Rent Control Act). This indicates that
Parliament intended that the provisions of the Public Premises
Act would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Control Act in
spite of the abovementioned provisions contained in the Rent
Control Act.
66. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that there is no conflict between the provisions of the Rent
Control Act and the Public Premises Act and that both the
provisions can be given effect to without one overriding the
other. In this regard, it has been pointed out that since no
provision has been made in the Public Premises Act for the
termination of the lease, the provisions of the Rent Control Act
can be held applicable up to the stage of termination of the
lease, and thereafter, proceedings can be initiated for eviction
under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. In support of
this submission, reliance has been placed on Dhanpal Chettiar
case [(1979) 4 SCC 214 : (1980) 1 SCR 334] , wherein it has
been held that in view of the special provisions contained in the
State Rent Control Acts, it is no longer necessary to issue a
notice under Sections 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to
terminate the tenancy because in spite of the said notice the
tenant is entitled to continue in occupation by virtue of the
provisions of the said Acts. In the said case, it has been further
laid down that the relationship between the landlord and
tenant continues till the passing of the order of eviction in
accordance with the provisions of the Rent Act, and therefore,
for the eviction of the tenant in accordance with the law, an
order of the competent court under the Rent Control Act is
necessary. This would mean that in order to evict a person who
is continuing in occupation after the expiration or termination
of his contractual tenancy in accordance with law, two

37

proceedings will have to be initiated. First, there will be
proceedings under Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller
followed by appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal and
revision before the High Court. After these proceedings have
ended they would be followed by proceedings under the Public
Premises Act, before the Estate Officer and the Appellate
Authority. In other words, persons in occupation of public
premises would receive greater protection than tenants in
premises owned by private persons. It could not be the
intention of Parliament to confer this dual benefit on persons in
occupation of public premises.
67. It has also been urged that in Section 22 of the Rent
Control Act, special provision has been made for recovery of
possession of premises belonging to a company or other body
corporate or any local authority or any public institution and
that premises belonging to companies, corporations and
autonomous bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of Section
2( e ) of the Public Premises Act would be covered by the said
provision and that in view of this special provision it is not
necessary to have a further provision in the Public Premises
Act for the recovery of possession belonging to those bodies,
and therefore, the provisions of the Public Premises Act should
be confined in their application to premises other than
premises covered by the Rent Control Act. Section 22 of the
Rent Control Act provides as under:
“22. Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any
company or other body corporate or any local authority or any
public institution and the premises are required for the use of
employees of such landlord or in the case of a public institution
for the furtherance of its activities, then, notwithstanding
anything contained in Section 14 or any other law, the
Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by
such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of such
premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who
may be in occupation thereof, if the Controller is satisfied—
( a ) that the tenant to whom such premises were let for use as a
residence at a time when he was in the service or employment
of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or
employment; or
( b ) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms,
express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy
such premises; or
( c ) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such
premises; or
( d ) that the premises are required bona fide by the public
institution for the furtherance of its activities.
Explanation .— For the purpose of this section, “public
institution” includes any educational institutional, library,

38

hospital and charitable dispensary but does not include any
such institution set up by any private trust.”
68. The said special provision shows that, it enables recovery
of possession of premises of which the landlord is a company
or other body corporate or any local authority or any public
institution in certain circumstances viz. if the premises are
required for the use of the employees of such landlord. In the
case of public institutions possession can also be obtained
under this provision if the premises are required for the
furtherance of its activities. In other words, recovery of
possession is permissible under this provision only in certain
circumstances and for certain purposes. In spite of this
provision Parliament has considered it necessary to extend the
Public Premises Act to premises belonging to companies,
corporations and statutory bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and
(3) of Section 2( e ) by widening the definition of the expression
“public premises” in Section 2( e ) of the Public Premises Act.
The scope and ambit of the aforesaid power conferred under
the Public Premises Act cannot be restricted by reference to the
provision contained in Section 22 of the Rent Control Act.
69. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners
that many of the corporations referred to in Section 2( e )(2)( ii ) of
the Public Premises Act, like the nationalised banks and the
Life Insurance Corporation, are trading corporations and under
the provisions of the enactments whereby they are constituted
these corporations are required to carry on their business with
a view to earn profit, and that there is nothing to preclude
these corporations to buy property in possession of tenants at
a low price and after buying such property evict the tenants
after terminating the tenancy and thereafter sell the said
property at a much higher value because the value of property
in possession of tenants is much less as compared to vacant
property. We are unable to cut down the scope of the
provisions of the Public Premises Act on the basis of such an
apprehension because as pointed out by this Court
in Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the
Port of Bombay [(1989) 3 SCC 293] : (SCC p. 306, para 27)
“...every activity of a public authority especially in the
background of the assumption on which such authority enjoys
immunity from the rigours of the Rent Act, must be informed
by reason and guided by the public interest. All exercise of
discretion or power by public authorities as the respondent, in
respect of dealing with tenants in respect of which they have
been treated separately and distinctly from other landlords on
the assumption that they would not act as private landlords,
must be judged by that standard.”
These observations were made in the context of the provisions
of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates

39

(Control) Act, 1947 whereby exemption from the provisions of
the Act has been granted to premises belonging to the Bombay
Port Trust. The consequence of giving overriding effect to the
provisions of the Public Premises Act is that premises
belonging to companies and statutory bodies referred to in
clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2( e ) of the Public Premises Act
would be exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act.
The actions of the companies and statutory bodies mentioned
in clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2( e ) of the Public Premises Act
while dealing with their properties under the Public Premises
Act will, therefore, have to be judged by the same standard.
70. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to accept the
contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the
provisions contained in the Public Premises Act cannot be
applied to premises which fall within the ambit of the Rent
Control Act. In our opinion, the provisions of the Public
Premises Act, to the extent they cover premises falling within
the ambit of the Rent Control Act, override the provisions of the
Rent Control Act and a person in unauthorised occupation of
public premises under Section 2( e ) of the Act cannot invoke the
protection of the Rent Control Act.”

33. In Jain Ink (supra) , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, what was
germane for the purpose of interpretation of Section 2(g) was whether or
not the person concerned was in occupation of the public premises when
the said Act was passed. In Jain Ink (supra) also, the appellant had
continued to possess the property after the said Act had come into force
and had accepted LIC as the landlord. It was held that, as the appellant
therein was issued a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, the appellant/tenant fell within the ambit of the definition of Section
2(g) of the said Act and had become an unauthorised occupant after having
been served a notice to quit and vacate. The claim for protection under the
Rent Control Act was denied. It was held as follows:

40

“5. It would be seen that before a person could be said to be in an
unauthorised occupation, the Act required the following conditions:
( 1 ) that the occupant had entered into possession before or after the
commencement of the Act,
( 2 ) that he had entered into such possession otherwise than under
and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant.
That Act, therefore, lays special stress on only one point, namely, the
entry into possession. Thus, if the entry into possession had taken
place prior to the passing of the Act, then obviously the occupant
concerned would not be an unauthorised occupant. What made the
occupancy unauthorised was his entry into possession at a
particular point of time. It was in construing these provisions that
this Court held that if the appellants in that case were in possession
before the sale of the property to the government, their entry into
possession could not be said to be unauthorised. These observations,
however, would have absolutely no application to the instant case
where Section 2( g ) defines unauthorised occupation thus:
“ ‘Unauthorised occupation’, in relation to any public premises,
means the occupation by any person of the public premises without
authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in
occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority
(whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which
he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been
determined for any reason whatsoever.”
To begin with, it is manifest that Section 2( g ) does not use the word
“possession” or the words “entry into possession” at any point of time
at all. The section merely requires occupation of any public premises.
Entry into possession connotes one single terminus viz. the point of
time when a person enters into possession or occupies the property
whereas occupation is a continuous process which starts right from
the point of time when the person enters into possession or occupies
the premises and continues until he leaves the premises. What is
germane for the purpose of interpretation of Section 2( g ) is whether
or not the person concerned was in occupation of the public premises
when the Premises Act was passed. In the instant case, it is not
disputed that the appellant continued to occupy the property even
after the Premises Act came into force and in fact accepted the LIC as
his landlord. In these circumstances, therefore, the case of the
appellant squarely falls within the ambit of the definition of
‘unauthorised occupation’ as contemplated by Section 2( g ). There is
yet another aspect of the matter which distinguishes the present case
from the language employed in the Punjab Act. Section 2( g ) is an
inclusive definition and consists of two separate limbs— (1) where a
person is in occupation in relation to any public premises without
authority for such occupation, and (2) even if the possession or
occupation of the tenant continues after the lease is determined. In
the instant case, the lease was doubtless determined by the landlord
by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act whose
validity for purposes of deciding the question of law has not been

41

questioned by the learned Counsel for the appellant. Therefore, there
can be no doubt that the appellant was in unauthorised occupation
of the premises once the lease was determined. The second limb
mentioned in Section 2( g ) is conspicuously absent from the
provisions of the Punjab Act. For these reasons, we overrule the first
contention raised by the counsel for the appellant and we hold,
agreeing with the High Court, that the appellant was undoubtedly in
unauthorised occupation of the premises.
6. The second contention put forward by Mr Rao was that in view of
the provisions of the Rent Act which override the provisions of the
Premises Act, Section 14 of the Rent Act completely bars recovery of
possession of any premises except in accordance with the procedure
laid down in the Rent Act. It was contended by Mr Rao that although
the Premises Act was passed in 1971, it has been given retrospective
effect from September 16, 1958 and, therefore, should be construed
as a law having been passed in 1958 and as the Rent Act was passed
in 1959 it overrides the Premises Act. We are, however, unable to
agree with this argument. In the first place, the Premises Act was
passed in 1971 and came into force on August 23, 1971, that is to
say, long after the Rent Act was passed in 1959. The mere fact that
by virtue of a fiction the Premises Act was given retrospective effect
from 1958 will not alter the date when the Premises Act was actually
passed, that is to say, August 23, 1971. In these circumstances,
therefore, the Premises Act being subsequent to the Rent Act would
naturally prevail over and override the provisions of the Rent Act. It
was further contended by Mr Rao that the Rent Act being a special
law as compared to the Premises Act, it will override the Premises Act
without going into the question as to which of the two Acts were prior
in point of time. In support of his contention the counsel relied on a
decision of this Court in Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal [(1977) 1 SCC
750, 760 : (1977) 2 SCR 421] where this Court observed as follows:
(SCC p. 760, para 20)
“When two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains
a nonobstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of
any other law, stimulating and incisive problems of interpretation
arise. Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol,
cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the object and
purpose of the laws under consideration.” (emphasis supplied)
7. It is true that in both the Acts there is a non-obstante clause but
the question to be determined is whether the nonobstante clauses
operate in the same field or have two different spheres though there
may be some amount of overlapping. The observations cited above
clearly lay down that in such cases the conflict should be resolved by
reference to the object and purpose of the laws in consideration.
In Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd. [AIR 1956 SC
614 : 1956 SCR 603 : (1956) 26 Com Cas 280] , this Court made the
following observations:
“It is, therefore, desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or
the other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts, in a given case,

42

on much broader considerations of the purpose and policy
underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the
language of the relevant provisions therein.”
8. In the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases we
would test the position in the present case. So far as the Premises
Act is concerned it operates in a very limited field in that it applies
only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets
of individuals, a particular set of juristic persons like companies,
corporations or the Central Government. Thus, the Premises Act has
a very limited application. Secondly, the object of the Premises Act is
to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public
premises by a summary procedure so that the premises may be
available to the authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which
constitute a class by themselves. That the authorities to which the
Premises Act applies are a class by themselves is not disputed by the
counsel for the appellant as even in the case of Northern India
Caterers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab [AIR 1967 SC 1581 : (1967) 3
SCR 399] such authorities were held to form a class and, therefore,
immune from challenge on Article 14 of the Constitution. Similarly,
the summary procedure prescribed by the Premises Act is also not
violative of Article 14 as held by this Court in Maganlal Chhagganlal
(P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay [(1974) 2 SCC 402
: (1975) 1 SCR 1] .
9. Thus, it would appear that both the scope and the object of the
Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act
is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as it
applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited
exceptions indicated in Section 2 of the Premises Act. The object of
the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or
private landlords or landlords who are neither a corporation nor
government or corporate bodies. It would be seen that even under the
Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been
carved out under Section 25-B which provides for special procedure
for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal
necessity. Thus, Section 25-B itself becomes a special law within the
Rent Act. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt
that the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act, which has a very
broad spectrum, is a special Act and overrides the provisions of the
Rent Act.

34. Upon enactment of the 1971 Act, the petitioner could proceed against
the opposite party under the said Act. The said Act was enacted to deal

43

with the mischief of rampant unauthorized occupation of public premises,

by providing a speedy machinery for eviction of such persons.
35. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Kaikhosrou (chick) Kavasji Framji
(supra) observed as follows:-
“49 . At this stage we consider apposite to take note of the
Constitution Bench decision of this Court wherein this Court after
examining and upholding the constitutional validity of the PP Act in
Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile Corporation. (Maharashtra
North) Ltd. reiterated the view taken by this Court in an earlier
decision of Northern India Caterers (P) Ltd. v. State of Punjab that
the PP Act does not create any new right of eviction but it only
creates a remedy for a right which already exists under the general
law. In other words, it was held that it only provides a remedy which
is speedier than the remedy of a suit under the general law.”

36. The relevant paragraphs of Gyan Mahendra Swarup v. Life
Insurance Corporation of India are quoted below:-
“36. Hence, the Transfer of Property Act cannot be said to provide
any special protection to the occupier vis-à-vis the 1971 Act, akin
to that provided by the 1997 Actor for that matter any other State
Rent Control Act.
37. Moreover, a combined reading of Section 3(a) (iii) of the 1997
Act, which exempts premises owned by the Government
undertakings or enterprises from the operation of the said Act, and
the definition of "public premises" for the purpose of the 1971 Act,
which includes such premises within the fold of the said Act, point
unerringly to the conclusion that there is no conflict between the
1997 Act and the 1971 Act. The 1971 Act is thus a special statute
governing the public premises, which are under discussion at
present, thereby automatically excluding the applicability of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to such premises.
38. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the Estate Officer could
not be said to have acted without jurisdiction in taking up the
proceeding under Section 5 of the 1971 Act for adjudication upon
holding the same to be maintainable.
39. That apart, in the present case, the notice to quit dated May 2,
2017 sufficiently satisfied the pre-requisite envisaged under

44

Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act as well as Section 111, alternatively
Section 106, of the Transfer of Property Act insofar as
determination of the previous jural relationship between the
parties was concerned. Hence, the Estate Officer had jurisdiction,
in any event, to entertain and decide the proceeding under Section
5 of the 1971 Act, since the petitioner had already been rendered
to be in 'unauthorized occupation' as contemplated under Sections
2(g) and 4 of the 1971 Act by the notice to quit.”

37. The learned appeal court held as follows:-

“17. Therefore, the submission made on behalf of the Appellants
that the Indian Jute Industries Research Association is a “state”
in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and a Central
Government Organization or Government aided organization and
therefore does not come under the purview of “ unauthorized
occupation ” as defined u/sec.2 (g) of the 1971 Act, finds force in
it.
18. Ld. Advocate for the Appellant relied on a decision of the
Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court, in the matter of Lakhan
Lal Rawat V/s Union of India, reported in 2010(89) AIC 677
(MP), wherein, it has been held that word ‘payable’ in section 7
of Act means legally recoverable. Damages for illegal occupation
of Railway quarter for the period from 01.04.1985 to
29.06.1997, recovery proceeding after about 6 years was time
barred and could not be recovered. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the matter Shiv Sagar Tiwari Vs Union of India reported in
AIR 1997 SC 2725 has been pleased to observe public premises,
the Estate Officer may, having regard to such principal of
assessment of damages as may be prescribed, assess the
damages on account of the use of the occupation.
19. The public premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971, came into force with effect from 23.04.1971 and no
retrospective effect has been given. Whether any retrospective
effect has been given to the aforesaid act, the Appellant relied on
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in SCC
2014 685, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased
to hold “1971 Act has no retrospective effect and will not apply
to persons who had entered into occupation prior to date”. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold "All persons
falling within the definition of a tenant occupying the premises
prior thereto will not come under the ambit of the Public
Premises Act and cannot be therefore, be said to be persons in
‘Unauthorized Occupation’ and the Public Premises Act apply
only to those who come in such occupation after such date”.
20. The Ld. Advocate for the Appellant also relied on a decision
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in SCC 2015 Page 652-A

45

wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold
that Public Premises Act cannot be applied to premises where
occupants came into possession prior to enforcement of 1971
Act, i.e., 16.09.1958. After the said judgment, an amendment
was made to the Public Premises Act, wherein retrospective
th
effect has been given on and from 16 day of September, 1958,
save and except of sections 11, 19 and 20 and therefore Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 could
th
have given retrospective effect upto 16 day of September, 1958
and not beyond that.
21. Having gone through the purported lease deed which has
been executed on 18.12.1947, it appears that the said Lease
Agreement was entered into between the Commissioners for the
Port of Calcutta (hereinafter will be referred the
“Commissioners”) and the Indian Jute Mills Association
st
Research Institute with effect from 1 day of July, 1947 at a
monthly rent of Rs.1,200/- being calculated at the rate of Rs.4/-
per cottah per month. The said lease renewed vide Deed of
Indenture dated 23.04.1981 in between the aforesaid parties
st
with effect from 1 of July, 1977 for the term of 30 years at a
monthly rent of Rs.8.900.99p. Therefore, it appears that the
Appellant came into possession over the property in question in
the year 1947 and since then the Appellant is in possession over
the property in question. As it appears that the subsequent
amendment of the Act has given retrospective effect to the
aforesaid act, with effect from 16.09.1958, save and except
certain sections and therefore, Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 cannot be said to be
applicable to premises where occupants came into possession,
prior to enforcement of 1971 Act, which has been given
retrospective on and from 16.09.1958 and therefore the
Appellant who has come into possession of the premises in
question in the year 1947 does not come within the purview of
the “unauthorized occupants”.
22.
The Ld. Advocate for the Appellant has contended that Office
Memorandum issued by Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public
Enterprises, Department of Public Enterprises, whereby
Government set up administrative mechanism for resolution of
CPSE(s) disputes (AMRC) for resolving disputes arising in
between two or more for settlement for public disputes between
Central Public Enterprises inter se and CPSE(s) and Government
Departments and the present disputes in between Indian Jute
Industries Research Association (IJIRA) and (KOPT) is pending
for disposal. The Ld. Advocate for the Appellant has relied on the
copy of the petition pending before the Administrative
mechanism for resolution of CPSE(s)’ disputes (AMRCD) and
drew the attention of the court that there is specific clause of
Arbitration for settlement of any disputes and differences in the

46

renewal Deed of Lease dated 23.04.1981. Accordingly, it is
contended that the order of eviction dated 18.03.2013, passed
by the Ld. Estate Officer be set aside.
23. Perused the Office Memorandum dated 22.05.2018, wherein
it appears that in the said memorandum, it has been stated on
the point of applicability that in the event of any dispute or
difference relating to the interpretation and application to the
provisions of commercial contract(s) between Central Public
Sector Enterprises (CPSEs) / Port Trust inter se and also
between CPSE(s) and Government Departments / organizations
(excluding disputes concerning Railways, Income Tax, Customs
and Excise Departments) such dispute or difference shall be
taken up by either party for its resolution through AMRCD. The
Secretary cum Financial Controller of IJIRA on 31.07.1997 has
sent a letter addressed to the Assistant Land Manager-II,
Calcutta Port Trust, State Department, 15, Strand Road,
Calcutta - 700001, for revision of rent at the end of second ten
years with a request to consider the first alternative i.e.,
enhancement of rent by 25% in preference to the current
schedule rate basis which has been sent by registered post.
Again by a letter dated August 6 / 7, 1997, the Secretary cum
Financial Controller, IJIRA, submitted another letter to the
Assistant Land Manager-II, Calcutta Port Trust Estate
Department and informed their inability to entertain the huge
demand and admit the liability till a mutually acceptable final
settlement is reached in the matter. However, no settlement has
been taken place in between IJIRA and the Port Trust Authority
and the Ld. Estate Officer did not deal the same convincingly.
24. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, it appears
that the Appellant, who is in occupation since prior to
16.09.1958 i.e., prior to the applicability of the Public Premises
Act, is clearly outside the coverage of the Public Premises Act,
1971 and as such the order passed by the Ld. Estate Officer on
18.03.2013 is liable to be set aside.”


38. The scope of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India is limited. This court has assessed the perversity and patent illegality
in the order impugned.
39. The issue under reference in Life Insurance Corporation of India
Limited (supra) are quoted below:-

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“ 2. The referral order dated 17-3-2015 [ LIC v. Vita (P) Ltd. , 2015 SCC
OnLine SC 1995] , aforementioned, reads as under: ( LIC
case [ LIC v. Vita (P) Ltd. , 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1995] , SCC OnLine
SC para 1)
“ 1 . In these petitions, in fact, the ratio decided by the two-Judge
Bench of this Court in Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd. [ Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. , (2014) 4 SCC
657 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 685] , is contrary to the decision of the
Constitution Bench rendered in Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National
Bank [ Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank , (1990) 4 SCC 406 :
(1992) 74 Comp Cas 482] . Therefore, these matters need to be heard
by a three-Judge Bench.”
3. It is accordingly that the present batch of cases came to be posted
before this Court, which await answer to the issue referred to.
Issue under reference
4. The principal question that arises for determination in this batch
of matters is whether the provisions of the PP Act, 1971 would prevail
over the respective State Rent Control legislations, in relation to
premises let out prior to the commencement of the said Act, as
against the premises let out after its enforcement but before their
acquisition or transfer to the Government or any statutory
corporation, by which the character of such premises stood
transformed into “public premises” within the meaning of the Act.”

40. The issue which fell for decision in Life Insurance Corporation of
India (supra) was whether a valid distinction could be made between
tenants who were in occupation of the premises prior to the enforcement of
the said Act and those who entered into occupation subsequent thereto,
but before such premises were taken over by the government or a
government corporation as the case may be, and whether in such cases the
operation of the said Act was intended to be only prospective in nature.
41. In Suhas H. Pophale (supra), the Division Bench carved out two
categories of persons in occupation of premises which became public
premises, for the purpose of applying to them the provisions of the said Act.

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It was held that, for premises which became public premises, the relevant
date would be September 16, 1958 or on whichever later date the
concerned premises had become public premises, that is, the date on
which it was acquired by any public body or nationalised bank or company,
insurance companies etc. All persons/entities falling within the definition
of tenant who were occupying the premises prior to September 16, 1958,
would not come within the ambit of the said Act, and those
persons/entities could not be said to be in unauthorised occupation as per
its definition under the said Act. Thus, according to the Division bench in
Suhas H. Pophale (supra) , it would not be open to such company or
corporations to issue notices and proceed against those occupants under
the said Act. Any such proceeding would be void and illegal. It was held in
Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) that, as a consequence of
overriding effect of the provisions of the said Act over the Rent Control Act,
building, belonging to companies, corporations, central government and
other autonomous bodies referred to under Section 2(e) of the said Act
would be excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act in the same
manner as properties belonging to the Central Government. The
conclusions of the large bench are quoted below:-
“Conclusions

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77. In view of the foregoing discussion, reasons and analysis, the
following position of law emerges:
77.1. In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in
Ashoka Mktg.¹ and the three-Judge Bench decision in Jain Ink, the
view taken in Suhas H. Pophale² which is a two-Judge Bench
decision, is palpably incorrect and unjustified. Suhas H. Pophale²
cannot and does not hold the field.
77.2. Since, the propositions laid down in Suhas H. Pophale runs
contrary to the decisions laid down by the Benches of larger strength
in Ashoka Mktg. and Jain Ink², the same is bad in law.
77.3. The ratio decidendi by the Bench of larger strength is binding
on the Bench of the smaller strength, irrespective of the fact whether
the judgment by the Bench of the larger strength is a priori or
posterior, in point of time.
77.4. A Bench of the smaller strength cannot mark a departure from
the decision of the Bench of larger strength, so as to vary the ratio of
the Bench of larger strength, in guise of explaining the decision of the
larger Bench.
77.5. It was not permissible for the two-Judge Bench in Suhas H.
Pophale to interpret the statutes and lay down propositions in
conflict with what was laid down by the Constitution Bench in
Ashoka Mktg.2 and by a three-Judge Bench in Jain Ink², when the
set of material facts in the background of the controversy dealt with,
were similar,
77.6. In laying down the propositions incongruent to and contrary to
the law laid down in Ashoka Mktg.2, the Bench in Suhas H. Pophale
disregarded the principle of stare decisis and violated the well-settled
law of precedent.
78. As a sequitur, this Court reiterates the propositions of law laid in
Ashoka Mktg.2
78.1. Both categories of statutes, namely, the PP Act, 1971 on one
hand, and the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947, the Maharashtra
Rent Control Act, 1999, the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and similar
Rent Control legislations, on the other hand, are special laws.
Therefore, in order to determine as to which Act will apply in case of
conflict, reference has to be made to the purpose and policy
underlying the two enactments and the clear intendment conveyed
by the language of the relevant provisions therein. Keeping in view
the object and purpose underlying both the enactments, that is, the
PP Act, 1971 and the Rent Control Acts, the provisions of the PP Act,
1971 shall override the provisions in the Rent Control legislations.
78.2. The PP Act, 1971 and the State Rent Control Acts are special
enactments in themselves. Rule generalia specialibus non derogant
will not apply. Having regard to the purpose, policy and legislative
intent of the PP Act, 1971, the same would prevail over the State
Rent Control Acts in respect of eviction of "unauthorised occupants"
of "public premises" as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act.

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78.3. The provisions of the PP Act, 1971, to the extent they cover the
premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control Act, override the
provisions of the Rent Control Act.
78.4. A person in unauthorised occupation of "Public Premises"
under Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent
Control Act.
78.5. In cases where the tenanted premises are claimed to be
governed by the State Rent Control Act and the same have also
become "Public Premises" within the meaning in Section 2(e) of the
PP Act, 1971, for their unauthorised occupation, the PP Act, 1971
will have application. 78.6. The statutory machinery envisaged under
the PP Act, 1971, could be activated for recovery of possession of
public premises by any government or public entity mentioned in the
definition. 78.7. The PP Act, 1971 will apply to the tenancies which
may have been created and in existence either before coming into
force of the Act or which may have been created subsequent to
coming into the force of the Act.
78.8. Two conditions must be satisfied for the applicability as above.
Firstly, the tenanted premises must fall within the purview of
definition under Section 2(e) of the PP Act, 1971. Secondly, the
premises should have been in unauthorised occupation.
78.9. Termination of tenancy of "Public Premises" by issuing notice
under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is one of the
modes which would render the occupation of the tenant
unauthorised, post the date specified in such notice. This would hold
true in respect of tenancies created before or after coming into force
of the PP Act, 1971.
78.10. Invocation and applicability of the provisions of the PP Act,
1971 is not dependent upon the aspect of possession. What is
material is the occupation of the premises which has become
unauthorised occupation. The occupation is a continuous concept.
78.11. The propositions enunciated in Suhas H. Pophale, as noticed
in para 19 of this judgment, do not, in our considered view, state the
correct position of law. The observations made therein, with great
respect, are not in consonance with the settled legal principles and
runs contrary to the principle of stare decisis and stand overruled to
that extent.
79. The reference is answered accordingly.”

42. It is accordingly held that the order impugned suffers from
perversity. The appeal court misinterpreted the law with regard to the
prospective effect of the said Act and wrongly applied the guidelines in
respect of the opposite party. Under such circumstances and for the

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reasons afforded herein above, the application succeeds. The order
impugned is set aside. The petitioner is at liberty to proceed with the
implementation of the order of the Estate Officer.
43. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied, for be
supplied to the parties upon fulfilment of requisite formalities.

( Shampa Sarkar, J. )