Bagher Singh vs State Of Punjab And Others
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
114
CWP-23493-2026
Date of Decision : 02.09.2026
Bagher Singh …..Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and others ....Respondents
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present : Mr. Lakhwinder Singh Sidhu, Advocate for the petitioner.
.
Mr. Rohit Ahuja, D.A.G., Punjab
NAMIT KUMAR, J.
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this
Court by filing the instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the inquiry report dated
25.07.2022 (Annexure P-3) submitted by respondent No.7; show cause
notice dated 25.07.2022 (Annexure P-4), issued by respondent No.6;
order dated 16.08.2022 (Annexure P-5), passed by respondent No.6,
whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service; and orders
dated 09.01.2023, 11.04.2023, 28.08.2023, 03.04.2024 & 15.04.2025
(Annexures P-7 to P-10 & P-12), whereby repeated appeals filed by the
petitioner against the order dated 16.08.2022 has been rejected by the
concerned authorities. Further, seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus
directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of
service and back wages.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case, as have been pleaded in
the petition, are that in pursuance to the Advertisement No.1/2016 dated
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31.05.2016, online applications were invited for direct recruitment to fill
up the vacancies of Male and Female Constables in District Police
Cadre and Armed Police Cadre of Punjab Police and the last date for
submission of online applications was fixed as 21.06.2016. As per the
said advertisement, 3751 posts were advertised in District Police Cadre
and 2501 posts in Armed Police Cadre and for female candidates, 1164
posts were advertised in District Police Cadre. As per Clause 6(C) of the
said advertisement, the essential educational qualification was 10+2 or
its equivalent from a recognized Education Board/University apart from
the condition that the candidates must have passed Matriculation
Examination with Punjabi as one of the compulsory or elective subjects
or any other equivalent examination in Punjabi language. Clause 6(C) of
the advertisement reads as under :-
“C. EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
●
The minimum Educational qualifications shall be
10+2 or its equivalent from a recognized Education
Board/University , and the candidate must have passed
Matriculation examination with Punjabi as one of the
compulsory or elective subjects or any other equivalent
examination in Punjabi language.
●
However, in case of Ex-Servicemen, the minimum
educational qualifications shall be Matriculation. Provided
that if the Ex-Serviceman (or the wife/a dependent child of
Ex-Serviceman, as the case may be) has not passed
Matriculation examination with Punjabi as one of the
compulsory or elective subjects, he/she shall have to pass
an examination of Punjabi language equivalent to
Matriculation standard or he/she shall have to qualify a
test conducted by the Language Wing of the Department of
Education of the Punjab Government within a period of
two years from the date of his appointment as per the
Punjab Government notification no. GSR-33/Const./Art
th
309/94 dated 4 of May, 1994.
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Note:
The candidate must have attained the above-mentioned
educational qualifications on or before the date of
publication of advertisement of the recruitment process.”
3. The petitioner applied for the post of Male Constable under
Wards of Police Personnel Category and upon being selected, he was
subjected to medical examination and thereafter, on 17.12.2016, he was
enrolled as Provisional Constable. On 21.12.2016 (Annexure P-2), he
rd
was allotted Regimental No.3C/757 of 3 Commando Battalion, Phase
11, SAS Nagar subject to the verification of Certificates of Educational
Qualification, Fingerprint and Caste Certificate (if any). Thereafter, vide
order dated 04.12.2018, passed by the Additional Director General of
Police, SOG and Commando Punjab, Bahadurgarh, the petitioner was
th
transferred to 5 Commando Battalion and he reported on 06.12.2018
under Regimental No.5C/281. From the perusal of service record of the
petitioner, it was found that at the time of his initial recruitment, the
petitioner has submitted his 10+2 Certificate with Sr. No.0376895, Roll
No.2716177 dated 21.05.2016, issued by Central Board of Secondary
Education (CBSE) and as per the said certificate his result was declared
as ‘Compartment’. In this manner, the petitioner did not fulfil the
educational qualification as per Clause 6(C) of the Advertisement
dated 31.05.2016, at the time of enrolment and therefore, his
candidature was liable to be cancelled. With these allegations, the
th
Commandant, 5 Commando Battalion, Bathinda, vide office order
dated 10.12.2021, initiated departmental proceedings against the
petitioner and Sh. Gurdev Singh, PPS, Deputy Superintendent of Police
was appointed as an Inquiry Officer and a charge-sheet was issued to
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the petitioner. While the statements of the witnesses were being
recorded, the petitioner absented from 21.03.2022 to 15.06.2022.
Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer proceeded on earned leave and Sh. Jaspal
th
Singh, PPS, DSP (Admin), 5 Commando Battalian was appointed as a
new Inquiry Officer. Since the petitioner continued to remain absent and
did not participate in the inquiry proceedings, therefore, ex-parte
proceedings were held against him. The Inquiry Officer submitted his
report, vide order dated 25.07.2022, proving the charges against the
petitioner and after following the due procedure, the petitioner was
dismissed from service, vide order dated 16.08.2022 (Annexure P-5),
passed by respondent No.6. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner
preferred a statutory appeal, which was rejected by respondent No.5,
vide order dated 09.01.2023 (Annexure P-7). Thereafter, the petitioner
filed repeated appeals which were dismissed by the concerned
authorities, vide orders dated 11.04.2023, 28.08.2023 & 03.04.2024
(Annexures P-8 to P-10). Against the said orders, the petitioner
submitted another appeal/representation which was considered and
rejected by the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab,
Department of Home Affairs and Justice, vide order dated 15.04.2025
(Annexure P-12). Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court by
filing CWP No.17871 of 2026 (Bagher Singh Vs. State of Punjab and
others), which was dismissed as withdrawn, vide order dated 29.05.2026
(Annexure P-13), with liberty to the petitioner to file afresh on the same
cause of action with better particulars. Hence, the instant petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that although,
initially, the petitioner has submitted his 10+2 Certificate with Sr.
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No.0376895, Roll No.2716177 dated 21.05.2016, issued by the CBSE
along with his online application, however, later on he has submitted his
10+2 Certificate dated 26.12.2016, issued by the Rural Institute of Open
Schooling, Delhi and once the petitioner had completed his 10+2, as per
nd
the 2 certificate submitted by him, and rendered service of more than
05 years, the action of the respondents in dismissing the petitioner from
service is totally illegal and harsh and the petitioner is entitled to
continue in service. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the
petitioner relies upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dr. M.S. Mudhol Vs. Shri S.D. Halegkar : 1993(4) S.C.T. 226 .
5. On receipt of advance copy of the petition, learned State
counsel has put in appearance and submits that as per Clause 6(C) of the
advertisement dated 31.05.2016, the essential educational qualification
for the post of Constable was 10+2 or its equivalent from a recognized
Education Board/University and though, on the cut off date, the
petitioner was having 10+2 Certificate but the result on the same was
shown as ‘Compartment’ and, therefore, he was not fulfilling the
educational qualification on the said date and was ineligible for the post
nd
of Constable. He further submits that the 2 Certificate submitted by the
petitioner was issued on 26.12.2016 i.e. after the cut off date i.e.
21.06.2016 and, therefore, the same cannot be taken into consideration
for the eligibility of the petitioner. He further submits that two
certificates issued for the same period by two different institutions also
raises doubt about the authenticity of the said certificates particularly
nd
the 2 Certificate. He also submits that apart from the above, the
petitioner was earlier also dismissed from service in the year 2020 on
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being absence from duty and his one year service was permanently
forfeited for annual increment on account of registration of a NDPS
case against him. He was also awarded another punishment of forfeiture
of 03 years service permanently and 02 years service temporarily.
Therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant documents.
7. The facts are not in dispute that the petitioner was initially
enrolled as a Constable on 21.12.2016 and later on it was found by the
department that at the time of submission of online application for the
post of Constable, the petitioner had submitted 10+2 Certificate with Sr.
No.0376895, Roll No.2716177 dated 21.05.2016, issued by the CBSE,
however, in the said certificate the result was shown as ‘Compartment’.
On the said allegations regular departmental inquiry was initiated
against the petitioner and after following the due procedure, he was
dismissed from service, vide order dated 16.08.2022 (Annexue P-5),
passed by respondent No.6. Thereafter, the repeated appeals filed by the
petitioner against the order dated 16.08.2022 have been considered and
rejected by the concerned authorities, vide orders dated 09.01.2023,
11.04.2023, 28.08.2023, 03.04.2024 & 15.04.2025 (Annexures P-7 to P-
10 & P-12).
8. The principal question, therefore, is not whether this Court
should re-appreciate the evidence recorded in the departmental
proceedings, but whether the decision-making process suffers from any
illegality or violation of principles of natural justice warranting
interference. The scope of judicial review has been discussed by the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S.
Sree Rama Rao, 1963 AIR Supreme Court 1723, wherein it has been
held that the High Court is not a Court of appeal which examines the
merits of the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry and the
power of judicial review is confined to; whether the inquiry was held by
a competent authority; according to the procedure prescribed and
whether rules of natural justice have been followed.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others
v. P. Gunasekaran, 2015(1) SCT 5 while considering the scope of
interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has held
he as under: -
"13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-
appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer.
The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of
its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether :
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice
in conducting the proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at such conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
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h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case
the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.
14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra
Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963
Supreme Court 1723 , many of the above principles have
been discussed and it has been concluded thus :
"7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a
court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant: it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice
are not violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold
the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the
function of the High Court in a petition for a writ
under Article 226 to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The
High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the
departmental authorities have held the proceedings
against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or
where the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case
or by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on
the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever
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have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar
grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the
enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of
facts and if there be some legal evidence on which
their findings can be based, the adequacy or
reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can
be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court
in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution."
15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra
Venkata Rao, (1975)2 SCC 557 , the principles have been
further discussed at paragraph-21 to 24, which read as
follows :
"21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before this
Court. Two propositions were laid down by this
Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao . First,
there is no warrant for the view that in considering
whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct
charged against him, the rule followed in criminal
trials that an offence is not established unless proved
by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the
satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule
be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the
High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not competent to declare the order of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal
under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant. The Court is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated. Second,
where there is some evidence which the authority
entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has
accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High
Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High Court
may interfere where the departmental authorities
have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice
or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the
mode of enquiry or where the authorities have
disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by
some considerations extraneous to the evidence and
the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be
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influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and
if there is some legal evidence on which their
findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of
that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted
to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
22. Again, this Court in Railway Board,
representing the Union of India, New Delhi v.
Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not
interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary
authority unless the finding is not supported by any
evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person
could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh
case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its
powers in interfering with the findings of the
disciplinary authority on the charge that the
respondent was instrumental in compelling the shut-
down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on
May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry
Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that
the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled
them to close down their compressor could not be
accepted at its face value. The General Manager did
not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point.
The General Manager accepted the evidence. This
Court said that it was open to the General Manager
to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion
reached by the committee. This Court held that the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority
should prevail and the High Court should not have
interfered with the conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The
Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The
findings of fact reached by an inferior court or
tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence
are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
An error of law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of
fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to
a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be
issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to
admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which
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has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be
regarded as an error of law which can be corrected
by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by
the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that
the relevant and material evidence adduced before
the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a
finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led
on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from
the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S.
Radhakrishnan .
24. The High Court in the present case assessed
the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion.
The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from
the aspect that the High Court does not correct a
finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not
sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present
case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be
scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion
that there is no evidence which would justify the
finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not
make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its
conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to
say that no reasonable person could have arrived at
these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the
evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected
the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what
the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari should not do."
These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the
living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in
State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2
SCC 491 . To quote the unparalled and inimitable
expressions:
"4. .... in a domestic enquiry the strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian
Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are
logically probative for a prudent mind are
permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence
provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is
true that departmental authorities and Administrative
Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material
and should not glibly swallow what is strictly
speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act.
For this proposition it is not necessary to cite
decisions nor text books, although we have been
taken through case-law and other authorities by
counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial
approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous
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materials or considerations and observance of rules
of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis
and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender
of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions
reached, such finding, even though of a domestic
tribunal, cannot be held good.…"
10. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Central Industrial Security Force and others v.
Abrar Ali, 2017(1) SCT 682, wherein it has been held as under: -
"8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority,
the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that
he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without
assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary
Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which
could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really
suffering from illness. It was further held that the
delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a
local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into
the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of
evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence
is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of
Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya reported in
2011(2) S.C.T. 782 : 2011(3) Recent Apex Judgments
(R.A.J.) 28 : (2011) 4 SCC 584 , this Court held as follows:
"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not
act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence
led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the
ground that another view is possible on the material
on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly
held and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable
nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with
findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries,
except where such findings are based on no evidence
or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find
out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting
reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or
finding, on the material on record. The courts will
however interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory
regulations have been violated or if the order is
found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based
on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi
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v. Union of India, 1996(1) S.C.T. 617 : (1995) 6
SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44,
Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, 1997(4) S.C.T.
214 : (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806,
Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, 1999(3)
S.C.T. 669 : (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S)
1036 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v.
Shashikant S. Patil. "
11. The said view has recently been reiterated by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and
others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021(1) SCT 285 and in the said
judgment it has been held as under: -
“23. The power of judicial review in the matters of
disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the
departmental/appellate authorities discharged by
constitutional Courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or
Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by
limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors
leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of
natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case
on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier
examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V.
Venuaopalan, 1994(6) SCC 302 and later in Government
of T.N. and Another v. A. Rajapandian, 1995(1) SCC 216
and further examined by the three Judge Bench of this
Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others,
1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it has been held as under:-
"13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate
authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not
relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before
the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel
[(1964) 4 SCR 718] this Court held at p. 728 that if
the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
suffers from patent error on the face of the record or
based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari
could be issued."
24. It has been consistently followed in the later decision
of this Court in Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board
Limited v. Mahesh Dahiya, 2017(1) SCC 768 and recently
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by the three Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v.
Union of India and Others, 2020(9) SCC 471.
25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the
Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision-
making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It
is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness
of conclusion. The Court/Tribunal may interfere in the
proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any
manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of
enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the
disciplinary authority if based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person
would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the
face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial
review cannot be extended to the examination of
correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as
a matter of fact.
26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the
alleged misconduct against the public servant, the Court is
to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was
held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of
natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings
or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority
has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or
conclusion.
27. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the
disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry,
the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the
findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement,
the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for
disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing
to the delinquent may record his own findings if the
evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise
or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further
enquiry.
28. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable
to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only
requirement of law is that the allegation against the
delinquent must be established by such evidence acting
upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and
with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the
gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is
true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the
finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry
proceedings.
VINOD KOTHIYAL
2026.09.07 13:07
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CWP-23493-2026 15
29. The Constitutional Court while exercising its
jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article
136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry
proceedings except in a case of malafides or perversity,
i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or
where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and
with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so
long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion
arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to
be sustained."
12. To the similar effect is the judgment in B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India and others : 1996(1) SCT 617 and Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora : (1997) 3 SCC 72 .
13. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid
judgments to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that since in
the 10+2 Certificate submitted by the petitioner along with his online
application for the post of Constable, the result showed as
‘Compartment’, therefore, as per Clause 6(C) of the advertisement dated
31.05.2016, the petitioner did not fulfil the essential educational
qualification for the post of Constable. In these circumstances, no
procedural infirmity or perversity in findings of the
Punishing/Appellate/Revisional authority has been demonstrated so as
to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
14. The judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in
Dr. M.S. Mudhol’s case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the
present case as perusal of the service record of the petitioner suggest
that he was earlier also dismissed from service in the year 2020 on
being absence from duty and he was also awarded punishments of
forfeiture of 01 year service permanently for annual increments on
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2026.09.07 13:07
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CWP-23493-2026 16
account of his involvement in the NDPS case; forfeiture of 03 years
service permanently; and 02 years service temporarily. Further, in Dr.
M.S. Mudhol’s case (supra) the petitioner therein had rendered 12 years
service and in view of his long service record, the relief was granted to
him, whereas in the present case the petitioner has rendered only 05
years service with blemished service record.
15. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances and
the settled law, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner
has failed to establish any ground warranting interference under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. The finding recorded by the
disciplinary authorities are based upon evidence and do not suffer from
any perversity or procedural irregularity. Thus, the instant petition,
being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
02.09.2026 JUDGE
Kothiyal
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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2026.09.07 13:07
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