The Municipal Corporation Gwalior vs Shanti Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Maryadit Gwalior A Co Operative Society Registered Under The Prov

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21331
1 WA-1283-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
th
ON THE 15 OF JULY, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 1283 of 2025
THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION GWALIOR
Versus
SHANTI GRAH NIRMAN SAHAKARI SAMITI MARYADIT GWALIOR
A CO OPERATIVE SOCIETY REGISTERED UNDER THE PROV AND
OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri S.S.Gautam, Advocate for appellant
Shri Prashant Sharma, Advocate for respondent No.1
Shri S.S.Kushwaha, Govt. Advocate for respondent No.2/State.
Shri Utkarsh Bajpai, Advocate for respondent No.3.
ORDER
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
This writ appeal, under section 2(1) of the M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya
(Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been filed against the
order dated 16/1/2025 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P.
No.1287/2015, by which the Corporation has been directed to either restore
back the land of petitioner by removing the road as well as park, or acquire
the said land as per the prevailing laws.
2. It is submitted by counsel for appellant that although appellant does
not wish to challenge the findings recorded by learned Single Judge with
regard to ownership of respondent No.1 over the land in dispute but since the
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road and park are in existence for last more than 30 years, therefore,

direction to remove road and park or to acquire the land is bad in law. It is
submitted that the State, as well as, the Corporation have perfected their title
by way of adverse possession and said aspect has escaped from the notice of
learned Single Judge.
3. Heard, learned counsel for the appellant.
4. At the cost of repetition, it is once again clarified that on specific
query raised by this Court as to whether appellant is challenging the findings
recorded by learned Single Judge with regard to ownership of respondent
No.1 or not, it was specifically stated by counsel for appellant that the
ownership of respondent No.1 is not under challenge.
5. Now, the moot question for consideration is as to whether a citizen
of country can be deprived of his property without following due procedure
of law or not ?
6. Article 300-A of Constitution of India reads as under:-

"300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority
of law
No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of
law."

7. The Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Devi Vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh and Others, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held as
under:-

“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in
1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right
guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31
guaranteed the right to private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh
Gopal Bose, (1953) 2 SCC 688 : AIR 1954 SC 92] , which could
not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair
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compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the
Constitution (FortyFourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC ,
(2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] in a welfare State,
and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution.
Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a
citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though
not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that
Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka , (2011) 9
SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414]
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property,
without following due process of law, would be violative of a
human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300-A
of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai
[Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai,
(2005) 7 SCC 627] , wherein this Court held that: (SCC p. 634,
para 6)

“6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article
300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power
of “eminent domain” may interfere with the right of property
of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a
public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must
be paid.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy [N. Padmamma
v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517] , this Court held
that: (SCC p. 526, para 21)
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a
constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in
accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution
protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to
divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article
300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly
construed.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Delhi
Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. , (2011) 9 SCC 354 :
(2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673] , this Court recognised the right to
property as a basic human right in the following words: (SCC p.
379, para 30)
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different
political thinkers that some amount of property right is an
indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic
oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that
liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property.
“Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was
the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property
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itself is the seed-bed which must be conserved if other
constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among
political thinkers and jurists.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat [Jilubhai
Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596] ,
this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 627, para 48)

“48. … In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers
of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation
without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode
is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A.
In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and
without following due process of law, and depriving her payment
of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of
forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her
predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is
completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal
sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by
the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State
could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the
sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court
in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC ,
(2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held
that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State
being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate
to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [State of
Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC
(Civ) 769] held that the right to property is now considered to be
not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right.
Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual
rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc.
Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the
High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the
land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse”
possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to
take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e.
a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over
such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to
perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse
possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been
done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21331
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of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected.
Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause
of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of
the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion,
which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts
and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of
fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how
the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the
courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial
justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a
constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to
promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of
T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v.
MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] , this Court
while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows: (SCC
p. 359, para 11)

“11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches
extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these
authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of
compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago,
recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities
and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true
that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and
laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his
fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226
of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different
scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the appellants without
any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for
grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either
comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition,
or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.”

30. The Supreme Court in the case of Kolkata Municipal Corporation
& Anr. Vs. Bimal Kumar Shah, decided on 16.05.2024 in Civil Appeal No.
6466 of 2024 has held as under:-

“30. Following are the seven principles:
30.1. The Right to notice : (i) A prior notice informing the bearer
of the right that the State intends to deprive them of the right to
property is a right in itself; a linear extension of the right to know
embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does not
contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice to acquire must be
clear, cogent and meaningful. Some of the statutes reflect this
right.
(ii) Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(1) of
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21331
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the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952, Section 11 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3A of the National Highways
Act, 1956 are examples of such statutory incorporation of the right
to notice before initiation of the land acquisition proceedings.
(iii) In a large number of decisions, our constitutional courts have
independently recognised the right to notice before any process of
acquisition is commenced.
30.2. The Right to be heard: (i) Following the right to a
meaningful and effective prior notice of acquisition, is the right of
the property-bearer to communicate his objections and concerns to
the authority acquiring the property. This right to be heard against
the proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not a sham.
(ii) Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(1) of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952, Section 15 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3C of the National Highways
Act, 1956, are some statutory embodiments of this right.
(iii) Judicial opinions recognizing the importance of this right are
far too many to reproduce. Suffice to say that that the enquiry in
which a land holder would raise his objection is not a mere
formality.
30.3. The Right to a reasoned decision: i) That the authorities have
heard and considered the objections is evidenced only through a
reasoned order. It is incumbent upon the authority to take an
informed decision and communicate the same to the objector.
(ii) Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(2) of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952, Section 19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 and Section 3D of the National Highways
Act, 1956, are the statutory incorporations of this principle.
(iii) Highlighting the importance of the declaration of the decision
to acquire, the Courts have held that the declaration is mandatory,
failing which, the acquisition proceedings will cease to have
effect.
30.4. The Duty to acquire only for public purpose: (i) That the
acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an
important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire. This
requirement, which conditions the purpose of acquisition must
stand to reason with the larger constitutional goals of a welfare
state and distributive justice.
(ii) Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections
3(1) and 7(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952, Sections 2(1), 11(1), 15 (1) (b) and 19(1) of
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and
Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 depict the
statutory incorporation of the public purpose requirement of

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compulsory acquisition.
(iii) The decision of compulsory acquisition of land is subject to
judicial review and the Court will examine and determine whether
the acquisition is related to public purpose. If the court arrives at a
conclusion that that there is no public purpose involved in the
acquisition, the entire process can be set-aside. This Court has
time and again reiterated the importance of the underlying
objective of acquisition of land by the State to be for a public
purpose.
30.5. The Right of restitution or fair compensation: (i) A person's
right to hold and enjoy property is an integral part to the
constitutional right under Article 300A. Deprivation or
extinguishment of that right is permissible only upon restitution,
be it in the form of monetary compensation, rehabilitation or other
similar means. Compensation has always been considered to be an
integral part of the process of acquisition.
(ii) Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 8 and 9
of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952, Section 23 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Sections 3G and 3H of the National
Highways Act, 1956 are the statutory incorporations of the right to
restitute a person whose land has been compulsorily acquired.
(iii) Our courts have not only considered that compensation is
necessary, but have also held that a fair and reasonable
compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition process.
30.6. The Right to an efficient and expeditious process: (i) The
acquisition process is traumatic for more than one reason. The
administrative delays in identifying the land, conducting the
enquiry and evaluating the objections, leading to a final
declaration, consume time and energy. Further, passing of the
award, payment of compensation and taking over the possession
are equally time consuming. It is necessary for the administration
to be efficient in concluding the process and within a reasonable
time. This obligation must necessarily form part of Article 300A.
(ii) Sections 5A (1), 6, 11A, and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Sections 6 (1A) and 9 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition
of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Sections 4(2), 7(4), 7(5), 11(5),
14, 15(1), 16 (1), 19(2), 25, 38(1), 60(4), 64 and 80 of the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and Sections 3C(1),
3D(3) and 3E(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956, prescribe
for statutory frameworks for the completion of individual steps in
the process of acquisition of land within stipulated timelines.
(iii) On multiple occasions, upon failure to adhere to the timelines
specified in law, the courts have set aside the acquisition
proceedings.
30.7. The Right of conclusion: (i) Upon conclusion of process of
acquisition and payment of compensation, the State takes
possession of the property in normal circumstances. The
culmination of an acquisition process is not in the payment of

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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21331
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compensation, but also in taking over the actual physical
possession of the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition is not
complete. With the taking over of actual possession after the
normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is divested
and the right, title and interest in the property, along-with
possession is vested in the State. Without final vesting, the State's,
or its beneficiary's right, title and interest in the property is
inconclusive and causes lot of difficulties. The obligation to
conclude and complete the process of acquisition is also part of
Article 300A.
ii) Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 4 and 5
of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952, Sections 37 and 38 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Sections 3D and 3E of the National
Highways Act, 1956, statutorily recognise this right of the
acquirer.
iii) This step of taking over of possession has been a matter of
great judicial scrutiny and this Court has endeavoured to construe
the relevant provisions in a way which ensures non-arbitrariness in
this action of the acquirer. For that matter, after taking over
possession, the process of land acquisition concludes with the
vesting of the land with the concerned authority. The culmination
of an acquisition process by vesting has been a matter of great
importance. On this aspect, the courts have given a large number
of decisions as to the time, method and manner by which vesting
takes place.”


8. Thus, it is clear that not only right to property is a constitutional
right, but the State can also not claim ownership on the basis of adverse
possession. Since finding recorded by learned Single Judge with regard to
title of respondent No.1 has not been challenged by the appellant, therefore,
this Court is of considered opinion that learned Single Judge did not commit
any mistake by directing Municipal Corporation either to remove the
construction (road and park, if any) or to acquire the land. Whether land is to
be acquired by the State or by the Corporation is inter se dispute between
Corporation and the State.
9. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that
no case is made out warranting interference.
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10. Appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed.

(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
(ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE
JUDGE
(and)

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