Sh Subhash Wadhwa vs Sh Narender Kumar Sharma & Ors.

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 07.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27.10.2026

+ RC.REV. 19/2024, CM APPL. 3115/2024 (Stay), CM APPL.
3116/2024 (To place on record subsequent events) & CM
APPL. 13515/2025 (Dir.)

SH SUBHASH WADHWA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Jai Sahai Endlaw, Ms.
Shruti Kapur, Ms. Harshita Pal
and Mr. Ishaan Kapoor,
Advocates.
versus


SH NARENDER KUMAR SHARMA & ORS. ...Respondents
Through: Mr. M Salim and Mr. Sadaat
Salim, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Revision Petition, filed under the proviso to Section
1
25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , seeks to assail the
2
Order dated 19.07.2023 , passed by the learned Additional Rent
3
Controller, South District, Saket Courts, Delhi , in Eviction
4
Petition, being RC ARC 35 of 2021 , titled “Narender Kumar
Sharma & Ors. v. Subhash Wadhwa” .

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
ARC
4
Eviction Petition
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RC.REV. 19/2024 Page 1 of 36
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

2. By way of the Impugned Order, the Application dated
27.04.2022, filed by the Petitioner, seeking a complete copy of the
Eviction Petition was dismissed and an Eviction Order was
consequently passed, in terms of Section 25-B(4), in favour of the
Respondents under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, in respect of
tenanted premises, being Property No. 22/5 (Back Side), Mandir
Wali Gali, Yusuf Sarai Market, Aurobindo Marg, New Delhi-
5
110016 .

FACTUAL MATRIX:
3. The Respondents instituted the Eviction Petition under Section
14(1)(e) of the DRC Act espousing bona fide requirement of the
Subject Premises for installation of a lift and setting up a reception in
connection with their existing Paying Guest Accommodation running
in Property Nos. 22/3, 22/4 and 22/5, Mandir Wali Gali, Yusuf
6
Sarai Market, Aurobindo Marg, New Delhi-110016 , which they
intended to convert into a full-fledged guest house.
4. Upon admission of the said Eviction Petition, the learned ARC,
vide Order dated 27.11.2021, directed issuance of summons to the
Petitioner in the prescribed form under the Third Schedule of the DRC
Act. The said summons were recorded as having been served, through
ordinary mode, upon the Petitioner on 08.12.2021. However, no
Application seeking Leave to Defend came to be filed on behalf of the
Petitioner within the period of 15 days, as prescribed under Section
25-B(4) of the DRC Act.
5. The Petitioner, however, first entered appearance before the
learned ARC in the Eviction Petition proceedings, through his

5
Subject Premises
6
PG Accommodation
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

counsel, on 28.02.2022. On that date, it was submitted on behalf of the
Petitioner that the complete copy of the Eviction Petition had not been
received with the summons, and therefore the Application seeking
leave to Defend could not be filed within the prescribed time. The
learned ARC, upon the said submissions, directed the Petitioner to
move an appropriate Application in this regard.
6. Pursuant thereto, the Petitioner filed an Application seeking
supply of a complete copy of the Eviction Petition dated
7
27.04.2022 , contending that certain pages, including Page Nos. 9 and
10, were missing from the copy of the Eviction Petition served upon
him. However, while the said Application was pending consideration,
the Petitioner subsequently obtained a certified copy of the Eviction
Petition from the Trial Court Record on 17.10.2022 and filed an
Application seeking Leave to Defend on 29.10.2022, contending the
same to be within the prescribed period of 15 days.

7. The Respondents opposed the said Application seeking copy of
the Eviction Petition, contending that a complete copy of the Eviction
Petition had already been supplied to the Petitioner along with the
summons, as also through WhatsApp. It was further contended that
the said Application was an attempt to circumvent the statutory period
prescribed for filing an Application seeking Leave to Defend, and that
in any event, the Petitioner could have approached the counsel for the
Respondents or inspected the Trial Court Record to obtain any
missing documents, within 15 days of service of the summons.
8. Upon consideration of the rival submissions and the material on
record, the learned ARC, vide the Impugned Order, dismissed the said
Application seeking copy of the Eviction Petition, observing, inter

7
Application seeking copy of the Eviction Petition
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

alia , that the same was unsigned by the Petitioner and unsupported by
any Affidavit, and that the report of the process server recorded
service of the summons along with a copy of the Eviction Petition.
9. The learned ARC held that the Petitioner had failed to establish
that the copy supplied to him was incomplete and that the statutory
period for filing an Application for Leave to Defend had commenced
upon service of summons on 08.12.2021. Consequently, in the
absence of an Application for Leave to Defend within the prescribed
period, the averments in the Eviction Petition were treated as
admitted, in terms of Section 25-B(4) of the DRC Act, and an
Eviction Order came to be passed in favour of the Respondents.
10. Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Petitioner has preferred
the present Petition, principally assailing the Impugned Order on the
ground that the requirement of service of summons in two modes
under Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act was not fulfilled, and
contending that the statutory period for filing an Application for Leave
to Defend could not have commenced without compliance with that
requirement. The Petitioner, therefore, seeks setting aside of the
Impugned Order and a direction for consideration of his Application
seeking Leave to Defend on merits.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner would
assail the Impugned Order, contending that the Application seeking
Leave to Defend could not have been rejected as being beyond the
prescribed period of limitation, having regard to the manner in which
summons of the Eviction Petition were served upon the Petitioner.
12. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would contend that Section
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act mandates summons to be served upon the
tenant through two modes, i.e. , the ordinary process and through
registered post, acknowledgement due (R.P.A.D). It would be
submitted that, in the present case, service was effected only through
ordinary process and the statutory requirement of simultaneous service
through both prescribed modes was not complied with by the
Respondents. The grievance is, as articulated in the Written
Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner also, that the Respondents
failed to take the requisite steps to effect service through both the
modes and that the Petitioner was served only through one mode i.e. ,
through ordinary process, which is against the provision of Section
25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act.
13. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would, in order to
substantiate the aforesaid contention, place reliance upon the decision
of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar v.
8
Purshotam Lal Verma to submit that the requirement of two modes
of service of summons, prescribed under Section 25-B(3)(a) of the
DRC Act, is mandatory and cannot be treated as a mere formality. It
would, therefore, be contended that the consequences of limitation
under Section 25-B(4) of the DRC Act could not have been invoked
without due compliance with the mandatory procedure governing
service of summons.
14. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would also submit that even
the service of summons through the ordinary process, effectuated on
08.12.2021, could not have been considered an effective service by
the learned ARC, inasmuch as the copy of the Eviction Petition
accompanying the said summons was incomplete and did not contain

8
2016 SCC OnLine Del 5358
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

all the requisite pages and documents, and therefore the period of
limitation of 15 days for filing the Application seeking Leave to
Defend could not have started to run therefrom, as held by the learned
ARC in the Impugned Order.
15. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
Petitioner accordingly sought a complete and legible copy of the
Eviction Petition by moving an Application dated 27.04.2022. It is
contended that the complete copy was ultimately obtained by the
Petitioner on 17.10.2022, whereafter the Application for Leave to
Defend was filed on 29.10.2022, within the prescribed period of
fifteen days of obtaining the same, and therefore their Application
seeking Leave to Defend ought to be considered on merits and could
not have been rejected outrightly on the ground of being barred by
limitation.
16. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, in light of the foregoing
submissions, would seek setting aside of the Eviction Order and that
the Petitioner’s Application for Leave to Defend ought to be
considered on merits.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:
17. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents would support the Impugned Order and submit that the
summons of the Eviction Petition were duly issued pursuant to the
Order dated 27.11.2021 and served upon the Petitioner through
ordinary process on 08.12.2021. It would be contended that the
Petitioner became aware of the eviction proceedings upon the said
service, which is also evident from the fact that he entered appearance
through counsel before the learned ARC on 28.02.2022. Learned
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

counsel for the Respondents would therefore submit that the purpose
of issuance of summons stood fulfilled.
18. Learned counsel for the Respondents would further submit that
the reliance placed by the Petitioner upon Ashok Kumar (supra) is
misconceived inasmuch as the said decision does not stipulate that the
tenant must necessarily be served through both the prescribed modes
before the statutory period for filing an Application for Leave to
Defend commences. Learned counsel for the Respondents would
submit that the requirement of service through two modes,
simultaneously, is intended to ensure that the tenant receives due
intimation of the eviction proceedings timely, without unnecessary
delay. The said object, it would be submitted, stood amply fulfilled
upon service of the summons upon the Petitioner on 08.12.2021, and
the submission on behalf of the Petitioner is merely an after-thought to
circumvent the Petitioner’s failure to approach the learned ARC
within the prescribed time.
19. Learned counsel for the Respondents would further contend that
the Petitioner cannot seek to defeat the statutory scheme under Section
25-B of the DRC Act by raising a hyper-technical objection to the
mode of service, particularly when the summons had been duly served
and the Petitioner had entered appearance in the proceedings. Learned
counsel for the Respondents would submit that the alleged non-
completion of service through registered post, in the facts of the
present case, cannot be construed as a ground to defer the
commencement of the statutory period.
20. Learned counsel for the Respondents would submit that the
Petitioner cannot disregard the service effected on 08.12.2021 and
contend that the period prescribed under Section 25-B(4) of the DRC
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

Act commenced only upon his obtaining a certified copy of the
complete Eviction Petition on 17.10.2022. It would be contended that
the subsequent procurement of the certified copy would not, by itself,
furnish a fresh starting point for computation of the statutory period
and that the Application for Leave to Defend, filed on 29.10.2022,
was, in fact, beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
21. Learned counsel for the Respondents would, in this regard,
while reiterating the reliance upon Ashok Kumar (supra) , submit that
once service has been validly effected through one of the prescribed
modes, the commencement of the statutory period is not postponed
merely because service through the other mode has not been
completed. It would be submitted that, in view of the service effected
upon the Petitioner and his subsequent appearance before the learned
ARC, the alleged non-completion of service through registered post
does not, in itself, warrant interference with the Impugned Order.

22. Learned counsel for the Respondents would also submit that the
objection raised by the Petitioner with regard to the alleged
incompleteness of the copy of the Eviction Petition accompanying the
summons, in respect of which the Petitioner had moved an
Application dated 27.04.2022 seeking a complete and legible copy,
has already been duly considered and accorded a reasoned
adjudication by the learned ARC, and therefore does not warrant any
interference by this Court on this ground.
23. Learned counsel for the Respondents would also contend that
the ground of challenge, with respect to the service of summons,
sought to be raised by the Petitioner before this Court, was neither
pleaded nor urged before the learned ARC and has been raised for the
first time in the present Revision Petition, which ought not to be
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

entertained, given the limited and circumscribed scope of the
revisional jurisdiction exercisable by this Court.
24. Learned counsel for the Respondents would accordingly submit
that the Impugned Order does not suffer from any illegality or
material irregularity warranting interference in the exercise of the
limited revisional jurisdiction conferred upon this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

ANALYSIS:

25. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material
available on record.
26. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the ensuing discussion
is arranged under separate headings corresponding to the principal
discussion thereunder.
27. It is made clear that the said headings are merely intended to
facilitate the orderly appreciation of the reasoning and are not to be
construed as creating isolated distinction between the issues. The
Judgment is to be read as a whole, and the findings recorded under
each heading shall be understood in the context of, and in conjunction
with, the findings and reasoning contained in the other parts of the
Judgment.
Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction
28. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction, sought to be invoked by way
of the present Petition, vested in this Court under the proviso to
Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

29. The contours of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B
of the DRC Act are well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla
9
Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum
10
Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-
11
Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has consistently held that the jurisdiction
exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the
DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be
equated with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
30. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
12
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
13
Grover .
31. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent
Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior

9
(1998) 8 SCC 119
10
(2014) 9 SCC 78
11
(2022) 6 SCC 30
12
2024:DHC:9322
13
2025:DHC:11285
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural
compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and
supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the
appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process
adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on
the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence
of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to
disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving
inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to
converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first
appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”

32. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra) , a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) ,
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
33. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
34. Having delineated the scope of the revisional jurisdiction
exercisable by this Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the
DRC Act, it is apposite, before proceeding further, to identify the
precise question that calls for determination.
Scope of Controversy
35. The challenge of the Petitioner to the Impugned Order rests on
two contentions. First , that the mandate of Section 25-B(3)(a) of the
DRC Act, which, according to the Petitioner, requires summons to be
served simultaneously through the ordinary process and by registered
post, was not fulfilled, and that the period for seeking leave to defend
could not, therefore, be reckoned from the date of service through the
ordinary process. Secondly, that the copy of the Eviction Petition
served along with the summons was incomplete, which, it is urged,
further postponed the commencement of that period.
36. The Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Petitioner
seeks to raise an objection that is purely technical in nature, which
ignores the end that the procedure is designed to serve. They submit
that the objection is, moreover, a new ground raised for the first time
in revision, since service through the ordinary process was in fact
effected, and the Petitioner entered appearance before the learned
ARC pursuant to the very summons so served.
37. Since no other contentions were raised on behalf of the parties,
this Court proceeds to adjudicate the matter confined to the
contentions as expressly raised and set out hereinabove.
38. The questions that, therefore, fall for consideration is, first,
whether the learned ARC was correct in holding that the summons
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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were duly served upon the Petitioner on 08.12.2021, so that the period
of fifteen days for seeking leave to defend commenced from that date,
even assuming that the summons were served only through the
ordinary process, and secondly , whether the challenge to the findings
of the learned ARC, with regard to supply of incomplete copy of the
Eviction Petition, warrants interference by this Court.
39. The discussion upon the second limb of challenge would
necessarily entail a perusal of the Impugned Order, in light of the
circumscribed scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court, which
would be undertaken after answering the first limb of the controversy.
40. To answer the first question, it would be necessary to construe
Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act, and that must be done in the light
of the object and legislative intent of Section 25-B of the DRC Act as
a special provision, for the meaning of a procedural mandate is best
understood by the purpose it was designed to serve.
Section 25-B of the DRC Act: Objective and Legislative Intent
41. Section 25-B was inserted into the DRC Act by way of an
amendment in 1976, providing a self-contained procedure for
adjudication of eviction proceedings instituted by specified categories
of landlords on the statutory grounds enumerated therein, including
bona fide requirement.
42. A reading of Section 25-B of the DRC Act makes it manifest
that the procedure prescribed thereunder marks a conscious departure
from the ordinary course of eviction proceedings under the DRC Act.
Section 25-B evidently has expedition and speedy disposal as its core
objective. It envisages a carefully structured mechanism, whose
salient features bring out the legislative intent with clarity. First, the
tenant does not enjoy an unrestricted right to contest an eviction
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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claim. The tenant must seek leave to defend by disclosing grounds
warranting a contest, and is entitled to defend the proceedings on
merits only if such leave is granted. Secondly, the statute prescribes a
strict period of fifteen days from the service of summons within which
such leave must be sought. Thirdly, failure to seek leave within the
stipulated period attracts the consequence prescribed under Section
25-B(4) of the DRC Act, namely, the statements made by the landlord
in the Eviction Petition are deemed to be admitted, and the landlord
becomes entitled to an Order of eviction on the statutory ground
invoked. The procedure thus replaces an unrestricted right to contest
with a time-bound and conditional opportunity to defend, which
reflects it true objective of speedy and expeditious adjudication and
disposal. The legislative emphasis can further be substantiated and
inferred. The idea of expeditiousness is not restricted to the
adjudication before the learned Rent Controller, but extends beyond.

43. An Order passed under Section 25-B of the DRC Act is not
amenable to an ordinary appeal, instead, the statutory scheme provides
for review and subjects the Order to the limited revisional jurisdiction
of this Court, the limited contours of which have been delineated
herein before. The provision accordingly seeks to secure expedition
throughout the course of adjudication, including at the stage of
challenge to the resulting Order. The prescribed timelines, the
consequence of default and the restricted avenues of challenge operate
in concert to prevent the proceedings from being prolonged by an
unrestricted right to contest, while preserving the opportunity to
defend expressly conferred upon the tenant by the statute.
44. The object and nature of Section 25-B of the DRC Act further
stand authoritatively explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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14
Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh , where it was held that Chapter III-
A of the DRC Act is a special code governing the disposal of the
specified categories of eviction proceedings, and must therefore be
followed strictly. In doing so, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also took
note of the legislative purpose underlying this special procedure, as
15
elucidated in Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava , namely, to
afford landlords whose claims fall within the specified statutory
grounds a speedy, expeditious and effective remedy, so that the
prolonged course of ordinary eviction proceedings does not defeat the
very necessity that occasioned the claim. The relevant observations
read as under:
“10. Now comes Chapter III-A of the Rent Act which consists of
Sections 25-A to 25-C as inserted by Act 18 of 1976 i.e. w.e.f. 1-
12-1975. By introduction of Chapter III-A, a special provision was
introduced by the legislature for summary trial of certain
applications filed under the Rent Act. Section 25-A of the Act
clearly says that this provision of Chapter III-A to have overriding
effect notwithstanding any inconsistency thereof contained
elsewhere in this Act or any other law for the time being in force.
Section 25-B is the provision by which special procedure for
disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide
requirement filed at the instance of the landlord under Section 14
or 14-A or 14-B or 14-C or 14-D of the Act has been laid down.
16. From a careful perusal of sub-section (4) of Section 25-B of the
Rent Act, it would be clearly evident that the tenant shall not be
permitted to contest the prayer for eviction unless he files an
affidavit before the Controller stating the ground on which he
seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from
the Controller. This section also clearly indicates that in default of
his appearance in compliance with the summons or his obtaining
such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the eviction
proceedings shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the
landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground
mentioned in the eviction petition. At this stage, we may also note
that in sub-section (4) of Section 25-B of the Rent Act read with
the Third Schedule, it has been made clear by the legislature that if
the summons of the proceeding is received by the tenant, he has to
appear and ask for leave to contest the eviction proceedings within

14
(2010) 2 SCC 15
15
(1984) 2 SCC 75
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

15 days from the date of service of notice upon the tenant and if he
fails to do so, automatically, an order of eviction in favour of the
landlord on the ground of bona fide requirement shall be made.
20. The scope of Chapter III-A of the Rent Act has been
elaborately discussed in Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal
Bhargava [(1984) 2 SCC 75 : AIR 1984 SC 967] in which this
Court duly discussed the object of the Rent Act and also the
insertion of Chapter III-A of the same in the following manner:
(SCC pp. 78-79, para 7)
“ 7 . … The dominant object of the amending act [is] to
provide a speedy, expeditious and effective remedy for a
class of landlords contemplated by Sections 14(1)( e ) and
14-A and for avoiding unusual dilatory process provided
otherwise by the Rent Act. It is common experience that
suits for eviction under the Act take a long time
commencing with the Rent Controller and ending up with
the Supreme Court. In many cases experience has
indicated that by the time the eviction decree became final
several years elapsed and either the landlord died or the
necessity which provided the cause of action disappeared
and if there was further delay in securing eviction and the
family of the landlord had by then expanded, in the
absence of accommodation the members of the family
were virtually thrown on the road. It was this mischief
which the legislature intended to avoid by incorporating
the new procedure in Chapter III-A. The legislature in its
wisdom thought that in cases where the landlords required
their own premises for bona fide and personal necessity
they should be treated as a separate class along with the
landlords covered by Section 14-A and should be allowed
to reap the fruits of decrees for eviction within the
quickest possible time. It cannot, therefore, be said that the
classification of such landlords would be an unreasonable
one because such a classification has got a clear nexus
with the objects of the amending Act and the purposes
which it seeks to subserve. Tenants cannot complain of
any discrimination because the Rent Act merely gave
certain protection to them in public interest and if the
protection or a part of it afforded by the Rent Act was
withdrawn and the common law right of the tenant under
the Transfer of Property Act was still preserved, no
genuine grievance could be made.”
(Emphasis supplied)

45. In view of the foregoing discussion, the object, nature and
legislative intent of Section 25-B of the DRC Act may thus be stated.
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Section 25-B is a special, self-contained and summary procedure,
enacted to give landlords of the specified classes a speedy and
effective remedy by shortening the ordinary course of eviction
proceedings. It is, in that sense, a beneficial and welfare provision,
conceived for the relief of landlords whose claim to recover
possession rests on a genuine and pressing requirement, such as the
bona fide need of the premises, a need which the legislature
recognised may be defeated by the very delay of ordinary
proceedings. Its defining characteristic is expedition, and every feature
of the provision, from the circumscribed right to contest and the fixed
time for seeking leave, to the deemed admission on default and the
restricted remedies against the Order, is directed to that end.
46. A provision enacted for such a purpose must be construed so as
to advance, and not frustrate, the relief it was meant to confer. It
cannot be read in a manner that converts the machinery of service,
devised to hasten the proceedings, into a source of prejudice to the
very landlord for whose benefit the procedure exists. This
understanding is not peculiar to this Court and as discussed
hereinbefore, finds firm support in the decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, inter alia , in Ravi Dutt Sharma (supra).
47. It is against this legislative backdrop that the controversy in the
present Petition falls to be examined. The controversy now turns upon
the interpretation and application of Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC
Act, which prescribes the modes of service to be adopted in
proceedings governed by Section 25-B of the DRC Act. The statutory
text is, therefore, where the inquiry must begin.
Service of Summons under Section 25-B(3)(a): The Statutory Text
48. The service of summons in proceedings under Section 25-B of
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the DRC Act is governed by sub-sections (2) and (3) thereof. Section
25-B(2) requires the Rent Controller to issue summons, in relation to
every application of the kind referred to in sub-section (1), in the form
specified in the Third Schedule of the DRC Act. Section 25-B(3)(a)
then prescribes the manner in which such summons are to be served.
For the sake of clarity, and because the controversy turns on its text,
the relevant provisions are reproduced hereunder:
“ (2) The Controller shall issue summons, in relation to every
application referred to in sub-section (1), in the form specified in
the Third Schedule.
(3)(a) The Controller shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with,
the issue of summons for service on the tenant, also direct the
summons to be served by registered post, acknowledgement due,
addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the
service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and
voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for
gain and may, if the circumstances of the case so require, also
direct the publication of the summons in a newspaper circulating in
the locality in which the tenant is last known to have resided or
carried on business or personally worked for gain.
(b) When an acknowledgement purporting to be signed by the
tenant or his agent is received by the Controller or the registered
article containing the summons is received back with an
endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee
to the effect that the tenant or his agent had refused to take delivery
of the registered article, the Controller may declare that there has
been a valid service of summons.
(4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in
the ordinary way or by registered post) in the form specified in the
Third Schedule shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the
premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which
he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave
from the Controller as hereinafter provided; and in default of his
appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such
leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for
eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the
applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground
aforesaid.”
(Emphasis supplied)

49. The expressions “in addition to” and “simultaneously with” ,
envisaged in Section 25-B(3)(a), when read in the light of the
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discussed object and intent of Section 25-B of the DRC Act, call for
careful consideration. The process of service of summons under the
provision involves three stages, which must be kept distinct, namely,
first, the direction of the Controller, which sets the modes of service in
motion; secondly, the steps taken by the landlord to give effect to that
direction, such as furnishing the process fee and the requisite copies
for each mode; and thirdly, the actual receipt of the summons by the
tenant, whereby he is brought to notice of the proceedings. The text of
Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act speaks only to the first of these
stages. It casts a duty upon the Controller, in the mandatory language
of “shall” , to direct service by registered post at the very time that
summons are issued in the ordinary way. It does not, in terms, speak
of the second or the third stage.
50. The stages of service are distinct is of material consequence. A
reading which requires the expression “in addition to” and
“simultaneously with” to be interpreted in a way that the tenant be
served through both the prescribed modes, before the service is
regarded as complete, would make the faster mode wait upon the
slower, and impose upon the proceedings the very delay that Section
25-B of the DRC Act was enacted to avoid. Such a construction
would, in the considered view of this Court, run counter to the object
of expedition and speedy trial, which, as discussed above, is the
central legislative purpose of Section 25-B of the DRC Act. A
provision conceived to secure speedy adjudication ought not to be so
read as to defeat it.
51. Similarly, Section 25-B of the DRC Act, as discussed herein
before, is a beneficial provision, enacted for the relief of a class of
landlords who seek possession on the strength of a genuine
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requirement. Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act, therefore, cannot be
construed as imposing upon the landlord so strict an obligation to take
steps for both modes together that, if the second is not undertaken, the
landlord is visited with delay, notwithstanding that the tenant has in
fact been brought to notice of the proceedings through the first. A
construction which would visit the very landlord with a delay, owing
to a procedural technicality, for whose benefit the procedure exists,
and which achieves nothing for the tenant who has already been
notified, would be contrary to the legislative intent and object of
Section 25-B of the DRC Act.
52. The text of the provision, however, does not itself state the
consequence where one mode of service is completed and the other is
not, for whatsoever reason. Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B offers a
pointer, in attaching the consequence of default to a tenant “on whom
the summons is duly served (whether in the ordinary way or by
registered post)” , and thereby itself recognises service in either mode.
How that recognition is to be reconciled with the expressions “in
addition to” and “simultaneously with” , envisaged in Section 25-
B(3)(a) is the ultimate question, which is required to be deliberated, in
order to furnish an answer to the first limb of the controversy involved
at hand.
53. At this juncture, the discussion necessarily turns upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar
(supra) .
Simultaneous Modes of Service: The Decision in Ashok Kumar v.
Purshotam Lal Verma
54. In Ashok Kumar (supra) , the Hon’ble Division Bench of this
Court was called upon to answer two questions, namely, first, whether
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a tenant is required to be served through both modes contemplated by
Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act, or whether service through one
mode suffices; and secondly, where service is effected through both,
from which date the period of fifteen days for seeking leave to defend
is to be reckoned. The relevant observations are reproduced herein
under for ready reference:
“ 1. This judgment is upon a reference of two questions by a
learned single judge of this court, in her order dated 12.05.2015, in
the course of a rent control Revision petition. The reference was
necessitated in view of conflict of opinions discerned in judgments
of this court (all delivered by learned single judges). The questions
referred are:
“ 1. Whether the tenant is required to be served by both the modes
as prescribed under Section 25B DRC Act or even service by one
mode is sufficient service as per the requirement of the provision?
2. In case the tenant is served by both the modes whether the
period of15 days for filing the leave to defend has to be counted
from the first service or the second service? ”
*
Analysis and Findings
10. The special nature of Section 25B was noticed by the Supreme
Court in the judgment reported as Prithpal Singh v. Satpal
Singh , (2010) 2 SCC 15. The Supreme Court had to deal with a
contention that provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, which
said that provisions of the Civil Procedure Code should generally
be followed, do not apply to summary proceedings. The court held
as follows:
“ 22. Apart from that, as we have noted herein earlier,
Section 25B itself is a special code and therefore, Rent
Controller, while dealing with an application for eviction
of a tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement, has to
follow strictly in compliance with Section 25B of the Act.
Therefore, after insertion of Section 25B of the Act, any
application for granting eviction for a special kind of
landlord, shall be dealt with strictly in compliance with
Section 25B and question of relying on Rule 23 of the
Code, which also does not give full right to apply the
provisions of the Code, could be applied.
23. That apart, Rule 23 does not specifically confer any
power on the Controller to follow the provisions of the
Code in special classes of landlords. It is a general rule,
by which the Controller in deciding any question relating
to procedure not specifically provided by the Act and these
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rules shall, as far as possible, be guided by the provisions
contained in the Code.
24. In view of our discussions made hereinabove that
Section 25B has been inserted by the Legislature for
eviction of a tenant of a certain classes of landlords, in
which the entire procedure has been given, it is difficult
for us to hold that Rule 23 of the Rules can be applied in
the present case in view of the specific provisions provided
in Section 25B of the Rent Act. Accordingly, we are of the
view that Rule 23 has no manner of application.
25. That being the position, if Rule 23 cannot be applied in
the present case because of applicability of Section 25B,
which is a special code and specific procedure for eviction
of a tenant by a landlord on the ground of bona fide
requirement, we cannot agree with the courts below that
in view of Rule 23 of the Rules, the provisions of the Code
can be applied in the present case and, therefore, we are
of the view that the High Court had acted illegally and
with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction
in setting aside the order of eviction and in allowing the
affidavit filed by the tenant for the purpose of defending
the proceedings for eviction. ”
11. That the enactment prescribes two concurrent modes, is
indisputable. The question is what is the effect, if both modes of
service are to be undertaken simultaneously, rather than
sequentially? Though there is a seeming legislative silence in that
regard, in the opinion of this court, the effect and consequence is
clear. The object of providing a special provision for service - in
this part of the Act, is to ensure that there is speedy service of
summons to the tenant; given that the procedure is special, aimed
at quick disposal of the class of disputes envisioned in the chapter.
The legislature thought it appropriate to ensure that two modes
were simultaneously resorted to, having regard to past attempts (at
service, where if the first notice of summons was not served in the
ordinary way, the court would then issue summons under
registered post) which inevitably lengthened proceedings due to
the delay entailed. In the other regime , the question of one mode of
service acquiring primacy over the other did not arise; if summons
were served in the ordinary manner in the first instance that was
deemed sufficient. However, having regard to past experience
whereby if the first mode was unsuccessful, the second mode-
through registered post, was resorted to, invariably entailing delay,
both modes were insisted upon. This, in the court's opinion did not
alter the fact that both modes were “normal” but provided for so as
to ensure that if through one, service was not effected, at least it
was through the other. Therefore, both modes of service are
effective; if service is completed through both, the question of one
acquiring primacy over the other does not arise. The legislative
mandate is unequivocal : “ The Controller shall, in addition to, and
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simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service on the
tenant, also direct the summons to be served by registered post,
acknowledgement due.. ” Furthermore, the service of summons
through publication is not mandatory, but depend upon the
Controller's opinion that “ if the circumstances of the case so
require.. ” These circumstances clearly show that the first two
modes are compulsory and simultaneous. The first question
therefore, has to be answered in the affirmative; both modes of
service are to be resorted to simultaneously; one cannot be
preferred over the other. Nor can one be made to await the other
mode. Both have to be ordered together. At the same time, it does
not follow that when one mode is successful and the other not so
successful, service is not complete. In other words, the obligation
to issue summons through two modes is mandated; however if one
is completed and the other not completed, service is deemed
completed in regard to the one where summons is served.
12. The next issue is what is the effective date from which the 15
day time limit starts, for a tenant seeking leave to defend the
proceedings. If the true object of service of summons is that the
party receiving it is informed about the institution of the case and
also required to take steps to defend himself or herself, logically,
time would start whenever summons are served in accordance with
law. It is quite possible - even within contemplation of the
Parliament - that service was to be through both modes. However,
the insistence that both should be together is only to further the
intent of speedy resolution of the class of cases which is provided
for. It does not mean that a tenant, in receipt of summons through
one mode-say registered post, has the option of waiting to see
when the ordinary process service is effected. The object of
informing the respondent/tenant is to ensure that he or she applies
within the time prescribed the moment the first service is
completed. It does not depend on if, and when the second mode is
completed. Since the intention of providing for service of
summons is to ensure that the party concerned is notified of the
pendency of proceeding, the object is fulfilled the moment service
is completed. This is not to be confused with the controller's
obligation to direct summons through both modes. The object
of providing for two modes is to speed up the process and also
ensure that if one mode is unsuccessful the other mode is resorted
to at the same time. Therefore, the answer to the second question is
that time to apply for leave to defend begins whenever the tenant is
first served the notice (regardless of the mode : i.e. ordinary or
registered).
13. In view of the above discussion, the reference is answered in
the following terms:
1. Both modes of service are mandated and have to be resorted to
simultaneously by the Controller. However, if service through
one mode is completed or successful, that is deemed sufficient,
irrespective of whether the other mode is successful or not.
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2. In case the tenant is served by both the modes, the period of 15
days for filing the leave to defend has to be counted from the first
date of service. Time, for the purpose of filing leave to defend,
does not depend on the second service of summons.”
(Emphasis supplied )

55. A perusal of the discussion by the Hon’ble Division Bench
makes it evident that it corresponds closely to the three stages of
service identified above in this discussion. As to the first stage, the
Hon’ble Division Bench holds that the legislative mandate is
unequivocal, and that the obligation to issue summons through two
modes is mandated, so that both are to be ordered together. That
obligation is, as the Hon’ble Division Bench takes care to stress, that
of the Controller. The same is observed as “This is not to be confused
with the controller’s obligation to direct summons through both
modes.”
56. Further, as to the third stage, the Hon’ble Division bench holds
that the object of service is to inform the tenant of the pendency of the
proceedings, and that this “object is fulfilled the moment service is
completed” . As to what lies between the two, namely, the
consequence where one mode is completed and the other is not, the
Hon’ble Division Bench holds that “it does not follow that when one
mode is successful and the other not so successful, service is not
complete” , and that “service is deemed completed in regard to the one
where summons is served” , irrespective of whether the other is
successful or not.
57. Therefore, the Hon’ble Division Bench rejected in categorical
terms, each of the two constructions that this Court has found to be at
odds with the legislative intent. The Hon’ble Division Bench has held
that Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act does not require that the
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tenant be actually served through both modes, to the contrary, it holds
that one completed service is “deemed sufficient” . More importantly,
it has been held that Section 25-B(3)(a) does not permit the
sufficiency of service, or the commencement of the statutory period,
to be held hostage to the fate of the second mode of service.
58. The reasoning is anchored in the object of intimation to the
tenant and expedition, and not in the reason for which the other mode
remains incomplete. Whether the second mode is unsuccessful,
delayed, or has yet to be effected, the tenant, who has already been
brought to notice through the first, has no option of waiting for it, and
the proceedings are not to be held up on that account. The
construction adopted is thus faithful to the beneficial character of the
provision. The landlord who has duly secured service through one
mode is not made to pay, in delay, for the fate of the other.
59. This principle accords with the legislative design of Section 25-
B of the DRC Act. The requirement of two concurrent modes is meant
to facilitate effective and expeditious service, and not to create
successive procedural hurdles once the tenant has already been duly
notified. To construe the provision as requiring successful service
through both modes before service can be treated as complete would
frustrate the very purpose for which the modes are to be pursued
simultaneously, and would convert a safeguard intended to expedite
service into a source of delay. The distinction drawn in Ashok Kumar
(supra) is, therefore, between the Controller’s obligation to set both
modes of service in motion and the legal consequence that follows
upon successful service through one of them. The two must not be
conflated.
60. A further principle that emerges from Ashok Kumar (supra)
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concerns the point from which time runs. The period of fifteen days
for seeking leave to defend commences on the date of the first service,
and the position of the second mode is immaterial to its
commencement. The second mode may await process fee, may prove
unsuccessful, or may be delayed or effected later. Once service
through any one mode is complete, the object of the summons is
achieved, i.e. , the tenant is made aware of the proceedings, and the
tenant has no option to wait and watch for the other mode. The other
mode, for the purpose of computing the statutory period, ceases to
have any bearing.
Principles governing service of summons under Section 25-B(3)(a)
61. Section 25-B of the DRC Act is a special and beneficial
procedure, enacted to give landlords of the specified classes a speedy
remedy, and its machinery of service is a means to that end and not an
end in itself. The text of sub-section (3)(a) of Section 25-B imposes a
duty upon the Rent Controller to direct both modes of service of
summons together. It does not require that the tenant be actually
served through both, nor does it make the landlord answerable, in
delay, for the fate of the second mode where the tenant has already
been brought to notice through the first.
62. This reading best accords with the object of expedition and with
the beneficial character of the provision, and it is this interpretation
that the Division Bench in Ashok Kumar (supra) , whose decision
binds this Court, has authoritatively adopted. Three consequences
follow, which, for ease of application, may now be stated as distinct
propositions, and against which the challenge of the Petitioner is to be
tested. The same are distilled as under:
I. The mandate is addressed, and confined, to the Rent
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Controller: Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act casts a mandatory
duty upon the Controller to direct service of summons through the
ordinary process and by registered post, acknowledgement due,
simultaneously. The obligation to set both modes in motion lies with
the Rent Controller, and no further.
II. Service of summons through one mode deemed sufficient:
The sufficiency of service does not depend upon its completion
through both modes. Service effected through even one of the two
prescribed modes is deemed sufficient service in law.
III. Prescribed period of limitation of 15 days runs from the
first valid service: Once service has been validly effected through
one of the prescribed modes, the period of fifteen days for seeking
leave to defend commences from that date, and is not postponed
merely because the other mode remains unsuccessful, incomplete or is
effected later. The object of the summons, namely, to intimate the
tenant of the initiation of proceedings, stands fulfilled, and the second
mode, for the purpose of commencement of the statutory period,
becomes irrelevant.
Application to the facts of the present case
63. It is against these propositions that the challenge of the
Petitioner is to be tested. The Petitioner contends that he was served
only through the ordinary process, that the requirement of service
through both modes was not complied with by the Respondents, and
that the period of fifteen days for seeking leave to defend could not,
therefore, be reckoned from the date of such service. The challenge
thus resolves itself into two questions: first, whether the Petitioner was
validly served with summons through a prescribed mode on
08.12.2021; and secondly, if so, whether the period of fifteen days
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under Section 25-B(4) of the DRC Act commenced on that date,
notwithstanding the alleged omission to serve him also by registered
post. Each limb of the challenge is examined hereunder against the
corresponding proposition.
The Mandate of Section 25-B(3)(a), confined to the Rent Controller,
not in contention.
64. The Order dated 27.11.2021 records that the learned ARC, upon
admission of the Eviction Petition, directed summons to be issued to
the Petitioner in the form prescribed under the Third Schedule of the
DRC Act. Nothing in the said Order confines the issuance or service
of summons to the ordinary process, or excludes service by registered
post, acknowledgement due. On a plain reading, the direction is
general in its terms and is not limited to any one mode. There is,
accordingly, no material on record to suggest that the learned ARC
directed service through the ordinary process alone.

65. The said aspect is, in any event, not in dispute. It has never been
the case of the Petitioner, whether before the learned ARC, in the
Revision Petition, or in the Written Submissions, that the learned
ARC failed to discharge the duty cast upon it by Section 25-B(3)(a) of
the DRC Act. The Petitioner’s grievance has been consistent that the
Respondents did not take the requisite steps for service through both
modes, and that he was, as a result, served only through the ordinary
process. The grievance is thus aimed at the conduct of the
Respondents in giving effect to the direction, and not at the direction
itself or at the Order of the learned ARC. This Court has been given
no occasion to examine any alleged default on the part of the learned
ARC, and finds none.
66. Even if it were assumed, in the Petitioner’s favour, that
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summons were dispatched only for service through the ordinary
process, that would not alter the position. Such an assumption would
go to the execution of the direction, that is, to the second of the three
stages identified hereinabove, and not to the existence or sufficiency
of the direction itself. Whatever its cause, it is a shortfall in the
implementation of the direction, and the consequence that follows
from it falls to be determined on the second and third propositions. It
cannot, in any case, be allowed to operate to the prejudice of the
landlord, for whose benefit the procedure exists, by undoing a service
that has fully achieved its purpose. Accordingly, the obligation cast
upon the learned ARC by Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act cannot
be said to have remained undischarged, nor is it the foundation on
which the Petitioner’s challenge can rest.
Deemed sufficient service on the Petitioner through ordinary mode.
67. Pursuant to issuance of the said summons, the record
establishes, and the Petitioner himself does not dispute, it was served
upon him through the ordinary process on 08.12.2021. The contention
that he ought to have been served through both modes is, in the light
of the foregoing discussion, misconceived. As held in Ashok Kumar
(supra) , and the principles distilled therefrom, service effected
through even one of the prescribed modes is sufficient service in law,
irrespective of the fate of the other. Service through the ordinary
process, having been effected on 08.12.2021, satisfied the requirement
of the statute.
68. Procedure is the handmaiden of justice, and not its mistress; it
cannot be invoked to defeat the very ends it was designed to serve.
Service of summons is the means by which the law brings a litigant to
the door of the Court; it is not a ritual whose every repetition is a
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condition of validity. Where the summons has reached the tenant,
announcing in plain terms the nature of the claim and the time within
which he must respond, the purpose of service stands exhausted, and
the law expects the tenant to act, not to wait. The machinery devised
to serve a purpose cannot be permitted to swallow it. The law aids the
vigilant, not those who slumber over their rights i.e. , vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt .
69. Therefore, the principal aim of a summons is to bring the
pendency of the proceedings to the notice of the person against whom
they are instituted. That object was fully achieved on 08.12.2021. To
insist, in the face of a completed service, that the proceedings must
nonetheless await the second mode is to take a view which sacrifices
substance at the altar of form and is, in the considered opinion of this
Court, a hyper-technical one.
Commencement of statutory period

70. In view of the foregoing discussion, and as a natural corollary,
the period of fifteen days under Section 25-B(4) of the DRC Act
commenced on 08.12.2021, the date of the first valid service, and
expired on 23.12.2021. The Petitioner entered appearance through
counsel only on 28.02.2022, well beyond that period, and the
Application seeking Leave to Defend was filed on 29.10.2022. As
soon as service through the ordinary process was effected, the second
mode ceased to have any bearing upon the commencement of the
statutory period, and the Petitioner had no option to wait for it. The
challenge that time could not run from the date of ordinary service has
been answered in categorical terms in Ashok Kumar (supra) , and is
without merit.
71. Accordingly, the first limb of the challenge to the Impugned
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Order fails to inspire the confidence of this Court. In the considered
view of this Court, the Petitioner was attempting to raise a hyper-
technical objection, which in view of the foregoing discussion, is
bereft of any merit. This Court shall now advert to the second limb of
the challenge to the Impugned Order.
Plea of supply of incomplete copy of the Eviction Petition
72. The second limb of the Petitioner’s challenge is that the copy of
the Eviction Petition served along with the summons was incomplete,
and that the period for seeking leave to defend could not, therefore,
commence until a complete copy was obtained. This plea, unlike the
objection founded on Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC, was raised by
the Petitioner before the learned ARC, by way of the Application
dated 27.04.2022, and was dealt with by the learned ARC in the
Impugned Order. It falls for examination within the limited parameters
of revisional scrutiny delineated hereinbefore.

73. The relevant portions of the Impugned Order read as under:
“ 8. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that this application,
although states that page no.9 and 10 of the petition were missing
at the time of service, it is unsigned by the respondent and
unsupported by any affidavit whatsoever. In these circumstances,
there is no basis for the court to believe that the same were
missing.
9. Further, perusal of the record reveals that the summons were
received by the respondent on 08.12.2021. As per the report of the
process server, he supplied copy of the summons along-with the
copy of petition. There is no reason for court to disbelieve this
report, or believe that the copy was incomplete.
10. It is specifically stated in the summons that they were in
respect of a petition for eviction u/S 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
Further, it is stated that the respondent was required to appear and
obtain leave of the controller to contest the application for eviction
within 15 days, after expiry of which the petitioner will be entitled
to an order for eviction. Despite that, the respondent failed to
appear/apply for leave to defend within 15 days.
11. As per vakalatnama, respondent engaged his counsel only on
28.02.2022, and appeared before the court for the first time on the
same date i.e. more than two months after service. The respondent
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

was put to sufficient notice that he was required to seek leave of
the controller within 15 days of service. It was incumbent upon the
respondent to approach this court well within time such that he
could comply with the mandate of 15 days. Instead, the respondent
chose to sleepover the summons, and approached this court only
after more than two months.
12. Even on the date fixed i.e. 28.02.2022, he did not move any
application seeking the alleged missing documents. When directed
by the Ld. predecessor of this court to move such an application,
he filed the same after delay of another two months i.e. on
29.04.2022. No explanation for this delay was forthcoming.
13. The aforesaid conduct of the respondent neither warrants any
leniency nor inspires any confidence. It seems that the summons
sent by the court were not taken seriously by the respondent. The
15 days’ period was treated casually and when the respondent
realised that non-filing of leave to defend within the said period
has opened him up to eviction proceedings, this contention was
raised as an afterthought to gain further time for filing leave to
defend application. To seek still more time, the application too was
filed with much delay.
*
15. For the aforesaid reasons, and keeping in view all facts and
circumstances, application dated 27.04.2022 is dismissed. As a
natural corollary, respondent was duly served on 08.12.2021.
16. Respondent did not file leave to defend application as per the
provision of Section 25B(4) of the DRC Act within 15 days of
service. As far as granting additional time for filing leave to defend
is concerned, it is a settled position of law that the 15-day period
for filing of leave to defend application is inflexible and
sacrosanct, and there cannot be condonation of delay of even one
day in filing of leave to defend application. Thus, there arises no
question of granting any additional time to the respondent for filing
the same.”

74. A perusal of the Impugned Order reveals that the reasoning of
the learned ARC is, in substance, fourfold. First, the plea rested on a
bare assertion, for the Application, though it alleged that Page Nos. 9
and 10 were missing, was neither signed by the Petitioner nor
supported by an affidavit. Secondly, the report of the process server,
which the learned ARC found no reason to disbelieve, recorded that
the copy of the petition was supplied along with the summons.
Thirdly, the summons itself informed the Petitioner that it related to a
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, and that
leave to contest was to be sought within fifteen days. Fourthly, the
conduct of the Petitioner belied the plea: he engaged counsel only on
28.02.2022, more than two months after service; he moved no
application even on that date; and when directed to do so, he took a
further two months, without explanation. The plea was, in the view of
the learned ARC, an afterthought, raised to gain time after the
Petitioner realised that the period had lapsed.
75. This Court finds no infirmity in this approach. The question
whether the copy served was complete was one of fact, which the
learned ARC examined on the material available on record, including
the report of the process server and the conduct of the Petitioner. The
finding that the Petitioner had not established the incompleteness is a
plausible one, drawn from the material, and is not shown to be
perverse, nor founded on any error of law or any error apparent on the
face of the record. It is not for this Court, in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, to re-appreciate the material and substitute its own view
for that of the learned ARC.
Grounds urged for the first time in Revision
76. This Court takes note of the fact that the objection founded on
non-compliance with Section 25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act was never
raised before the learned ARC. The Petitioner approached the learned
ARC with a singular grievance, namely, that the copy of the Eviction
Petition served upon him was incomplete. At no stage did he question
the manner in which summons were issued or served, nor was the
learned ARC called upon to examine whether any omission in that
regard bore upon the commencement of the statutory period. The
Impugned Order was, therefore, rendered on the objection actually
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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pressed before the learned ARC, and not on the one now sought to be
urged.
77. This is of consequence to the nature of the jurisdiction invoked.
The jurisdiction of this Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of
the DRC Act is supervisory, and not appellate. It is concerned with the
legality and propriety of the decision-making process of the learned
ARC on the matters that were placed before it. It is not a forum for the
first determination of a new objection, and certainly not of one that, as
in the present case, turns upon foundational facts, such as the steps
taken for issuance of summons and the course of service, which the
learned ARC had no occasion to examine, and which the Respondents
had no opportunity to meet. An Order cannot be assailed in revision
on a ground that was never urged below, and that the learned ARC,
therefore, had no occasion to decide.
78. There is a further, and equally telling, circumstance, which this
Court deems it necessary to note while parting with the present matter.
The ground concerning service of summons finds no articulation in
the Revision Petition itself. It does not figure among more than sixty
grounds of challenge enumerated in the present Petition, and has
surfaced only in the course of oral arguments and in the Written
Submissions handed across the Bar. A party cannot be permitted to
travel beyond his pleadings in this manner.
79. The present Petition could, on either of these two grounds, have
been dismissed at the threshold. This Court has, nevertheless, chosen
to examine the challenge on its merits, so that the Petitioner is left in
no doubt as to why it fails.
CONCLUSION:
80. On a conspectus of the foregoing discussion, the position is
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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clear. The Petitioner was served with summons on 08.12.2021 through
a mode sanctioned by the statute, and the object of service, namely, to
bring the institution of the proceedings to his notice, was thereby fully
achieved. The period of fifteen days prescribed by Section 25-B(4) of
the DRC Act accordingly commenced on that date and expired
without any application for leave to defend being filed. The only
objection that the Petitioner actually carried to the learned ARC,
namely, the alleged incompleteness of the copy of the Eviction
Petition, was duly considered and rejected by a reasoned Order, which
discloses no infirmity warranting interference. The alleged omission
to serve the Petitioner also by registered post, even if assumed in his
favour, does not, in the light of Ashok Kumar (supra) , displace the
commencement of the statutory period.
81. This conclusion neither dilutes the mandatory nature of Section
25-B(3)(a) of the DRC Act, nor treats the knowledge of the tenant as a
substitute for service in the manner prescribed by law. It proceeds on
the footing that the Petitioner was, in fact and in law, duly served. The
Application seeking Leave to Defend, having been filed long after the
statutory period had run out, could not be entertained, and the Eviction
Order was, therefore, rightly passed in terms of Section 25-B(4) of the
DRC Act.

DECISION:
82. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no ground
warranting interference with the Impugned Order in exercise of the
revisional jurisdiction conferred by the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of
the DRC Act.
83. Accordingly, the present Petition, being sans merit, is
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

dismissed.
84. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
is disposed of in aforementioned terms.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026 /DJ

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RC.REV. 19/2024 Page 36 of 36
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14