NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA vs THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER - 3
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
TH
RESERVED ON 29 JULY 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 05 DAY OF AUGUST, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 3756 OF 2026 (AA)
BETWEEN:
1. NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
UNIT (PIU) - MYSURU
NO.609, SRI CHAMUNDESHWARI
RAILWAY LAYOUT
SHYADANAHALLI VILLAGE
MYSURU TALUK
AND DISTRICT -570 003
REPRESENTED BY ITS
GENERAL MANAGER (TECH.) AND
PROJECT DIRECTOR
EARLIER KNOWN AS
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION UNIT
- RAMANAGARA
EARLIER HAVING OFFICE AT:
BASAVANAPURA
(RAMADEVARAPADA)
RAMANAGARA - 562 128
REPRESENTED BEFORE
THE DISTRICT COURT BY ITS:
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER
(TECH.) AND PROJECT DIRECTOR
2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
AND COMPETENT AUTHORITY
NH-275 (BANGALORE-MYSORE DIVISION)
Digitally
signed by K
P SWETHA
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS
AUTHORITY OF INDIA
HAVING OFFICE AT NO.106
GROUND FLOOR
KANDAYA BHAVAN
RAMANAGARA - 562 159
EARLIER HAVING OFFICE AT:
OLD MUNICIPAL OFFICE
ST
1 FLOOR, MAHAVEERA CIRCLE
MANDYA - 571 401
…APPELLANTS
(BY SMT. SRUTI CHAGANTI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER - 3
AND ARBITRATOR
BANGABRE URBAN DISTRICT
BANGALORE - 560 009
2. C. PRAMOD
S/O C. GOPALAN
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO. 153
TH
5 CROSS, SIDDAPURA
ST
JAYANAGARA 1 BLOCK
BANGALORE - 560 011
…RESPONDENTS
(SRI K.N. PHANINDRA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SMT. KRUTIKA RAGHAVAN, ADVOCATE FOR C/R-2)
THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 37(1)(C) OF THE
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 PRAYING TO SET
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 13.02.2026 PASSED
BY THE LEARNED PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BENGALURU RURAL, AT BENGALURU, IN A.P.NO.42/2024,
PRODUCED HEREWITH AS ANNEXURE - A & ETC.
THIS APPEAL, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS PRONOUNCED AS UNDER:
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU ,CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE)
1. The appellants have filed the present appeal under Section
37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [ A&C Act ]
impugning an order dated 13.02.2026 [ impugned order ] passed
by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural
District, Bengaluru [ District Court ] in A.P.No.42/2024.
The appellants had filed the said petition under Section 34 of the
A&C Act seeking setting aside of the arbitral award dated
01.12.2023 [ impugned award ] passed by respondent No.1
[ Arbitral Tribunal ] pursuant to an application filed under Section
3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 [ NH Act ].
2. The dispute relates to the compensation payable for the land
measuring 1398 sq. mtrs. comprising in Survey Nos.42/2 and 179/1
of Kumbalagodu Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk,
Bengaluru Urban District [ subject land ], which was acquired for
upgradation/widening of NH-275 (Bengaluru-Mysuru Division).
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
3. The subject land belonged to respondent No.2 (the land
owner). The preliminary notification dated 02.02.2016 under
Section 3-A(1) of the NH Act was issued for acquisition of, inter
alia, the subject land and was published in the requisite
newspapers on 23.02.2016. The final notification under Section
3-D(1) of the NH Act was issued on 04.10.2016. Appellant No.2
[ SLAO ] passed the award on 05.01.2017 in respect of the subject
land. The SLAO determined the market value of dry agricultural
land abutting the Bengaluru-Mysuru Road, other than the land
`
falling in Survey No.30, at 3,50,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crore and
Fifty Lakh only) per acre ( ` 8,646/- per sq. mtr.). The compensation
of the subject land was determined at
` 4,07,92,483/-, which included ` 29,66,386/- as compensation for
structures; compensation of ` 1,36,400/- for malkis in Survey
No.42/2; and compensation of ` 71,240/- for malkis in Survey
No.179/1.
4. Respondent No.2, being dissatisfied with the compensation,
filed an application under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act before the
Arbitral Tribunal. The said proceedings culminated in the arbitral
award dated 08.07.2021. The same was successfully challenged
before the learned District Court in A.P No.10/2022 filed by the
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
appellants under Section 34 of the A&C Act. By order dated
22.11.2022, the learned District Court set aside the arbitral award
dated 08.07.2021 rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal and remanded
the matter for consideration afresh.
5. Thereafter, the Arbitral Tribunal delivered the impugned
award on 01.12.2023 determining the compensation for the subject
land on the basis of the Guideline Value Notification dated
28.03.2016. Under the said notification, the value of ` 19,380/- per
sq. mtr. was indicated for Kumbalagodu Industrial Area. The
Arbitral Tribunal noted that the subject land was converted for
industrial use prior to the issuance of preliminary notification under
Section 3-A(1) of the NH Act. The impugned award was received
by the appellants on 08.12.2023. Thereafter, on 09.05.2024, the
appellants filed an application under Section 33 of the A&C Act
contending that the impugned award was erroneous inasmuch as it
proceeded on the basis that the subject land was fully developed
land. The appellants contended that the subject land was
undeveloped and, therefore, the compensation was required to be
determined on the basis of guideline value of agricultural land, as
enhanced by 55%.
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
6. The Arbitral Tribunal rejected the application filed under
Section 33 of the A&C Act by a communication dated 13.06.2024.
The Arbitral Tribunal held that the enhanced compensation was
rightly awarded after hearing the contentions of the parties on the
basis of the available records. After observing the above, the
Arbitral Tribunal dismissed the application under Section 33 of the
A&C Act as it was not filed within the prescribed period of limitation.
7. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants filed a petition under
Section 34 of the A&C Act (A.P.No.42/2024) seeking setting aside
of the impugned award. The appellants also impugned the order
dated 13.06.2024 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting the
appellants' application under Section 33 of the A&C Act.
8. Before the learned District Court, the appellants contended
that the impugned award and the order rejecting the application
under Section 33 of the A&C Act are vitiated by patent illegality. It
was contended that the Arbitral Tribunal had erred in adopting the
Guideline Value Notification dated 28.03.2016 as the same was
issued after the issuance of the preliminary notification on
02.02.2016. It was also contended that the subject land was not
fully developed.
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
9. The learned District Court held that the matter had already
once being remanded to the Arbitral Tribunal and could not be
re-referred, and observed that the impugned award was properly
passed by giving the benefits as required and on the basis of
valuation based on the documents on record. It found that the
impugned award was not vitiated by patent illegality and was not
opposed to public policy within the meaning of Section 34(2)(b)(ii)
of the A&C Act. Accordingly, by the impugned order, the learned
District Court dismissed A.P.No.42/2024 and confirmed the
impugned award.
10. Ms. Shruti Chaganti, learned counsel appearing for the
appellants contended that the Arbitral Tribunal erred in rejecting the
application under Section 33 of the A&C Act on the ground of
limitation. She submitted that although the application was beyond
the stipulated period of 30 days provided for making the said
application, the appellants had also filed an application seeking
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
[ Limitation Act ] which was not considered by the Arbitral Tribunal.
11. She referred to Section 2(4) of the A&C Act and contended
that the provisions of Part I of the A&C Act were not applicable to
statutory arbitrations in the event there was any inconsistency
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
between the provisions of Part I of the A&C Act and the statutory
enactment (in this case NH Act). She contended that Section 43 of
the A&C Act was not applicable to statutory arbitrations. She
contended that in the circumstances, a question would arise
whether the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act are
applicable to the arbitration proceedings under the NH Act. She
submitted that the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the NH Act
performed judicial functions and, therefore, the provisions of
Limitation Act and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would apply.
She argued that since there was no provision which expressly
excluded the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act,
the same would be applicable as well.
12. She referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union
1
of India vs. Popular Construction Co. and, on the strength of
the observations made in the said decision submitted that merely
providing the period of limitation under Section 34 of the A&C Act
would not be sufficient to exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation
Act. However, since there was an express bar for condoning the
delay beyond the period of 30 days under the proviso to Section
1
(2001) 8 SCC 470
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
34(3) of the A&C Act, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act was excluded.
13. Next, she referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department)
Represented by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers
2
Engineers and Contractors Private Limited and submitted that
the Supreme Court had overruled an earlier decision in N.V.
3
International vs. State of Assam . In the said decision, it was
held that any delay in filing an appeal under Section 37 of the A&C
Act could not be condoned beyond the period of 30 days as
stipulated under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. The
said view was overruled, as the Supreme Court found that
application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not excluded by
the scheme of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Accordingly, the
court could condone the delay in filing an appeal under Section 37
of the A&C Act if sufficient cause was established.
14. She referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in North
4
Delhi Municipal Corporation vs. S.A. Builders Limited wherein
2
(2021) 6 SCC 460
3
(2020) 2 SCC 109
4
(2025) 7 SCC 132
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
the Supreme Court had held that a period of 30 days as provided
under Section 33(1) of the A&C Act is not inflexible as the same
can be extended if the parties agree. She contended that the
scope of any agreement between the parties for extending the
period of limitation was excluded as arbitration under the NH Act
was a statutory arbitration. Thus, parties did not have the flexibility
of entering into any agreement to vary the period within which an
application under Section 33 of the A&C Act could be filed or
decided. She submitted that thus, instead of extension of time by
an agreement between the parties, the provisions of Limitation Act
could be invoked seeking condonation of delay in filing an
application under Section 33 of the A&C Act.
15. She further argued that under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act,
the Arbitral Tribunal functioned as a reference court. She
submitted that since the issue revolved around the compensation
for land losers, the period of limitation could not be considered as
sacrosanct. She referred to the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition
5
Officer vs. S.V.Global Mill Limited , wherein the Supreme Court
had held that Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
5
2026 SCC OnLine SC 171
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 did not exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.
Thus, any delay in filing the application under Section 33 of the
A&C Act could also be condoned.
16. Mr. K.N.Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
respondent No.2 countered the aforesaid submissions. He referred
to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Tantia Construction
6
Limited vs. Ircon International Ltd. , Vidhur Bhardwaj vs.
7
Horizon Crest India Real Estate and Others and Schokhi
Industrials Pvt. Ltd. vs. Maharashtra State Power Generation
8
Co. Ltd. and contended that the delay in filing an application
under Section 33 of the A&C Act cannot be condoned. He also
submitted that if the same is accepted, an application under
Section 33 of the A&C Act would be filed as a tactical move to
extend the period of limitation as provided under Section 34(3) of
the A&C Act. He also referred to the decision of the Delhi High
Court in CMI Limited vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and
9
Another and a decision of the Supreme Court in National
6
2021 SCC OnLine Del 2640
7
2022 SCC OnLine Del 3829
8
2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1513
9
2010:DHC:3342
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
10
Highway Authority of India vs. T.Younis and Another in
support of the said contention.
REASONS AND CONCLUSIONS
17. At the outset , we may note that although the appellants have
based their case entirely on the question whether Section 5 of the
Limitation Act would be applicable to an application under Section
33 of the A&C Act, the said decision on the said issue is not
dispositive of the appeal in the given facts.
18. The learned Arbitral Tribunal had rejected the appellants'
application under Section 33 of the A&C Act on merits as well as
on the ground that it was filed beyond the period stipulated for filing
the said application. This is evident from the following observations
made by the learned Arbitral Tribunal in the communication dated
13.06.2024 rejecting the appellants application under Section 33 of
the A&C Act:
"On examination of the case records, it is found
that the enhanced compensation was rightly
awarded through Arbitration after hearing the
contentions of the claimant and the respondents
and on the basis of the records available."
10
2026 SCC OnLine SC 1060
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
19. The learned District Court had also found that the impugned
award was neither opposed to public policy nor vitiated by patent
illegality.
20. Having stated the above, we also find no merit in the
appellants' contention that the petition A.P.No.42/2024 to set aside
the impugned award was filed within the period of limitation as
provided under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. The application filed
by the appellants under Section 33 of the A&C Act was filed on
09.05.2024, which was beyond the period of three months from the
receipt of the impugned award and thus, the time for filing the
petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act to set aside an award had
already expired. Further, the period of 30 days that could be
condoned under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act had
expired as well.
21. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to Section 33 of
the A&C Act which reads as under:
" 33. Correction and interpretation of award;
additional award. - (1) Within thirty days from the
receipt of the arbitral award, unless another period
of time has been agreed upon by the parties-
(a) a party, with notice to the other party, may
request the arbitral tribunal to correct any
computation errors, any clerical or
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
typographical errors or any other errors of a
similar nature occurring in the award;
(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice
to the other party, may request the arbitral
tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific
point or part of the award.
(2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request
made under sub-section (1) to be justified, it shall
make the correction or give the interpretation
within thirty days from the receipt of the request
and the interpretation shall form part of the arbitral
award.
(3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error
of the type referred to in clause (a) of sub-section
(1), on its own initiative, within thirty days from the
date of the arbitral award.
(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a
party with notice to the other party, may request,
within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral
award, the arbitral tribunal to make an additional
arbitral award as to claims presented in the arbitral
proceedings but omitted from the arbitral award.
(5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request
made under sub-section (4) to be justified, it shall
make the additional arbitral award within sixty
days from the receipt of such request.
(6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if
necessary, the period of time within which it shall
make a correction, give an interpretation or make
an additional arbitral award under sub-section (2)
or sub-section (5).
(7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or
interpretation of the arbitral award or to an
additional arbitral award made under this section."
22. As is apparent from plain reading of Section 33(1) of the A&C
Act, an application under Section 33 of the A&C Act can be made
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
within a period of 30 days from the receipt of the arbitral award
unless the parties have agreed for another period of time. It is also
important to note that an application under Section 33(1)(a) of the
A&C Act is confined to seeking correction of any computation
errors, clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a
similar nature.
23. It is apparent that the application filed by the appellants did
not fall within the confines of Section 33(1)(a) of the A&C Act.
According to the appellants, the subject land is not developed land.
Therefore, the same could not be valued on the said basis.
According to the appellants, the subject land was to be valued on
the basis that they were undeveloped industrial land by enhancing
the rate for dry agricultural land by 55%. Admittedly, this was the
subject matter of dispute before the learned Arbitral Tribunal. In the
aforesaid backdrop, the net effect of the appellants' contention is
that although the time for filing an application to set aside an
arbitral award is over and the delay in doing so cannot be
condoned, it would be open for a party to file a belated and an
incompetent application under Section 33 of the A&C Act and
revive the period of limitation for challenging the award which had
since expired. In our view, the said contention is flawed.
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
24. We may briefly examine the time periods stipulated under
Section 33 of the A&C Act. An application under Sub-section(1) of
Section 33 of the A&C Act can be made within a period of 30
(thirty) days from the date of receipt of the arbitral award unless
another period of time has been agreed between the parties. The
said condition makes it explicit that the time period of 30 days
within which an application can be made under Section 33 of the
A&C Act cannot be extended unless the parties have agreed for
another period of time.
25. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 33 of the A&C Act, if the
arbitral tribunal finds the request made under Sub-section (1) to be
justified, it shall make the correction or give the interpretation within
thirty days from the receipt of the request.
26. Under Sub-section (3), the Arbitral Tribunal may, on its own
initiative, correct any computational, clerical or typographical error,
or any other error of a similar nature, within a period of thirty days
from the date of the arbitral award.
27. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 33 of the A&C Act, a party
can within thirty days of the receipt of the arbitral award make a
request for an additional award as to any claim that may have been
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
omitted. This period of thirty days is also subject to the parties not
agreeing otherwise. In other words, the parties can by agreement
vary the period within which an application for an additional award
can be made under Sub-section (4) of Section 33 of the A&C Act. If
the arbitral tribunal finds the request for an additional award under
Sub-section (4) to be justified, it has to make the additional arbitral
award within 60 (sixty) days from the receipt of such request.
28. It is important to note that in terms of Sub-section (6) of
Section 33 of the A&C Act, the arbitral tribunal can extend the time
within which to make a correction or give an interpretation under
Section 33(2) or to make an additional award under Section 33(5)
of the A&C Act.
29. The legislative scheme is quite clear, it expressly provides
that the time as stipulated for certain acts as specified under
Section 33 of the A&C Act could be extended. But there is no
provision for extending the period in certain other events. Thus,
wherever the legislative intent was to permit extension of time
under Section 33 of the A&C Act, the same has been specifically
provided. It follows that where there is no provision for extension of
time, the period cannot be extended.
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
30. There is no provision, whereby the Arbitral Tribunal could
suo motu correct the award under Section 33(3) of the A&C Act
beyond the period of thirty days from the date of the award. It is
also relevant to note that the period specified runs from the date of
the award and not from the date of delivery or receipt of the award
by the parties.
31. We may also refer to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
which is set out below:
"(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for
any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed by the
Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply
as if such period were the period prescribed by the
Schedule and for the purpose of determining any
period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal
or application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive)
shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law."
32. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act expressly provides that
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply only in so far as,
and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by the
special or local law.
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
11
33. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra , the
Supreme Court had explained that, if on an examination of the
relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of Limitation Act
are necessarily excluded then, the said provisions would not apply.
The court had further explained that the court could examine the
nature of the subject matter in the scheme of the Special Law to
ascertain whether the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act were excluded. The observations made by the
Supreme Court are set out below:
“17. Though Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act
has been made applicable to appeals both under
the Act as well as under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, no case has been brought to our
notice where Section 29(2) has been made
applicable to an election petition filed under
Section 81 of the Act by virtue of which either
Sections 4, 5 or 12 of the Limitation Act has been
attracted. Even assuming that where a period of
limitation has not been fixed for election petitions
in the Schedule to the Limitation Act which is
different from that fixed under Section 81 of the
Act, Section 29(2) would be attracted, and what
we have to determine is whether the provisions of
this Section are expressly excluded in the case of
an election petition. It is contended before us that
the words “expressly excluded” would mean that
there must be an express reference made in the
special or local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. As usual the meaning given in the
Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we
have to see is whether the scheme of the
special law, that is in this case the Act, and the
11
( 1974) 2 SCC 133
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
nature of the remedy provided therein are such
that the Legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should
govern the several matters provided by it. If on
an examination of the relevant provisions it is
clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act
are necessarily excluded, then the benefits
conferred therein cannot be called in aid to
supplement the provisions of the Act. In our
view, even in a case where the special law
does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4
to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express
reference, it would nonetheless be open to the
Court to examine whether and to what extent
the nature of those provisions or the nature of
the subject-matter and scheme of the special
law exclude their operation. The provisions of
Section 3 of the Limitation Act that a suit instituted,
appeal preferred and application made after the
prescribed period shall be dismissed are provided
for in Section 86 of the Act which gives a
peremptory command that the High Court shall
dismiss an election petition which does not comply
with the provisions of Sections 81, 82 or 117. It will
be seen that Section 81 is not the only Section
mentioned in Section 86, and if the Limitation Act
were to apply to an election petition under Section
81 it should equally apply to Sections 82 and 117
because under Section 86 the High Court cannot
say that by an application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, Section 81 is complied with while
no such benefit is available in dismissing an
application for non-compliance with the provisions
of Sections 82 and 117 of the Act, or alternatively
if the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply
to Section 82 and Section 117 of the Act, it cannot
be said that they apply to Section 81. Again
Section 6 of the Limitation Act which provides for
the extension of the period of limitation till after the
disability in the case of a person who is either a
minor or insane or an idiot is inapplicable to an
election petition. Similarly, Sections 7 to 24 are in
terms inapplicable to the proceedings under the
Act, particularly in respect of the filing of election
petitions and their trial.
[emphasis added]
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
34. If we examine the scheme of Section 33 of the A&C Act in
the context of Section 34 of the A&C Act, it is at once clear that the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are wholly inapplicable
to Section 33 of the A&C Act. The period within which an
application to set aside an arbitral award can be made is inflexible.
The application may be made within a period of three months from
the date of the receipt of the arbitral award. In terms of the proviso
to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act, this period can be extended but
not beyond a period of 30 (thirty) days. The period within which an
application to set aside an award can be made begins from the
date the copy of the arbitral award is received.
35. Section 33 of the A&C Act provides the extent and manner in
which the award can be corrected or interpreted and the time frame
within which such correction can be made. The application for
correction under clause (a) of Section 33(1) or for an interpretation
under clause (b) of Section 33(1) of the A&C Act can be made
within a period of thirty days from the receipt of the award and such
correction or further interpretation, if made or given, would form a
part of the arbitral award. Under Section 33(4) of the A&C Act, an
additional award may be made.
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MFA No. 3756 of 2026
36. In conformity with the above, Section 34(3) of the A&C Act
also provides that, where a request has been made under Section
33 of the A&C Act, an application for setting aside the award may
be made within a period of three months from the date on which
the said request has been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal. It is
material to note that the time for filing an application to set aside an
arbitral award is not extended on account of the arbitral tribunal suo
motu correcting the arbitral award under Section 33(3) of the A&C
Act.
37. The context in which an inflexible time period for preferring
an application for setting aside an arbitral award, is provided, was
noted by the Supreme Court in Popular Construction Co . ( supra )
We consider it apposite to refer to the following extract from the
said decision:
"14. Here the history and scheme of the 1996
Act support the conclusion that the time limit
prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an
Award is absolute and unextendible by Court
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which
preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main
objectives the need "to minimise the supervisory
role of courts in the arbitral process". This
objective has found expression in Section 5 of the
Act which prescribes the extent of judicial
intervention in no uncertain terms :
"5. Extent of judicial intervention. -
Notwithstanding anything contained in
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any other law for the time being in
force, in matter governed by this Part,
no judicial authority shall intervene
except where so provided in this Part."
15. The 'Part' referred to in Section 5 is Part I of
the 1996 Act which deals with domestic
arbitrations. Section 34 is contained in Part I and
is therefore subject to the sweep of the prohibition
contained in Section 5 of the 1996 Act.
16. Furthermore, section 34(1) itself provides
that recourse to a court against an arbitral award
may be made only by an application for setting
aside such award "in accordance with" sub
Section (2) and sub Section (3). Sub Section (2)
relates to grounds for setting aside an award and
is not relevant for our purposes. But an application
filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34,
sub section (3) would not be an application "in
accordance with" that sub section. Consequently
by virtue of Section 34 (1), recourse to the court
against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond
the period prescribed. The importance of the
period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by
the provisions of Section 36 which provide that
"where the time for making an
application to set aside the arbitral
award under Section 34 has
expired.......the award shall be
enforced and the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 in the same manner
as if it were a decree of a court".
This is a significant departure from the provisions
of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act,
after the time to set aside the award expired, the
court was required to "proceed to pronounce
judgment according to the award and upon the
judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow"
(Section 17). Now the consequence of the time
expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that
the award becomes immediately enforceable
without any further act of the Court. If there were
any residual doubt on the interpretation of the
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language used in Section 34, the scheme of the
1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of
curtailment of the Court's powers by the exclusion
of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act."
38. The scheme of the time period as provided under Section 33
of the A&C Act has to be read in conjunction with the provisions of
Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.
39. It is also relevant to refer to Section 32 of the A&C Act. Sub-
section (1) of Section 32 of the A&C Act provides that the arbitral
proceedings shall be terminated by the final award or by an order
of the Arbitral Tribunal under Sub-section (2) of Section 32.
Sub-section (3) of Section 32 the A&C Act provides that:
"(3) Subject to section 33 and sub-section (4) of
section 34, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal
shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral
proceedings."
40. Thus, on rendering the final award, the mandate of the
arbitral tribunal ends, and it ceases to have any jurisdiction except
to the extent of Section 33 or Sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the
A&C Act, where the court adjourns the proceedings to enable the
arbitral tribunal to resume proceedings.
41. Thus, the very jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to correct
the award, give interpretation, or make an additional award after
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the final award has been delivered is derived from the provisions of
Section 33 of the A&C Act. The filing of an application under
Section 33(1) of A&C Act or 33(4) of the A&C Act, is a jurisdictional
condition for the Arbitral Tribunal to assume jurisdiction to pass an
order under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (5) of Section 33 of the
A&C Act. It necessarily follows that an application must be in
accordance with the provisions of the A&C Act and that would
necessarily require that an application be made within the period
which is stipulated under Section 33 for making such an
application.
42. We consider it apposite to refer to the observations of the
Supreme Court in Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep
12
Gurav , in the context of the interplay between Section 33 and
Section 34(3) of the A&C Act:
"26. Thus, what is material for the purpose of
computation of limitation under Section 34 sub-
section (3) of the 1996 Act, where a request was
made in terms of Section 33, is not whether such
request fell within the purview of the said provision
or not, but only the factum that such request was
made in the manner delineated under Section 33
i.e., it was made " within thirty days from the receipt
of the arbitral award " and " with notice to the other
party ".
12
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1811
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27. The aforesaid flows from the reason that once
the arbitral award is amended/corrected, it is, for
all purposes, in the form of an award itself under
Section 31 of the 1996 Act, distinct from the award
that was originally passed, prior to the making of
such request. It would be this award alone, and
not the original award passed prior to the request
under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, which has to be
challenged."
43. It is clear from the above that the Supreme Court had
emphasised that an application under Section 33 of the A&C Act
was required to be made within the prescribed period of thirty days
(or such other time as the parties may have agreed) for the
limitation period under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act to run from its
disposal.
44. According to the learned counsel for the appellants insofar
as non-statutory arbitrations are concerned, the timelines provided
under Section 33 of the A&C Act would be sacrosanct. However,
for arbitrations under the NH Act or any other statutory arbitrations,
the timelines as prescribed under Section 33 of the A&C Act would
be flexible and the delay in filing an application could be condoned.
45. We do not find any basis for the said contention. Section
3G(6) of the NH Act expressly provides that the provisions of the
A&C Act would apply to arbitration under the NH Act, subject to the
provisions of the NH Act. There is no provision under the NH Act,
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which would exclude the time period stipulated under Section 33 of
the A&C Act.
46. We may refer to Section 2(4) of the A&C Act which reads as
under:
"(4) This Part except sub-section (1) of section 40,
sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration
under any other enactment for the time being in
force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an
arbitration agreement and as if that other
enactment were an arbitration agreement, except
in so far as the provisions of this Part are
inconsistent with that other enactment or with any
rules made thereunder."
47. Thus, by virtue of Section 2(4) of the A&C Act, Sub-
section(1) of Section 40, and Sections 41 and 43 of the A&C Act,
are inapplicable to a statutory arbitration. Section 43(1) of the A&C
Act expressly provides that the Limitation Act would apply to
arbitration as it applies to proceedings in court. Under Section
43(2) of the A&C Act, the arbitration is deemed to have
commenced on the date referred to in Section 21 of the A&C Act
for the purpose of limitation. If the provisions of the Limitation Act
are excluded by virtue of Section 2(4) of the A&C Act for
proceedings under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act, it would also follow
that recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be
available. However, it is not necessary to examine the general
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proposition as to whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to
arbitrations under the NH Act in these proceedings. We say so
since there is no dispute that Section 33 of the A&C Act is
applicable.
48. The appellants' application was moved under Section 33 of
the A&C Act. The time period stipulated therein is not flexible.
Given the scheme of Section 33 of the A&C Act, there is no scope
for permitting any condonation of delay in filing an application
under Section 33 of the A&C Act. The contention that since there
cannot be an agreement to alter the period within which an
application under Section 33(1) of the A&C Act is to be made in a
statutory arbitration, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable in
case of such arbitrations, is unmerited. Section 33(1) of the A&C
Act provides that parties can make an application “w ithin thirty days
from the receipt of the arbitral award, unless another period of time
has been agreed upon by the parties”.
49. As discussed hereinbefore, the language of Section 33(1) of
the A&C Act clearly indicates that the time period of thirty days to
make the application is inflexible, as the only exception mentioned
is “if the parties have agreed to a different time period”. The
reference to the exception cements the rule; it informs our
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understanding that the period of thirty days is inflexible. It cannot
be understood that if the exception is unavailable in given cases,
the interpretation of the main provision would change in those
cases. It would only mean that thirty days period remains fixed as
the exception (of the parties agreeing otherwise) does not apply.
The interpretation of Section 33 of the A&C Act is not contingent on
whether the arbitration is a statutory arbitration or under an
arbitration agreement between parties.
50. In view of the above, the petition filed by the appellants under
Section 34 of the A&C Act was liable to be rejected, inter alia, on
the ground that it was filed beyond the period stipulated under
Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.
51. The present appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
Sd/-
(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
(K.S. HEMALEKHA)
JUDGE
AHB/KPS