MR. HARSHIL MATHUR vs UNION OF INDIA

1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 04 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

WRIT PETITION No.16078 OF 2026 (GM - RES)


BETWEEN:

1 . MR. HARSHIL MATHUR
C/O RAZORPAY SOFTWARE LIMITED
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
ST
1 FLOOR, SJR CYBER,
22, LASKAR HOSUR ROAD,
ADUGODI, BENGALURU – 560 030.
E-MAIL ID- [email protected]

2 . MR. SHASHANK KUMAR
C/O RAZORPAY SOFTWARE LIMITED
AGED MAJOR
ST
1 FLOOR, SJR CYBER,
22, LASKAR HOSUR ROAD,
ADUGODI, BENGALURU – 560 030.
E-MAIL ID- [email protected]

... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI SANDESH J.CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI ABHISHEK KUMAR, ADVOCATE)

AND:

UNION OF INDIA
MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS
Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench

2
REPRESENTED BY
HEMANT TYAGI.
THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICER,
SERIOUS FRAUD INVESTIGATION OFFICE
CENTRAL CRIME BRANCH,

REGD. OFFICE AT:
ND
2 FLOOR, PT. DEENDAYAL ANTYODAYA BHAWAN,
CGO COMPLEX, LODHI ROAD,
NEW DELHI – 110 003.
Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
... RESPONDENT

(BY SRI K.ARVIND KAMATH, ASG A/W
MS.ANUPARNA BORDOLOI, CGC)


THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF BNSS,
2023, PRAYING TO. a. ALLOW THE PRESET WRIT PETITION AND
ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT
/ ORDER / DIRECTION, TO: (I) QUASH COMPLAINT BEARING SPL. C
NO. 324/2026 (ARISING OUT OF PCR NO. 33/2025) AT ANNEXURE
A PENDING BEFORE THE LIX ADDL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS
JUDGE AT BENGALURU CITY (CCH-60), IN SO FAR AS IT
IMPLICATES THE PETITIONERS (ARRAYED AS ACCUSED NO. 8 AND
9); (II) QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING ALONG WITH
COGNIZANCE ORDER DATED 05.03.2026 AND THE SUMMONS
ISSUED PURSUANT THERETO (NOT RECEIVED BY THE
PETITIONERS AS ON DATE) AT ANNEXURE B ISSUED BY THE LIX
ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AT BENGALURU
CITY(CCH-60) IN THE IMPUGNED COMPLAINT; (III) QUASH ALL
CONSEQUENTIAL PROCEEDINGS EMANATING THEREFROM QUA
THE PETITIONERS.

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THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE
COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioners/accused Nos.8 and 9 in Special C.No.324 of
2026 pending before the LIX Additional City Civil and Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru arising out of P.C.R.No.33 of 2025 are at the
doors of this Court calling in question initiation of proceedings by
the respondent/Serious Fraud Investigation Office (hereinafter
referred to as ‘SFIO’ for short).

2. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

The petitioners are the office bearers of Razorpay Private
Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘Razorpay’ for short), an
st nd
intermediary. 1 petitioner is the whole time Director and the 2
petitioner is the Managing Director of the payment aggregator
platform/Intermediary - Razorpay. It is the averment that Razorpay
is regulated by the Reserve Bank of India and is engaged in the
business of providing intermediary payment aggregation services

4
and implementing payment solutions to third party merchants
across diverse sectors. The genesis of the proceedings in the case
at hand is on a confidential report of the Registrar of Companies,
which is said to have uncovered a network of shell companies with
dummy directors created by one Jilian Consultants India Private
Limited (‘JCIPL’), a wholly owned subsidiary of a company named
Fininty Private Limited. Based on the affairs of the said company
and 32 other companies, the Government of India by an order
dated 09-09-2022 directs investigation into the affairs of the said
company under Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). The investigation
report is placed before the Government on 31-07-2024 by the
respondent/ SFIO. The investigation report by the SFIO forms the
sole foundation for the impugned complaint.

3. As per the complaint, one Mad Elephant Network
Technology Private Limited ('MENTPL'), which was one of the 33
companies under investigation, was incorporated on 15-11-2019
through JCIPL, allegedly arranging dummy directors completely
controlled by Chinese entities. MENTPL subsequently entered into

5
an arrangement with X10 Financial Services Limited, a non-banking
financial company, as a service provider for lending operations
through digital platforms and mobile applications. The allegations
against MENTPL is that unethical methods were followed for
recovery, which was predatory and coercive and generated
wrongful gains to MENTPL to the tune of Rs. 56.63/- crores. Insofar
as the petitioners are concerned, they are arrayed as accused Nos.8
and 9. The allegations qua the petitioners in the impugned
complaint pertain to deficiencies and negligence in merchant
onboarding processes, including alleged lapses in know your
customer ('KYC') verification of MENTPL, non-conduct of due
diligence and non-monitoring of transactions of MENTPL by
Razorpay. The impugned complaint further alleges that the
petitioners being Directors of Razorpay failed to exercise their
duties as Directors with due and reasonable care, skill and diligence
and exercise of independent judgment and, therefore, were liable to
be charged under Section 166 of the Act.

st
4. The statement of the 1 petitioner was recorded on
st
16-08-2023, wherein it is said that the 1 petitioner explained that

6
Reserve Bank of India guidelines were then evolving and onus of
doing a full KYC was not on the petitioners. The petitioners
challenge the said proceedings in P.C.R.No.33 of 2025 on manifold
scores inter alia the absence of statutory obligation and imaginary
duty cast upon payment aggregators like the Razorpay. They seek
complete quashment of proceedings against them – accused Nos.8
and 9.

5. Heard Sri Sandesh J. Chouta , learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioners and Sri K. Arvind Kamath , learned
Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the respondent.

6.1. The learned senior counsel Sri Sandesh J. Chouta ,
appearing for the petitioners would contend that under Section 212
of the Act, there is no jurisdiction to the SFIO to investigate. It is
strictly confined to the affairs of the company named in the order of
investigation passed by the Central Government. The order dated
09-09-2022 names JCIPL and 32 companies under investigation.
Razorpay is not arrayed as a company under investigation. The
petitioners are not the officers of any company under investigation.
Mere provision of payment gateway cannot constitute an action in

7
connection with the affairs of a company under Section 212 of the
Act.

6.2. Learned senior counsel would submit that the complaint
refers to Section 166 of the Act to bring in allegations against the
Directors of Razorpay without it being made an accused. The
submission of the learned senior counsel is that Section 166 is
wholly inapplicable and misconceived. He would submit that what is
alleged against these petitioners is non-verification of KYC norms
and negligence. Negligence per se would not become an offence is
the contention of the learned senior counsel. Amplifying the
submission that Razorpay, which is allegedly negligent at the time
of onboarding, is not an accused. Without there being any specific
allegation against the petitioners, the Director or the Managing
Director of Razorpay cannot be dragged in as there is no concept of
vicarious liability in criminal jurisprudence.

6.3. Learned senior counsel would further submit that the
entire proceedings are barred by limitation. The punishment under
Section 166 of the Act is one year with fine. Since the complaint is
registered after three years, it would be hit by Section 468 of the

8
Cr.P.C. The learned senior counsel further would take this Court
through the allegations in the complaint to contend that in the
absence of mens rea and nexus of the petitioners with the
Company – MENTPL, the proceedings must not be permitted to be
continued. Learned senior counsel would contend that the
allegation is non-adherence to KYC obligation. KYC obligation is the
duty of the Bank and not an intermediary like Razorpay. Identical
intermediaries are left off and Razorpay is singled out. Therefore,
the proceedings must be obliterated.

6.4. In the alternative, learned senior counsel submits that
cognizance taken by the concerned Court after the onset of BNSS is
contrary to law and therefore, must be obliterated and remitted
back to the hands of the concerned Court for fresh consideration in
terms of Section 223 (1) of the BNSS. He would seek to place
reliance on several judgments of the Apex Court, this Court and
different High Courts to buttress the aforesaid contentions. These
judgments would bear consideration qua their relevance in the
course of the order.

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7. Per contra , the learned Additional Solicitor General of India
Sri Arvind Kamath would vehemently refute the submissions to
contend that the petitioners are Directors of Razorpay, a payment
aggregator. The offence against the Directors is the one punishable
under Section 166 of the Act. The accusations against the
petitioners are based upon statutory investigation under Section
212 of the Act. The backdrop of the allegations is that Chinese
controlled illegal digital lending operation have made wrongful gains
of about Rs.57/- crores through usurious interest at 30% upfront
deduction at the time of payment and coercive recovery. Section
212 of the Act has a wide amplitude and it necessarily extends to
persons and entities through whom the affairs were conducted and
through whom funds were routed. The routing of money has taken
place through fake companies. Razorpay was precisely a conduit
carrying Rs.320/- crores of MENTPL's transactions. The prosecution
of the petitioners flows from the mandate of the statute under
Section 212 of the Act, which empowers the Government of India to
take action. Insofar as the order of taking cognizance, it cannot be
said that a rowing inquiry or a mini-trial must be conducted at the

10
time of taking of cognizance. He would, therefore, seek dismissal of
the petition.

8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.

9. The afore-narrated facts, the role of these petitioners and
them coming into the dragnet of crime are all a matter of record.
The submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General of India
is that, Section 212 of the Act deals with investigation into the
affairs of the company and would include the entities through whom
company affairs would be conducted and the funds were routed. It
becomes apposite to notice Section 212 of the Act. It reads as
follows:
"
212. Investigation into affairs of Company by
Serious Fraud Investigation Office.—(1) Without
prejudice to the provisions of Section 210, where the
Central Government is of the opinion, that it is
necessary to investigate into the affairs of a company
by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office—

( a ) on receipt of a report of the Registrar or inspector
under Section 208;

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( b ) on intimation of a special resolution passed by a
company that its affairs are required to be
investigated;

( c ) in the public interest; or

( d ) on request from any Department of the Central
Government or a State Government, the Central
Government may, by order, assign the
investigation into the affairs of the said company
to the Serious Fraud Investigation Office and its
Director, may designate such number of
inspectors, as he may consider necessary for the
purpose of such investigation.

…. …. ….

(14) On receipt of the investigation report, the
Central Government may, after examination of the
report (and after taking such legal advice, as it may
think fit), direct the Serious Fraud Investigation Office
to initiate prosecution against the company and its
officers or employees, who are or have been in
employment of the company or any other person
directly or indirectly connected with the affairs of the
company."

Sub-section (1) of Section 212 of the Act permits the Central
Government to direct the SFIO to conduct investigation into the
affairs of a Company. Sub-section (14) of Section 212 holds that
the Central Government may direct the Central Government to
initiate prosecution against the company or any other person
directly or indirectly connected with the affairs of the company.
The submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General of India

12
is that, Razorpay is a conduit carrying approximately Rs.320/-
crores of MENTPL's transactions.

10. The petitioners are arrayed under Section 166 of the Act
on the score that they have a fiduciary duty as Directors of
Razorpay , especially when a large amount of money, amounting to
approximately Rs.320/- crores is involved in the subject
transactions. Whether such fiduciary duty is complied with by the
petitioners or whether due-diligence is done by the petitioners or
otherwise is a disputed question of fact, which can only be
considered at the stage of trial.

11. The submission of the learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioner would all be necessary to be considered at a later
point in time and not today, in the light of the matter still being at a
nascent stage. The primary submission is that Razorpay is not
being made as a party to these proceedings and only its directors.
While the matter as observed, is still at a nascent stage and is
shrouded with seriously disputed questions of facts. While
conducting further investigation or taking it a little forward, the role
of Razorpay could come about. At this stage of the proceedings,

13
there is no warrant of interference in the light of the issue, as
observed, being shrouded with seriously disputed questions of
facts.

12. It is by now too well settled that this Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS cannot
embark upon a mini-trial and adjudicate upon disputed questions of
fact by entering into the merits of allegations.

12.1. The Apex Court in the case of KAPTAN SINGH v.
1
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
9.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in
the present case the High Court in exercise of powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,, has quashed the criminal
proceedings for the offences under Sections 147, 148,
149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC. It is required to be noted
that when the High Court in exercise of powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C.,, quashed the criminal proceedings,
by the time the investigating officer after recording the
statement of the witnesses, statement of the
complainant and collecting the evidence from the
incident place and after taking statement of the
independent witnesses and even statement of the
accused persons, has filed the charge-sheet before the
learned Magistrate for the offences under Sections 147,
148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC and even the learned
Magistrate also took the cognizance. From the impugned
judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of U.P.,

1
(2021) 9 SCC 35

14
2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by the High Court, it does
not appear that the High Court took into consideration the
material collected during the investigation/inquiry and even
the statements recorded. If the petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C.,, was at the stage of FIR in that case the
allegations in the FIR/complaint only are required to be
considered and whether a cognizable offence is
disclosed or not is required to be considered. However,
thereafter when the statements are recorded, evidence
is collected and the charge-sheet is filed after
conclusion of the investigation/inquiry the matter
stands on different footing and the Court is required to
consider the material/evidence collected during the
investigation. Even at this stage also, as observed and held
by this Court in a catena of decisions, the High Court is not
required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or enter
into the merits of the case as if the High Court is exercising
the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. As held
by this Court in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel [Dineshbhai
Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 :
(2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683] in order to examine as to whether
factual contents of FIR disclose any cognizable offence or not,
the High Court cannot act like the investigating agency nor
can exercise the powers like an appellate court. It is further
observed and held that that question is required to be
examined keeping in view, the contents of FIR and prima facie
material, if any, requiring no proof. At such stage, the High
Court cannot appreciate evidence nor can it draw its
own inferences from contents of FIR and material relied
on. It is further observed it is more so, when the
material relied on is disputed. It is further observed
that in such a situation, it becomes the job of the
investigating authority at such stage to probe and then
of the court to examine questions once the charge-
sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and
to what extent reliance can be placed on such material.

9.2. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar [Dhruvaram
Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 :
(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 672] after considering the decisions of this
Court in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , it is held by this
Court that exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,, to

15
quash the proceedings is an exception and not a rule. It is
further observed that inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.P.C.,, though wide is to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution, only when such
exercise is justified by tests specifically laid down in the
section itself. It is further observed that appreciation of
evidence is not permissible at the stage of quashing of
proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C. , Similar view has been expressed by this Court
in Arvind Khanna [CBI v. Arvind Khanna, (2019) 10 SCC 686 :
(2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 94] , Managipet [State of
Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC
(Cri) 702] and in XYZ [XYZ v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 10 SCC
337 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 173] , referred to hereinabove.

9.3. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of
the opinion that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in
quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C.,

10. The High Court has failed to appreciate and consider
the fact that there are very serious triable issues/allegations
which are required to be gone into and considered at the time
of trial. The High Court has lost sight of crucial aspects which
have emerged during the course of the investigation. The High
Court has failed to appreciate and consider the fact that the
document i.e. a joint notarised affidavit of Mamta Gupta
Accused 2 and Munni Devi under which according to Accused 2
Ms Mamta Gupta, Rs 25 lakhs was paid and the possession
was transferred to her itself is seriously disputed. It is
required to be noted that in the registered agreement to sell
dated 27-10-2010, the sale consideration is stated to be Rs 25
lakhs and with no reference to payment of Rs 25 lakhs to Ms
Munni Devi and no reference to handing over the possession.
However, in the joint notarised affidavit of the same date i.e.
27-10-2010 sale consideration is stated to be Rs 35 lakhs out
of which Rs 25 lakhs is alleged to have been paid and there is
a reference to transfer of possession to Accused 2. Whether Rs
25 lakhs has been paid or not the accused have to establish
during the trial, because the accused are relying upon the said
document and payment of Rs 25 lakhs as mentioned in the
joint notarised affidavit dated 27-10-2010. It is also required

16
to be considered that the first agreement to sell in which Rs
25 lakhs is stated to be sale consideration and there is
reference to the payment of Rs 10 lakhs by cheques. It is a
registered document. The aforesaid are all triable
issues/allegations which are required to be considered at the
time of trial. The High Court has failed to notice and/or
consider the material collected during the investigation.

11. Now so far as the finding recorded by the High
Court that no case is made out for the offence under Section
406 IPC is concerned, it is to be noted that the High Court
itself has noted that the joint notarised affidavit dated 27-10-
2010 is seriously disputed, however as per the High Court the
same is required to be considered in the civil proceedings.
There the High Court has committed an error. Even the High
Court has failed to notice that another FIR has been lodged
against the accused for the offences under Sections 467, 468,
471 IPC with respect to the said alleged joint notarised
affidavit. Even according to the accused the possession was
handed over to them. However, when the payment of Rs 25
lakhs as mentioned in the joint notarised affidavit is seriously
disputed and even one of the cheques out of 5 cheques each
of Rs 2 lakhs was dishonoured and according to the accused
they were handed over the possession (which is seriously
disputed) it can be said to be entrustment of property.
Therefore, at this stage to opine that no case is made out for
the offence under Section 406 IPC is premature and the
aforesaid aspect is to be considered during trial. It is also
required to be noted that the first suit was filed by Munni Devi
and thereafter subsequent suit came to be filed by the
accused and that too for permanent injunction only. Nothing is
on record that any suit for specific performance has been filed.
Be that as it may, all the aforesaid aspects are required to be
considered at the time of trial only.

12. Therefore, the High Court has grossly erred in
quashing the criminal proceedings by entering into the
merits of the allegations as if the High Court was
exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting
the trial. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in
quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,

17
13. Even the High Court has erred in observing that
original complaint has no locus. The aforesaid observation is
made on the premise that the complainant has not placed on
record the power of attorney along with the counter filed
before the High Court. However, when it is specifically stated
in the FIR that Munni Devi has executed the power of attorney
and thereafter the investigating officer has conducted the
investigation and has recorded the statement of the
complainant, accused and the independent witnesses,
thereafter whether the complainant is having the power of
attorney or not is to be considered during trial.

14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated
above, the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam
Gupta v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by
the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise
of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is unsustainable and the
same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly
quashed and set aside. Now, the trial is to be conducted and
proceeded further in accordance with law and on its own
merits. It is made clear that the observations made by this
Court in the present proceedings are to be treated to be
confined to the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only
and the trial court to decide the case in accordance with law
and on its own merits and on the basis of the evidence to be
laid and without being influenced by any of the observations
made by us hereinabove. The present appeal is accordingly
allowed.”

12.2. The Apex Court in the case of MUSKAN v. ISHAAN
2
KHAN (SATANIYA) , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
C. ANALYSIS

17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is
whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal

2
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355

18
proceedings against the private respondents primarily on the
ground that the earlier complaints did not mention the two
specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which
were later on added in the FIR and whether the same would
not amount to conducting a ‘ mini trial ’ which is clearly
prohibited under the scheme of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.

…. …. ….

22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts
under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the
stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a
mini trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat
limited as the Court has to only consider whether any
sufficient material is available to proceed against the
accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the
power under Section 482 should not be exercised.

23. This Court in the case of State of Odisha v. Pratima
Mohanty 10 held that:

“ 8.2. It is trite that the power of quashing
should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection
and in rare cases. As per the settled proposition of law
while examining an FIR/complaint quashing of which is
sought, the court cannot embark upon any enquiry as
to the reliability or genuineness of allegations made in
the FIR/complaint. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should
be an exception rather than any ordinary rule.
Normally the criminal proceedings should not be
quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC
when after a thorough investigation the charge-sheet
has been filed. At the stage of discharge and/or
considering the application under Section 482
CrPC the courts are not required to go into the
merits of the allegations and/or evidence in
detail as if conducting the mini-trial. As held by
this Court the powers under Section 482 CrPC
are very wide, but conferment of wide power
requires the court to be more cautious. It casts
an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.”

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24. Further in the case of Central Bureau of
Investigation v. Aryan Singh 11, this Court held that at
the stage of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., the High Court
is not required to conduct a mini trial.

“6. From the impugned common judgment
and order [ Aryan Singh v. CBI , 2022 SCC OnLine
P&H 4158] passed by the High Court, it appears
that the High Court has dealt with the
proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was
conducting a mini trial and/or the High Court
was considering the applications against the
judgment and order passed by the learned trial
court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal
principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or
quashing of the criminal proceedings, while
exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC,
the Court is not required to conduct the mini
trial. The High Court in the common impugned
judgment and order has observed that the
charges against the accused are not proved. This
is not the stage where the
prosecution/investigating agency is/are
required to prove the charges. The charges are
required to be proved during the trial on the
basis of the evidence led by the
prosecution/investigating agency.”

(emphasis supplied)

25. This Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Private
Limited (supra) gave following directions to the Courts
exercising the power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.:

“ Conclusions

33. In view of the above and for the reasons
stated above, our final conclusions on the
principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be
justified in passing an interim order of stay of
investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be
adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing
petition under Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India and in what
circumstances and whether the High Court would be
justified in passing the order of not to arrest the

20
accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during
the investigation or till the final report/charge-sheet is
filed under Section 173 CrPC, while
dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing
the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of
powers under Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions
are as under:

33.1 ….

33.2. Courts would not thwart any
investigation into the cognizable offences.

33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable
offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first
information report that the Court will not permit an
investigation to go on.

33.4. The power of quashing should be
exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been
observed, in the “rarest of rare cases” (not to be
confused with the formation in the context of death
penalty).

33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint,
quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the
FIR/complaint.

33.6 ….

33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be
an exception rather than an ordinary rule.

33.8 to 33.11 ….

33.12. The first information report is not an
encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details
relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the
investigation by the police is in progress, the court
should not go into the merits of the allegations in the
FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the
investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the
conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR
does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts

21
to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the
investigating officer finds that there is no substance in
the application made by the complainant, the
investigating officer may file an appropriate
report/summary before the learned Magistrate which
may be considered by the learned Magistrate in
accordance with the known procedure.

33.13 and 33.14 …..

33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is
made by the alleged accused and the court when it
exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has
to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose
commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court
is not required to consider on merits whether or not
the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable
offence and the court has to permit the investigating
agency/police to investigate the allegations in the
FIR.”

(emphasis supplied)

26. Further, this Court in the case of State of
Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani 12 held that:

“13. There can be no dispute over the
proposition that inherent power in a matter of
quashment of FIR has to be exercised sparingly
and with caution and when and only when such
exercise is justified by the test specifically laid
down in the provision itself. There is no denial of
the fact that the power under Section 482 CrPC
is very wide but it needs no special emphasis to
state that conferment of wide power requires
the Court to be more cautious. It casts an
onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.

14. In this regard, it would be seemly to
reproduce a passage from Kurukshetra University
[ Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana , (1977) 4
SCC 451 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 613] wherein Chandrachud,
J. (as his Lordship then was) opined thus : (SCC p.
451, para 2)

“2. It surprises us in the extreme
that the High Court thought that in the
exercise of its inherent powers under Section

22
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it
could quash a first information report. The
police had not even commenced
investigation into the complaint filed by the
Warden of the University and no proceeding
at all was pending in any court in pursuance
of the FIR. It ought to be realised that
inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary
jurisdiction on the High Court to act
according to whim or caprice. That statutory
power has to be exercised sparingly, with
circumspection and in the rarest of rare
cases.””
(emphasis supplied)

27. We are of the view that the High Court has
erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard
to credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the
complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR,
it must be shown that there exists no prime facie case
against the accused persons. In the present case, from
the conjoint reading of the complaints and the FIR, it
can be seen that prime facie allegations of harassment
and demand of dowry are made out, despite that the
High Court quashed the FIR against the private
respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier
two complaints that were filed by the appellant did not
mention the specific instances that happened on
22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 and the same were later on
mentioned in the FIR only as an afterthought and was a
counterblast to the legal notice sent by respondent no.
1/husband to the appellant as she was not coming back
to her matrimonial home. This approach adopted by the
High Court, in our considered opinion, amounts to
conducting a mini trial .”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)

In the light of the afore-quoted judgments of the Apex Court -
and the facts obtaining in the case at hand, it is for the petitioners

23
to come out clean in a full-blown trial. I do not find any warrant of
interference at this juncture.


13. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition lacking in merit,
stands rejected .




Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE

Nvj
CT:MJ