Kirpal Singh vs Government Of India New Delhi

Court: Supreme Court
Case type: Civil Appeal
Decided on: 21-11-2024

<pre> 1
2024 INSC 944
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.12849-12856/2024
(@ Special Leave Petition(C)Nos. 15368-15375/2020)
KIRPAL SINGH Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals arise from the judgment and order passed by
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh dated
19.10.2019 in FAO Nos. 800/2013, 7453, 7454, 8136/2014, 1278,
1290, 2000 and 2887/2015. The short question that arises for
consideration is whether the period commencing from 20.10.2011
to 20.01.2012 should be condoned under Section 14 of the
Limitation Act while reckoning the period of limitation for
filing objections under Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1 2
1996 incorporated in the National Highways Act, 1956 . 
3. The facts relevant for our decision are that the land
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
INDU MARWAH
Date: 2024.12.09
17:44:52 IST
Reason:
belonging to the appellant was acquired under the NH Act
1 Hereinafter referred to as “the Arbitration Act”
2 Hereinafter referred to as “the NH Act”

2
leading to passing of an award dated 25.07.2011. Application
for a certified copy of the award was made on 12.08.2011 and
the same was received on 08.09.2011. Thereafter, a Regular
First Appeal was filed before the High Court on 20.10.2011 on
an erroneous understanding.
4. The Registry of the High Court notified certain defects
on 09.11.2011 and it is said to have been received by the
concerned Advocate only on 20.01.2012. It is only thereafter
when the appellant came to know about the appropriate action
available to him, being the statutory remedy under Section 34
of the Arbitration Act, and he took steps and instituted
proceedings under Section 34 of the said Act on 23.02.2012.
5. The District Judge took up the application under Section
34 of the Act and by his order dated 16.05.2012 dismissed the
same on the ground that it is barred by limitation as
determined by this Court in the case of Union of India Vs.
3
Popular Construction Co . . The appeal under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act was also dismissed by the order impugned
before us.
6. Mr. Gaurav Agarwal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for
the appellant has submitted that his client is entitled to the
exclusion of period from 20.10.2011 to 20.01.2012 under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act. For this purpose, he relied
3 2002( 1) RCR (Civil) 124

3
on the judgment of this Court in Consolidated Engineering
Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and
4
Others . The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted
hereunder:
“23. At this stage it would be relevant to
ascertain whether there is any express provision in
the Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability
of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. On review of
the provisions of the Act of 1996 this Court finds
that there is no provision in the said Act which
excludes the applicability of the provisions of
Section 14 of the said Act…..
Hence, Section 43 incorporating the Limitation
Act will apply to the proceedings in the
arbitration as it applies to the proceedings of a
suit in the court. Sub-section (4) of Section 43,
inter alia, provides that where the court orders
that an arbitral award be set aside, the period
between the commencement of the arbitration and the
date of the order of the court shall be excluded in
computing the time prescribed by the Limitation
Act, 1963, for the commencement of the proceedings
with respect to the dispute soc submitted. If the
period between the commencement of the arbitration
proceedings till the award is set aside by the
court, has to be excluded in computing the period
of limitation provided for any proceedings with
respect o the dispute, there is no good reason as
to why it should not be held that the to provisions
of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be
applicable to an application submitted under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996, more particularly d
where no provision is to be found in the Act of
1996, which excludes the applicability of Section
14 of the Limitation Act, to an application made
under Section 34 of the Act. It is to be noticed
that the powers under Section 34 of the Act can be
exercised by the court only if the aggrieved party
makes an application. The jurisdiction under
Section 34 of the Act, cannot be exercised suo
motu. The total period of four months within which
an application, for setting aside an arbitral
award, has to be made is not unusually long.
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would be unduly
4 2008 (7) SCC 169

4
oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable
to it, because cases are no doubt conceivable where
an aggrieved party, despite exercise of due
diligence and good faith, is unable to make an
application within a period of four months. From
the scheme and language of Section 34 of the Act of
1996, the intention of the legislature to exclude
the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act is not manifest. It is well to remember that
Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not provide
for a fresh period of limitation but only provides
for the exclusion of a certain period. Having
regard to the legislative intent, it will have to
be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to g an
application submitted under Section 34 of the Act
of 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award.”
7. On the other hand, Mr. Rajat Sangwan, learned counsel
appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 (National Highway
Authority of India) has vehemently contended that the periods
of limitation under the Arbitration Act are sacrosanct and
these provisions are strictly interpreted by the Courts. He
would further submit that, even assuming that Section 14 of
the Limitation Act is applicable, the benefit of the said
section cannot be extended beyond 20.10.2011. In other words,
his submission is that the period commencing from 09.11.2011
to the filing of Section 34 petition being 23.02.2012, should
not be condoned.
8. Further, Mr. Rajat Sangwan, would also submit that the
language of Section 14 is mandatory and on the basis of the
said provision it cannot be said that the appellant has
exercised due diligence in approaching the Court by filing the

5
Section 34 petition. He also argued that strict enforcement of
time-lines under the Arbitration Act are recognized and
incorporated under the National Highways Act. For this
purpose, he referred to sub-section 7 of Section 3(G) of the
NH Act.
9. Having considered the matter in detail, we are of the
opinion that the issue is covered by the decision of this
court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal
5
Secretary, Irrigation Dept. (supra).
10. We may hasten to add that when the substantive remedies
under Sections 34 and/or 37 of the Arbitration Act are by
their very nature limited in their scope due to statutory
6
prescription , it is necessary to interpret the limitation
provisions liberally, or else, even that limited window to
challenge an arbitral award will be lost. The remedies under
Sections 34 and 37 are precious. Courts of law will keep in
mind the need to secure and protect such a remedy while
calculating the period of limitation for invoking these
jurisdictions.
11. Applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act, we hold that
there is sufficient cause for excluding the period commencing
from 20.10.2011 to 23.02.2012. In view of the fact that this
5 2008 (7) SCC 169.
6 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

6
period is excluded, the appellant will be entitled to the
statutory remedy under Section 34 of the Act. 
12. In view of the above, we allow the appeals, set aside the
judgment and order passed by the High Court in FAO Nos.
800/2013(O&M), 2000/2015(O&M), 1278/2015(O&M), 1290/2015(O&M),
7453/2014(O&M), 7454/2014(O&M), 2887/2015(O&M) and 8136/2014
(O&M) dated 19.10.2019 and also the order of the District
Judge, Jalandhar dated 16.05.2012 and restore the Section 34
petition in Arbitration No.3435/2012 to its original number.
We further direct the District Judge, Jalandhar to issue
notice to all the parties, hear them and decide the petition
as per law. 
13. With the above observations, the civil appeals are
disposed of.
14. There shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………………………J.
 [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]
 
…………………………………………J.
[MANOJ MISRA]
New Delhi
November 21,2024. </pre>