Smt. Manju Rai vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
th
ON THE 30 OF OCTOBER, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 45809 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC010814372026
SMT. MANJU RAI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Manikant Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Nilesh Yadav - Additional Advocate General with Shri Swapnil
Ganguly - Deputy Advocate General for the respondents/State.
ORDER
Present petition is filed assailing the show cause notice dated 22.10.2026
issued by the respondent No.1 whereby the petitioner has been called upon to
explain various allegations allegedly found proved against her in the preliminary
inquiry report.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was elected as President
of Municipal Council Damoh. The local M.L.A. submitted an application for
renewal of lease of a property, which was not done by the petitioner and on being
unsuccessful, he made a complaint to the respondent No.1 against the petitioner
alleging various illegalities on the part of the petitioner. The respondent No.1
constituted a committee. The said committee did not call the petitioner and
conducted an enquiry behind the back of the petitioner and submitted an enquiry
report, prima-facie, some allegations allegedly found proved against the petitioner.
On the basis of said enquiry, the impugned show cause notice has been issued
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SUSHEEL
KUMAR JHARIYA
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asking the petitioner to explain various allegations allegedly found proved against

her in the preliminary inquiry report. Hence, this petition.
3. It is argued before this Court that no opportunity of hearing was
granted to the petitioner in the preliminary inquiry conducted by the authorities.
Based upon the said inquiry, the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner.
Every effort is being made to remove the petitioner from the post at the behest of a
complaint made to the Minister of Urban Administration and Department alleging
false allegations against the petitioner.
4. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing before the State has
taken a serious objection with respect to the maintainability of the petition as the
same is only against the show cause notice issued to the petitioner, for which, the
petitioner can file a reply to the show cause notice and after granting opportunity
of hearing to the petitioner, the orders will be passed. There is no requirement for
granting any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner during the preliminary
inquiry. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing before the State has
relied upon the orders passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
Smt. Satyaprakashi Pharsedia v. State of MP and another (W.P. No. 2943 of 2017)
th
dated 6 July 2018 as well as by this Court in the case of Shahanaz Begum and
others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (W.P. No. 41607 of 2026) dated
th
12 October 2026 and has argued that if action under Section 41-A of the
Municipalities Act, 1961 for removal of an office bearer is to be taken, then the
Act provides for grant of opportunity of hearing to the office bearer. By way of
show cause notice, the petitioner is being provided an opportunity of hearing, to
which, the petitioner should have filed a reply and appear before the authorities. It
is argued that Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and another vs.
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KUMAR JHARIYA
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Kunisetty Satyanarayana reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 has categorically laid

down the guidelines regarding challenge to show cause notice and categorically
held that a petition against a show cause notice is not maintainable. Therefore, he
has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. From the perusal of the records, it is seen that on a complaint made
against the petitioner, a preliminary inquiry was got conducted by the authorities
wherein the allegations made in the complaint were found to be correct against the
petitioner. Thereafter, a show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner, which
is a notice impugned, calling upon the petitioner to explain various allegations
allegedly found proved against her.
7. It is the case of the petitioner that the show cause notice clearly reflects
that action under Section 41-A of the Act is proposed to be taken against the
petitioner which provides for grant of an opportunity to the petitioner. It is argued
by the counsel that the preliminary inquiry was conducted behind the back of the
petitioner and no notice was issued to him. The fact remains that at the stage of
preliminary inquiry, no notices are required to be issued to the concerned. The
said aspect was duly considered by this Court in the case of Smt. Satyaprakash
Parsedia (supra) wherein it was held as under:
"38. As far as submissions regarding opportunity of hearing before the
Office of Lokayukt and Deputy Director, Urban Administration and
Development Department are concerned, since it was the preliminary
enquiry, therefore, the opportunity of hearing was not required. The
respondents show caused the petitioner when there was substance existed
against her for show cause notice. Therefore, the opportunity of hearing
was not required to be given at the initial stage because it was not
adversely affecting her in any manner.
44. In the present case, it was the duty of the petitioner as President of
Municipal Council that interest of council lies in reduction of establishment
cost rather than inflating it by giving appointments to the persons more
than required. In absence of any objective consideration being made, the
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same amounts to causing pilferage to the public money and advancing
spoil system which is not permissible as per the provisions of Section 41-A
of the Municipalities Act, 1961. In fact, petitioner acted contrary to Public
Interest, rather, defeated it."

8. If the observations made in the aforesaid case is taken note of, then
there was no requirement of issuance any show cause notice to the petitioner at the
stage of preliminary inquiry. It is a settled legal provision that the members of the
Legislative Assembly are duty bound and can make complaints regarding working
of a post holder; like the petitioner being an elected President of the Municipal
Council, Damoh. On the complaint made by the concerned MLA, the preliminary
inquiry was got conducted and the allegations made against the petitioner were
found to be correct.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Masood Ahmad vs.
State of U.P. and others reported in (2007) 8 SCC 150 has held as under:-
"8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned transfer
order of the appellant from Muzaffarnagar to Mawana, District Meerut was
made at the instance of an MLA. On the other hand, it has been stated in
the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2 that the
appellant has been transferred due to complaints against him. In our
opinion, even if the allegation of the appellant is correct that he was
transferred on the recommendation of an MLA, that by itself would not
vitiate the transfer order. After all, it is the duty of the representatives of the
people in the legislature to express the grievances of the people and if there
is any complaint against an official the State Government is certainly
within its jurisdiction to transfer such an employee. There can be no hard-
and-fast rule that every transfer at the instance of an MP or MLA would be
vitiated. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of an individual case.
In the present case, we see no infirmity in the impugned transfer order."
10. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rukmani Jaiwar Vs.
The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others in Writ Appeal No.1630/2023 has
categorically held that the local representatives are duty bound to make
applications or complaints regarding the working of the office bearers. That does
not amount to any malefic action on their part. The complaint made against the
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KUMAR JHARIYA
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petitioner was found to be correct in the preliminary inquiry.

11. Now, in terms of Section 41-A of the Act, a show cause notice has
been issued to the petitioner. Section 41-A of the Act reads as under:
"41-A. Removal of President or Vice-President or Chairman of a
Committee.- The President or a Chairman of any Committee, if his
continuance as such is not in the opinion of the State Government desirable
in public interest or in the interest of the Council or if it is found that he is
incapable of performing his duties or is working against the provisions of
the Act or any rules made thereunder or if it is found that he does not
belong to the reserved category for which the seat was reserved. (2) As
result of the order of removal of Vice-President or Chairman of any
Committee, as the case may be, under sub-section (1) it shall be deemed
that such Vice-President or a Chairman of any Committee, as the case may
be, has been removed from the office of Councillor also. At the time of
passing order under sub-section (1), the State Government may also pass
such order that the President or Vice-President or Chairman of any
Committee, as the case may be, shall disqualified to hold the office of
President or Vice-President or Chairman of any Committee, as the case
may be, shall be disqualified to hold the office of President or Vice-
President or Chairman, as the case may be for the next term:
Provided that no such order under this Section shall be passed unless a
reasonable opportunity of being heard is given."
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v.
District Collector Raigad and others reported in (2012) 4 SCC 407 has held as
under :-
"22. Amendment in the Constitution by adding Parts IX and IX-
A confers upon the local self-government a complete autonomy
on the basic democratic unit unshackled from official control.
Thus, exercise of any power having effect of destroying the
Constitutional institution besides being outrageous is
dangerous to the democratic set-up of this country. Therefore,
an elected official cannot be permitted to be removed
unceremoniously without following the procedure prescribed by
law, in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the
Constitution, by the State by adopting a casual approach and
resorting to manipulations to achieve ulterior purpose. The
Court being the custodian of law cannot tolerate any attempt to
thwart the institution.
30. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal
proposition that removal of a duly elected member on the basis
of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature.
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[Vide Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social
Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685 : AIR 2002 SC 2158] .] This view
stands further fortified by the Constitution Bench judgments of
this Court in Bachhitar Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC
395] and Union of India v. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] .
Therefore, the principles of natural justice are required to be
given full play and strict compliance should be ensured, even in
the absence of any provision providing for the same. Principles
of natural justice require a fair opportunity of defence to such
an elected officebearer.
31. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local self-government
has to be put on a higher pedestal as against a government
servant. If a temporary government employee cannot be
removed on the ground of misconduct without holding a full-
fledged inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how an elected office-
bearer can be removed without holding a full-fledged inquiry.
36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised
to the effect that an elected member can be removed in
exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the
statutory provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the
requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an
incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that
removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes
away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office-
bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of
representation by the person of their choice."

13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs.
State of Punjab and others reported in (2001) 6 SCC 260 has held as under :-
“7. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an
office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to
hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless
his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to
law. That a returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office
and discharge the duties related therewith during the term
specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right
not only of the returned candidate but also of the constituency
or the electoral college which he represents. Removal from such
an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the
holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office
in view of certain allegations having been held proved
rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held.
Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling
within Section 22 of the Act must be clearly made out. A
President may be removed from office by the State
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Government, within the meaning of Section 22, on the ground
of “abuse of his powers” (of President), inter alia. This is the
phrase with which we are concerned in the present case. 16. In
the system of Indian democratic governance as contemplated by
the Constitution, senior officers occupying key positions such
as Secretaries are not supposed to mortgage their own
discretion, volition and decision-making authority and be
prepared to give way or being pushed back or pressed ahead at
the behest of politicians for carrying out commands having no
sanctity in law. The Conduct Rules of Central Government
Services command the civil servants to maintain at all times
absolute integrity and devotion to duty and do nothing which is
unbecoming of a government servant. No government servant
shall in the performance of his official duties, or in the exercise
of power conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best
judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his
official superior. In Anirudhsinhji Jadeja [Anirudhsinhji
Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 302 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 902] this Court has held that a statutory authority
vested with jurisdiction must exercise it according to its own
discretion; discretion exercised under the direction or
instruction of some higher authority is failure to exercise
discretion altogether. Observations of this Court in Purtabpore
Co. Ltd. [Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commr., Bihar, (1969) 1
SCC 308 : AIR 1970 SC 1896] are instructive and apposite.
Executive Officers may in exercise of their statutory discretions
take into account considerations of public policy and in some
context, policy of a Minister or the Government as a whole
when it is a relevant factor in weighing the policy but they are
not absolved from their duty to exercise their personal judgment
in individual cases unless explicit statutory provision has been
made for instructions by a superior to bind them. As already
stated, we are not recording, for want of adequate material, any
positive finding that the impugned order was passed at the
behest of or dictated by someone else than its author. Yet we
have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order betrays
utter non-application of mind to the facts of the case and the
relevant law. The manner in which the power under Section 22
has been exercised by the competent authority is suggestive of
betrayal of the confidence which the State Government reposed
in the Principal Secretary in conferring upon him the exercise of
drastic power like removal of President of a Municipality under
Section 22 of the Act. To say the least, what has been done is
not what is expected to be done by a senior official like the
Principal Secretary of a wing of the State Government. We
leave it at that and say no more on this issue.”

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SUSHEEL
KUMAR JHARIYA
Signing time: 05-11-2026
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14. This Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Shukla Vs. State of M.P. and

others reported in 2019 (1) MPLJ 426 has held as under :-
“14. A plain reading of the show cause notice shows that
allegations against the petitioner are confined to committing the
alleged irregularity in the matter of purchase of hand pump and
water supply material and purchase of sanitary material. The
allegations are made that petitioner has purchased these
materials beyond his financial competence. He has not obtained
permission/sanction from the competent authority. 16. On the
basis of aforesaid reasons, the conclusions are drawn in the last
paragraph of this order. A careful reading of the reasons
assigned shows that the finding of government is that the
petitioner has wrongly interpreted the account rules. If the said
reasons are carefully examined, it will be clear that there is no
finding against the petitioner that he has misappropriated or
misutilised the amount. The only finding is that petitioner has

wrongly interpreted the provisions.”
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Kailash Mittal Vs.
State of M.P. and others reported in (2010) 2 SCC 319) has held as under :-
“26. There are no sufficient guidelines in the provisions of
Section 41-A as to the manner in which the power has to be
exercised, except that it requires that reasonable opportunity of
hearing has to be afforded to the office-bearer proceeded
against. Keeping in view the nature of the power and the
consequences that flows on its exercise it has to be held that
such power can be invoked by the State Government only for
very strong and weighty reason. Such a power is not to be
exercised for minor irregularities in discharge of duties by the
holder of the elected post. The provision has to be construed in
strict manner because the holder of office occupies it by
election and he/she is deprived of the office by an executive
order in which the electorate has no chance of participation. 27.
In the present case, the actions of the appellant, even if proved,
only amount to irregularities, and not grave forms of illegalities,
which may allow the State Government to invoke its extreme
power under Section 41-A.”
From a perusal of the aforesaid, it is apparently clear that any order for
removal of an office bearer; like the petitioner is passed, then an opportunity of
hearing was required to be granted to him. Based upon the allegations of
preliminary inquiry, now a show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner.
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The petitioner will be granted full opportunity to defend herself. She can file a

reply to the show cause notice issued to her.
16. Even otherwise, the present petition has been filed assailing the show
cause notice and a writ petition challenging the show cause notice is not
maintainable as has been held by The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra) has held as under:
“13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily
no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive
Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramesh Kumar Singh and others
JT 1995 (8) SC 331, Special Director and another vs. Mohd. Ghulam
Ghouse and another AIR 2004 SC 1467, Ulagappa and others vs.
Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others 2001 (10) SCC 639, State of
U.P. vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and another AIR 1987 SC 943 etc.”
17. Further, a Division Bench of this Court in case of Jagdish Baheti Vs.
High Court of M.P. and others reported in 2015 (2) MPHT 382 has considered the
similar aspect and has held as under:-
"7. In the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra
Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565, the Supreme Court has held that ordinarily a
writ petition does not lie against the charge-sheet or a show cause notice as
it does not give rise to any cause of action unless the same has been issued
by an authority not competent to initiate departmental proceedings. The
Supreme Court has laid down the law in this regard by relying on several
previous decisions, in the following terms:-
"10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge-sheet
or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any
cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which
affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a
person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies
when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge-sheet does
not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order
imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is
passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a
charge-sheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings
should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. [Vide: State of U.P
v. Brahm Datt Sharma, (1987) 2 SCC 179; Executive Engineer,
Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh, (1996) 1 SCC
327; Ulagappa v. Divn. Commr., Mysore, (2001) 10 SCC 639;
Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440; and
Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28].
11. In State of Orissa v. Sangram Keshari Misra, (2010) 13 SCC
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311, this Court held that normally a charge-sheet is not quashed
prior to the conclusion of the enquiry on the ground that the facts
stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that correctness or
truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. [See
also: Union of India v. Upendra Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 357].
12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject-matter of challenge as it
does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is
established that the same has been issued by an authority not
competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the
disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an
initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues.
Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that
proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be
concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice
to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a
relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the
proceedings."
8. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above quoted decisions,
therefore, makes it clear that generally and ordinarily a writ petition is not
maintainable against a charge-sheet as issuance of the same does not give
rise to a cause of action on account of the fact that it does not adversely
effect the rights of a party except in cases where the charge-sheet has been
issued by an authority not competent to do so. The Supreme Court has also
held that neither disciplinary proceedings nor a charge-sheet can be
quashed at the initial stage on merits as it would be a pre-mature stage to
deal with the merits of the case. The Supreme Court has also held that at
the stage of issuance of charge-sheet the correctness or veracity of the
charges cannot be looked into in writ proceedings as that aspect is the
domain of the disciplinary authority and not the High Court."


18. If all the aforesaid facts are taken note of and the judgments passed in
the aforesaid cases are taken into consideration, then no relief can be extended to
the petitioner. The petitioner is at liberty to file a response to the show cause
notice issued to her and the authorities are expected to grant an opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner and follow the provisions of Section 41-A of the
Municipalities Act, 1961 prior to passing a final order in the matter. Under these
circumstances, no relief can be extended to the petitioner.
19. The writ petition sans merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as
to costs.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SUSHEEL
KUMAR JHARIYA
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20. At this stage, the petitioner' counsel has made a request that the copy

of the preliminary report be supplied to him to enable him to file a proper reply to
the show cause notice issued to him.
21. Prayer appears to be reasonable.
22. State counsel has no objection for supply of the preliminary report to
the petitioner.
23. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to supply copy of the
preliminary inquiry report to the petitioner to enable her to file proper reply to the
show cause notice.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
sj

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SUSHEEL
KUMAR JHARIYA
Signing time: 05-11-2026
11:54:08