Kishor Kumar Agrawal vs Sri Ashok Kumar Varshney And 4 Others

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 12156 of 2026
Kishor Kumar Agrawal
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Sri Ashok Kumar Varshney and 4 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Pankaj Agarwal
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Akanksha Gaur
AFR
Court No. - 35
HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
1. Heard Sri Pankaj Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Ms. Akanksha Gaur, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. The
record of the petition, including the orders impugned herein, has been
perused.
2. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
is directed against the orders dated 09.03.2026, passed by the Judge,
Small Causes Court, Aligarh, in SCC Suit No.16 of 2015, and
13.08.2026, passed by the Rent Tribunal/Special Judge (E.C. Act),
Aligarh, in SCC Revision No.46 of 2026. By the first order, the
petitioner's application, Paper No. 216-Ga, seeking recall of the order
dated 31.07.2025 and permission to examine a handwriting expert, was
rejected. The revision preferred against the said order has been dismissed
by the second order.

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3. The dispute arises out of SCC Suit No.16 of 2015, instituted by
the respondent-landlord seeking eviction of the petitioner-tenant on the
ground of default in payment of rent in respect of a shop bearing
Municipal No. 3/456, situated at Ramghat Road, opposite Gandhi Eye
Hospital, Aligarh. The shop in question was stated to have been let out to
the petitioner at a monthly rent.
4. The petitioner contested the suit by filing a written statement and
proceeded to lead evidence in support of his defence. In the course of the
proceedings, the petitioner filed a list of witnesses, which included
Sameer Sharma, a handwriting expert. The petitioner thereafter
examined four witnesses, designated as D.W.-1 to D.W.-4, between
22.04.2025 and 24.07.2025.
5. On 31.07.2025, an endorsement was made on behalf of the
petitioner stating that no further evidence was required to be adduced.
Acting upon the said endorsement, the trial court closed the petitioner's
evidence and fixed the suit for arguments. The handwriting expert
included in the list of witnesses was, however, not examined.
6. Subsequently, the petitioner moved an application, Paper No. 216-
Ga, seeking recall of the order dated 31.07.2025 and permission to
examine Sameer Sharma, the handwriting expert. The ground taken in
the application was that the omission to examine the said witness had
occurred inadvertently on account of a mistake on the part of the
petitioner's counsel. It was asserted that the testimony of the handwriting
expert was necessary to establish that the rent receipts relied upon by the
respondent-landlord were forged and that his examination was material
for the proper adjudication of the dispute.
7. The respondent-landlord opposed the application, contending that
the petitioner had already been afforded sufficient opportunities to
adduce evidence and had himself made an endorsement that no further
evidence was required. It was further contended that the application had
been moved at a belated stage, after the proceedings had reached the
stage of final arguments, and was intended to delay the disposal of the
suit despite the direction issued for its expeditious conclusion.

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8. The trial court, by order dated 09.03.2026, rejected the
application. It noticed that the petitioner's witnesses had already been
examined and that, on 31.07.2025, the petitioner had expressly stated
that no further evidence was required to be adduced. It further took note
of the fact that, after the suit had been fixed for arguments, various
applications moved by the petitioner and the revisions arising therefrom
had been dealt with. Significantly, the application seeking permission to
adduce further evidence was moved only after the respondent's counsel
had concluded arguments on 21.02.2026. Finding no sufficient
justification for reopening the evidentiary stage at that juncture, the trial
court rejected the application.
9. Aggrieved by the order dated 09.03.2026, the petitioner preferred
SCC Revision No. 46 of 2026. The revisional court, by order dated
13.08.2026, dismissed the revision and declined to interfere with the
order passed by the trial court.
10. The revisional court noticed that the handwriting expert had
already been included in the list of witnesses filed by the petitioner on
21.04.2025, but had not been produced for examination despite the
opportunities afforded to the petitioner. It further took note of the fact
that the petitioner had himself closed his evidence on 31.07.2025 and
that the application seeking permission to examine the handwriting
expert had been moved only after the respondent had concluded final
arguments and submitted written arguments.
11. The revisional court also noticed the admissions made by the
petitioner in his written statement and reply to the legal notice with
regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant. Having regard to the
aforesaid circumstances, it found that the necessity of examining the
handwriting expert had not been sufficiently demonstrated. Placing
reliance upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in K.K.
1
Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy , the revisional court observed that
procedural powers could not ordinarily be invoked to enable a party to
fill lacunae in its evidence after having been afforded sufficient
1 (2011) 11 SCC 275

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opportunities to lead the same. It also distinguished the decision of this
2
Court in Syed Ashraf Ali v. Onkar Singh , observing that the case before
it did not involve denial of an effective opportunity of cross-
examination, but a situation where the petitioner had himself closed his
evidence.
12. The revisional court further took note of the direction issued by
this Court for expeditious disposal of the suit and observed that
reopening the evidence after the proceedings had reached the stage of
final arguments would occasion further delay. Finding no illegality,
material irregularity or jurisdictional error in the order passed by the trial
court, it dismissed the revision and directed the parties to appear before
the trial court on 18.08.2026. The trial court was directed to make every
endeavour to decide the suit within one month, with the parties
extending their cooperation for its expeditious disposal.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
orders have been passed without properly appreciating the circumstances
in which the petitioner's evidence came to be closed. It is contended that
the endorsement dated 31.07.2025, recording that no further evidence
was required to be adduced, was made inadvertently on account of a
mistake on the part of the petitioner's counsel, notwithstanding that the
handwriting expert had already been included in the list of witnesses.
14. It is further submitted that the examination of the handwriting
expert is material to the controversy, inasmuch as the petitioner disputes
the genuineness of the rent receipts relied upon by the respondent-
landlord and seeks to establish that the same are forged. According to
learned counsel, refusal to permit examination of the expert would
deprive the petitioner of an opportunity to substantiate his defence with
regard to the disputed documents.
15. Learned counsel further submits that the omission to examine the
handwriting expert was neither deliberate nor intended to delay the
proceedings. It is contended that the petitioner's advanced age and
physical disability were also relevant circumstances which ought to have
2 2005 (1) ARC 546

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been taken into consideration while examining the explanation furnished
for the omission. The mere fact that the application was moved at an
advanced stage of the proceedings could not, by itself, constitute a
ground for refusing permission to adduce further evidence, particularly
where such evidence is claimed to be material for the fair adjudication of
the dispute.
16. It is also contended that any prejudice or inconvenience likely to
be caused to the respondent by permitting examination of the
handwriting expert could have been adequately addressed by imposing
appropriate costs and affording the respondent a limited opportunity to
meet the evidence so adduced. Learned counsel submits that the courts
below have adopted an unduly technical approach and failed to strike a
proper balance between the requirement of procedural fairness and the
need for expeditious disposal of the suit.
 17. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel prays that the
impugned orders dated 09.03.2026 and 13.08.2026 be set aside and the
petitioner be permitted to examine the handwriting expert in support of
his defence.
18. Learned counsel for the respondent opposes the petition and
supports the impugned orders. It is submitted that the petitioner had been
afforded sufficient opportunities to adduce evidence and that the
handwriting expert had already been included in the list of witnesses
filed on 21.04.2025. Despite being aware of the proposed witness and
having an opportunity to produce him, the petitioner failed to do so and
thereafter made an express endorsement on 31.07.2025 that no further
evidence was required to be adduced.
19. It is further submitted that the application seeking permission to
examine the handwriting expert was moved only after the proceedings
had advanced to the stage of final arguments and the respondent's
counsel had concluded the arguments and submitted written arguments.
According to learned counsel, no satisfactory explanation has been
furnished for the failure to produce the witness at the appropriate stage
of the proceedings.

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20. Learned counsel submits that the plea of an inadvertent mistake on
the part of the petitioner's counsel does not, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, furnish sufficient justification for reopening
the evidentiary stage after the petitioner had himself expressly closed his
evidence. It is further contended that the petitioner has also failed to
demonstrate the necessity of examining the handwriting expert in the
context of the controversy requiring adjudication, particularly in view of
the admissions made in the written statement and reply to the legal
notice with regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant and the rent
payable.
21. It is urged that permitting the petitioner to adduce further evidence
at this stage would occasion further delay in the disposal of a suit
instituted in the year 2015 and would frustrate the objective of
expeditious adjudication. Learned counsel submits that the revisional
court has duly considered the relevant facts and circumstances and that
no jurisdictional error or other infirmity warranting interference under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been made out. On the
aforesaid submissions, learned counsel prays for dismissal of the
petition.
22. The principal question that arises for consideration is whether, and
in what circumstances, a party who has expressly closed its evidence can
subsequently seek reopening of the evidentiary stage to examine a
witness already included in its list of witnesses. This also requires
examination of the scope and limits of the powers exercisable by a Court
under Section 151 read with Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'CPC'), in relation to
reopening of evidence and permission to adduce further evidence at the
instance of a party.
23. The controversy, therefore, is not confined to the existence of the
power of the Court to permit reopening of evidence in an appropriate
case. The question is whether, having regard to the circumstances in
which the petitioner's evidence was closed, the explanation furnished for
not examining the proposed witness at the appropriate stage, and the

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stage at which the application came to be filed, sufficient grounds
existed for exercise of such power in favour of the petitioner.
24. Order XVIII Rule 17 of CPC empowers the Court to recall a
witness who has already been examined and to put such questions to him
as the Court may consider necessary. The provision is primarily intended
to enable the Court to clarify any doubt or ambiguity arising from the
evidence already on record. It is not intended to confer upon a party an
independent right to seek recall of a witness or to reopen the evidentiary
stage for the purpose of introducing further evidence.
25. The power to recall a witness under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is
distinct from the power to reopen evidence or permit a party to adduce
further evidence. While the former enables the Court to recall a witness
already examined for the purpose of clarifying any doubt or ambiguity, it
does not confer upon a party an independent right to seek recall or
introduce further evidence. The power to reopen evidence or permit a
party to adduce additional evidence may, in an appropriate case, be
exercised by the Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under
Section 151 CPC. Such power, however, is discretionary and has to be
exercised judicially, having regard to the circumstances of the case and
the requirements of justice.
26. The distinction between the power to recall a witness under Order
XVIII Rule 17 CPC and the inherent power of the Court to reopen
evidence under Section 151 CPC has been considered by this Court in
3
Dr. Ravi Bhushan v. Nitin Kumar , wherein the Court examined the
principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Vadiraj Naggappa
4
Vernekar (Dead) through LRs. v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate ;
5
K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy ; Bagai Construction v. Gupta Building
6 7
Material Store ; and Ram Rati v. Mange Ram (Dead) through LRs . The
Court considered the scope of these provisions and observed that the
power to reopen evidence or permit further examination at the instance
3 2026:AHC:216624
4 (2009) 4 SCC 410
5 (2011) 11 SCC 275
6 (2013) 14 SCC 1
7 (2016) 11 SCC 296

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of a party is required to be exercised judicially, having regard to the
purpose for which such evidence is sought to be introduced, its relevance
to the controversy, the stage of the proceedings and the explanation
furnished for the earlier omission.
27. In Dr. Ravi Bhushan (supra), this Court further emphasised that
the power to reopen evidence cannot be exercised as a matter of course
to enable a party to fill lacunae in its case or to improve upon the
evidence already adduced, particularly where the relevant material was
within the party's knowledge and the necessary steps could have been
taken at the appropriate stage. The Court is required to examine whether
the proposed evidence would materially assist in the just adjudication of
the dispute or whether the request is merely an attempt to secure a
further opportunity to make good an omission which could have been
addressed during the original course of evidence.
28. The exercise of the power to reopen evidence is intended to
advance the cause of justice and prevent a failure of justice. At the same
time, the mere assertion that the omission to produce a particular witness
was inadvertent does not, by itself, furnish sufficient justification for
reopening the evidentiary stage. The Court must examine whether the
proposed evidence has a material bearing upon an issue requiring
adjudication, whether the necessity for its production has been
adequately demonstrated, and whether the applicant has furnished a
satisfactory explanation for not producing it at the appropriate stage. The
bona fides of the request must also be assessed in the context of the stage
of the proceedings at which the application is made.
29. A distinction has to be maintained between a case where a party
has been denied a reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence and one
where the party, despite having been afforded such opportunity, has itself
expressly closed its evidence. In the former situation, the question may
arise whether the party was afforded a fair and effective opportunity to
present its case. In the latter, the Court must additionally examine the
circumstances in which the party seeks to resile from its earlier position
and the explanation furnished for not availing of the opportunity already

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available. An express closure of evidence does not, by itself, operate as
an absolute bar to reopening, but it is a material circumstance which
calls for a satisfactory explanation before the Court exercises its
discretion to permit further evidence.
30. The fact that a proposed witness had already been included in the
list of witnesses is also a relevant circumstance. It may indicate that the
party was aware of the witness and had identified the evidence which it
intended to produce. However, prior inclusion in the list of witnesses
does not, by itself, preclude permission to examine such witness at a
later stage. The circumstances explaining the failure to produce the
witness at the appropriate stage have to be examined. Where the
omission is attributable to circumstances beyond the party's control, or
where the proposed evidence is shown to be of substantial significance
for the just adjudication of the controversy, the Court may consider
permitting its examination, subject to appropriate safeguards.
Conversely, where the witness was known and available, an opportunity
to produce him had been afforded, and no satisfactory explanation for
the omission is forthcoming, the request for reopening calls for closer
scrutiny.
31. The requirement of expeditious disposal is another relevant
consideration, particularly where the proceedings have remained
pending for a considerable period. The need for expedition cannot,
however, by itself, justify refusal of an opportunity to adduce evidence
which is demonstrably necessary for a fair adjudication. Equally, the
requirement of a fair opportunity cannot be invoked as an unrestricted
basis for reopening evidence whenever a party notices an omission after
its evidence has been closed. The Court must strike a balance between
the relevance and necessity of the proposed evidence, the explanation
furnished for its earlier non-production, the stage at which the request is
made and the likely effect of reopening the evidence upon the progress
of the proceedings.
 32. The exercise of discretion in such matters, therefore, requires a
cumulative assessment of the relevant circumstances and cannot be

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governed by any single consideration in isolation. The applicant must
demonstrate not merely that the proposed witness may furnish evidence
in support of his case, but that the proposed evidence has a material
bearing upon the controversy and that sufficient justification exists for
permitting its introduction at the stage when the application is made. The
power to reopen evidence cannot be permitted to become a means of
keeping the evidentiary stage open indefinitely or of securing successive
opportunities to produce material which was available and could have
been produced during the original course of evidence. 
33. The legal position that emerges from the aforesaid principles is
that the power to reopen evidence or permit a party to adduce further
evidence under Section 151 CPC is discretionary and is to be exercised
sparingly, where the circumstances of the case so warrant in the interests
of justice. Neither the prior inclusion of a witness in the list of witnesses
nor the subsequent closure of evidence operates as an absolute bar to his
examination. However, where a party, despite having identified the
witness and having been afforded an opportunity to produce him,
expressly closes its evidence and thereafter seeks to introduce such
witness at a belated stage, the Court must examine whether a satisfactory
explanation has been furnished for the earlier omission and whether the
proposed evidence is sufficiently material for the just adjudication of the
controversy. The stage at which the application is made, the bona fides
of the request, the possibility of prejudice to the opposite party and the
impact on the progress of the proceedings are also relevant
considerations. The power cannot be invoked as a matter of course
merely to fill an evidentiary lacuna or to afford a party another
opportunity to improve its case.
34. Examined in the light of the aforesaid principles, the chronology
of the proceedings assumes significance. The petitioner filed his list of
witnesses on 21.04.2025, which included Sameer Sharma, the
handwriting expert. Thereafter, the petitioner examined D.W.-1 to
D.W.-4 between 22.04.2025 and 24.07.2025. On 31.07.2025, an
endorsement was made on his behalf stating that no further evidence was

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required to be adduced. The trial court thereupon closed the petitioner's
evidence and fixed the matter for arguments.
35. It is not in dispute that the handwriting expert had been included
in the list of witnesses before the petitioner's evidence was closed. The
proposed witness was, therefore, known to the petitioner during the
course of the proceedings, and his examination was not sought on
account of any subsequent discovery or the availability of material
which had come to light only after the closure of evidence. The
petitioner had an opportunity to produce the witness before making the
endorsement dated 31.07.2025.
36. The petitioner's explanation is that the omission occurred
inadvertently on account of a mistake on the part of his counsel. An
omission attributable to counsel cannot be rejected merely on the ground
that it was a consequence of inadvertence. At the same time, the
assertion of inadvertence must be examined in the context of the
proceedings as a whole and the circumstances in which reopening was
sought. A general assertion of mistake, without sufficiently explaining
why the identified witness was not produced despite the opportunity
available, and why the omission was not addressed before the matter
advanced to final arguments, does not, by itself, furnish sufficient
grounds for reopening the evidence.
37. The petitioner has also relied upon his advanced age and physical
disability. Such circumstances may be relevant in assessing the
explanation furnished for a procedural omission. Their significance,
however, has to be considered in relation to the particular omission
sought to be rectified. The material placed before the Court does not
establish how these circumstances prevented the petitioner from
producing the handwriting expert before expressly closing his evidence,
or otherwise explain the stage at which the application came to be filed.
These circumstances, therefore, do not, by themselves, furnish sufficient
justification for reopening the evidentiary stage.
38. The stage at which the application was moved is another relevant
consideration. The trial court recorded that the petitioner's evidence had

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been closed on 31.07.2025 and that the matter had thereafter been fixed
for arguments. Various applications and revisions arising in the course of
the proceedings were subsequently dealt with. The application seeking
permission to examine the handwriting expert was ultimately filed after
the respondent's counsel had concluded final arguments on 21.02.2026
and submitted written arguments.
39. Mere delay in making an application does not, in every case,
justify its rejection. Where the proposed evidence is materially necessary
for the just adjudication of the controversy and the omission is
satisfactorily explained, the Court may, even at an advanced stage,
consider reopening the evidence, subject to appropriate safeguards. In
the present case, however, the delay assumes significance when
considered cumulatively with the fact that the proposed witness had
already been included in the list of witnesses, the petitioner had an
opportunity to produce him, and his evidence had been expressly closed
before the matter proceeded to final arguments.
40. The petitioner's contention is that the testimony of the handwriting
expert is necessary to establish that the rent receipts relied upon by the
respondent-landlord are forged. The question concerning the
genuineness of those receipts may be relevant to the controversy
between the parties, subject to the pleadings and evidence on record.
However, the relevance of a disputed document does not, by itself,
establish that examination of a particular witness must necessarily be
permitted after the evidentiary stage has concluded. It was also necessary
for the petitioner to demonstrate the materiality and necessity of the
proposed evidence and furnish a satisfactory explanation for not
producing the witness at the appropriate stage.
41. In the present case, the petitioner had identified the handwriting
expert in his list of witnesses but did not examine him before closing his
evidence. The explanation of an inadvertent mistake on the part of
counsel was considered by the courts below but was not found sufficient
to justify reopening the evidence at the stage when the application came
to be filed. The material placed before this Court does not disclose any

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subsequent development or circumstance which rendered the proposed
examination necessary only after the closure of evidence. Nor does it
sufficiently explain why the omission could not have been rectified
before the petitioner expressly stated that no further evidence was
required.
42. The revisional court also took note of the petitioner's admissions
concerning the relationship of landlord and tenant and the monthly rent
in the written statement and reply to the legal notice. That circumstance
was considered while assessing the necessity of examining the
handwriting expert in the context of the controversy before the trial
court. The significance of those admissions, and the extent to which they
bear upon the issues requiring determination in the suit, remain matters
to be assessed by the trial court in accordance with law. For the limited
purpose of examining the procedural order impugned herein, it is
sufficient to observe that the revisional court found that the necessity of
the proposed examination had not been established in the circumstances
of the case.
43. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that any
prejudice to the respondent could have been addressed by imposing costs
and granting a limited opportunity to respond to the expert's testimony.
The imposition of costs or the grant of a limited opportunity to the
opposite party may, in an appropriate case, serve as safeguards when
further evidence is permitted. Such measures, however, do not dispense
with the threshold requirement of establishing sufficient grounds for
reopening the evidence. The availability of safeguards against prejudice
cannot, by itself, justify reopening the evidentiary stage in the absence of
a satisfactory explanation for the omission and a demonstrated need for
the proposed evidence.
44. The revisional court has also referred to the direction issued by
this Court for expeditious disposal of the suit. A direction for expeditious
disposal cannot, by itself, constitute a ground for refusing an otherwise
justified request to adduce material evidence. At the same time, the stage
already reached in the proceedings and the consequences of reopening

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the evidence are relevant considerations in assessing whether the request
is sufficiently justified. In the present case, the direction for expeditious
disposal was considered along with the voluntary closure of evidence,
the prior availability of the proposed witness, the explanation furnished
for the omission, and the timing of the application. The rejection of the
application is, therefore, not being sustained merely on the ground that
the suit was required to be decided expeditiously.
45. The distinction drawn by the revisional court between the present
case and Syed Ashraf Ali (supra) also has to be understood in the context
of the procedural issue arising for consideration. The present case
concerns a request to reopen evidence after the petitioner had expressly
stated that no further evidence was required to be adduced. It is not a
case in which the petitioner seeks to remedy the denial of an effective
opportunity to cross-examine a witness. The principles applicable to a
denial of opportunity to test evidence, therefore, do not govern the
present controversy in the same manner, having regard to the distinct
circumstances in which the petitioner's evidence came to be closed.
46. The trial court considered the application in the context of the
opportunities afforded to the petitioner, the endorsement dated
31.07.2025, and the stage reached in the suit. The revisional court, in
turn, examined the relevant circumstances, including the prior
identification of the handwriting expert, the closure of evidence, the
belated filing of the application, the explanation furnished by the
petitioner, and the requirement of expeditious disposal. Both courts
found that the circumstances did not furnish sufficient justification for
permitting further evidence at that stage.
47. The petitioner's plea of inadvertence has, thus, been considered in
the context of the entire sequence of proceedings. The procedural power
to reopen evidence is not exercisable merely upon an assertion that the
omission was accidental, particularly where the proposed witness had
already been identified and the party had an opportunity to produce him
before expressly closing its evidence. In the absence of a satisfactory
explanation for the omission, and having regard to the stage at which the

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application was made, the discretion exercised by the courts below
cannot be said to be arbitrary or legally unsustainable.
48. The conclusion reached by the courts below does not amount to a
determination that the disputed rent receipts are genuine or that the
petitioner's objections concerning their genuineness are devoid of merit.
The controversy before this Court is confined to the legality of the orders
refusing permission to examine the handwriting expert after the closure
of evidence. The merits of the underlying dispute, including the
evidentiary value of the rent receipts and the respective claims of the
parties, remain matters to be decided by the trial court on the basis of the
pleadings and evidence on record and in accordance with law.
49. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is intended to ensure that subordinate courts and
tribunals act within the bounds of their authority and exercise their
jurisdiction in accordance with law. It is not an appellate jurisdiction
permitting reassessment of every procedural order merely because
another view may be possible. Interference is warranted where a
subordinate court has acted beyond its jurisdiction, failed to exercise
jurisdiction vested in it, or committed a material illegality or procedural
irregularity warranting supervisory correction.
50. In the present case, the trial court exercised its discretion after
considering the circumstances in which the petitioner's evidence had
been closed and the stage at which the application for adducing further
evidence was made. The revisional court thereafter examined the order
and found no illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error
warranting interference. The reasons recorded by the courts below are
consistent with the principles governing the reopening of evidence. The
material placed before this Court does not disclose any infirmity
warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
51. For the reasons recorded above, this Court finds no jurisdictional
error, material illegality or procedural irregularity in the orders dated
09.03.2026 and 13.08.2026 warranting interference in exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

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52. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
53. The trial court shall proceed with the suit in accordance with law
and endeavour to decide the same expeditiously, having regard to the
direction already issued by the revisional court. The decision shall be
based on the pleadings and evidence on record, uninfluenced by any
observation made in this judgment touching upon the merits of the
respective claims of the parties.
54. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)
November 04, 2026
RKK/-
Digitally signed by :-
RAJ KUMAR KANNAUJIA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad