SHRI MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE KARMACHARI COOPERATIVE BANK LIMITED vs ARUNBHAI T SHAH
- Court
- Gujarat High Court
C/LPA/487/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 16/10/2026
(GJHC240256832026)
Reserved On : 30/07/2026
Pronounced On : 16/10/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 487 of 2026
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION/11566/2020
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2026
In R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 487 of 2026
==================================================
SHRI MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE KARMACHARI COOPERATIVE BANK
LIMITED
Versus
ARUNBHAI T SHAH & ORS.
==================================================
Appearance :
IG JOSHI(8726) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR GAURAV K MEHTA(5227) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==================================================
CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J. L. ODEDRA
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA)
[1] RULE . Mr. Gaurav K. Mehta, learned advocates waive
service of note of rule on behalf of the respondent.
[2] These facts are not in dispute.
[3] In the year 1986, the respondent, Arunbhai T. Shah
(hereinafter referred to as “the workman”), was appointed as a
Clerk in the appellant bank. He was later confirmed to the said
post in the year 1994.
Page 1 of 9
Uploaded by DHARMENDRA KUMAR(HC01071) on Fri Oct 16 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 16 18:14:01 IST 2026
C/LPA/487/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 16/10/2026
(GJHC240256832026)
[4] On 31.08.2007, the workman was suspended on the
premise that he had left the cash counter without securing
permission on 27.07.2007 between 1:00 p.m. and 1:30 p.m., and
was found to be sitting near the lift, with his legs stretched on a
table, and this act caused severe inconvenience.
[5] Thereafter, the bank initiated departmental proceedings
by appointing an Advocate as an Inquiry Officer who conducted
the departmental inquiry. The Inquiry Officer on conducting the
inquiry recorded a finding that the charges against the
workman had been proved.
[6] On the basis of this inquiry report dated 26.11.2007, a
second show-cause notice dated 11.12.2007 was issued by the
bank, wherein the punishment of dismissal was proposed to be
imposed on the workman. This was responded to by the
workman on 15.12.2007. Incidentally, in this reply, it was
asserted that he was not granted an opportunity to defend
himself and that the inquiry was vitiated. Despite this reply, the
bank proceeded to pass an order imposing punishment of
dismissal on 01.01.2008.
[7] Being aggrieved by this dismissal, the workman
approached the bank, as provided under Section 42, sub-clause
(4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act, 1946”), requesting the bank to change
the order of dismissal that had been passed against him.
Page 2 of 9
Uploaded by DHARMENDRA KUMAR(HC01071) on Fri Oct 16 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 16 18:14:01 IST 2026
C/LPA/487/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 16/10/2026
(GJHC240256832026)
[8] Since this was not acceded to, the workman approached
the Labour Court challenging the order of dismissal and seeking
reinstatement with all consequential benefits, including
continuity of service and back wages.
[9] The appellant bank contested the proceedings before the
Labour Court and sought to justify its order of dismissal.
[10] The Labour Court passed an order on 22.01.2016 to the
effect that the inquiry conducted against the workman was
unfair and was in violation of the principles of natural justice.
[11] The Labour Court thereafter proceeded to grant an
opportunity to the bank to establish the allegations that had
been levelled against the workman. Accordingly, the bank
availed itself of this opportunity and examined three witnesses
to prove the guilt of the workman.
[12] The Labour Court, on consideration of the evidence that
was adduced before it, noticed that the deposition of the
witness, Vikramsinh Takhatsinh Solanki, was to the effect that
the management had verbally reprimanded the workman for his
irresponsible behaviour and he had thereafter submitted a letter
of apology, in his handwriting, acknowledging his error.
[13] However, the Labour Court found that this letter of
apology, alleged to have been written by the workman, was not
produced by the bank in order to substantiate its case.
Page 3 of 9
Uploaded by DHARMENDRA KUMAR(HC01071) on Fri Oct 16 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 16 18:14:01 IST 2026
C/LPA/487/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 16/10/2026
(GJHC240256832026)
[14] The Labour Court also found that the other witness,
Dhirajbhai Lallubhai Desai, who was working as a Peon in the
bank, deposed in his cross-examination that the bank had not
recorded his statement regarding the fact that he had
approached the workman and had called him back therefrom.
The Labour Court noticed that though the deposition on oath
was placed on record by the management, the said Dhirajbhai
Lallubhai Desai was not examined during the inquiry, and he
had not disclosed such facts made against the applicant in the
letter dated 31.08.2007. The Labour Court, therefore, came to
the conclusion that the bank had subsequently fabricated the
version of events and had submitted the deposition.
[15] The Labour Court also found that the third witness,
Sureshbhai Lavjibhai Chaudhary, who was working as
Supervisor, had admitted in his cross-examination that no
charge-sheet had been issued against the workman regarding
the incident dated 27.07.2007, and this particular fact indicated
that the bank had not provided any opportunity to the workman
to even offer an explanation.
[16] The Labour Court also noticed that to establish the case
put forth by the management, it had not even examined the
Manager or the customers present at the time of the alleged
incident to prove that the applicant had left his cash counter.
The Labour Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the
workman had been dismissed from service illegally, and the
order of punishment could not be sustained.
Page 4 of 9
Uploaded by DHARMENDRA KUMAR(HC01071) on Fri Oct 16 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 16 18:14:01 IST 2026
C/LPA/487/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 16/10/2026
(GJHC240256832026)
[17] The Labour Court also found that though the workman
was suspended, he had not been paid the subsistence allowance
and he had to make an application for recovery of the
subsistence allowance, which was granted to him only on
01.8.2009.
[18] The Labour Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that
the entire proceedings initiated against the workman was
illegal, and set aside the order of punishment and directed that
the workman be reinstated to his original post with continuity of
service, and also granted the wages for the intervening period.
A cost of Rs.1,500/- was also imposed on the bank.
[19] Being aggrieved by this order, the bank preferred an
appeal to the Industrial Court.
[20] The Industrial Court, on consideration of the judgment and
the material on record, found no reason to disagree with the
finding of the Labour Court, and it proceeded to dismiss the
appeal, thereby confirming the fact that the punishment of
dismissal imposed against the workman was illegal. The
Industrial Court specifically noted that since a charge-sheet was
not laid against the workman and he was given an opportunity
to defend himself, the entire proceedings was vitiated.
[21] Being aggrieved by this order of the Industrial Court, the
bank preferred a writ petition before this Court.
Page 5 of 9
Uploaded by DHARMENDRA KUMAR(HC01071) on Fri Oct 16 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 16 18:14:01 IST 2026
C/LPA/487/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 16/10/2026
(GJHC240256832026)
[22] The learned Single Judge, by the impugned order, has
concurred with the view taken by the Labour Court and the
Industrial Court, and has dismissed the writ petition.
[23] As a result, the bank is in appeal.
[24] Learned counsel for the bank strenuously contended that
the learned Single Judge had basically relied upon Section 11-A
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as
“the I.D.Act”) to come to the conclusion that the order of the
Labour Court and the Industrial Court was correct. He
submitted that the provisions of Section 11-A- of the I.D.Act had
no application in respect of a proceeding under the Act, 1946
and, therefore, the order of the learned Single Judge was
incorrect.
[25] He further submitted that the matter requires a remand to
the learned Single Judge, who was required to examine the
matter without reference to Section 11-A of the I.D.Act. Learned
counsel also sought to argue that the order of termination was
justified since the workman was to be at the counter during
bank hours, had abandoned his post, and was found sitting
elsewhere, and this gross dereliction of duty deserved nothing
but the extreme order of dismissal.
[26] In our view, there is absolutely no merit in either of the
contentions advanced by the bank.
Page 6 of 9
Uploaded by DHARMENDRA KUMAR(HC01071) on Fri Oct 16 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 16 18:14:01 IST 2026
C/LPA/487/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 16/10/2026
(GJHC240256832026)
[27] At the outset, it is to be noticed here that the workman
had discharged his services as a Clerk right from 1986. In other
words, as on the date of the alleged misconduct, he had put in
21 years of service. The bank in respect of a permanent
employee, could not have proceeded to pass any order of
punishment unless an inquiry was conducted, during the course
of which a charge-sheet was issued to the workman and he was
given a chance to defend himself.
[28] The Labour Court, as well as the Industrial Court, have
recorded a clear finding of fact that no charge-sheet was even
laid against the workman. The Labour Court, after having found
that the inquiry was unfair, gave an opportunity to the bank to
examine three witnesses, and the Labour Court found that the
evidence of these three witnesses was not at all credible.
[29] The Labour Court has, in fact, taken note of the fact that
one of the witnesses claimed that the workman was
reprimanded and he thereafter acknowledged his error and had
given an apology in writing. If this was the factual position, the
bank was required to produce the said apology given in writing.
In the absence of such a crucial document, the entire set of
allegations made against the workman would fall to the ground.
[30] In our view, the Labour Court on assessing the evidence
has recorded a clear finding of fact which has been affirmed by
Page 7 of 9
Uploaded by DHARMENDRA KUMAR(HC01071) on Fri Oct 16 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 16 18:14:01 IST 2026
C/LPA/487/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 16/10/2026
(GJHC240256832026)
the Industrial Court in appeal. In a proceeding under Articles
226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, normally, this Court
would not disturb findings of fact which are recorded on the
proper appreciation of the evidence. The learned Single Judge
was, therefore, justified in dismissing the appeal.
[31] Though arguments are advanced that the learned Single
Judge has relied upon Section 11-A- of the I.D.Act to uphold the
order passed by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court, in
our view, this argument and the observations made by the
learned Single Judge would be of no relevance, given the
indisputable fact that even a charge-sheet had not been laid
against the workman and he had been dismissed from service
without even conducting an inquiry.
[32] The further fact that even the evidence adduced before the
Labour Court indicated that the charge had not been
established also leads to the inference that the allegations made
by the bank were not at all established.
[33] In this view of the matter, even though certain
observations are made by the learned Single Judge regarding
the applicability of Section 11-A of the I.D.Act, in our view, since
the order of the Labour Court has recorded a clear finding that
the order of dismissal was without conducting an inquiry, the
orders passed by the Labour Court, as affirmed by the Industrial
Court and the learned Single Judge, cannot be found fault with.
Page 8 of 9
Uploaded by DHARMENDRA KUMAR(HC01071) on Fri Oct 16 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 16 18:14:01 IST 2026
C/LPA/487/2026 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 16/10/2026
(GJHC240256832026)
[34] The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged.
[35] All pending applications stand consigned to records.
(N.S.SANJAY GOWDA, J.)
(J. L. ODEDRA, J.)
DHARMENDRA KUMAR
Page 9 of 9
Uploaded by DHARMENDRA KUMAR(HC01071) on Fri Oct 16 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 16 18:14:01 IST 2026