ICICI BANK LTD., GUJARAT vs GITANJALI MAHARANA
- Court
- Odisha High Court
CMP/217/2026
ODHC010065012026
2026:OHC:265
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
C.M.P No.217 of 2026
CNR No.- ODHC010065012026
(In the matter of an application under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
ICICI Bank Ltd., Gujarat …. Petitioner (s)
-versus-
Gitanjali Maharana …. Opposite Party (s)
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode :
For Petitioner (s) : Mr. Ramachandra Panigrahy, Adv.
For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. Debasis Mishra, Adv.
CORAM:
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-27.08.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT:- 30.10.2026
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. The Petitioner, ICICI Bank Ltd., represented through its Senior
Manager, has instituted the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the legality,
propriety and correctness of the order dated 10.12.2025 passed by the
st
learned 1 Addl. District Judge, Puri, in F.A.O. No.64 of 2023. Apart
from the above, the Petitioner has also challenged the order dated
19.10.2023 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puri, in I.A. No.
105 of 2022, arising out of Civil Suit No. 341 of 2022, pending before
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puri. The impugned orders, being
devoid of reasons and reflecting complete non-application of judicial
mind, has caused serious prejudice and grave hardship to the
Petitioner. It is, therefore, liable to be set aside in exercise of the
supervisory jurisdiction of this Court.
ACTUAL ATRIX OF THE ASE
I. F M C :
2.
The brief facts of the case are as follows:
(i) The Opposite Party/Plaintiff has instituted the above Civil Suit
against the Petitioner/Defendant-Bank, inter alia , praying for a
decree declaring the recovery proceedings of the
Defendant/Bank under different provisions of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002, over the schedule property against the Plaintiff and
her family members as null and void, a decree of permanent
injunction, besides other consequential reliefs of damages.
(ii) (ii) The borrowers, i.e., Shri Gajendra Kumar Maharana, Shri
Bhanu Pratap Maharana, and Shri Shakti Prasad Maharana,
approached the Petitioner-Bank to avail a Home Loan. The
Bank, on 20.12.2014, sanctioned the Home Loan of Rs.22,00,000/-
. The borrowers again approached the Bank for a Top-Up Loan
of Rs.14,00,000/-, which was sanctioned on 22.12.2014, and
another Top-Up Loan of Rs.7,20,000/- was sanctioned on
26.11.2015. Hence, a total amount of Rs.43,20,000/- was
sanctioned and disbursed to the borrowers. Details of all the
loans availed by the borrowers against the mortgage of the suit
property are as follows:-
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
Borrowers Loan
Type
Loan A/C No. Sanction
Date
Sanction
Amount
Gajendra
Kumar
Maharana,
Bhanu
Pratap
Maharana
& Sakti
Prasad
Maharana
Home
Loan
LBPUR00002295783 20.12.
2014
Rs.22.00,000/-
Gajendra
Kumar
Maharana,
Bhanu
Pratap
Maharana
& Sakti
Prasad
Maharana
Top
Up
Loan
LBPUR00002295835 22.12.
2014
Rs.14,00,000/-
Gajendra
Kumar
Maharana,
Bhanu
Pratap
Maharana
& Sakti
Prasad
Maharana
Top
Up
Loan
LBPUR00002517486 26.11.
2015
Rs.7,20,000/-
(iii) The above loan amounts were sanctioned during the period
from December 2014 to November 2015. There was family
discord between the sons and daughter-in-law of the
Plaintiff/Opposite Party. Consequent thereto, presumably, one
of the sons, i.e., Shakti Prasad Maharana, committed suicide on
22.08.2021. Though a UD Case was registered, it was closed
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
after due investigation, and later on, the daughter-in-law
lodged an FIR against the other son and daughter of the
Plaintiff. The other son was arrested and later released on bail.
(iv) Much after the alleged incident, the loan accounts of the
borrowers were declared NPA on 01.12.2021. Owing to the
default in payment of the instalments, the Bank, on 03.01.2022,
issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002,
calling upon them to pay the dues within 60 days. When the
notice under Section 13(2) was issued and delivered to the
borrowers, it was informed to the Bank that the borrower,
Gajendra Maharana, had died prior to the issuance of the notice
under the SARFAESI Act. Hence, the Bank had no option but to
withdraw the earlier notice and issue a fresh notice under
Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, as a notice to a deceased
person is a nullity. On the date of the alleged suicide by one of
the sons of the Plaintiff, no action had been initiated by the
Bank. Despite receipt of the notice, the borrower did not pay the
dues and outstanding amount, and consequently, the Bank, on
09.05.2022, issued a possession notice under Section 13(4) of the
SARFAESI Act, 2002.
(v) The Plaintiff/Opposite Party, being the wife of late Shri
Gajendra Maharana, one of the borrowers, filed the present suit
for declaration, permanent injunction, and damages against the
Defendant-Bank, challenging the legal action initiated by the
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
Bank under the SARFAESI Act. The allegations of the Plaintiff
were that, since her late husband and son had taken the loan,
she was not aware of the same and the Bank should not recover
any dues from her. She also alleged that, due to the harassment
of the Bank, her son committed suicide on 22.08.2021. However,
the fact remains that the account was declared NPA on
01.12.2021, which was three months after the alleged suicide.
There was a matrimonial dispute between the deceased son and
his wife, and an FIR was also lodged by the wife. The deceased
son was arrested and released on bail, and thereafter he
committed suicide.
(vi) The Plaintiff/Opposite Party filed the above Civil Suit along
with an I.A., vide I.A. No. 105 of 2022, under Order 39 Rules 1 &
2 CPC read with Section 151 CPC, with a prayer to restrain the
Defendant/Petitioner from dispossessing the Plaintiff and her
family members from the suit house, from changing the nature
and character of the same, and from entering into the suit
property till disposal of the suit.
(vii) In the said I.A., the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puri, allowed the
said I.A. vide order dated 19.10.2023, and the
Petitioner/Defendant was directed to refrain from dispossessing
the Opposite Party/Plaintiff along with her family members
from the suit house, from changing the nature and character of
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
the suit property by any means, and from entering into the suit
property till disposal of the suit.
(viii) Challenging the said order dated 19.10.2023, the
st
Petitioner/Defendant approached the learned 1 Addl. District
st
Judge, Puri, in F.A.O. No. 64 of 2023 and the learned 1 Addl.
District Judge, Puri, after hearing the matter, dismissed the
above F.A.O., affirming the order dated 19.10.2023 passed by
the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puri, in I.A. No. 105 of 2022.
II. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE P ETITIONER :
3.
The learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) As the borrowers failed to adhere to the terms and conditions of
the said loans/credit facilities, resulting in the said loan/credit
facility accounts being classified as Non-Performing Assets, the
Bank subsequently recalled all three loans/credit facilities vide
loan recall notice issued on 02.12.2021.
(ii) As the borrowers did not repay the loan dues as demanded in
the loan recall notice, the Bank issued a statutory demand notice
under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, on 03.01.2022,
demanding payment of Rs.36,88,813.00 due as on 03.01.2022
against all three loan accounts. The demand notice was issued
through speed post to all the borrowers, and the notice was also
made sufficient by way of publication in newspapers.
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
(iii) The borrowers did not repay the loan dues as demanded in the
statutory demand notice. As such, the Bank issued a possession
notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, on
09.05.2022, and published the possession notice in the
newspaper on 13.05.2022. It is further submitted that the present
suit was filed with a malicious motive of suppressing as well as
concealing the true facts of the matter, wherein the subject
property is mortgaged with the Bank and, as such, constitutes a
security interest as defined under Section 2(zf) of the SARFAESI
Act.
(iv) The cause of action for filing the instant suit arises out of Section
13 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, and hence, the
suit filed before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puri, is not fit to
be heard by the learned Civil Court and is thus liable to be
dismissed at the very outset without any consideration of the
merits of the case. Entertaining the suit filed by the
Respondent/Plaintiff will create a wrong precedent and defeat
the very purpose of the SARFAESI Act. It is submitted that the
SARFAESI Act was one of the most radical legislative measures
to ensure that dues of banks are recovered without any
obstruction.
(v) It is further contended that the very object of the SARFAESI Act
enacted by Parliament would be defeated if the present Civil
Suit is entertained by the Civil Court. It is submitted that the
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
main object of the legislature was to ensure that there are no
unwarranted impediments in the recovery of debts due to
banks and other financial institutions and secured creditors
from Non-Performing Assets. If the present Civil Suit is
entertained, it would have a serious adverse impact on the
rights of the Defendant-Bank and its financial health.
(vi) It is further contended that, in view of Section 34 of the
SARFAESI Act, the present suit is not maintainable and the
learned Trial Court cannot assume jurisdiction to try and
adjudicate the present suit, where the DRT or DRAT has
exclusive jurisdiction to entertain any and all issues pertaining
to the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
(vii) It is the further contention of the Petitioner/Defendant-Bank
that the present suit and the I.A. are barred by the jurisdiction
of the learned Trial Court. Under Section 17 of the SARFAESI
Act, any aggrieved person can approach the Debt Recovery
Tribunal against the measures taken by the Secured Creditor.
(viii) It is the further contention of the Petitioner/Defendant-Bank
that, in view of Section 19 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the DRT
has the power not only to restore possession to the borrower or
any other person, but also to compensate in accordance with
law.
(ix) It is the further contention of the Petitioner/Defendant-Bank
that the wife of the deceased son had lodged a criminal case
against the family members, and consequent thereto, her elder
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Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
son was arrested. It is further stated by the
Petitioner/Defendant-Bank herein that the enmity between the
Respondent/Plaintiff and her son and daughter-in-law may
have caused the unfortunate incident of the death of the
younger son, and for that, the Petitioner/Defendant-Bank was in
no way responsible.
(x) It is further contended that the Debt Recovery Tribunal has
wider powers than the Civil Court and all the disputes raised in
the present case can be adjudicated by the learned DRT. In case
the learned Tribunal finds that the procedure adopted by the
Petitioner/Defendant-Bank was not in consonance with law, the
learned Tribunal can not only restore possession of the secured
assets but also grant compensation and damages to the
aggrieved party in view of Section 19 of the SARFAESI Act,
2002.
(xi) It is further contended that the present suit was filed on
20.07.2022 along with I.A. No.105 of 2022, but since then, no
injunction order was passed by the learned Trial Court.
However, the impugned order was passed on the plea that,
since there was no SARFAESI proceeding by the Bank, the
Plaintiff was entitled to an injunction. It is further submitted
that the entire suit was filed to declare the SARFAESI
proceedings as null and void, which squarely falls within the
ambit of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Moreover,
admittedly, where there was no SARFAESI proceeding, the
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Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
cause of action for the suit fails. It is further stated that the
Appellant/Defendant has also filed the written statement to the
amended plaint, wherein it has brought to the notice of the
learned Trial Court the reason for withdrawal of the earlier
SARFAESI notice and issuance of a fresh demand notice under
Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, which was not challenged by
the Plaintiff.
(xii) The Opposite Party/Plaintiff has no cause of action to file the
present suit, nor could any interim order have been passed by
the learned Trial Court. However, the plaint was presented in
order to delay/defer the recovery proceedings in respect of the
loans availed by the deceased spouse and sons of the Plaintiff. It
is further submitted that the Plaintiff is neither the owner of the
property nor the mortgagor and, hence, does not have any locus
standi to file the present suit. It is further submitted that the
learned Trial Court as well as the learned Appellate Court failed
to appreciate the settled law that where the issue involved can
be adjudicated by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) or Debt
Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), the Civil Court cannot
assume jurisdiction and pass an interim injunction restraining
the Secured Creditor from initiating legal proceedings under
the SARFAESI Act, 2002. It is further submitted that the learned
Trial Court completely misunderstood the settled law and
passed the impugned order dated 19.10.2023 on the premise
that, since the notice under Section 13(2) was withdrawn by the
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
Petitioner/Defendant-Bank, possession of the mortgaged
property could not be taken, and passed an order restraining
the Bank from dispossessing the Plaintiff and her family
members from the suit house, from changing the nature and
character of the suit property by any means, and from entering
into the suit property till disposal of the suit.
(xiii) It is further contended that the Petitioner/Defendant-Bank filed
a First Appeal being F.A.O. No. 64 of 2023, challenging the
order dated 19.10.2023 passed by the learned Trial Court, which
came to be dismissed by the learned Appellate Court vide
impugned judgment dated 10.12.2025 on the premise that, since
the notice dated 03.01.2022 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI
Act was withdrawn and, in the absence of such notice, the Bank
did not have any right to take possession of the property, the
action of the Bank was not in conformity with the provisions of
law. The Appellate Court has also held that the Bank, at the
same time, is not debarred from exercising its right to take
appropriate action as per law. It is further submitted that both
the learned Courts have recognised the rights of the Bank under
the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but interfered with the issue and
passed an interim injunction restraining the Bank from taking
legal action as per law.
(xiv) It is the further contention that the Petitioner/Defendant-Bank
has already filed Original Application No. 394 of 2023 on
16.05.2023 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Cuttack, which is
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Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
pending for adjudication. The Opposite Party/Plaintiff has filed
their written statement, admitting the fact that the deceased
husband of the Plaintiff had taken a home loan from the
Defendant-Bank, but they are not aware of such loan. It is
further submitted that the Plaintiffs cannot enjoy the property
without paying the due instalments.
(xv) Learned counsel has placed reliance in the case of Jagdish Singh
1
v. Heeralal & Ors. , wherein the relevant paragraphs are
reproduced below:
“ 19. The expression “any person” used in Section 17 is
of wide import and takes within its fold not only the
borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who
may be affected by action taken under Section 13(4) of
the Securitisation Act. Reference may be made to the
judgment of this Court in Satyawati Tondon
case [United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010)
8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] .
20. Therefore, the expression “any person” referred to in
Section 17 would take in the plaintiffs in the suit as well.
Therefore, irrespective of the question whether the civil
suit is maintainable or not, under the Securitisation Act
itself, a remedy is provided to such persons so that they
can invoke the provisions of Section 17 of the
Securitisation Act, in case the Bank (secured creditor)
adopt any measure including the sale of the secured
assets, on which the plaintiffs claim interest.
21. Section 34 of the Securitisation Act ousts the civil
court jurisdiction. For easy reference, we may extract
Section 34 of the Securitisation Act, which is as follows:
“ 34. Civil court not to have
jurisdiction .—No civil court shall have
1
(2014) 1 Supreme Court Cases 479
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Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
jurisdiction to entertain any suit or
proceeding in respect of any matter which a
Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate
Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act
to determine and no injunction shall be
granted by any court or other authority in
respect of any action taken or to be taken in
pursuance of any power conferred by or
under this Act or under the Recovery of
Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).”
22. The scope of Section 34 came up for consideration
before this Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. [Mardia
Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311]
and this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 349, para 50)
“50. It has also been submitted that an
appeal is entertainable before the Debts
Recovery Tribunal only after such measures
as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 13
are taken and Section 34 bars to entertain
any proceeding in respect of a matter which
the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the
Appellate Tribunal is empowered to
determine. Thus before any action or
measure is taken under sub-section (4) of
Section 13, it is submitted by Mr Salve, one
of the counsel for the respondents that there
would be no bar to approach the civil court.
Therefore, it cannot be said that no remedy
is available to the borrowers. We, however,
find that this contention as advanced by
Shri Salve is not correct. A full reading of
Section 34 shows that the jurisdiction of the
civil court is barred in respect of matters
which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or an
Appellate Tribunal is empowered to
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
determine in respect of any action taken ‘or
to be taken in pursuance of any power
conferred under this Act’. That is to say, the
prohibition covers even matters which can
be taken cognizance of by the Debts
Recovery Tribunal though no measure in
that direction has so far been taken under
sub-section (4) of Section 13. It is further to
be noted that the bar of jurisdiction is in
respect of a proceeding which matter may be
taken to the Tribunal. Therefore, any matter
in respect of which an action may be taken
even later on, the civil court shall have no
jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding
thereof. The bar of civil court thus applies to
all such matters which may be taken
cognizance of by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, apart from those matters in which
measures have already been taken under
sub-section (4) of Section 13.”
23. Section 13, as already indicated, deals with the
enforcement of the security interest without the
intervention of the court or tribunal but in accordance
with the provisions of the Securitisation Act.
24. Statutory interest is being created in favour of the
secured creditor on the secured assets and when the
secured creditor proposes to proceed against the secured
assets, sub-section (4) of Section 13 envisages various
measures to secure the borrower's debt. One of the
measures provided by the statute is to take possession of
secured assets of the borrowers, including the right to
transfer by way of lease, assignment or realising the
secured assets. Any person aggrieved by any of the
“measures” referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13
has got a statutory right of appeal to the DRT under
Section 17. The opening portion of Section 34 clearly
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Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
states that no civil court shall have the jurisdiction to
entertain any suit or proceeding “in respect of any
matter” which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is
empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to
determine. The expression “in respect of any matter”
referred to in Section 34 would take in the “measures”
provided under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the
Securitisation Act. Consequently, if any aggrieved
person has got any grievance against any “measures”
taken by the borrower under sub-section (4) of Section
13, the remedy open to him is to approach the DRT or
the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court. The civil
court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to
entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those
matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of
the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within
the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal.
Further, Section 35 says, the Securitisation Act
overrides other laws, if they are inconsistent with the
provisions of that Act, which takes in Section 9 CPC as
well .”
(xvi) He has also placed reliance in the case of Sree Anandhakumar
2
Mills Limited v. Indian Overseas Bank & Ors. , wherein the
relevant paragraph is reproduced below:
“ 4. The matter need not engage the Court in any great
detail as in view of the law laid down by this Court
in Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal [Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal,
(2014) 1 SCC 479 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 444] it would be
clear and evident that the suit filed by the second
respondent (i.e. OS No. 106 of 2009) is not
maintainable. In Jagdish Singh [Jagdish
Singh v. Heeralal, (2014) 1 SCC 479 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Civ) 444] this Court after an elaborate consideration of
2
(2019) 14 Supreme Court Cases 788
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Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, particularly,
Sections 2(zf), 2(zc), 13(1), 17, 18 and 34, took the view,
on almost similar facts, that a suit for partition would
not be maintainable in a situation where proceedings
under the SARFAESI Act had been initiated. It was also
held that the remedy of any person aggrieved by the
initiation of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act lies
under Section 17 which provides for an efficacious and
adequate remedy to a party aggrieved. Para 24 of the
Report in Jagdish Singh [Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal,
(2014) 1 SCC 479 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 444] which
makes the above position clear may be usefully extracted
below: (SCC p. 489)
“24. Statutory interest is being created in
favour of the secured creditor on the secured
assets and when the secured creditor
proposes to proceed against the secured
assets, sub-section (4) of Section 13
envisages various measures to secure the
borrower's debt. One of the measures
provided by the statute is to take possession
of secured assets of the borrowers, including
the right to transfer by way of lease,
assignment or realising the secured assets.
Any person aggrieved by any of the
“measures” referred to in sub-section (4) of
Section 13 has got a statutory right of
appeal to the DRT under Section 17. The
opening portion of Section 34 clearly states
that no civil court shall have the
jurisdiction to entertain any suit or
proceeding “in respect of any matter” which
a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is
empowered by or under the Securitisation
Act to determine. The expression “in
respect of any matter” referred to in Section
34 would take in the “measures” provided
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09
under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the
Securitisation Act. Consequently, if any
aggrieved person has got any grievance
against any “measures” taken by the
borrower under sub-section (4) of Section
13, the remedy open to him is to approach
the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not
the civil court. The civil court in such
circumstances has no jurisdiction to
entertain any suit or proceedings in respect
of those matters which fall under sub-
section (4) of Section 13 of the
Securitisation Act because those matters fell
within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the
Appellate Tribunal. Further, Section 35
says, the Securitisation Act overrides other
laws, if they are inconsistent with the
provisions of that Act, which takes in
Section 9 CPC as well.”
(emphasis in original)
(xvii) He has also placed reliance in the case of Punjab & Sind Bank v.
3
Frontline Corporation Ltd. , wherein the reverent paragraphs
are reproduced below:
“ 12 . The issue as to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of a
civil court is no more res integra. The provisions of
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act have been considered
by a Bench of three Judges of this Court in Mardia
Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [Mardia Chemicals
Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311] . It will be
relevant to refer to the following observations of this
Court in the said case :
“50. It has also been submitted that an
appeal is entertainable before the Debts
Recovery Tribunal only after such measures
3
(2023) 4 SCR 858
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as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 13
are taken and Section 34 bars to entertain
any proceeding in respect of a matter which
the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the
Appellate Tribunal is empowered to
determine. Thus before any action or
measure is taken under sub-section (4) of
Section 13, it is submitted by Mr Salve, one
of the counsel for the respondents that there
would be no bar to approach the civil court.
Therefore, it cannot be said that no remedy is
available to the borrowers. We, however, find
that this contention as advanced by Shri
Salve is not correct. A full reading of Section
34 shows that the jurisdiction of the civil
court is barred in respect of matters which a
Debts Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate
Tribunal is empowered to determine in
respect of any action taken “or to be taken in
pursuance of any power conferred under this
Act”. That is to say, the prohibition covers
even matters which can be taken cognizance
of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal though no
measure in that direction has so far been
taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13. It
is further to be noted that the bar of
jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding
which matter may be taken to the Tribunal.
Therefore, any matter in respect of which an
action may be taken even later on, the civil
court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain
any proceeding thereof. The bar of civil court
thus applies to all such matters which may
be taken cognizance of by the Debts
Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters
in which measures have already been taken
under sub-section (4) of Section 13.
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51. However, to a very limited extent
jurisdiction of the civil court can also be
invoked, where for example, the action of the
secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or
his claim may be so absurd and untenable
which may not require any probe whatsoever
or to say precisely to the extent the scope is
permissible to bring an action in the civil
court in the cases of English mortgages. We
find such a scope having been recognised in
the two decisions of the Madras High Court
which have been relied upon heavily by the
learned Attorney General as well appearing
for the Union of India, namely, V.
Narasimhachariar [V.
Narasimhachariar v. Egmore Benefit
Society, 1954 SCC OnLine Mad 352 : AIR
1955 Mad 135] , AIR at pp. 141 & 144, a
judgment of the learned Single Judge where
it is observed as follows : (SCC OnLine Mad
para 22 : AIR para 22)
“22. The remedies of a mortgagor
against the mortgagee who is
acting in violation of the rights,
duties and obligations are twofold
in character. The mortgagor can
come to the court before sale with
an injunction for staying the sale
if there are materials to show that
the power of sale is being
exercised in a fraudulent or
improper manner contrary to the
terms of the mortgage. But the
pleadings in an action for
restraining a sale by mortgagee,
must clearly disclose a fraud or
irregularity on the basis of which
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relief is sought
: Adams v. Scott [Adams v. Scott
, (1859) 7 WR 213, 249] . I need
not point out that this restraint
on the exercise of the power of
sale will be exercised by courts
only under the limited
circumstances mentioned above
because otherwise to grant such
an injunction would be to cancel
one of the clauses of the deed to
which both the parties had agreed
and annul one of the chief
securities on which persons
advancing moneys on mortgages
rely. (See Ghose, Rashbehary
: Law of Mortgages, Vol. II, 4th
Edn., p. 784.)””
13. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the
jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of
matters which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is
empowered to determine in respect of any action taken
“or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred
under this Act”. The Court has held that the prohibition
covers even matters which may be taken cognizance of by
the DRT though no measure in that direction has so far
been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of
the SARFAESI Act. It has been held that the bar of
jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter
may be taken to the Tribunal. It has categorically been
held that any matter in respect of which an action may
be taken even later on, the civil court shall have no
jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding thereof. The
Court held that the bar of civil court thus applies to all
such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the
DRT, apart from those matters in which measures have
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already been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of
the SARFAESI Act .”
(xviii) He has also placed reliance in the case of Electrosteel Castings
4
Limited v. UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors .,
wherein the relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:
7. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing
“
on behalf of the respective parties at length.
7.1. It is the case on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant
herein that in the plaint there are allegations of “fraud”
with respect to the assignment agreement dated 30-6-
2018 and it is the case on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant
herein that assignment agreement is “fraudulent”
inasmuch as after the full payment as per the approved
resolution plan under IBC and the original corporate
debtor is discharged, there shall not be any debt by the
plaintiff-appellant herein as a guarantor and therefore
assignment deed is fraudulent. Therefore, it is the case
on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant herein that the suit in
which there are allegations of “fraud” with respect to the
assignment deed shall be maintainable and the bar under
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act shall not be applicable.
7.2. However, it is required to be noted that except the
words used “fraud”/“fraudulent” there are no specific
particulars pleaded with respect to the “fraud”. It
appears that by a clever drafting and using the words
“fraud”/“fraudulent” without any specific particulars
with respect to the “fraud”, the plaintiff-appellant herein
intends to get out of the bar under Section 34 of
the SARFAESI Act and wants the suit to be
maintainable. As per the settled proposition of law mere
mentioning and using the word “fraud”/“fraudulent” is
not sufficient to satisfy the test of “fraud”. As per the
settled proposition of law such a pleading/using the word
4
(2022) 2 Supreme Court Cases 573
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“fraud”/“fraudulent” without any material particulars
would not tantamount to pleading of “fraud”.
8. In Bishundeo Narain [Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni
Rai, 1951 SCC 447 : 1951 SCR 548] in para 22, it is
observed and held as under : (SCC p. 454)
“22. … Now if there is one rule which is
better established than any other, it is that
in cases of fraud, undue influence and
coercion, the parties pleading it must set
forth full particulars and the case can only
be decided on the particulars as laid. There
can be no departure from them in evidence.
General allegations are insufficient even to
amount to an averment of fraud of which
any court ought to take notice however
strong the language in which they are
couched may be, and the same applies to
undue influence and coercion. See Order 6
Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code.”
8.1. Similar view has been expressed in Ladli Parshad
Jaiswal [Ladli Parshad Jaiswal v. Karnal Distillery Co.
Ltd., (1964) 1 SCR 270 : AIR 1963 SC 1279] and after
considering the decision of the Privy Council in Bharat
Dharma Syndicate Ltd. v. Harish Chandra [Bharat
Dharma Syndicate Ltd. v. Harish Chandra, 1937 SCC
OnLine PC 24 : (1936-37) 64 IA 143] , it is held that a
litigant who prefers allegation of fraud or other improper
conduct must place on record precise and specific details
of these charges. Even as per Order VI Rule 4 in all cases
in which the party pleading relies on any
misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default,
or undue influence, particulars shall be stated in the
pleading. Similarly in K.C. Sharma & Co. [Union of
India v. K.C. Sharma & Co., (2020) 15 SCC 209] it is
held that “fraud” has to be pleaded with necessary
particulars. In Ram Singh [Ram Singh v. Gram
Panchayat Mehal Kalan, (1986) 4 SCC 364] , it is
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observed and held by this Court that when the suit is
barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to
circumvent that provision by means of clever drafting so
as to avoid mention of those circumstances by which the
suit is barred by law of limitation.
8.2. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [T.
Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467] , it
is observed and held in para 5 as under : (SCC p. 470)
“5. We have not the slightest hesitation in
condemning the petitioner for the gross
abuse of the process of the court repeatedly
and unrepentantly resorted to. From the
statement of the facts found in the judgment
of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that
the suit now pending before the First
Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant
misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving
plaints. The learned Munsif must remember
that if on a meaningful — not formal —
reading of the plaint it is manifestly
vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not
disclosing a clear right to sue, he should
exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC taking care to see that the ground
mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever
drafting has created the illusion of a cause
of action, nip it in the bud at the first
hearing by examining the party searchingly
under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is
the answer to irresponsible law suits.”
8.3. A similar view has been expressed by this Court in
the recent decision in P. Selathal [Canara Bank v. P.
Selathal, (2020) 13 SCC 143] .
xxx xxx xxx
11. It is required to be noted that as such in the present
case the assignee has already initiated the proceedings
under Section 13 which can be challenged by the
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plaintiff-appellant herein by way of application under
Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act before the DRT on
whatever the legally available defences which may be
available to it. We are of the firm opinion that the suit
filed by the plaintiff-appellant herein was absolutely not
maintainable in view of the bar contained under Section
34 of the SARFAESI Act. Therefore, as such the courts
below have not committed any error in rejecting the
plaint/dismissing the suit in view of the bar under
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.
12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
the present appeal fails and the same deserves to be
dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. However, it will
be open for the appellant herein to initiate appropriate
proceedings before the DRT under Section 17 of
the SARFAESI Act against the initiation of the
proceedings by the assignee-Respondent 1 herein under
Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act inter alia on the
ground : (1) that the assignee cannot be said to be
secured creditor so far as the appellant is concerned;
(2) that there is no amount due and payable by the
plaintiff-appellant herein on the ground that in view of
the proceedings under IBC against the corporate debtor
and the corporate debtor being discharged after the
approved resolution plan, there shall not be any
enforceable debt against the appellant. If such an
application is filed within a period of two weeks from
today the same be considered in accordance with law and
on merits after complying with all other requirements
which may be required while filing the application under
Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act
.”
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(xix) He has also placed reliance in the case of Bajaj Finance Ltd. v.
5
Ali Agency & Ors. , wherein the relevant paragraph is
reproduced below:
“ 28. Further, the enactment does not leave the aggrieved
person remediless. In case if any person is aggrieved of
any action taken by the creditor including of an order
passed by the District Magistrate or Chief Judicial
Magistrate the remedy lies with DRT in view of
Section 17 (1) of the Act, 2002 [See Para 20 of Kaniyalal
8
Lalchand Sachdev v. State of Maharashtra ].
Section 34 of the Act, 2002, excludes the jurisdiction of
any court or other authority from granting any
injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken
by the secured creditor under the provisions of the Act.
Thus, the DRT shall be competent to examine the
validity of not only the steps taken by the secured
creditor under Section 13(4) but also all subsequent and
consequential actions taken by the secured creditor
under the Act .
(xx) Finally, he submits that since the learned Debt Recovery
Tribunal is empowered to restore back the possession of the
secured asset with compensation and damages, if found the
procedure adopted by the Petitioner/Defendant-Bank is not in
consonance with the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The impugned
orders are not sustainable as both the learned Courts below
have failed to appreciate that there is no cause of action rests
with the plaintiff to plead further for passing of the impugned
order as she was not the owner of the property nor the
borrower/guarantor or mortgagor. Accordingly, taking into
5
2022 SCC OnLine Ori 4133
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account the contentions and the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, he prays for setting aside the judgment dated
st
10.12.2025 passed by the learned 1 Addl. District Judge, Puri in
F.A.O. No.64 of 2023 and order dated 19.10.2023 passed by the
learned Senior Civil Judge, Puri in I.A. No.105 of 2022 (arising
out of Civil Suit No.341 of 2022).
III. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE OPPOSITE PARTY :
4.
Per contra , the learned counsel for Opposite Party earnestly made the
submission that the present CMP deserves to be rejected in limine.
(i) On a bare perusal of the said notice issued under the SARFAESI
Act, it appears that the notice is defective, as it does not contain
the address of the concerned authority, the signature of the
authority, or the loan account number. Therefore, the
Plaintiff/Opposite Party instituted the suit seeking a decree
declaring the recovery proceedings initiated by the Bank under
the various provisions of the SARFAESI Act in respect of the
scheduled property against the Plaintiff and her family
members to be null and void. The Plaintiff also prayed for a
permanent injunction and other consequential reliefs.
(ii) Upon being noticed, the Petitioner/Defendant-Bank entered
appearance and filed its written statement, inter alia,
contending that the proceedings had been initiated under the
SARFAESI Act, 2002, and that the Civil Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
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(iii) The learned Trial Court, vide its order dated 19.10.2023, held
that the question of maintainability of the suit had already been
decided vide order dated 24.02.2023, wherein it was held that
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act does not bar the present suit.
The learned Trial Court further held that, since the possession
notice issued against the Opposite Party/Plaintiff had been
recalled, the Petitioner/Defendant-Bank had no authority to
take possession of the suit property. Accordingly, the learned
Trial Court restrained the Bank from dispossessing the
Opposite Party/Plaintiff and her family members from the suit
house. Challenging the said order, the Petitioner/Defendant
filed FAO No.64 of 2023 before the learned 1st Additional
District Judge, Puri, which was also dismissed vide judgment
dated 10.02.2025.
(iv) Finally, learned counsel for the Opposite Party submits that the
concurrent findings of both the Courts below are to the effect
that there was no valid notice issued under the SARFAESI Act
authorising the dispossession of the Opposite Party/Plaintiff
from the suit property. Therefore, according to learned counsel,
both the Courts below have rightly passed the impugned
orders, which call for no interference by this Court.
INDING OF THE LEARNED TRIAL COURT
IV. F :
5. On perusal of the impugned order dated 19.10.2023 passed by the
learned Senior Civil Judge, Puri in I.A. No.105 of 2022 arising out of
C.S. No.341 of 2022, it appears that the learned Civil Judge, upon
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considering the materials available on record, held that, once the
possession notice issued against the Opposite Party was recalled, the
Petitioner/Defendant had no authority to take possession of the suit
property. Accordingly, the learned Civil Judge restrained the
Petitioner/Defendant from dispossessing the Opposite Party/Plaintiff
and her family members from the suit house, from changing the
nature and character of the suit property in any manner, and from
entering into the suit property during pendency of the suit.
6. On further perusal of the impugned judgment dated 10.12.2025
passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Puri in F.A.O.
No.64 of 2023, it appears that the learned Appellate Court, upon
consideration of the materials available on record and the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court, found no sufficient ground to
interfere with the order dated 19.10.2023 passed in I.A. No.105 of
2022. Accordingly, the learned Appellate Court confirmed the said
order and dismissed the appeal.
7. In view of the aforesaid orders passed by the learned Courts below,
the interim protection granted in favour of the Opposite
Party/Plaintiff shall operate in terms of the order dated 19.10.2023, as
affirmed by the judgment dated 10.12.2025, subject to the final
adjudication of the rights of the parties in the pending suit.
V. THIS C OURT S R EASONING AND A NALYSIS :
’
8. Shorn of its factual detail the present petition raises one question. That
is, Could a Civil Court restrain a secured creditor from taking
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possession of a mortgaged property in the face of Section 34 of the
SARFAESI Act, 2002? If it could not, does the concurrent grant of such
an injunction call for correction in the supervisory jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution?
9. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is not an appeal in disguise.
It does not exist to reweigh evidence or to substitute one plausible
view for another. Yet it was conferred for a purpose. Its purpose is to
keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. The
6
Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil
7
and again in Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel , has held that
interference is warranted where a court has assumed a jurisdiction it
does not possess, or has acted in flagrant disregard of law, causing
manifest injustice. An order passed in the teeth of a statutory
prohibition is the plainest case for interference. Concurrence between
two courts cannot cure it. Two orders resting on the same want of
jurisdiction are no stronger than one.
10. The SARFAESI Act is a self-contained code for the enforcement of
security interests without the intervention of courts. Section 13(2)
obliges the secured creditor to serve a demand notice on the borrower.
Section 13(4) empowers it to take possession of the secured asset if the
dues remain unpaid. Section 17(1) gives “any person” aggrieved by a
measure under Section 13(4) a right to approach the Debts Recovery
Tribunal.
6
( 2010) 8 SCC 329
7
(2022) 4 SCC 181
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11. Sections 17(2) and 17(3) empower the Tribunal to examine whether the
measures conform to the Act and the Rules. Where they do not, the
Tribunal may declare them invalid and restore possession. Section 19
empowers it to award compensation. Section 35 gives the Act
overriding effect over any inconsistent law, which includes Section 9 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
12. Section 34 stands guard over this scheme and it has two distinct limbs
that is the first one bars a civil court from entertaining any suit or
proceeding in respect of any matter which the Tribunal or the
Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. The second is wider
and admits no exception. No injunction shall be granted by any court
or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in
pursuance of any power conferred under the Act. The second limb
does not depend on the first. Even where some part of a suit may
survive scrutiny, the power to injunct the secured creditor’s statutory
action is taken away altogether.
8
13. In Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India , a Bench of three Judges
rejected the argument that a civil court remains open until a measure
under Section 13(4) is actually taken. The Court held that the bar
extends to any matter in respect of which action may be taken even
later. Jagdish Singh (supra) held that the remedy of every aggrieved
person lies before the Tribunal and not before the civil court. The said
position has been affirmed in Sree Anandhakumar Mills (supra) and
Punjab & Sind Bank v. Frontline Corporation Ltd. (supra). Further,
8
2004) 4 SCC 311
(
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Electro steel Castings (supra) has held that a suit framed to escape
Section 34 by clever drafting deserves to be nipped at the bud. United
9
Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon cautioned all courts against
obstructing recovery under the Act when an efficacious statutory
remedy is at hand. The law on the point is settled. The following
paragraph crystalizes the same:
“An analysis of the provisions of the DRT Act shows
that primary object of that Act was to facilitate creation of
special machinery for speedy recovery of the dues of banks
and financial institutions. This is the reason why the DRT
Act not only provides for establishment of the Tribunals
and the Appellate Tribunals with the jurisdiction, powers
and authority to make summary adjudication of
applications made by banks or financial institutions and
specifies the modes of recovery of the amount determined
by the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal but also bars the
jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court and the
High Courts in relation to the matters specified in Section
17. The Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals have also
been freed from the shackles of procedure contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure. To put it differently, the DRT Act
has not only brought into existence special procedural
mechanism for speedy recovery of the dues of banks and
financial institutions, but also made provision for ensuring
that defaulting borrowers are not able to invoke the
jurisdiction of Civil Courts for frustrating the proceedings
initiated by the banks and other financial institutions. “
14. Both the Courts below reasoned that the earlier notice under Section
13(2) had been withdrawn. Without that notice the Bank had no
authority to take possession. The Bank must therefore be restrained.
9
(2010) 8 SCC 110
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This reasoning does not survive scrutiny. It places the Courts below
in a dilemma from which there is no escape. The record shows that
the first notice under Section 13(2) was withdrawn for a sound
reason. It had been addressed to a borrower who was already dead,
and a notice to a dead person is a nullity. The record also shows the
following and three Important Dates which are as followsm:
1. A fresh demand notice was issued on 03.01.2022.
2. A possession notice under Section 13(4) followed on
09.05.2022.
3. The possession notice was published on 13.05.2022.
15. If these notices stand, they are measures under the Act. Every
objection the Opposite Party raises against them is an objection to the
legality of a Section 13 measure. These include the absence of an
address, a signature or a loan account number. Determining such
objections is precisely the function Section 17 entrusts to the Tribunal.
The injunction would then restrain action already taken under the
Act. The second limb of Section 34 forbids exactly that. Suppose
instead that no valid notice survives, as the Courts below assumed.
Then the Bank stands at the threshold of statutory action and has not
crossed it. The injunction would then restrain action yet to be taken
under the Act. Mardia Chemicals (supr holds in terms that the bar
covers that situation too. Nor could the Bank lawfully dispossess the
Opposite Party without completing the statutory process. If it
attempted to do so, the Opposite Party’s remedy would again lie
before the Tribunal.
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16. On either view the injunction cannot stand. The Courts below did not
see that the premise they relied on to grant the injunction was itself
the reason it could not be granted.
17. The Appellate Court recorded that the Bank is not debarred from
taking appropriate action in accordance with law. In the same breath
it affirmed an unqualified restraint operating till the disposal of the
suit. That restraint forbids the Bank from dispossessing the Opposite
Party, from entering the property and from changing its character.
The Bank cannot act under the Act without doing at least one of these
things. The two parts of the judgment cannot live together. A right
recognised in the reasoning and extinguished in the operative
direction is no right at all.
18. The learned Trial Court treated the question as foreclosed by its
earlier order dated 24.02.2023, which held that Section 34 did not bar
the suit. That order cannot carry the weight placed on it. Jurisdiction
is conferred by statute alone. It cannot arise from consent, from
acquiescence or from an interlocutory finding of the very court whose
jurisdiction is in question.
19. More importantly, the earlier order concerned the maintainability of
the suit. The injunction is struck by the second limb of Section 34,
which operates independently. In Central Bank of India v. Prabha
10
Jain , the Supreme Court held that a civil court may try reliefs lying
beyond the competence of the Tribunal. Even taking the said view, a
civil court cannot injunct statutory action under the Act. Whether any
10
(2025) 4 SCC 38
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part of the present suit survives Section 34 is a question for the
learned Trial Court. This Court expresses no opinion on it. That
question has no bearing on the interim order. No court had the power
to make that order.
20. Mardia Chemicals(supra) left a narrow opening where the action of
the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent, or its claim is so
absurd that it needs no probe. Neither exists here. The Opposite Party
pleads no fraud, let alone fraud with the particulars that Order VI
Rule 4 CPC and Electrosteel Castings demand. Alleged defects in the
form of a notice are at most irregularities in procedure. They are the
daily business of the Tribunal. They cannot be dressed up as fraud to
reopen the doors of the civil court.
21. Even apart from the statutory bar, the order could not stand on the
settled tests for an injunction. A prima facie case cannot rest on a
claim that the forum itself cannot entertain. No irreparable injury
arises where the statute empowers the Tribunal to restore possession
wrongly taken and to award compensation. The balance of
convenience does not favour a party who admits the loan, has paid
nothing, and seeks to remain in possession of a mortgaged house
indefinitely through a suit.This Court is conscious of the grief behind
this litigation. The Opposite Party has lost her husband and a son,
and her household has been torn by discord and criminal
proceedings. No court can be indifferent to such suffering. But
compassion cannot redraw the boundaries which the Parliament has
drawn.
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22. The chronology also does not support the allegation that the Bank
drove her son to his death. The son died on 22.08.2021. The accounts
were classified as non-performing on 01.12.2021, more than three
months later. No coercive step had been taken before his death. The
Opposite Party says she was a stranger to the loans. If so, and if she
has an independent interest in the property, she is “any person”
within Section 17 as explained in Jagdish Singh . (supra) She is not
without a remedy. She has simply approached the wrong forum.
23. The Bank has already instituted O.A. No.394 of 2023 before the Debts
Recovery Tribunal, Cuttack, and the Opposite Party is contesting it.
The dispute between the parties is therefore before the forum that the
law designates for it. A civil court injunction operating alongside that
proceeding serves only to fragment the dispute. It defeats the very
object of the Act.
24. For these reasons, the order dated 19.10.2023 and the judgment dated
10.12.2025 suffer from a patent want of jurisdiction. Both Courts
below ignored the express mandate of Section 34 and the binding law
declared by the Supreme Court. Their orders have frozen a statutory
remedy at the instance of a party who had a remedy of her own
under the same statute. This is a fit case for this Court to exercise its
supervisory jurisdiction.
VII. CONCLUSION:
25. In the result, the CMP is allowed. The following orders are made:
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The judgment dated 10.12.2025 passed by the learned 1st Addl.
District Judge, Puri in F.A.O. No.64 of 2023 is set aside.
i. The order dated 19.10.2023 passed by the learned Senior
Civil Judge, Puri in I.A. No.105 of 2022 arising out of C.S.
No.341 of 2022 is set aside. I.A. No.105 of 2022 stands
rejected.
ii. The Opposite Party is at liberty to approach the Debts
Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act
against any measure taken or proposed by the Petitioner-
Bank. If she does so within four weeks from today, the
Tribunal shall consider the application, and any prayer for
interim relief in it, on its own merits and in accordance with
law. The Tribunal shall not be influenced by any observation
in this judgment, which is confined to the legality of the
interim order.
iii. The learned Trial Court shall decide any question of the
maintainability of C.S. No.341 of 2022 in accordance with
law, keeping in view the law declared by the Supreme Court.
Any interim order passed by this Court in the present CMP
stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.
26.
Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
th
Dated the 30 October, 2026/
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 03-Nov-2026 18:29:09