KEYA KUNDU vs PARAG MUKHERJEE AND ORS.
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
Form No. J(2)
In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present: The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon’ble Justice Sandip Kumar De
FMA No. 593 of 2026
+
CAN 1 of 2026
Smt. Keya Kundu
Vs.
Mr. Parag Mukherje and others
For the appellant : Mr. Gouranga Kumar Das,
Mr. Bishal Maity, Advs.
For the plaintiff/
respondent no. 1 : Mr. Arnab Mukherjee,
Mrs. Madhurima Mukherjee,
Mr. Aniket Bhowmich, Advs.
Heard on : 28.09.2026.
Judgment on : 28.09.2026.
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. The present appeal has been preferred against an order whereby the
learned Trial Judge granted injunction restraining the defendant nos. 1
and 2, their men and agents from alienating, transferring and/or
creating any sort of third party interest with respect to the suit property
in any manner till the disposal of the suit.
2. The second defendant in the suit, being the sister of the first
defendant, is the appellant before this Court; whereas the first
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defendant has been arrayed in the appeal as proforma respondent
no.2.
3. The impugned order was passed in a suit for specific performance of
an agreement for sale allegedly entered into between the parties in
respect of an immoveable property.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the defendant no.2 / appellant argues
that at no point of time was any agreement entered into between the
plaintiff / respondent no.1 and the present appellant.
5. All the emails and other documents produced by the plaintiff /
respondent no.1 along with the plaint and the injunction application
were between the plaintiff / respondent no.1 and the proforma
respondent no. 2, that is, the brother of the appellant and/or the
husband of the appellant.
6. It is submitted that no power of attorney was ever executed by the
appellant either in favour of her husband and/or her brother and, as
such, they did not have any authority to enter into the purported
agreement on behalf of the appellant, thus vitiating the said purported
agreement.
7. Secondly, learned counsel for the appellant argues that in view of the
ingredients mentioned in Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
as amended, having not been complied with, the learned Trial Judge
acted beyond jurisdiction in looking into the purported printouts of the
emails / WhatsApp messages, which are in the nature of electronic
evidence.
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8. Thirdly, learned counsel argues that in the absence of any earnest
money or consideration having been paid, there was no concluded
contract between the parties at any point of time.
9. Lastly, learned counsel places reliance on Section 10 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 and argues that no written agreement having been
entered into the parties, the suit for specific performance of agreement
does not stand on its own strength.
10. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellant cites
Anvar P.V. Vs. P. K. Basheer and others reported at (2014) 11 S.C.R.
399: (2014) 10 SCC 473 .
11. On the strength of the said judgment, it is argued that the Hon’ble
Supreme Court approved the view that unless the provisions of Section
65B are complied with and a certificate is produced in terms thereof, no
electronic evidence can be looked into by the Court.
12. Learned counsel next relies on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Limited
Vs. Ks Infraspace Llp Limited reported at AIR 2020 SC 307 for the
proposition that specific performance itself being a discretionary
remedy, a plaintiff seeking temporary injunction in such a suit will have
to establish a strong prima facie case on the basis of undisputed facts
to obtain an injunction. The conduct of the plaintiff, it was held, will
also be a very relevant consideration for the purposes of injunction.
The discretion at this stage, as held in the said judgment, has to be
exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.
13. It is argued that, applying the aforesaid tests, the learned Trial Judge
erred in law and in fact in granting injunction.
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14. While contradicting the arguments of the appellant, learned counsel
for the plaintiff / respondent no.1 submits that from the series of
communications between the parties, by way of Whatsapp messages /
emails, it would be evident that there was consensus ad idem between
the parties.
15. From the materials placed before the learned Trial Judge, which have
also been annexed to the supplementary affidavit filed before this
Court, it would be evident that there was an offer, coupled with a draft
deed being forwarded on behalf of the defendants to the plaintiff, which
offer was accepted by the plaintiff, thereby conclusively entering into a
contract between the parties.
16. Learned counsel submits that it would be premature to argue at this
stage, while deciding an injunction application, that the parameters of
Section 65B of the Evidence Act had to be complied with.
17. Learned counsel further submits that earnest money, as per the plaint
case, was partially paid by the plaintiff.
18. Even otherwise, learned counsel submits on instruction that the
plaintiff / respondent no.1 is agreeable to deposit the earnest money /
advance of Rs.6,00,000/-, as agreed in the emails between the parties,
in court, if so directed.
19. Learned counsel argues that in the context of the present case, a
concluded contract has been conclusively made out to exist, at least at
the level of prima facie case, thus giving rise to a triable issue, entitling
the plaintiff to injunction.
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20. Learned counsel places reliance on a coordinate Bench judgment of
this Court in the case of Amit Mondal since deceased by his legal heirs
and representatives Vs. Pannalal Das and others reported at 2017
SCC OnLine Cal 8739 for the proposition that there are various modes
of creation of contract. A contract, it was held therein, may be
concluded orally, by exchange of letters or by signing a document by
the parties to the contract and exchange thereof between them.
21. The Division Bench observed that once the vendor executes a
contract containing the terms and conditions on which he agreed to
transfer his property to the purchaser and the purchaser, acting upon
the said agreement, pays the earnest money to the vendor for
purchasing the suit property, such payment of earnest money to the
vendor and acceptance thereof by the vendor amounts to conclusion of
the contract between the parties.
22. Learned counsel next cites Ram Krishan Singhal Vs. Executive
Engineer and others reported at (1990) SCC Online Del 310 , where a
learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court observed, inter alia, that
a formal contract is a mere formality and merely because the same
was not executed, it would not mean that a final and a binding contract
had not come into existence between the parties by exchange of
letters, as in the said case. The contract, it was observed, had come
into existence between the parties by exchange of letters.
23. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
24. Insofar as the argument advanced by the appellant on Section 65B of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is concerned, Anvar P.V. (supra) does
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not come to the aid of the appellant. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court was considering a scenario where an election petition,
having the trappings of a suit, had been finally adjudicated. During
trial, several documents were tendered in evidence and marked as
exhibits. In such context, it was held that non-compliance of Section
65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was fatal to the admissibility of
such evidence.
25. As opposed thereto, in the present case, the matter has only reached
the preliminary stage of consideration of an application for injunction.
Section 65B of the Evidence Act is only attracted as and when a
document is tendered in evidence and at the stage of marking the
same as an exhibit. It would be premature to apply such principle at
the stage of adjudicating an injunction application since, if so applied,
an injunction application hearing would be converted to a full-fledged
trial involving adduction of evidence, which is not contemplated by any
law.
26. At the stage of grant of injunction, the court is only to look at the
respective pleadings of the parties on oath, as evidenced from the
plaint and/or the written statement as well as the temporary injunction
application and its written objection, along with the documents relied
on therein. The court is only to ascertain whether triable issues have
been raised for the matter to go for trial, and not whether the plaint
case has been proved to the hilt.
27. Thus, alleged non-compliance of Section 65B is not a relevant
consideration at the stage of grant of temporary injunction.
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28. The argument as to no earnest money having been paid does not
hold water as well. The payment of earnest money only follows a
contract being concluded between the parties. In a suit for specific
performance, the primary consideration of the court is whether a
concluded contract exists between the parties. The payment of earnest
money only follows thereafter.
29. In the facts of the present case, as evidenced by the documents
furnished by the plaintiff in the Trial Court, we find that immediately
after consensus ad idem was reached, by an email dated September 7,
2023, sent at 3.52 p.m, the proforma respondent no. 2, that is the
brother of the appellant, one of the co-owners with the appellant,
expressed disagreement to honour the same. Thus, the stage of
payment of earnest money did not fructify in the present case, although
the contract had already got a final shape.
30. Secondly, the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff in the present
case is sufficiently evidenced by the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 having
submitted before us that he is agreeable to put in the earnest
money/advance of Rs. 6,00,000/-, as borne out by the emails to be the
advance contemplated between the parties.
31. Under the amended Specific Relief Act, 1963, the readiness and
willingness is not even required to be pleaded, although it is required
to be proved, which shall come only at the stage of trial. However, by
dint of having offered to put in the agreed advance amount, sufficient
readiness and willingness has been exhibited by the
plaintiff/respondent no. 1. Thus, the non-payment of earnest
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money/consideration would be an irrelevant factor in the facts of the
present case.
32. Learned counsel for the appellant also relies on Section 10 of the
Indian Contract Act to bolster his argument that no written agreement
has been entered into between the parties. However, it is unknown to
Indian law that in order to be a concluded agreement, such agreement
has necessarily to be in writing. Section 10 merely mandates that all
agreements are contracts if they are made by free consent of parties
competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful
object and are not expressly declared to be void.
33. The proviso thereto stipulates that nothing therein contained shall
affect any law in force in India by which any contract is required to be
made in writing or in the presence of witnesses or any law relating to
the registration of documents.
34. In the present case, nothing has been produced before us to indicate
that there is any law debarring an oral agreement or providing that an
agreement by exchange of emails / whatsapp messages cannot be a
concluded contract in law.
35. Insofar as the emails are concerned, we find sufficient prima facie
proof of a concluded contract being borne out by the same.
36. The appellant relies on Ambalal Sarabhai (supra) to argue that
specific performance is a discretionary remedy and that a strong prima
facie case has to be established. In the said case, the negotiations
between the parties were disbelieved to have given rise to a concluded
contract by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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37. With utmost respect, with the 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief
Act, 1963, the element of discretion which was statutorily recognized to
vest in courts in the grant of the relief of specific performance has been
erased.
38. Although, in all cases, the court implicitly has a discretion to grant the
relief based on several factors, the law, as it stands now after the 2018
amendment, does not vest any statutory discretionary power in the
Court if the parties otherwise prove the necessary ingredients of a
concluded contract.
39. In Ambalal Sarabhai (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered
the judgment in a particular context. It is well-settled that the ratio of a
judgment cannot be extracted in isolation of the factual matrix of the
case.
40. In paragraph no. 17 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
recorded that the negotiations between the parties were reflected in
approximately seventeen emails exchanged between them. In the
same breath, however, it was recorded that the plaintiff therein was
well aware from the very inception that the defendant was negotiating
for sale of the land simultaneously with two others and was further
aware on March 30, 2018 itself that the deal with it had virtually fallen
through, as informed to the escrow agent. It was also recorded that
there was no evidence at that stage that the acceptance was
communicated to the defendant before the latter entered into a deal
with defendant no. 2 on March 30, 2018 and executed a registered
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agreement for sale in favour of a said third party to the agreement on
March 31, 2018.
41. The pleadings in the said suit, as observed in paragraph no. 18 of the
report, acknowledged the awareness of the plaintiff of the then ongoing
negotiations with defendant no. 2.
42. The defendant no. 2 in the said case, as recorded in paragraph no. 20
of the report, in addition to the dues of the Income Tax department,
made further payment of a substantial amount to the defendants, who
had also proceeded to utilize a part out of the said amount and had
materially altered their position by the inaction of the plaintiff to
institute the suit in time and having allowed third party rights to accrue
by making substantial investments.
43. In stark contradiction therewith, in the present case, there is no
ingredient of any subsequent indefeasible or valuable accrued rights
having been created in favour of any third party which would prevent
the Court from granting the relief of specific performance of contract.
44. On a bare perusal of the printouts of the emails produced before the
Trial Court in the instant case, which are also before us, it appears that
a concluded contract was entered into between the parties, at least on
a prima facie footing.
45. By an email dated August 3, 2023, the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 had
acknowledged the receipt of an earlier email sent by one Dipak Kundu,
the husband of the present appellant.
46. In furtherance thereof, on August 23, 2023, there was a further email
by proforma respondent no. 2, the co-owner of the appellant and her
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brother, to the present plaintiff/respondent no. 1, indicating that based
on telephonic conversation with one Raja Banerjee (apparently a
broker), it was observed that the plaintiff had made his mind to
purchase the building of the defendants at a price of Rs.66,00,000/-.
As per the said email, consequent upon such telephonic conversation,
the proforma respondent no. 2 was forwarding a draft agreement for
sale for the premises for the ready reference of the plaintiff. It was
also offered that upon review of the same, if the plaintiff felt that he
wanted to alter any condition, to discuss telephonically the same. A
photocopy of such draft deed, attached to the email, has also been
produced in court.
47. Notably, a copy of the said email, as evident therefrom, was also
forwarded to the husband of the appellant.
48. In fruition of such negotiations, the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 wrote a
further email addressed to the proforma respondent no. 2 on
September 7, 2023, referring to whatsapp calls made on August, 2023
where the recipient of the email had intimated his offer of
Rs.66,00,000/- and expressed agreement to such offer on the part of
the plaintiff.
49. Thus, by the email dated September 7, 2023, prima facie the parties
came to a consensus ad idem as to the essential terms and conditions
of the transfer of the property, thereby taking the shape of a concluded
contract. Whereas such acceptance was conveyed at 1.25 p.m. on
September 7, 2023 by the plaintiff, post facto, by an email of even date
sent at around 3.52 p.m., it was sought to be conveyed by proforma
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respondent no. 2 that “we” (indicating both the co-owners) had decided
not to sell the property “at this time”.
50. Such post facto conveyance of disagreement cannot vitiate a contract
already entered into between the parties, as evidenced by the emails
referred to earlier.
51. Thus, a strong prima facie case has been made out insofar as there
being a concluded contract between the parties is concerned.
52. The question of registration, which was also one of the considerations
in Ambalal Sarabhai (supra), does not acquire relevance in the present
case in view of the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, which
does not mandate any registration for a document to be accepted by
the Court even in evidence as proof of a contract between the parties
in a suit for specific performance of such contract.
53. Lastly, although the appellant feigns ignorance of the transaction and
seeks to disassociate herself from it as well as anything to do with her
husband and the proforma respondent no. 2, who is her brother, fact
remains that the appellant did not shy away from filing a joint written
statement as well as joint written objection with her brother, the
defendant no.1 / proforma respondent no.2, in connection with the suit
as well as the injunction application, which clearly bears out her
complicity in the matter. If the appellant had no connection with her
brother, the other co-owner, vis-à-vis the transaction, there could be no
justification for her not entering appearance separately in the suit and
pleading her case against her brother, who she alleges to have entered
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into the contract on her behalf behind her back, collusively with her
husband.
54. Moreover, the first email, which was referred to in the initial email sent
by the plaintiff, was also sent by the husband of the appellant.
Thereafter, copies of most of the emails concerned were forwarded to
the said husband, which clearly shows that it was the husband of the
appellant who was dealing in the matter on her behalf.
55. In such view of the matter, the complicity between the appellant and
the proforma respondent no. 2, who are defendants in the present suit,
is apparent and cannot be denied at the whims of the appellant
conveniently, for the purpose of the present litigation.
56. In view of the above discussions, this Court is of the opinion that the
learned Trial Judge was justified in granting injunction as a sufficient
case has been made out for grant of injunction.
57. Apart from a prima facie case being made out by the
plaintiff/respondent no.1, the balance of convenience and
inconvenience is also in favour of such grant in view of the subsequent
attempts of the appellant as well as the proforma respondent no. 2 to
deny the very existence of the contract.
58. The appellant might suffer irreparable injury and there would be
unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings unless the injunction as sought
for was granted by the learned Trial Judge.
59. Hence, we do not find any merit in the appeal.
60. Accordingly, FMA No. 593 of 2026 is dismissed on contest, thereby
affirming the impugned order dated January 16, 2026 passed by the
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learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Fifth Court at Alipore, District-
South 24 Parganas, in Title Suit No. 1463 of 2023.
61. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2026 is disposed of as well.
62. However, it will be open to the learned Trial Court, if it is of such
opinion at any stage of the suit, to direct the plaintiff/respondent no.1
to deposit the contractually agreed advance amount of Rs. 6 lakh in the
Trial Court to prove her readiness and willingness, subject to the
outcome of the suit.
63. We make it abundantly clear that the aforesaid observations are
tentative in nature, rendered only for the purpose of deciding the
present appeal, and shall not be treated to be binding on the parties or
the learned Trial Judge at any subsequent stage of the suit.
64. There will be no order as to costs.
65. Urgent certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be made
available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Sandip Kumar De, J.)