Ashok Kumar vs Central Bank Of India
- Court
- Supreme Court
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 1242
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 29916 OF 2024]
ASHOK KUMAR …APPELLANT
VERSUS
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
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2. We have heard the appellant-in-person and Mr. Gopal Jha, learned
counsel, who was appointed amicus curiae to assist the Court. Mr. R.
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Basant, learned senior counsel appearing for the Central Bank of India
has also been heard.
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3. Kumar challenges a judgment and order dated 9 May, 2024, passed
by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.11.18
17:20:14 IST
Reason:
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Kumar
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Bank
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Chandigarh dismissing his intra-court appeal and, thereby, upholding
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dismissal of Kumar’s miscellaneous application in his writ petition .
4. The facts leading to this appeal, though tracing back nearly five
decades, are not too complicated; however, the legal position has been
obscured by Kumar’s pursuit of overlapping remedies for the same
relief.
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5. Kumar, having joined the Bank on 1 March, 1969, was found to have
defalcated certain amounts with fraudulent intent. He was placed
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under suspension by the Bank’s competent authority on 22
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November, 1978. An FIR was registered on 24 November, 1978,
under Sections 409, 420, 465, 468, 471, and 120B of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860. Pursuant thereto, charges were framed against Kumar
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and three others. Upon trial, Kumar was acquitted on 15 July, 1983.
Appeal/revision against such acquittal carried by the State and the
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Bank, respectively, came to be dismissed by the High Court on 27
May, 1991. Further proceedings not having been taken to this Court,
Kumar’s acquittal attained finality.
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6. On 16 May, 1990, the Bank initiated departmental proceedings
against Kumar by drawing up a charge-sheet. Kumar challenged such
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action in the earlier writ petition, instituted on 11 June, 1991, on the
ground that the criminal court had acquitted him on the self-same
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High Court
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LPA 1164 of 2024
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CM-4377-CWP-2024
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CWP-8983-1991 (hereafter earlier writ petition)
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charge of defalcation. That earlier writ petition was allowed by the High
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Court, more than 15 (fifteen) years after its institution, on 12
October, 2007. The operative portion of the order reads thus:
18. In the light of foregoing discussion, the present petition shall
stand allowed. The enquiry proceedings shall stand quashed. If the
petitioner has not attained age of superannuation, he shall be
reinstated forthwith. He shall also be entitled to all the consequential
benefits relatable to reinstatement. If he has retired from service, he
would obviously be entitled to only the consequential benefits.
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7. Challenge thereto in an intra-court appeal , at the instance of the
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Bank, failed. The appeal was dismissed vide an order dated 20
December, 2007. Such dismissal came to be challenged by the Bank
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before this Court in a special leave petition .
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8. It is noted that by an interim order dated 20 March, 2009, passed on
the special leave petition, the Bank was granted liberty to conclude the
disciplinary proceedings against Kumar and to pass the final order, but
was restrained from giving effect thereto without the leave of the
Court. In pursuance thereof, the Bank had concluded the disciplinary
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proceedings and passed a final order of dismissal dated 30 March,
2009; but the same could not be given effect in the wake of the order
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dated 20 March, 2009.
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9. On 31 March, 2009, Kumar, while continuing under suspension,
retired from service upon attaining the age of superannuation.
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LPA 246 of 2007 (O&M)
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SLP (C) No. 2989 of 2008
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10. The Bank’s special leave petition, however, failed. It was dismissed on
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26 July, 2011 by this Court notwithstanding the fact that the Bank
proposed to dismiss Kumar based on the findings returned in respect
of the three charges levelled against him.
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11. On 10 August, 2011, Kumar submitted a representation before the
Bank seeking release of his dues. Having not received a penny, Kumar
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initiated contempt action . During its pendency, the Bank disbursed
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Rs.37,07,445.61/- to Kumar on 1 December, 2011. A further sum of
Rs.4,89,198.00/- towards Provident Fund dues was thereafter
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released in his favour. On 28 October, 2013, the contempt action was
disposed of by the High Court, recording that the Bank had paid Kumar
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more than Rs.42,00,000.00/- in compliance with the order dated 12
October, 2007.
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12. Kumar thereafter filed a fresh writ petition on 26 May, 2015 before
the High Court seeking interest @ 18% p.a. compounded annually on
the delayed payment of salary / arrears of salary, from the day each
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single salary became due and payable to him till 1 December, 2011,
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(the date of payment, in terms of the High Court’s order dated 12
October, 2007) and further interest @ 24% p.a. compounded annually
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on the total amount of interest so calculated as it stood on 1
December, 2011 until the actual payment is made. The High Court, by
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COCP 2688/2011
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CWP-11438-2015 (hereafter the subsequent writ petition)
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its judgment and order dated 11 December, 2023, spurned such claim
observing as under:
It is a settled principle of law that any relief claimed and not granted
or any relief not claimed, will amount to the non-grant of the said
relief by the competent Court of law. The petitioner, who appears in
person, concedes the fact that no interest was claimed for while
seeking the reinstatement with consequential benefits. That being
factual situation, the petitioner cannot claim the interest in the
subsequent proceedings as grant of the said benefit will amount to
modifying the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court dated
12.10.2007, which has already attained finality upto the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India.
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13. In view of the subsequent writ petition having failed, on 26 February,
2024, Kumar filed the miscellaneous application referred to above in
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the earlier writ petition (finally decided on 12 October, 2007) under
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Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 , after about 17
(seventeen) years of final disposal of the earlier writ petition. The
application sought ‘ interest at the rate of 18% per annum compounded
annually on the delayed payment of salary / arrears of salary, from
the day each single salary became due / payable to the petitioner till
01.12.11 when the arrears of salary were paid ’.
14. The Single Judge, while dismissing the said application vide a
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judgment and order dated 21 March, 2024, reasoned that Kumar, not
having claimed interest in the earlier writ petition, grant of interest at
such a belated stage would amount to a modification of the original
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order dated 12 October, 2007 and that it is inappropriate to grant
such relief.
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CPC
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15. The Division Bench confirmed dismissal as aforesaid vide the impugned
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judgment and order dated 9 May, 2024 . It was noticed that Kumar
did not file any cross-objection / appeal when the Bank appealed to
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the Division Bench against the order dated 12 October, 2007. Kumar
was represented throughout the proceedings, right till the dismissal of
the Bank’s special leave petition before this Court. In such
circumstances, the Division Bench opined that the principle of finality
of proceedings must be adhered to. Having not chosen to seek interest
at the relevant stage, it was also held that a subsequent proceeding
would be barred in view of the principles of constructive res judicata
and estoppel.
16. According to Mr. Basant, in the multiple proceedings that ensued,
Kumar could have sought interest but chose not to. The claim for
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interest came to be raised for the first time on 26 May, 2015, in the
second writ petition, and, upon its dismissal, by filing the
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miscellaneous application in the earlier writ petition on 26 February,
2024. In the circumstances, the High Court was justified in declining
Kumar’s relief, as claimed.
17. While urging us to express agreement with the view taken by the High
Court in the impugned order, Mr. Basant referred to us the decision of
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impugned order
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this Court in CIT v. T.P. Kumaran and placed particular emphasis
on paragraph 4 thereof. This Court’s succinct and precise ruling reads:
4. The Tribunal has committed a gross error of law in directing the
payment. The claim is barred by constructive res judicata under
Section 11, Explanation IV, CPC which envisages that any matter
which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or
attack in a former suit, shall be deemed to have been a matter
directly and substantially in issue in a subsequent suit. Hence when
the claim was made on earlier occasion, he should have or might
have sought and secured decree for interest. He did not seek so and,
therefore, it operates as res judicata. Even otherwise, when he filed
a suit and specifically did not claim the same, Order 2 Rule 2 CPC
prohibits the petitioner to seek the remedy separately. In either
event, the OA is not sustainable.
18. Having considered the facts and the materials on record vis-à-vis the
applicable law, we find Kumar to have faltered in pursuing the proper
remedy.
19. When he instituted the earlier writ petition, Kumar had challenged the
initiation of disciplinary proceedings (after acquittal in the criminal
trial) and prayed for quashing thereof, together with reinstatement in
(sic, resumption of) service (since, from 1978, he had been under
suspension). The question of claiming any interest on delayed payment
of salary did not quite arise on the date Kumar first entered the portals
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of the High Court on 11 June, 1991. He tasted success when the first
writ petition succeeded in 2007. The challenge to the writ order in the
intra-court appeal before the Division Bench having failed in December,
2007, Kumar prevailed over the Bank once again. Following another
unsuccessful foray by the Bank before this Court through a special
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(1996) 10 SCC 561
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leave petition, which stood dismissed in July, 2011, the proceedings
attained finality. Between 1991 and 2011, Kumar spent the major part
of the remaining tenure of service under suspension and embroiled in
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litigation and, in the meanwhile, retired on 31 March, 2009.
20. This being the trajectory of proceedings since litigation commenced on
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11 June, 1991, and considering the cause of action (primary
challenge to initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and claiming
relief of quashing thereof together with reinstatement in service) that
triggered the institution of the earlier writ petition, did non-payment
of salary constitute any part of Kumar’s grievance that he could have
legitimately raised in the first writ petition? Did also a cause of action
accrue to Kumar for claiming interest? We think not! A right to relief
ordinarily relates back to the date the proceedings are instituted. The
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crucial date here is 11 June, 1991. Res judicata and/or principles
analogous thereto and the bar of Order II Rule 2, CPC apply only to a
claim that could have been raised when the earlier writ petition was
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instituted. On 11 June, 1991, Kumar had no claim for interest, having
not foreseen that it would take years for the proceedings to conclude.
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The Single Judge, therefore, while making the order dated 12
October, 2007, was quite right in directing Kumar’s reinstatement in
service, provided he had not retired, and the release of all
consequential benefits relatable to such reinstatement. Since Kumar
was under suspension and must have been in receipt of subsistence
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allowance, consequential benefits would include payment of salary for
the entire period spent under suspension, minus the subsistence
allowance and other notional benefits, if any. Once the financial
benefits were released to Kumar following the dismissal of the special
leave petition by this Court and during the contempt action, Kumar
invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court a second time, claiming
interest. The claim for interest did not arise from the same cause of
action which triggered the earlier writ petition but was part of a
separate cause of action that arose by virtue of the delay in conclusion
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of judicial proceedings from the order dated 12 October, 2007, ending
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with this Court’s order dated 26 July, 2011. The delay was a
subsequent event during pendency of the earlier writ petition and after
its disposal. A claim based on a subsequent cause of action cannot be
barred by a judgment on a prior cause of action. That apart, grant of
interest required adjudication of disputed facts not forming part of the
original lis – such as entitlement to interest, the period of delay
attributable to each party, the applicable rate, etc. The relief, in such
event, being substantive and independent, the proper remedy was a
fresh proceeding, which Kumar correctly instituted. However, to his
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misfortune, the Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 11
December, 2023, on an untenable ground. In our opinion, Kumar
should have challenged the order dismissing his subsequent writ
petition by way of an intra-court appeal and not by filing the
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miscellaneous application in the earlier writ petition, which involved a
different issue, and request for such relief which was not in the nature
of seeking clarification of an ambiguous and equivocal order.
21. It is trite that a miscellaneous application in a finally decided writ
petition is not an independent proceeding. It has a narrow scope,
deriving its sustenance from the main proceeding and can be
maintained only for matters ancillary to the disposal: such as
correction of an arithmetical or a clerical error, clarification of an
ambiguity in the operative part of the order of disposal, modification
of the mode of compliance and/or extension of time for
implementation, recall of an order of dismissal, etc. It is procedural,
not substantive, and cannot be used as a vehicle to agitate, on merits,
a subsequent or independent cause of action. Once the main
proceedings stand decided, the Court becomes functus officio except
for the limited purposes, as aforesaid. This Court has held that a
miscellaneous application cannot be used to seek (i) reopening of
proceedings in respect of a matter providing a fresh cause of action;
(ii) a substantive relief that was not granted in the main proceedings;
(iii) recall of an order on merits, except in very limited cases of fraud,
lack of jurisdiction, or complete breach of the audi alteram partem and
nemo debet esse judex in causa sua rules; (iv) a fresh adjudication on
a point that was decided, or that could or should have been raised in
the main proceedings; and (iv) a review of the judgment/order on
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merits, circumventing the limitation and grounds for review under
Order XLVII, CPC / Article 226. This is, however, subject to the limited
class of applications that the law permits to be entertained even after
disposal of the main proceedings, where the relief sought is truly
ancillary to, and in aid of, the order already passed. For the exposition
adverted to us, we have drawn guidance from the decisions of this
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Court in State of U.P. v. Brahma Dutt Sharma , Budhia Swain v.
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Gopinath Deb , Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi , K.A.
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Ansari v. Indian Airlines Ltd. and Government of NCT of Delhi
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v. K.L. Rathi Steels Limited .
22. To our mind, the miscellaneous application of Kumar was not seeking
a clarification as in K. A. Ansari (supra); on the contrary, it was a
substantive claim for interest dressed as a miscellaneous prayer, akin
to fresh relief claimed in Brahma Dutt Sharma (supra). Once the
substantive claim for interest raised in the subsequent writ petition
stood rejected, the miscellaneous application in the earlier writ petition
was no longer a legally available option for Kumar. The Single Judge,
followed by the Division Bench, did not, therefore, commit any error in
dismissing the miscellaneous application and the appeal arising
therefrom. This appeal, based on the satisfaction that the Division
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(1987) 2 SCC 179
15
(1999) 4 SCC 396
16
(2004) 12 SCC 713
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(2009) 2 SCC 164
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(2024) 7 SCC 315
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Bench was right in upholding the order of the Single Judge, would,
thus, seem not to merit any further consideration.
23. When Kumar claimed interest, it was a claim for restitution for delay
pendente lite and during the appeal(s), a distinct cause of action
arising subsequently. Facts not in dispute, the Single Judge seized of
the subsequent writ petition could and should have considered the
claim on its merits instead of dismissing the same. The misconception
about interest has been clarified by this Court in Alok Shanker
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Pandey v. Union of India , which observed that it is not a penalty
or punishment at all; it is a normal accretion on capital. Therefore, it
is clear that Kumar, though entitled to lay claim to interest, was shown
the door by the High Court without justification. It is here that we are
reminded of the salutary principle that an act of court should harm no
litigant. This Court has repeatedly applied the actus curiae neminem
gravabit rule, which we need not refer to at this stage in detail.
24. Also, we need to bear in mind that Kumar initially had to contest
criminal proceedings for around a dozen years and, thereafter, was
embroiled in writ litigation for more than three decades. Despite an
order of dismissal from service hanging over his head as a Damocles
sword, which could not ultimately be enforced, he had wrongfully been
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kept away from discharge of duty since 22 September, 1978 (date of
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suspension) till 31 March, 2009 (date of his retirement). Though the
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(2007) 3 SCC 545
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claim for grant of interest could have legitimately been raised in an
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intra-court appeal from the order dated 11 December, 2023, it was
mistakenly raised in the miscellaneous application, which was indeed
not maintainable; and omission to claim interest before the
appropriate fora has deprived him of money which was otherwise due.
In fact, neither the Single Judges (dismissing the subsequent writ
petition and the miscellaneous application) nor the Division Bench
(upholding dismissal of the miscellaneous application) held that Kumar
was not entitled to an order for grant of interest.
25. Given the facts that Kumar had to run from pillar to post to obtain an
order granting interest across various fora for a long time, and now
that he is in the twilight of his life, being a septuagenarian, a
compassionate view may not be wholly unjust and inappropriate in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. We may draw inspiration
from the decision in Jeypore Sugar Company Ltd. v. Sales Tax
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Officer , where this Court held as follows:
5. … According to us, it would not be just and proper to deny relief
to the appellant, which is otherwise due, on the ground that earlier
it had only assailed the question of exigibility to tax. It is correct that
the plea now taken could have been advanced earlier as well, but the
fact this was not done, should not be a ground to deny the relief
which is otherwise due to the appellant. The technical plea of
constructive res judicata should not stand in the way of the appellant
in a case of the present nature.
26. The Bank paid an aggregate sum of about Rs.42,00,000.00/- to Kumar
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on 1 December, 2011. In exercise of our powers under Article 142 of
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(1998) 9 SCC 358
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the Constitution of India, we are of the considered opinion that an
additional sum of Rs.5,00,000/-, if paid by the Bank to Kumar, would
sufficiently serve the ends of justice. We, thus, order accordingly. The
said additional sum, which shall constitute full and final settlement of
Kumar’s dues against the Bank, shall be paid to him within 2 (two)
months from the date of production of a copy of this judgment before
the competent authority of the Bank.
27. The appeal stands disposed of on the aforesaid terms. Connected
applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
28. We record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by the amicus ,
Mr. Gopal Jha.
…………………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
..……………………………….J.
(SHEEL NAGU)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 18, 2026.
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