Pulkit @ Monu vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Court
Supreme Court

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2026 INSC 543
Criminal Appeal No(s). 1818/2022
PULKIT @ MONU Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
2. This appeal arises from an order of
1
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore
dated 25.06.2022 passed in Criminal Appeal
No. 1475/2012, whereby the appeal of the
appellant against his conviction under
Section 302/ 120B IPC in Sessions Trial
No.662/ 2008 was dismissed.
Facts
3. Four persons, namely, Tarun, Mithun @
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
CHETAN ARORA
Date: 2026.05.26
13:26:48 IST
Reason:
Deepak, Sandeep and the appellant, were
1 High Court
1

tried for murder of one Ashok Bakdiya, which
took place on 18.06.2008. Tarun, Mithun @
Deepak and Sandeep, were convicted under
Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code,
2
1860 and Section 25 of the Arms Act whereas
the appellant was convicted for criminal
conspiracy to commit murder, punishable
under Section 302/120B IPC. All convicted
accused appealed to the High Court.
Sandeep’s appeal abated whereas rest three
appeals were dismissed by the impugned
order.
4. This appeal is confined to the case
against the appellant who has been convicted
for criminal conspiracy to commit murder of
3
Ashok Bakdiya .
5. The trial court convicted the
appellant for the offence of conspiracy by
relying on the following circumstances:
(i) Three days before the incident,
appellant had contacted Manish (PW3)
2 IPC
3 Deceased
2

in the presence of Sonu @ Jitendra
(PW5) to do recce of the daily
movement of the deceased.
(ii) Few days before the incident
Yogesh (PW-9), while parking his
vehicle at a public place, saw the
appellant, co-accused Tarun and few
others talking abusively about the
deceased.
(iii) Disclosure statement of the
appellant led to discovery of the
names of other co-accused i.e.
perpetrators of the crime and seizure
of appellant’s mobile with which he
contacted the co-accused Tarun after
the occurrence.
(iv) There was a dispute between the
appellant and the deceased as
disclosed by Asha Bakdiya (PW8), wife
of the deceased, and one Navneet
(PW10), who, about six months before,
saw the appellant being slapped by the
3

deceased, in response to which the
appellant had pointed a gun at the
deceased. Thus, there existed motive
for the crime.
(v) After the occurrence, on the same
day, the appellant had contacted co-
accused Tarun from the mobile seized
from the appellant.
6. Though the appeal of the appellant was
dismissed, the High Court discarded the
testimony of PW3 and PW5 upon finding that
those two witnesses had deposed that they
were detained illegally for a few days at
the police station before their statement
was recorded. However, the High Court relied
on other circumstances to uphold conviction
of the appellant.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
7. Impugning the orders of the trial
court as well as the High Court, the
submission on behalf of the appellant is as
follows:
4

(i) There is no evidence, direct or
indirect, to indicate that there was
an agreement or meeting of mind
between the appellant and the
perpetrators of the crime, prior to
the occurrence.
(ii) Once the High Court discarded the
testimony of PW3 and PW5, there
remained literally no evidence as
regards involvement of the appellant.
(iii)Disclosure statement suffered by
the appellant in custody is not
admissible being a confessional
statement which led to no discovery of
any fact. In that context, it was
urged that (a) the appellant was
arrested on 01.07.2008 whereas
statements of PW3, PW5, PW9 and other
witnesses were recorded on or about
21/22.06.2008 wherein the name of
Tarun had already surfaced; (b) PW 23
(R.K. Malviya) i.e., the investigating
5

officer, during cross-examination, had
admitted that he had suspicion about
the involvement of the appellant and
Tarun through secret information.
(iv) Insofar as the mobile seized from
the appellant is concerned, it was not
discovered but handed over by the
appellant to the police. Moreover, it
stood in the name of his father.
Besides, the mobile number allegedly
contacted from that mobile was not of
any co-accused. Thus, in absence of
any evidence of prior agreement, these
bits and pieces of unreliable
evidence, which have no evidentiary
value, cannot sustain conviction of
the appellant on the charge of
conspiracy.
(v) Motive is not proved beyond
reasonable doubt. PW8, wife of the
deceased, in her statement-in-chief
stated that her husband had no
6

enemies. However, later, during cross-
examination by the prosecution, she
stated that her husband had informed
her about some dispute with the
appellant about a year and half back.
PW10 (Navneet) states about some
incident which he witnessed by chance
about 6 months before the incident.
Being a chance witness his testimony
had to be viewed with circumspection.
Moreover, motive by itself is not
sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Besides, it could form the basis of
false implication. In such
circumstances, according to the
learned counsel for the appellant,
there is no worthwhile evidence to
convict the appellant for the charge
of conspiracy.
Submissions on behalf of the State
8. Per contra, on behalf of the State, it
is submitted that the High Court fell in
7

error in discarding the testimony of PW3 and
PW5. It is submitted that though PW3 and PW5
had stated that they were detained by the
police for a few days, their statement to
that extent did not appear correct because
their statements were recorded by the
investigating officer just 4 days after the
incident. Therefore, the trial court
disbelieved that part of their statement
where they stated about being detained for
5-6 days before their statement was
recorded. Besides, nothing much could be
elicited in the cross-examination to doubt
the correctness of their statement. The Call
Detail Record (“CDR”) indicated that after
the occurrence there had been a contact
between the appellant and the perpetrator of
the crime. In such circumstances, as motive
was also proved, the concurrent finding of
guilt returned by the two courts below does
not warrant any interference.
Analysis
8

9. We have accorded due consideration to
the rival submissions and have perused the
record carefully.
10. Admittedly, the FIR was lodged against
unknown persons by son of the deceased
without expressing suspicion against anyone.
Four persons were sent for trial. Charge
against the appellant is one of conspiracy.
Admittedly, there is no evidence regarding
the presence of the appellant at the place
of occurrence.
11. To bring home the charge of
conspiracy, the prosecution must prove,
either by direct evidence or circumstantial,
that the accused had been privy to an
agreement to do, or cause to be done, an
illegal act or an act which is not illegal
by illegal means. Here, there is no direct
reliable evidence to indicate that the
accused persons i.e., perpetrator and
conspirator, met each other at any place,
prior to the occurrence. PW-9, the sole
9

witness who states that he saw the appellant
and co-accused Tarun along with few others
at a public place talking about the
deceased, is a chance witness. He states
that while he was parking his vehicle at a
public place, he could overhear what they
were talking. However, he could not
elaborate upon the nature of talks and
admittedly it was a fleeting presence of PW9
there. Besides, the defense gave suggestion
about the criminal antecedents of that
witness as also that he was set up by the
police. Admittedly, there are no call detail
records of the appellant being in concert
with the other co-accused prior to the
occurrence. Further, no evidence of money/
consideration passing from the appellant to
any of the co-accused is on record.
12. We are conscious of the law that from
circumstances also inference of conspiracy
can be drawn. However, the law regarding
proof of guilt by circumstantial evidence is
settled. The circumstances from which the
10

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must or
should be, and not merely may be, fully
established; the facts established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty; these circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency; they should
exclude every possible hypothesis except the
one to be proved; and there must be a chain
of circumstances so complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused
and must show that in all human probability
4
the act must have been done by the accused .
13. In that light, we shall deal with the
circumstances set out by the prosecution and
relied by the trial court.
14. First circumstance is motive.
Regarding motive for the crime, there is no
worthwhile evidence. Wife of the deceased
4 Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116
11

stated in her statement in chief that her
husband had no enemies. Though, later,
during her cross-examination by the
prosecution, she stated about being
informed, a year and half ago, of some
dispute between the appellant and her
husband. The other witness Navneet (PW10)
speaks about some incident which occurred
six months before the occurrence. According
to him, he saw the deceased slapping the
appellant and the appellant taking out his
gun and threatening the deceased. There is
no proximity between the date of that
incident and the date of the crime.
Moreover, there is no report of any such
incident. Besides, motive alone, though may
be relevant for investigation of the case,
by itself cannot sustain a conviction. It is
nothing more than a link to the chain of
incriminating circumstances. On its own, it
cannot form the basis of conviction.
15. As far as the circumstance of the
appellant requesting PW3 and PW5 for a recce
12

of the deceased is concerned, the
testimonies of PW-3 and PW-5 have already
been discarded by the High Court as one
obtained by coercion in as much as those
witnesses had deposed that they were
illegally detained by the police for few
days. No doubt the trial court observed that
their statement about detention for 5-6 days
may not be correct as their statement was
recorded within 4 days of the incident, but
once those witnesses complain of detention
and there appears no good reason for the
investigating agency to summon those
witnesses, there arises a doubt whether
those witnesses were set up by the police.
In such circumstances, when the High Court
had discarded testimony of those witnesses
there is no reason for us to accept their
testimony.
16. Now the circumstance regarding the
appellant being seen few days before the
occurrence with few others including Tarun
talking about the deceased, falls for our
13

consideration. This circumstance is narrated
by Yogesh. Yogesh is a chance witness.
According to his testimony, while he was
parking his vehicle, he came to witness few
people including the appellant and Tarun
talking about the deceased. However, it is
not disclosed as to what those talks were
about. Besides from the testimony of the
investigating officer (R.K. Malviya)
(paragraph 82) it appears that during
investigation Yogesh did not disclose about
abusive word being used in the context of
the deceased. Therefore, not much importance
can be attached to the said circumstance as
it is not of conclusive nature and tendency
in pointing towards the guilt of the
accused-appellant.
17. Now we come to the disclosure
statement. It is well settled that a
confessional disclosure made during police
custody is admissible under Section 27 of
5
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 only to the
5 Evidence Act
14

6
extent it leads to discovery of a fact .
According to the learned counsel for the
State, it led to discovery of mobile and
identity of other co-accused. Insofar as
discovery of the name of co-accused Tarun is
concerned, that surfaced much earlier as
would be clear from the testimony of Yogesh,
whose statement was recorded much prior to
the arrest of the appellant and disclosure
statement made by him. Insofar as the
relevance of mobile is concerned, it would
depend on the probative value of the call
detail record (CDR) of that mobile because
it is not a case of there being any
incriminating audio or video recording.
18. Insofar as the relevance of CDR of the
mobile seized from the appellant and the one
alleged to be in possession of co-accused
Tarun is concerned, apart from there being
serious doubt regarding its admissibility
for want of certificate under Section 65B of
the Evidence Act, there is no evidence that
6 Pulukuri Kotayya & Ors. v. King-Emperor: AIR 1947 PC 67: 1946 SCC OnLine SC 67, recently followed in Raja
Naykar v. State of Chattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 481.
15

the other mobile, which was contacted after
the occurrence from the mobile of the
appellant, was in the name of any of the co-
accused. Rather, it stood in the name of one
Kailash. Further, it is not borne out from
the record that the said mobile was in
possession of the concerned accused on the
date of the incident. Besides, the CDR
record does not indicate that the appellant
was the only one who contacted that mobile
after the incident. And, most importantly,
there is no evidence that there was a mobile
contact with the perpetrators of crime prior
to the incident. Thus, the seizure of mobile
and its CDR had little or no evidentiary
value to link the appellant to the crime.
19. In the light of discussion above, in
our view, neither the circumstances are
proved beyond reasonable doubt, nor they are
of conclusive nature and tendency as to
point towards the guilt of the appellant.
Besides, the chain of those circumstances is
not complete as to rule out all hypotheses
16

save and except the guilt of the appellant.
20. In such circumstances, we are of the
considered view that the conviction of the
appellant is not sustainable. The appellant
ought to have been given the benefit of
doubt.
21. Consequently, the appeal is allowed;
the judgment and order of the High Court as
well as of the trial court is set aside.
22. The appellant is acquitted of the
charge for which he was tried and convicted.
He shall be released, unless required in any
other case.
23. All pending applications shall stand
disposed of.
…………………………………………………………….J
[MANOJ MISRA]
…………………………………………………………….J
[MANMOHAN]
New Delhi;
May 20, 2026
17

ITEM NO.1 COURT NO.14 SECTION II-E
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s). 1818/2022
PULKIT @ MONU Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Respondent(s)
[ONLY IA NO. 122214/26 IS LISTED UNDER THIS ITEM]
IA No. 122214/2026 - GRANT OF BAIL

Date : 20-05-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
For Appellant(s) :
Mr. Ganesh A. Khemka, Adv.
Mr. Sarthak Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Shreenath A. Khemka, Adv.
Ms. Vidhi Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Raghavendra Pratap Singh, AOR

For Respondent(s) :
Mr. Pashupathi Nath Razdan, AOR
Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Adv.


UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. IA No. 122214/2026 is allowed.
2. The appeal is allowed in terms of the
signed order placed on the file.
3. All pending applications shall stand
disposed of.
(CHETAN ARORA) (SAPNA BANSAL)
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
18