Akshay Puri vs Kailash Kumar Arora
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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% Reserved on: 01 September, 2026
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Pronounced on: 18 November, 2026
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Uploaded on: 18 November, 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010142702026
+ RFA 327/2026, CM APPL. 22678/2026, CM APPL. 22680- 22681/2026
AKSHAY PURI
Aged about 50 years
S/o Late Ashok Puri,
R/o D1/10, Vasant Vihar GF, New
Delhi-110057. .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Jetender Pal Singh, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Vishal Ganda, Mr.
Varun Kumar, Ms. Chhavi Jain, Mr.
Rishabh Arya, Advocates.
versus
Mr. KAILASH KUMAR ARORA
S/o Shri Lila Kishan
R/o 68, Main Street N, Suite 229,
Markham Ontario,
Canada-L3P 0N5. ....Respondent
Through: Mr. Abhimanyu Garg, Ms. Tanishka,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1. Regular First Appeal under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as „CPC‟) , has
been filed on behalf of the Appellant, Akshay Puri , against the Judgment and
Signature Not Verified
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By:VIKAS ARORA
Signing Date:18.11.2026
16:09:34
RFA 327/2026 Page 1 of 46
Decree dated 10.02.2026 of possession and Mesne Profits to the tune of
Rs.3,00,000/- per month, from the date of filing of the Suit till realisation ,
passed by the learned District Judge, New Delhi, under Order XII Rule 6
read with Order XV CPC.
2. The Plaintiff, through his Power of Attorney Holder, Mr. Sunil Jasuja ,
under the Power of Attorney dated 05.05.2017, had filed a Civil Suit
bearing CS No. 463/2018 for Recovery of Possession of the Basement and
Ground Floor of the residential Property bearing No. D-1/10, Vasant Vihar,
New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as „suit property‟) admeasuring 605
square yards, and Mesne Profits @ Rs.2,50,000/- per month from
16.04.2018 till the date of delivery of possession.
3. The brief facts are, that the Plaintiff, Mr. K.K. Arora , a citizen of
Canada of Indian origin and resident of Markham, Ontario, who was aged
76 years, stated that the entire property bearing No. D-1/10, Vasant Vihar,
New Delhi, was inherited by him from his mother, Late Smt. Janki Dev i,
upon her demise in 1996. He became the sole and absolute owner of the suit
property and it was mutated in his name as a freehold property, in the
records of the Delhi Development Authority.
4. The Plaintiff entered into a Collaboration Agreement on 12.11.1998
with Mr. B.K. Uppal, the Developer, for redevelopment of the property. In
terms of the Collaboration Agreement, apart from some monetary
consideration, the Plaintiff got the completed and finished Basement and
Ground Floor of the property.
5. The Plaintiff subsequently, out of love and affection for his sister,
Late Mrs. Promila Puri , permitted her to reside in the suit property with her
husband, Mr. Ashok Puri, Defendant No.1, and their two sons, Mr. Akshay
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Puri , Defendant No.2, and Mr. Anuj Puri, Defendant No.3, sometime in
around 2000-2001.
6. They occupied the suit property gratis i.e. without paying any rent or
fees or charges to the Plaintiff, and had no right or title in the suit property
except the right of permitted user granted by the Plaintiff. Mr. Anuj Puri, the
son moved to Hong Kong long back and resides there since long.
7. The Plaintiff being the owner, continued to pay all taxes and duties,
including property tax, in respect of the suit property. He visited India
regularly, on average, twice a year and stayed in the suit property for
extended periods, during his visits. Some of his personal belongings also
remained there.
8. After the demise of Mrs. Promila Puri in 2013, Defendant Nos.1 and
2 continued to reside in the suit property without paying any rent or charges.
The Plaintiff proposed the execution of a Rent Agreement, but no agreement
materialised as Defendant No.1 was unwilling to enter into such an
arrangement; instead wished to purchase the suit property, to which the
Plaintiff did not agree.
9. Subsequently, the relations between the parties, soured. Nevertheless,
considering their familial relationship, the Plaintiff, by a Letter dated
10.12.2017 sent by email, proposed certain options for the Defendants’
continued occupation. He called upon Defendant No. 1 to execute a Rent
Agreement by 15.03.2018, or hand over vacant possession of the suit
property, by 15.04.2018.
10. No response was received from Defendant No.1. By a further Letter
dated 08.03.2018, the Plaintiff expressly withdrew his earlier offer and
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asked the Defendants to vacate the suit property on or before 15.04.2018,
and hand over vacant physical possession to his Power of Attorney Holder.
11. The Plaintiff, by way of abundant caution, also addressed an e-mail
dated 10.03.2018 to the Defendants at the e-mail ID of Defendant No.2,
Akshay Puri, wherein he reiterated the contents of the Letter dated
08.03.2018, with the same request to the Defendants to vacate the suit
property and to hand over its possession to his Power of Attorney Holder, on
or before 15.04.2018.
12. Despite service of these communications, the Defendants failed to
vacate the suit property. The Plaintiff asserted that, upon withdrawal of the
permission granted to them, their continued occupation after 15.04.2018 was
illegal and unauthorised.
13. Hence, the Plaintiff filed the Suit for Recovery of Possession and
Mesne Profits @Rs.2,50,000/- per month from 16.04.2018 till delivery of
vacant and complete possession, claiming it to be the prevalent monthly rent
of a similarly situated property.
14. The defence of the Defendants was struck off vide Order dated
29.10.2018, which was recalled on 28.11.2022 and the Written Statement
was taken on record.
15. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, namely , Ashok Puri and Akshay Puri, in their
Written Statement raised a preliminary objection that the Suit constituted
an abuse of the process of law and had been instituted with a mala fide
intention to harass them.
16. They claimed that the rights qua the suit property had already been
settled inter se the parties and that the Plaintiff, by his conduct and pursuant
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to a mutual settlement with Late Smt. Promila Puri and the Defendants, had
waived his rights therein.
17. According to the Defendants, the Plaintiff had been residing in
Canada for almost 60 years and wanted to ensure that his share in the family
properties, be protected. The parties, therefore, entered into a mutual
settlement and understanding.
18. Since the Plaintiff resided abroad, he authorised Smt. Promila Puri to
facilitate the sale of the first floor of the property bearing No. D-1/10,
Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, and remit the entire sale proceeds to him. He also
authorised her to sell two other properties, namely, 412A, Ansal Bhavan,
Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi, and 408, Surya Kiran, Kasturba Gandhi
Marg, New Delhi.
19. In consideration of the efforts of Smt. Promila Puri , the Plaintiff had
bequeathed his rights qua the Basement and Ground Floor of the suit
property, and the parties arrived at an arrangement whereby Smt. Promila
Puri and the Defendants were given complete ownership and possession
rights therein, upon payment of a small sum .
20. During her lifetime, Smt. Promila Puri repeatedly requested the
Plaintiff, to complete the transfer of ownership. He, however, assured her
that he would bequeath the suit property to her through a Will, so that the
parties would avoid the taxes and levies applicable to a transfer and would
be required to pay only minimal mutation charges, upon inheritance.
21. The Defendants further pleaded that the Plaintiff had, in fact, executed
a Will bequeathing complete rights in the suit property to Smt. Promila Puri,
which made it amply clear that the parties wanted to give effect to the
mutual agreement between them.
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22. The Defendants further stated that in December 1999, the Plaintiff
and Smt. Promila Puri entered into an Oral understanding in the nature of a
Settlement, whereby the Plaintiff agreed to give up his rights to own and
reside in the suit property, in return for substantial sums to be transferred to
him through a joint savings account held with Smt. Promila Puri, at
Standard Chartered Bank.
23. They claimed that Smt. Promila Puri and the Defendants transferred
substantial sums for the Plaintiff’s benefit, pursuant to this arrangement. The
sale proceeds of the other properties, were also remitted to him. They
disputed that their occupation of the suit property was merely gratuitous and
claimed a right to remain in possession under the Settlement.
24. Smt. Promila Puri expired on 08.04.2013 and pre-deceased the
Plaintiff. The Defendants pleaded that thereafter, a further agreement was
reached whereby, the Plaintiff was to retain complete ownership and control
over the joint Account, while they were to get complete ownership of the
suit property. Pursuant to this arrangement, they relinquished, by their
conduct, their rights in the joint Account, leaving its sole benefit with the
Plaintiff. In return, he assured them that the formalities for transfer of title in
the suit property, would be completed in due course.
25. The Defendants claimed continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession of the suit property since December 1999, extending over more
than 19 years. Without prejudice to their claim under the settlement, they
alternatively pleaded ownership by adverse possession .
26. On merits , the Defendants stated that Late Smt. Janki Devi , mother of
the Plaintiff, was granted the sub-lease rights of the plot under the Perpetual
Sub-Lease Deed dated 30.12.1972, and she bequeathed all her rights in the
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property to the Plaintiff, by her Will dated 16.02.1988. Upon her demise on
08.12.1996, the property was mutated in favour of the Plaintiff by the DDA,
vide letter dated 06.05.2017. The averments regarding the Collaboration
Agreement, were denied as false. It was asserted that the Plaintiff had
handed over the entire possession of the property to Mr. B.K. Uppal under
the Collaboration Agreement dated 12.11.1998, and had thereafter, got back
its possession, including of the First Floor, through Smt. Promila Puri, vide
possession letter dated 27.09.1999.
27. The communications dated 10.12.2017, 08.03.2018 and 10.03.2018
were described as matters of record, requiring no reply. However, relying on
the settlement and arrangements stated above, they disputed that their
occupation was gratuitous or unauthorised and denied the Plaintiff‟s
entitlement to possession and mesne profits.
28. Accordingly, they sought dismissal of the Suit with costs.
29. The Plaintiff moved an Application under Section 151 CPC dated
16.09.2021, seeking deposit of use and occupation charges @Rs.3,00,000/-
per month, along with copies of Lease deeds of similarly situated properties
in Vasant Vihar. While considering the Application, the learned District
Judge examined the pleadings and invoked Order XII Rule 6 and Order
XV CPC, considering the admission made in the pleadings.
30. The learned District Judge held that the alleged Mutual Settlement
lacked material particulars and that relinquishment of the Plaintiff’s rights,
required a registered instrument. The alleged payment of consideration, was
also unsupported by documentary proof.
31. The claim under the alleged Will was also rejected, the Plaintiff being
alive and his Notice dated 08.03.2018 being inconsistent with any subsisting
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bequest. The Defendants’ occupation was held to be permissive, and their
plea of adverse possession was rejected for want of the requisite hostile
assertion, against the Plaintiff’s title.
32. The learned District Judge found the defence vague and inconsistent
and held that no triable issue arose. The Lease Deeds of similarly situated
properties in the same locality, were accepted as substantiating the claim for
mesne profits at Rs.3,00,000/- per month.
33. Consequently, the Suit of the Plaintiff was decreed vide judgement
dated 10.02.2026 for recovery of Possession of the suit property and for
Mesne Profits @ Rs.3,00,000/- per month from the date of institution of
the Suit “till realization”, under Order XII Rule 6 and Order XV CPC .
34. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree dated 10.02.2026, the
Appellant has preferred the present Regular First Appeal .
35. The grounds of challenge are, firstly, that Order XII Rule 6 read with
Order XV CPC has been wrongly invoked, the Suit has wrongly been
decreed without trial. It is contended that the power to pronounce Judgment
on admissions is discretionary and requires clear, unequivocal and
unconditional admissions. The Written Statement disputed the Plaintiff’s
subsisting ownership and right to possession, on the basis of a family
settlement; execution of a Will; consideration through relinquishment of
claims to the joint Bank Account and, alternatively, adverse possession.
These defences, if established, would defeat the claim for possession and
could not be disregarded, while identifying admissions in the pleadings.
36. Reliance is placed on Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd ., (2011) 15
SCC 273; Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar , (2022) 10 SCC 496 ; Jeevan
Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha , (2010) 6 SCC 601; and
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Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. v. United Bank of India , (2000) 7 SCC 120, to
contend that judgment on admissions was unwarranted where substantive
defences required adjudication. S.M. Asif v. Virendar Kumar Bajaj , (2015) 9
SCC 287 and Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396 are also
relied upon to submit that the discretion could not be exercised
mechanically.
37. The Plaintiff had sought a Decree under Orders X, XII, XIV and XV
CPC read conjointly, without framing formal issues. The Appellants contend
that reliance on these provisions, did not dispense with their respective
requirements. The disposal without trial, is specifically opposed on the
ground that the defence raised material questions concerning the Settlement,
the parties’ subsequent conduct and the nature of their possession.
38. It is further contended that Order XV Rule 1 CPC was inapplicable,
because the parties were at issue on material questions of law and fact. The
conditions under Rule 3 were also not satisfied, since further evidence was
necessary to determine the pleaded arrangements and no conclusion could
be reached that the immediate disposal would cause no injustice. The
hearing ought to have been postponed for production of evidence, under
Rule 3(2).
39. The Order dated 29.10.2018 striking off the defence, had been
recalled on 28.11.2022, and the Written Statement was taken on record.
Despite restoration of the defence, the Appellants were denied an
opportunity to lead evidence and test the Plaintiff's case through cross-
examination. They contend that this violated the principles of natural justice
and their right to a fair hearing under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
of India.
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40. In support, reliance is placed on S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan , (1980) 4
SCC 379; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , (1978) 1 SCC 248; Aroush
Motors / Avnita Auto Tech, 2025 SC; Ranjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand ,
2024 INSC 724; and Paradise Industrial Corporation v. Kiln Plastics
Products , AIR 1975 SC.
41. The delay between striking off the defence in 2018 and its restoration
in 2022, followed by disposal of the Suit in 2026 without trial, is claimed to
have caused prejudice. The Appellants contend that, despite the prolonged
proceedings, they were ultimately denied an opportunity to establish the
rights, asserted by them.
42. Secondly, the Appellants contended that the Written Statement was
not considered, in its entirety. Reliance is placed on R.K. Markan v. Rajiv
Kumar Markan , 2002 (62) DRJ 241 and Vijay Gupta v. Ashok Kumar
Gupta , 2007 (95) DRJ 167, to submit that isolated statements could not be
treated as admissions, without considering the accompanying explanations
and substantive defence. The failure to consider the pleaded case and
supporting material, is assailed as perversity and non-application of mind,
for which reliance is also placed on Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of
Police , (1999) 2 SCC 10 and Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab , (2013) 12
SCC 615.
43. It is contended that the learned District Judge has wrongly rejected
the oral Family Settlement and the supporting material relied upon, by the
Appellant. The learned Trial Court erroneously treated the Settlement as an
ordinary oral relinquishment requiring registration. Its reliance on Sushila v.
Vijay Kumar Bhardwaj , Prema Suryanarayanan v. S. Venkataramanan and
Sandeep Kohli v. Vinod Kohli, is disputed on the ground that those decisions
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concerned pleas of oral partition and did not justify rejection of the family
arrangement, pleaded in the present case.
44. Relying on Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors. ,
(1976) 3 SCC 119, the Appellants submit that a family arrangement may be
oral and, in such a case, does not require registration. There is a distinction
between an Instrument creating rights in immovable property and a
subsequent Memorandum recording an already concluded arrangement. The
absence of an antecedent title in one participant, does not necessarily defeat
the arrangement where the other participant relinquishes his claim and
acknowledges the former’s entitlement.
45. The Appellants asserts that a Family Arrangement which adjusts the
rights and claims of its participants, is not to be treated as an ordinary
conveyance. The expression “family” encompasses the Plaintiff, his sister
and her family, and the arrangement is sought to be upheld on the basis of
their relationship, mutual obligations and subsequent conduct. Reliance is
placed on Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi , (1965) 3 SCR 841 and K.
Arumuga Velaiah v. P.R. Ramasamy , (2023) 3 SCC 757, in addition to Kale
& Ors. (supra).
46. The finding that the Settlement lacked material particulars, is
specifically disputed. The Appellants refer to the pleaded understanding of
December 1999, the identity of its participants, the suit property and the
other properties involved and Smt. Promila Puri's assistance in managing
and disposing of the Plaintiff's properties, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon her. The Will and the arrangement concerning the joint Bank
Account, are relied upon as corroborative acts. These averments, having
been disputed, required framing of Issues under Order XIV Rule 1 CPC and
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determination through evidence. The learned Trial Court could not have held
that the Settlement was unproved, without permitting evidence in its
support.
47. The Will dated 11.04.2001 was relied upon as evidence of the
Plaintiff’s intention and as corroboration of the family Settlement, rather
than as a testamentary instrument conferring title. The Appellants contend
that the Plaintiff being alive, did not render the Will irrelevant and that its
evidentiary significance was distinct from its operative effect under Section
2(h) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. They invoke Sections 8 and 9 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and contend that they ought to have been
permitted to prove the document under Order XVIII CPC. Reliance is placed
on Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthaih , 2025 INSC 879.
48. The subsequent arrangement concerning the joint Bank Account, also
required adjudication. The Appellants claim that, after Smt. Promila Puri‟s
demise, they relinquished their claims to the joint Account, in consideration
of the Plaintiff agreeing to transfer ownership of the suit property to them.
Whether such relinquishment occurred and constituted consideration for the
arrangement, required examination of the Bank records and the parties’
conduct. Further, their plea of set-off, could not be rejected without
adjudication, in terms of Order VIII Rule 6 CPC.
49. The Appellants further submit that the Will, bank records, financial
statements and correspondence relied upon by them, were overlooked. These
documents, together with oral evidence, had a bearing upon the existence
and implementation of the Settlement, the Plaintiff’s acceptance of its
benefits and the effect of his subsequent notice seeking possession.
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50. Thirdly, it is contended that the learned District Judge has wrongly
rejected the alternative plea of adverse possession and ignored the
acquiescence by the Plaintiff. The Appellants contend that their defence
could not be rejected, merely because alternative pleas had been taken. Their
primary claim was ownership under the Family Settlement , while adverse
possession was pleaded in the alternative. These pleas are stated to operate
sequentially, rather than being mutually destructive.
51. Reliance is placed on Smt. Arundhati Mishra v. Sri Ram Charitra
Pandey , (1994) 2 SCC 29; Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant
Eknath Jadoo , (2009) 5 SCC 713; and Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v.
Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177.
52. It is submitted that the nature of their possession could not have been
determined, merely by describing it as permissive. Whether their occupation
was hostile, continuous, open and exclusive, accompanied by the requisite
intention, required evidence. Their assertion of possession as of right under
the Settlement also required consideration, before they could be treated as
licensees. Reliance is placed on Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of
India , (2004) 10 SCC 779 and Gaya Parshad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal
Chander , AIR 1984 SC 930.
53. Fourthly , the Appellants also invoked the principles of delay, laches,
acquiescence and estoppel, by making a reference to the interval between
commencement of their occupation around 1999-2001 and institution of the
Suit in 2018, including the period of nearly five years, after Smt. Promila
Puri's demise. They claimed to have made substantial improvements and
having established their home in the suit property, relying on the Plaintiff's
conduct and the arrangements between the parties. The Plaintiff's prolonged
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inaction is relied upon, to dispute his subsequent demand for possession.
Reference is made to the Limitation Act, 1963 and the principles of
estoppel, with reliance on State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries , AIR
1964 SC 1179 and Balakrishnan v. M.A. Krishnamurthy , (1998) 7 SCC 123.
54. The fifth ground raised challenges the award of mesne profits at
Rs.3,00,000/- per month, from institution of the Suit "till realization". The
Appellants contend that the foundational requirement of wrongful
possession under Section 2(12) CPC, could not have been determined
without adjudicating their claim about the family settlement. Both their
liability for mesne profits and the awarded quantum, are disputed.
55. It is submitted that no evidence was recorded or inquiry conducted
under Order XX Rule 12 CPC to determine the appropriate rate. The Lease
Deeds of allegedly comparable properties, were accepted without permitting
the Appellants to challenge their comparability, cross-examine the relevant
witnesses or produce independent valuation evidence.
56. Reliance is placed on Chitturi Subbanna v. Kudapa Subbanna , AIR
1965 SC 1325, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India remanded the
matter as the High Court had raised the rate of Mesn e Profits without
assigning adequate reasons. In Santosh Arora v. M.L. Arora (Delhi HC,
2011), it was held that the rate of Mesne Profits is to be determined on
evidence and not as a matter of contract.
57. The Appellants further state that the Plaintiff’s pleaded case was that
the Appellants occupation was initially gratuitous and that no Rent
Agreement was executed. The permission to reside, did not create a
landlord-tenant relationship. Also, the use of market rentals to impose
liability upon them as though they were tenants, is challenged. The absence
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of agreed rent, rent payments or acknowledgments, is relied upon to
challenge the basis of the grant of Mesne profits.
58. The rate of Rs.3,00,000/- per month, is also assailed as arbitrary and
punitive. The Appellants contend that compensation required an evidentiary
assessment, rather than adoption of a notional rental figure. It is further
submitted that no rental income was ever received or declared by the
Plaintiff and reiterate that the neighbouring properties’ Lease deeds, were
never tested through evidence.
59. Hence, it is prayed that the impugned Judgment and Decree, inter
alia, to the extent of mesne profits, be set aside and remand of the Suit under
Order XLI Rule 23 CPC, for framing of Issues and adjudication after
affording both parties an opportunity to lead evidence. Moreover, an inquiry
is sought into mesne profits under Order XX Rule 12 CPC. Reliance is
placed on Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by LRs., (2001) 3
SCC 179 and Sirajudheen v. Zeenath , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 196.
60. The Appellant, in his Written Submissions , reiterated the challenge
to disposal without trial and specifically objected to the grant of final relief,
while deciding an Application under Section 151 CPC seeking deposit of
use and occupation charges. The Application did not seek a final Decree of
possession or final determination of mesne profits. Reliance is placed on
Padam Sen v. State of U.P. , 1960 SCC OnLine SC 77, to contend that
inherent powers regulate procedure and cannot be used to determine
substantive rights in the manner adopted.
61. Reliance is also placed on Union of India v. Modiluft Ltd., (2003) 6
SCC 65; P.R. Sinha v. Inder Krishan Raina , (1996) 1 SCC 681; and State of
Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1951 SCC 1024, to submit that interim
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relief must be ancillary to the main relief and cannot substitute final
adjudication of the disputed rights.
62. The Appellant further raised an objection to valuation and pecuniary
jurisdiction. It is contended that the suit property was undervalued to avoid
payment of the appropriate court fee and that its value, assessed by reference
to the circle rates relied upon by him, exceeded Rs.4 crores and the
pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Trial Court. Reliance is placed on
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan , (1954) 1 SCC 710, in support of this
objection.
63. The oral Family Settlement is reiterated as a substantive defence,
requiring trial. The Appellant refers to the understanding of December 1999,
Smt. Promila Puri's assistance in managing and disposing of the
Respondent's properties under Powers of Attorney, the Will dated
11.04.2001 and the subsequent arrangement concerning the joint Bank
account, together with the family's continued possession, to show that the
arrangement was acted upon. Reliance is placed on Anil Vaswani v. Jyoti
Ramesh Santani , CS(OS) 561/2021 and Kavita Sharma v. Kanta Sharma ,
2025 SCC OnLine Del 990, to contend that the disputed family arrangement
required adjudication on evidence.
64. The grant of mesne profits is challenged on the additional ground
that the third-party Lease Deeds filed with the Application, were not proved
or tested through evidence. The Appellant submits that neither their
genuineness nor their suitability as comparables was established. The
Interlocutory Application under S.151 CPC, could not furnish a sufficient
basis for a final award covering the entire period from institution of the Suit
"till realization" .
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65. The Respondent, in his Written Submissions , supports the impugned
Judgment and Decree. It is contended that the Written Statement, read as a
whole, acknowledged the title of the plaintiff; the permissive origin of the
Appellant’s possession and receipt of the Notice withdrawing permission.
The pleas of ownership through settlement, bequest under a Will, a
subsequent oral arrangement and adverse possession were vague,
unsupported and mutually inconsistent, disclosing no triable issue.
66. It is submitted that reference to Orders X, XIV and XV CPC did not
dilute the applicability of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, but provided additional
procedural grounds for disposal without framing issues. Mere filing of a
Written Statement did not necessitate a trial, where the defence lacked
material particulars. Reliance is placed on Urmila Sharma v. Jai Bhagwan,
2021 SCC OnLine Del 4552, to contend that a Suit may be decreed on the
pleadings, where a trial would be unnecessary and futile.
67. The objection concerning denial of a fair hearing, is also disputed.
The Appellant had filed his Written Statement and Written Submissions and
was heard through counsel on the question of disposal without trial. The
natural justice did not require a prolonged trial on assertions which disclosed
no sustainable defence; the learned Trial Court had considered each plea on
a meaningful reading of the pleadings.
68. In regard to the alleged Family Settlement , the Plaintiff submitted that
the Written Statement disclosed neither a pre-existing dispute nor any
antecedent right of the Defendants, and did not set out clear terms of a
concluded Arrangement. The alleged understanding was, therefore,
insufficient to divest him of ownership. Merely describing it as a “family
settlement” could not dispense with the necessary pleadings or the
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requirements of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Indian Stamp Act,
1899 and the Registration Act, 1908.
69. The Respondent further contended that the particulars subsequently
relied upon, were introduced through Written Submissions and the Appeal,
to remedy the deficiencies in the Written Statement. The reliance on
“decades of service” as consideration, is disputed and contrasts it with the
pleaded payment of a “small sum ”, characterising the subsequent
formulation, as a change in the foundation of the defence.
70. As to the Will dated 11.04.2001, it is submitted that the Written
Statement relied upon it, as a means of acquiring ownership. Its subsequent
characterisation as corroborative evidence of the settlement, is assailed as an
attempt to overcome the adverse finding of the learned Trial Court. The
Respondent also relies on the Notice dated 08.03.2018, as an unequivocal
assertion of his rights and withdrawal of the permission to occupy the suit
property.
71. The alleged relinquishment of rights in the joint Bank Account, is
stated to be unsupported by documents or particulars of the balance,
transactions, nomination or the value of the interest allegedly surrendered.
The Respondent contends that the Account itself, as distinct from any
established entitlement to its funds, could not constitute consideration of an
ascertainable value. In the absence of a pleaded liquidated and ascertained
sum, the arrangement could not be treated as a valid set-off under Order VIII
Rule 6 CPC.
72. It is submitted that the plea of ownership through settlement and
adverse possession, are mutually destructive and not merely alternative.
According to the Respondent, the Written Statement admitted that
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possession originated with his consent, while adverse possession required an
assertion hostile to his ownership. The simultaneous reliance on these pleas,
reinforces the finding that no genuine triable defence arose . It is further
submitted that neither the date on which possession allegedly became hostile
nor any overt act denying the Respondent's title, was pleaded. Mere
continuance in occupation, including after revocation of permission, did not
establish adverse possession, in the absence of a positive hostile assertion.
73. The pleas of delay, laches, acquiescence and estoppel, are also
opposed. The Respondent submits that prolonged permissive occupation, did
not confer an independent right upon the Appellant. The alleged further
arrangement after Smt. Promila Puri's demise on 08.04.2013, itself
recognised the Respondent's subsisting ownership and authority over the suit
property.
74. The Respondent referred to the communication dated 10.12.2017, the
Notice dated 08.03.2018 and the email dated 10.03.2018 requiring delivery
of possession by 15.04.2018. The Suit, instituted in 2018, is stated to be
within limitation. The Appellant had not identified any applicable provision
barring it, and the alleged prejudice arising from displacement after his
continued occupation, was not tenable, after the withdrawal of permission.
75. In support of the awarded mesne profits, the Respondent had relied on
the location of the suit property in Vasant Vihar and the Appellant's
occupation without payment since 2000-2001. Lease deeds of comparable
properties in the same locality were filed with the Application under Section
151 CPC dated 16.09.2021, to substantiate the prevailing rental value of
Rs.3,00,000/- per month.
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76. The Respondent disputes that the Appellant was denied an
opportunity, to contest these documents. Referring to the procedural history,
he submits that repeated opportunities were granted to file a Reply and
advance arguments, accompanied by costs on several occasions. Ultimately,
on 08.07.2023, the Defendants stated that no Reply to the Application would
be filed. Their right to file a Reply was accordingly closed, and costs of
Rs.20,000/- were imposed for their previous conduct.
77. It is further submitted that, on 23.08.2023, the Respondent sought
disposal without framing issues, whereupon both parties were directed to file
Written Submissions. Written Submissions were subsequently filed and
arguments were heard on several dates, including 09.09.2025 and
12.01.2026, before the Suit was decreed on 10.02.2026. The Respondent
contends that sufficient opportunity existed to object to the lease deeds or
place contrary valuation material on record, and that the Appellant cannot
now complain of its denial.
78. The Respondent maintains that the initial gratuitous occupation
reflected the familial relationship, did not preclude compensation after
permission was withdrawn. The claim is for mesne profits arising from
wrongful occupation, rather than contractual rent. Having regard to the
location of the suit property and the comparable leases, Rs.3,00,000/- per
month is stated to be a fair and conservative assessment. The dismissal of
the Appeal is accordingly, sought.
Submissions heard and record perused.
79. The Respondent/Plaintiff, K.K. Arora , had filed the Suit for recovery
of possession of the suit property, claiming to be its sole and absolute owner.
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As per the Plaint, the entire property bearing No. D-1/10, Vasant Vihar, New
Delhi, was inherited by the Plaintiff from his mother, Late Smt. Janki Devi ,
upon her demise in the year 1996, and was mutated in his name as a freehold
property, by the Delhi Development Authority. Thereafter, the Plaintiff
entered into a Collaboration Agreement dated 12.11.1998 with Mr. B.K.
Uppal, under which he got the completed Basement and Ground Floor of the
property.
80. The title of the Plaintiff in the suit property, has been admitted by the
Defendants. In reply to the paragraph 2 of the Plaint, wherein the
inheritance and mutation have been averred, the Defendants have stated that
“the contents are a matter of record”.
81. Further, in paragraph 11 of the Written Statement, the Defendants
have stated as under:
“…late Smt. Janki Devi, mother of the Plaintiff and
mother-in-law of the Defendant was granted the sub-
lease rights of the plot pertaining to the suit property as
per Perpetual Sub-Lease Deed dated 30.12.1972…
Subsequently, late Smt. Janki Devi left for heavenly
abode on 08.12.1996, and as such prior to which, she
got the suit property constructed and made her last will
and testament dated 16.02.1988 in which she
bequeathed all her rights in the suit property in favour
of the Plaintiff. Consequently, the suit property was
mutated in favour of the Plaintiff in the records of the
Delhi Development Authority (“DDA”) vide letter…
dated 06.05.2017.”
82. Thus, it is admitted that the Plaintiff is the owner of the suit
property, having inherited it from his mother, Late Smt. Janki Devi , under
her Will dated 16.02.1988.
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83. The second aspect is the manner in which the Defendants came into
occupation of the suit property. As per the Plaint, sometime around 2000-01,
the Plaintiff, K.K. Arora, out of love and affection for his sister, Late Smt.
Promila Puri , permitted her to reside in the suit property along with her
husband, Ashok Puri, and their two sons, Akshay Puri and Anuj Puri, gratis
i.e. without paying any rent, fee or charges . Anuj Puri has since long moved
to Hong Kong.
84. Smt. Promila Puri expired on 08.04.2013, while her husband and son,
Akshay Puri, continued to reside in the suit property. During the pendency
of the Suit, Ashok Puri also expired on 28.08.2024, and his legal
representatives were brought on record, vide Order dated 02.08.2025. The
Suit is contested by Akshay Puri, Defendant No.2.
85. The permissive occupation granted by the Plaintiff, is also admitted
by the Defendants. There is no claim by the Defendants that they ever paid
any rent or charges to the Plaintiff for their occupation of the suit property.
86. In para 6 of the Written Statement , it is stated that “the Plaintiff out of
love, affection and mutual understanding, gave his consent to Late Mrs.
Promila Puri and the Answering Defendants to reside at the suit
property…”.
87. Similarly, in para 9 of the Written Statement , they have averred as
under:
"Subsequently, as per the mutual understanding and
settlement, the Plaintiff out of love and affection gave
his consent to Late Mrs. Promila Puri and the
Answering Defendants to reside at the suit property.”
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88. It is also on record that the Plaintiff, vide Letter dated 08.03.2018,
withdrew the permission and called upon the Defendants to vacate the suit
property on or before 15.04.2018, which the Defendants, in their reply to the
Plaint, have described as a matter of record.
89. It is, therefore, established that the Defendants were put in
possession of the suit property by the Plaintiff, out of love and affection for
his sister, and their occupation was gratuitous, with the permission of the
Plaintiff.
I. Whether the Defendant acquired Ownership in the Suit Property:
90. The Defendants have, however, asserted that they acquired ownership
of the suit property. The relevant portion of the Preliminary Submissions
of the Written Statement , reads as under:
“3… It is submitted that the Plaintiff admittedly has been
residing in Canada for almost 60 years and as such he
wanted to ensure that his share in the family properties
be protected. Consequently, the parties herein and Late
Mrs. Promila Puri, being the sister of the Plaintiff,
decided that they would ensure that the rights and
interests of all the parties concerned, should remain
protected . In order to give effect to this, the aforesaid
persons entered into a mutual settlement and
understanding. That in terms of the understanding and
settlement between the parties, on account of the fact that
the Plaintiff resided abroad and as such it was not
efficient and expeditious for him to dispose off the first
floor of the subject property, the Plaintiff had authorised
Mrs. Promila Puri to help the Plaintiff dispose off the
First Floor of the subject property and give the entire
proceeds of the sale to the Plaintiff . Further, on account
of the same reason, the Plaintiff had authorised Late
Mrs. Promila Puri to dispose off two other properties
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bearing address 412A, Ansal Bhavan, Kasturba Gandhi
Marg, New Delhi - 110001 and 408, Surya Kiran,
Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi - 110001. That in
consideration of the efforts of Late Mrs. Promila Puri,
the Plaintiff had bequeathed his rights qua the Ground
floor and basement of the suit property. In pursuance of
the same, the parties arrived at the arrangement whereby
the Defendants herein and Late Mrs. Promila Puri were
given complete ownership and possession rights qua the
Ground Floor and basement of the suit property upon
payment of a small sum. That during the lifetime of Late
Mrs. Promila Puri, she repeatedly reminded the Plaintiff
about his agreement to transfer the complete ownership
qua the Ground Floor and basement of the suit property
to her; however, the Plaintiff assured her that he would
bequeath it to her through a will so that the parties did
not have to pay the applicable statutory taxes qua the
said transfer. That the Plaintiff further assured the
parties that once they inherit the Ground Floor and
basement of the suit property from the Plaintiff, they
would have to pay minimal mutation charges and they
would be able to prevent payment of the aforesaid taxes
and levies . In fact, in pursuance of the same, the Plaintiff
had also executed a will to this effect wherein he had
bequeathed complete rights qua the suit property to Late
Mrs. Promila Puri which makes it amply clear that the
parties wanted to give effect to the aforesaid mutual
agreement between them.”
91. Thus, as per the Preliminary Submissions, the Plaintiff had authorised
Smt. Promila Puri , his sister, to help him dispose of the First Floor of the
property in question and two other properties and to give the entire sale
proceeds to him. In consideration of her efforts , the Defendants and Smt.
Promila Puri were given complete ownership and possession rights in the
Basement and Ground Floor, “upon payment of a small sum”.
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92. However, a different version has been given in paragraph 5 of the
Written Statement, wherein it is stated as under:
“That the Plaintiff out of love and affection for late Mrs.
Promila Puri and to honour the terms of the settlement
between the parties, entered into a settlement agreement
with Late Mrs. Promila Puri and the Answering
Defendants as per which, Late Mrs. Promila Puri along
with the Answering Defendants were to reside in the suit
property. Subsequently, as per the terms of the settlement
agreement and in lieu of the plaintiff mutually waiving
off his rights towards owning and residing at the Suit
Property, a joint savings account bearing account no.
52310008898 was opened in Standard Chartered Bank
in the name of the Plaintiff and Late Mrs. Promila Puri
and Late Mrs. Promila Puri along with the Answering
Defendants continuously transferred huge sums of
money in favour of the Plaintiff . Simultaneously, circa
2000, the Plaintiff authorised Late Mrs. Promila Puri to
sell the aforementioned properties on his behalf and the
proceeds thereof were transferred in favour of the
Plaintiff…”
93. Similarly, in paragraph 11 of the Written Statement , same facts were
reiterated as under:
"That during the month of December, 1999, the Plaintiff
out of love and affection for his sister i.e. Late Mrs.
Promila Puri, agreed to a mutual understanding with
Late Mrs. Promila Puri and the Answering Defendants,
allowed them to reside at the suit property and in respect
of which, the Plaintiff and Late Mrs. Promila Puri
entered into an oral understanding in the nature of a
settlement, as per which, it was agreed that the Plaintiff
would mutually waive his right to own and reside at the
Suit Property and Late Mrs. Promila Puri along with the
Answering Defendants would have continuous, peaceful
and uninterrupted possession over the Suit Property and
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in lieu of waiving off his right towards the suit Property,
the Plaintiff and Late Mrs. Promila Puri would open a
joint account in their name, through which substantial
amount of funds would be transferred to the Plaintiff by
Late Mrs. Promila Puri and the answering defendants."
94. The Written Statement thus, discloses that the defendant had
claimed ownership on the following grounds: firstly, a mutual settlement
or oral family settlement arrived at in December, 1999 in recognition of the
efforts of Smt. Promila Puri in disposing of the First Floor and the two other
properties of the Plaintiff; secondly, the payment of a small sum and also the
transfer of huge sums of money through the joint Bank Account; thirdly, the
Will executed by the Plaintiff, K.K. Arora, in favour of Smt. Promila Puri ;
fourthly , a further Agreement after the demise of Smt. Promila Puri in 2013,
in consideration of relinquishment of their rights in the joint Bank Account;
and fifthly, in the alternative, adverse possession on account of their long
possession since December, 1999.
95. These grounds are considered, as follows.
A. Whether the Defendants acquired ownership under the alleged Mutual
Settlement in 1999:
96. The first ground that is agitated is that the suit property had been
given to Late Smt. Promila Puri and the Defendants, by virtue of a mutual
Settlement and Understanding, in 1999.
97. From a comprehensive reading of the aforesaid averments in the
various paragraphs of the Written Statement, it emerges that admittedly, the
Plaintiff was based in Canada. He authorized, through a General power of
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Attorney, his sister/Defendant, Smt. Promila Puri , with whom he had love
and affection, to sell the first floor of property in question and two other
properties, and the sale proceeds were transferred to Plaintiff. It is also the
case of the Defendants that in December 1999, they were permitted to reside
in the suit property.
98. Pertinently, the Written Statement nowhere describes the arrangement
as a family settlement. It is variously termed a “mutual settlement and
understanding” , an “arrangement”, a “settlement agreement” and an “oral
understanding in the nature of a settlement”, whereby the Plaintiff is stated
to have “waived off his rights”. It is only in the Appeal, that it is sought to
be projected as an oral family settlement. The plea of a mutual settlement
is thus, vague and contradictory, and is a bald assertion unsupported by
material particulars.
99. Thus, from the averments made in the Written Statement, it is evident
that no concluded mutual settlement or understanding has been disclosed
whereby the sister, Smt. Promila Puri, became the owner of the suit
property.
100. Even if, for the sake of arguments, it is accepted that there was a
settlement as pleaded , the question is whether it could have conferred any
right, title or interest in the suit property upon Smt. Promila Puri or the
Defendants.
101. The significance and importance of a Family Settlement has been
repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court. In Ram Charan Das v.
Girjanandini Devi, (1965) 3 SCR 841, it was observed that the consideration
for a family settlement is the expectation that it will result in establishing or
ensuring amity and goodwill amongst persons bearing relationship with one
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another. In S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai , (1973) 2 SCC 312,
it was observed that where the family members have settled their disputes
amicably, the Court would lean in favour of the family arrangement and
would be reluctant to disturb the same.
102. The first aspect, however, is to understand what arrangement can be
termed as a family settlement. The Supreme Court in Sahu Madho Das v.
Pandit Mukand Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481, explained as under:
“It is well settled that compromise or family arrangement
is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent
title of some sort in the parties and the agreement
acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party
relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling
to his share and recognising the right of the others, as
they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to
them respectively. That explains why no conveyance is
required in these cases to pass the title from the one in
whom it resides to the person receiving it under the
family arrangement.”
103. These principles were reiterated in Kale v. Deputy Director of
Consolidation , (1976) 3 SCC 119. There it was held that a family
arrangement must be bona fide , so as to resolve family disputes and rival
claims by a fair and equitable division of properties between the members of
the family. It may even be oral, in which case no registration is necessary.
The members who are parties to the family arrangement must have some
antecedent title, claim or interest, or even a possible claim, in the property,
which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the
parties has no title, the arrangement may be upheld where the other party
relinquishes all his claims in favour of such person and acknowledges him to
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be the sole owner. The onus of proving the family settlement lies on the
person who asserts it.
104. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, the facts of the present case
may be considered. As noted above, the Defendants have themselves
admitted that Late Smt. Janki Devi, by her Will dated 16.02.1988,
bequeathed all her rights in the suit property to the Plaintiff. Smt. Promila
Puri, therefore, had no title or claim in her own right, in the suit property,
nor is there any averment of a dispute between the Plaintiff and his sister
which was sought to be resolved. The alleged arrangement could, therefore,
be upheld only if the Plaintiff had relinquished his title in her favour and
acknowledged her to be the owner, as observed in Kale (supra), on which
reliance has been placed by the Appellant.
105. It is the own case of the Defendants that despite repeated reminders by
Smt. Promila Puri , the Plaintiff did not transfer the ownership to her, but
only assured her that he would bequeath the suit property to her through a
Will. Admittedly, no document of transfer of title was ever executed. What
emerges from the averments in the Written Statement is that the Plaintiff had
the intention and understanding to transfer the property to the sister, but it
did not fructify into any document of transfer. Mere intention or
understanding cannot, under the law, transfer any title in favour of the
sister.
106. Smt. Promila Puri having no antecedent title, and the Plaintiff having
not relinquished his title, the alleged arrangement could only have been a
transfer of the ownership of the suit property, which, whether by way of sale
or gift, could be effected only by a registered instrument under Sections 54
and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Merely describing the
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arrangement as a “family settlement”, cannot dispense with the essential
requirement of a family arrangement i.e. an antecedent title or claim of the
parties and a bona fide settlement of disputes between them and in the
absence of such settlement, a document of conveyance is necessary.
107. Even otherwise, the services rendered by Smt. Promila Puri as an
attorney of the Plaintiff, howsoever long, were rendered to manage the suit
property, much prior to the alleged settlement of December, 1999, and
cannot be equated with ownership of the suit property.
108. Significantly, there is nothing in the Written Statement to show that
the Defendants ever dealt with the suit property, as owners. On their own
showing, the suit property was mutated in the name of the Plaintiff by the
DDA, vide letter dated 06.05.2017, nearly eighteen years after the alleged
settlement. There is no averment that the Defendants ever sought mutation in
their favour, or paid the property tax, which as per the Plaintiff was all along
paid by him.
109. The Plaintiff, therefore, never relinquished his title or acknowledged
Smt. Promila Puri or the Defendants as owners. On the contrary, after the
demise of Smt. Promila Puri, the Plaintiff proposed a Rent Agreement and
thereafter, vide Notice dated 08.03.2018, withdrew the permission and called
upon the Defendants to vacate the suit property, both of which assertions,
the Defendants have described “ as a matter of record”.
110. Thus, the first ground of a mutual settlement , even if accepted as
pleaded, does not confer any right, title or interest in the suit property upon
the Defendants.
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B. Whether the payment of consideration was made by the Defendant/
Sister:
111. The Defendants, now represented through the Appellant, have taken
mutually destructive stands in their Written Statement. While admitting that
the Plaintiff was the owner and that his sister, Smt. Promila Puri , had been
permitted to stay in the suit property out of love and affection, in order to
establish a right to continue in the suit property, it was asserted in the
Preliminary Submissions that in lieu of the efforts of Smt. Promila Puri in
disposing of the properties of the Plaintiff in India, the Plaintiff decided to
bequeath the Basement and Ground Floor of the suit property to her, for
which a “small sum” was paid.
112. However, in paragraph 5 of the Written Statement , it was stated that a
Joint Savings Account was opened in the Standard Chartered Bank in the
names of the Plaintiff and Late Smt. Promila Puri , and that Smt. Promila
Puri along with the Defendants had continuously transferred huge sums of
money in favour of the Plaintiff. It was further stated that the sale proceeds
of the properties of the Plaintiff, sold on his behalf by Late Smt. Promila
Puri , were also transferred in favour of the Plaintiff.
113. Likewise, a plea was taken in paragraph 11 of the Written Statement
that the parties "entered into an oral understanding in the nature of a
settlement, as per which, it was agreed that the Plaintiff would mutually
waive his right to own and reside at the Suit Property… and in lieu of
waiving off his right towards the suit Property, the Plaintiff and Late Mrs.
Promila Puri would open a joint account in their name, through which
substantial amount of funds would be transferred to the Plaintiff by Late
Mrs. Promila Puri and the answering defendants".
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114. From the aforesaid averments made in the Written Statement, it
emerges that while at one place it is stated to be a small sum, at another it is
huge sums of money. There is, however, no description or details of this
alleged small amount, or of the date on which it was paid to the Plaintiff, in
terms of the alleged oral understanding inter-se the parties.
115. Though it is pleaded that a Joint Account of the Plaintiff and Late Smt.
Promila Puri was opened, but not an iota of evidence, even by way of
figures or details in the Written Statement, to explain the alleged huge sums
of money transferred by Late Smt. Promila Puri , or the amounts given up in
favour of the Plaintiff.
116. Therefore, the Defendants have not been able to show any right, title
or interest in the suit property.
C. Whether the Defendants acquired ownership under the further
Agreement in 2013, after the demise of Smt. Promila Puri, in
consideration of relinquishment of their rights in the Joint Bank Account:
117. In order to establish their ownership rights, the Defendants have given
different, contradictory versions. In the Preliminary Submissions of the
Written Statement, the Defendants have set up a fresh agreement after the
demise of Smt. Promila Puri in 2013, as under:
“Late Mrs. Promila Puri met her sad demise on
08.04.2013 and pre-deceased the Plaintiff. Subsequently,
t he Plaintiff and the Defendants herein came to the
agreement that the Plaintiff would continue to operate
and enjoy complete ownership and control over the joint
account of the Plaintiff and Late Mrs. Promila Puri and
the Defendants would get complete ownership of the
Ground Floor and basement of the suit property. In
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pursuance of the same, by their conduct, the Answering
Defendants relinquished all their rights qua the said
joint account and the Plaintiff continued to enjoy the
sole benefit of the said joint account. In consideration of
the same, the Plaintiff assured the Defendants herein that
it would only be a matter of time before all the formalities
in connection with transferring the title, of the Ground
Floor and basement of the suit property, to the
Defendants is concluded.”
118. This plea is inconsistent with the plea of the first settlement of
December, 1999. If the ownership had already been given in December,
1999, for which consideration in the form of the efforts of Smt. Promila
Puri, a small sum and substantial sums of money is claimed to have been
paid, there was no occasion for a further Agreement in 2013 on a fresh
consideration, by way of relinquishment of their rights in the Joint Account,
whereby the Defendants “would get” complete ownership.
119. Thus, on the Defendants’ own case, even after the demise of Smt.
Promila Puri , the title in the suit property had not passed to them, and the
formalities for its transfer, were yet to be completed. The averment that
complete ownership was given to them is, therefore, a bare assertion, which
is belied by the very facts pleaded by them in its support, and does not give
rise to any triable issue.
120. As noted above, the Joint Account was stated to be in the names of the
Plaintiff and Smt. Promila Puri , and the Defendants were not its account
holders. Apart from the account number, no particulars of the balance, the
transactions or the value of the right allegedly relinquished, have been given.
These particulars are material, since the relinquishment of rights in the Joint
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Account, is set up as the very consideration for the transfer of ownership of
the suit property.
121. Even if it is accepted that after the demise of Smt. Promila Puri, there
may have been an agreement inter-se the parties, that the Account was left to
be operated exclusively by the Plaintiff, but there is no whisper about the
sums allegedly contributed in the Joint Account by Late Smt. Promila Puri ,
or that there was any agreement to let the money actually owned by Smt.
Promila Puri, be enjoyed by the Plaintiff.
122. The defence that a small amount, and thereafter, huge amounts
through the Joint Account, were paid by Late Smt. Promila Puri as
consideration for the waiver by the Plaintiff of his rights in the suit property,
is thus, vague. No details of any kind have been furnished in the Written
Statement from which it could be inferred that any triable issue arises. It is a
vague plea, bereft of any details, which does not give rise to any triable
issue.
123. Irrespective of the aforesaid, even if it is accepted that small or large
amounts were transferred by Late Smt. Promila Puri to the Plaintiff, in the
absence of any Sale Deed or other document of transfer of the property in
the name of Smt. Promila Puri , mere payment of money cannot create any
proprietary right in the suit property, in favour of Late Smt. Promila Puri .
Admittedly, no document whatsoever, of transfer of the property has been
executed in favour of Smt. Promila Puri, and the Plaintiff continues to be the
exclusive owner of the suit property. In the absence of any averment as to
what was in the account, or what right the Defendants had therein, whether
as heirs of Smt. Promila Puri or otherwise, which they gave up, the plea
discloses no ascertainable consideration whatsoever.
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124. Even if accepted as pleaded, the alleged agreement is at best an oral
agreement to transfer the ownership in future, which under Section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, does not, of itself, create any interest in such
property. Nor can such an oral agreement entitle the Defendants to retain
possession, since the protection under Section 53A of the Act, is available
only under a contract in writing, signed by the transferor.
125. Thus, the alleged Agreement after the demise of Smt. Promila Puri
does not confer any right, title or interest upon the Defendants in the suit
property.
D. Whether the Will dated 11.04.2001 executed by the Plaintiff, conferred
the ownership rights in favour of Smt. Promila Puri:
126. As per the version of the Defendants, complete ownership was given
to them in December, 1999. It is their case that Smt. Promila Puri repeatedly
reminded the Plaintiff to transfer the ownership to her, and that the Plaintiff
assured her that he would bequeath it to her through a Will, so that they
would “inherit” it from him, to save tax. It was further asserted that Plaintiff
“ had also executed a Will to this effect wherein he had bequeathed
complete rights qua the suit property to Late Mrs. Promila Puri”.
127. The paragraph 12 of the Written Statement, stated that the Plaintiff
“intended to bequeath and leave his right, title and interest in the suit
property absolutely and forever unto and to the use of Late Mrs. Promila
Puri” . It was further asserted that the plaintiff had stated that he would
bequeath the property to her through a Will, so that they would “inherit” it
from him and pay only minimal mutation charges.
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128. A Will, as defined under Section 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act,
1925, is the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his
property, which he desires to be carried into effect after his death. It is
ambulatory in nature and takes effect only upon the death of the testator.
The ownership can pass only by inheritance after the death of the Plaintiff,
which presupposes that he continued to be the owner .
129. Even if the Will had been prepared by the Plaintiff, at best, it
reflected an intention of the Plaintiff to give the property after his death,
which also corroborates that he continued to be the owner of the suit
property. Admittedly, the Plaintiff is alive and further, Smt. Promila Puri
expired on 08.04.2013, during the lifetime of the Plaintiff. Under Section
105 of the Act, where the legatee does not survive the testator, the legacy in
her favour would lapse.
130. The existence of the Will, is of little consequence , since the testator is
still alive. A mere intention to transfer, howsoever express, does not by itself
create or transfer any right, title or interest in immovable property, which
can pass only in the manner recognised by law. The Will, at best, may be a
promise of a testamentary disposition, but it did not transfer the title in
favour of Smt. Promila Puri and the legal heirs of Smt. Promila Puri cannot
claim ownership on the basis of Will, which has failed to take effect.
131. Thus, the alleged Will, did not confer any right, title or interest upon
the Defendants, in the suit property.
E. Whether the Defendants acquired ownership by Adverse Possession, on
account of the long possession:
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132. The plea of adverse possession has been taken in the Preliminary
Submissions, repeated in para 6 of the Written Statement, thus: "Assuming
but not conceding, without prejudice, it is submitted that the Defendants
enjoy adverse possession qua the Ground Floor and basement of the suit
property."
133. As noted above, the Defendants have themselves averred that the
Plaintiff, out of love and affection, gave his consent to their residing in the
suit property. Their defence thus, traces their right in the suit property
through the Plaintiff, and is premised upon the Plaintiff being its owner.
What remains for consideration is whether their long possession since
December, 1999, which originated with such consent, confers any right upon
them.
134. To claim ownership by adverse possession, the determinative test is
not the duration of long possession, but such possession must be nec vi, nec
clam, nec precario, i.e. hostile to the true owner, and actual, open,
continuous and exclusive, for the statutory period of twelve years.
135. In S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina , AIR 1964 SC 1254, the Supreme
Court held that a plea of adverse possession must at least show when the
possession became adverse. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of
India , (2004) 10 SCC 779, it was held that the claimant must plead when he
came into possession, the nature of his possession, whether it was known to
the owner, and for how long it continued, openly and undisturbed.
136. Recently, in Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 INSC 983, the
Supreme Court reiterated that where possession is permissive in origin, mere
lapse of time does not render it adverse, and the absence of pleadings
identifying when the possession became hostile is not a mere technical
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defect. Further, in Narasamma v. A. Krishnappa , AIR 2020 SC 4178, it was
held that a claim of title from a particular date and a plea of adverse
possession from the very same date cannot be simultaneously sustained.
137. There is no averment as to when the possession became hostile, what
act constituted the hostile assertion, or when it was brought to the knowledge
of the Plaintiff. The possession is claimed from December, 1999, the very
month in which the alleged settlement with the Plaintiff is stated to have
been arrived at. On the contrary, the Written Statement itself refers to the
Defendants awaiting the formalities for transfer of title by the Plaintiff, even
after the demise of Smt. Promila Puri. The Written Statement thus, discloses
no hostile assertion of title against the Plaintiff. The plea fails not because it
is taken in the alternative, but because even as taken, it does not disclose the
essential ingredients of adverse possession.
138. Similar facts as in hand, came up for consideration, in the case of
Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira , (2012) 5
SCC 370, wherein the owner/sister, while residing away, had permitted her
brother to occupy and look after the premises. The Apex Court crystallized
the governing principles, as follows:
“(i) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was
allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously; even by long
possession of years or decades, such person would not
acquire any right or interest in the said property;
(ii) A caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire
interest in the property, irrespective of his long possession,
and is required to give possession forthwith on demand;
(iii) The Courts are not justified in protecting the possession
of a caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to
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live in the premises for some time either as a friend,
relative, caretaker or as a servant;
(iv) The protection of the Court can only be granted or
extended to a person who has a valid, subsisting rent
agreement, lease agreement or licence agreement in his
favour; and
(v) The caretaker or agent holds the property of the
principal only on behalf of the principal and acquires no
right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property,
irrespective of his long stay or possession.”
139. The Supreme Court in Maria Margarida (supra) thus, held, inter alia ,
that gratuitous occupation, even for years or decades, does not confer title
and a caretaker, servant, friend or relative permitted to occupy the premises
does not acquire an interest merely by reason of such occupation. A
caretaker or agent merely holds the property on behalf of the principal and
cannot claim an independent right merely from the duration of possession.
The Supreme Court thus, concluded that no one acquires title to a property
if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously, and even by
long possession of years or decades, such a person does not acquire any
right or interest therein.
140. The aforesaid principles apply squarely to the present case. The
relationship between the Plaintiff and Smt. Promila Puri, being brother and
sister, explains both the permission to reside in the suit property and its
continuation over the years without payment of any rent. Such familial
generosity, by itself, does not signify an intention to part with the ownership.
Equally, the continued residence of the family of Smt. Promila Puri after her
demise, cannot, merely by its duration, establish a transfer of title.
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141. The Plaintiff, while residing in Canada, had permitted his sister and
her family to reside in the suit property. Their continued occupation, for
whatever period, did not create any right in their favour to resist the claim
for possession, once the permission was withdrawn.
II. Whether the Relief to the Plaintiff is barred by delay, laches,
acquiescence and estoppel :
142. The pleas of delay, laches, acquiescence and estoppel are also
without merit. The permission was withdrawn vide Notice dated 08.03.2018,
requiring the Defendants to vacate by 15.04.2018, and the Suit was filed in
the year 2018. A Suit filed within limitation, cannot be defeated on the
ground of delay or laches. The continuation of the permission over the years,
does not amount to acquiescence in any hostile claim, nor does it create any
estoppel against the owner.
III. Whether the Suit could be decreed under Order XII Rule 6 read with
Order XV CPC:
143. The main challenge of the Appellant is that the Suit could not have
been decreed under Order XII Rule 6 read with Order XV CPC, without
trial.
144. The Order XII Rule 6 empowers the Court to pronounce a judgment
on admissions at any stage, either on the application of a party or of its own
motion. The objection that the Decree was passed while considering an
Application under Section 151 CPC is, therefore, of no consequence. The
Supreme Court in Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India ,
(2000) 7 SCC 120, held that the object of the provision is to enable a party to
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obtain a speedy judgment to the extent of the admissions. In Karam Kapahi
v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust , (2010) 4 SCC 753, it was held that
admissions may be gathered from the pleadings read as a whole, including
constructive admissions.
145. In the present case, the Written Statement, when read as a whole,
discloses that the Defendants have admitted that the Plaintiff inherited the
suit property from his mother and that it stands mutated in his name. In para
8 of the Written Statement, they have specifically averred that “the Plaintiff
out of love and affection gave his consent to Late Mrs. Promila Puri and the
Answering Defendants to reside at the suit property”, and similar averments
are made in para 6 and 11 of the Written Statement. Thus, they have
admitted that they came to reside in the suit property with his consent. They
have also described the Letters dated 10.12.2017 and 08.03.2018 as a matter
of record. The defences raised by them, as discussed above, even if
accepted, do not confer upon them any right in the suit property.
146. In order to be entitled to a decree of possession, the Plaintiff is
required to establish, firstly, that he is the owner of the suit property,
secondly , that the Defendants were in occupation of the suit property with
his permission, which has been withdrawn, and thirdly , that the Defendants
have no right or title in the suit premises, whether as tenants or authorised
occupants.
147. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the Plaintiff is the owner
of the suit property. It is also admitted that the Defendants, along with Smt.
Promila Puri, the sister of the Plaintiff, were in permissive use and
occupation of the suit property. No licence fee or any other amount was paid
by the Defendants for their occupation of the suit property. Once the
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permission to continue in possession was withdrawn, the possession of the
Defendants became unauthorised, and the Plaintiff became entitled to
recover the possession of the suit property.
148. Since all the material facts required for a Decree of possession were
admitted, there was no need to frame issues on the admitted facts, or to
adduce evidence thereon.
149. The learned District Judge, therefore, rightly held that in the light of
the admissions of the Defendants in the Written Statement, no triable issue
arose, and the Decree of possession was rightly passed under Order XII Rule
6 CPC, on the basis of the admissions.
150. The Appellant has asserted that he was denied a fair hearing.
However, the record reflects that not only had the Defendants filed their
Written Statement, which was eventually taken on record, but they had also
addressed arguments on the aspect of passing a judgment under Order XII
Rule 6 CPC. So much so, they had filed their Written Submissions dated
08.09.2025, specifically opposing the disposal of the Suit without trial. The
assertion of the Appellant of being denied a fair hearing is not borne out by
the record, and is not tenable.
151. In view of the foregoing discussion , the Decree of possession of the
suit property has been rightly granted in favour of the Plaintiff.
IV. Whether the grant of Mesne Profits is sustainable:
152. The last aspect for consideration is the grant of Mesne Profits @
Rs.3,00,000/- per month, from the date of institution of the Suit "till
realization" . Section 2(12) CPC defines mesne profits as those profits which
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the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received, or
might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom.
153. Order XX Rule 12 CPC provides for the manner in which mesne
profits are to be determined, as under:
"12. Decree for possession and mesne profits.-(1) Where
a suit is for the recovery of possession of immovable
property and for rent or mesne profits, the Court may
pass a decree-
(a) for the possession of the property;
(b) for the rents which have accrued on the property
during the period prior to the institution of the suit or
directing an inquiry as to such rent;
(ba) for the mesne profits or directing an inquiry as to
such mesne profits;
(c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from
the institution of the suit until-
(i) the delivery of possession to the decree-holder,
(ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment-
debtor with notice to the decree-holder through the
Court, or
(iii) the expiration of three years from the date of the
decree, whichever event first occurs.
(2) Where an inquiry is directed under clause (b) or
clause (c), a final decree in respect of the rent or mesne
profits shall be passed in accordance with the result of
such inquiry."
154. The occupation of the Defendants was gratis, as admittedly, Smt.
Promila Puri, the sister, had been put in possession by the Plaintiff, her
brother, out of love and affection. However, once the permission was
withdrawn vide Notice dated 08.03.2018, requiring the Defendants to vacate
the suit property by 15.04.2018, their possession became unauthorised from
the said date.
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155. The contention of the Appellant is that since their occupation was
gratis, and there was no relationship of landlord and tenant, no mesne profits
can be granted. However, this contention is completely fallacious, because
mesne profits are not limited to a relationship of landlord and tenant, but
pertain to unauthorised occupation of the suit premises. It has already been
held that once the permission was withdrawn by the Plaintiff, the occupation
of the Defendants became unauthorised, for which they are liable to pay
mesne profits, or user and occupation charges.
156. The gratuitous nature of the occupation during the subsistence of the
permission does not absolve the Defendants of their liability to compensate
the Plaintiff thereafter. As held by the Apex Cort in Atma Ram Properties
(P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705, once the right of the
occupant to continue in possession comes to an end, he becomes liable to
pay damages for use and occupation at the rate at which the owner could
have let out the premises. The principle applies with greater force to a
permissive occupant, who never had any right to occupy the premises except
by the permission of the owner.
157. Therefore, though the Defendants are liable to pay user and
occupation charges after 15.04.2018, the more significant aspect is the
determination of the quantum at which such charges are payable . The
Plaintiff claimed Mesne Profits @ Rs.2,50,000/- per month in the Plaint,
while the rate of Rs.3,00,000/- per month was claimed in the Application
under Section 151 CPC dated 16.09.2021, on the basis of copies of Lease
Deeds of other properties in the locality. There is no admission by the
Defendants as to the rate.
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158. The rate of Rs.3,00,000/- per month was thus, claimed on the basis of
copies of Lease Deeds of other properties in the vicinity, annexed with the
Application under Section 151 CPC. However, the Plaintiff was required to
prove, through cogent evidence, whether by way of Lease Deeds of
properties in the vicinity or otherwise, the rate for the effective
determination of the user and occupation charges payable by the Defendants.
159. The learned Trial Court could not have accepted the copies of the
Lease Deeds without being proved by the Plaintiff, and without affording
the Defendants an opportunity, either by cross-examination or by leading
evidence, to disprove the rate at which the mesne profits were claimed by the
Plaintiff. The copies of the Lease Deeds could not have been accepted as
absolute proof for calculating the mesne profits. In the absence of any
evidence or admission of the Defendants in regard to the rate of mesne
profits, the determination of Mesne Profits, or user and occupation charges,
necessarily required an inquiry in terms of Order XX Rule 12 CPC.
160. Therefore, the grant of Mesne Profits @ Rs.3,00,000/- per month,
without such inquiry, cannot be sustained. The impugned Judgment
and Decree, to the extent it grants Mesne Profits, is accordingly set
aside.
Conclusion:
161. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Appeal is accordingly,
partly allowed and the Decree of possession of the suit property in
favour of the Plaintiff, vide Judgment and Decree dated 10.02.2026, is
upheld.
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162. However, the Decree, to the extent it grants Mesne Profits @
Rs.3,00,000/- per month from the date of institution of the Suit till
realisation, is set aside. The matter is remanded to the learned District
Judge for determination of Mesne Profits/ user and occupation charges, in
accordance with Order XX Rule 12 CPC, after affording an opportunity to
lead evidence, to both the parties.
163. The parties are directed to appear before the learned District Judge on
07.12.2026.
164. The pending Application(s), if any, are disposed of, accordingly.
(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
NOVEMBER 18, 2026/R
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