Nikunj Sharma And Anr. vs Manoj Kumar Gupta

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 30.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 18.11.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010444962024
+ RC.REV. 199/2024 & CM APPL. 42580/2024 (Stay)
NIKUNJ SHARMA AND ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Anmol Mathur and Mr.
Tanmay Vats, Advs.

versus

MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. C.M. Grover, Adv.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
1

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , by the Petitioners, assailing the
2

Order dated 22.03.2024 passed by the learned Administrative
3
Civil Judge-cum-Additional Rent Controller (Central), Delhi , in
4
RC ARC No. 313/2022 , titled Manoj Kumar Gupta v. Nikunj
Sharma & Anr. , whereby the learned ARC dismissed the Petitioners’
application seeking leave to defend and consequently passed an
eviction order in respect of the first floor, second floor and terrace

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Ored
3
learned ARC
4
Eviction Petition
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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RC.REV. 199/2024 Page 1 of 14

of property bearing Municipal No. 179–181, Chatta Bhawani
Shankar, previously known as Chatta Jan Nisar Khan, Church
5
Mission Road, Fatehpuri, Chandni Chowk, Delhi–110006 .

BRIEF FACTS:
2. The Respondent instituted the Eviction Petition under Section
14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958,
seeking eviction of the Petitioners from the subject premises.
6
Claiming ownership under a registered Sale Deed dated 03.11.2015 ,
the Respondent asserted that the premises were bona fide required for
running his business independently, particularly in view of the
apprehended loss of possession of the premises from which he was
then carrying on business.
3. The Petitioners sought leave to defend, disputing the identity of
the subject premises, the Respondent’s title and the existence of a
landlord–tenant relationship. They contended that they occupied
property bearing No. 178-179 and relied upon official documents and
a site plan in support of their claim. They also questioned the
Respondent’s chain of title, the constitution of the tenancy, the non-
impleadment of other legal heirs of the deceased tenant, the alleged
threat of dispossession from the Respondent’s existing business
premises, and the availability of alternative commercial
accommodation.
4. The Respondent opposed the application, maintaining that the
Petitioners occupied the premises described in the Eviction Petition,
that his title was sufficiently established, and that the property cited as

5
subject premises
6
Sale Deed
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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alternative accommodation was being used for residential purposes.
5. Vide the Impugned Order, the learned ARC dismissed the
application for leave to defend, holding that the Petitioners had failed
to raise any triable issue, and consequently passed an eviction order in
respect of the subject premises.
6. Aggrieved by the dismissal of their application for leave to
defend and the consequential eviction order, the Petitioners have
instituted the present Petition.
7. Vide Order dated 06.09.2024, this Court directed the
Respondent not to initiate execution proceedings till the next date of
hearing. Subsequently, vide Order dated 06.12.2024, upon considering
the documents and photographs placed on record by the parties, this
Court fixed user and occupation charges at Rs. 30,000/- per month
with effect from 22.09.2024, subject to the final outcome of the
present Petition. The continuation of interim protection was made
conditional upon timely payment of the said charges.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
8. At the outset, learned counsel for the Petitioners would confine
the challenge in the present Petition to the existence of the landlord-
tenant relationship between the parties. He would submit that the
learned ARC failed to appreciate the material discrepancies
concerning the identity of the subject premises and the Respondent’s
claim thereto.
9. It would be contended that the property described in the Sale
Deed relied upon by the Respondent is recorded as residential and not
commercial, despite the Respondent claiming it for commencing a
business therefrom. It would further be contended that the premises in
Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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occupation of the Petitioners bear a different municipal number,
thereby raising a dispute as to whether the property described in the
Sale Deed is the same premises as that in their occupation.
He would submit that these discrepancies raise a substantial dispute
regarding whether the property claimed by the Respondent is the same
as that occupied by them.
10. Learned counsel would further submit that the Respondent has
not established any credible threat of dispossession from his existing
business premises and that the alleged bona fide requirement is
founded merely upon a notice issued by Punjab National Bank.
11. He would submit that the aforesaid circumstances, when
considered cumulatively, ought to have persuaded the learned ARC to
grant leave to defend, as they allegedly disclose triable issues
concerning the Respondent’s claim and the identity of the subject
premises.

12. He would accordingly assail the Impugned Order as erroneous
and perverse, and pray that the same be set aside.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
13. Per contra , learned counsel for the Respondent would
wholeheartedly support the Impugned Order and submits that the
learned ARC has duly considered the objections raised by the
Petitioners and returned findings on the basis of the material available
on record.
14. It would be contended that the submissions advanced in the
present Petition are, in substance, a reiteration of the arguments urged
before the learned ARC, seeking nothing more than a different
interpretation of the same material, which does not warrant
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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interference in revisional jurisdiction.
15. Learned counsel would submit that the Petitioners’ contention
regarding the identity of the subject premises has been duly
considered and rejected by the learned ARC, who found no substantial
variance between the parties with respect to the identity of the
premises, particularly when both parties acknowledged that M/s
Laxmi Bilas Marwari Guest House was being run from the premises
in question.
16. He would further submit that the Petitioners’ challenge to the
Respondent’s title is unsubstantiated, as they have admitted that their
predecessor-in-interest entered the premises as a tenant under the
erstwhile owner, Mst. Fatima Begum, and the Respondent has relied
upon a registered Sale Deed executed by her legal heirs.
17. Learned counsel would submit that the learned ARC
accordingly held that the Respondent had sufficiently established a
title superior to that of the Petitioners for the purposes of the
proceedings under the DRC Act.
18. Learned counsel would further submit that the Petitioners have
failed to demonstrate any perversity, patent illegality or material
infirmity in the findings returned by the learned ARC warranting
interference by this Court in the exercise of its limited revisional
jurisdiction.
19. He would accordingly pray that the present Petition be
dismissed.

ANALYSIS:
20. This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
parties and, with their able assistance, perused the Impugned Order as
Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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also the material placed on record.
21. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioners, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
22. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
7

Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
8 9
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
23. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
10
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
11
Grover .
24. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent

7
(1998) 8 SCC 119
8
(2014) 9 SCC 78
9
(2022) 6 SCC 30
10
2024:DHC:9322
11
2025:DHC:11285
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Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent
Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior
court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural
compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and
supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the
appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process
adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on
the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence
of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to
disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving
inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to
converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first
appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”

25. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
26. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
27. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioners against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
28. The relevant findings in the Impugned Order relating to the
submissions that have been advanced by the Petitioners herein are as
follows:
“13. It is stated by the respondents that they have no concern with
the demised premises, and are in fact tenants with respect to
property bearing 178-179. A separate site plan has also been filed
by the respondent. However, comparison of the same with the site
plan filed by the petitioner reveals that the two are identical in all
material respects. Both the parties have admitted that in the
premises with respect to which the subject proceedings pertain,
Laxmi Bilas Marwari Guest House is running. To that extent also,
both the parties are not at variance as regards the identity of the
demised premises. Only the respondents have set up a case that the
premises bear the no. 178-179, but to substantiate their assertions,
they have only relied upon certificates issued from the fire
department, etc., which would have been issued on self-declaration
basis, on information given to relevant authorities by the
predecessor in interest of the respondents/respondents themselves.
No other documents such as utility bill, etc. has been filed by them
to show that the premises actually bear a different number than that
described by the petitioner. Even if that is the case, as it is seen that
both the parties agree that it is actually Laxmi Bilas Marwari Guest
House which is being run out of the premises, this Court is of the
considered opinion that there is no substantial variance between the
parties as regards the identity of the demised premises. Even this
objection taken by the respondents is liable to be repelled.
Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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14. The respondents have controverted the existence of landlord
tenant relationship between the parties as well as the ownership of
the petitioner by stating that the sale deed relied upon by the
petitioner was executed in his favor not by the owner of the
property Mst. Fatima Begum, but by complete strangers to the
property. It is seen that the respondents have admitted that they
entered the property as tenants of Mst. Fatima Begum. The sale
deed relied upon by the petitioner is executed by the LRs of said
Mst. Fatima Begum, as per the recitals of the sale deed itself. Now,
for the respondents to say that Usman Khadija & Jamila are
strangers to the property, despite them being described as LRs of
Mst. Fatima Begum in the sale deed itself, is an averment, bald and
unsubstantiated, which cannot be looked into for any favorable
consideration. It is next stated by the respondents that they are
occupying property bearing no. 178 and 179, and out of the same,
property bearing 178 was earlier owned by one Mohd. Iqbal but the
sale deeds relied upon by the petitioner do not advert to said Mohd.
Iqbal at all, and therefore there is a defect in the title of the
petitioner. In the considered opinion of this court, even this
argument of the respondents is liable to be dismissed. Firstly, while
stating that property bearing no. 178 belonged to Mohd. Iqbal, the
respondents have not relied on any document to show the same. In
the application for leave for defend, they have also adverted to
earlier DR Petition filed by them, impleading only Mst. Fatima
Begum as a respondent therein and not Mohd. Iqbal. If, as per the
case of the respondent, Mohd. Iqbal was the joint owner of the
property, they ought to have paid rent to said Mohd. Iqbal also.
Non payment of any rent to any such Mohd. Iqbal and absence of
any such pleading also makes the case of the respondent
unbelievable. Even otherwise, since the respondents have admitted
that their predecessor in interest entered into the property as
tenants, it is not up to them to challenge the perfection of the title
of the petitioner. In proceedings of this nature, the petitioner is only
to show that he is something more than a tenant, and with the help
of the sale deed set up by him, the petitioner has been successful in
so establishing. On similar basis, the argument of respondent
regarding discrepancy between the sale deed through which
petitioner derives his title, and the sale deed through which his
predecessor-in-interest purchased the demised premises, can be
discarded. Reliance at this juncture can be placed upon Rajender
Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. Leelawati & Ors. 155 (2008) DLT 383,
wherein it has been held by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi that
“landlord is not supposed to prove absolute ownership as required
under Transfer of Property Act. He is required to show only that he
is more than tenant.” Further, once landlord has produced a
document showing his ownership on record, he is deemed to have
discharged his burden of ownership vis-a-vis the Rent Control Act
and such a document can at best be challenged by the heirs of the
owner and not by the tenant. Reliance being placed upon
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BHATIA
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Plastichemicals Company Vs. Ashit Chadda & Anr. , 114 (2004)
DLT 408.
15. … … This Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner
has been able to establish both the existence of landlord tenant
relationship between him and the respondents, as well as the fact
that he is owner of the demised premises. Qua these two criterion,
the respondents have not been able to raise any triable issue.
16. The respondents have stated that the petitioner has set up a false
case and there is no actual threat of the property, from which he is
running his business at present, being taken over by PNB, as bank
officials are restrained by law from taking over the possession of
any property which was already under a tenancy before the loan
was advanced. This court does not find any merit in this defence
raised by the respondents. The petitioner has proved on record that
a notice of possession has indeed been served upon by PNB
officials on the property out of which he runs his business as a
tenant. The concern of the petitioner that he does not wish to run
his business out of premises which is embroiled in litigation cannot
be undermined. The petitioner cannot be faulted with for wanting
to run his business out of the premises that he owns himself,
instead of premises which are subject-matter of litigation pending
between its owner and his creditor, and on the outer walls of which
premises, a possession notice has been affixed. Even otherwise, the
petitioner has stated that at present, the premises out of which he
runs his business, is under the joint tenancy of him and his brothers,
and since he owns the demised premises solely, it would be more
convenient for him to run his business out of the same solely and
without the interference of his brothers. Even this argument raised
by the petitioner appears to be reasonable, and it appears that the
petitioner has been able to disclose a bonafide need for seeking
vacant possession of the demised premises. The respondents have
been able to show the contrary.”

29. In proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B
of the DRC Act, the existence of a landlord–tenant relationship and
the landlord’s ownership of the premises to the extent recognised
under law are material considerations.
30. At the stage of consideration of an application for leave to
defend, the tenant is not required to establish the defence
conclusively; it is sufficient if the defence discloses a triable issue, as
explained in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra). However, a mere assertion,
unsupported by material, would not by itself warrant the grant of leave
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BHATIA
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to defend.
31. It is equally well settled that the landlord is not required to
establish an indefeasible title to the premises as would be necessary in
a suit for declaration of title. The requirement is to demonstrate a right
superior to that of the tenant. Where the tenant admits that the tenancy
originated under an erstwhile owner, a subsequent claim through such
owner cannot be displaced by a bald denial of the landlord’s title.
32. A perusal of the Impugned Order reveals that the learned ARC,
while considering the objection concerning the identity of the subject
premises, noted that the Petitioners claimed to be tenants in respect of
property bearing Municipal No. 178-179, whereas the Respondent had
described the premises as property bearing Municipal No. 179-181.
33. The learned ARC compared the respective site plans placed on
record and found them to be identical in all material respects. It was
further noted that both parties acknowledged that M/s Laxmi Bilas
Marwari Guest House was being run from the premises in question. It
was also observed that the documents relied upon by the Petitioners,
including certificates issued by the Fire Department, did not
conclusively establish a different municipal identity, particularly in
the absence of supporting documents such as utility bills.
34. The aforesaid finding has been returned upon consideration of
the pleadings and documents placed before the learned ARC. The
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the site plans were materially
misread or that any document having a direct bearing on the identity
of the subject premises was disregarded. The mere assertion of a
difference in municipal numbers, in the face of the material
considered by the learned ARC, does not establish an error warranting
interference in the present proceedings.
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BHATIA
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35. The Petitioners have also disputed the Respondent’s title and,
consequently, his entitlement to claim the status of landlord in respect
of the subject premises. In this regard, the learned ARC noted that the
Petitioners had admitted that their predecessor-in-interest had entered
the premises as a tenant under Mst. Fatima Begum. The Respondent,
in turn, relied upon a registered Sale Deed, stated to have been
executed in his favour by the legal heirs of Mst. Fatima Begum.
36. The learned ARC found that the Petitioners had not
substantiated their assertion that the persons executing the Sale Deed
were strangers to the property. It also noted that the Petitioners had
not produced documentary material in support of their contention that
property bearing Municipal No. 178 was owned by Mohd. Iqbal, or
that the Respondent’s chain of title was defective.
37. Therefore, the learned ARC proceeded on the footing that, for
the purposes of proceedings under the DRC Act, the landlord was not
required to establish absolute title in the manner required in a civil suit
for declaration of ownership, but was required to demonstrate a title
superior to that of the tenant.
38. Having regard to the admitted induction of the Petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest as a tenant under the erstwhile owner and the
Sale Deed relied upon by the Respondent, the learned ARC concluded
that the Petitioners had failed to raise a triable issue regarding the
Respondent’s status as landlord.
39. This Court is unable to discern any patent illegality or
perversity in the aforesaid reasoning. The question at this stage is not
whether the Respondent has conclusively established an indefeasible
title to the property against the world at large, but whether the material
relied upon by him, considered alongside the Petitioners’ own
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BHATIA
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admissions and objections, was sufficient for the limited purpose of
the eviction proceedings.
40. The Petitioners’ challenge to the Respondent’s title rests
substantially upon their assertions regarding the municipal identity of
the property, the alleged defect in the chain of title and the ownership
attributed to Mohd. Iqbal. These objections were considered by the
learned ARC, which found them unsupported by adequate material.
No specific error in the appreciation of the relevant documents, or any
material plea left unaddressed by the learned ARC, has been
demonstrated before this Court so as to warrant revisional
interference.
41. Further, the contention that the landlord-tenant relationship
ceased to exist upon service of the legal notice dated 30.09.2020 was
also considered and rejected by the learned ARC, observing that
termination of the contractual tenancy does not, by itself, convert a
tenant into an unauthorized occupant so as to defeat eviction
proceedings under the DRC Act.
42. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid reasoning
is consistent with the distinction between termination of a contractual
tenancy and the continuance of statutory protection under rent control
legislation. Accordingly, the mere fact that the Respondent had issued
a notice terminating the tenancy would not, by itself, negate the
relationship relevant to the maintainability of the eviction petition.
43. Viewed cumulatively, the findings recorded by the learned
ARC demonstrate that the objections concerning the identity of the
subject premises, the Respondent’s title and the existence of the
landlord-tenant relationship were considered and adjudicated upon.
44. The Petitioners have not shown that the findings are based on a
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BHATIA
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wholly unreasonable view of the material on record, suffer from an
error apparent on the face of the record, or disclose any material
irregularity in the decision-making process. Accordingly, the present
proceedings cannot be converted into an appeal for a fresh assessment
of the same material merely because the Petitioners seek a different
conclusion.
45. In these circumstances, and having regard to the limited scope
of scrutiny under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, this
Court finds no ground to interfere with the Impugned Order insofar as
it concerns the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship between
the parties and the challenge raised by the Petitioners, as confined
during the course of these proceedings, accordingly fails.

CONCLUSION:
46. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with the pending
application(s), if any, stands dismissed.
47. No order as to Costs.




HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 18, 2026/jk
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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